Enlargement and European defence after 11 September

Jiri Sedivy, Pal Dunay and Jacek Saryusz-Wolski
Edited by Antonio Missiroli
In January 2002 the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) became an autonomous Paris-based agency of the European Union. Following an EU Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001, it is now an integral part of the new structures that will support the further development of the CFSP/ESDP. The Institute’s core mission is to provide analyses and recommendations that can be of use and relevance to the formulation of EU policies. In carrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface between experts and decision-makers at all levels. The EUISS is the successor to the WEU Institute for Security Studies, set up in 1990 by the WEU Council to foster and stimulate a wider discussion of security issues across Europe.

Chaillot Papers are monographs on topical questions written either by a member of the ISS research team or by outside authors chosen and commissioned by the Institute. Early drafts are normally discussed at a seminar or study group of experts convened by the Institute and publication indicates that the paper is considered by the ISS as a useful and authoritative contribution to the debate on CFSP/ESDP. Responsibility for the views expressed in them lies exclusively with authors. Chaillot Papers are also accessible via the Institute’s Website: www.iss-eu.org
Enlargement and European defence after 11 September

Jiri Sedivy, Pal Dunay and Jacek Saryusz-Wolski
Edited by Antonio Missiroli
## Contents

### Preface
Nicole Gnesotto

4

### Introduction
Antonio Missiroli

5

1. The constraints and the opportunities
Jiri Sedivy

7
- After 11 September: perceptions, polemics and policies
- ‘Czeching-in’ the ESDP
- Implications and perspectives
- Towards the future shape of the EU
- Conclusion

12
17
21
24
27

2. Almost in - but what for?
Pal Dunay

28
- The Hungarian political landscape and EU enlargement
- NATO: enlarge when in trouble
- Early Hungarian views on the future of the Union
- The regional dimension
- Conclusion

31
45
46
50
52

3. Looking to the future
Jacek Saryusz-Wolski

55
- The EU enlargement process
- The NATO enlargement process
- The need for European leadership
- The need for an integral, cross-pillar approach to security
- The European Union after the forthcoming enlargement
- Conclusions

55
57
58
60
64
69

### Conclusions
Antonio Missiroli

70

### Annexes

73
- About the authors
- Abbreviations

73
74
Here are unavoidable moments of truth for institutions, as there are for all major collective projects. For the European Union, concerning in particular the deepening of its common security and defence policy, enlargement is at a historic turning point: depending on whether it is well or badly handled, it could lead either to a breakthrough in terms of the Union’s ability to assert itself on the world stage or to a state of disintegration and paralysis such that it has no hope of influencing the rest of the world.

There is of course nothing new about this dilemma, but taking the new international system since 11 September and the looming prospect of EU enlargement together, its possible consequences no longer lie in the sphere of theoretical-institutional analysis but have become the bases of concrete policies and questions of power that are as pressing as they are real. The Convention on the future of the Union thus finds itself with a historic mission: to paraphrase a celebrated Italian expert, if the widened ESDP means simply that 27 countries will have the right to decide that 4 or 5 others alone take on all the risks, it is doomed to failure. If, on the contrary, enlargement of ESDP enables the Union to combine the operational effectiveness of some members, the solidarity of others and the legitimacy of all, the odds are that it will succeed.

Yet nothing has been decided. A certain politically correct line has up to now dominated the debate on the impact of enlargement on the Union’s security and defence. What is more, the same reassuring rhetoric is also widespread within the Atlantic Alliance, which is also obliged to adapt as a matter of urgency to the combined effects of terrorism, American unilateralism and enlargement. Quite understandably, the candidate countries for accession have always proclaimed the expected benefits for themselves and others of their forthcoming alignment with the Union’s common policies. But if the institutional struggles have already been acknowledged as such, the real debate on a number of issues has not really begun. For instance, what might be the Union’s legitimate role in the world? Can a common defence policy be built on the basis of the political and institutional acquis laid down at Cologne? How can some member states’ willingness to intervene be reconciled with the abstentionist tendencies of others? How can the question of burden-sharing and strategic leadership in the Union be resolved, knowing that the intra-European gaps in military capabilities are realities that are every bit as constraining as the principle of equality of member states? Do developments in US strategy suggest that a Euro-American security alliance is a reality or a fiction? And is it necessary, and if so how, to adapt the Union’s international role to this new situation?
In this hopefully active period of political reflection in Europe, the Institute has decided to give a platform in its Chaillot Papers to the candidate countries themselves. The three contributors to this issue are all experts recognised in both their own countries and the wider European strategic community. Although quite different from each other, their contributions are all illuminating in a number of respects:

周恩来 on the existence of nationalist populism that is already a problem common to all European countries;
周恩来 on the impossibility, following 11 September, of distinguishing between domestic and external security issues;
周恩来 on the ambivalent relationship that these countries have with the NATO-EU combination: all have an absolute preference to entrust security in Europe, or even farther afield, to NATO under American leadership. But this deliberate choice goes hand in hand with a clear analysis, devoid of any illusions, on developments in America. Thus, if Washington were to change fundamentally its relationship with NATO, the Union’s ESDP would remain as a fall-back position, an alternative institutionalisation of defence that would in their view avoid the worst of all situations: a general renationalisation of defence;
周恩来 on the link between the Union’s geographic enlargement and a widening of the Union’s strategic awareness. These three candidate countries naturally have a marked preference for giving priority to relations with the East of the continent, and they will undoubtedly endeavour to convince their partners in the Union to develop CFSP in that direction. Yet the inclusion of candidates from the south will have a similar effect, extending the future Union’s strategic vision and interests to the fringes of the Middle East and Asia. While there is little doubt that it will be difficult to reconcile these conflicting priorities, it will at the same time be impossible to perpetuate what is currently one of the CFSP’s biggest problems: the European Union’s strategic introversion.

Paris, June 2002
The jury is still out on the extent to which 11 September has changed the concept – let alone the perception – of security. All the more so for European security at large, whose contours are still quite blurred. As for the European Union proper, 11 September has triggered a prompt response in the field of *internal* security, while the military reaction has been either channelled through NATO and the UN or managed individually (and bilaterally with the United States) by both member and applicant states. More indirectly, 11 September has increased the pressure towards enlargement by pushing for a faster and broader accession of the current candidates in order to further stabilise the Union’s immediate neighbourhood: a quintessential case of security policy by other means, one is tempted to say, in line with a long tradition in the European integration process. Moreover, for similar reasons, the Atlantic Alliance, too, is likely to enlarge more quickly and more extensively than previously envisaged. Key decisions in those directions are to be taken in Prague (NATO) and Copenhagen (EU) later this year. For the Union, anyway, the endgame has already started. With it, the enlargement process will have come almost full circle: ‘from Copenhagen to Copenhagen’, so to speak, in just under ten years.

The happy ending, however, is not a foregone conclusion. On the one hand, the latest Eurobarometer opinion poll – taken in October 2001 and released in April 2002 – shows an increase in EU-wide support for enlargement: 51 per cent of respondents were in favour of including new countries, 30 against. Some 39 per cent believed that enlargement should be selective though, with only 24 showing unqualified support. At the top of the pro-enlargement group came Greece and the Scandinavian countries, while Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom ranked below the EU average and France was the only country with a clear majority of respondents opposed to opening the Union to new members. In addition, roughly two-thirds of respondents appeared to believe that the EU would become more important in the world – and culturally richer – if it...
included more countries. A similar proportion, however, also felt that enlargement might make it more difficult to take decisions on a European scale. On the whole, very few people felt well informed about enlargement, although the poll seemed to corroborate the somewhat more relaxed view that the adhesion of new members should entail fewer risks (and perhaps also fewer opportunities) than initially predicted – a view that seems to be largely confirmed by most analysts on the economic and social front.1

On the other hand, all the real polls that have been conducted in the European Union since 11 September have shown that a significant and growing share of EU citizens feel more insecure than before and also tend to blame ‘foreigners’ for that. Some political forces have articulated these fears publicly and vocally, and have increased their votes. Furthermore, negotiations with the applicant countries have just entered their final and most critical phase, namely the one in which the thorniest issues (agricultural and regional policies, financial framework) have to be tackled and solved before any deal is finalised. Depending on its outcome, the present road map for enlargement will be kept or altered and the overall approach adjusted accordingly. Domestic political developments, too, may have a marginal impact on the process, in member as well as applicant countries. Enlargement of the Union (and the Alliance), in fact, is the most important game in town, and needs to be – and be seen to be – a success on both sides of the negotiating table. Failing that, the repercussions will be felt right across the Continent.

That is the broader context in which the EU Institute for Security Studies asked well-known experts from three of the candidate countries to give their assessment of the way in which the current situation is perceived and evaluated in their respective countries (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) in relation to:
(a) the general impact of 11 September on the process of enlargement and on European security at large;
(b) its effects on CFSP and ESDP as seen from the perspective of their countries;
(c) the likely shape of the EU (and of Europe at large) after the forthcoming enlargement. As the reader will see, the three contributors have written in both a ‘national’ and a personal capacity, adding their own views to the overall analytical picture.

Why Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in particular?

Needless to say, the three countries have always been at the forefront of the ‘return to Europe’ drive that characterises the present wave of enlargement. They belong to mainstream European history more than any other candidates. They had already enjoyed national independence and statehood between the two World Wars (although within slightly different borders), and then simply found themselves on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. Since 1990 they have made remarkable progress in gradually adjusting to Western standards and making a transition to democracy that has hardly been comparable to previous ones, especially to those that had already occurred in southern Europe a quarter of a century earlier, in that it aimed at creating, almost from scratch, both a democratic order and a market economy.²

Moreover, they share a common subregional position and perspective: while enlargement encompasses a wider set of countries stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea (what might be called ‘Middle’ Europe, lying between the current EU and the former Soviet Union)³ and the Mediterranean, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic represent ‘Central’ Europe proper. After the end of the Cold War, they quickly tried to recreate a distinctive subregional dimension by forming the so-called ‘Visegrad Group’ (which, until the ‘velvet divorce’ of 1993, also included Slovakia). Each presumably had a particular map of this Central European ‘space’: arguably, the Czechs had a geographically and culturally more restricted perspective (roughly covering the Austrian part of the late Habsburg Empire), while the Hungarians had a more ‘Danubian’ vision (prior to the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, that is, encompassing all its scattered Magyar minorities) and the Poles one stretching from Vilnius to Lvov and including the whole area between Germany and Russia. Nevertheless, they tried to present a united front to the EU and to foster subregional cooperation in economic and trade (the CEFTA) as well as cultural and humanitarian matters (the 1995 Balladur Pact).⁴ As was also to happen later with the Baltic States, however, the Union did not encourage the formation of such a ‘bloc’ particularly, preferring rather to take a country-by-country approach, as shown by the decision taken in Luxembourg in December 1997 to open accession negotiations with only a limited number of applicants – thus triggering a ‘beauty contest’ among them that is not yet over.

Last, but certainly not least, all three countries have also been full members of NATO since March 1999, and therefore have a particu-


lar approach to European security, one that is not necessarily shared by other fellow EU applicants or European Allies.

The way in which and the extent to which all of this spills over into the three countries’ current attitudes vis-à-vis European security will be shown in the following pages.
The constraints 
and the opportunities

Jiri Sedivy

This year the Czech Republic (CR) is entering a key period in terms of finalising its efforts to join the EU. Prague hopes to finish the accession negotiations with the Commission by the middle of 2002. The Czech government has set 1 January 2003 as the reference date by which the economic and political conditions for membership should be met and the CR should be ready for accession. Together with the other candidates, the Czechs were expected to formulate their ideas and suggestions as to the further institutional development of the Union at the Convention that started in March 2002. The aspirants anticipate that the EU will issue a package of invitations at the Copenhagen summit in December 2002.

Domestically, this will be an important election period, with elections to Parliament’s lower house in spring 2002 and to the Senate and local councils in the autumn. Presidential elections will follow at the beginning of 2003, and a referendum on EU membership is expected to take place in the same year. More than ever before, EU issues are going to be an important part of the pre-election agendas of the political parties as well as political and public debates at large.

On top of this busy schedule the CR is hosting the NATO summit in November 2002. This will deal with a wide range of themes such as NATO enlargement, relations with Russia, missile defence, EU/ESDP-NATO cooperation and US-European relations in general, and, last but not least, NATO’s role and mission in view of developments since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.

Therefore, one can expect a complex and interdependent convergence of mutually influencing agendas at various levels of activities in a manner not experienced in the country since its inception in 1993: domestic with foreign, national with international, NATO with EU, political and economic with security. With a new emphasis since 11 September, security seems to be one of the driving factors permeating all these agendas and activities.
Developments over the last few months have merely confirmed the longer-term trends analysed by security experts at least since the end of the Cold War: the demilitarisation of security, the emergence of threats that are not state-related and the privatisation of armed violence, and widening of the security agenda (both in terms of its globalisation and localisation). Traditional lines of demarcation between warfare, terrorism and criminal activities; between the combat zone and the civilian sphere; between internal and external security; and between the domestic and foreign spheres, have become blurred over time.

While most of the wars and armed conflicts of the last decade were internal and local, terrorists and organised criminals have been able to operate globally. In both respects non-state actors have been the major players. The strike against the United States and the ensuing campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan exemplified the complexity of the new security environment. It served to illustrate the changing roles of state and non-state actors at national, international and supranational levels of conflict, and the complexity of the search for resolutions that include military, social, ideological and cultural aspects.

This chapter opens with an overview of reactions to the terrorist attacks as reflected in the political and security debates in the CR, with special emphasis on the processes related to the EU and NATO. In the second part, the focus is narrowed to the development of the Czech approach to ESDP. The third part outlines the longer-term implications of the recent events for European security as well as the Czech Republic’s potential place in its future development. Finally, the possible input of the candidates into the debate about the EU’s final shape is touched upon.

After 11 September: perceptions, polemics and policies

As Nicole Gnesotto, reflecting on the possible impact of the new terrorism on European integration, has put it, ‘all threats, especially those hardest to identify, have a unifying effect’. But the opposite reaction, in terms of retreating into the fortress of the nation-state and reinforcing its machinery, might occur as well. Documents and practical measures adopted by the EU since the extraordinary European Council meeting on 21 September seem to confirm the former. Yet one may also identify elements of the latter

thesis both within the EU – as witnessed by the separate meetings of European leaders of large states outside the EU’s formal framework – and in the CR.

