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International terrorism and Europe

Thérèse Delpech



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International terrorism and Europe

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Since 11 September a spectre has been haunting the world: international terrorism, a blind, murderous force that is at once a direct product and the implacable enemy of globalisation, has shattered the serenity of our democracies. Since the events in New York and Washington, in 2002 there have been a series of bloody attacks on targets in Djerba, Bali, Yemen, Kuwait and the Philippines, while alerts have become more frequent on all continents, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has remained largely out of control and the shadow of al-Qaeda continues to hang over all these threats.

Apart from the urgent need to protect civil populations that now find themselves in the front line, terrorism is confronting democracies with two problems. Firstly, on the strategic level, the traditional rules of the game no longer apply. Faced with a threat that is by its very nature anonymous, non-state and unpredictable, it is almost impossible to construct a defensive system based on a prediction or anticipation of the adversary's policy, on discussion and negotiation, and lastly on deterrence or the threat of coercion — a triad that on the contrary normally works in classic, interstate conflict situations. Secondly, on the psychological level, international terrorism tends to produce extreme reactions of either denial or hyperbole: on the one hand a certain scepticism regarding the reality or the imminence of these threats, as they are by definition theoretical until they are carried through; on the other a propensity to regard terrorism as the sole frame of reference for the complexity of the world and one that justifies a confusion or bending of the very principles on which democracies are founded. Transatlantic discord — over the role of armed force in strategies to combat terrorism, how to deal with Iraq, and the distinction between terrorism and the right to self-determination — stems directly from these new challenges.

America has taken the lead in the war on terror, often with courage and clear-sightedness, occasionally with excessive zeal and over-simplification, but always giving it first priority in its foreign policy. The Europeans on the other hand have often expressed their differing view, both in their analyses of the phenomenon and their strategies in response to it. Why should this be so? What are the characteristics of the terrorist threat on the Continent? Theatres of operation? Targets? Logistic bases? Risks? Weak links? Are European countries any different from the United States when it comes to the terrorist networks' list of potential targets? Thérèse Delpech, Director for

Strategic Affairs at France's Commissariat à l'Énergie atomique and a leading European expert on proliferation, is best placed to attempt to answer those questions. Using open sources, this Chaillot Paper gives a comprehensive outline of the current threats and challenges that face Europe directly. Naturally, as the threats are by definition anonymous and unpredictable, an exact appreciation of the risks is a matter for debate. What is certain is that this new international situation puts responsibilities and political choices before European leaders that are very different from what the post-Cold War irenicism might have led them to expect.

Paris, November 2002

'We have sent a few messages to America's allies so that they cease all involvement in the American crusade . . . in particular, to France and to Germany. But if these things are not enough, we are prepared to do more.'

Ayman al-Zawahiri, 8 October 2002

'We have to count on a new attack, an attack of a much larger dimension. There is a big threat, also in Germany.'

August Hanning, Director, BND (German
Foreign Intelligence Service)
5 November 2002

'We cannot be sure of when and where or how the terrorists will strike, but we can be sure that they will try . . . Today's breed of terrorist is looking for ever more dramatic and devastating effects.'

David Blunkett, British Home Secretary,
7 November 2002

'Bin Laden is threatening Italy.'

(*'Bin Laden minaccia l'Italia'*)
La Repubblica, 13 November 2002

A strong but fleeting emotional response

The events of 11 September moved all Europeans, but were never understood for what they really were: the return of war¹ to the most developed societies. Thus, the emotion quickly gave way to the belief that an isolated event had taken place, or at least one that would not be repeated on the same scale. The entry of the Americans and their Afghan allies into Kabul a month after the first air strikes reinforced this belief.² Even if the military operations in Afghanistan were far from over then, the Europeans, more so than the Americans – who at that time still had to cope with a biological attack – began to lose their focus. The first reason for that short-lived emotion is that 11 September, even when perceived as an attack on the entire Western world, had not happened in Europe. There is also a widespread refusal in Europe, after the turbulent history of the previous century, to admit that European territory might again be vulnerable to serious threats. Lastly, European leaders were anxious not to frighten their populations or to strain relations with the Muslim minorities living in Europe.³

The persistence of a more traditional form of terrorism in Europe

In March 2002, only a few months after the most spectacular terrorist operation in history, Europe was witnessing the unexpected return of a more conventional phenomenon. The assassination of Marco Biagi, an adviser to the Italian employment minister, was claimed by the Red Brigades that many thought had disappeared in the mid-1970s. This killing, which was the second carried out by the group in the last few years, revealed the existence of a new generation of ‘conventional’ terrorists that were using the call-sign and the prestige of their predecessors,⁴ still in prison but able to

1. This notion has been commented on so often since 11 September that a comment on its significance is called for: this was a declaration of war by a transnational terrorist network that the United Nations recognised, for the first time in its history, justified a military response. The same reasoning brought NATO to invoke, for the first time since its creation, the collective self-defence clause of the North Atlantic Treaty.

2. Military operations against the Taliban began on 7 October 2001, and the liberation of Kabul took place, to the astonishment of most commentators, as early as 13 November. In the autumn of 2002, the quick military victory of the first phase in the war seems less assured. The al-Qaeda leadership appears to have survived the air strikes of the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001. Corroborating reports indicate that the terrorist network has regrouped on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And the warlords, to whom the United States gave almost a free hand, and internal struggles, threaten Hamid Karzai's government.

3 This concern meant that a debate on the new parameters of security never took place. It would have been easy, in the autumn of 2001, to use the genuine sympathy and to draw upon the many issues that had been raised by the events to bring the Europeans to ask questions on security from a new angle, discarding the traditional distinction between the interior and the exterior, between force projection and territorial defence, between external military operations and civil defence. But that would have meant a little daring, and that was lacking, even in the two European countries with

impending elections – France and Germany – which had the opportunity to build a case. At present, it seems only a catastrophe on European soil will force a debate.

4. The first Red Brigades were formed at the beginning of the 1970s. They carried out a number of bombings and assassinations, the most famous of which being the murder of the former prime minister, Aldo Moro, in 1978. There were the *anni di piombo*, the ‘years of lead’.

5. Two motorcyclists carried out the murder of Marco Biagi, a law professor in Bologna. In 1999 the Red Brigades claimed responsibility for the killing of Massimo d’Antona, another adviser to the employment minister. D’Antona, like Biagi, was working on the reform of employment law. The murder weapon appears to have been the same in both cases.

6. More and more terrorists are using the internet and publicly available cryptology techniques. To decode and make sense of their communications, it would be necessary to allocate considerable resources.

7. The ETA, a Basque separatist movement originating in Spain, is the most violent organisation of its kind in Europe. The ETA is also active in France, often sourcing its weaponry and bomb-making equipment in Paris. According to Irène Stoller, the head of the 14th anti-terrorist division of the Paris prosecutor’s office, ‘French society remains ignorant of the reality of Basque terrorism’, which poses a threat that is not confined to Spain: ‘The big question is whether or not the ETA will hit French soil’.

8. Grupo de Resistencia Anti-Fascista Primero de Octubre.

9. One of the issues that Europe must confront is that of future links between conventional national movements with new forms of terrorism that no longer identify with a particular territory.

10. Since 1996 anti-terrorist operations have been organised centrally – to address both internal and external terrorism – in an anti-terrorist cell made up of four investigating magistrates who have

communicate with the outside world and plan attacks. Today the organisation has only a few tens of members, but the Italian police and judiciary fear further growth in the movement. The literature it produces has hardly changed in the past twenty-five years: it is still as confused as it was in the middle of the 1970s, and still speaks of the failure of capitalism and a fight to the death against the United States. Individual assassination is still one of the methods – e.g. the murder of Marco Biagi on 19 March 2002⁵ – as is bombing, e.g. the attack on the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome on 10 April 2001. The only major evolution is in the technical area: it is more difficult to identify members of the network because of their new communication methods.⁶ Concerns that ‘domestic’ terrorism had made a comeback to coincide with international terrorism were on everyone’s mind in Italy in March 2002. This sort of terrorism is well known in several European countries, be it in Spain (Basque terrorism⁷ or the left-wing terrorism of GRAPO⁸), in France (Corsican terrorism), in Greece (the 17 November movement), or in the United Kingdom (Irish terrorism).⁹

International terrorism has been known in Europe since the mid-1990s.

European experts¹⁰ now admit they identified, around ten years ago, an ‘international’ generation, with no specific territorial base, whose members were trained in Afghan camps before settling in Europe to plan attacks. These ‘wandering terrorists’, who form unstable groupings that are very difficult to monitor for that very reason, live off varying illicit ventures – credit card trafficking for example – and their financial independence makes them even less easy to identify. There was an Algerian connection from the very beginnings of this generation. The cancellation of elections in January 1992¹¹ in that country and the banning of the FIS (the Islamic Salvation Front) by the regime, towards which European countries (France in particular) are seen as sympathetic,¹² may indeed explain the presence in Europe of the first elements that gradually built up the hardest core of this most recent terrorist generation. First setting up logistical bases in Europe (principally in France, but also in Italy, Germany, and Belgium) for the supply of guerrilla groups in Algeria, these organisations were then almost entirely

controlled by the GIA (the Armed Islamic Group),¹³ which was responsible for the 1995 terrorist attacks in France.¹⁴ By 1996 radical elements of the GIA and Islamic Jihad had left their parent organisations to join a current of Islamist extremism which, although still formless, already had characteristics similar to those of the al-Qaeda network.

A valuable European experience

Europeans have thus gained much useful knowledge when it comes to the fight against international terrorism, and hence many opportunities for cooperating with the Americans on intelligence and justice. Following 11 September, instances, often discreet, of this cooperation have been far more balanced than in the military sphere. The ability to foresee the tragic events in New York and Washington was admittedly as meagre in Europe as in the United States, but plenty of useful information has since been shared on the nature of the networks, their means of communicating and how they operate. What is more, these exchanges had begun prior to 11 September. The best-known example is the arrest on the Canadian border of Ahmed Rezam,¹⁵ an Algerian national in possession of powerful explosives that he intended to detonate in Los Angeles during the millennium celebrations. The French secret services had been compiling information on this individual for several years, and indicated that this represented their first direct contact with the al-Qaeda network.¹⁶ They subsequently provided documents to the United States testifying that the episode was not an isolated event, but part of a larger pattern. These same services gave information to the FBI on Zacharias Moussaoui, the French national arrested in August 2001 in the United States.¹⁷ Finally, the Europeans had known for some years of the terrorists' interest in weapons of mass destruction, particularly biological or chemical, and the existence of specialised camps in Afghanistan for studying them, particularly the one at Derunta.¹⁸ Information on training carried out in Afghanistan and CD-ROMs with recipes for producing these weapons were seized in Europe in the second half of the 1990s.¹⁹

considerable powers (questioning and judicial powers, searches, confiscation, bugging, etc.).

11. The head of the GIA (Armed Islamic Group), Antar Zouabri, was killed on 8 February 2002 during a confrontation at Boufarik. A bounty was placed on his head to the value of 64,000. The various GIA factions have lost some of their influence, but their attacks in February were still able to claim dozens of victims. New attacks came immediately following the killing of Zouabri. Then there is Hassan Hattab's Salafist Group for Call and Combat, which is very active in west and central Algeria.

12. See David Ignatius, 'Qaida Agents in West Wait Quietly for Orders', *International Herald Tribune*, 19 November 2001: 'The DST has unusual expertise on terrorism because France has for decades been facing attacks from Algerian and other Arab groups. In this long turning anti-terror fight, the DST has worked closely with both Israeli and Arab intelligence services. Soon after taking control of the DST in 1997, Mr Pascal began to notice a pattern – which he termed the 'neo-Afghans' – of Algerians traveling to Osama bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan... The DST issued a first intelligence report warning about this neo-Afghan threat in 1998. By watching the travelers and their networks, the DST was able to disrupt some planned Qaida operations.'

13. A 'Salafist', fundamentalist, movement based in Algeria from which the GSPC (Salafist Group for Call and Combat) would be formed.

14. In December 1994, an Airbus departing from Algiers was hijacked. The terrorists intended to crash into the Eiffel Tower with similar suicide tactics to those used on 11 September, even if the terrorist network that prepared this attack was not the same one that prepared the New York attacks. French special forces (GIGN) brought the situation under control at Marseilles.

15. Ahmed Rezam was sentenced

in the United States to 140 years' incarceration for conspiracy.

16. In fact the name of the organisation dates from 1988, and the network was already responsible for the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center – the first such attempt on the complex. It was also to blame for the attacks in Riyadh (November 1995) and Dhahran (June 1996) in Saudi Arabia – attacks which are often mentioned. Furthermore, al-Qaeda is alleged to have tried to assassinate President Mubarak in Ethiopia in June 1995.

17. In particular France indicated to the United States that this individual had made several trips to Afghanistan at the end of the 1990s to follow classes in terrorism at these camps, and that he had met al-Qaeda leaders in Jalalabad and Kandahar.

18. This site was heavily bombed in October 2001, featuring prominently on the abundant video material that was seized in Afghanistan, some of which CNN broadcast in August 2002.

19. Among the reasons why the Europeans are frustrated with Washington is that cooperation on intelligence happens almost exclusively in one direction on matters of terrorism.

