EUROPEAN SECURITY INTEGRATION IN THE 1990s

Ian Gambles
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PREFACE

As the third of its Chaillot Papers the Institute is pleased to publish this essay by Dr Ian Gambles on European security integration in the 1990s. In a period in which we are having to examine radical restructuring of security in Europe following the historic changes of the last two years, Dr Gambles' paper provides an important reflection on some of the conceptual underpinnings for security analysis in Europe. We invited Dr Gambles to begin work on this paper earlier this year and inevitably the changes which occurred in the Soviet Union this August have led to certain revisions being made. The paper, however, presents an analysis which will be useful for the continuing debate on the arrangements which we require. As in all the Chaillot Papers which we publish, the detail of the argument is of course the author's, but the Institute believes that this will be a valuable stimulus to debate in this field.

One of the most important achievements of developments in Western Europe in the postwar period has been the establishment of a `security community', as outlined by Dr Gambles. This has made war between West European states unthinkable, and it is indeed the challenge of the immediate future for such security arrangements to be extended to the remaining parts of Europe. This could then serve as a model for the world as a whole.

John Roper
Paris, November 1991
European security integration in the 1990s

Ian Gambles
INTRODUCTION: A NEW DEBATE

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the concept of European security integration. This is a complex and difficult concept, a nexus of different ideas rather than a coherent idea in its own right. Integration is the combination of diverse parts to make a whole, and international integration is the product of a process of convergence between the policies, procedures, institutions, commitments, and expectations of a number of different states and peoples. Security is a more contested idea, but may provisionally be understood as the protection of a people from external threats, and includes arrangements for defence and deterrence. Now while European integration generally refers to the development of European unity among the Twelve\(^{(1)}\) in the context of the Treaty of Rome, European security is generally considered within the context of the North Atlantic Treaty. The words 'integration' and 'security' have tended to be claimed by two distinct groups of students and practitioners. Thus the transition from the familiar debates in the field of European security, where integration meant no more than international cooperation, to a new debate in the context of the process of European political integration, involves the coming together of historically separate traditions of thought.

Intellectual clarity is absolutely vital in this complex situation, yet it is precisely in such grand questions of European politics that clarity can prove most elusive. There is a tendency for consensus on generalities to dissolve when it comes to specifics, a tendency which goes beyond the normal predilection of most politicians (indeed, most people) for pious words and grand intentions free of definite commitments and costs. This familiar phenomenon is compounded by a characteristically European tension between romanticism and pragmatism in the development of political programmes, a tension resolved more readily through skilled and subtle drafting than through substantive compromise; many European documents are a product of a manufactured consensus which subsists primarily at the level of language. Such ingenious adoption of common terms or formulae can be useful in mitigating the effects of irreconcilable doctrinal conflict, but it can also mask radically incompatible expectations of the practical political process they describe. The interpretation and implementation of an agreed principle, be it the principle of a single market, the principle of 'subsidiarity', the principle of political union, or the principle of security integration, cannot progress without a clear understanding of its relationship to political practice.\(^{(2)}\) The concept of European security integration is diffuse, embracing everything from an EC Troika mission to Yugoslavia to a NATO integrated air defence system, and the objective here is to advance the new debate by contributing an analytical framework for understanding the concept.

This analysis begins with a short history of the idea of European security cooperation, illustrating the point of departure for the new debate. It then turns to European security integration, beginning with an examination of its goals, noting the very substantial differences of opinion which exist regarding the meaning of security and the purpose of integration and attempting to define some common objectives by making use of Karl Deutsch's concept of a 'security-community'. Turning next to the special problems of membership and participation, it examines the complex institutional configuration of European security, lays out a model of the present situation, and puts forward criteria by which future developments might be managed.
to advance the goals of European security integration. The longest section of the paper considers the modalities of security integration, examining how security policy is currently integrated at a European level, whether in the EC, in WEU, in NATO, or not at all, and assesses the prospects for further integration. The paper ends with brief summary of conclusions.
A SHORT HISTORY OF AN IDEA

The most ardent proponent of European security integration could not claim that it is an entirely new idea. Whatever interpretation of the concept is preferred, it has clearly developed out of a long tradition of advocacy of European cooperation and self-reliance in security matters, including a spectrum of general ideas and specific proposals for a European defence entity, European security identity, European pillar, European Defence Community, or European Security Organization. These ideas are tired, worn out and in large measure discredited by too frequent repetition and too little action. Indeed so much vague, unrealistic, and even hypocritical rhetoric has surrounded this mirage for so many years that the prospect of a 'new debate' induces both scepticism and despondency. Yet there is a new debate in the 1990s, and a brief survey of the history of the general idea of European cooperation and self-reliance in security shows how a familiar issue has resurfaced in a new context, how established perspectives have been changed by the current political transformation in Europe. Consider the following short analysis of the development of this idea. (3)

From 1945 to 1954, the debate was about transcending sovereign independence in national security, which had failed to contain Germany in the past and held little prospect of containing Germany or the Soviet Union in the future, and urgently establishing new and durable international or supranational security structures. The signing of the Brussels Treaty in 1948, although not involving any supranational organization, bound Germany's West European conquerors together in a military alliance of unprecedented duration and automaticity. (4) Meanwhile the ideas of Jean Monnet and others, which drove forward the development of European institutions among the Six (5) in the economic domain, were taken up in the security sphere with the signing of the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty in 1952. Had this been implemented, it would have created a European army integrated at division level with a common uniform, a unified command structure, a unified armaments production and procurement system, and a mix of supranational and intergovernmental authorities mirroring the European Coal and Steel Community. (6)

From 1954 to 1962, after the failure of the French Assemblée Nationale to ratify the EDC treaty, and the subsequent signing of the Paris Agreements admitting West Germany to NATO, the idea of European cooperation and self-reliance in security was to all intents and purposes dormant. Although the practicalities of military integration proceeded apace within NATO as national governments and defence establishments became accustomed to shared responsibility for defence planning and intimate cooperation in the field, the leadership of the United States under Eisenhower was taken for granted on all sides, and the idea of European self-reliance had little resonance.

From 1962 to 1968, the US campaigned to transform the Atlantic Alliance, in its own interests, into a more equal partnership, coining the now hackneyed metaphor of the European pillar. The purpose of European cooperation in the American conception of this period was to ease the problems of extending deterrence. A larger European conventional effort in NATO and a stronger European economic performance through the EEC promised to strengthen the West as a whole, increasing the effectiveness of deterrence below the nuclear threshold, while nuclear cooperation through the
(abortive) Multilateral Force and its substitute, the Nuclear Planning Group, would
help reassure the Europeans and discourage nuclear proliferation and national
deterrents. Although much of this conception, thanks primarily to French and
British opposition, was still-born, the images of pillar and partnership proved more
lasting.

From 1968 to 1978, after the Harmel Report had piloted the Alliance on to a new and
unanimous course of deterrence and détente, European cooperation and self-reliance
in security were seen from two different angles: as an instrument of burden-sharing,
and as a way of building up the European voice in NATO affairs. From the American
point of view, Europe's rising GNP total and their own economic difficulties,
epitomized in the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system, made their interest
predominantly budgetary. From the European point of view, the dwindling of
American power and reputation after Vietnam and the crisis of American leadership
from Watergate to the Carter presidency made their interest predominantly political.
In each case, a more even balance within the Alliance was the aim.

From 1978 to 1987, a series of transatlantic clashes over security, beginning under
President Carter with bitter arguments over the neutron bomb and over sanctions
against the USSR after the invasion of Afghanistan, and continuing with barely a
breathing space throughout the Reagan presidency, shifted the emphasis of the debate
to the articulation of distinct European interests in the security sphere. The terrible
trauma over both the installation and the removal of cruise and Pershing missiles, the
deep European-American divergence of views over the so-called 'new Cold War', the
shock of the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the radical proposals for nuclear
disarmament discussed at the Reykjavik summit all convinced Europeans across the
political spectrum that there were indeed separate continental interests. The
revitalization of the Western European Union as a forum for the discussion of
European security interests without the presence of the United States was a major
governmental initiative which expressed that common concern.

Now the picture has changed again. With the advent of the Bush presidency, a clearer
orientation towards Europe, a more mature diplomacy, and a more consensual
approach on the part of the US have reduced transatlantic discord to perhaps its lowest
level for thirty years. Meanwhile, the post-war order in Europe has unravelled with
extraordinary speed. The conclusion of the CFE Treaty after Soviet acceptance of the
principle of asymmetrical arms reductions, and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact
after the 1989 revolutions have suddenly all but eliminated the military threat to
Western Europe from the Soviet Union, at least on the former Central Front. The
unification of Germany, with a minimum of international fuss, and the continuing
withdrawal of the majority of US and Soviet forces from Europe have created a
situation of complete novelty and considerable bewilderment. Moreover, the process
of European political and economic integration continues to gather momentum, with
the success of the Single European Act and the new agenda of monetary and political
union, raising the prospect of a European Community both deeper and wider than
previously anticipated.