The EU has invited the candidate states to join ‘the broadest possible global coalition against terrorism’, and they have done so both individually and collectively. The Czech Social Democratic government supported the EU’s Action Plan that was adopted on 21 September, the day after its launch, and has associated itself with the plan’s initiatives and activities. There seems to be approval, across the Czech political spectrum,2 of the steps the EU has so far taken internally to strengthen its security and preventive instruments for combating terrorism. The EU’s provisions are generally perceived as necessary, functional measures that will enhance Czech security as well. Apprehension caused by claims that additional EU demands derived from deepening the EU acquis generated by the 11 September events might temporarily complicate the accession process has proved ill-founded in the case of the CR. Chapter 24 (Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs; Schengen) was, as expected, closed on 12 December 2001. A substantial slowdown or even derailment of the whole enlargement process is thus fairly improbable.3 The Government is about to adopt a national plan of action inspired by the EU’s plan, along with a ‘Concept for Combating Terrorism’. The inter-pillar pattern applied in the EU’s Plan of Action is followed in the inter-sectoral coordination of these and other related activities. The whole process is coordinated by the National Security Council of the CR.

One exception to the overwhelming pro-European consensus on the Czech political scene is the right-wing, Tory-like Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Vaclav Klaus. His Eurosceptic position dates back to his days as Czech Prime Minister (1993-97). While Klaus sees no alternative to the country’s integration into the EU, he favours the intergovernmental model – based on the nation-state – and strongly emphasises a concept of national interest spelt out in realist (at times even nationalistic) terms. Klaus has objected to ‘abusing the tragic events of 11 September for a creeping Europeanisation of the internal policy and security and defence policy’. At an election campaign rally he warned against the introduction of a European arrest warrant which, according to him, would allow ‘a German policeman to cross our border with a loaded gun’ to arrest a Czech citizen. His shadow foreign minister asked an ‘urgent question whether building a widespread Euro-

2. The 1998 elections brought five political parties into the lower house of the Czech Parliament: Social Democrats (CSSD, 37 per cent), conservative right-wing Civic Democratic Party (ODS, 31.5 per cent), Czech Communist Party (KSCM, 12 per cent), centre-right Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL, 10 per cent) and liberal Union of Freedom (US, 9.5 per cent).

3. In its comments on the Czech position paper, and expecting further development of acquis in this chapter between 1 January 2002 and the conclusion of the negotiations, the EU reserved for itself the possibility to ‘return to this chapter at an appropriate moment’. ‘European Union Common Position, Chapter 24: Co-operation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs’. Unpublished document.
An European supranational empire according to a nineteenth century pattern, without internal borders, is not another security risk in the era of modern terrorism and . . . a potential seedbed for terrorist threat.

Other political parties, and the President, who are, except for the Communists, strongly pro-European and even pro-federalist, have challenged these views. Views expressed by the ODS do not represent the mainstream attitudes of the Czech political class and general public. Yet their potential impact should not be underestimated. It has been Klaus and his people who have – at least so far – managed to keep the initiative in the CR’s European debate and are setting out its content. They were also the first to include the question of the EU in the 2002 election campaign. Now, anyone entering the debate with a pro-European bias must define his/her ideas vis-à-vis the ODS. This consequently helps to keep the latter’s views to the fore. Last but not least, Klaus is still probably the only actor able to make a potent ‘European’ appeal – though more in a negative sense – to Czech voters.

One can only speculate on a causal relationship between the existence of a Eurosceptic element on the Czech political stage and low (and still gradually decreasing) public support for the CR’s EU membership, which has been one of the lowest among the candidates. It fell from over 60 per cent in 1998 to around 50 per cent at the end of 2001. On the other hand, in a referendum on accession only about 20-26 per cent of participants declared they would vote against EU membership, the rest being undecided. The percentage of ‘don’t knows’ (around 30 per cent) is substantially larger in the CR than in other candidate countries.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to hypothesise about the results of the 2002 elections and the composition of the next Government. If Klaus and his party are returned to power, one might well see a moderation of their Euroscepticism under the pressure of their executive agenda and responsibility.

Despite the fact that the EU has adopted a number of doctrinal and practical measures since 11 September and seems more active in this respect than NATO is, the intensity of media attention and the direction of political debates leave us with the impression that it is the United States and the Alliance that dominate the overall picture in the CR. Yet that is quite natural. The Czechs have been in NATO for three years already. Together with the Poles and Hungarians they represent the more pro-American wing in the
Alliance. The Government has moderated its previously legalistic position on the ABM Treaty. Commenting on the United States’ unilateral abrogation of the Treaty, Foreign Minister Jan Kavan declared at the National Security Council meeting on 18 October 2001 that a necessity to modify the Treaty or to replace it by a new mechanism had emerged in light of the new situation. And, last but not least, the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty had indeed a more straightforward impact and emotional appeal than the less visible conceptual developments within the EU.

The Czechs, together with other NATO allies, supported a set of measures requested from them by the United States at the beginning of October 2001. The Government’s offer of about 500 troops for Operation Enduring Freedom (a chemical/biological protection company, a special forces unit, a field hospital and a transport aircraft) and the possibility of their combat deployment abroad was supported by 55 per cent of Czechs in December. 74 per cent of those polled were convinced that NATO should help the United States, and long-term support for NATO membership has stabilised at around 70 per cent. The NBC protection company (250 troops) was deployed in Kuwait in mid-March 2002 and the field hospital (150 people) is being set up in Afghanistan.

The new entente between NATO and Russia after 11 September was an issue on which Prague (together with Budapest and Warsaw) initially deviated from the mainstream Alliance view. There has been much less enthusiasm in the capitals of the new members than in London, Berlin or Paris for bringing Russia closer to or even inside NATO (as some interpretations of the so-called ‘Blair initiative’ have implied). Compromising NATO cohesion and freedom of action, including its enlargement, and giving Russia membership through the back door, were among the main misgivings voiced by the new members. On this topic the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in a way tested their leverage in the process of NATO’s political deliberation. As a result of their concerted effort, which was eventually supported by the United States, the conclusions of the December 2001 North Atlantic Council’s ministerial meeting concerning future relations with Russia proposed an evolutionary approach rather than moving swiftly towards a radically new mode of cooperation, which was also on the table. And the new NATO-Russia Council’s operational procedures adopted at the summit in Rome on 28 May 2002 provide for adequate checks on ‘preserving NATO’s prerogative to

4. Enhanced intelligence sharing, overflight clearances for US and other NATO planes, increasing security for US facilities on their territory, access to ports and airfields, deployment of standing NATO naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean, the deployment of NATO AWACS to US airspace.

5. The recent historical experience with Russia/USSR is probably the main reason. The fact that Russian intelligence services have intensified their activities in the three post-communist states since they joined NATO is another one. Furthermore, the memories of the robust Russian campaign against the entry of these states into NATO, which verged at times on blackmail, are still fresh in the memory of the new members. Last but not least, more than their Western allies these Central European states are exposed to organised crime and other socio-pathological phenomena flowing out from Russia.
act independently', while giving Russia enough room to broaden its cooperation with the Alliance.

Similarly, the new members would not accept any slowdown or limitation in NATO enlargement as a reward to Putin for Russia’s cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Poland and the Czech Republic are now the leading proponents of further enlargement. An informal division of labour between Presidents Vaclav Havel and Aleksander Kwasniewski in campaigning for the case has been established. Besides helping Slovakia, both countries also support the candidacy of the Baltic States. Moreover, NATO’s Prague summit will be Havel’s last big international event before retiring after twelve years in office. He wants his farewell to be truly grand, which means, among other things, as extensive an enlargement as possible.

Also working in the Baltics’ favour is the factor of parallelism in the expansion of NATO and the EU. A demand for the two processes to be complementary was included in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement. Later, the dynamics of the two enlargement processes diverged as a result of an accelerated tempo in the Alliance’s expansion and the EU’s difficulties with internal reform. Now it appears that the two processes could be synchronised again and even mutually supportive. In December 2002, shortly after the Prague summit, the EU will hold a summit in Copenhagen at which it is expected to name its new members. From the Baltic group of candidates, at least Estonia will be included. Since the general criteria for entrance into NATO and the EU are nearly identical (with the exception of the military conditions) it would be difficult for NATO to defend a decision not to ask in a country that holds an invitation to the EU. And even if Estonia is the only country invited to join the EU, thus increasing its eligibility for NATO membership, the Alliance should still accept all three Baltic States, given the security interdependence and deep military integration among the three countries. In any case, some consultation – even coordination – between the EU and NATO about their enlargements seems to be desirable.

The increased chances of the Baltic States and the Balkan candidates’ relative distance behind the other aspirants do not necessarily mean that Bulgaria and Romania have completely fallen out of the race for NATO membership. The gradual US withdrawal from the Balkans, which was further catalysed by 11 September, will have to be balanced. A further increase in the NATO European

---

6. According to the criteria established by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, an applicant country should have: (a) stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities; (b) a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with the competitive pressure of market forces within the Union; and (c) the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
allies’ share of forces deployed in the Balkans will be inevitable. One cannot even exclude the possibility of a subsequent Europeanisation and employment of military forces under EU command (taking over responsibility for at least some of the current missions). At the same time the Balkan aspirants’ value for stabilisation of the region stems from their potential both as a reservoir of peacekeepers and, above all, as a launching pad for the projection of power and stability into the region.

‘Czeching-in’ the ESDP

The basic framework for the Czech and other five non-EU European allies’ participation in the ESDP was defined, both institutionally and procedurally, at the EU summit in Feira (June 2000) and finalised at Nice (December 2000). Only thereafter did the NEEA (non-EU European allies) realise that they would not achieve the same level of participation in the EU’s new defence organisation as they had formerly enjoyed in the Western European Union (WEU). The Czechs thus concluded that they should operate within the given framework in order to influence its practical content, rather than try to change the framework itself, as they did initially.

At the EU Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000, the CR pledged a part of its military capabilities assigned to the NATO ARRC to the EU’s Headline Goal under the ‘double-hatting’ principle. The Czech contribution of around 1,000 troops is similar to that of EU states of comparable size (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland and Sweden). A year later, the Government offered 100 policemen for the European police capability, ready for deployment in post-conflict situations.

Nevertheless, the first Czech (and other NEEA) reactions to the St-Malo initiative and, above all, to the initial intention to subsume WEU into the EU, were more than apprehensive. Association with WEU had a special meaning for the post-communist countries. WEU was the first Western security organisation to open its doors to the new democracies and offer them some means of participation – first as Associate Partners in 1994, later as Associate Members after they joined NATO in 1999. The organisation had been a useful vehicle for the political-military socialisation of the post-communist countries in terms of transferring Western political and military culture and taking part in parliamentarians’ discussions in the WEU Assembly.

7. Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey.
The main apprehension of those NEEA countries with the clear prospect of early EU membership was that they might for a time be denied a chance of further substantial involvement in the ESDP framework in its formative period. Involvement in this process was seen as contributing to the NEEA’s capabilities for interoperability and harmonisation with the EU in the field of security and defence. In this context, we should note that the issues pertaining to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) were among the least controversial items for negotiation between the EU candidates and the Union.\(^9\) If the EU develops a new \textit{acquis} in the CFSP framework, this chapter will probably have to be re-opened in the final stages of negotiations but no complications are in fact expected. The Czechs were also alarmed by the notion of European security ‘autonomy’ that was stressed in the St-Malo declaration and subsequently elaborated in various EU documents. They feared a compromise of NATO cohesion and undermining of the transatlantic bond.

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland originally intended to develop a joint position. They soon found that impossible, however, and decided merely to consult each other on their national approaches. In the early debates among and between them, they weighed several extreme views against each other. Some were considering ways of slowing down the incorporation of some of WEU’s functions into the EU, or even blocking the process completely. They deliberated on vetoing EU access to NATO assets and capabilities in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) if the full set of WEU acquis were not transferred to the EU.

Another source of worries was a conviction that the ESDP would be a way to exclude the United States from Europe (a ‘French plot’ theory). In this respect one could detect a certain tension between two identities. On the one hand, NATO (and the United States as the main engine of NATO enlargement) was and remains the main reference in the security field for the CR. US support for the case of the NEEA’s participation (Madeleine Albright’s non-discrimination ‘D’) further underpinned the NEEA’s Atlanticism. On the other hand, certain concerns that too strong an Atlanticist/pro-US stance could harm the Czech Republic’s chances of EU membership existed, though there have been no explicit hints in this direction on the EU’s part.

Initial anxiety in the Czech Republic, similar to that in Poland and Hungary, ultimately gave way to more rational and construc-
tive views. All three countries have remained closer to the Atlanticist end of the spectrum in the ESDP debate. They stress the importance of maintaining the transatlantic link and the US presence in Europe. Collective defence should, in the Czech view, remain a NATO responsibility. EU military planning should be as intertwined as possible with that of NATO. The Central Europeans also emphasise the necessity of maintaining close coordination between the development and review processes of EU military capacities - the headline goals (HG) - and NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The Nice summit only partly addressed these concerns, since there will be two parallel and partly separate defence planning processes, built on two tracks of ministerial guidelines and two sets of force goals.

The current arrangement for the participation of the NEEA includes a consultation scheme at the political and military levels. At the political level, EU states will hold two meetings on ESDP with the six NEEA during each presidency, one of them at ministerial level. At least another two meetings at the Military Committee representative level, as well as regular exchanges at the military expert level, are also envisaged. Extra meetings may be organised if circumstances so require. Each country may appoint a civilian representative from its mission to the EU to follow the ESDP and act as an interlocutor with regard to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Third countries (a denomination the NEEA do not like, since it puts them in the same group as non-NATO EU candidates) can establish a permanent military liaison officer at the EU Military Staff. Yet the officer appointed will not, as was the case with WEU, be an integral part of the staff.

At the operational level, there are principally two scenarios. First, in the event of an EU-only operation, the EU may ask NEEA (but also other candidate countries) to commit their forces. They will then participate in the day-to-day operational management in an ad hoc Committee of Contributors on an equal basis with other EU member states involved, provided they contribute a ‘significant force’. Second, for operations requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, operational planning will be carried out by the Alliance’s planning bodies. This will assure the presence of the Czechs and other NEEA in the process.

The question of the involvement of NEEA states (except for Turkey) in the ESDP framework is not so much an operational/practical problem as a political/symbolic one. On the oper-
National level, there is only a very remote possibility that the EU will be able to conduct a large-scale operation without the use of NATO assets in the foreseeable future, i.e. certainly not before the Central European NEEA enter the Union. Therefore, for the CR at least, it is a short-term problem that will be solved when it joins the EU.

A longer-term tension, though, based on the NATO/Atlanticist-ESDP/Europeanist dualism will probably remain one of the outstanding features (though not the most important one) of the Czech political and security discourse in the foreseeable future. Recently, it manifested itself at a public hearing on Czech foreign policy held in the Senate on 27 November 2001. Except for the ruling Social Democrats represented there by Foreign Minister Kavan, all representatives of the centre and right-wing parties spelt out their fears of a transatlantic divorce as the consequence of ESDP. On another occasion, the shadow foreign minister in the ODS described ESDP as a combination of the ‘inherent anti-Americanism of some European circles and . . . appeasement . . . towards some dictatorial regimes’, and as ‘strategically threatening and weakening European security and stability’. In one of its current election slogans the ODS advocates ‘a capable NATO, not a Brussels army’. On the other hand, the fact that the ESDP project was initiated in London and has been driven by the United Kingdom is perceived as a safeguard against the possibility of transatlantic subversion.