20. This is a reference to president Bush's speech to mark six months since the attacks. Even the British did not receive special treatment. It was as if the British had hardly been thanked for the particularly dangerous operations in which they participated in the mountains of Tora Bora and in March 2002 during Operation *Anaconda*. As for the French planes and naval vessels and the German special forces, there was almost not a word in the American media. The Pentagon continues to publish an information bulletin, which is updated regularly, showing the contribution of the allies to the war against terrorism (Coalition Partners' Contributions in War against Terrorism, Department of

America's response to the Europeans

One of Washington's most obvious mistakes in the diplomatic handling after 11 September was the incapacity to use or to maintain the huge capital of sympathy that emerged in Europe following the attacks. European offers of help – especially in the military domain – were probably not equal to the circumstances, but they might have been taken more seriously if only for cementing the coalition. The expertise of the Europeans on terrorist matters could have been put to better use. The State of the Union Address of 29 January 2002 could have included a word of recognition of America's allies. And it was not necessary to wait until 11 March 2002 to thank them publicly.²⁰ More serious differences than wounded pride also quickly soured transatlantic relations after 11 September. The inability to make progress on resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict gave rise to damaging misunderstanding. Then, while the Europeans had at first felt, as did the rest of the world, that the attacks, which prompted unanimous resolutions of support within both the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, had opened a new era in international cooperation and alliances, it quickly became apparent that such was not the case.²¹ To a great extent they had the opposite effect, following the rapid victory in the first phase of the military campaign, of heightening the feeling already present in the United States before the attacks – that American freedom of action and sovereignty had to be preserved at all costs. Moreover, the feeble European contribution to the military operations convinced America that it alone was able and willing to wage this lengthy and difficult war against the al-Qaeda network. And the Americans provided stunning proof of their capacity to intervene alone, with local allies,²² and of their willingness to adapt alliances to missions. Does this mean that the United States no longer has privileged or permanent allies, but only ad hoc allies? If it does, what becomes of the Atlantic Alliance? Even French commentators, who rarely spring to defend NATO, have begun to ask that question. And commentators such as Anatol Lieven have no hesitation in referring to NATO as 'half dead',²³ even if others, such as Joseph Nye, opine that NATO went through other difficult periods following the end of the Cold War and will overcome the present crisis by developing

new capacities, integrating new members, and maintaining a new relationship with Russia.²⁴

The combined effect on European security of the war on terrorism, NATO enlargement and the United States' Asian priority

Whereas the war on terrorism is accentuating America's militarisation, NATO enlargement will reduce the military dimension of the Alliance, which has already been affected by the inability of the Europeans to meet modernisation targets and the completion of the Afghan campaign without them. The new NATO-Russia relationship, which is playing an increasing role in Alliance strategy, cannot flourish unless the institution becomes more political than military.²⁵ The military weakening of NATO runs the risk of reinvigorating the present US administration's unilateral tendencies. But there might be something even more seriously wrong in the uneasy US-European relations. For ten years the situation in the Balkans maintained the illusion that the security of Europe was still important to the Americans. 11 September and the war in Afghanistan shattered this illusion. The American theatre of operations is now Asia, a region whose growing strategic importance is little understood by the Europeans. Yet Asia is already the source of the main threats to international security – and that will increasingly be the case. Europe, like America, will therefore have to help avert crises in this vast region, which extends from the Middle East to Japan, and, should prevention fail, help to contain any crisis, stopping it from degenerating into conflict. If by misfortune conflict were to break out, escalation and the use of weapons of mass destruction would have to be averted. The readiness of European capitals to meet these major challenges, including those in the Middle East, is still woefully inadequate, as their disagreements over Iraq illustrate. Criticism of a military operation against Baghdad, somewhat well-founded, is often rightly interpreted as a European refusal to even contemplate the possible use of force. Most European capitals fail to understand that unless strong, concerted, and constant pressure is applied, Saddam Hussein will not be persuaded to give up his weapons of mass destruction programmes. Nor does one need to be a great expert on the United States to

Defense, Office of Public Affairs), but American journalists do not seem to have passed on the many facts that it contains.

21 In his article in *Policy Review*, 'Power and Weakness', which was the subject of much comment in spring 2002, Robert Kagan concludes a little rashly that the Europeans are attracted to the treaties and to multilateralism because they have no military power, without even taking the time to consider that the EU would disappear if it did not consent on a regular basis to the concession of sovereignty and did not undertake multilateral consultation.

22. Operation *Enduring Freedom* began on 7 October with air attacks directed from US Central Command at Tampa, Florida. The British were the only Europeans to be present from day one. NATO's contribution (AWACS planes) was outside the theatre of operations. It seems now that excessive confidence in the local warlords compromised the central operation on Tora Bora and, equally, the return to stability of Afghanistan after the constitution of a government around Hamid Karzai.

23. Anatol Lieven, 'The End of NATO', *Prospect*, December 2001. There is only one thing on which commentators agree. NATO cannot avoid transforming itself. The adaptation process, which began in 1990, is at a new and potentially decisive stage, as will be seen at the Prague summit in November 2002.

24. See Joseph Nye, 'Nato remains necessary', *International Herald Tribune*, 16 May 2002.

25. Since the signing of the NATO-Russia agreement in Rome in May 2002, which has considerably extended Moscow's capacity to participate in consultations and in NATO's decision-making processes outside Article 5, military cooperation has been on the decline. The Balkans situation is an illustration of this – the Russian participation has been reduced to 700 men in SFOR and KFOR.

understand that unless the European capitals are able to agree on a common strategy, they will have no influence at all. Is there a European strategic vision that is anything other than reactive? There is little reason to think so.

Europe in the aftermath of 11 September

Threats and responses – where things stand

Solidarity

As early as 21 September, the European Council declared itself in total solidarity with the United States at an extraordinary meeting whose aim was to analyse the international situation in the aftermath of the attacks. The feeling that there was a common threat carried the day: 'These attacks are an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural societies.' At that time reference to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was still conditional on the attacks coming from abroad, in accordance with the NATO Council's declaration of 12 September: 'The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.'²⁶ But that condition was quickly fulfilled, and all European NATO members recognised the activation of the collective security article.²⁷ In this event, the Treaty stipulates that each country will take the action it deems necessary, and that made it possible to avoid collective action, something Washington hardly wanted,²⁸ and for which NATO was ill-prepared.²⁹ During the Cold War, NATO solidarity was considered sufficient to deter the USSR from attacking Europe, but it was never put to the test. It was indeed a very strange application of the collective defence clause, and one that none of the signatories could have conceived of when the North Atlantic Treaty was being drawn up. Atlantic solidarity went beyond even the present members of the Alliance: at the same time as the NATO decision, the foreign affairs ministers of ten candidate countries for NATO membership (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) expressed their support for the US-led anti-terrorist campaign in a joint communiqué.

26 'The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.'

27 This recognition materialised with the making available of NATO AWACS aircraft for the surveillance of American airspace with European crews.

28 On his visit to Brussels on 26 September, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defence, declared that Washington had not envisaged 'collective NATO action' as a retaliatory measure for the attacks.

29 This does not negate the observation that it would have been propitious to have set up an information unit or even a steering committee to maintain regular contact between the allies.

Cooperation

On 26 September, US Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz suggested that members of the Alliance could help the United States by providing intelligence and tracing terrorist funding. America's requests, received on 3 October, were accepted within twenty-four hours: improved intelligence sharing, increased protection of Allied facilities in Europe, access to ports and airports, blanket overflight clearance, the 'backfilling' of selected NATO assets – especially its seventeen AWACS surveillance aircrafts – deployment of naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean, and, if the need should arise, the replacement of troops in the Balkans, where 10,000 American soldiers were then deployed. NATO formally accepted these requests on 4 October, and the Secretary-General indicated that this decision 'operationalised' Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Most of the requests, which are an indication of the 'peripheral' support that the United States expected of its allies, had already been agreed bilaterally. The formal request to the Alliance, many commentators thought, was not necessary from a practical point of view, but it carried a strong political message. Since then, it has been often said that NATO will be judged in accordance with its usefulness in the fight against terrorism, which has been hailed by the United States as the first war of the twenty-first century. Paul Wolfowitz was quick to stress that this should be a major priority for the Alliance. Lord Robertson, Secretary-General of NATO, is well aware of the stakes: the Prague summit has resulted in decisions on terrorism that are as significant as those on missile defense and enlargement; and the creation of a rapid response force should make it possible to overcome some of the shortcomings that were identified in 2001 within the organisation.

Is Europe yet to face the revolution in terrorism affairs?

That is the view of some, who build their case by referring to how the terrorists responsible for 11 September had resided in Europe but had not carried out their attacks on European soil. Europe according to this view, might be a target for conventional terrorists and an ideal base for preparing spectacular attacks, but is not a target in the way the United States and US interests are. Not only is this conclusion false but it is also dangerous, because it would pre-

vent Europe from taking the necessary measures to protect itself from future attacks on a far greater scale than those it has had to face in the past. The Italian police and judiciary for instance are fully aware that they must address two phenomena that do not necessarily have anything to do with each other: old and new forms of terrorism. There is no proof of any connection between the Red Brigades and al-Qaeda, but there is no doubt about the presence in Italy, particularly in Milan, of terrorist cells with links to Osama bin Laden's network. And those cells are present throughout Europe. Apart from Milan, the best-known are those in Hamburg, Frankfurt and Madrid. In dealing with international terrorism, Europe has more to think about than the mere presence of networks that are planning attacks against US interests. Terrorist cells that have been identified and destroyed in Europe did indeed plan to carry out attacks on European soil: the Christmas market in Strasbourg in December 2000, the US embassy in Paris in the summer of 2001, and, more recently, Bologna Cathedral in May 2002 have been planned targets.³⁰ In addition, cells reportedly planned to carry out attacks in 2001 on St Peter's in Rome and St Mark's in Venice. Even Sweden has not been immune: a Swede of Tunisian origin was arrested in Stockholm while attempting to board a Boeing 727 bound for London with the intention, according to Swedish military intelligence, of crashing the plane into an official building.³¹ Other European countries have been targeted abroad: German citizens were targeted in Tunisia (fourteen German tourists were killed in an attack against the El Ghriba synagogue in Djerba on 11 April 2002), and France was hit in Pakistan (eleven engineers of the Directorate of Naval Construction were killed in Karachi on 8 May 2002) and in Yemen (attack on the tanker Limburg in October 2002). Links between these three incidents and al-Qaeda seem by now to have been established.³² Europeans tend too often to conclude that any attack is merely a show of exasperation towards the United States in general and its presence in the Middle East in particular, and that any future attacks will therefore target only American interests at home and abroad.³³ Yet that thought bears little relation to facts, intentions or to the ideology of the networks concerned. The United States may be the prime target because of its central symbolism and its global presence, but it is above all seen as the leader of a Western civilisation, of which Europe is a part, and that is the real threat. All available interviews with members of al-Qaeda bear this out.³⁴ Some European experts on terrorism even

30 Four Moroccans and an Italian were stopped in August in Bologna in connection with the investigation. The Cathedral houses a fifteenth-century fresco that some consider to be insulting to Islam.

31 There is still a lot of mystery surrounding this event, with a number of contradictory statements having been issued, but the incident shook Sweden, especially with an election looming. The man who was taken into custody has been released.

32 French secret services established the link between the Karachi and Yemen attacks and al-Qaeda, as the German services came to the same conclusion over the Djerba synagogue bombing. *The Wall Street Journal* on 20 April 2002 carried a fairly precise account of the investigation: 'April bombing signaled al-Qaeda is dangerous even without a head'.

33 There is no doubt that Osama bin Laden sees the United States as the main enemy 'who divided the Ummah into small and little countries and pushed it, for the last few decades, into a state of confusion'. In fact this division is due to the work of European states. But 'The latest and the greatest of these aggressions . . . is the occupation of the land of the two holy places – the foundation of the house of Islam – the place of the revelation, the source of the message and the place of the noble Ka'ba, the Qiblah of all Muslims – by the armies of the American Crusaders and their allies.' Such was Osama bin Laden's first fatwa. And next to the Holy Places there is oil: 'The presence of the USA Crusader military forces on land, sea and air of the states of the Islamic Gulf is the greatest danger threatening the largest oil reserve in the world.'

34 John Christopher Campbell, an American originally from Missouri who has converted to Islam, conducted the most recent interviews recorded in Baluchistan and in Pakistan during the summer of 2002. They analyse the hostility towards the corrupting influence of money and Western values on Arab countries: 'They don't want

their world polluted'. This so-called 'pollution' comes as much from Europe as the United States.

35 The attack that took place in Karachi on 8 May 2002 against French technicians and engineers seems to have been the sequel to the failure of the attack on the Paris-Miami flight. In effect, one of the persons who was stopped and expelled from France to Pakistan in April 2002, Abdul Qahar, is alleged to have been the ring-leader of the attack. The French investigators have not been reticent in reminding their Pakistani colleagues of this disturbing detail – especially since Abdul Qahar had been in fact sent to Karachi.

36 See Yaroslav Trofimov, 'Mediterranean may be next terrorist theater', *The Wall Street Journal*, 12 June 2002. The operation that was prevented in the Straits of Gibraltar was supposedly planned after 11 September, in the mountains of Tora Bora, as the al-Qaeda leadership was taking the decision to flee, in December 2001, when it was the target of a particularly violent air strike.

37 The United Kingdom has suffered more dead than any other European country since 11 September. Around forty British nationals perished in the Bali attack in October 2002 alone. The number of Europeans who died in this attack is estimated to be around seventy.

38 It is important to note the authoritative influence of the London mosques, like the one in Finsbury Park, north London – where, on the day after 11 September, the imam Abu Hamza al-Masri gave his blessing to the attacks in the name of 'legitimate defence' – and the large Regent's Park Mosque. In October 2002, Sheikh Omar Mahmood Abu Omar, also known as Abu Qatada, considered one of al-Qaeda's main recruiters in Europe, was arrested in London. He had disappeared in December 2001 when the new anti-terrorist law was passed.

think that Europe, which is now deeply involved in the fight against terrorism, could become a more tempting target for the terrorists as it is less well protected than the United States. Several of Europe's characteristics do in fact make it more attractive than the United States, not least of which its geography and a growing Muslim population.

Terrorism as a common threat for the Alliance?

On several occasions during his trip to Europe in May 2002, the US president declared that 'Europe was facing the same threats as America'. It is easy to see how such a statement might serve the ideas and interests that George Bush had then come to defend in Europe. But it is striking that European experts on terrorism are saying almost the same thing. They all refer to the presence of terrorists in Europe – whose numbers are increasing with new arrivals, often after regrouping in the Balkans – and are all worried that a major attack could be successfully carried out on European soil. The EU countries most directly affected by the presence of terrorists are the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Spain. Since the wave of attacks in 1994 and 1995 it sometimes seems that France is less directly threatened on its own soil³⁵ because of the anti-terrorist measures that have subsequently been adopted. But that theory is not borne out by the terrorists' own recent statements. Terrorist cells in Europe have been set up by two major movements: the Egyptian group Anathema and Exile and the Algerian Salafist Group for Preach and Combat. More than two hundred persons have been arrested in Europe since 11 September (in Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain). The arrest in June 2002 of several al-Qaeda members in Morocco while they were planning to blow up a naval vessel in the Straits of Gibraltar has led some European observers to forecast that the Mediterranean could be one of the terrorist networks' next theatre of operations.³⁶

► The *United Kingdom* is perhaps the European country most affected by the presence of terrorists.³⁷ It is both a sanctuary because of the protection of civil liberties and a recruitment centre for the whole of Europe.³⁸ According to their acquaintances,

Djamel Beghal, Nazir Trabelsi, and Zacharias Moussaoui led peaceful lives before crossing the Channel. Their switch to terrorism happened as a result of chance meetings in 'Londonistan', especially at the Finsbury Park Mosque.³⁹ For the Algerian GIA, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and many underground groups, the United Kingdom was – and still is – a country of choice. The United Kingdom and France have been on opposite sides of a debate since 1995 because of a request to extradite Rashid Ramda, one of the sponsors of the terrorist campaign in France, whom British judges refused for a long period to extradite.⁴⁰ Decisions were taken following 11 September to improve cooperation not only with the United States but also with other European countries. In some cases London seems to have gone from one extreme to another. Legislation was enacted in December 2001 that allowed for imprisonment without trial for foreigners suspected of terrorist activities. That law has come in for heavy criticism for introducing discrimination between Britons and foreigners. The British also took the most significant offensive and defensive measures in Europe following the attacks. In July 2002, the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, announced a long series of measures that covered aerial surveillance, specific means for dealing with NRBC, and the creation of domestic Reaction Forces made up of a total of 6,000 reservists for responding to possible terrorist attacks.⁴¹ In November 2002, particularly serious threats were directed at London.