This complex of factors has sharply altered the thrust of the debate in two ways.
Firstly, it has increased the importance of 'Europeanist' considerations at the expense
of 'Atlanticist' considerations. Old phrases such as 'the European pillar' or 'the new
transatlantic bargain', which have dominated European security cooperation for thirty years, no longer capture the essence of the debate. Although European governments are still keen to keep some American troops in Europe, to retain the US nuclear guarantee, and to uphold the North Atlantic Treaty, these concerns have lost much of their former impact. So long as bipolarity prevailed in Europe, and the Soviet Union posed an immediate threat to which only the US held an adequate response, the politics of West European security were inevitably dominated by the politics of the transatlantic relationship. In the new circumstances, the leitmotif of the new debate is now Europeanization.

The countries of Eastern Europe - Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland in the first instance, but ranks of states and would-be states behind them - want to break with their rejected communist past and insure their uncertain liberal-democratic future by acquiring a new European identity, taking their place in the successful integrative experiment of the European Community and in a new European security order. The countries of Western Europe are all concerned that the end of bipolarity should not bring about a return to the hazardous pursuit of national security through balance of power politics, and many see in the relaxation of the 'superpower squeeze' both an opportunity and a necessity for a qualitative leap to a more integrated, federated Europe. Perhaps most importantly, the unification of Germany has given rise to an undecurrent of anxiety, both in Germany and among its neighbours, over its future role in Europe and the world as a restored Great Power, and irreversible German involvement in an integrated European security system is the only solution likely to command a national and international consensus.

Secondly, the new political situation has broadened the debate, contributing to the conceptual ambiguity which this paper seeks to address. The whole framework of European security is at issue, not merely the balance of the Alliance. Is the Alliance still necessary to European security? To what extent is security still a military matter? The Cold War was a unique type of war, but a war none the less, and as it comes to an end the call for general reconstruction so characteristic of the ends of wars is heard more and more loudly. As after the First World War, there is much talk of a pan-European system of common security, a transcendence of alliances through the evolution of CSCE into a self-sustaining community of states, a 'common European home'. As after the Second World War, there is much talk of a supranational structure of European security, a transcendence of national and international defence through the eventual evolution of the EC into an armed federation. The Europeanist impetus to cooperation and self-reliance, therefore, is not focused narrowly on defence integration within the Alliance, but more broadly on the re-examination of security in all its aspects right across the continent and beyond.

Thus by seeing the new debate on European security integration in the light of history, it becomes clear how open and extensive this debate is, and how great is the task of clarification and interpretation.
GOALS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY INTEGRATION

The starting-point of this analysis of European security integration is its goals. Later sections will deal with the problems of participation - who is European, and in what context; and of implementation - how is integration pursued, and through which institutions? In this section the question at hand is this: what is European security integration for? What is its purpose? There are, it is suggested, three goals of European security integration:

(i) the preservation and extension of the European security-community (defined below),

(ii) the more effective and efficient protection and promotion of the vital national interests of European states in international relations, and

(iii) the construction of a federal Europe.

These will be discussed in order.

The most widely-shared objective of European security integration is the preservation and extension of the European security-community. What does this mean? The concept of a security-community, first developed in the 1950s by Karl Deutsch, refers not to an institutionalized community of states, but simply to a region in which war is no longer contemplated as a possible way of resolving inter-state disputes, a community ‘in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’. A variety of factors may contribute to the emergence and maintenance of a security-community, including the consolidation of liberal democracy as the sole form of government in the region, creating a Kantian ‘pacific union' of liberal republics, the development of complex networks of political and economic cooperation and interdependence among states in the region, and the entrenchment among publics and decision-makers of a well-founded fear of general war. All these factors have played a major role in creating a security-community based in Western Europe whose solidity and depth is in historical perspective quite remarkable. It is an immense achievement that war between such long-standing adversaries as France and Germany or Italy and Austria is now inconceivable. But of course it is unwise to be complacent - historical change can be rapid and unpredictable, and the inevitable rise to power of generations for whom European war is textbook history rather than family memory poses a challenge to contemporary policy-makers to use all available means to guarantee the future of the European security-community.

Among these means is security integration. Any danger of a reversion after the Second World War to the pattern of territorial rivalry, nationalist animus, and an uncertain military balance which had followed the previous war was forestalled by the rise of the Soviet threat. NATO provided a vehicle through which West European states, including the western part of Germany, could act jointly to defend themselves against the political and military threat from the East, their democratic will and their
military cohesion shielded from the temptation of appeasement and dissension by the nuclear arm of the United States. The consolidation of the European security-community was made possible in part by forty years in which West European states had little choice but to set aside their differences and cooperate in a joint approach to security backed by a collective defence system under the leadership of the US. The security-community matured under the aegis of what Josef Joffe, in a seminal article on the subject, labelled 'Europe's American pacifier'.

Are the Americans still needed in this role? Is NATO still needed? Who exactly is a part of this security-community? These questions are postponed until later sections. What seems certain is that no responsible European statesman or critic wishes to see the achievements of the last forty years jeopardized by the current political transformation. Neither Britain nor France nor Germany nor any other European state now wishes to resume full independence in security matters; the armed forces they retain after the current round of cuts must be and surely will be deployed in accordance with closely interdependent security policies. Moreover, one of the principal concerns of the security debate both within NATO and within the European Community is to reconcile the common determination to preserve the existing security-community with the aspiration to expand it geographically, to bring more and more countries into the structures and habits of political, economic, and military integration which characterize and support the zone of peace.

Secondly, it is a goal of European security integration to protect and promote the vital national interests of European nations more effectively and efficiently in international relations. This is a more controversial objective, because it implies a particular understanding of the concept of security which has been challenged both in academic and in public debate recently. Both liberal and conservative thinkers have over-reacted to the outbreak of East-West peace by seeking to enlarge the scope of security to include interests ranging from individual emancipation to environmental protection, and threats from inner-city riots to narcotics traffic. Such thinking could be pressed into the service of either a new militarism, redoubling the power of the state in the face of these new enemies of security, or a new programme of world government, rejecting the idea that security can be achieved by any one state or group of states vis-à-vis another. It does not, however, serve intellectual clarity in a still largely anarchical international society where force and coercion are still routinely employed. States must and do make provision to secure their vital interests against other states, for the security-community prevailing in Europe is the exception and not the rule. This goal of European security integration also sits uneasily with some sections of public opinion, particularly in Germany and in some of the smaller European countries, which either oppose all use of force, in defence or in deterrence, or regard the security of the state as indivisible from the security of the world community as a whole as represented by the United Nations.

Evidently considerable thought needs to be given to how this fundamental goal of security policy, to protect the national interest, can now be served by security integration. Western success in the Cold War has had a disorientating effect, and it is no longer possible for a reasonable degree of consensus to be achieved among the European powers, as it has been for over twenty years, by recycling the basic precepts of the Harmel Report. Harmel's work is finished; even if deterrence is still an important concept, détente belongs to the old world of bloc politics, and the myth of
German unification, which Harmel held up as its goal, has suddenly become reality. A more up-to-date formulation is needed to sustain the case for security integration, and the argument put forward here is that it protects and promotes the vital interests of European states by:

- providing military insurance,

- making defence affordable, and

- buttressing foreign policy.

The end of bloc rivalry in Europe is of course extremely welcome, and brings with it a sharp reduction in the need to maintain heavily-armed and numerous forces at a high state of readiness to defend Western Europe. No one could argue, however, especially in 1991, the year of the Gulf War, the violent upheaval in Yugoslavia, and the attempted coup in Moscow, that the appearance of unexpected threats to European security of a military character can be ruled out. European states alone are in many cases very small and potentially vulnerable, unable to maintain forces sufficient to deal with a major threatening military contingency of any kind. European states acting together, however, can feel much more confident of their ability to maintain security against any plausible threat, whether from turbulence in Soviet politics, nationalist or irredentist conflict in Eastern Europe, or non-European aggressors. Security integration, in security policy and in force structures, allows the provision of collective insurance for the security of European states in an uncertain international environment. (14)

Insurance is never free, and the armed forces necessary to underwrite the insurance of security in this sense have to be paid for by European taxpayers. Integration saves money, and makes security affordable. European defence budgets have been under constant pressure since the Second World War, partly because in most cases they have stood at historically unprecedented peacetime levels, partly because society's expectations of the state have risen so sharply that the margin for manoeuvre in public expenditure is smaller than ever, and partly because of strong public pacifist and anti-nuclear sentiment. Yet the arms racing and shadow combat of the Cold War increased the importance of well-paid professional personnel and high-technology equipment, making the levels of manpower and readiness in the European theatre ever less financially sustainable. The political requirement for a 'peace dividend' at the end of the Cold War has at last made drastic reductions in armed forces unavoidable.