Contributing to NATO missions will be the first main task of the Czech armed forces, as defined in the plan for their reform of 2001. This doctrinal review was prompted above all by NATO’s criticism of the slow pace of the Czech military transformation. Yet, the efforts within ESDP to improve European capabilities introduced another important element into that reform. Cooperation within ESDP is subsumed in the document under the tasks ‘derived from the membership in international organisations’ such as the UN, OSCE and EU. One can expect a gradual balancing of these asymmetries (political and military) in favour of the EU after the CR fully integrates into the Union, provided the further development of CFSP/ESDP is successful. This anticipation is supported by the fact that, while NATO is the reference organisation in the Czech security discourse, the public perceives the EU as the most important organisation that ‘can assist in the desirable development of the CR’ in a wider sense.

10. The Czech army should be fully professional by 2006, downsized from the current 60,000 to 34–36,000, with 85 per cent of its forces earmarked for NATO (currently with 72 per cent), able to deploy one brigade (5,000 troops) for a NATO out-of-area higher-intensity operation (without rotation) or 1,000 for a peace operation (with triple rotation), with a two-level command and control system. See Security strategy of the Czech Republic, adopted by the government on 22 January 2001, http://www.mzv.cz/bezp_strategie/abs1.html; Reform of The Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, http://www.army.cz/reforma/english/index.htm

11. 38 per cent of the public see the EU as the most helpful body for the wider development of the country, followed by the UN with 13 per cent, OECD with 11 per cent, WB/IMF with 8 per cent, NATO with 4 per cent, the OSCE with 3 per cent and 23 per cent ‘don’t knows’. Mezinarodni postaveni a bezpecnost CR (International Position and Security of the CR), Gabal, Analysis and Consulting. The poll was conducted in November-December 2001 with 1000 respondents. www.gac.cz.
Implications and perspectives

The methods of dealing with the complex security agenda must reflect the character of the challenge. 11 September and its aftermath illustrate the imperative of a holistic approach combining military, police, intelligence and civil protection aspects with financial security, development assistance and arms control measures, which must be adopted at various interlocking levels of cooperation: regional, national, EC/EU and multilateral.

Seen from this perspective, the EU’s division into pillars has increasingly been conceptually awkward for such a complex challenge. The erosion of the dividing lines and the pillars’ different agendas will continue. Responsibility for external relations, which is divided between the EU presidency, the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations, further complicates the EU’s international performance. Reforming the current system of rotating presidency and merging the functions of ‘Mr PESC’ with those of the external relations commissioner would make the process more rational and improve the continuity of the foreign and security policy of the EU. The first pill mentioned in particular might not be easy for future members to swallow, but in a Union of some twenty-five states they would hold the presidency once every twelve years anyway, provided the current system is preserved. They may be more open to reform once they have gained inside experience of the EU’s working mechanisms. A system of presidency rotation based on representation by subregional groups of states might be one solution.

There cannot be a truly ‘common’ ESDP without a ‘common’ foreign and security policy, and this still seems a long way off. Yet ESDP functional maturation appears to be outpacing the CFSP’s political development. If functionalist theories of integration prove valid, a spillover effect from the functional area of the former policy into the political space of the latter should follow in time. The reluctance of several EU countries aside, the traditionalist mindset that is prevailing in the Czech (and other candidate countries’) security debate (being state- and sovereignty-centred while Atlantic-oriented) might temporarily complicate the adoption of further innovative steps in military reform, such as encouraging the development of niche capabilities, international pooling of military capacities, joint procurement projects and cross-border military integration. The same goes for the political issue of deepening the EU’s second pillar after enlargement.
Making use of the flexibility provisions for enhanced cooperation within the CFSP will be one of the possible solutions to the dilemma. Accepting in part the leadership role of the EU’s core states (the great powers, if you will) in European security and military affairs will be inevitable. Similarly, integration by ‘objectives’ rather than by ‘directives’, i.e. a softer method of setting common EU benchmarks while leaving the method of reaching them up to the respective states, will be helpful. In this context, the idea of convergence criteria – input in terms of the structure of defence budgets, output in terms of the structure of forces – should be further explored for ESDP.

The gap between the general language used to describe the Petersberg tasks on the one hand and the practical details of the military headline goals should be filled. Therefore, a thoroughgoing, truly common threat assessment should be undertaken by the EU. Based on this assessment a spectrum of generic scenarios should be defined in order to identify relevant force elements and attribute them to respective scenarios. The current approach, whereby threats are assessed according to available capabilities and not vice versa, should be reversed. Future members should be invited to join in the exercise, firstly in order to make up for their participation deficit and, secondly, to enhance their socialisation within ESDP. Bringing future members into the debate would have a stimulating effect on their internal discussions, similar to that resulting from their participation in the Convention together with the promise of participation in the 2004 IGC for debates on the finalité of the Union.

The emphasis in most of the candidate states on the primary role of NATO, and their pro-US inclination, will probably also influence their position in debates on the possibility of widening the geographical/operational scope of ESDP beyond the outer periphery of the EU. They are more reluctant than some of the EU states to accept the idea of Europe as a global power. On the other hand, as the Czech case has shown, they would be willing to deploy their forces outside the EU’s immediate area if there is clearly reasonable cause (the campaign against terror) and unambiguous leadership (provided by the US in this case).

Given the restrictive fiscal environment within the EU and the level of economic development of its future members, a substantial increase in European defence spending can hardly be expected. Pooling of military capabilities, the emphasis on specialisation,
the multinational complementarity of forces and joint procurement projects should be the main cost-effective ways to cope with this problem. A division of labour on the basis of states’ comparative advantages and the effect of economies of scale should be the guiding principles of such a rationalisation of European defence. The candidate states are, in theory at least, better suited for more radical steps in this direction due to both their budgetary situation and ongoing military transformation. They should be encouraged in this, and a debate on a European strategic review might be a suitable forum for that.

The candidates themselves should be innovative. On the political level, within NATO, the three Central European NEEA should initiate talks between the Alliance and the EU about the possibility of coordinating and, if possible, complementing and/or synchronising the two processes of enlargement of these organisations. On the military level they should promote multinational military arrangements, for instance in terms of offering prepared joint force packages/modules based on a deeper division of labour, service complementarity and multinational rotation, as a contribution to the HG forces. The establishment of a Czech-Slovak peacekeeping unit for KFOR and the plan to build a joint Czech-Polish-Slovak brigade as a military expression of Visegrad subregional cooperation (V-4) may be good examples of such an approach. The possibility of organising a deployable HQ should be explored as the next step in this project once the brigade becomes operational in 2004.

Developing niche capabilities with a higher added value is another way of rationalising defence spending. In the Czech case, the development of its chemical/biological protection capability includes a wider programme of chemical and biological protection R&D. The Czech military is now building a ‘biocentre’ with research laboratories and a hospital equipped with state-of-the-art technology allowing it to deal with the consequences of a biological attack.

It is the conviction of this author – though not one that is widely shared in the CR – that if Europe is to achieve truly fully-fledged and effective military capabilities, some sort of European army, whatever its label, will have to be established in due course. Duplication, lack of deeper defence integration and doctrinal ambiguity among the Union’s members are the main obstacles on the road towards ‘the capacity for autonomous action, backed up

12. The relative level of the CR’s defence expenditure (2.2 per cent of GDP) is sufficient. The low share of R&D and investment in production is the main problem. Only about 2 per cent of the Czech armed forces are deployable abroad and sustainable for more than one rotation cycle.

13. This installation is unique in Central Europe and there are only a few comparable centres in the other EU and NATO states (namely in the United Kingdom and United States).
by credible military forces’ that would enable Europe to ‘play its full role on the international stage’, as called for in the St-Malo declaration. The autonomy imperative is even more urgent given recent experience. Europe must be ready for and capable of action in cases where the United States is engaged elsewhere. In this respect constructive duplication – i.e. developed in close coordination with NATO and the US – should not be feared.

In the area of defence industry and trade, the CR has lost the strong position it had among major arms exporters prior to 1989. The main interest of the surviving producers lies in cooperation with major European producers. Attempts at coordinating arms production or modernisation of the former Soviet-type military hardware within the V-4 region have thus far failed. Similarly, the possibility of adopting a joint approach to large procurement projects, such as the acquisition of supersonic fighter aircraft – relevant for the CR, Hungary, Poland and also Austria – has probably been missed. It would be only logical to support the creation of the Czech-Polish-Slovak brigade by a joint purchase of transport planes, e.g. the European Airbus A400M.

Towards the future shape of the EU

Despite the dose of urgency injected into the debates on European security by the events of 11 September, the discussion in the CR has been dominated by the accession process and, recently, also by preparations of the country’s position for the EU’s Convention. The traditional intergovernmentalist-supranationalist cleavage serves as the principle means of orientation and differentiation in the national debate on the Union’s finalité. Except for the ODS, the majority of political actors – including trade unions – tend towards the latter.

All parties represented in the Parliament (see note 1) generally support the CR’s integration into the EU. Their positions in the finalité debate are briefly outlined below with reference to the basic points set out in Article 23 of the Treaty of Nice:

- CSSD: more integration, a stronger Commission, strengthening of QMV in the Council, solidarity and social market economy, clear-cut functional delimitation of powers, a charter of rights should become a part of a basic EU document (that might have the status of a constitution), more power for the EP and more cooperation between the EP and national parliaments;
ODS: no more supranational deepening, no extension of QMV, national veto rights to be retained, yes to a binding quasi-constititutional document (a catalogue of competencies and division of powers between EU and state levels would prevent further creeping integration), the Council is the most legitimate body, the nation-state the basic building block;

Coalition (an election coalition of KDU-CSL and US): more accountability of the Commission, gradual federalisation, democratisation, solidarity, bottom-up consensus-building, charter of rights part of a constitution, clear-cut catalogue of competencies, more powers for the EP, the Commission to be directly accountable to the EP;

KSCM: equal treatment and protection of smaller states, social solidarity and welfare state, no other preferences spelt out so far;

The President: federal structure, civil society involved on various levels of governance, solidarity, legally binding Charter of Rights, simple constitutional document, stronger Commission with a directly elected President, EP second chamber nominated from national parliaments.

No national consensus has been formulated so far, but the need to protect the interests of smaller states in the EU is the lowest common denominator in the debate. For the ODS the preservation of the sovereign state as the principal European actor and locus of national identity and political legitimacy is the main safeguard of it. Partnership with the United Kingdom and relations with the United States are seen as ways of moderating integrationist dynamics and counterbalancing the alleged hegemonic ambitions of Brussels.

Other political actors on the Czech scene support – with minor differences in emphasis – closer integration. There are several broad features that are common to the pro-European voices on the Czech scene, as well as to the finalité debates in other candidate countries.

Firstly, there is a widely shared emphasis on the solidarity movement in the integration project. The main reason is the welfare gap between the EU and the aspirants. There cannot be solidarity without some level of a shared mutuality, i.e. without a European identity. This presupposes that the legitimacy of EU institutions be conditioned by their democratic accountability and transparency as well as by their effective performance in practice. Therefore, a catalogue of competencies – whatever the title of
the document – that would respect the principle of solidarity is generally seen as desirable in the candidate states. Secondly, fears that the candidates’ past experience of forced integration into the Soviet bloc, in combination with the freshly acquired sovereignty of their states and identity of their peoples, would make them reluctant to accept deeper integration and pooling of sovereignty in the EU, seem to be unsubstantiated. In reality, supranationalism, viewed as a safeguard for smaller states against the dominance of the larger states, enjoys significant support among the candidates. Similarly, their citizens are quite open to the notion of a European identity, which helps them to differentiate themselves from their communist past and from their perception of themselves as European outsiders.

Thirdly, while in the finalité debate the future members’ penchant is for a strengthening of the EU’s supranational elements and institutions, in the security and defence area they remain more conservative than the EU mainstream and much closer to the intergovernmentalist position.

Fourthly, interesting ideas going beyond the traditional intergovernmental-supranational axis have appeared (albeit marginally) in the candidate countries’ debates about the future shape of Europe. Certain shades of the notion of a ‘post-Westphalian’ polity (discussed within various concepts such as multilevel polity, governance without government, or Europe as a network) can be found in e.g. contributions by the Czech President Vaclav Havel or the Estonian Foreign Minister Thomas Hendrik Ilves. The Czech president has stressed the necessity to cultivate a European civil society as a foundation for the further development of supranational construction, and as a base for a new European identity and solidarity. His conception of civil society encompasses a broad spectrum of actors (including NGOs and self-ruling regions) that should be empowered in terms of claiming competencies at the expense of states and the Union. He is also the only actor on the Czech scene who has introduced the question of multiple-level governance into the debate.

It remains to be seen what the final position of the national team representing the CR at the Convention (two national parliament members and one government representative) will be. Preparatory work on the CR’s stance has only just started and one can expect intensive debates on formulating a consensus acceptable to both Eurosceptical and Europeanist parties in the Parlia-
ment. The results of the spring 2002 general elections could also affect this process.

Conclusion

The last major international crisis before 11 September involving the Czech Republic (as a recently joined member of NATO) was the Kosovo crisis in 1999. With certain reservations as to the comparability of the character of those two situations (Kosovo and the aftermath of 11 September), it can be concluded that the Czech political class and society have since matured on both security and wider international issues. Unlike in 1999, since the terrorist attacks straightforward political leadership has been exercised by the political élite. The executive's reaction was rapid and reasonably efficient. Public attitudes have reflected growing acceptance of the necessity to carry a share of the responsibility for developments in the wider world – a remarkable achievement, indeed, for a traditionally inward-looking society that only recently emerged from fifty years of isolation.

Looking to the future, one can assume that while the new EU members will most probably be pro-integration oriented and reform-minded in the EU’s wider institutional debate, they will be more conservative in the area of security and defence. Still, a gradual re-balancing of the current pro-Atlantic bias can be expected in due course following their full integration into the EU. The more channels for socialisation and participation are established between the Union and its future members prior to accession, the smoother the post-accession transition will be.
Almost in – but what for?

Pal Dunay

If 11 September 2001 remains a lasting, formative element of the history of international relations, it will be because it signalled the end of the post-Cold War era. Our thinking about international security and the doubts we have shared since the late-1980s changed overnight. The central element of the post-Cold War system was attacked asymmetrically by a non-state actor. The United States as a global player, and possibly the only one, had a unique role in determining the system of international security since the end of the Cold War. Its change of course and thinking has therefore unavoidable had global effects.

The impact of 11 September was far-reaching and extended to several areas. First and foremost it brought clarity to the debate that had dominated the 1990s about the new and old threats originating from state- and non-state actors, and the chance of successful asymmetrical attack against highly developed and well organised industrial democracies. It has also ended the discussion about capabilities versus threat-based armed forces. After a decade-long pause there was a clearly identifiable threat to address.