► In *Germany*, in which three of the eleven terrorists, including Mohamed Atta, had resided for several years (in Hamburg⁴²), the biggest police investigation in German history was launched following 11 September, with over 600 police officers. A dozen or so Islamists were arrested, including some close to Mohamed Atta, and the authorities quickly realised that the scale of the Islamist threat was much greater than they had previously suspected.⁴³ The danger had not been completely overlooked, however: in December 2000, a faction was thwarted in Frankfurt while it prepared attacks on Strasbourg. It was also the German authorities who had unearthed plans to attack the World Trade Center dating from 1999. Lastly, in September 2002 a plan to attack a US military base at Heidelberg was foiled. Germany has taken a number of significant measures to avoid having terrorist organisations benefiting from the considerable freedoms enjoyed by religious associations

39 This mosque is now considered to be a recruitment centre for al-Qaeda in Europe. Zacharias Moussaoui and Richard Reid both passed through there. At present, the recruiters are looking for, preferably, Muslims of European or US nationality.

40. France, for its part, has only recently extradited to Italy Paolo Persichetti, who had been teaching for some years at the University of Paris VIII, and who had been wanted in Rome as a former member of the Red Brigades that had been implicated in the assassination of General Licio Giorgeri on 20 March 1987.

41. The Secretary of State for Defence declared that these measures 'were designed to ensure that our defence policies, capabilities and force structures matched the new challenges that were so vividly and tragically illustrated in the 11 September attacks.' A prototype of an unmanned aerial vehicle, the *Watchkeeper*, should start its trials programme in 2003. A new chapter of Britain's Strategic Defence Review was published on 18 July 2002. It provides for an increase in the defence budget of £3.5 billion between now and 2006.

42. In the summer of 2002, one of the most accurate accounts on the Hamburg cell was made public, in which it emerged in particular that Marwan al-Shehi, the pilot of the United Airlines plane that hit the south tower of the World Trade Center, had boasted in Germany in spring 2001 of soon being responsible for the deaths of thousands. This revelation was made at the trial of Mounir El Mottasedeq, who is being held in Germany for his role in planning the attacks. He was arrested in Hamburg on 28 November 2001.

43. On Tuesday 8 October, the Qatari television channel Al-Jazeera broadcast an audio tape that was attributed to the number two of the terrorist network, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who publicly threatened Germany and France.

since the end of the Second World War. For some months now there has been a fairly marked reluctance on the part of the German people and firms to participate in the implementation of new measures, especially those that would help the police to build up files on suspects.⁴⁴ Such measures bring back memories that the great majority of Germans have for long tried to erase.

► *Italy* suffered a series of particularly violent terrorist activities in the 1970s that continue to be the subject of much research.⁴⁵ The Italian peninsula, along with the United Kingdom, has been described as the European centre for al-Qaeda operations, because of its proximity to the Balkans. Here too, arrests were made before the September 2001 attacks. On 4 April 2000, members of a cell linked to al-Qaeda were arrested in Milan as they prepared an attack on the American Embassy in Rome. In March 2001, again in Milan, listening devices planted in the apartment of a terrorist of Tunisian origin revealed new plans that targeted sites in Europe. References were made there to a large network in extreme language (e.g. 'Europe is in our hands'). This cell allegedly prepared chemical attacks using a liquid agent described as 'very efficient' and designed to suffocate people. The arrest of all the members put an end to those plans, but not to the concerns raised by them. One year later, in March 2002, during Easter celebrations, four Italian cities – Florence, Milan, Venice and Rome – were put on alert as attacks on American citizens or interests were feared. Finally, persistent threats against Bologna Cathedral have meant the mobilisation of police forces for some months. As in Germany, there have been only a few arrests since 11 September: around twenty-five suspects have been jailed since the attacks.

► In *Spain* terrorist infiltration began very early, at the beginning of the 1990s. Following 11 September the Madrid-based judge Baltazar Garzon launched in November 2001 Operation *Date* against al-Qaeda's support networks in Spain. In one year around fifteen Islamist militants were arrested, several of whom were raising funds in Europe for al-Qaeda. The police have also put their hands on video material showing several American symbolic landmarks (the World Trade Center, Sears Tower in Chicago, the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, the Statue of Liberty etc.), for the probable

44. See Ian Johnson and David Crawford: 'German Profiling Effort Wakens Ugly Memories and Employer Defiance', *The Wall Street Journal*, 9-11 August 2002.

45. The last two books on the subject were: *The Moro Affair*, by Leonardo Sciasca, and *Cassa Rossa*, by Francesca Marciano.

purpose of identifying terrorist targets. Spain may also have been used as a logistic base for preparing 11 September, with a consultative summit being held in July 2001 that at least two of the pilots, including the ringleader, Mohamed Atta, reportedly attended. The cell that developed in Madrid since 1994 was dismantled and its eight members arrested. This was the so-called Soldiers of Allah, headed by a Palestinian, Anwar Adnan Mohamed Saleh and a Syrian, Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, that was placed under surveillance for several years and, like the Milan cell, revealed a good deal of intelligence on network activities in Europe. In addition to Islamist terrorism, Spain is having to contend with the radicalisation of ETA, which is controlled these days by its most extreme and violent elements.⁴⁶

► In *France*, the tranquillity of the population is justified neither by al-Qaeda's declarations, which have publicly threatened France, nor by the events of the past few years. Several attacks have been thwarted, one in Strasbourg at Christmas 2000 and another against the American Embassy in Paris during summer 2001 – Djamel Beghal was stopped at Dubai Airport on 28 July 2001 while he was preparing the latter attack. It was also from France that Richard Reid boarded the American Airlines Paris-Miami flight with explosives in his shoes on 22 December 2001. Since 11 September, two attacks against French nationals and French interests abroad deserve attention: first, the attack that killed eleven French engineers and technicians of the DCN, the French Directorate for Naval Construction of Cherbourg in Karachi on 8 May 2002. It seems that this attack was carried out by one of Richard Reid's contacts in France, and therefore a link to the al-Qaeda network existed. Then, a few months later, on 6 October, the French oil tanker *Limburg* was attacked to the south-east of Sanaa in Yemen reportedly with powerful explosives. This was probably the work of a team in a small boat that was seen by a crew member approaching the tanker at high speed just prior to the explosion, along the same lines as the attack on the *USS Cole*.⁴⁷ On 8 October, Al-Jazeera Television broadcast threats directed against France by the al-Qaeda number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Some experts on terrorism believe that France is threatened both as a weak link in the United States-led coalition and because of the strong Algerian presence in al-Qaeda network.⁴⁸ France's anti-terrorist set-up was already in

46. See Leslie Crawford 'Divided by Violence', *Financial Times*, 24-25 August: 'Violence has become ETA's main rationale' says a former separatist who renounced the ETA long ago. 'The exercise of killing creates antibodies. ETA's next recruits can digest barbaric acts that would have been unthinkable before: the torturing of town councillors, the killing of children, of traffic wardens and local policemen. ETA now is led by its most extreme elements, those who are prepared to go furthest in all this senseless killing.'

47. In September 2002, the US Navy gave a warning on the possibility of al-Qaeda attacks against oil tankers in the Gulf and the Red Sea, through which a third of the world's oil exports pass. The maritime insurance group, Lloyds, whose findings were made public on 10 October, rapidly decided that an attack had probably taken place.

48. This is certainly what the anti-terrorist magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguière has concluded. As has the DST, the Directorate of Territory Surveillance. See the interview that Pierre de Bousquet, the head of the DST, gave to *Le Monde* on 12 September: 'The risk is that today there is a real rapprochement between the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), which is present in Algeria, and the people of al-Qaeda.'

place, for the most part, before September 2001. Having suffered a series of bloody attacks in 1995, France put in place the following year measures that have considerably strengthened the investigative powers of judges in terrorist cases.⁴⁹ Following 11 September, a new internal security law was enacted on 15 November with further provisions: car and home searches, additional checks at airports and seaports, surveillance of Internet communications, the right to disband certain groups. Any measures in this legislation that have been passed for bolstering the fight against terrorism have a limited duration of two years, at which point an assessment report will be submitted to Parliament on their application. The resources of the defence and interior ministries available for fighting terrorism have been increased in 2002. And finally, France's defence spending for 2003-08 specifies that, should a serious terrorist attack occur, 'security forces may be reinforced with military assets' and that 'all military detachments must be capable of assisting the civil population in the event of asymmetric attacks', particularly those of a non-conventional nature. However, civil defence remains under-supported because of the considerable ground still to be made up in the armed forces' more conventional requirements.

► *Belgium*⁵⁰ has been experiencing a rise in Islamist activities linked to Afghanistan and the struggle against the USSR since the 1980s with the opening in Brussels of an Office of Mujaheddin Afghans. Later, during the 1990s, logistical support structures were set up in Belgium to help combatants in the Algerian militias. Finally, as in the rest of Europe, the Bosnian and Chechen conflicts worked to accelerate and facilitate the development of activities in Belgium. In March 1998, an Islamist network with a transnational vocation was dismantled in Brussels. Activists of North African origin were among the members of this organisation who possessed explosives and could also forge documents.

► *Flow-on effects on domestic terrorism.* Thanks to the fight against terrorism, European nations have also managed to restrict or put an end to the activities of groups having more strictly national aims on their home territory. The most eloquent example is possibly Greece, where the police have partially dismantled the Revolution-

49. Law passed on 23 July 1996 for reinforcing the repression of terrorism.

50. See the publications of Alain Grignard (police superintendent, terrorist division, Brussels) on this subject, particularly: 'Brève genèse de l'Islamisme radical' (a brief description of the origins of radical Islamism) in G. Chalian, *L'arme du terrorisme* (Paris: Ed Audibert, 2002); and F. Dassetto (ed.), *Facettes de l'Islam belge (Facets of Belgian Islam)* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Editions Academia-Bruyants, 1998).

ary Organisation 17 November after twenty-five years of fruitless efforts to track it down. This organisation, whose roots can be traced to the student movements of the late 1960s, is held responsible for over twenty political assassinations, including those of four Americans and one Briton, in the name of the struggle against 'imperialism'. There is, however, considerable uncertainty as to the significance of the arrests and the residual capacity of the organisation to carry out acts of terror. Italy, Spain and Germany have also made progress in clamping down on their own terrorist groups with 'domestic' objectives.⁵¹ And France has extradited a member of the Red Brigades to Italy who lived in France for years without ever being bothered.

Towards an integrated police and judiciary?

Traditionally, European integration has been confined to the economic and trade areas, while military and judicial issues remained the preserve of member states. The situation created by the events of 11 September showed the urgent need for certain changes to be made, especially since the terrorists were able to take advantage not only of the civil liberties that European citizens enjoy, but also of the juxtaposition of two phenomena: the freedom of movement inside the Schengen area⁵² and the multiplicity of different police and justice systems. The proposed creation of a European judicial 'space' and a European police force was speeded up by the 11 September attacks.⁵³ The Commission quickly studied new measures designed to combat terrorism, including a definition of what constitutes a terrorist act⁵⁴ and, even more importantly, a European arrest warrant to replace the present cumbersome extradition between member states.⁵⁵ On the initiative of the Spanish presidency, which devoted a lot of energy to this subject, the European Council of June 2002 declared that CFSP and ESDP were to play a more important part in the fight against terrorism. A legal ruling makes it possible to freeze funds anywhere in Europe once an individual or organisation has been identified as a potential source of terrorism financing.⁵⁶ An agreement on Eurojust, which is to be set up in The Hague as a permanent arrangement for cooperation between the judicial institutions and magistratures of the Fifteen, was reached in Laeken in December 2001. European police forces have also improved their cooperation. The operations of Europol,

51. The alleged head of GRAPO was arrested in Paris this summer. Furthermore, in August 2002, the investigating magistrate, Baltazar Garzon, took measures to proscribe the Basque separatist party, Batasuna, which is linked to the terrorist organisation ETA. Successive Spanish governments have looked at proscribing this party since its creation in 1978 because of its links to terrorism. Even before the ban was decided on, Spanish authorities had suspended the organisation.

52. Inside this area, which was inaugurated in 1985 by Germany, France and the Benelux countries, and to which eleven countries of the EU now belong, all interior borders are abolished. This agreement was incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam. This 'security zone' does involve exchanges of information and a certain degree of cooperation between the police forces, but it has not been crafted to deal with new forms of terrorism.

53. Accelerated but not created, since it was the European Council meeting in Tampere that took the first steps towards the creation of a European judicial area. The Council's recommendations related, in particular, to the need to be prepared for possible criminal and terrorist activity. These were very useful following 11 September.

54. This has been the subject of endless debates at the UN. The member states of the EU came to an agreement covering nine points in June 2002, with a wide definition that covers abduction, hijackings of aircraft or boats, the manufacture and possession of conventional and non-conventional weapons, mass destruction, etc.

55. The warrant was agreed on at the Laeken summit in December 2001. Thirty-two offences and crimes (not all of which involve terrorism) can justify arrest in any EU country from January 2003. Some EU countries, such as Greece, must change their constitution. On the subject of terrorism, the fifteen justice ministers agreed on harmonised sentencing practices in April 2002, so that terrorists cannot benefit from more

favourable treatment in any one EU country. The EU states recognise that unification of arrest procedures is the only proper way of dealing with the scale of the challenge that has arisen as a result of the most serious incidents of international terrorism.

56. Around a million euros have been frozen. At a meeting organised in Paris in January 2002, one of the most prominent French magistrates working on terrorism, Jean-Louis Bruguière, declared that measures taken to address the financing of terrorism were insufficient: 'In effect, our efforts can only address "macro-financing", that is, significant financing operations, which use known channels and financial institutions. Yet recent experience shows that it is "micro-financing" that is responsible for supplying the networks that have carried out terrorist attacks. Most small-scale financing comes from legal donations and, especially, petty crime, which are encouraged solely for the financing of operations.' In August 2002, a United Nations report, which concluded that measures taken with the aim of curtailing the financing of terrorism were of limited effect, sparked off a debate with the American authorities, who were keen to defend the results that had been obtained. It seems, in reality, that the efforts continue, and in some cases are being toughened up, but that terrorists are still benefiting from new sources of financing (or old sources that have often been renamed).