In various ways, and to an extent which is not yet clear, Europe's defence ministries look to integration to provide better value for their shrinking budgets. Most obviously, competitive procurement of standardized or at least interoperable equipment produced for export as well as for the national market can help contain escalating unit costs and improve efficiency. Force integration, in which national brigades or divisions are combined into multinational divisions or corps, can preserve realistic fighting units in the face of severe manpower cuts. Task specialization, in which national armed forces concentrate their training and procurement on only part of the range of military capabilities required for modern warfare, agreeing to depend in a conflict on the availability of their allies' complementary capabilities, has obvious economic advantages, and of course requires thoroughly integrated security policies.
Security integration can also buttress foreign policy. Power in international politics is a function of a range of attributes of the state, including not only its own military and economic power but also the extent to which it is visibly able to rely for political and ultimately military support on a powerful group of allies. Foreign policy and security policy are closely related, and although the UK and France retain the international status associated with nuclear capability, and some limited intervention forces, no European country now has the independence in security policy necessary to back up a national foreign policy in the way that the United States can. Consequently the protection and promotion of Europeans' overseas political and economic interests, including the enforcement of principles of international conduct and the consolidation of geopolitical order, is a foreign policy goal for which European security integration is now essential. As the European Community's experience in the Gulf War showed, world respect for Europe as a power in its own right is fatally undermined by its known inability to muster either the will to determine a common security policy or the capability to carry out a common military effort. But even if foreign policy is conceived as a purely national matter, security integration is still necessary to buttress foreign policy. The diplomatic efforts of the UK in the Falklands crisis, for example, or of West Germany in the pursuit of *ostpolitik*, were immeasurably strengthened by the political solidarity, enhanced international standing, and reduced risk provided by a security alliance.

It is one of the three main objectives of European security integration, then, to protect and promote the vital interests of European states in international relations, by providing military insurance, making defence affordable, and buttressing foreign policy.

Thirdly, and most controversially, it is a goal of European security integration to advance the construction of a federal Europe. In this sense, European security integration is an end in itself, a vital element of a project of European unity which has for some become the unshakeable political commitment by which all political programmes and decisions must now be guided. European integration is not merely a means to utilitarian ends such as security or prosperity, but a cause, a form of ideology. To analyse European integration exclusively in terms of bargaining among utility-maximizing states or individuals, European integration as a cooperative solution to nation-state problems, or as a forerunner of a 'post-historical' global system, is to misunderstand this political commitment and miss the character of the European movement. European integrationism is, in part at least, nationalism *à la mode*, a romantic quest for a European political and cultural identity larger, fresher, and more forward-looking than that offered by the European nation-states, whose post-war governance has been for the most part barren of any aspirational quality. Identity, as students of nationalism have repeatedly emphasized in the context of nineteenth century European and twentieth century post-colonial history, is as much created as given, and the leaders of the European movement are well aware that practical integrative measures must precede, not follow, the emergence of a genuinely and widely felt European identity. Security integration promises not only to strip the states of one of the most important means of asserting separate, sovereign identities on the international stage, but also to bestow on the emergent European entity the advantages of powerful identity-forming devices such as martial symbols, military *esprit de corps*, and shared exposure to casualty and risk.
It is in this respect that common goals for security integration are hardest to find, and it is an important aspect of the new debate on European security integration, with its focus on Europeanization rather than on transatlantic balance, that these intangible but deeply-felt values are now of real consequence. For many, the overall, long-term direction of European integration is towards supranational union. A supranational union must have the full range of attributes associated with a state, and a commitment to the European idea therefore must include a commitment to an integrated security policy and an integrated military arm, even if no progress whatsoever is possible in the short term. This teleological approach to European integration is alien to the pragmatic temper of British (and perhaps Scandinavian and American) thought, and may prove to be the source of even more trouble in the security sphere than it is currently in the economic and political spheres.

This concludes the examination of the goals of European security integration. Even though it would not be possible to obtain a consensus on this, or any other formulation of them, it is immediately apparent how different, and how much more wide-ranging these goals are than those of European security cooperation during the Cold War.
CONFIGURATIONS: WHO IS EUROPEAN?

Who is European? Who are the parties to European security integration? The answer to these crucial questions is by no means self-evident. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) may reasonably be considered all-inclusive, in that no people not represented there in one way or another could make a plausible case for being European. CSCE, however, cannot be the exclusive, or even the predominant locus of European security integration. There are too many unsettled scores and the habit of peace is too weak among the member-states of CSCE for a security-community (in the Deutschian sense discussed above) to be maintained among them now or for the foreseeable future. Still less can the diverse interests of CSCE states (and peoples) be sufficiently reconciled to allow for their joint protection and promotion. Least of all can CSCE carry the torch for European unity.

Yet while CSCE cannot be the primary forum for security integration, all its members have legitimate interests in European security, and no smaller, more homogeneous and exclusive grouping dare embark on a process of security integration without carefully considering the need to involve other European or semi-European actors. Consequently, European security integration tends to proceed in a plurality of fora, groups of overlapping membership developing different facets of integration in pursuit of distinct but complementary goals.

This variety of groupings is usually described as the architecture or variable geometry of European security. Now while it is unwise to attach too much importance to terminology, these terms have not perhaps encouraged a clear view of the situation. The concept of architecture is too purposive; it implies the existence of, if not an architect, at least a design, blueprint, or plan for the execution of an agreed project of construction. The concept of variable geometry, a rather pretentious phrase adopted to bestow some social-scientific legitimacy on the often essentially arbitrary rise and fall of European institutions, seems similarly to imply the existence of a sort of Euclidian logic in the pattern. A more neutral term would be helpful, a term which acknowledges the complexity of European security, the plethora of institutions with different memberships and the web of bilateral and multilateral relationships among the various states, without attributing to it any particular logic or virtue. This paper will refer to the configuration of European security.

The present configuration is unstable and in some danger of partial collapse. The previous Cold War configuration was economical to a fault, consisting essentially of two mutually exclusive organizations, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, each designed primarily to achieve security against the other. But the end of this potentially lethal system of rival blocs has led to structural chaos. Major roles in security are now claimed by the CSCE (34 members), NATO (16), the EC (12), and the WEU (9), and there are additional voices from the Visegrad Group (3), the south-eastern Hexagonale (6), and incipient security clusters in the Baltic, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean.

This mess is not quite so hopeless as might at first sight appear, however, because, after an initial wave of over-optimism about CSCE, it is now clear to everyone who is at the centre and who is at the periphery. At the centre are the Nine (17), not because
they are in the still relatively insignificant WEU, but because they form the core of both NATO and the EC, the only two institutions concerned with European security enjoying substantial histories, major bureaucracies, massive budgets, and a deep level of commitment from all their members. Arrayed around this core, and exerting huge pressures on any consensus within it through their own anxieties and interests, are five peripheral groups. Many of the most serious obstacles to security integration in Europe result from the complexities of this centre-periphery configuration.

First, there are the non-EC NATO states - the US, Canada, Turkey, Norway, and Iceland. Of these, Iceland and Canada play only a small role, while Norway is showing increasing signs of reconsidering its negative attitude to EC membership, which would automatically add it to the core. The US and Turkey are both of great importance to European security, and their ambiguous relationship to the core makes it difficult to develop European security integration either within NATO (because they are not part of the Community) or within the Community (because it would exclude these two major allies).

Second, there are the non-WEU EC states - Greece, Denmark, and Ireland. These states have severely hampered progress in European security integration within the EC, Ireland because of its neutrality, Denmark because of its equivocal attitude towards defence in general and defence in the Community in particular, Greece because of other states' reluctance to constitute an anti-Turkish alliance by default.

Third, there are the non-EC neutrals - Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, and Austria. As the meaning of neutrality after the Cold War is brought into question, these states are reconsidering their position on integration, and may all have applied to the EC within the decade; they cannot any longer simply be left on one side in structuring a security configuration. Neutrality and integration are discussed at length in the last section.

Fourth, there are the Central and East Europeans - Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia (whole or in pieces), and Albania. The wearing off of revolutionary euphoria has left Eastern Europe in the chill of what President Havel and others have called a 'security vacuum', and they are all to varying degrees anxious to attach themselves somehow to the centre.