The reaction of the United States to the attacks highlighted its strengths and weaknesses. Among the strengths it is necessary to mention the following. It formed a coalition of like-minded countries in a short period of time. There is no doubt that the experience of the Bush team in building a coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1990-91 was very useful in this respect. After the terrorist attacks the United States gave the impression that it was willing to rely on multinational institutions, at least politically. Even though invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the history of NATO was not a US initiative, Washington played along and thus effectively made the political reaction to the terrorist attacks a multilateral one.1 The United States fought a war in Afghanistan pursuing an appropriate military strategy. It did not engage directly on the terrain dur-

1. It has to be said that the United States was in a relatively easy position. Due to its enormous influence in the international system, shared common basic values or for other reasons, such as facing challenges similar to terrorism, many countries expressed their full support.
ning the high-intensity phase of the operation and ‘won’ the war at a cost of very few casualties. Among the weaknesses it is worth mentioning the following. Soon after the United States decided to retaliate against Afghanistan it made it clear that it had not found the military support of its allies necessary in the high-intensity phase of the operation. This reminded the European allies of the idea already raised during the Bush election campaign. A division of labour had been suggested that was now put into practice: the United States would be responsible for high-intensity crisis management, whereas the Europeans would take the lead in low-intensity peace support operations.\(^2\) Such an arrangement, applied for the first time in the war against Afghanistan, means that the military part of the NATO coalition, at least in operational terms, has been demonstratively weakened. It has also been worrying to see how little importance the United States has attached to consulting its allies and taking their opinion into consideration in the long run. When Europe, at a later stage, argued for eliminating the root causes of terrorism by addressing its socio-economic reasons, the American establishment spoke about the ‘axis of evil’ and about providing ‘total security’ for Americans. The last factor where the divergence of opinion of the two sides has become highly visible was the Administration’s disregard for international law concerning the treatment of arrested Taliban fighters following their capture, in striking contrast to the position of Western Europe. The reaction to the terrorist attacks of 11 September has highlighted more than anything else during the previous decade that, if the parties are not ready to address the root causes of their differences in principle, in politics and in military matters the basis of transatlantic relations will be redefined and will become a looser, restructured relationship.\(^3\)

The reaction of the Hungarian government to 11 September was entirely appropriate and in accordance with the size and the allied status of the country. The Government expressed its solidarity with the United States. With the exception of one party of the Parliament, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (HJLP), the full political spectrum condemned the terrorist attack resolutely. The chairman of the HJLP, a party of chauvinistic and fascist orientation,\(^4\) said on Hungarian television that it was partly the policy of the US government that could be held responsible for the events of 11 September. Protection of US property was increased and the country offered to send blood products and rescue teams

---


3. The fact that according to public opinion a good part of the US population would agree with ‘the need for the United States to cooperate with and listen to its allies’ may not be enough to counteract the unilateralist tendencies dominating the US administration. See ‘America’s new internationalist point of view’, the Pew Research Center and the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 24 October 2001, quoted in Steven Everts, ‘A New Phase in US-European Relations’, \textit{Europe after September 11th} (London: Centre for European Reform, 2001), p. 25.

4. The HJLP had a 12 member-strong group in the single-chamber Hungarian legislative of 386 members before the April 2002 elections. At the elections of 7 April it failed to reach the 5 per cent threshold and could not form a parliamentary group in the new legislative.
to the United States. The US authorities declined the latter offer. The Government strengthened border control. The Parliament, at its first session after the event, approved the contribution of the country to Operation **Infinite Justice**. The Government speeded up the preparation of new laws to fight money laundering. There was only one area where Hungary proved to be less committed than many other member countries of NATO and some candidates: it did not offer any contribution to the peace support operation in Afghanistan after the war apart from expressing its readiness to send a small medical team. This level of commitment is identical with Hungary’s contribution to Operation **Desert Storm** ten years earlier. This could in no way be regarded as a demonstration of unwillingness to contribute to the peace effort. It has much more to do with Hungary’s high-level commitment to other peace operations. More than seven hundred Hungarian military personnel are serving in various peace support operations, the largest numbers being in SFOR, KFOR and UNFICYP. Hungary has no contingent that could work under the prevailing conditions in Afghanistan, and, lastly, the Hungarian armed forces have been facing severe financial constraints for more than a decade.

Following the attacks on the United States, Hungary was well aware that it was not facing any direct terrorist threat. As, like many West European countries, it had never been challenged by terrorists directly, it was reluctant to overdo the anti-terrorist campaign. Despite the fact that it went along with the main stream in its fight against terrorism, the relationship between Washington and Budapest became lukewarm at about the same time. Even though Hungary’s lack of enthusiasm for the fight against terrorism has appeared among those factors that contributed to that change, it has definitely not been the most prominent reason for this temporary and relatively minor deterioration of bilateral relations. A number of other reasons explain the phenomenon. There have been references to ‘anti-Semitic and xenophobic’ statements, and to the fact that Hungary decided to hire 14 **Gripen** aircraft rather than opting for US F-16s. In a public pronouncement, the new US Ambassador to Budapest thanked Hungary for its contribution to anti-terrorist activity, although she added somewhat enigmatically that it was time for the Hungarian government to demonstrate how far it had progressed during the last decade.5

---

The Hungarian political landscape and EU enlargement

Hungary – similarly to the Czech Republic and Poland – has been among the front-runners of Western integration. It was the first country of the region to join the Council of Europe in 1990. It was among the first three to sign a Europe Agreement with the European Communities in December 1991. It was the second country of the region to join OECD and among the first three to gain NATO membership in 1999. The assessment of its performance by the European Union has always been among the most positive ones since Agenda 2000.

Integration in the EU’s first pillar

Hungary, like the Czech Republic and Poland, belongs to the so-called ‘Luxembourg group’, whose medium-term membership prospect was assessed positively as long ago as 1997. Unlike the two other countries, however, the economic performance of Hungary has been free of unexpected downturns. Micro-economic integration, the flow of foreign direct investment and, since 1997, high economic growth, have continued unabated. Even the introduction of a successful macro-economic stabilisation package in 1995 did not present any major problem in the process. Hungary has always been proud of its achievements, even though the country’s three post-Cold War governments have reacted differently to the successful integration effort.

Hungary’s good economic performance does not mean that the country has not encountered any problems along its path to Western integration. Some of them have been temporary, such as the increase of inflation in 2000, whereas others, such as the (mal-)treatment of the Roma population, corruption and absorbing EU financial aid, have been more lasting. Interestingly, the Orban government that came into office in the summer of 1998 and faced elections in April 2002, although the success story of economic integration has continued, has added to the political problems. Interestingly, the Government demonstrated that it had also made efforts in those areas where criticism by the European Commission had been most persistent. Such issues include the Roma policy, where the Government has adopted a medium-term action programme, corruption, which ‘remained high on the political agenda of the Government’ although it ‘continued to be a prob-
Accession to the European Union has been the single most important issue on Hungary’s international agenda since it gained NATO membership. Similarly to other candidate countries, Hungary has put heavy emphasis on the date of accession. The government programme stated its expectation of concluding accession talks successfully, ‘with the aim that Hungary would become a member of the European Union in 2002’. This emphasis on the accession date should not be trivialised. It can serve many purposes. First and foremost, a hypothetical date presents the state administration with a deadline to prepare for EU compatibility in the adoption and application of the acquis. Accession is not only of symbolic importance, demonstrating the completion of the country’s integration in the West. It also matters a lot as it implies a significant increase of EU aid. Emphasis on the accession date has also contributed to keeping the public’s attention during the long, technical accession talks. Internationally, the Orban government has perceived the environment similarly to its predecessors on the question of the date of accession, i.e. selective attention has been paid to the matter. The Hungarian leadership has listened only to the good news among the predictions made by many Western politicians, high-ranking civil servants and international officials as to the date of enlargement. This has continued since 11 September. The potential negative consequences of the events of 11 September on enlargement have been ignored by the Hungarian leadership, as they have by that of other candidate countries.

The Orban government has brought about two further changes in the country’s EU accession strategy. It has emphasised that it will represent the national interest and will be a ‘tough’ negotiating partner at the talks. The reference to national interest is entirely appropriate, as the previous Socialist-Liberal government coalition (1994-98) never referred to it and thus left an important gap in the political vocabulary. In fact, substantive accession negotiations started after the arrival in office of the Orban government, so that there was no basis on which to compare the negotiating strategy of the two governments and highlight the toughness of the Orban government compared with that of its predecessor. If we take a closer look at the compromises made during this period, we can conclude that the Orban government negotiated just as any other reasonable administration

---

would have done. The promised change was thus exclusively rhetorical. The last, and for this study most important, difference was the announcement by the Government that the focus of EU accession talks after the country had joined NATO would be on economic issues. The two previous governments thought of integration in the West in terms of the fundamental socio-economic and political reorientation of the country. Orban and his entourage narrowed down the EU accession agenda to economic integration. If one recognises that the political requirements of accession to the Council of Europe and NATO largely overlap with the political part of the Copenhagen criteria, this is certainly legitimate. If, however, one takes into account that, after it had been formed, the Orban government wanted to send a powerful message that the country had once and for all met the political criteria of EU accession, it was clearly incorrect. Acquiring international political legitimacy is not a task that can be carried out once and for all. The Orban government made only one departure from its line that saw the task of EU integration simply as integration in the first pillar. Due to the significant ethnic Hungarian community in several neighbouring countries, including ones which most probably will join the EU later than Hungary – like Romania, Serbia and Ukraine – Budapest has been interested in the free movement of those Hungarians who have citizenship of those countries after the accession of Hungary as well. The disinterest of Hungary in the Common Foreign and Security Policy during the last years means that not even major changes in this area could have an effect upon Hungary.

The reasons presented above should be sufficient to illustrate why the Hungarian political establishment has been convinced that upcoming membership of the European Union has a lot to do with economic integration, a bit with justice and home affairs and very little with anything else. It is therefore understandable that the post-11 September debates have not focused on CFSP and ESDP in Hungary. They have had a lot to do with two far more topical matters: the issue of so-called ‘big bang’ enlargement and the pending financial arrangement offered to candidate countries.

Hungary, at least for the last four years and tacitly for a longer period of time, has looked on itself as a lead candidate for EU membership. Accordingly, different scenarios of enlargement have been in circulation in the state apparatus. Behind closed doors there have been two competing versions. One of them has
considered it realistic to have a very small first wave of eastern enlargement, extending to 3-4 countries, including Hungary, though excluding Poland. The other has taken the view that, for political reasons, the first wave would be unimaginable without Poland, and would most likely include all countries of the Luxembourg group, with the possible addition of Malta. What happened in the last months of 2001 had been entirely inconceivable in Budapest. Indication of the possibility of a ‘big bang’ enlargement in November, which was repeated at the Laeken summit in December 2001, shocked the Hungarian elite. A country that was confident that its superior performance would be recognised by its earlier accession to the EU had difficulties in accepting that its leitmotif – differentiation based on self-differentiation – was not shared by the Union. Debate ensued on two levels: expert economists contemplated the pros and cons of a ‘big bang’, whereas political parties held their own discussions with a view to the upcoming elections.

The Hungarian government regularly emphasised its reservations concerning the ‘big bang’, and requested individual treatment on the basis of the country’s eminent performance. This has angered the Union, particularly after the announcement of the ‘big bang’. It has also upset other candidate countries: even though they have not officially expressed their reservations when the Hungarian government has made foreign policy mistakes, not even the closest partners of Hungary, the so-called Visegrad states, were tolerant on this occasion. The parliamentary opposition found the opportunity to criticise the Government. It has been emphasised that the ‘big bang’ contains the danger that the country ‘would lose the advantage enjoyed earlier’. According to them, the ‘big bang’ is not a problem in itself. It is a problem, however, that Hungary’s accession may be delayed for several years if the country has to wait for the less prepared candidates to complete their preparation for accession. It is apparent that the political spectrum, government and opposition alike, have not succeeded in getting over the shock of the upcoming ‘big bang’ enlargement. The heated atmosphere of the election campaign may be an explanation for this. It is probably far more important, however, that the country has for many years, and most notably for the last four, been pursuing the illusion that it is the most prominent candidate whose performance cannot be matched by others.

---

7. It is memorable that the then Foreign Minister László Kovács, even at the beginning of the accession talks at the end of March 1998, had a heated exchange with his Polish counterpart, Bronislaw Geremek, in front of representatives of other candidate countries and EU officials. Kovács said that Hungary did not want to wait for anybody in the enlargement process, and did not want any country to wait for it. This pointed statement was no doubt directed at Poland, the largest candidate country and one that was regarded by many as being an ‘indispensable’ member of the first wave of Eastern enlargement.
No change: the irrelevance of the second pillar in Hungary’s approach to the EU

The Atlantic Alliance has been regarded as the primary external security provider for Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary, and the most important security institution. That is why the advice of NATO, with the decisive involvement of the United States, has been listened to most attentively. No other international institution is assumed to be able to contribute substantively to the security of the Central and East European countries. This is due inter alia to the fact that many candidate countries have some residual concerns that may make (individual and) collective self-defence necessary. Hungary is thus not unique in this respect. Even though it has rightly de-emphasised its threat perceptions, these did undeniably exist. There is one difference, however, between Hungary and the other two Central and East European members of the Atlantic Alliance: the threat perception of the Hungarian public has been dominated by conflict among the southern Slavs. With the departure of the Milosevic regime from power or, more precisely, somewhat earlier, the perceived threat reached a new post-Cold War low in Hungary.

This does not mean that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are mavericks that do not appreciate the importance of power projection capabilities or pay only lip service to conflict management. It does mean, however, that the security perception of these countries induces a different mix of power projection and individual and collective self-defence than that of many EU member countries. Consequently, only an institution such as NATO can claim credibility in the security of Hungary (similarly to many other countries of the region) and can address the full continuum of military capabilities ranging from low-intensity peacekeeping to high-intensity collective self-defence. In light of this the EU, which has recently started to claim to have some security relevance, including in the military sense, faces a number of difficult challenges. It does not merely have the disadvantage of being a new security institution. It also has to counteract a temporary disadvantage: NATO has completed its first eastward enlargement earlier than the EU, and has thus gained extra credibility as an institution that has put into practice its declared intentions on enlargement. The EU has to clearly define its potential security role. Its current definition, which is confined to the Petersberg
tasks, does not present any problem to the candidate countries. To put it bluntly, as a contributing factor to the security of Hungary it is not too much but rather too little. For Hungary, the question is not whether or not to cooperate with ESDP but rather how to ensure that this framework represents a satisfactory contribution to providing for the security needs of the country. Furthermore, how the evolution of ESDP will affect NATO, which is widely regarded as the country’s main security provider, has to be analysed.