57. As Anne Deighton indicates in a study that will be published in Montreal in 2003, 'Towards a security space: internal security in the EU since 9/11': '11 September has "galvanized" the EU in its efforts to create an area of security, freedom and justice as envisaged at Tampere. However, major policy developments in the EU are always a challenge to relations between Brussels and the member-states, as well as between the member-states themselves. The delivery of an effective and legitimate security policy tests how far the institutional structure of the Union can be empowered to upgrade the interests of individual member-states.'

which is also based in The Hague and has been operating since July 1999, were speeded up as a result of the terrorist attacks. A task force on terrorism was set up – with exchanges of information with the United States. One of Europol's great weaknesses is that it has no power in Central and Eastern Europe, where false identity papers and counterfeit payment means are manufactured on a large scale. Another weakness is a shortage of Arab, Pashtun, and Urdu speakers – a necessity for understanding intercepted messages and infiltrating the networks. But the main obstacle to creating a common judicial and police space in Europe is undoubtedly – as is the case every time a new common institution is set up – relations between Brussels and member states.⁵⁷ Yet despite all of this, the EU is moving towards the harmonisation of legislation and the creation of a judicial space, and it is working on common judicial practice and procedures. The conditions for creating a common police force are not quite so favourable, but progress has been achieved in this area over the past few months, with the plan to create a European border police force. Hopefully, further progress in all these areas should be made at the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC).

Limited but real military participation in Afghanistan

The extraordinary European Council meeting on 21 September recognised the legitimacy of America's response and indicated that members of the Union would assist according to their means. In this respect, the British had three advantages: there were British forces already in the region (joint exercises in the Gulf), they have a high degree of interoperability with the Americans, and because of the special relationship between the intelligence communities in London and Washington, information was exchanged that the United States would hesitate to share with other members of the EU, at a time when it is embarking on a very delicate operation. The first of these advantages allowed a smoother transfer of troops to the theatre of operations. The second made it possible to save precious preparation time; the third, to share crucial information.⁵⁸ But the most important fact was perhaps the British prime minister's decision from the outset that this fight was also Britain's, establishing himself as an uncontested ally of Washington. For Tony Blair, as early as September, there was only 'one possible out-

come – our victory’ and the dangers of inaction were presented as greater than the dangers of action. From the first day of the operation, 7 October, British forces were therefore present and firing on Taliban positions. Later, British special forces were involved in the fiercest fighting, both at Tora Bora in December 2001⁵⁹ and in Operation *Anaconda* in March 2002.⁶⁰ London deployed some 1,500 troops in the hunt for al-Qaida fighters. The gradual withdrawal of British troops from July 2002 indicated that the terrorist threat in Afghanistan had substantially decreased, even if the country was far from stabilised. Apart from the British contribution,⁶¹ the Europeans’ military cooperation may appear limited but it was none the less real. The presence of hundreds of German special forces is often forgotten, even in Germany,⁶² because of Berlin’s wish to remain discreet on the subject. Nevertheless, these troops played an important role, in several zones where the warlords might have threatened the new government in Kabul. As for France, whose forces’ participation was codenamed Operation *Héraclès*, its contribution consisted of intelligence assets, two marine infantry companies and, admittedly a little late, Task Force 473 centred on the aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle* (which was on station on 18 December 2001) and air elements at Manas, where six 2000D *Mirages* arrived on 6 February 2002.⁶³ In all, France’s involvement amounted to 5,000 troops between 15 December 2001 and 20 June 2002.⁶⁴ Most of them were based in the Indian Ocean, where they stopped and searched 2000 vessels, but several hundred, based in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, and Dushanbe, in Tajikistan, also participated in the air strikes on Afghan soil, especially in March 2002.⁶⁵ By the autumn of 2002, the Taliban and al-Qaeda are less of a threat, but Hamid Karzai’s position is under pressure from within his own government, particularly from his defence minister, Mohammed Fahim – a Tajik who commands several thousand men. That struggle conceals a renewal of interethnic conflict that could plunge Afghanistan back into a state of anarchy. If that were to happen, the military operation as a whole might possibly be seen in a different light, particularly in Europe, where the limitations of military operations by themselves have always been stressed. Nor would some then have any hesitation in remarking, with some justification, that a stabilisation force limited to Kabul could scarcely ‘stabilise’ all of Afghanistan. From this viewpoint, the Europeans have been just as reticent as the Americans to widen the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force.

58. Although it seems on this point that exchanges were limited by the lack of information available to the Americans on Afghanistan; and dependence on the Pakistani services was excessive at the beginning of operations.

59. British special forces were on the ground at Tora Bora during the decisive battle against Osama bin Laden. That the Americans were not on the ground and that they had delegated the fighting to Afghan troops during this battle probably resulted in the entire al-Qaeda leadership to escape while a short truce negotiated with local forces held effect.

60. Beginning on March 2, Operation *Anaconda* took place about sixty miles from Tora Bora, leading to particularly violent skirmishing. Participating in various roles in the US-led fighting, there were Australian, British, Canadian, French, German and Norwegian forces, and ground forces of the new Afghan government (in all about 2,000 men), opposing around a thousand al-Qaeda militiamen.

61. See the declaration of the Secretary of State for Defence to the House of Commons on 18 March 2002 on the British contribution to operations in Afghanistan.

62. The French, for their part, may have been surprised to learn when reading *Le Monde* of 23 October 2002 that French special forces, because of their performance in Afghanistan, had been called ‘Framework nation for special operations’. This label allows the holder, in the event of intervention by allied commandos, to take command.

63. It is interesting to note that by autumn 2002, Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark had all deployed six aircraft each to Afghanistan.

64. Between 15 December 2001 and 20 June 2002, a French air carrier group has carried out surveillance of Afghan territory (sixteen *Super Etendard* have participated in these operations) and of maritime space along the Pakistani coast (2,000 boats stopped, including suspect vessels heading to Oman from Iran). Since March 2002, there have

been six *Mirage 2000* based in Manas (Kyrgyzstan), which participated in air strikes over Afghanistan in March, and an air force detachment of 130 men at Dushanbe (Tajikistan). By the summer of 2002 there were only two French naval vessels left in the Indian Ocean; 500 personnel attached to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, the air force detachment at Dushanbe, and sixty instructors in charge of training the Afghan army.

65. Participation in these bombardments was the subject of debate between the Gaullist president and the Socialist government, who were nearing the end of their 'cohabitation' period. The prime minister was in fact opposed to these strikes and avoided, for this reason, any publicity on the matter.

66. See, for example, Thérèse Delpech, 'Terrorisme de masse, Acte I', *Liberation*, 18 septembre 2001.

67. Tabun and sarin were among the chemical weapons that terrorists were being instructed in at the camps. In the biological field, work has been done on anthrax, but also on hemorrhagic fevers, like the Ebola virus. Tests may have been carried out on animals in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda video cassettes that were seized in Afghanistan heighten suspicions in this area: included in the tapes are the images of puppies dying after gas was dispersed near them, probably of a neuro-toxic variety given the reactions of the animals. Another fear of terrorism experts is water pollution.

68. Air strikes completely destroyed the Derunta site. The US Vice-President, Dick Cheney, alluded to it on 7 August 2002, in a speech at San Francisco: 'In the rubble of Afghanistan, we've found confirmation, if any were needed, that bin Laden and the Al Qaida network are seriously interested in nuclear and radiological weapons, and in biological and chemical agents.'

69. This attack, which happened on 20 March 1995, is today seen as a warning shot that was not

NRBC Terrorism

Non-conventional attacks: the emergence of fears

For about a decade, fears of NRBC terrorism have been in the minds of governments and experts, but have remained unknown to the wider public. It was mass terrorism and its historic advent on 11 September 2001 that have led many analysts to emphasise in the media that the next stage could involve the use of weapons specifically designed to cause large numbers of victims.⁶⁶ These weapons, which are accurately described as weapons of mass destruction, include chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Their spread to new states is officially held to be, since January 1992, one of the main threats to international security (declaration of the president of the Security Council at a meeting of heads of state and government). That belief played an important part in the agreement of all states to extend the NPT indefinitely in 1995. With non-states possibly possessing such weapons, a milestone has been passed. Concern that terrorists could acquire them is backed up by the existence in several terrorist networks of experts whose job is to obtain the materials, agents and equipment required for making these weapons. Training camps, like the one at Derunta in Afghanistan, have been set up specifically to train terrorists in the manufacture of chemical or biological weapons.⁶⁷ These camps, whose existence was known to Western intelligence prior to the military operations in Afghanistan, were visited after the hostilities.⁶⁸ And finally, it cannot be ignored that such weapons have already been used, and that NRBC terrorism is no longer the preserve of the action thriller. A chemical attack, carried out by the Aum Shinri Kyo sect on the Tokyo underground in March 1995, left 11 dead and a thousand others suffering from its effects.⁶⁹ The same group had unsuccessfully attempted to use biological weapons in 1990 (botulinum toxin) in Tokyo, on Narita airport, and on the US bases in Yokohama and Yokosuka, but without success.⁷⁰ In June and July of 1993, the sect tried again using anthrax in an area of Tokyo, but the sample was not virulent and there were no victims. The first bio-terrorism victims were making the front pages of newspapers in the United States and throughout the world shortly after the 11 September attacks. Letters laced with anthrax, containing not more than a half-ounce of powder, killed

five persons, afflicted twelve, paralysed Congress for several months and terrified millions of Americans. The financial cost was put at several billion dollars, as a result of government buildings and post offices being contaminated. Those attacks transformed what was hitherto a very vague threat of bio-terrorism into a reality. Even if the perpetrator was an American, which many have since autumn 2001 thought is the case, it does not make it less of a terrifying first. There is scarcely any doubt that new generation terrorists are trying to obtain such weapons, and that they will not hesitate to use them.

Experts are particularly concerned about chemical and biological weapons

Not only has there never been an attack involving a nuclear device, but terrorists seem to have a preference for chemical and biological weapons. Several reports proved that numerous members of al-Qaeda are excellent chemists capable of developing deadly weapons out of products easily available. Such attacks could be more destructive than the 11 September attacks, especially on the psychological level, which is so important for terrorists. This was verified in the United States in autumn 2001 when envelopes containing only a few grams of anthrax managed to scare not only millions of Americans, but also nationals of other countries. In Europe, where no similar incident has taken place, there were a significant number of cases where 'white powders' were sighted in public and private buildings, each time proving to be harmless but suddenly seen under a different light.⁷¹ A number of Europeans leaders made public declarations on NRBC terrorism to highlight how seriously they were taking the threat. In April 2002, British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared to the House of Commons: 'I draw the House's attention to the fact that, in my first statement to the House a few days after 11 September, I made it clear that the issue of weapons of mass destruction had to be, and should be, dealt with.' France's five-year defence spending plan (*Loi de Programmation militaire*) also emphasises the need of making available to civil defence the unique NRBC capabilities of the Ministry of Defence and, in particular, the army health services and the DGA (MOD's directorate for armaments programmes).⁷²

taken seriously enough in the rest of the world, particularly in Europe.

70. The sect tried actively to obtain weapons of mass destruction from laboratories and experts in the former Soviet Union to wage an apocalyptic war. It has worked on developing chemical weapons (anthrax, bucolic toxin and Ebola). Yet it is an area where few practical results have been achieved.

71. In France, on 19 October alone, several false alerts were reported. See Pierre Georges, 'Défense civile'. *Le Monde*, 20 octobre 2001.

72. See *Loi de Programmation Militaire*, ch. 3, p. 26.

Nuclear and radiological terrorism

Even if John Ashcroft overdid the significance of the José Padilla affair, there is still a clear threat in the form of radiological weapons. They have been included in the UN definition of weapons of mass destruction since 1948. States have not developed them, but non-state organisations may find them attractive because of the relative ease of their manufacture and the devastating psychological effect that their use would have on the population. Many nuclear materials can be used in conjunction with conventional explosives to build a radiological weapon around: cobalt 60, strontium 90, caesium 137, plutonium 238, etc.⁷³ A number of initiatives are under way to address the threat, especially at the IAEA.⁷⁴ This institution, which for ten years has maintained a register of illegal trafficking in nuclear materials, is concerned both with helping in international efforts to fight terrorism and protecting the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy throughout the world. The fission products of uranium-235 or plutonium-239 in the nuclear fuel of working reactors are among the most dangerous radioactive materials (essentially caesium and strontium). The prevention of nuclear terrorism has resulted in a new IAEA initiative aimed at so-called 'orphaned' radioactive sources, i.e. non-identified or registered materials that can cause serious incidents, like the recent case in Georgia in spring 2002. The IAEA must also take measures to protect nuclear installations that are vulnerable to attacks and to prevent theft or purchase of fissile materials as well as the theft of nuclear warheads. In this last area, there has been more rumour than fact – up to now. But to keep it this way, attention must now be turned to Russia's tactical weapons, which are not covered by any bilateral or multilateral agreement, and for which greater transparency has become essential. This must encompass small nuclear devices (often called 'suitcase bombs') that were designed during the Cold War for destroying bridges on the European front in the event of an East-West confrontation. General Alexander Lebed spoke of some eighty of these that had been lost. That allegation has never been verified, but, what is certain, is that they would be redoubtable weapons in the hands of terrorist organisations.

73. Plutonium-238 and strontium-90 are easy to manipulate because they emit only alpha or beta rays. Cobalt-60 and caesium-137 raise a number of difficulties on the other hand because they emit gamma rays, and this over a long period. Furthermore, caesium is soluble in water.

74. A revision of the convention on physical protection will make it possible to take into account the terrorist threat (sabotage for example); furthermore, the IAEA has launched an operation whose purpose is to recoup rogue nuclear energy materials, to help prevent illegal trafficking in vulnerable countries and to verify protection procedures of nuclear installations and materials.

The biological risk deserves special mention

Whereas the twentieth century was the century of physics, the twenty-first will be the century of the life sciences. Military applications of discoveries as significant as the human genome are potentially devastating. The use of biological weapons is outlawed by an international convention that dates back to 1925, and has been signed and ratified by most states. The production and storage of biological weapons were banned by the 1972 BTW Convention. But the USSR, which is one of the depositary states of the treaty, did not hesitate to build up a biological empire that employed 70,000 persons shortly after it had ratified the text, which did not include verification procedures. This set an example to others wanting to develop such weapons clandestinely. Moreover, non-state networks are not bound by treaties. In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that bio-terrorism, against which there is currently little protection, has caught governments' attention. This has been true in Europe. On 19 October 2001 at Ghent, at the very moment that bio-attacks were being carried out in Florida, Washington and New York, the heads of state and government of the EU decided to establish a programme to fight bio-terrorism that would be handled by the European Commission and health experts from member states. It includes the setting up of a consultation mechanism in times of crisis and a register of the capacities of European laboratories expert in matters of prevention. Their holdings of vaccines, serum and antibiotics were also included. Networks of experts responsible for risk evaluation, and dissemination of information have been created, but new methods of treatment must still be developed. A monitoring and information centre was established in October 2001, with Belgian, French and Swedish experts.⁷⁵ Since 1 January 2002 all EU members have access to this information centre on bio-terrorism that is manned twenty-four hours a day and provides a register of national intervention teams, a training course, a system for mobilising and coordinating earmarked experts, and a network dedicated to emergency communications between the EU Commission and national authorities.⁷⁶ Lastly, at the Laeken European Council on 14 and 15 December 2001, it was decided to create a European Civil Protection Agency.