Finally, there is the Soviet Union. The greatest loser by far of the European shake-out that is of its own making, the Soviet Union is rapidly disintegrating into its constituent European, semi-European, and non-European republics, and the process is likely to cloud the picture of European integration, and create security concerns, for some time to come. Even without the overarching threat, European security integration is still profoundly influenced by events within the USSR.

The existing configuration of European security, then, is a core of nine - the WEU states - surrounded by five peripheral groups: non-EC NATO, non-WEU EC, non-EC neutrals, Central and East Europeans, and the Soviet Republics. This complex configuration does not make security integration easy. Who is to be included and who excluded? How can any institution make significant progress in an integrative project without running up against obstructivism from within or objections from without? Having laid out a model of the existing configuration, this section pursues the question further by defining parameters within which the future evolution of the
configuration might be managed. First, criteria are set out for establishing a *rational* configuration, by which is meant a configuration which supports rather than undermines the goals of security integration; secondly, criteria are set out for establishing a *justifiable* configuration, by which is meant a configuration in which the inclusion or exclusion of any given state can be publicly defended on plausible and reasonable grounds. These two sets of criteria together indicate the outline of a rational, justifiable configuration of European security.

A *rational* configuration, then, one guided by the goals of European security integration, should conform to the following principles:

(i) **Transparency.** If the existing European security-community is not to be undermined, then integrative processes in security involving some states in the security-community but not others must be transparent and conspicuously unthreatening to all those excluded. As the security-community includes not only the core, but also all the states in the first three peripheral groups listed above with the possible exception of Greece and Turkey, it is vital that security integration in any European institution, be it in WEU, in the EC, or in NATO, should always be transparent to the whole security-community.

(ii) **Openness.** If the goal of European security integration is not to restrict but to expand the European security-community, then a closed configuration cannot be rational. All institutions involved in security matters should be open in principle, and public justifications of the kind discussed below should be offered for any restrictions on membership. There may be good reasons for excluding a state either temporarily or permanently from a particular institution, but no state in the CSCE area should be set altogether beyond the pale of European security.

(iii) **Internal stability.** If the configuration of institutions and alliances in Europe is to be kept definitively free from 'Sarajevo syndrome', the danger of a sudden unravelling or explosion under pressure, then it must be internally stable. In those regions where armed conflict among European peoples cannot be ruled out, it may or may not ultimately be in the interest of other European states to intervene, but it is surely not in the interests of European security for a chain-reaction of intervention to be predetermined. In particular, no state should become party to the peremptory Brussels Treaty unless it can confidently be considered at lasting peace with every other state party.

(iv) **Flexibility.** It scarcely needs repeating that the predictability of challenges to European security has been completely lost over the last five years. Preparing for the single contingency of Soviet aggression required considerable flexibility in the available military responses; preparing for a variety of unforeseeable contingencies requires not only equal or greater military flexibility (if less military power), but much greater political flexibility. Differing national responses may be expected in the face of different types and sources of threat, and the worst configuration would be one which left the Europeans hamstrung in a crisis or riven with recriminations after it. What is needed, as François Heisbourg has commented, is an organizational array 'from which decision-makers will want to choose as a function of specific circumstances. Flexibility is required, not rigidity, in the face of the largely *sui generis* crises of the new era'.(20)
(v) **Non-redundancy.** If it is a goal of European security integration to economize on defence spending, then the configuration cannot be one that leads to increased costs. The proliferation of secretariats should be kept to a minimum, the proliferation of command structures discouraged, and the duplication of military resources avoided altogether.

(vi) **Compatibility with European construction.** The creation of a federal Europe is a goal shared by some, but not others, and this unresolved issue lies at the heart of the debate about a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for Europe, not including the US. However, given the obvious level of commitment to such integration in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on European Political Union (EPU), and the fact that all the WEU states have declared themselves `convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence', a configuration which made the future implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy impossible would not be rational. Security integration and political integration should not be radically separated.

Turning, then, to the task of establishing criteria for a justifiable configuration, and starting from the assumption that all peoples in the CSCE area have a provisional claim to inclusion in institutions involved in security integration, the legitimate bases for discrimination are as follows:

(i) **Geography.** No exact geographical definition of Europe may command universal assent, but nor is the question a hopeless one. Europe is approximately bounded by Iceland and the northern end of the Ural Mountains in the north, and by Gibraltar and the Bosporus in the south. Although geography alone is rarely a sufficient basis for discrimination, it is important in that the European status of the US, Canada, Turkey, the USSR as a union, and Russia as a republic can never be unqualified.

(ii) **History and culture.** The global diffusion of European culture makes this an even more slippery basis for discrimination, but it is certainly an important factor in the politics of European integration. History and culture operate as a critical modifier of the criterion of geography, for while Turkey remains excluded on these grounds, the US and Canada share unequivocally in the European tradition and way of life, while the Soviet Union, and Russia within it, again sit uneasily astride the fence.

(iii) **Political values.** Liberal democracy is no longer merely the nominally preferred political system in Europe, for it has spread in practice, to one degree or another of integrity and effectiveness, to every state in the CSCE. Clearly any state which could not reasonably claim to uphold liberal and democratic values could not be accepted into any integrative process, and serious doubts about internal political stability would also be a reason for exclusion. Despite extraordinary and accelerating changes in the disintegrating Soviet Union, for example, no liberal democratic state would wish to enter integrated organizations with any of the Republics until their political, social, and economic structures have stabilized into a Western pattern. While it would be undesirable for political experimentation in Europe to be cramped by interventionism, a sort of latter-day Holy Alliance imposing political and economic uniformity on free and sovereign peoples, it would be worse for an integrated security structure based on homogeneity or contiguity of values to be destabilized by a maverick within. The
question of values is a particularly important one, in that there is little or no basis for distinguishing the political values of Western Europe from those of North America - common values formed and still form the basis of the Atlantic Alliance.\textsuperscript{(22)}

(iv) **Political choice.** Whatever the logical configuration of actors might be from all other points of view, there is of course no value in hypothesizing structures contrary to the express and lasting will of any intended participant. Thus neither Britain nor perhaps France would for the foreseeable future be interested in integration to the extent of the original European Defence Community, while neutral countries may have even deeper reservations. Another aspect of political choice is a willingness to contribute. Neither economic prosperity nor a particular type of economy should be necessary conditions for inclusion in a security structure, a point which has considerable bearing on the Community's ambitions. But clearly a state which chooses to participate in security arrangements must be prepared to pay its share of the burden. Free riders can justifiably be excluded from security integration.

Over and above these criteria, arguments for the inclusion or exclusion of actors in regard to particular security configurations can justifiably be examined in the light of *realpolitik*. Configurations must be stable and conducive to the security of all, so the balance of power must always be considered. This is a far-reaching caveat, but applies most obviously at the present time in ruling out, say, Polish membership of NATO without Russian consent, and in making German involvement in West European security structures essential.

This completes the exercise of defining the parameters within which movement away from the present unstable post-Cold War security configuration should proceed. The central idea, as has been explained, is that structural changes should be governed by rational principles derived from the goals of European security integration, and that changes in the membership and participation of individual actors in the evolving security configuration should be defended with reference to justifiable grounds for differential treatment. In this way, there will be at least a chance of generating a viable and preferable alternative to the ruined Cold War configuration, in which progress towards the objectives of European security integration may be possible.
MODALITIES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY INTEGRATION

Having discussed the goals of security integration and their implications for the configuration of European security, we must now turn to questions of implementation. The modalities of integration are essentially threefold. International integration by treaty brings states together by a specific act, a decision to yield up some part of sovereign right to create a collective enterprise. International functional integration brings states together over time by the gradual extension of inter-state cooperation, through conscious decision or spillover, from one issue-area to another.\(^{(23)}\) International integration through integration of the executive, extensively studied by Ernst Haas under the rubric of 'neofunctional' integration, brings states together over time by creating a transnational elite committed or habituated to common norms of governance.\(^{(24)}\)

It is readily apparent, then, that integration is not a question which can be considered on a blank slate. Even that most radical of integrative projects, the constitution of the United States of America, needed a foundation of common beliefs and practices and an opportunity created by success in a common task. Thus it would be quite futile to deduce from the preceding section a particular configuration of European security which in theory would best serve the objectives of European security integration. Treaties are already signed, habits of inter-state cooperation are already established, supranational and supranationally-minded executives are already in place. In this section, an examination is made of the present state and future prospects of security integration in the three principal institutions committed to it - the EC, WEU, and NATO - and it concludes with a brief look at the extent of non-integration, the persistence of full sovereignty in security matters.