Whereas the EU gained some vague security relevance in the Maastricht Treaty, it took nearly a decade to move from verbal reassurance to the expression of a willingness to build some operational military capability in order to carry out the Petersberg tasks. Although possible EU missions are confined to those tasks, the matter has become highly controversial. For some it is seen as a first step in the direction of a collective EU defence capability, while for others the Petersberg tasks represent the maximum acceptable.

The EU’s idea of gaining some security relevance represents a major challenge for the Central and East European countries which would like to become members of both NATO and the EU or have already joined the Atlantic Alliance. The challenge is that none of them wants to jeopardise its interests with either organisation. Furthermore, they are all strongly committed to the presence of the United States in Europe and would not subscribe to a project that risked disengagement of the United States from the Old Continent. In this sense the view of Hungary (and probably many other candidate countries) is a mirror image of the old Soviet view that Europe without a US presence gives Russia more room for manoeuvre. The Central and East European countries are strongly of the view that Europe is safer with the US presence. It is probable that this view is shared by most EU member states as well. One analyst has expressed this somewhat differently: ‘For the efficiency of European politics the question emerges how stable and functional the institutionalisation of the relationship between NATO and the EU will be.’

Even at an early stage, when the EU was planning its ESDP, Hungary expressed its view. It was somewhat enigmatic and, for reasons outlined above, has had to remain so ever since: as an internal MFA paper stated, ‘the continued commitment to a firm transatlantic relationship and strategic cooperation between

NATO and the European Union are the prerequisites of effective European crisis prevention.’ After the Helsinki summit and the publication of the headline goals, the four Visegrad countries declared that they perceived the Petersberg tasks ‘as enhancing Euro-Atlantic security, of which the North Atlantic Alliance is the cornerstone’. Shortly afterwards, the Hungarian foreign minister, in a letter outlining his country’s position on many major aspects of the future of the Union, scarcely touched upon ESDP: ‘Hungary is fully aware of the importance and supportive of the evolution of the common European security and defence policy.’ This laconic statement on the topic could not have been less enthusiastic.

The new members of NATO have demonstrated the fundamental difference between a de facto non-aligned country and a member of the Atlantic Alliance. The prime minister of Hungary expressed this in relation to the Kosovo conflict: ‘Due to our fast NATO accession we have arrived at the outbreak of the warlike conflict not defenceless, lonely but as [an] equal member of the strongest military alliance.’ It is clear that the new members of the Alliance regard their membership as a symbolic milestone on their way to becoming fully-fledged members of the Western security community.

Despite the strong NATO commitment of both the first three Central and East European member states and the candidates for membership of the Atlantic Alliance, these countries have not wanted to challenge ESDP openly for a number of reasons. One, and maybe the most important, is that it would be unwise not to demonstrate commitment towards an organisation which the country hopes to join. Furthermore, nobody knows whether ESDP will turn out to be a success or a failure. It is impossible to predict whether, as a result of a declining US commitment to Europe, ESDP will gain in importance or not. The mixed signals from Washington during the two years before 11 September certainly did not encourage the candidate countries to increase their effort vis-à-vis the ESDP.

The candidates lived up to expectations and offered their contributions to the EU Capabilities Commitment Conference held in November 2000. Most candidates, including Hungary, which committed a battalion-strength force of 350 persons, offered smaller or larger contributions. It is not known how much of this force has already been committed internationally to NATO or...
peace support operations. Beyond the symbolic importance of making a contribution, Hungary has strong views about the right to participate in shaping those decisions taken prior to mounting an operation. Hungary has consequently represented a position that has given preference to cooperation between EU member states and European non-EU NATO members (15 + 6) and not to the framework that included every EU candidate country and Norway and Iceland (15 + 15).

It is too early to tell in what direction ESDP will evolve in the years to come. Its originally heavy emphasis on the military side of conflict prevention and management did not necessarily seem to make it one that would fill a niche as long as the Atlantic Alliance, including the United States, was a credible security provider. The shortage of competence and resources is far more striking in the areas of international policing and other non-military forms of conflict management. Thus, a reorientation of the project in that direction would certainly be welcomed by the Central and East European countries, among others, in order to contribute better to European security and avoid unnecessary duplication with NATO. This would make it possible for them not to have to face a painful choice between their transatlantic and European allegiances. It is clear that, at this early stage of the project, it would be fairly difficult to adapt to it anyway. When it is further exacerbated by the project’s elusive character, and the situation is aggravated by the fact that one country holding the presidency puts a clearly different emphasis than another, this is nearly impossible. The insufficiently clear orientation of ESDP makes adaptation difficult, even for the best ‘pupils’ among the candidate countries, such as Hungary.

The aftermath of the events of 11 September may bring about a change in this situation. Hungary has been monitoring the situation closely as it has evolved. Its enthusiasm toward ESDP may increase if the project gains a clear orientation and consolidates. As a relatively small country, Hungary will not challenge mainstream international, including European, developments. Nor does it intend to make the foolish mistake of committing itself to a programme which does not in the end come to fruition. When analysing the position of the country on ESDP it is necessary to make a clear-cut difference between cautious official statements and rather more forward-looking analytical comments. The Foreign Minister has drawn the conclusion: ‘It was underlined what
had been clear before, that European security and defence policy is
not in contradiction with NATO, it does not compete with it. In
the framework and in accordance with the primary and decisive
security function of NATO it carries out specific crisis prevention
and management tasks and thus contributes to the strengthening
of the foreign and security policy dimension of European integra-
tion. The tragedy of the 11th September made it clear among oth-
er that the cohesion of the Atlantic family is a far more important
issue than the many controversies between Europe and Amer-
ica.’ Interestingly, during a full-day debate in the Hungarian
Parliament in November 2001, ESDP was mentioned only once,
when an MP listed the Petersberg tasks in his contribution and
emphasised the inclusive character of ESDP, which involved can-
didate countries as well. This was another illustration of how little
the Hungarian political establishment and society at large think
about the security aspect of the EU.

Where changes are perceived: justice and home affairs

As mentioned earlier, Hungary has represented a moderate main-
stream position in the new fight against terrorism. There have been
certain concrete matters beyond the symbolic alliance with major
forces of Western civilisation that had to be taken up. In this case it
is not particularly difficult to separate the steps that have been
taken due to the changes induced by the events of 11 September
and those which are unrelated.

The Government has noticed that there are certain shortcom-
ings in the country’s commitment to fight terrorism, and Hun-
gary has demonstrated its willingness to close some loopholes.
Strengthening of the legal framework has been a priority on its
agenda. In November 2001 Hungary ratified the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and The
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
was signed the same month. This is the only universal convention
addressing terrorism that has not entered into force in Hungary.
With these two actions, Hungary has practically attained full par-
icipation in the web of conventions against terrorism. The coun-
try is now party to 11 universal and one regional treaties on the
topic, and is a signatory to one universal convention.

In light of the attacks against the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, the issue of money laundering has attracted increasing

11 Janos Martonyi, ‘Az aldozat
ertelme’ (The Meaning of Sacri-
fice), Nepszabadsag, 24 October
attention, far beyond habitual concern over this type of organised crime. It has been the intention of the international community to establish a foolproof system that prevents the financing of terrorist activity. Hungary had several reasons to cooperate in this, and not only the fact that it shares the objective of fighting terrorism. Hungary was the only OECD member state that was identified as a non-cooperative country by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for its practice of not foreclosing certain activities that made money laundering possible. Countries on the list included Nauru, Nigeria, Russia and Ukraine, among others.\(^\text{12}\) When the anti-money laundering legislation was introduced in the Parliament, attention was called to two factors: (1) the urgency of passing such legislation in order that Hungary could be taken off the FATF’s list at its next session in January 2002. Otherwise, it was emphasised, there was a danger that the country’s prospects of EU accession would be jeopardised; (2) the terrorist attacks of September 2001 made the adoption of the legislation particularly urgent in light of the initiative of the UN Security Council. Hence, considerations related to EU enlargement were combined with the attention this area has gained due to terrorism. The legislative package included measures like the elimination of anonymous bank accounts and extending anti-money laundering legislation to intermediaries like real-estate agents, traders in objets d’art or precious metals, law firms, solicitors and accountants. Restrictions were introduced on granting permission to open currency exchange offices.

Hungary has been interested in third-pillar cooperation, and engaged actively in it well before September 2001. There were certain concerns in the past over the extent to which Hungarian law enforcement might be affected by corruption. As EU membership approached and these concerns eased, a cooperation agreement was signed between Europol and Hungary. The Council of the European Union concluded in March 2001 that there was no impediment to the transfer of sensitive information to Hungary. The objective of the agreement that was signed in October 2001 and entered into force in November the same year has been to broaden cooperation in the fight against the most extreme forms of international criminality, particularly through the exchange of strategic and operational information. No direct access to Europol’s information system has been provided in the agreement: it has been made possible through contact officers only.\(^\text{13}\)

---

It happened during 2001 that the chapter on cooperation in justice and home affairs was on the agenda of the accession talks. As Hungary had not asked for any derogation, two questions dominated the agenda:

(1) had Hungary taken the necessary steps in the harmonisation of its legal system?

(2) would Hungary be able to apply the norms following accession, particularly those of the Schengen regime? When the chapter was closed in December 2001, the EU recognised that Hungary would gradually align its visa policy with the Union’s requirements.

Discussions now focus on Hungary’s ability to implement the Schengen regime following accession. A ‘big bang’ enlargement would ease the burden on Hungary of establishing the regime. Of the country’s seven neighbours, Austria has been a member of the Union since 1995 and there is a fair chance that two further states, Slovakia and Slovenia, will join the EU with Hungary at the same time. This would mean that Hungary would be the external border of the Union vis-à-vis four countries (Croatia, Romania, Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). As the necessary technical facilities are being established, Hungary seems confident that it would be able to implement Schengen upon accession. In spite of this, Hungary will only join the Schengen regime at least two years after EU accession. Thorough on-site inspection on the Hungarian border will precede that by the EU. No doubt the country would be happy if more financial assistance were to be provided to establish and then modernise the system of border controls, especially if such costs were shared by the member states.

In other areas Hungary has perceived no difficulty. On certain new developments, like the European arrest warrant, it has not pronounced its view, as they will come to Hungary as part of the acquis communautaire and there is no point in debating a matter which will have to be accepted anyway.

In sum, Hungary has noticed that third-pillar issues in the broad sense have gained more prominence since 11 September. One may say that the gap between the Union’s extremely heavy first pillar and the least extensive third pillar has started to narrow. It is too early to tell whether the methods applied in the third pillar will be ‘communitarised’. As Hungary is making efforts to fight organised crime and control its borders more rigorously, the increasing efforts of the Union to the same effect are welcome developments.
The first three former Warsaw Pact members of the Atlantic Alliance have of course noticed the dissatisfaction with their performance. It would be far too simple to conclude that they have simply not performed at all since their accession to the Alliance. They have compensated for the disappointment they have generated in a number of ways.

- They have all proved to be extremely loyal members of the Alliance and aware of their importance compared to the great powers of NATO. Their loyalty has been reflected in the fact that they have not interfered with the decision-making process of NATO in any measurable way. This could be perceived most clearly during NATO’s Kosovo operation, when decisions were taken just as smoothly with 19 members as they would have been with 16. Loyalty was also reflected in their contribution to the two major NATO-led peace operations, SFOR and KFOR, in common with most candidate countries.

- They have also contributed to carrying out Alliance tasks through their location. The Alliance has been able to use their airspace, airfields and other military facilities whenever necessary. In the case of Hungary, a neighbour of three successor states of former Yugoslavia including Serbia, this meant a particularly active engagement in the Kosovo operation.

- Due to the strategic location of the new members, and their instincts concerning some of their strategically important neighbours, they have contributed to the Alliance’s common knowledge. They have also actively participated in intelligence cooperation.

- Last but not least, the new members have compensated for their weak performance in a number of fields through the promises they have made. However, they have also become extremely skilful in making promises yet seldom delivering on them later. When they have, delivery has been belated and made under pressure from different forces in the Alliance. This has resulted in a situation of permanent dissatisfaction with the performance of all three. The United States and the International Military Staff have been particularly vocal about it. If NATO becomes more political, and hence less of a traditional collective defence alliance, it is likely that there will be less demand on the new members. And of course attention will be divided among seven and not three countries as it was the last time.

Ever since the idea of eastward enlargement was considered positively, NATO kept reminding the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe that they were not going to join ‘the old NATO’, i.e. a classical military alliance with an identifiable, powerful adversary. They were going to join a ‘new alliance’ that contributed to the stabilisation of Europe and eventually its periphery, and whose agenda had been dominated by conflict management tasks. This was the primary objective. Consequently, the Allies should have adequate power projection capabilities. Their armed forces should be based on certain capabilities and not on any perceived or real threat. The defence of national territory plays a residual, and no longer a decisive role. The importance of collective defence has been reiterated regularly at the request of one member state or another in NATO Council documents. As Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was not invoked for five decades, its value was not tested. To be more precise, it was tested during the Cold War period when collective defence of the Alliance and the link between US and European security played an undeniably effective deterrent role. It is less evident what role Article 5 has had since the beginning of the 1990s.

My personal impression is that the diminished importance attributed to the defence of national territory has de facto de-legitimised those efforts which have been made to improve territorial defence capabilities by member states, either individually or collectively. The Central and East European countries have understood that the Alliance they have been striving to join does not give priority to territorial defence. Their involvement in peace operations and contribution to allied power projection shows this. It is not due to lack of understanding that they are not ready to accept the almost exclusive emphasis put on power projection. It is their national interest, based on their perception of international security, that explains their belief in a balance between territorial defence and power projection as well as between threat-based and capabilities-based armed forces. There is no doubt that other Central and East European countries willing to join the Alliance in the future share their conviction. Consequently, if the number of member states from the region increases so will to some extent the emphasis on the traditional collective defence function of the alliance.

In September 2001, following the terrorist attacks in the United States, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history. After this the European Allies provided certain military assistance to the United States. Most importantly, they helped the United States to
NATO: enlarge when in trouble

The only defensive alliance in the Euro-Atlantic area is NATO. Consequently, it is the primary aim of the countries of the region to join the Atlantic Alliance. At the time when an invitation was first extended to former member states of the Warsaw Treaty in 1997 to negotiate membership, the main issue was how few countries should be taken. Most other countries of the region intend to join at the earliest moment. Now, the main consideration seems to be how many countries can be admitted. The Atlantic Alliance, or at least one of its members, seems determined to opt for a ‘big bang’ NATO enlargement. Today’s different circumstances make it largely impossible to draw conclusions from the first post-Cold War enlargement for any future ones, except possibly that it is far easier to influence prospective members before their accession than new members after it.