75. At the European Council meeting in Ghent on October 2001, the fifteen member states decided to designate a European coordinator for civil protection measures who is in charge of coordinating the perfection and monitoring of EU initiatives, such as control and epidemic prevention measures. The fight against bio-terrorism is a question of common interest between member states, which justifies the implementation of a cooperative programme that draws on the expertise and means of the member states and the EU Commission.

76. The first priority was to set up a fast communication system between the fifteen member-states and the European Commission in the event of an emergency. This network is now up and running. The second priority was to draw on the talent of experts on epidemiology, dangerous agents, and diagnosis so as to be in a position at the end of 2003 to be able to define the biological risk, which is taken very seriously in Brussels. The third priority was to agree on the possibility of launching a programme to perfect a third-generation vaccine against smallpox. No decision has yet been taken on this matter. Both France and the United Kingdom have around twenty million doses, but the unwanted side-effects are considerable. Finally, the pooling of means at the European level (antibiotics, for example) is still very difficult, except for France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Efforts have been made in the area of early detection, essential for addressing the threat. As early as January 1999, a surveillance network for epidemiology and control of infectious diseases became operational. This made it possible to exchange data on outbreaks of infectious diseases. A group of testing laboratories now allows the confirmation of findings that are provided through the network.

Security of nuclear materials and biological and chemical agents

This is not a new issue. Since the demise of the USSR, the possibility that nuclear materials might fall into the hands of countries with clandestine military programmes is one of the main concerns of many states, the United States in the first place, that have made considerable financial resources available to reduce this risk. European countries have been able to see the risk on their soil, with the rise of illicit trafficking that was unknown during the Cold War. There are several explanations. First, there is the weakening of controls over countries that formed the ex-USSR. Second, there is the emergence of clandestine networks whose origins can often be traced back to the ex-USSR. This risk had been taken into account before 11 September. The most recent development is the possible acquisition of fissile materials, not by states but by terrorist organisations. Also, far greater attention than previously is being paid to the security of biological and chemical agents, which until recently were not considered as great a priority as nuclear materials. Finally, after experts had called unsuccessfully for the establishment of a European CTR,⁷⁷ European countries have begun to make more significant financial and political commitments. Since autumn 2001, NATO has held discussions with Russia, but it was at the G-8 summit at Kananaskis, Canada, in July 2002, that the breakthrough was made. To get a commitment to spend \$20 billion on this over the next ten years would probably not have been possible before the shock of 11 September. The financial commitment of the G-8 countries, especially the European countries, is still far from finalised: at present, only the United Kingdom (\$750 million) and Germany (\$1,500 million) have specified their financial commitment.⁷⁸ Other economic priorities, the belief that the United States will continue to look after the problem, mistrust of some Russian procedures and a lack of transparency on Moscow's part threaten the implementation of the pledge. The decisions taken will therefore require a rigorous follow-up if they are to be put into practice. Plans have been discussed since autumn 2002, and take into account the possibility of verifying the use of funds to which the Russians agree. Despite all the limitations listed above, European participation in reducing the threat in Russia should gradually reach a level not attained since the fall of the USSR. Europe may soon be able to compare its contribution less unfavourably with

77. CTR: Cooperative Threat Reduction – since the end of the USSR, this programme has benefited from the tenacity of two US senators, Sam Nunn and Dick Lugar, who have associated their names with this significant programme in cooperation with the Russian authorities.

78. France will probably make its commitment known in 2003, when it assumes the presidency of the G-8.

what the Americans have done over the past ten years.⁷⁹ And that will be a significant move forward.

Conclusion: a new perception of the problem posed by WMD proliferation

European countries have come a long way since the end of the 1980s in their analysis of proliferation and its implications for European security. Whereas it was a minor concern during the Cold War, overshadowed by a much more obvious Soviet threat, the spread of nuclear,⁸⁰ biological and chemical weapons, as well as the means of getting them to their targets, has gradually become one of the main issues for European security policy. The teams of experts that work on these questions in foreign and defence ministries and intelligence communities in European capitals have been reinforced. Export controls has been reviewed. And if the conclusions reached differ from those of the United States in terms of the solutions,⁸¹ understanding of the phenomenon is better shared on both sides of the Atlantic than it was a few years ago, including on such delicate issues as ballistic missile proliferation or Iran's clandestine programmes. Divided amongst themselves on the question of nuclear disarmament, the Europeans agree on the need to fight the proliferation of nuclear know-how, equipment, technology, and materials that can be used for developing weapons of mass destruction, especially in the most unstable countries. They now have to recognise that international treaties, which by definition constrain only states, must be associated with other measures to address the problem posed by the spread of non-conventional weapons to non-state networks. There is an area where NRBC terrorism has opened a contentious transatlantic debate: policy on the 'Axis of Evil', an unfortunate expression that came up in President Bush's State of the Union Address in January 2002. The Europeans do not want the risks of NRBC terrorism, serious as they are, to lead to pre-emptive military action against countries that might be developing weapons of mass destruction. Such operations could hardly gain international legitimacy unless the procedures for threat assessment and for taking action were managed collectively. Otherwise they could increase the likelihood of both instability and the use of non-conventional weapons.

79. Over the past ten years the EU has probably spent around \$300 million while the United States has spent \$6,000 to \$7,000 million.

80. Special mention should be made here of non-strategic nuclear weapons that, at present, are only covered by unilateral commitments (1991-92), and which pose particularly delicate problems for proliferation, and also nuclear terrorism.

81. Whether it means missile defence, whose pressing need and even its utility are misunderstood in Europe, or war against countries that have secret development programmes.

Euro-American Relations

Will America withdraw from the Balkans?

This question came up very shortly after the attacks and could therefore be considered as one of its likely immediate consequences. Washington, even under the previous Administration, has never seen the Balkans as an area of strategic importance. The successive wars that ravaged the area in the 1990s maintained the illusion that Europe and its security was still of importance to America. But following 11 September and the war in Afghanistan, this illusion has been shattered: the era of Asian security has begun. During the past decade, multiple crises involving North Korea or Taiwan, and Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, sent that message to the world. Yet the presence of US servicemen in the Balkans throughout that period, as well as the continued stationing of 100,000 US troops in Europe, might have given the impression that a balance would be found between the two extremities of 'Eurasia'. As soon as the end of September 2001, America's intention to disengage from the Balkans was scarcely in doubt. On 26 September Paul Wolfowitz declared to NATO that deploying forces around the world would strain 'low-density, high-demand assets'. It would, moreover, be logical for the Europeans to take over in the Balkans, especially after the events of September 2001. The United States initially indicated that it intended to withdraw from Macedonia in autumn 2002 but in the end did not, and from the police operations in Bosnia in January 2003. Nor will it remain in Kosovo, where the central question of sovereignty is unresolved.⁸² Because of the presence of al-Qaeda members in Bosnia, from where they can hatch plots to carry out attacks in Europe and the United States, a US contingent will remain for a while longer in this part of the Balkans. Of greater concern is the British decision to withdraw from Kosovo, probably because of a possible military operation against Iraq at the beginning of 2003. The stabilisation of the Balkans will require years of effort on the part of the Europeans, who are now likely to find themselves on their own. As Carl Bildt ceaselessly repeats, stabilisation of the Balkans is still far from accomplished.

82. The Kosovo problem is the sovereignty of Belgrade or the independence of Kosovo. The provisional UN authority and KFOR did not have the power to change this. This matter is in the hands of the Security Council.

Europe, unlike the United States, does not feel at war⁸³

The United States has clearly expressed its wish to make the fight against terrorism the new priority for cooperation with Europe, following the common cause of the fight against communism during the Cold War. It sees that combat, like the one against the USSR, as a long-term enterprise, with a significant ideological dimension. But most Europeans do not accept the idea of a 'war' on terrorism. They are used to dealing with this phenomenon with other methods (intelligence services, police, justice), and have not really taken in the consequences of the magnitude of the change wrought by the events of 11 September 2001. Taking into account the very nature of terrorism, the Europeans fear that the Americans are engaging in an endless war without considering all the possible consequences. Finally they – including the British – think that going to war against countries that are developing weapons of mass destruction would be highly questionable if those countries are neither committing provocative acts nor attacking others.⁸⁴ Behind these differences of opinion, there are divergent policies with regard to defence spending. 11 September not only led the United States to declare itself 'at war'. It also led to a sizeable increase in US military spending, and brought about the biggest governmental reorganisation in fifty years.⁸⁵ A new Department of Homeland Security, which encompasses twenty-two federal agencies, has been created. The enabling legislation was adopted in November 2002. In Europe, only the United Kingdom and France have decided to increase their defence budgets following 11 September. London has adopted a new chapter of its Strategic Defence Review. In France's case, in spite of the problem being recognised in the draft *Loi de Programmation militaire*, the measures adopted will be of marginal benefit.⁸⁶ The first objective of the legislation in matters of procurement is to bridge the gaps identified before the attacks (for instance, the availability of aircraft and naval vessels⁸⁷) or to improve force projection capability (by ensuring that by the end of the period covered by the law an aircraft carrier and a naval air group are always at sea). Planned increases are of only slight benefit to civil defence and means specifically earmarked to combat terrorism.

83. Tom Ridge re-emphasised this again in July 2002: 'Today we are fighting a new war . . .' In Europe, only the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, shares this feeling, at least publicly.

84. At least that is the view of the governments. It is less certain that the defence ministries are all hostile to the idea of pre-emptive strikes.

85. This reorganisation, under Tom Ridge's leadership, is often compared, in effect, to the reform that was undertaken under Harry Truman in 1947, which led to, notably, the creation of the CIA and the National Security Council, and which gave the United States defence institutions that were adapted to the Cold War.

86. The United Kingdom seems to have taken a more serious view of the new terrorist threat, with a reinforcement of aerial surveillance, special forces, means of combating NRBC terrorism, and the creation of Reaction Forces that would involve 6,000 men in total. When these measures were announced to the House of Commons in August 2002, the Secretary of State for Defence emphasised the need to combine defensive and offensive means: 'A wholly defensive posture will not be enough. Terrorism thrives on the element of surprise and one of the key ways to defeat it is to take the fight to the terrorist. We must be able to do this with threats at distance: hit the enemy hard in this own backyard, not in ours, and at a time of our choosing, not his.'

87. An additional sum of €900 million should address the most urgent priorities. Furthermore, a new planning law should make it possible to reduce the gap between France and the United Kingdom, which is the reference point for France.

Europe's reaction is far more measured than America's

The open societies that make up Europe represent an almost infinite number of potential terrorist targets. They are a more likely rallying point for al-Qaeda members than the United States. European intelligence services, whose anti-terrorist efforts have been intensified, are aware of this. Progress has been made in the fields of police, justice and finance. Yet the overall reaction to the new phenomenon and to the potential threats is slow and piecemeal. There has apparently been no appeal to the private sector to develop new technologies or to laboratories to accelerate medical research.⁸⁸ An inventory of vital infrastructure has been effected in some countries (in France, for example), but the measures to ensure its protection are still to be defined, with the exception of some steps such as those that were quite naturally taken to protect sites that, if attacked, could cause particularly catastrophic results, like the reprocessing plant at La Hague.⁸⁹ The security of container ships and protection of maritime approaches have been more often addressed by reports than by actual measures. Building up sufficient stocks of vaccines to deal with biological threats will take years. The reinforcement of computer networks that assure telecommunications or energy and water supply is only just beginning.

Force projection or homeland defence?

In the European lexicon, unlike in the United States, defence of the territory conjures up memories of the Cold War,⁹⁰ while force projection is a post-Cold War concept. For the Americans, on the other hand, the Cold War was always associated with a force projection capability and homeland defence is a more recent idea, even if Soviet nuclear missiles threatened US territory from the beginning of the 1960s. Today, the absence of a clear distinction between the interior and the exterior, as well as between homeland defence and force projection, will be one of the new century's security characteristics. In both areas, Europe has yet to make significant progress.

88. The private sector will finance a share of US territory defence measures. As president Bush said: 'We must rally our entire society to overcome a new and very complex challenge.'

89. Surface-to-air missiles were deployed around the reprocessing plant in France.

90. Territorial defence not only means resisting an invasion but also protecting sensitive sites. During the cold war, US territory was theoretically threatened from 1957 onwards, following sputnik's first flight.

Terrorism and democracy

Defence of civil liberties⁹¹

Democratic nations should ponder the effect that measures introduced to deal with an exceptional situation might have on the protection of fundamental liberties that lie at the heart of their political identity. That is why the decisions taken in both the United States and Europe for protecting their societies from new attacks have been hotly debated on both sides of the Atlantic. The discussion has turned to a more fundamental issue, which is how to achieve a balance between security and liberty. Democracies have well-known weaknesses when facing terrorism. Among these are their openness, their dedication to freedom of speech and information, their defence of minorities and the rights of accused persons. When facing an enemy determined to hit them without scruples about the means used, these characteristics become weaknesses. But their preservation is also the preservation of democracy itself.⁹² The debate has been particularly lively in the United Kingdom and Germany. In the United Kingdom, the adoption of new law in December 2001⁹³ permitting the imprisonment without trial of foreigners suspected of terrorism and their indefinite detention has been criticised not only by defenders of civil liberties but also by British judges,⁹⁴ who considered it contained unacceptable discrimination between foreigners resident in Britain and British nationals. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that these individuals, who run the risk of being sentenced to death in their home countries, cannot be extradited from a country of the European Union. Even as the new law was being voted in the United Kingdom, documents found at Kandahar in Afghanistan revealed that an attack had been planned against London in the very heart of the City (Moorgate). Paradoxically, this debate came after the United Kingdom had for many years been charged with laxity by many EU

91. The European countries have undertaken to reinforce their judicial branches at the price of breaking with their civil liberty traditions. At the end of November 2001, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Walter Schwimmer, and the OESC bureau chief for democratic institutions, Gérard Stoudmann, warned governments against excesses: 'While we recognize that the threat of terrorism requires specific measures, we call on all governments to refrain from any excessive steps which would violate fundamental freedoms and undermine legitimate dissent' (Action against terrorism must not undermine human rights, joint press statement, Vienna, 29 November 2001). Even in the United States, American judges have challenged the secret detention of 11 September suspects: 1,200 persons have been arrested since the attacks on New York and Washington (750 for infringing immigration laws, of whom around twenty were considered to be 'material witnesses', and the final category includes, it is said, a number of individuals who are accused of being 'enemy combatants'). By the summer of 2002, only 200 are thought still to be in prison without legal guarantees: even their names remain a secret. Furthermore, 600 prisoners are held at the Guantanamo Bay naval base, but there is no disagreement between the executive and legislative branches in this matter as the base is outside the jurisdiction of US courts. Lawyers and associations for the defence of human rights have, none the less, mobilised to ask questions on the treatment of these prisoners.