The European Community

The failure of the European Defence Community in 1954 had a considerable long-term impact on the process of European integration within the European Community. The original concept of the EC was strongly influenced by security considerations - coal and steel were chosen as the first subject for integration because of their importance in sustaining a national war effort - but this major reverse set security firmly at the bottom of the agenda of European integration, where it has remained until now. Even the Single European Act, in other respects a major step towards further integration, remained exceptionally cautious in this matter, recording only the parties' readiness 'to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security'.\(^{(25)}\) But the ambitions of the Community have grown apace since 1987, and security integration is now an important issue in discussions of its future development. Crucial decisions will be taken in the next few years regarding both the deepening and widening of the Community, determining its role in security integration for at least a generation.

The current programme of approfondissement (deepening) in the Community is meeting more obstacles in the security sphere than in any other. The outcomes of the two IGCs remain uncertain, but it seems likely that considerable steps will be taken
towards European Monetary Union, towards a power of co-decision for the European Parliament, and towards common policies on matters such as immigration and the environment. A Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), however, in the full Community sense of a common policy as single, centrally determined, and binding, seems very unlikely to be agreed in the near future.

The Community's difficulty is twofold. Firstly, it lacks any institutional experience in security integration to give credibility to its aspirations. The Commission has made little progress in its long-running battle to rid itself of Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome or its effects, and extend European competitions policy into the armaments market, partly because member states remain too attached to the idea of *juste retour*, but also because regulating an industry so deeply interdependent with national defence planning requires a level of military expertise which the Commission does not have. Similarly, the administration of COCOM regulations on the export of sensitive technology will not come under the Community's aegis until it is capable of effective enforcement in a field where the collective fence is only as high as the lowest national section. (26) This lack of expertise is not irremediable, and Jacques Delors in particular has tried to lay the basis for a bigger role in the future, recruiting personnel with security expertise to the Commission and opening a dialogue with NATO on questions such as the armaments market.

More decisively, too many member states prefer to handle security as an intergovernmental matter. The current dispute at the IGC between those who see Europe as a temple and those who see it as a tree, much like an argument at a seventh century synod over the date of Easter, is virtually impenetrable but profoundly important. In a 'tree', the European CFSP as it developed would fall within the Community as such, ultimately leaving sole power of initiative in security matters to the European Commission, power of veto to the European Parliament, and powers of oversight to the European Court of Justice. In a 'temple', the CFSP would fall within the framework of European Political Union (EPU) but outside the Community stricto sensu; general principles laid down by the European Council would be implemented by ministers acting through European Political Cooperation and through the Western European Union. The United Kingdom and France both prefer the temple to the tree, at least in security matters, and security integration thus seems certain to remain for the foreseeable future an intergovernmental matter in the framework of EPU.

EPU has the potential to make a considerable contribution to security integration, provided it restricts its ambitions to certain aspects of security. The recent qualified success of the Troika mission to Slovenia and the unexpected use of the Community flag in a civilian observer function was a considerable coup for the European Community, but its path was made much smoother because the mission was for peacekeeping purposes with the imprimatur of the CSCE, which also gained unexpected prestige from its actions in a crisis. EPU can do more of this, just as it can make a major contribution by strengthening European coordination in areas where the Twelve ought to be united, but in fact are often not, namely international economic policy, including aid and sanctions, joint action in international organizations and conferences, and political solidarity in a crisis. (27) If security integration in EPU can contribute to the management, containment, and avoidance of threats by a concerted political and economic effort, it will have been a striking success, and the actual
deterrence and confrontation of threats will be an easier task for other types of security integration in other fora.

If security integration is handled in EPU rather than in the Community stricto sensu, and if it is confined to these non-military aspects of security, major problems associated with élargissement may be averted. The intergovernmental approach will facilitate the association of Central and East European countries with European security integration without obliging the West Europeans to make the economic sacrifices involved in admitting them as full members of the Community. Even more importantly, the exclusion of military aspects of security will allow neutral states to play a full part in European construction without abandoning neutrality.

The fate of the concept of neutrality after the Cold War is, admittedly, uncertain. It is not impossible that it may fall gradually into disuse, as involvement in European security structures ceases to betoken alignment with one or another superpower and becomes more an acknowledgment of regional identity and interdependence within the framework of international law. Such a development, however, will probably have to await the rise of a new, post-Cold War political generation, and the expectation seems in any event to be predicated on the pacification of international society. In the more likely eventuality of continuing but more unpredictable conflict in international society, the ancient idea of neutrality may be expected to evolve rather than decay, drifting from non-alignment to independence as each neutral state interprets its neutrality in a more idiosyncratic, selective, and unpredictable way.

Each case is different. Ireland, of course, is an existing Community member, but it is small and strategically inconsequential, and its neutrality is more a statement of non-subordination to its British neighbour and erstwhile overlord than a refusal to engage in any form of collective security system. Sweden, which applied for Community membership in July 1991, seems certain to be admitted, perhaps as early as 1 January 1995. As the most heavily armed neutral state, and because of its key role in the Nordic area, the evolution of neutrality in Sweden is of particular importance and may define the limits of EPU’s reach. Sweden has made it clear that it accepts the long-term goals of the Community and its acquis, that it is willing to join in foreign policy coordination - even in majority voting where required - on issues such as peacekeeping, armaments cooperation, arms control, non-proliferation, and sanctions, but that ‘Sweden cannot take part in a common defence policy or a mutual defence commitment within the EC framework, without foregoing its policy of neutrality’. Austria, which applied in 1989 and may hope to be admitted at the same time as Sweden, has already demonstrated its willingness to participate actively in security integration by working with Community members to activate the CSCE in the Slovenian crisis. Yet its limits may be similar to Sweden's, if for quite different reasons. Austria's Federal Constitutional Law of 26 October 1955, freely promulgated but internationally accepted in the context of negotiations for the Austrian State Treaty, declares that ‘Austria will never in the future accede to any military alliance’. ‘Playing around with this status of neutrality', argues a former Austrian foreign minister, 'would inevitably revive international discussion of Austria's independence. It is not necessary to stress that there could hardly be a more unfavourable time for such a discussion than the very moment the unification of Germany is completed'. Finland and Switzerland will probably apply later in the decade, and will probably be accepted. In both cases neutrality is being reassessed, as
Finland explores a new international liberty from its former *de facto* obligations to the Soviet Union, and Switzerland reconsiders the benefits of collective action in the light of the newfound vigour of the UN and the CSCE. ‘On ne peut pas non plus exclure’, according to a recent Swiss Federal Council paper, ‘qu'il y ait lieu à long terme d'envisager notre adhésion à un système collectif de sécurité englobant l'Europe entière.’

The European Community in the 1990s is a dynamic organization, and the intensity of commitment to integration among some member states and peoples is such that further dramatic steps in the direction of a federal *finalité* cannot be excluded. But the rise of intergovernmentalism in EPU, thanks to Britain and France, and the inevitability of *élargissement*, thanks above all to Germany's insistence, seems more likely to direct its impetus to security integration away from defence matters and, at least initially, towards a role as the driving force of CSCE and the European diplomatic voice in world affairs.

**The Western European Union**

WEU’s traditional role has been as a forum of convenience for intergovernmental agreements and meetings which, for whatever reason, could not be fitted appropriately into a more substantial institution. The organization is run out of a pair of houses in London with minimal resources, and lacks institutional authority in its own right. Even as a 'bridge' between the EC and NATO, WEU will need to sink some stronger foundations to avoid being washed away; as the principal forum for European security integration, it is simply not a candidate.

WEU’s credibility is therefore entirely dependent on the political commitment of its member states, the core of the European security-community, and their solidarity behind basic principles of security policy. Although the 1987 Platform on European Security Interests is now somewhat out of date, and it is unlikely that such a strong affirmation of the importance of nuclear weapons or the pre-eminence of NATO could be agreed in the present climate of opinion, the consensus among the Nine remains strong, and the idea of a radical disassociation from WEU holds no real attractions in any country. In this respect, as a Franco-German submission on the subject to the IGC recognized, WEU is well placed to act in lieu of EPU on defence issues, and some states are keen to extend its activities through functional integration as a prelude to its absorption into the Community at a later date. The principal requirement is for WEU as an institution to acquire a kernel of expertise in defence issues, developing over time its capacity to take on important tasks which at present can only be performed in NATO. This idea of functional integration as part of a learning process for WEU is now also shared by the British, to ensure that European security integration outside NATO does not develop in isolation from informed awareness of defence issues. British and French views coincide, then, on the idea of *entraînement*, working through WEU to bring the sometimes woolly and overly pacific discourse of security in Europe into contact with military realities.