After 11 September, when the United States was unwilling to rely on and cooperate with its allies in the high-intensity phase of the war in Afghanistan, the conclusion was drawn that the Alliance as such had become less relevant militarily. Irrespective of the counter-arguments, which the Secretary-General of NATO presented in a series of speeches and articles, it has become obvious that it will be increasingly difficult for the Allies to fight wars together. The United States is in a class of its own in war-fighting that even the most powerful European members of the Alliance find extremely difficult to match. The smaller countries of Europe are so far from this level of technological development that there is no point in them even trying to catch up with it. Bearing in mind that each country of Central and Eastern Europe is small (exceptionally, medium-sized) this may have major repercussions. Some of the conclusions have not been drawn from the new situation, however, and there are questions that require answers. If NATO gains a more political and less military profile, will it still be just as important as before to put so much effort into investing in defence, and will some smaller current and future members be more resistant to heavy investment in defence, given that their potential contribution to the collective defence effort is irrelevant anyway? Will the United States, the International Military Staff and the Secretary-General of NATO reduce their pressure on member states and candidate countries to sustain their defence modernisation effort?
free some of its forces from other duties in order to concentrate them on its action in Afghanistan. This included the replacement of US forces in the Balkans, as well as contributing to the monitoring of US airspace. The United States upgraded its homeland defence and redefined its security priorities in a short period of time. It is necessary to draw attention to two factors.

◗ The heavy emphasis upon defending the national territory of the most powerful member of the Alliance probably gives better grounds for the Central and East European countries to argue their case for individual and collective self-defence.

◗ For these countries, invoking Article 5, albeit in special circumstances, meant a reaffirmation of the viability of that Article. How the United States and NATO reacted to the terrorist attacks was certainly not against the interests of the Central and East European NATO members and candidate countries.

It may well be, however, that the aftermath of 11 September will represent a fundamentally new phase in the evolution of NATO, especially as regards its possible role in the fight against terrorism. If this results in a reduction of the Alliance’s operational capability, there is a danger that the relevance of NATO will decline. It is uncertain whether the loss of momentum militarily will be compensated by another institution, in particular the EU. For the small Central and East European countries it would be worrying to see Europe remaining without a credible institutional framework to address defence matters, including in operational terms. As the countries of the region are overwhelmingly ‘policy-taker’ states, they would definitely not like to see a renationalisation of defence. Even less would they like to see the reduction of institutional capacity in one organisation without a corresponding build-up in another. Hence, if NATO becomes less relevant as a collective defence institution, the Central and East European countries who are performing a ‘double act’ in striving to gain membership of both NATO and the EU may pay more attention to ESDP and assess its prospects more positively. They will base their assessment and declarations on the evolution of the process as determined by the major players in the international system.

**Early Hungarian views on the future of the Union**

The last time that the public witnessed a debate on the future of the European Union it concerned adoption of the Maastricht Treaty at
the beginning of 1992. As the President of Hungary put it: ‘The future of European integration has always been on the agenda, a topic of sometimes intensive [and] at other times less feverish debates throughout the history of the integration, spanning over half a century. This common thinking has taken a new momentum in recent months.’

The recent debate was launched by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in May 2000 at Humboldt University. The speech reflected the EU’s two major achievements in the 1990s: realisation of (economic and) monetary union and agreement on the objective of European Security and Defence Policy. In addition to these major policy changes, the pressure of enlargement has been looming large on the horizon and has presented the Union with the need for institutional adaptation. There are two important questions in this context.

- Is it reasonable to assume that the debate will shape European politics in the medium to long run?
- What is the relationship between the debate and the forthcoming institutional and procedural changes to be agreed upon at the Convention and the ensuing intergovernmental conference? Or to put it differently, is the debate politically relevant or merely intellectually exciting?

If one starts from the assumption that the Convention and the subsequent IGC will shape the future of the Union, it is of major importance that the candidate countries, including Hungary, should be present. The Prime Minister has emphasised that ‘[at] the conference scheduled for 2004 in Nice to deal with the future of the Union, Hungary no longer wishes to be in attendance as an outsider, but as a peer, sharing the responsibility for defining the further goals and milestones of integration.’ This question is casting a shadow over the position of Hungary and that of many other candidate countries. No decisions should be ‘taken about us without us’. What is at stake is more than just participation: it is membership at the earliest moment.

If one takes a closer look at the approximately half dozen official statements and articles by high-ranking politicians on these issues, it becomes clear that the Hungarian leadership is strongly and unanimously of the view that it is necessary to build a ‘common Europe of human dimensions, a Europe of our own. A Europe that every citizen regards as his own, where citizens endorse and actively shape the goals set, where citizens understand and support the sys-
tem of laws and the operation of institutions’, as stated again by Orban. His Foreign Minister, Janos Martonyi, is of the view that a ‘precondition to move forward is the intellectual and institutional renewal of the course of integration: a simpler, more transparent and more effective Union, easier to understand.’

It is understandable that, as a candidate country, Hungary advocates a move towards a more transparent Union that is capable of overcoming the democratic deficit, for three reasons:

▸ it is something that is in every EU-related actor’s interest;
▸ it is not controversial among the member states, at least not in its simplest terms;
▸ it is in the interest of any candidate country that intends to join the Union soon yet does not want to face a situation where its citizens feel alienated and disillusioned by the Union soon after accession.

As far as institutional arrangements are concerned, Orban is clearly in favour of ‘a clear-cut sharing of tasks and democratic empowerment’ and, rightly, does not enter into further details. Martonyi repeats those elements, which have dominated the institutional debates of the Union for many years. Accordingly, the legislative powers of the European Parliament should be extended. This would be the most effective way to fight ‘the disinterest of citizens in EP elections’. Martonyi is fairly clear on one debated issue at least, the future legislative structure of the EU: ‘A stronger and more cooperative relationship between national parliaments and the European Parliament should be made part of the institutional system, allowing for national parliaments to play a more active role in European developments. It would perhaps be worth considering the possibility of setting up a second chamber, serving as the framework for this deeper cooperation between parliaments. For me, the competing suggestion – namely to turn the Council into a Senate – does not seem to be the appropriate path to follow.’

The Council shall continue to function as the forum of intergovernmental cooperation . . . ‘[it] should serve as the forum bringing national interests and member-states together’. Last but not least, it is essential that the European Commission remain ‘– through the right of initiative – the engine of the integration process, at the same time taking care of the implementation of Treaty obligations, common policies and community rules.’

Martonyi takes sides in another somewhat controversial matter as well: ‘The election of its President [i.e. the President of the
Commission] directly by the citizens would mark a move towards the evolution of a genuine European executive . . . I am convinced [that] should Europe be impersonated by and identified with a charismatic leader in the eyes of its citizens, this would help [to narrow] the distance felt between Europe and Europeans, at present an undeniable accompaniment of the integration process.'

Thus the Hungarian foreign minister, in his careful, non-confrontational manner, expressed his views on some institutional issues. Martonyi earlier emphasised the importance of having a member of the Commission from each member state, though again he left the door open for a different approach if circumstances change: '. . . at the present stage of the development of the Union every Member State should be represented by a Commissioner'.

The extent to which his position shapes the national position of the Hungarian government in the long run, and how insistent Hungary can be if it does not gain the support of the member states, are separate issues.

Martonyi, however, is representative of those major changes that have been taking place in the international environment lately. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September in the United States he perceived the need to adapt institutions further, beyond the ideas that had been put forward earlier and recommended that 'it would be possible to consider the reshuffling of the three pillars and simplify the functioning of the institutions'. Martonyi has noticed correctly that the new situation requires the reconsideration of the separation of the second and third pillars in recognition of the close link to be established between internal and external security.

Both Orban and Martonyi emphasise that the current debate on the future of Europe is taking place amidst globalisation. Interestingly enough, the requirement to build a competitive Europe is linked to the prospect of enlargement in any case and not to the competitiveness of Europe generally. Martonyi, following the events of 11 September, also called attention to the urgency of the matter: there is 'not much time left to create a really united, enlarged Europe. Global challenges do not only make this unavoidable, but urgent as well'.

There have been some doubts whether members of the Hungarian political establishment are united in their views on the future of Europe or whether there are certain differences in their attitudes. It has been the prevailing assumption of observers that the Hungar-
ian foreign minister is more sympathetic towards the federative idea represented and advocated by Joschka Fischer whereas others, in the first place the Prime Minister, are more in favour of a Europe of nation-states. It is a fact, however, that Martonyi has never even tacitly contradicted Orban, either on concrete, politically relevant matters or on more theoretical, strategic issues, like the one discussed here. Bearing in mind Orban’s zero tolerance policy in the cabinet, this is the best a member of the Government can do: it is a separate question whether Martonyi has gained some influence through his combination of loyalty, intellect and wide-ranging professional experience. It is therefore not surprising that Martonyi avoids taking sides on the most controversial issue of the future of Europe: ‘...the approach of choosing between purely intergovernmental or supranational models is mistaken. To apply the two methods in a mutually reinforcing manner would be more advantageous, and perhaps easier. This is of course not a new idea – the very essence of the European Union lies exactly in the coexistence and interaction of intergovernmental and community/supranational elements.’ Orban’s position is by and large in line with that of Martonyi: ‘...it is imperative to have an amalgamated system of federal and intergovernmental elements’.

In the same address the Prime Minister makes it clear, however, that he is not in favour of too much centralisation and ‘federalisation’. He expects that the future structure ‘will provide for the efficient operation of the Union, for the strengthening of its role in the world and for the consistent consideration and application of the principle of subsidiarity at the same time. Those, and only those functions and powers should be delegated to the EU which can be discharged and exercised most efficiently in the interest of the public at the European level.’ National interests do prevail, however, over rationalisation of the functioning of the EU. This was reflected in the statement of the Hungarian foreign minister in February 2000 according to which ‘...reinforced cooperation does not have to figure on the agenda at the moment. Should philosophical differences or practical differences arise among the Member States subsequently to enlargement, we will be happy to seek with our partners ways to forge ahead towards a stronger, deeper cooperation.’ Even though this aspect of the Hungarian position later disappeared from official documents, it is certain that the country will in one way or another oppose its exclusion in the name of coopération renforcée from matters that affect it.
For anybody who has studied the foreign policy of Hungary, the Prime Minister’s message is clear. Hungary will be able to live with the current level of EU integration but it would not welcome further steps that could put additional constraints on its sovereignty. If Martonyi disagreed with this to some extent, he expressed his reservations elegantly. He spoke about a Europe ‘where the notion of absolute territoriality would acquire less importance and significance, its place partly taken over by entities above or under state level, such as regions, or local communities and autonomous organisations … The fabric they develop would turn Europe into a Europe of Communities, a Community of Communities, allowing for the assertion and promotion of the cultural and linguistic, historic and cultural identity of minorities and majorities, making European diversity and culture one of the essential pillars of European unity.’ It is not entirely clear whether this is a tacit rejection of the views of those obsessed by state sovereignty or not.

Martonyi’s conclusions are close to those in the German foreign minister’s speech. Martonyi’s approach is less focused upon the concept of finalité and is more pragmatic and open-minded. It is for this reason that he does not want the achievements of European integration – the community method, the institutional balance and the community competencies – to be endangered.

This pragmatic approach has no doubt been arrived at in light of the situation of Hungary before decisions directly related to the future of the Union are taken.

The regional dimension

It is becoming increasingly likely that a good number of Central and East European countries will join the Union simultaneously. This will definitely contribute to consolidating the elimination of divisions in the region, although some divisions will become more apparent than hitherto. Since the de facto end of the artificial and imposed cooperation among CEECs in 1989, the countries of the region have developed several frameworks. If one attempts to establish certain categories in order to understand this mosaic, the following conclusions can be drawn. Most cooperation frameworks have focused on practical aspects of cooperation and have intentionally kept a low profile. It was exceptional for a group of countries to establish a high-profile framework like the so-called Viseg-
rad group. In the overwhelming majority of cases groups have been formed on the basis of the support or expected support of the West. None of these groups has been institutionalised. These factors, taken together, lead to the conclusion that the regional cooperative frameworks do not represent a strong regional identity. The lack of strong regional institutions has also resulted in a situation in which cooperation can die down and re-emerge easily. This might be regarded as both an advantage and a disadvantage at the same time.

Coordination of the stance of CEECs towards the West has played major role in the existence of regional institutions, and their functioning has been dominated more by common interests than common values in certain cases. There is no reason to assume that this would be otherwise in the future: sporadic cooperation will be based upon common interests. This may crystallise around an ending of the peripheral role of these countries in the Union generally or around some concrete economic issues, such as access to structural funds and agricultural subsidies. As the countries of the region have comparatively little in common beyond the issues mentioned above, it is not likely that they would form more lasting coalitions. It is, for instance, a myth that they will fight for the ‘common interests’ of the small member states. A look at their voting power as approved in Nice suffices to conclude that such an assumption would be unfounded. As most, if not all CEECs who join the EU will also be member states of NATO by that time, it is likely that they will be sensitive barometers of the EU-NATO relationship. Their position will probably follow the changing power relations between the two organisations, and the countries will not play an initiating role. What they would certainly like to avoid is a declining role of the Atlantic Alliance without the corresponding emergence of a credible European defence capability. Hence, they will do their utmost to avoid re-nationalisation of defence in Europe and promote continuing institutionalisation of European security.

It is clear that regional cooperation has not been stabilised (through institutionalisation, the intensification of relations and intimate links between the establishments) to the extent that it would be realistic to expect it to be more than just a complementary factor of international relations. That is why individual sceptics have sufficient strength to weaken the regional web significantly. This was eloquently demonstrated by Czech Prime
Minister Vaclav Klaus in the mid-1990s, and more recently by his Hungarian counterpart Viktor Orban at the beginning of 2002 through a political incident (the reference to the so-called ‘Benes Decrees’) for a short while. In such a situation it is inappropriate to speak about a regional identity that would enrich European cooperation significantly.

**Conclusion**

According to statesmen, international officials and analysts, the events initiated by the terrorist attack of 11 September represent a new phase in the evolution of international relations. I do not share this view, but feel rather that the underlying structure of international affairs has not changed since the end of the Cold War. The system was and has remained unipolar, with the United States as its central element. US unilateralism has continued and has become more visible in the aftermath of 11 September. The relationship between the United States and other major actors has not changed lastingly or significantly. Even though military cooperation in the Atlantic Alliance has weakened, most fundamental values are shared by the United States and its European allies. Political relations between the two sides have not changed fundamentally either. The new, warm relationship between the United States and Russia may, for reasons mentioned above, not last for too long. It may happen that in the long run the process will result in a visible decline of the military relevance of NATO, and that Europe will lack an institutional framework for addressing defence matters, including collective defence. It is open to question whether this will result in the EU gaining momentum in this field, and thus energising ESDP, or not. Currently it seems that security and defence are not the areas where the EU as an institution feels most comfortable. Hence it will take some time to develop a capacity that goes beyond the carrying out of lower-level Petersberg tasks.