92. See David Gompert, 'Terror-

ism and Democracy', George Marshall Center, August 2002: 'Racial profiling, indefinite detention, intrusive domestic surveillance, interference with lawyer-client channels and encouraging citizens and agencies to report "suspicious behavior" may afford greater security. But we should understand that such measures compromise our democratic beliefs and liberties.'

93. Law of 14 December 2001 (Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill), which specifies in an introduction: 'The Bill strikes a balance between respecting our fundamental rights and ensuring that they are not exploited by those who would destroy them.'

94. On 30 July 2002, an appeal commission on immigration (Special Immigration Appeals Commission) ruled that the 14 December Bill would cause unacceptable discrimination between Britons and non-Britons. The Bill allowed the indefinite detention of eleven suspects, of whom nine were classified in category A (prisoners held to be particularly dangerous) and were held in the prisons of Belmarsh (south London) and Wood Hill (Milton Keynes). Strangely, the judges ruled that the Bill would not pose any problems if dispensation from Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights had been asked for. This article covers racial and religious discrimination.

95. In July 2002, *Time Magazine*, quoting French sources, alleged that one of al-Qaeda's European lieutenants, Abu Qatada, was benefiting from MI5 protection. He has since been arrested.

96. For example, authorisation to include fingerprints on passports to avoid forgery.

97. See *Frankfurter Rundschau*, November 2001: 'Too many people in Germany have wanted to ignore the problem . . . in the mistaken belief that integration meant allowing each person to do as he wished.'

98. It is important not to put in place laws and practices that make it impossible for refugees to ask for asylum in European countries.

countries such as France.⁹⁵ Following 11 September, laws on immigration and the right to asylum were strengthened and incitement to religious hatred became a criminal offence. In Germany new anti-terrorist measures were adopted in November 2001. Some will be applied for a limited period of five years, after which they will be re-examined by Parliament.⁹⁶ Refugee status may be withdrawn in the event of a threat to national security. Religious organisations that abuse their status by engaging in terrorist activities may be outlawed – the 'Caliphate' organisation, in Cologne, has been proscribed under this legislation for suspected links to al-Qaeda; the organisation had 1,300 members in Germany. Armed 'sky-marshals' may now be found on German planes as in the United States. The post-Second World War tradition culture of respect for private liberties has been dented (in particular a law that forbade the Government from banning or restricting the liberty of a religious group).⁹⁷ But the main difficulty in Germany in fighting terrorism may be the dispersion of administrations in this federal state. Until recently, the police forces in the sixteen *Länder* were not exchanging information regularly with their colleagues in other regions. Criminal investigations covering the whole of Germany were rare. Since 2001, a working group has been created to compare BND (foreign intelligence) information with that of the BFV (interior intelligence) and the BKA (police). Following 11 September, the Minister for the Interior, Otto Schily, who had defended terrorists in court in the 1970s, had a number of anti-terrorist measures adopted through parliament 'in the name of security and the defence of democracy': 'We must defend ourselves and our open societies against our enemies. They have used our democratic societies which must therefore be protected.' The new German legislation extends the intelligence agencies' powers of surveillance and is a direct challenge to the very strict laws that protected private life in Germany. Fingerprints must now be included in identity papers. Those who ask for visas will have their voices recorded. Financial transactions will be open to surveillance. Religious organisations that advocate violence will be banned. These are important changes for a country that had taken so many precautions to protect its citizens from the state after the Nazi experience, and they have not happened without opposition. In fact, all of Europe must today look again at the balance between fundamental liberties and security, without which these liberties could not endure.⁹⁸ One of the main elements in the democracy/terrorism debate is military tri-

bunals, such as those that have been put in place in the United States.⁹⁹ These appear reprehensible to Europeans for two reasons: they are a departure from the rules of democratic societies, and they prevent the cooperation that is essential for fighting terrorism. Exceptional jurisdictions are by definition a brake on international cooperation.¹⁰⁰

The second phase of the war on terrorism and the Iraq question

An endless war?

From the outset, Washington has defined the war on terrorism as a worldwide undertaking, whose course was not known and whose outcome was uncertain. President Bush's speech to Congress on 24 September, in which he indicated that 'there are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries', includes some disturbing comments: 'Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated'. Granted, this speech was made in a highly emotional period and some moderation did follow during war preparations against the Taliban. But, in many respects, a 'perpetual war' has been declared, the unfolding and the outcome of which are known to none. The flexibility accorded to US forces and the policies behind their actions could not be defined more loosely. After the speedy capture of Kabul, the installation of a provisional government, and the organisation of elections – three remarkable achievements indeed – the stabilisation of Hamid Karzai's government is not an easy task.¹⁰¹ Apart from Afghanistan, US troops are present in operations of varying scale in countries from Colombia to the Philippines. And finally, there are two other wars that must be added to the first: the one that pits the United States against states that support terrorism, and that against states that have ongoing weapons of mass destruction programmes. This is what the Europeans have the most difficulty in accepting, especially when they are associated with the preventive war doctrine which President Bush outlined in his speech at West Point on 1 June 2002.¹⁰² Such operations would present serious legitimacy issues and risk causing at least as much

99. The debate on the protection of democratic liberties has been very lively in the United States, too, since autumn 2001. The US political system comprises a certain number of effective countermeasures to avoid abuses. In particular, a court that was created after Watergate in 1978 that is in charge of verifying FBI counter-espionage operations, has identified around a hundred cases where bugging and electronic surveillance were illegal and has refused the extension of certain FBI prerogatives that were authorised by the USA PATRIOT ACT that was passed after 11 September. See Katty Kay, 'US court restricts right to spy on terrorist suspects', *The Times*, 24 August 2002. But the situation of prisoners who are detained on non-US soil is not covered by any of the guarantees under the law. This debate has taken place on the international level at a time when the technical means of gathering information on individuals have never been greater. Thus, the Japanese opposed recently, in August 2002, the holding of 'family registers' by the police. There has also been, of course, the question of the killing of prisoners by US allies in Afghanistan, particularly those who are thought to have been suffocated in containers by Abdul Rashid Dostum's men during their transfer to Sheberghan prison near Mazar-el-Sharif in November 2001.

100. It is an important reminder that Amnesty International's 2002 report is very severe on what happened following 11 September. Democracies have not only taken anti-democratic measures. In doing so they have given a dangerous message to authoritarian regimes that have committed even greater abuses in the war against terrorism. The military forces have thus become more powerful in some countries where they had committed many violations of human rights, and opposition of all nature has been restricted in the name of the war against terrorism.

101. Among the many internal problems that Hamid Karzai must deal with are the thousands of prisoners who are being held on Afghan soil (between 2,500 and

4,000), and whose countries of origin are not in a hurry to have them back.

102. 'If we wait for threats to materialize, we will have waited too long. . . . Yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. . . . And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive actions when necessary to defend out liberty and to defend our lives.' It is worrying to note that on 2 September 2002, the head of Russian diplomacy, Igor Ivanov, declared himself in favour of multilateral action 'of a pre-emptive nature' in the fight against international terrorism and against other global threats. The new US security doctrine, published in September 2002, confirms the importance of the concept of 'pre-emptive war'. That being so, if war were declared on Iraq, it would not be a preventive war but rather a break in the cease-fire, which was conditional upon Iraq's disarmament. Western intelligence services have sufficient proof that these programmes have been resumed since 1998.

103. Resolution 687 authorised military action and Resolution 687 made a cease-fire conditional on Iraq's disarming, the process of which has been interrupted since December 1998. In other words, if a discussion at the Security Council is vital, it is not, on the other hand, legally necessary to obtain a new Security Council resolution to attack Iraq. But Resolution 1441 represents a major political victory for the Security Council.

104. See Patrick Tyler 'US Plan to Invade Iraq raises Alarms, Europeans fear consequences of war', *International Herald Tribune*, 23 July 2002; there is an overriding impression that the Americans are obsessed with Saddam Hussein and that the Europeans are obsessed with peace in the Middle East.

105. This declaration, which was closely linked to the German electoral campaign, not only attracted virulent criticism from the opposition spokesman for

disorder as order in international affairs, especially if other countries feel entitled to adopt the same policy.

The second phase of the war and the question of Iraq

Since 1991, the international community and Iraq have been in a cease-fire situation that has been broken on several occasions by limited military operations connected with Iraq's refusal to disarm as required by UNSC Resolution 687.¹⁰³ The prospect of military action against Iraq has led to deep division between Americans and Europeans,¹⁰⁴ and could endanger the coalition against terrorism. Chancellor Schröder declared that the 'Middle East needed a new peace, not a new war', and that to attack Iraq could 'destroy the international coalition against terrorism'. He even added that he could not participate in such an 'adventure', even with a UN mandate – a position taken essentially for electoral reasons.¹⁰⁵ In Paris, the President agreed, in an interview given to the *New York Times*, that it was necessary to put added pressure on Saddam Hussein to accept the return of inspectors, but he strongly defended the role of the UN in defining the course of action if it met with failure. Even the British have expressed their concerns about intervening in the Middle East at the present time,¹⁰⁶ and a demonstration by 200,000 people took place in London at the end of September 2002 in protest against war with Iraq. Tony Blair's position, very close to that of George Bush, according to which 'If necessary the action should be military and again, if necessary and justified, it should involve regime change', has been subjected to harsh criticism from the Labour Party. What the Europeans are afraid of is a military operation whose international legitimacy is insufficient. They believe that the probability of Saddam Hussein using weapons of mass destruction increases if Washington, whose main objective is regime change, offers no exit strategy to the Iraqi leader. They know that it will be difficult to prevent Israel from taking part if attacked, and that could have uncertain consequences.¹⁰⁷ They are also conscious of the need to maintain the unity of Iraq and to preserve a Sunni government in Baghdad after the eventual fall of Saddam Hussein in order to calm Arab nations' anxieties. The 'after Saddam' question is just as difficult as the war itself. The intervention raises even wider questions: if the United States is now considering to overthrow regimes that it considers to be dangerous,¹⁰⁸ where

will it stop? Such appeals to prudence, especially when echoed in Congress, may have played a part in convincing President Bush to give inspections one last chance, as he indicated when addressing the United Nations General Assembly. However, unless Baghdad complies fully, the inspections will not prevent Washington from proceeding to the military operations that are necessary for regime change, a point on which the decision already seems to have been taken.¹⁰⁹ On 17 September, under concerted pressure from the United States, the Security Council, and the Arab countries, Saddam Hussein announced that he accepted the unconditional return of inspectors. He also accepted the practical arrangements (visas, communication equipment, customs, transport etc.) for the inspections at a technical meeting with the chief inspector, Hans Blix, on 30 September in Vienna. In the end he was obliged to accept Security Council Resolution 1441, which was adopted unanimously on 8 November 2002. The pressure therefore seems to have paid off. At this stage, the only way of avoiding a military operation seems to be for Iraq to open its doors in the immediate future, with no restrictions on access, and to declare all residual activities prohibited under Security Council resolutions.

A receding ally

The geopolitical dimension

Europe is shifting eastwards, whereas America is looking to the west. With enlargement, the heart of Europe will be in Berlin. With the end of the Cold War, America's attention is diverted from Europe to Asia. This twofold geostrategic reality, which is separating the two sides of the Atlantic, plays a significant part in the evolution of US-European relations. In a world where security problems are global, this might be an opportunity for both parties to enlarge their strategic vision, but also perhaps an occasion for a greater distancing, especially if other elements come into play.

The military dimension

Military means, security policy, international co-operation, multi-lateral treaties, military tribunals, NATO relations, all are issues

foreign affairs, Wolfgang Schäuble, but also from Washington. See Steven Erlanger: 'Schröder rebuked by US on Iraq war', *International Herald Tribune*, 17-18 August 2002. See also Josef Joffe: 'Strong on words, weak on will', *Time Magazine*, August 2002.

106. According to a Channel Four poll published in August 2002, 52 per cent of those asked in the United Kingdom opposed the participation of the British Army, against 34 per cent who were favourable to the idea. In an article published in the *Financial Times* on 6 August 2002, Sir Michael Quinlan gave his view that action against Iraq is 'a blunder and a crime'. He referred to the doctrine of 'just war' to indicate that it would not apply in the present instance: 'The doctrine of just war rests on centuries of reasoned reflection and underlies much of the modern law of war. Attacking Iraq would be deeply questionable against several of its tests, such as just cause, proportionality and right authority'. He also brought up Winston Churchill's declaration: 'Never, never, never believe that any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter.'

107. Any Israeli government would respond to an Iraqi attack now, for the general lesson that was drawn in 1991 was that Israel's abstention reduced the deterrent effect on Baghdad. A smallpox vaccination campaign has begun in Israel (for ambulance teams and members of the emergency services), while thousands of families are receiving gas masks. See Molly Moore, 'Jittery about Iraq threat, Israelis get masks and prepare for worst', *The Washington Post*, 23 August 2002.

108. Some American commentators recommend a very firm line from the Europeans on this subject: 'The Europeans could refuse American use of NATO's European assets in an attack on Iraq, on the grounds that such an attack does not fall under the agreements on countering terrorism that produced NATO's article V resolution of last September . . . The US needs NATO more than Europe does: NATO provides the

indispensable material and strategic infrastructure for American military and strategic deployments throughout Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East and Africa. NATO gives the US a military presence, usually with extraterritorial privileges in every one of the alliance's member countries and in most of the former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet countries that are members of the Partnership for Peace.' See William Pfaff, 'NATO's Europeans could say "no"', *International Herald Tribune*, 25 July 2002. In September 2002, after President Bush's speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations, the debate changed considerably. What is currently the issue, following the adoption of Resolution 1441 in November 2002, is concerted pressure of the entire Security Council on Baghdad.

109. Washington's denials over this issue are connected with the difficulty in justifying this objective from the point of view of international law.

110. See Madeleine Albright's article: 'The allies are troubled by Bush's policies', *International Herald Tribune*, 23 May 2002.

111. The United States is not a warlike power, like the one people imagine it to be today. It is useful to recall Woodrow Wilson's comment in 1917: 'It is a fearful thing to lead this great pacific people into war'. Have the Americans changed? Congress has only ever authorised military force against those responsible for attacks, not against a potential threat, even a terrorist threat. An attack against Iraq, for example, would require new authorisation from Congress, which was accorded to President Bush in October 2002.