How is security integration to proceed in WEU? What functions can WEU take on? Firstly, it can continue to fulfil, and perhaps work at improving, its role as coordinator of European military efforts in crises outside the NATO area. The most successful instance of this was the European naval operation in the Gulf in 1987, where WEU’s
contribution in facilitating coordination in the theatre and among defence ministries enhanced Europe's collective profile in the US and the Middle East.\(^{(35)}\) \(\text{WEU}\) was particularly useful in fulfilling an 'alibi function' in some member states, winning legitimacy and public support for the mission by the use of a European label.\(^{(36)}\) \(\text{WEU}\) played the same role in the Gulf in 1990/91, although its significance was dwarfed by the activities of armies and air forces, which were not coordinated through \(\text{WEU}\) or indeed any other international organization. The \(\text{WEU}\) points of contact in defence ministries established in 1987 are now permanently established, and there is considerable support, especially after a successful first ever meeting of \(\text{WEU}\) Chiefs of Defence Staff in April 1991, for the creation of a military planning cell in \(\text{WEU}\) to advise the Secretary-General, facilitate inter-ministerial coordination, undertake studies on common European defence requirements, and propose and organize the conduct of \(\text{TEWTS}\) (Tactical Exercises Without Troops) or even a \(\text{WEU}\) field exercise.\(^{(37)}\)

But some very hard questions have to be faced with regard to \(\text{WEU}'s\) out-of-area role.\(^{(38)}\) Are Europeans prepared to maintain mobile volunteer forces capable of overseas intervention? Are Europeans prepared to invest in the airlift, in-flight refuelling, logistical and intelligence capabilities needed to enable \(\text{WEU}\) decisions on out-of-area activities to be other than reactions to United States initiatives? Are Europeans prepared to create a framework for crisis response flexible enough to circumvent an immobilizing veto from one or another state reluctant to bite the bullet? It appears increasingly doubtful if the political will exists for any major \(\text{WEU}\) effort outside the NATO area. Britain and France could agree on the principle of constituting an out-of-area force, but Britain would insist that it be composed of troops normally earmarked or assigned to NATO but operating under \(\text{WEU}\) command out of area, while France would insist on a separate force free to operate in the European theatre under the ultimate authority of EPU. Anything less would risk a brusque dismissal as, in the words of French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, `des projets operationnels dénués d'authenticité'.\(^{(39)}\) German agreement would be even harder to obtain, even to an exercise within Europe constructed around a generic out-of-area scenario. The prospect of an amendment to the Basic Law to rule out explicitly any German military activities overseas except under UN auspices has made the German authorities reluctant to countenance any new operational role for WEU at all. Peacekeeping out of area would be less problematic than intervention, and there are instances of European peacekeeping, hitherto coordinated on an \textit{ad hoc} basis, which might reasonably be brought under a \(\text{WEU}\) umbrella. Normally, however, peacekeeping, especially after the Gulf War, will be the prerogative of the UN, and any such \(\text{WEU}\) role would be merely as an agent of the UN.

Secondly, the Secretary-General of \(\text{WEU}\), Willem Van Eekelen, has been promoting a possible role for \(\text{WEU}\) in the so-called \textit{zone grise} - Europe outside NATO territory - through `double-hatting', a procedure under which forces within the NATO integrated military structure could also be deployed under \(\text{WEU}\) command, the commanders changing NATO for \(\text{WEU}\) hats at political discretion. The premise of this idea is separability of units, a flexible force structure from which various national forces, especially American and French, could be detached and reattached at will.

This scheme seems doomed, however. In the first place, it is very hard to conceive of any scenario which would induce Western Europe to intervene in Eastern Europe at
all, and even harder to imagine an intervention without an American imprimatur (remember Suez) and active US support in intelligence and logistics. In the second place, it is hard to believe that the Soviet military authorities would view a WEU intervention in Eastern Europe with any more equanimity than a NATO intervention. In a crisis, the question of WEU or NATO hats pales into insignificance beside the perception of the actual provenance and political task of the forces deployed. Again, a WEU role in peacekeeping in the zone might be more readily envisaged, but the Yugoslavs' preference for a Community mission in the Slovenian crisis and the Twelve's reluctance to call on WEU must cast doubt on the realism of even that lesser aspiration. Double-hatting has no place in Europe; if a WEU European Reaction Force cannot be constituted for out-of-area purposes, as the new British-Italian initiative proposes, it will not be constituted at all.

Thirdly, there are a variety of less high-profile but still extremely important functions which may be open to WEU. One is the diplomatic role of the Secretary-General. Since ‘revitalization', both Alfred Cahen and Willem Van Eekelen have used the advantage of relative freedom of action to compensate for the disadvantage of relative lack of institutional authority to play a vigorous part on the international stage, both as promoter of WEU and as Socratic gadfly to European governments. Van Eekelen, in tandem with the WEU presidency, has recently visited Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw, and plans to travel to Bucharest and Sofia, in a bid to carve out a niche for WEU in territory which is more delicate for NATO.\(^{(40)}\)

Another area of interest is space. Space is a particularly promising area for WEU, for no European country alone could possibly afford anything approaching a comprehensive military observation, reconnaissance and communications capability in space. All European countries oppose the American penchant for space-based weaponry, and there is a good track record of European cooperation in the equivalent civilian sector in the activities of the European Space Agency (ESA). The WEU Assembly, often underestimated, has devoted serious study to the idea of a WEU satellite data interpretation centre and an eventual WEU observation satellite, and the former proposal was officially approved at the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in June 1991.\(^{(41)}\)

An area with which WEU has been historically associated is arms control and verification, and the interpretation centre will allow WEU to act as a forum for coordinating the efforts of national inspectors and pooling data from national technical means, playing a supporting role in the verification of the CFE treaty. WEU can also help to coordinate a European position in arms control negotiations, and there would be a logical role for WEU in the development of an armaments export control regime. Interest in such a regime, at least for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and for precision-guided and long-range missile technology, has increased considerably as a result of the Gulf War, both the technological manner of the American victory and the eclectic provenance of the Iraqi arsenal. As a new and institutionally unclaimed issue, and one in which European coordination would be not just desirable but essential, it would be appropriate for WEU. The adhesion of Sweden, the only significant West European arms exporter not in WEU, would help. Of course any useful regime would have to involve the US, the USSR, and China as well, which points to a leading role for the permanent members of the UN Security
but a cogent and agreed European position would certainly help the negotiations.

Finally, WEU may be able to provide high-level guidance and impetus to the work of the Independent European Programme Group in stimulating European cooperation in armaments production and procurement. The IEPG’s objective is to foster collaborative production and competitive procurement, and its major recent achievements have been a high-technology (mostly electronics) defence research promotion programme, EUCLID (European Cooperative Long-term Initiative for Defence), and new procedures for the publication of contract bulletins in defence procurement and for improved communication between European governments and industries through focal points in defence ministries. This limited retreat from the jealous national protection of defence industries and defence contracts has combined with declining procurement budgets, intensifying export competition, and the knock-on effect of the 1992 process in the civilian sector, to shift producers’ and buyers’ attention away from costly and cumbersome ad hoc arrangements for collaboration on major programmes to international mergers and market-driven procurement. In these circumstances, given the limitations of the IEPG’s powers and its relatively low profile, and the obstacles to any EC role in this matter, WEU could make an important contribution to efficiency in the European arms market by cutting some of the Gordian knots which plague cooperation in this sector, acting as ‘le moteur du GEIP’.

The next few years are important ones for WEU. The Brussels Treaty provides for its members to withdraw if they so choose from 1998, and if the organization is to have any role in European security integration after that date it must build up its institutional experience and authority in the interim. A move to Brussels, where WEU would be realistically placed to fulfil its much-vaunted function as a bridge between the EC and NATO, is essential and long overdue, and member states must decide this, and the associated vexed issue of the appointment of ambassadors to the WEU Permanent Council (whether NATO/WEU or EC/WEU), soon. The alternative to taking WEU more seriously as a bridge organization is the development of a new form of relationship directly between NATO and the Community, and that dialogue is still in its infancy. WEU, as the British and the Italians at least recognize, does have a role if states are prepared to use it.