If it is indeed concluded that the international system, including the EU, has not been going through revolutionary change as a result of 11 September and its aftermath, then it is more appropriate to speak about a modification of the course of its development. The EU has modified its course and may continue to evolve along somewhat different lines.

Contrary to certain statements, the changes that have occurred have not affected the prospect of EU enlargement. The move to the
‘big bang’ is far more a demonstration of the strategic uncertainty of the EU vis-à-vis Central and Eastern Europe than a consequence of 11 September. It is for this reason that, as a candidate country, Hungary does not feel that the prospects of EU enlargement have been directly affected by those events. As a small country, Hungary may become more pro-European and less pro-Atlantic if there is a lasting shift in power relations, the United States further reduces its engagement in Europe and consequently the European Union expands its activity in the second pillar. If this happens it can be concluded that Hungary will become more pro-European in security not by design but by default.

As was indicated earlier, the micro-economic performance of the country is impressive and it has not encountered any severe problems yet. Certain worrying signs emerged, however, during the last years of the conservative coalition. Most of them (corruption, interference by the Government in certain economic processes, restrictions on certain democratic rights, illiberal democracy, étatisme) have only become visible with time. That is why the warning signals from the West became stronger and only clearly expressed during the first months of 2002. The Government has systematically ignored the expectations of the outside world and pursued its own populist agenda. Some of its actions have been in clear contradiction with its status as candidate for EU membership. Prime Minister Orban has spoken of ‘economic patriotism’, while the foreign press has carried articles about the discrimination of the Hungarian government against foreign capital and firms. At a late stage of the debate, the EU Commissioner responsible for the Internal Market, Frits Bolkestein, during a visit to Budapest, felt it necessary to clearly express his concern that the Hungarian government’s economic policy was endangering the country’s accession prospects. If one adds to this that the conservative Government, due to its populist decisions and the further promises it has made, has potentially undermined the economic balance of the country and alienated foreign investors, the economic prospects are far more gloomy than the figures alone would suggest.

The political prospects are not much better. The policy of Prime Minister Orban’s party since it came to power in 1998 aimed to eliminate the ‘political middle’ and divide society between Right and Left. The Right, united by his party, would represent the progressive forces, whereas the ‘Left’, united by the Socialist Party,
would represent nothing but forces with nostalgia for the Kadar era. The plan proved partly successful: the middle of the political spectrum was reduced very significantly. Orban’s objective of identifying the Socialist Party with the past has been less successful, and there has been a big swing to the Left. In the elections of 7 April 2002, the Socialist Party obtained 42.03 per cent of the votes and the conservatives 41.11 per cent.

The division of society will certainly pose a serious problem for the new Government. It is in the best interests of the new Socialist-Liberal coalition to build bridges and eliminate the sharp divide, otherwise it will be extremely difficult to govern the country.

It is clear from past experience of the Socialist-Liberal coalition government (1994-98) that attention will be paid to the expectations of the world at large. For understandable reasons, the most important being that 70 per cent of Hungarian exports are produced by multinational enterprises located in Hungary, the Prime Minister intends to boost foreign investment. Certain disagreements can be expected during the last phase of the EU accession talks – over the length of the transition period after which land ownership will be granted to foreigners, direct payments to agricultural producers, access to structural funds, etc. It is certain, however, that the world will not have to face irresponsible, populist statements from this government. The approach to the EU will not change, in the sense that priority will continue to be given to the first pillar. ESDP will be given a higher priority on the Government’s agenda if it establishes itself better, particularly if NATO gradually loses credibility as a security provider. From the point of view of Hungary’s security agenda, the importance of ESDP is inversely proportional to that of NATO, however, so that if the former decreases, the role of the latter will increase automatically. The time has once more come for a government of honest, pragmatic managers who hopefully are not only going to be able to put Hungary back on track but will also have the determination and the time to keep it there.
After the terrorist attacks against the United States (and indeed against the whole of Western civilisation) the official Polish position did not change substantially concerning either the future of the EU or the development of ESDP. It seems that the accession process did not undergo any dramatic evolution either. However, those developments did provide a certain amount of food for thought and may result in a slow evolution in Polish thinking on the question of European security. I would certainly hope that they will lead to a certain reassessment of the dominant philosophy.

If it is their ambition to become constructive members of the enlarged Union, as I believe it is, Poland, and indeed all of the other candidate countries, need to have their own vision of the future of European integration. The formulation of that vision would be impossible, however, without a far-reaching domestic debate on this difficult yet fascinating subject.

The EU enlargement process

The tragedy that happened in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 will undoubtedly have a significant impact on our perception of security, but it may also influence indirectly the EU enlargement process. The terrorist attacks provided a timely reminder for the EU of the need to respond to the security threats that it faces. The impact of those events in the United States on the impending accession of new members, however, may bring about widely differing results.

- It may help the EU realise that there is a need for more activism in its foreign policy, creating an impulse for a more integrated approach to security, which will include quick enlargement, as a means of strengthening the EU’s security by geopolitical means (on the principle that the more secure and strong your immediate neighbours are, the stronger and more secure you are yourself).
- On the other hand, the terrorist threat may have an exactly oppo-
site result. EU enlargement may become even less relevant for the European public, and thus cease to be the most important priority for the political elite.

The third possibility is simply a return to the status quo ante: after the initial shock, the EU will continue the process of accession as if nothing had happened.

Certain academics think that there is a greater probability that the events of 11 September will have a negative impact on the enlargement process. Timothy Garton Ash, on the basis of an interview with the then French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine, predicts that the enlargement process may actually be slowed down as a result of the terrorist attacks. According to Garton Ash, the EU, excessively conscious of its internal security problems, will simply add to the long list of difficult conditions that the candidate countries must fulfil upon joining. The imperviousness of the EU’s future eastern border will be perceived as the most important priority. If the Union, on top of demands to incorporate all of the Schengen acquis, draws up a whole list of other benchmarks concerning border policing (such as the level of salaries for customs officials), only to use it afterwards as a pretext for procrastination on enlargement, the candidate countries may face problems in their accession negotiations.

Supporters of the thesis that negotiations will slow down maintain that the terrorist attacks may affect the Union’s priorities, removing enlargement from the top of the list. Instead of adopting a global outlook on the problem and trying to deal with the crisis in an active manner, the Union may become more introverted. Moreover, it might become increasingly difficult to convince the European public that enlargement may have a beneficial influence on the security of the Continent. The vast majority of EU citizens are wary of ‘aliens’, and the terrorist attacks may simply aggravate those fears.

Most of the decision-makers in Central and Eastern Europe, however, believe that this pessimistic scenario will not materialise. It is possible that the ‘New York effect’, as in the case of the so-called ‘Kosovo effect’, and its beneficial influence over the strengthening of the CFSP, will also have a positive impact on the enlargement process. The EU should realise that enlargement will enhance its security. Closer cooperation with the candidate countries will facilitate the fight against the threats that are looming on the horizon but it will not be sufficient. Only their full involvement in European policies can fulfil that need.

---

The stabilising effects of enlargement are already palpable. It was the perspective of EU accession that helped to pacify former Yugoslavia. Croatia, Montenegro and even Serbia undertook important political reforms precisely in order to comply with the Copenhagen criteria philosophy. To take various examples, were not the Hungarian-Romanian tensions resolved largely because of the perspective of imminent accession? Were not the problems associated with Russian minorities in the Baltic states eased because of respect for European standards? The prospect of enlargement stabilises the potentially volatile regions of the Continent. If the EU were to make that prospect hazy, the costs would be borne by all, including the current member states.

Unfortunately, the third scenario cannot be completely disregarded. After the initial shock, the enlargement dossier might be treated as if nothing had happened. It must be admitted that the EU’s Laeken summit of December 2001 added impetus to the enlargement process by both naming the ten candidate countries that are the most advanced in their quest for membership and confirming, with special emphasis, the Nice/Göteborg timetable. However, it remains to be seen whether those political declarations are going to be put into practice. It is quite probable that the impact of 11 September may become a little more palpable when the negotiations broach the subject of the EU’s external borders and the area of justice and home affairs.

The NATO enlargement process

When it comes to the effect of the New York and Washington events on the process of NATO enlargement, it also seems that this could vary. Objective security reasons (for instance, a need to expand the security area to counter the terrorist threat more effectively) may prompt members of the Atlantic Alliance to support an ambitious enlargement scenario. Alternatively, the much warmer and closer relationship between the West and Russia that has resulted directly from the terrorist crisis may have some effect on the prospect of wider NATO enlargement.

The question of interplay between the two enlargements is not easy to assess. However, there exist certain linkages which can be expounded upon. Most obviously, there is the question of the performance of the new NATO members, which sometimes features as an argument in the EU accession debate (especially the ability to
fulfil membership obligations and the inclination to behave as constructive members). Most importantly, however, the interplay between the two enlargements finds its realisation in a thesis, which dominates in both Western and Central and Eastern Europe, according to which – for the sake of stability – the countries of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe should be offered at least a prospect of membership of either NATO or the EU. Therefore, the redefinition of the Atlantic Alliance’s role which, as it seems, is on the mind of American policy-makers, makes ESDP even more important and urgent for the candidate countries.

The example of the three countries described in this volume – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – demonstrates that membership of NATO has not only largely eliminated the feeling of insecurity among their citizens but also had a positive impact on stability within the region. The fact that these three countries are members of NATO has focused the internal EU accession debate on economic issues. Therefore, many academics and decision-makers argue that, for the sake of stability, the laggards in the EU accession process should first be offered quick NATO membership. The problem is that, according to the general perception, the countries which are not ready for accession to the EU are also in the short term not going to be able to fulfil the obligations of membership of the Alliance.

The need for European leadership

Whatever the impact of 11 September on the EU and NATO enlargement processes, it cannot be denied that what the enlarged EU needs most is leadership. The extraordinary success of European integration has produced a certain paradox, which Joseph Weiler has called ‘a paradox of success’.4 In its foundational period, European integration was perceived as a moral imperative for dealing with the heritage of the past. Once the goal had been achieved, war had become not only ‘politically unthinkable but also economically unfeasible’, and the Europeans had achieved a sense of security, they were faced with the temptation of becoming introverts.

In 1976 Raymond Aron wrote, ‘Yesterday, Europe only just avoided perishing from imperial follies and frenzied ideologies, she could perish tomorrow through historical abdication’.5 Very similar sentiments have been shared by many intellectuals. In

---

1989 Samuel Huntington prophesised that the twenty-first century would be characterised by the leadership of the European federation. However, Europeans did not yet seem to be ready to face such grand responsibilities. Many authors who attempted to describe the underlying dynamics of the twenty-first century agreed that globalisation would force the Europeans to assume more political responsibility, as the EU had no alternative but to move forward and become more and more influential on the world scene. However, Europe always faced problems of renouncing an inward-looking attitude. Even at the beginning of the 1990s, it was absolutely clear that if Europe did not do so, if it hid itself from international exposure and neglected the potential threats, then it might become vulnerable to them.

There is no guarantee that a more ambitious European contribution to regional security would help to deal with the activities of international terrorist and criminal organisations, which constitute perhaps the most direct and immediate physical threat. But if the EU continues to ignore the crises on its periphery, it runs the risk of importing the consequences of such crises into its core. The best way to prevent that from happening will be effective EU enlargement without delay – an enlargement which will help to export stability and security to the periphery.

In suggesting that some of the criticism concerning the weakness of European leadership and the risk of European introversion is still valid today, one might be accused of exaggeration. From the middle of the 1990s, when most of that criticism was expressed, the EU made laudable progress in the field of its security. However, it must be said that the Amsterdam Treaty constituted the last effort to address the structural weaknesses of the inter-pillar relationship. The importance of the transfer of all questions concerning immigration, asylum and external borders into the first pillar and the incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the EU framework cannot be overstated. Since then, the EU has focused (mainly at its Cologne and Helsinki summits) on strengthening its military capability and on reinforcing cooperation in justice and home affairs (Tampere). However, it has done so while separating the two dossiers. The European decision-makers have not given enough consideration to the integrity and indivisibility of Europe’s security.

It seems that, despite efforts aimed at strengthening its security, the EU has not accepted enough responsibility for its imme-
The tragic events of 11 September have had a crucial influence on the general perception of security, leading to its profound redefinition. Major international actors have been taught a lesson once again: security can no longer be compartmentalised into internal and external dimensions. On a theoretical level this hypothesis is not a novelty. However, the practical implications of the New York effect may finally make it clear, not only that such an argument is valid, but that something should indeed be done about it. The distinction between different kinds of security – national and regional, military and economic, internal and external – have been progressively blurred for quite some time, but there is now a chance that this reality will be mirrored in the functioning of the EU.

It also seems that the events of 11 September may also have a certain impact on the perception of ESDP in the candidate countries. It is in Poland’s most essential interest to support a strengthening of European security structures – as long as they do not undermine the strategic role of the Atlantic Alliance. The terrorist threat has helped make everyone realise that every initiative aimed at strengthening security and stability in Europe’s immediate environment should be welcomed. Moreover, the recent developments may suggest that the US administration will for quite some time to come focus its attention outside Europe. Therefore, the New York effect may help to eliminate any of the traces of ambivalence towards ESDP of which certain candidate countries have been accused, especially if the EU treats the security domain in a more integrated and inclusive manner.

The rift between the EU and the United States may in effect influence the policy of the new NATO members. It will be in their enlightened self-interest to adopt an even more pro-European position. Recent developments, especially the temptation of a uni-
lateralist approach to security manifested by the United States, provide serious food for thought. Countries such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic widely share the opinion, dominant in Europe, that NATO is important as an organisation founded and sustained in order to guarantee the security of the Continent. Indications that the United States may be tempted to bypass NATO in its foreign policy-making worry Warsaw just as much as they worry Berlin or London.

The EU faces an urgent need to return to geopolitics. The future enlargement will result in the most drastic change in the geographical map of the EU in its history, and it will result in a radical transformation of most of its policies. Therefore, the time has come to start thinking in geopolitical terms once again. Undoubtedly, enlargement of the Union will make such analysis more urgent. As has already been pointed out, the EU has tended to separate its policies on internal and external security issues. Thinking in geopolitical terms would on the contrary mean developing a coherent, holistic approach that would combine internal and external security considerations. It is precisely the enlargement process that will stimulate this development.

The New York effect proves beyond doubt that security must be treated as an integrated entity. It is simply no longer possible to speak about just one particular approach to security, or just one of its aspects. As early as 1963, Alistair Buchanan gave one of the most famous definitions of international security. He defined it as a condition ‘in which inhibitions and disincentives to waging war are stronger than incentives’, while ‘the alternatives to a forceful solution to any conflict are as numerous, as sparing of national pride as human wit can devise, whether they be political, diplomatic or judicial.’ This definition, intellectually compelling as it may be, is no longer sufficient. Wars have ceased to be the only manifestation of conflict, far from it. Other threats, such as organised crime or terrorism, have become even more prominent. Globalisation has an influence on the market but it also has an undeniable influence over security. Threats and sources of instability have become globalised as well. The only way to deal with such a situation is to ‘globalise’ the response – that is, to treat security in an indivisible and integrated manner.