112. 'The mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission', in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 3, May-June 2002, an over-used and facile formula.

that have been separating the two sides of the Atlantic for some months now.¹¹⁰ The increase in the US defence budget, which was already \$60 billion more than the European countries combined, now stands at over \$40 billion, more than the highest defence budget among European Union member states. The Pentagon's budget and the share of the Department of Energy's budget devoted to nuclear weapons amounted to \$300 billion when George W. Bush took over as President. It will amount to \$350 billion in 2002, and will be \$396 billion in 2003. As for the projection to 2007, \$470 billion, it will be fifteen times greater than the British defence budget. Even if the increases will have to be looked at again in the light of economic performance, there is not simply a 'gap' between the United States and the rest of the world, but a gulf.¹¹¹ At the same time, the United States is manifesting its desire to maintain the greatest possible freedom of action, and never again to engage in military operations that are overseen by 'committees',¹¹² an inaccurate reminder of what happened in Kosovo, since NATO did not even get to discuss the targets, which were instead set after daily bilateral consultations with the principal allies. Finally, and partly for this reason, NATO seems more and more to be an institution for collective security rather than for collective defence – a sentiment that is further reinforced by the prospect of enlargement. Conscious of this dangerous evolution, which could condemn the institution and the Alliance, the Secretary-General of NATO wanted the Prague summit in November 2002 to be devoted not only to enlargement but also, after the 1991 and 1999 milestones, to a new adaptation of the Alliance to the new post-Cold War threats. The summit was an opportunity for new US proposals in this area, but it is far from certain that NATO rediscovered its vocation on this occasion.

Political questions

As stated before, one of the most remarkable developments, from the European point of view, is the way in which several fundamental civil rights have been undermined in the United States – the country known for the protection of the individual against the state. Moreover, at a time when US sovereignty seems to be better defended than ever, the war on terrorism tends to deny the sovereignty of states by claiming a general right to interfere. Important

factors in these US attitudes on the international scene are perhaps due to a transposition of domestic problems to the exterior and increased partisanship in American political life. At the same time, the Europeans do not take the US vulnerability sufficiently into account. As Joseph Nye rightly points out in his book *The Paradox of American Power*, the United States is too powerful to be directly attacked, but not powerful enough to manage alone in dealing with the terrorist problem, weapons of mass destruction, or to impose a solution in the Middle East. The Europeans are just as concerned about America's vulnerability as they are worried about its power, but they are too often merely spectators, unaware of the divisions within the United States itself on all the big strategic issues. United on the essential part – that is, the war on terrorism – the Americans disagree on the means. Domestic criticism of George Bush's policies is often more virulent than the criticism he gets from Europe. Differences have been voiced more clearly on the run-up to the elections in November 2002, but the Republican victory also showed that these had their limits.¹¹³ Much of these relate to the risks of Washington isolating itself, when international cooperation seems to be more needed than ever. The US policy in the Middle East is often considered too partisan, and relations with the allies too offhand.¹¹⁴

Rapprochement with Russia

A new era of cooperation

This is a lasting development, for Vladimir Putin has no real alternative if he is to modernise Russia. Europe is benefiting from rapprochement between Russia and the United States. As early as May 2001, President Bush, in whose eyes Russia no longer poses a threat, wanted to establish personal relations with Vladimir Putin, who desperately needs the help of the West if he is to meet the principal challenge of his presidency: economic recovery. What started with the first meeting in Slovenia between the two leaders has taken on a critical dimension since the terrorist attacks. Not only was Vladimir Putin the first to ring George Bush, he was also the first to understand how to take advantage of the event. Russia was going to become a responsible player in international affairs and an essential partner of America, which needed bases in Central Asia and

113. Mid-term elections are always an opportunity for cutting a ruling president down to size in the United States. On the contrary, he received a resounding endorsement.

114. Of course, Washington can change its policy with time, with the elections to Congress playing a role at present. Moreover, Churchill's remark comes to mind: 'You can always rely on America to do the right thing, once it has exhausted the alternatives.'

intelligence on terrorism in the region. This was also a golden opportunity to portray the situation in Chechnya as an episode in the common fight against terrorism.¹¹⁵ This rapprochement was cemented in September 2001 when Moscow announced cooperation of its security services, the opening of its airspace for humanitarian operations, and Russia's consent to the use of bases in Central Asia. In the face of the United States' rapid deployment there, Russia immediately understood that it could not stay as an onlooker at the risk of losing influence in the region.

Russia, NATO and the G-8

The rapprochement has had two important consequences for NATO. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council decided on 2 October 2001 that consultation would be held on the war on terrorism. They began that month, but it was in May 2002, in Rome, that relations with NATO were modified with the creation of a new council 'at 20', in which all security questions other than collective self-defence (i.e. smuggling, proliferation, terrorism) could be debated with Russia. What practical use Russia makes of this new arrangement is still uncertain, but its political significance is obvious. Another important development took place at the G-8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada (26-27 June 2002), from which Russia emerged as the major beneficiary, becoming a full member of the G-8, of which it will take over the presidency in 2006. Russia will also receive up to \$20 billion to neutralise and secure its stocks of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, practical cooperation between Russia and the West is still modest when it comes to security issues, especially when they require greater transparency on Moscow's part.

Thanks to the war on terrorism, Russia retains a surprising influence in international relations

The US-led war on terrorism and Russia's desire to pursue an economic rapprochement with the West reinforce both countries and dominate world politics. Only ten years after the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia are moving towards a global entente that is reducing the strategic influence of China, Japan –

115. From this point of view the events in Moscow in October 2002 are very significant. For instance, European capitals, despite their regard for multilateral treaties, do not seem to have asked Vladimir Putin too many questions about the type of gas used by Russian special forces in freeing the hostages held in a Moscow theatre at the end of October 2002. This faintheartedness is worrying.

and also Europe. From this viewpoint, Russia's conciliatory attitude on ABM, Missile Defence, NATO enlargement and the US presence in Central Asia is more astute than is thought by most commentators, who see it as a sign of weakness. Since 11 September, President Bush has often treated Russia as a more reliable partner than his European allies.

Disagreements remain

Despite all these signs of rapprochement, areas of discord with the United States remain. During summer 2002, an announcement to sell several nuclear reactors to Iran, a contract worth \$40 billion with Iraq, and Kim Jong Il's visit to the Russian Far East caused a firm reaction from Washington.¹¹⁶ There is no shortage of difficulties between Russia and Europe either, even if they are of a different nature. One of the main ones relates to the question of Kaliningrad. Moscow is demanding the right to land corridors, and the European Union wants to protect its external borders after Lithuania and Poland enter the Union. A compromise on this was ultimately reached in Brussels in November 2002.

Europe's 'near abroad'

Relations with the Muslim world

Many reactions to 11 September evoked pride: 'Arabs are capable of more than just sporting achievements' summarised a Moroccan journalist in autumn 2001. Even in places where there were no links with al-Qaeda, the attacks were greeted with a satisfaction that only a deep frustration can explain. In Muslim societies, specific problems of a political and economic nature contribute to the development of terrorism, as the recent United Nations report on the malaise of the Arab world brought out perfectly.¹¹⁷ The absence of a democratic environment¹¹⁸ in the great majority of Arab countries leaves the mosques as the only forums for discussion, while education is left to the imams, as is the case in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In October 2001, Salman Rushdie stated in the *New York Times*: 'Highly motivated organizations of Muslim men (oh, for the voices of Muslim women to be heard!) have been engaged over the last

116. See Tom Shanker's article: 'Rumsfeld Warns That Iraq Ties Will Hurt Russian Pocketbook', *New York Times*, 21 August 2002.

117. The Arab Human development Report 2002, published in July 2002, stresses that the lack of individual freedoms, the repression of women and Arab societies' isolation from the world of ideas all act as a considerable brake on their development.

118. Policies of the European countries towards the region are not contributing to the establishment of democracy, which they dread.

thirty years or so in growing radical political movements out of this mulch of “belief”. These Islamists – we must get used to this word, “Islamists” meaning those who are engaged upon such political projects, and learn to distinguish it from the more general and politically neutral “Muslim” – include the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the blood-soaked combatants of the Islamic Salvation Front and Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, the Shiite revolutionaries in Iran, and the Taliban. Poverty is their great helper, and the fruit of their efforts is paranoia. This paranoid Islam, which blames outsiders, “infidels”, for all of the ills of Muslim societies, and whose proposed remedy is the closing of those societies to the rival project of modernity, is presently the fastest growing version of Islam in the world.’ Like the Americans, the Europeans wanted to rally the moderate Muslim countries in the fight against terrorism to allay fears of a clash of civilisations. A delegation, which included Javier Solana, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Louis Michel, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jose Piqué, and the European External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten, was given the task at the end of September 2001 of visiting Pakistan, the Gulf (Saudi Arabia), and the Middle East (Iran, Egypt, Jordan, Syria). Discussions covered co-operation, the peace process, financial support to the Palestinians, and efforts to implement the Mitchell plan, of which the European Union was the co-author. Furthermore, as much for geographic as for historical reasons, Europe is particularly sensitive to relations with the Maghreb, seriously affected by terrorism. Algeria has a particular place in this puzzle. After the cancellation of elections, which might have brought the Islamists to power in Algiers, more than 150,000 persons have been killed, and the identity of the killers is still unclear. There are estimated to be between two and three thousand Algerians in al-Qaeda’s ranks, and some of them returned to Algeria following the beginning of hostilities against the Taliban. This must be taken into account for future relations with this country in the next years.

The urgent need to integrate the Muslim population

Causing a great deal of misunderstanding between Europe and the United States is the presence in Europe of fifteen million Muslims, whether North Africans in France, Pakistanis in the United

Kingdom, Indonesians in the Netherlands or Turks in Germany. Washington is quick to conclude that it is the presence of this population that leads to a 'timid' reaction to terrorism in Europe, overlooking the fact that European governments must prevent a radicalisation of this immigrant population, which is often far less well integrated in European societies than Muslims in the United States. In terms of numbers, moreover, the present situation, far from becoming stable, is likely to become more acute in the coming years, with a greater Muslim percentage of the population as a result of both demographic decline in Europe and development difficulties in the non-European countries of the Mediterranean. A European Commission report published in 2002 predicts that, in the best of cases, the growth of the population in Europe to 2015 will be nil; at this point, one European in three will be over fifty years old. Immigration is already responsible for 70 per cent of population growth in Europe.¹¹⁹ A Europe that is 'fortified' against illegal immigration is not a realistic solution. All the projections to 2015 concerning the development of North African and Middle Eastern societies are pessimistic: they will be more populous, poorer and more urban, with limited employment prospects. Under pressure from populist movements in Europe, the temptation to adopt more and more restrictive immigration policies is great, but it is hard to see how they would address the problem of European demographics and development difficulties in Muslim societies.¹²⁰

Africa, a failing continent

The priority given to EU enlargement has quite understandably contributed to reducing the Europeans' interest in the African continent, but this has happened at the worst possible time for Africa, which has suffered from terrible disasters for over ten years. The terrorist attacks, which proved that failed states are not simply an unpleasant feature of the post-modern world but can represent a strategic challenge by providing bases to terrorists, should cause Europe to pay greater attention to the African continent. It is tempting to think that Africa has seen the worst of its problems in the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century with the Rwanda massacres, the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the terrible conflict that ravaged the Congo, with its two million dead.

119. There are at present 500,000 immigrants per year in Europe.

120. See Jean Eaglesham and Michael Mann, 'Europe tries to hold up the traffic', *Financial Times*, 11 June 2002. Sweden could, on the contrary, if it adopts the measures proposed by the Social Democrat government in August 2002, move towards a voluntarist immigration policy to ensure the survival of social security and retirement and to guarantee economic development in a period of demographic regression. It is useful to recall the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, of 17 June 2002 on the prevention of desertification, where he announced that 'in Africa, over the next 20 years some 60 million people are expected to move from the Sahelian region to less hostile areas if the desertification of their land is not halted'. What conclusions are European countries to draw?

That would be a mistake. In May, a courageous article appeared in *Le Monde* with the title 'L'Afrique Suicidaire' (Suicidal Africa) that painted a gloomy picture of Africa's future: 'Today in most of our countries, the state apparatus has melted away, the praetorian guards and ethno-political militias have taken the place of the army, police and gendarmerie, which are but shadows of their former selves. Insecurity has become the rule, our highways and the streets of our villages have become no-go areas. The tragedy of AIDS is a dramatic reminder that with effective and responsible administrations we could have contained the spread of the scourge when it first appeared. Instead, over twenty million Africans, the majority of them young and many well-educated professional people, have already had their lives cut short, victims of the prevarication of our states and a pernicious, idle social environment from which all sense of individual and collective responsibility has evaporated.'¹²¹ Over the next few years, the effect of AIDS alone will put millions of orphans on the streets and will destroy entire units of the armed forces of countries as significant as South Africa.¹²² The consequences for security and the paths paved for violence are not hard to understand. One must hope that the Europeans, who will be the first to suffer from the consequences of the situation created in Africa in ten to twenty years if current trends continue, will fully appreciate those implications.

121. Jean-Paul Ngoupandé, former prime minister of the Central African Republic, *Le Monde*, 18 May 2002.

122. AIDS has already orphaned twelve million children in South Africa. By 2010 there will be forty-two million orphans in this country alone. In Sierra Leone, AIDS has orphaned five times as many as the civil war. Some African countries are going to lose a quarter of their agricultural work force by 2020. In Kenya, 75 per cent of deaths among the police force over the past few years have been the result of AIDS. Finally, 60 per cent of the South-African armed forces carry the AIDS virus. It would be necessary to add the effect of diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria, hepatitis C, and haemorrhagic fevers to gauge the strategic risks that health problems cause in this continent.

123. See François Godement's article in *Liberation* on 28 May 2002, 'Pas d'Europe sans l'Alliance' (No Europe without an alliance): 'the problem is not that of a "different" European policy. It is that it does not yet have an identity, and for three very simple reasons: it has no armed forces to command; it has no unity of action; and the Europeans are not even capable of agreeing among themselves on what values it could promote.'

124. See Marc Champion, 'On Issues of Security, US Needs Lessons, Some foreign Intelligence Agencies Seem to Coordinate better than American Counterparts Do', *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, 12 June 2002.

The role of the European Union

Europe's political influence is on the decline

With much better cards to play than Russia following 11 September, it is striking that Europe has not been able to play to its strengths. It has been poor at managing the public message for want of a unified voice and a collective will,¹²³ and has not been able to derive any benefit from the ongoing crisis to improve its standing on the international scene. It could have made more of its human intelligence capabilities (which are significant on terrorism) and coordination of information,¹²⁴ its knowledge of terrorist networks (which have been under surveillance in Europe for nearly ten years), its special forces (which in some respects are better than US special forces), its peacekeeping forces for stabilising unstable zones, and its broad conception of security issues (and

one sees today in Afghanistan how important that is in the lasting success of the operation). Yet Europe continues to find itself, for the most part, in a situation where it must accept what the United States decides, or balks at this and starts debates that in the end it loses. Anti-European sentiments are growing in Washington, which sometimes feels that relations with Europeans are more delicate than with Russia. The substantial strengths of Europe have not only been more poorly used than the small advantages of Russia have been used by Vladimir Putin. In the past year, the Europeans have been incapable of resolving even very small crises in their midst. The most worrying example was that of the tiny island of Perejil in July 2002. It was necessary to resort to mediation by the United States to reach an agreement on 20 July between Spain and Morocco over the conflict. In the meantime, France and Spain had managed to come to opposing positions. Was it normal that Rabat should have gone to the United States to sort out this difference? On another issue, visas for residents of Kaliningrad who visit Russia following Poland's and Lithuania's admission into the European Union, the European cacophony in July 2002 gave rise to acerbic and justified comments.¹²⁵ Finally, differing European voices that spoke in September on the subject of Iraq demonstrated once again that Europe has no common foreign policy.