**The North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

NATO remains the most important organization in European security, and it is moving to protect its in-area monopoly from rival contenders by redefining its purposes and strategies and by intensifying its own contribution to European security integration. The NATO Strategy Review will declare in fairly general terms the continuing importance of Western conventional and nuclear capabilities, including an American presence in Europe, to counterbalance what remains of Soviet military capabilities and to protect the peace against unforeseen military contingencies throughout the North Atlantic area. The public document will be complemented by a Military Committee document, a successor to MC 14/3 which created Flexible Response, discussing these possible contingencies more explicitly and setting out a new doctrine of preparedness to meet them. For political reasons, NATO broke the
The restructuring adheres to the principles set out in NATO's impressively radical 1990 London Declaration acknowledging the end of the adversarial East-West relationship and committing the Alliance to a more mobile and flexible force structure. Taking advantage of the inevitability of massive reductions in manpower and readiness to rid itself of the always unnervingly rigid and fragile system of forward defence, NATO has opted for a structure layered in depth and time rather than horizontally across the Central Front. First, there is the existing Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF), a small but highly professional formation in constant readiness to show a variety of national flags at any crisis point in the NATO area. Second, there is to be a new multinational Rapid Reaction Corps (RRC) under British command, consisting of four or five divisions, one of them airborne, with multinational air and naval support. Third, NATO's Main Defence Forces will be reorganized into six multinational corps, substantially smaller than the existing corps. Finally, the capacity to deal with a major war will be retained through the training of Augmentation Forces, reserves available for mobilization in a protracted emergency.

The RRC is perhaps infelicitously named, for it is not the same type of force as either the US Rapid Deployment Force, the French Force d'Action Rapide, or the proposed European Reaction Force. The British contribution is anomalously large (around 50%), suggesting that the whole idea is an ad hoc package lumping together NATO Northern Army Group (NORTHAG)'s long-standing plan for a multinational airborne division with a relabelled residue of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). Taken together with the disparagement heaped on the plan by the French President and Foreign Minister, and the problems liable to plague the proposed Southern division, the RRC looks like a very Anglo-Saxon formation, not likely to advance integration within NATO. The real raison d'être of the force, in a political-military crisis, would be to follow the AMF at a distance and hold terrain throughout the NATO area until a proper campaign can be organized, including particularly in Turkey, which now appears the most threatened state in NATO, and in the territory of the former GDR, where NATO troops are not stationed. This, as the Gulf War showed, can take months.

More significant for the future of integration within NATO is the planned reorganization of the Main Defence Forces. Whereas the idea of a multinational, mobile force operating behind the front line to deploy forward where required is not new, the idea that all NATO corps will in future be multinational is startling. The structure of the RRC, with a large proportion of forces supplied by the commanding state and other divisions and brigades contributed by other states, may well prove to be typical of the Main Defence Forces as well. The reason for this decision is partly economic, in that the smaller countries, notably Holland and Belgium, will no longer be in a position to contribute corps-sized forces, and integration into multinational corps seems a realistic and preferable alternative to the perpetuation of what are already rather skeletal national units. The main reason, however, as the proposal to place a German division in a US corps and a US division in a German corps clearly confirms, is political.
NATO has made a positive choice for force integration as a way of tightening the bonds of the Alliance at a moment when they have been called into question more seriously than ever before by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. One accomplishment of these moves is that anxieties, genuine if somewhat exaggerated, about the renationalization of defence and a revival of the German Sonderweg, have been allayed by a deliberate choice for integration. Locking national armed forces into an international military structure both generates habits of cooperation and severely impedes any regression to a nationalistic military posture. Another accomplishment is that European security integration has now become more fundamental than ever in NATO's official credo, attacking the idea that integrationism and Atlanticism are exclusive and undermining the efforts of the EC and WEU to stake out turf in the military sphere in Europe.

It has always been the case that the practical contribution to European security integration made by the day-to-day workings of the NATO integrated military structure, at the political level, at the command level, and in field exercises was much more substantial than that made in many more high-profile transactions elsewhere, and this truth holds no less in the new era. Force integration in the present restructuring is complemented by integrated force planning for the long term through NATO's Conventional Armaments Planning System (CAPS), by the near-total integration of West European air defences (including France) through the NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS), by the integrative effects of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization (NAMSO), and the sub-committees of the EUROGROUP such as EUROLOG, EUROMED, and EURO/NATO training, and by the whole panoply of the integrated military structure. It will now be necessary for NATO to consider developing integration at sea beyond the existing joint forces in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and channel commands, as a result of European naval cuts, and among tactical nuclear forces, as a result of the political necessity to remove SNF and nuclear artillery. Whatever is arranged bilaterally between Britain and France in this latter field, concerning the coordinated development and deployment of airborne sub-strategic nuclear weapons, will have to be coordinated at some level with the US, which means at least an indirect NATO involvement.\(^{(43)}\)

Beyond the military aspects of security integration, NATO is also taking steps to fulfil its political function as 'one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe', laying the foundations for the extension of the European security-community by building ties with former Warsaw Pact countries.\(^{(44)}\) Although there is a need for sensitivity in establishing links under the noses of the Soviets with their former allies, NATO has shown considerable imagination in this regard, inviting a stream of visitors to Brussels, developing political contacts between the Central and East Europeans (including Soviets) and the North Atlantic Council and Assembly, initiating contacts between military authorities, opening courses at NATO defence colleges to former Warsaw Pact officers, and making quite substantial sums available for 'Third Dimension' scientific and environmental programmes in Eastern Europe. To the new generation of elected leaders in the former Warsaw Pact countries, developing ties with NATO is as important as developing ties with the EC in the process of Europeanization; even without the extension of security guarantees, increasing involvement with Western Europe's integrated security system increases their sense of security and draws them towards the security-community.
The final collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, in ending any danger of a revival of the Cold War, has again accelerated the disarmament process in Europe and the obsolescence of much of previous NATO strategy, but it has by no means ushered in a new era of peace and certainty. The underlying need for NATO remains strong. NATO has come through its darkest hour, the period in 1989/90 when its early demise was widely anticipated as a result of the ending of the threat and the rise of European Political Union, with a new confidence and a stronger commitment to security integration. This new confidence manifests itself in NATO's whole-hearted endorsement of the idea of an EPU CFSP and its willingness to open dialogue even with the Commission. Its in-area monopoly of military integration no longer under serious challenge, and its political importance recognized anew in both Western and Eastern Europe in the newly turbulent international climate, NATO has more reason now to suppose that, as it insists, 'the development of a European security identity and defence role . . . will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance'.(45)

The persistence of sovereignty

Finally, having examined the integrative process at work in the EC, in WEU, and in NATO, it would be unwise to omit to mention those areas of non-integration which highlight the persistence of sovereign and separate national security policies. Perhaps the most conspicuous is that of strategic nuclear weapons. British SLBMs are in the first instance targeted in coordination with the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha, and the French too participate in NATO water space management and allegedly have extensive covert connections with the Pentagon regarding nuclear technology, but such things are only distractions from the overriding fact that the French and British strategic nuclear deterrents are the ultimate symbols, and in the last resort the ultimate defenders, of sovereignty. (46) Controversial ideas in France for extending nuclear deterrence over German and other European territory were always more real in the mysterious, half-lit world of nuclear wordplay, where uncertainty is welcome, than in the exact and exclusive context of nuclear decision-making, and they have not resurfaced since the end of the Cold War and the ensuing complication of European security. And as the experience of US extended deterrence in Europe shows, when nuclear guarantees are offered and concrete gestures made towards creating a community of risk, the tensions are only beginning. The existence of the absolute weapon seems to place permanent restrictions on the scope of European security integration.

But non-integration is not confined to this one very sensitive area. The level of peacetime integration among European armed forces should not be exaggerated. Except in the case of the Bundeswehr, which as a result of the post-war settlement has no general staff and is NATO's most integrated army, NATO's command structure is itself in part based on a principle akin to double-hatting. (47) The majority of commanders of forces assigned to NATO are national commanders; they wear national uniforms, take orders in peacetime from national headquarters, use predominantly national equipment and logistics, and up to the level of corps commander normally command only national troops. Integration below corps level is unusual, while integration below divisional level occurs only in special circumstances (the AMF, the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, and the proposed NATO
Composite Force for northern Norway) and is otherwise frowned upon, witness the fate of the symbolic and not especially successful experiment of the Franco-German brigade.

Moreover, if Germany's armed forces are highly integrated into NATO, and if those of the UK and the smaller European nations are partially integrated into NATO, those of France and the US are predominantly not integrated. An ever-increasing majority of the US armed forces are not based in Europe, while France's long absence from the integrated military structure is most unlikely to be reversed and its deleterious effects on integration will worsen once French troops withdraw from Germany. Although the French are not isolationists, and their success in keeping abreast of NATO procedures and maintaining bilateral working relationships with the US and others during operations was demonstrated in their performance in the Gulf, their own military effectiveness and their complementarity with other European forces are inevitably eroded by their separation from day-to-day cooperation, as a more protracted or evenly-matched land battle against Iraq might well have exposed.

The most important of all aspects of non-integration, however, is political autonomy. The undoubted development of habitual cooperation and consultation on foreign policy among European states within NATO, WEU, and the EC does not seem to have led to any significant retreat from the principle that at the moment of decision the interests considered first are national interests and the arbiter of those interests is the representative government of the state. In this most crucial of all respects, there is little evidence of convergence, and the release of the unifying pressure from the East is serving only to draw Europe back to what President Mitterrand, in defending the withdrawal of troops from Germany, called 'the natural order of international relations'.