US policy could, however, help the cause of European unity¹²⁶

The upshot of European irritation at the Bush administration could be to make them aware that the moment of truth is fast approaching for Europe.¹²⁷ A large proportion of Euro-Atlantic problems have their roots in Europe, not in the United States. Those who think that a more openly critical policy is necessary on subjects as diverse as the environment, the verification of biological weapons or the International Criminal Court are no doubt right, but it would be as least as useful to correct Europe's obvious weaknesses, including in areas where it has the most pretensions: 'soft power' and diplomacy. Reactions to Robert Kagan's article in *Policy Review*¹²⁸ on US power and European weakness showed irritation which was justified by the narrow way in which power was defined, but it would also be necessary to take more seriously those criticisms that seem relevant. If opinions on either side of the Atlantic on the use of force in the twenty-first century are divided, are not

125. In September 2002, the European Commission proposed a number of measures designed to facilitate transit after enlargement. The European Council meeting of 24 and 25 October in Brussels arrived at a compromise on this.

126. See Steven Erlanger, 'US disdain provokes new unity in Europe', *International Herald Tribune*, 22 July 2002.

127. This is a widely shared sentiment. See the declaration of Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing: 'Your convention holds in its hands the global future of Europe'. As Giscard himself said: 'The European convention is, in its own modest way, the last chance for a united Europe.' The Convention must make institutional and constitutional recommendations.

128. Robert Kagan, 'Power and Weakness', *Policy Review*, June-July 2002.

European reservations based at least in part on a form of cowardice whereby one allows the United States to act as the world's policeman, in order to be able to criticise it? The really important question is how far the Europeans would be prepared to go in the defence of their values. Would they take risks or casualties? One often contrasts European readiness to take casualties and American reluctance to face 'body-bags'. Is this still pertinent after 11 September? In other words, is Europe prepared to fight the new forms of terrorism?

Europe must protect its values despite security considerations

A good deal of time has been taken in Europe to debate how the war on terrorism has affected values that sustain European democracies. Discussion was necessary: whether it be the establishment of military tribunals, the debate over the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners, participation in the drawing up of police files in private companies, or restriction of the rights of certain religious associations. Respect for democratic values is one of the essential preconditions for membership of the European Union and it is important to ensure that it is preserved. Given that populists seem to have the political initiative in many European Union countries, vigilance is ever more necessary. This current is a reminder that the older Western democracies are more fragile than is generally thought. The use of civil liberties for malevolent ends is one of the permanent risks in a democracy, which must be able to resist the threat without disfiguring itself. But European societies must also be protected against the rise in the types of violent activity that they could not resist unless they changed profoundly, which would also make them unrecognizable.

The time is right for a European conversion on security questions

Fifty years after the Second World War, and more than ten years after the end of the Cold War, it is time to start thinking about it. This conversion first means broadening Europe's strategic vision, still limited to its immediate environment. It must also turn to

making a real priority of the protection of civilians, who are becoming more and more threatened in the south (interethnic conflicts), but also in the northern hemisphere (by asymmetric conflicts): ESDP must devote a significant part of its attention to civil defence. Finally, whereas it seems that the Americans need to solve conflicts using 'soft power', which today they too often ignore, the Europeans for their part need to make peace with the use of force if they want to play a part in international security in the twenty-first century. This has become necessary even for combating certain new types of international terrorism, whereas more traditional forms of terrorist attacks could be dealt with using only intelligence services and the police. That was rightly stressed by British Secretary of State for Defence Geoffrey Hoon in July 2002 in the House of Commons. The Europeans must improve their defences on the domestic front and build an offensive military capability with more mobile forces, better ways of projecting, greater means for surveillance, and more integrated special forces.¹²⁹ In Afghanistan, Europe had to put in place a stabilisation force in just a few weeks, overcoming many of the geographical limitations it thought it had before 11 September. Even if Europeans still seem disinclined to review their policies following 11 September, the possibility that they will be involved far from Europe itself has increased, and the division of labour with Washington is changing. No one expects the Europeans to deal with their own security by themselves in the foreseeable future, but it is time that they assumed a more significant share of it.

129. This will not in itself resolve US-European difficulties, considering Washington's permanent ambiguity on the military capabilities of Europe: the more initiatives that Europe takes, the more Washington will become suspicious. But the United States will not take Europe seriously unless it exists on the military level, and European security requires that the Europeans make a greater contribution when the Asiatic challenges are so great for the United States. The crisis that arose in North Korea in October 2002 provided a fresh reminder of this.

Conclusions: ten lessons to be drawn from 11 September

1. The privatisation of violence has reached the point where the phenomenon represents a challenge of a strategic, not just a tactical order

When the potential victims of terrorist attacks on urban centres can be numbered in their thousands, the nature of terrorism changes. It can no longer be dealt with by the intelligence services and police, as has been done in Europe, often successfully, for decades. This is even truer if the attacks include weapons of mass destruction, a real and little understood threat in Europe: non-conventional terrorist attacks are now not just a possibility but a probability. They form an integral part of the manifest rise in violence at the beginning of the twenty-first century and that sea change needs to be properly recognised in European capitals.

2. For the first time military intervention has been deemed necessary to respond to a terrorist attack

This is a consequence of the reality which has just been described. That necessity was recognised by the entire international community in the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2001. Europe has not taken sufficient stock of this fact at either the collective or individual level. What would have happened if an attack of the same order had occurred in a European capital? Would it have been necessary to depend entirely on the means and the goodwill of the Americans? And what would have happened if the United States was already involved in a conflict where their vital interests were in play? What means would the Europeans have had for retaliating, if they did not have the capacity to attack the backward bases of the terrorist power? It would be unacceptable for Europe to find itself powerless again ten years from now.

3. Insecurity has globalised, and a global vision as well as global cooperation are needed to meet the threat

Today, Europe lacks both. In principle, the enlargement of the European Union, which will bring Europe closer to Asia, and especially Central Asia, should be an opportunity for taking another look at European security interests and paying greater attention to events in Asia. Europe is no longer at the centre of the international stage, and it fears being marginalised – for its limited capabilities – but it must above all regain a vision for the world and its responsibilities in it, which it lost in the twentieth century as a result of the tragic events it had to face. Since 11 September regional crises have not changed in nature, but their potential gravity has increased exponentially. Europe cannot look idly on at this evolution. The North Korean crisis served as a timely reminder of this.

4. Military power, which protects Western countries from direct attacks by other states, does not protect them from terrorist attacks on their soil

At a time when Europe is mustering greater capacities for force projection, its national territory is once again vulnerable. During the Cold War a huge threat weighed over European territory, but, precisely because of the magnitude of this threat, war seemed ‘improbable’, and was shifted towards the periphery. It is now possibly tending to return to the centre. Protection of the civilian populations, neglected for a long time in favour of protection of the military, must become a priority.¹³⁰ Nuclear deterrence no doubt played a large role in the calculations of the ex-USSR, but whatever the current thinking on this issue, it is certain that it will play none in the thinking of the terrorist networks. Protection must therefore figure largely in defence policies. Western nations are once more vulnerable, and that means that civilian populations are at risk.

130. The new French budgetary legislation, which was made public in September 2002, and which includes a significant increase in defence credits, devoted only a small share to civil defence, while the protection of military forces against non-conventional attacks was improved.

5. There are many consequences for defence policies

Developing intelligence capabilities and early warning systems; increasing the numbers and the quality of special forces; putting in place civil defence forces, particularly in the NRBC area; protecting critical installations; increasing the amount of effort in the area of anti-ballistic missiles. In this last area, defence against cruise missiles, which was a secondary consideration, now becomes more important than it was before 11 September. It is even one of the areas in which potentially significant collaboration might now take place with the United States, which had not considered it a priority before the attacks. The realisation that commercial airplanes might be used as cruise missiles has helped to heighten awareness of this danger.

6. The Europeans should adopt a more proactive stance

One of the things that most encourages US unilateralism is Europe's low profile on the international scene. The Europeans are thus encouraging the attitude that they deplore.¹³¹ If the Europeans took into account the intensity of the debate that is under way in the United States on all the important subjects of international policy, including in Congress, they might get a genuine influence, provided they come forward with alternative solutions to the main security problems instead of being content merely to criticise the Bush administration's policy. A good start would be to exert sufficient pressure on Iraq, and a concerted response to North Korea's blackmail.

7. Western countries are poorly equipped to deal with radical thought

The Europeans are possibly even worse off than the Americans because they are more sceptical. Ideological and religious factors have assumed new importance on the international scene at a time

131. Moreover declarations by Chancellor Schröder on the 'German way' during the electoral campaign, hardly represent a model for the European countries if they want to encourage multilateralism. On the contrary, this was clearly a unilateral German position, as Alain Juppé has pointed out.

when ideology seemed to have disappeared from the northern hemisphere with the passing of the Soviet Union. The spectre of a threat that cannot be rationalised and which rests only on the exercise of violence prevents any negotiation process – in which the Europeans usually place so much faith. If the escalation to extremes is to be immediate and without warning, like 11 September, the political process is doomed in advance. But what can replace it?

8. The integration of Muslim communities in Europe must be seen with greater urgency

The number of Muslims in Europe is projected to rise over the next twenty years under pressure from countries of origin whose economic – and political – outlooks are discouraging. Only successful integration policies will make it possible to avoid social explosions in the large centres of population. Europe, which has often considered its immigrants as a temporary work force, could learn much from the United States in this area, where immigrants are considered an opportunity for the country.

9. 11 September is both a symbol and a warning. It is essential to understand the symbol and hear the warning

In July 2002, Peter Gridling, who has become head of Europol, declared that almost all the European countries still had members of al-Qaeda on their territory, and that the organisation continued to recruit in spite of ten months of intensive fighting. The enemy that is being faced is constantly changing form and is regrouping after the capture of Kabul and the end of the Taliban. A part of its reconstitution is taking place in the Balkans and in EU territory. Europe is therefore, whether it likes it or not, at the heart of prevention operations over the next years. Is Europe ready to face this trial or will it try to ignore it? It must remember that weakness always has a price – most often a high one.

10. The international community is reforming itself – where will Europe fit into this?

At present the answer does not look encouraging, despite Europe's exceptional advantages – starting with its location in one of the rare zones of peace and prosperity in a world that it otherwise racked by convulsions. It will not be enough to make appeals to good intentions, to the international community and its forums to resolve the questions that the new forms of terrorism have posed. It would be a good start if European capitals were to agree to analyse together the new security conditions in Europe, looking at all and every aspect. It would also be preferable to avoid too great a divergence in the political statements of European leaders when Europe's influence is waning on the international scene. Finally, on the question of international terrorism, which has been the subject of this essay, it must be hoped that it will not take another catastrophe on European soil to rouse Europe from its current slumber.

Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty)
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AWACS	Airborne Early Warning and Control System
BFV	Bundesamt für Verfassungsgericht
BKA	Bundeskriminalamt
BND	Bundesnachrichtendienst
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	Cable News Network
CTR	Cooperative Threat Reduction
DCN	Direction des Constructions Navales
DGA	Délégation Générale pour l' Armement
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ETA	Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (Basque separatist organisation in Spain)
G-8	Group of Eight leading industrialised nations
GIA	Armed Islamic Group
GIGN	Groupe d' Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale
GRAPO	Grupo de Resistencia Anti-Fascista Primero de Octubre
GSPC	Salafist Group for Call/Preach and Combat
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo peace implementation Force
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NRBC	Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical
SFOR	Stabilisation Force (Bosnia)
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Terrorist attacks or attempted attacks against targets on European territory or European interests abroad

24 December 1994:

four terrorists hijack a flight from Paris to Algiers with the intention of crashing it into a target in Paris but fail when the GIGN storm it on the ground in Marseilles.

25 July, 17 August and 6 October 1995:

three bombings in Paris result in 7 deaths and 150 injured.

June 1998:

attempted attack during football World Cup in Paris. Nearly 100 arrests of members of GIA in May 1998.

December 2000:

two abortive attacks in Strasbourg.

June 1998:

attempted attack during football World Cup in Paris. Nearly 100 arrests of members of GIA in May 1998.

January 2001:

attempted attack on American Embassy in Rome.

July 2001:

abortive attack on American Embassy in Paris.

24 December 2001:

attempt to blow up a Paris-Miami flight (Richard Reid).

11 April 2002:

attack on the El Ghriba synagogue at Djerba (21 dead, the majority German tourists).

8 May 2002:

attack on a bus in Karachi carrying DCN Cherbourg technicians (14 dead, 11 of them French).

May 2002:

attack on Bologna Cathedral planned.

29 August 2002:

arrest of a Swedish national embarking on a flight from Stockholm to London with the intention of crashing the aircraft into a government building; a controversial case.

September 2002:

attempted attack on US military base at Heidelberg by a presumed follower of Osama bin Laden planned to take place on the anniversary of 11 September.


6 October 2002:

attack on the French oil tanker *Limburg* in Yemeni territorial waters.

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The events of 11 September moved all Europeans but were never understood for what they really were: the return of war to the most developed societies. The emotion thus quickly gave way to the belief that this had been an isolated event, or at least one that would not be repeated on the same scale. The first reason for this is that 11 September, even if it has often been perceived as an attack on the entire Western world, did not happen in Europe. There is also a widespread refusal in Europe, after the turbulent history of the twentieth century, to admit that European territory might in the new century be vulnerable to serious threats. Lastly, European leaders were anxious not to frighten their populations or to strain relations with the Muslim minorities living in Europe. And yet since the middle of the 1990s there has been no shortage of attempts to carry out attacks in Europe or against European interests and citizens abroad. These attacks have revealed the existence of a new generation of terrorists quite unlike those with which Europe was previously familiar. Terrorist networks of this new type still exist in Europe and continue to plan attacks despite the few hundred arrests made since September 2001. These networks have the advantage of the considerable freedom of movement and expression common to European countries, and also benefit from the absence of a common police and judicial system. As a result of the reaction in Europe to the attacks on New York and Washington, real improvements have been made in key areas, but progress is still too slow compared with that achieved by the terrorists and their increasingly sophisticated knowledge and assets, including in the field of weapons of mass destruction. In November 2002 several major capitals considered it necessary to warn their populations of the risk of terrorist attacks on a wide scale, a reminder that, contrary to the received wisdom, Europe is now as much at risk as America.

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