No better illustration of the continued dominance of national interests could have been made to order than the Gulf War. None of the organizations discussed here proved really effective in bringing an integrated European effort to bear. NATO performed tolerably well in Turkey and the Mediterranean, but was essentially a marginal player in the crisis. WEU was again successful in inducing some level of contribution from each of its members, notably the first Spanish naval expedition to the Gulf, but did not really break any new ground. The EC performed poorly, unable to maintain political unity and unable to persuade the Iraqis even to meet their representatives. There was extensive ad hoc coordination and cooperation in the Gulf crisis, but no integration - indeed each of the three major European powers acted exactly as one might have expected if the idea of European security integration had never been suggested at all. The UK used force without much hesitation to defend a state with which it has historic and commercial ties, and was glad to cement the special relationship with the US in support of the international legal status quo. France was equally ready to show its commitment and capacity to act in the region, but its ties with Iraq and Iraq's Maghreb supporters made the attractions of the role of peacemaker greater, and led France to break from the EC consensus. Germany was unsettled by the crisis, a government uncertain of its world role confronted by a large and vocal section of the populace steeped in anti-militarism and anti-Americanism; the worst instance of particularism was the provocative and dangerous suggestion aired in some quarters that the North Atlantic Treaty did not oblige Germany to come to the aid of Turkey if it were attacked by Iraq.
The lesson here is that integration is not purely a matter of governmental will. European governments are representative, and they are inevitably and rightly bound to reflect, approximately it not exactly, the will of the people. Political debate on almost all questions, but most unequivocally on security questions, is national debate, not European debate. While a few issues, most notably environmentalism, have begun to prompt transnational debate, most are developed and discussed in essentially independent national public debates, brought together only at the pinnacle of the European elite. So long as the security debates in different European countries evolve independently, the principle of political autonomy in defence decision-making will reassert itself regardless of the institutional structures in place.

This concludes the examination of the modalities of European security integration. The next few years will be a time of flux and a time of decision, as NATO attempts to settle into an altered role with a reduced and more integrated force structure, as the workings of EPU are tested and the Community moves towards a review of its security identity later in the decade, and as WEU attempts to build its credibility as the bridge between NATO and the EC. The prospects for European security integration depend heavily on the willingness of the member states of these three organizations, notably of those states identified earlier as the core Nine, the member states of WEU, to carry the process forward in a flexible and thoughtful manner with a proper consciousness of the goals of security integration.
CONCLUSIONS

This is a period of swift and dramatic historical change, a period when international relations in Europe, released from the vice-like grip of the Cold War, are characterized by instability, uncertainty, and volatility. More than twenty years ago, Pierre Hassner tried to assess the possibilities for Europe beyond the Cold War and concluded that European security integration would be an essential anchor for the continent in the absence of direct superpower hegemony. "Some multilateral framework", he argued, "some collective arrangement committing stronger states to the protection and restraint of smaller ones must be an essential part of any European system."\(^{50}\) But the new security order, he warned, must evolve in living history, from the security requirements of the new political order, rather than by conscious and manipulative design; only failure awaits "a rational, intellectual or mechanical and deliberate construction as opposed to a natural, organic or historical product with all its confusions and hazards."\(^{51}\) This point is equally valid today. As François Heisbourg urges, "we must beware of spending too much time quarrelling about European security architectures, for however important they may be for the long term, the qualities which we will need in the next few months or years will be those of the navigator, not the architect: adaptability and mobility combined with a sense of direction."\(^{52}\) The crises will come too swiftly and suddenly, the actions of governments and the demands of peoples will be too unpredictable to allow leisure for elaborate projects of European construction. What are needed are criteria for preparedness for the unknown, buoys marking out the submerged rocks and stars to steer by. The purpose of this paper is to help the navigator by analyzing the concept of European security integration, clearing away some of the fog of ambiguity enveloping it.

It is of great importance not to lose sight of the fact that integration is a very special and demanding form of cooperation, and that security stands in a very particular relationship to politics. Security creates and protects the space within which politics takes place; it is not merely an aspect of a political process but a precondition of any political process. Security integration, whether by treaty or by habitual cooperation or by executive integration or by all three, is a solemn undertaking, making different communities of people deeply dependent on each other for their survival and the survival of their ways of life. It is not an issue that can be the subject of experimentation and risk-taking.

This paper has attempted to clarify the goals of European security integration, the implications of those goals for managing change in the configuration of European security, and the current state and future prospects of the principal institutions through which the modalities of security integration will develop. It is very much to be hoped that the development of security integration in the next few years, including most particularly the relationship between integration in NATO and integration in EPU, will be constructive for both European and Atlantic solidarity, will serve to extend and not to divide the European security-community, and will strengthen and not weaken the foundations of European security.
1. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.


3. Periodizations such as this are never to be taken too literally. Many of the same factors have been at work throughout the postwar era. See Ian Gamble, 'Prospects for West European Security Cooperation', *Adelphi Paper* 244 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1989), pp. 7-20.

4. There is an important distinction between the responses to armed attack pledged in the 1948 Brussels Treaty, in which the parties agreed to 'afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power,' and the 1949 Washington Treaty, in which each party agreed to 'assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith ... such action as it deems necessary'.

5. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.


7. An excellent analysis of this fascinating period of the history of transatlantic security cooperation, including the remarkable ideas of Secretary McNamara, is David N. Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1983).


9. The phrase is that of Peter Bender, 'The Superpower Squeeze', *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1986/87.


17. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

18. These groups are designated for analytical purposes only; it is not suggested that they either do, will, or should act as groups.


21. This commitment was made in the 1987 WEU Platform. WEU, op. cit. in note 8, p. 37.

22. This is not a view confined to Anglo-Saxon circles. The following particularly eloquent and forceful statement of it comes from a French commentator: 'Or l'identité européenne n'existe pas: s'agit-il d'une identité occidentale? Pan-européenne? Comment et par rapport à quoi se définit-elle? En termes culturels ou religieux? La seule identité européenne effectivement existante, c'est l'identité atlantique, c'est-à-dire celle qui unit les pays qui ont, d'une manière ou d'une autre, fait allégeance à l'Amérique - et par Amérique il faut entendre une certaine vision du monde et de la morale internationale, c'est-à-dire une communauté idéologique et de valeurs . . .', Jean Villars (pseud.), 'L'Amérique au miroir brisé', *Commentaire*, Summer 1991, p. 428.

24. See especially Ernst Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966). As illustrative examples of these three types of integration, consider:

integration by treaty - the creation of the United States of America by a constitutive act of the English colonies;

functional integration - the development of the Franco-German relationship through increasingly closer cooperation in an increasing variety of fields;

integration of the executive - the success of some UN agencies (such as the International Labour Organization and the World Health Organization) in building a common programme even in times of acute political disharmony among the member states.


29. Statement to the Riksdag by Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson on 14 June 1991, on Sweden's application for membership of the EC, p. 7.


31. Peter Jankowitsch, 'Neutrality after the Cold War', *Austria Today*, 4/90, p. 5.


35. A fuller account of these operations is given in Gambles, op. cit. in note 3, pp. 39 ff.


37. Meeting of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff, Preliminary Summary of Conclusions (WEU, 10 April 1991).

38. See, for example, `All dressed up, but not ready to go', *The Economist*, 25 May 1991.

39. Speech of Roland Dumas to the WEU Assembly, in UEO Assemblée, 37ème session ordinaire, *Compte Rendu Officiel de la troisième séance*, 4 juin 1991. Compare the remarks of Douglas Hurd, Britain's Foreign Secretary, to the sixth sitting on the following day.


42. For a fuller discussion of armaments cooperation and extensive references, see Gambles, op. cit. in note 3, pp. 41 ff. For EUCLID, see Carol Reed, `EUCLID and the Future of European Defence Technology', *Defence*, June 1990.

43. Force integration within NATO is discussed at more length in Gambles, op. cit. in note 3, pp. 21 ff.

44. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Copenhagen, 6/7 June 1991, Statement appended to the Final Communiqué, p. 2.

45. Ibid., Final Communiqué, p. 2.


47. It is worth noting that the difference between Germany and other NATO countries in this respect may be reduced as an indirect result of unification, by the agreement not to station NATO forces in the former GDR in the short term. This part of the NATO area will consequently be defended by a corps of the *Bundeswehr* not operating under NATO commanders.


51. Ibid., p. 4.

52. Heisbourg, op. cit. in note 20, p. 6.