In discussing the phenomenon of transnational threats to European security, some have hypothesised that terrorism may become the most serious threat to national and international

---

security in the twenty-first century. They have specifically pointed out three new dimensions of terrorism that appear to them to be particularly important:

➤ the much more varied and unpredictable character of terrorist groups, which has at least one crucial consequence – the prospects of rational calculation and self-restraint may diminish significantly;
➤ the likelihood that terrorists will resort to weapons of mass destruction;
➤ the emergence of cyber-terrorism, which constitutes a dangerous threat to economic and social life in Europe.

When one tries to assess the significance of these predictions one is immediately prompted to conclude that the elimination of rational calculation and diminishing self-restraint from strategic considerations are of fundamental importance for European security. In order to deal effectively with the threats posed by terrorism and all of the other plagues endangering Europe’s internal security, the EU has to strive to combine all of the security-enhancing measures that it has at its disposal. Hard security measures and diplomatic activism have to be supplemented by strengthened justice and home affairs cooperation, as well as by all of the coercive mechanisms (i.e. sanctions) that are available under the first pillar. Only if all of these fields are fully integrated will the EU be able to start effectively taking care of its own security.\(^\text{10}\)

If one is serious about introducing an integrated approach to security one should first focus on eliminating these inter-pillar inconsistencies. Secondly, EU decision-makers should use the potential that already exists in the realm of intergovernmental pillars (CFSP and JHA) in order to strengthen the related policies. Ideas are there; hopefully the post-New York effect will generate the political will to implement them. Along with the Ghent informal summit, which confirmed all of the measures aimed at combating international terrorism agreed previously by the Council, and the decision to include the measures aimed at internal reform of the Council on the agenda of the next IGC, the EU is seeing the very first signs of that happening.

Recently, there have been quite significant developments in the realm of both intergovernmental pillars: the ESDP structures have begun to work and certain other institutional aspects of both ESDP and CFSP are being seriously discussed, while the rapid reaction force is being made operational. The introduction of the

\(^{10}\) The ineffective character of a compartmentalised approach to security, and CFSP as such, was recently (September 2001) demonstrated by a failure of a Troika mission to the Middle East, showing that the EU is not sufficiently well equipped to play the role of mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in Afghanistan, where the EU failed to act as a unified force, except in the humanitarian sphere.
search-and-arrest warrant draws on the Tampere conclusions, which advocated abolishing cumbersome extradition procedures (in France, for example, these date as far back as 1927). Such a move, hitherto unthinkable to many, will be unprecedented as it concerns one of the oldest judicial traditions touching at the very heart of national sovereignty. The determination to abolish the principle of double incrimination for a wide range of actions is also an initiative of great political significance. Along with a common definition of terrorist offences, the first step has been taken on the way to a mutual recognition of judgements, which would undoubtedly constitute a watershed in judicial cooperation. Such measures are welcomed by Poland, as they strengthen the security of us all. However, their implications are quite far-reaching and they might be contested by Polish Euro-sceptics on the grounds that too much sovereignty is being surrendered. In this context, it should be pointed out that, in the case of the candidate countries, this sovereignty has only recently been regained, and therefore relinquishing it may pose a serious problem for some political forces.

Many other measures, such as a strengthening of the operational capacity of Europol, are also important and many of them are not new in any respect – they merely implement or build on the existing acquis. The most important post-New York development, however, is the progressive adoption of the inter-pillar approach to security. Many measures which are to be introduced pertain to more than just one pillar. We can see a general tendency to combine economic and police activities to combat terrorism: the actions aimed at freezing terrorists’ assets and fighting money laundering, as well as approval of the Commission’s proposal on air transport security, make direct use of first-pillar instruments. On the other hand, the extension of judicial and police cooperation with third countries and an initiative aimed at improving intelligence cooperation and exchange of information on terrorist incidents open up a direct link between the second and the third pillars.

The EU must deal effectively with the threats which it faces, most importantly in order to become relevant to its citizens. To understand why effectiveness is of such crucial importance for the EU it is best to turn for a while to the question of its legitimacy. Certain constitutional specialists, among them Neil Walker, point out that precisely because the EU lacks the fully developed attrib-
utes of authority and identity its very legitimacy is much more reliant on performance. Legitimacy stemming directly from effectiveness in practice is much more important in the case of the EU than in that of an ordinary state, which bases its existence predominantly on regime and polity legitimacy.^{11} If, in the eyes of its citizens, the Union ceased to be effective, it would weaken one of the most important aspects of its very integrity. Only if and when the Union increases its effectiveness by developing an integrated, cross-pillar approach, including the enlargement dimension, will it be capable of facing the emerging challenges.

There is absolutely no doubt that the future EU member states will be interested in a strong and effective Common Foreign and Security Policy. The more integrated it is, the more substantial a chance it will offer the new member states to influence its development. Poland has aspirations related to the CFSP: as has already been pointed out, it intends to be an active proponent of its Eastern dimension. Therefore, it seems that it should be ready to support all of the initiatives aimed at the communautarisation of the common foreign policy, including greater recourse to qualified majority voting. Most of the candidate countries appreciate the importance of flexibility within foreign policy, however abstention must remain an option. It is therefore not so strange that the ideas aimed at a directoire in foreign policy are not welcomed very warmly in Warsaw. Streamlining the Council’s work, reforming the rotating Presidency, even combining the posts of ‘Mr CFSP’ and the Commissioner for External Relations, can all be considered in good faith. However, the creation of a super-Council or a new steering committee – or any other movement towards strengthening intergovernmentalism in the sphere of CFSP – is not going to be viewed very positively by candidate countries.

The European Union after the forthcoming enlargement

The compromise reached in Nice concerning the institutional architecture of the EU was far from perfect. However, it had one great virtue: it finally allowed the future member states to think about the future of the European project on an equal footing with the current members. The greatest success of Nice stems from the fact that it took a first step on the road to removing the division between ‘us’ (the candidate countries) and ‘them’ (the Fifteen) from discussions about the institutional and constitutional shape of the EU.
To continue that inclusive trend, the constitutional issues that are on the agenda of the 2004 IGC should be resolved with the full participation of future member states. If the Union were to proceed without them this could have negative consequences, as it would create lasting divisions in the future EU. The new member states have to be able to identify with the future design of the Union. If it is to be construed as legitimate by the populations of the new members states, their representatives have to be fully involved in the preparatory phase. It is one thing to decide the distribution of votes without future member states’ participation but something altogether different to lay the constitutional foundations of the common enterprise without taking their views into consideration. After Nice the political costs of such exclusion have become unaffordable. Moreover, were the future member states of the EU to be excluded, they would, after joining the EU, be tempted to focus on alleviating the negative consequences of enlargement, which would distract their attention from making a constructive input to the strengthening of the European project.

In answering the question how it would be most desirable for the EU to work after the best prepared candidates are in, it is probably easiest to enumerate the features that should characterise the EU if it wants to avoid the risk of paralysis, public disenchantment or a crisis of legitimacy. It is in Poland’s greatest interests that, after enlargement, in the institutional domain the Union should above all be:

**based on the right equilibrium**

For decades the communities have nurtured a delicate balance between the community and intergovernmental methods that has positively influenced the development of European integration. Recently that equilibrium has tipped in favour of intergovernmentalism. The EU should in turn aim at regaining the former equilibrium. The community method secures the realisation of European aspirations more effectively, allowing the commonality of interests to prevail. After enlargement, in an EU of so many divergent interests, only the community method can facilitate the construction of a strong, balanced Union that promotes the interests of all its members – old and new, rich and poor, large and small – in equal fashion. Therefore, the official Polish position, shared by both the previous and current governments, fully supports the strengthening of the community method because, as former Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek has said, it is the com-
Community method which guarantees continuity and momentum of integration.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{\textcircled{r} representative}

The citizens of both the current and enlarged EU above all need a Union which is representative. That is why it is crucial to further develop the links between the national parliaments and the integration process. The creation of a third chamber in the Union (after the European Parliament and the Council) would not be the best solution, as it would create problems of duplication, transparency and clarity. When, for instance, should the third chamber intervene in the decision-making process? However, the Convention preparing the 2004 IGC should consider all of the steps aimed at increasing the sense of representation, for example by strengthening the European Parliament or institutional methods of cooperation with national parliaments.\textsuperscript{14} The EU should also strive at further clarification and practical observance of the subsidiarity principle.

\textbf{\textcircled{t} transparent and close to citizens}

This slogan has been repeated in the EU for years. European integration, if it is to be successful, should not involve only the élite; it should also be understandable and as close as possible to the ordinary citizen. The initiative of simplifying the treaties runs in this direction: it would not change anything in the community legal order, but could bring the EU closer to its citizens, providing them with an understandable text in which all of the goals and ambitions of integration would be stated in clear, precise language. Preparation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights has also made it clear how important it is to give the EU a human face, so that the citizens can identify with it. It is especially important from the point of view of the candidate countries, as our citizens are not as yet accustomed to identifying with the supranational level.

\textbf{\textcircled{f} flexible, but internally coherent}

After the enlargement, the EU will have to be flexible. Not all of the member states are willing or indeed capable of integrating at the same pace. Flexibility, should not, however, hamper the internal cohesion of the whole organism.\textsuperscript{15} The EU has to have a single institutional framework. Most importantly, the danger of two categories of membership should be avoided. This has always been very strongly stressed in the official position of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The cooperation undertaken on the basis of the treaty clauses on ‘reinforced cooperation’ has to be open to every-

\textsuperscript{13} Speech by former Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Brussels, 26 June 2001.

\textsuperscript{14} For example, through representation of the national parliaments in the governmental delegations to the Council – as proposed by Michel Barnier.

\textsuperscript{15} Certain EU member states should forgo the temptation to create new institutions such as a secretariat or super-Council, and focus instead on strengthening the existing ones.
one (inclusiveness is a keyword in this respect). If membership
requires the observance of any functional criteria, the EU should
support all of those countries that would wish to participate in
‘reinforced cooperation’ but are unable to do so. The future mem-
ber states should not be afraid of reinforced cooperation, provided
it is their ambition to be in the mainstream of European inte-
gration, which I believe is the case. The candidate countries have
always defended the thesis that an enlarged EU should be based on
the principle of equal treatment not just with respect to its institu-
tions. When it comes to its policies, the EU should, moreover, be
based on two principles that are by no means mutually exclusive –
rationality and solidarity.

**rational**
The enlargement of the EU is a very rational undertaking in itself,
as it will strengthen the EU and endow it with many positive char-
acteristics. Moreover, enlargement constitutes a direct stimulus for
reforms of the Union’s policies, some of which require a greater
dose of rationality.

**cohesive**
The EU was conceived as being based on the principle of solidarity.
Solidarity, both in an economic and political sense, has made it pos-
sible to tackle divisions, creating a sense of community and strength-
ening the internal equilibrium. The Polish élite has always been of the
opinion that, in order to minimise divisions within the EU, solidarity
should remain the cornerstone of the European project. There is a
historical chance that, after enlargement, if the process is properly
conducted, the EU will be first and foremost more secure (not,
however exclusive in character), stronger, more dynamic and comp-
petitive and yet as ambitious as it is today. That, I believe, is the
most cherished ambition of all candidate countries, and certainly
Poland’s.

**more secure**
Enlargement, of itself, will increase the stability and security of the
Continent, both externally and internally. The new member states
should play an active part in strengthening ESDP, which will
increase Europe’s potential in this sphere, without undermining
the coherence of the Atlantic Alliance. It is in the future member
states’ interests to play an active role in strengthening European
cooperation in justice and home affairs, which would allow
Europe to deal more effectively with such serious problems as
organised crime, terrorism or drug trafficking. The current prob-
lems that Europe has to tackle include food security. The future member states, which produce their food using very limited amounts of pesticides and other chemicals, can help Europe to restore the balance regarding consumer safety on the food market.

**more active and open**

The EU should not renounce its responsibilities on the international scene; it should invest in capabilities that would allow it to conduct an active foreign policy. However, it is even more important for the EU not to be a fortress. It should not create additional divisions on the Continent by concentrating only on providing welfare and security for itself. The Union should remain open to its most immediate environment, developing friendly relationships with its neighbours in a spirit of partnership. Its Mediterranean policy should be accompanied by a robust Eastern policy. Such a policy cannot be concerned only with restrictions: the common frontier should help to integrate, not divide. The EU should not only support efforts at reform in the countries of the former Soviet Union, but also develop practical cooperation in all of the possible sectors. New member states, among them Poland, once they join the Union, intend to become the main advocates of an active Eastern policy.

**stronger, ambitious and more effective**

A strong and effective enlarged EU is in the interests of all its members, new and old alike. Those who fear that the new member states will support any initiative aimed at watered-down integration, a return to simply a free-trade area, do not understand the aspirations and needs of the candidate countries. Only a truly integrated Europe, one which has similar, even greater, ambitions to those that it has today, will be able to deal with the challenges posed by the forthcoming enlargement.

**more dynamic**

The EU should develop dynamically, shaking off the spirit of hesitation. Enlargement will endow the Union with much-needed dynamism, both in a material sense through its large, developing market, and in an immaterial one, giving Europe back its enthusiasm for integration.

**modern and more competitive**

Enlargement will strengthen the EU’s competitiveness. The common goal of all member states is to have a modernised, competitive Union that is capable of facing the challenges of international competition. To achieve that goal it needs to invest in new technologies
and introduce more flexibility on the labour market, in accordance with the conclusions of the Lisbon summit of March 2000.

Conclusions

The EU needs innovative thinking; it should not be thought of only in simplistic, state-centric terms. Rather, it should be seen as a post-modern – or as some would have it ‘neo-medieval’ – entity, with soft internal border zones in flux, numerous cultural identities, a multiplicity of overlapping institutions, and sovereignty divided along different functional and territorial lines. And precisely because such an entity is characterised by a disassociation of decision-making bodies, functional competencies and territorial constituencies, if it aspires to control its destiny it must adopt an integrated approach to its security.

Besides possibly leading to a redefinition of European security, the New York effect, paradoxically, may have one beneficial result: it may remind Europeans that enlargement is above all about security and stability, and not only economic interests. That is why it is absolutely crucial to put the so-called New York dynamics to good use in order to remind EU citizens of the security benefits that will accrue from enlargement. It is difficult to garner support for great schemes if ordinary people cannot relate to them. The time has come to use convincingly the most basic and at the same time most obvious argumentation.

Enlargement should constitute an important stimulus for the development of an inclusive and integrated security concept and practice. Enlargement itself is a venture integrating and combining both internal and external security dimensions. Most of all, enlargement offers a chance to provide European integration with a new raison d’être. The new member states can endow the Union with much-needed enthusiasm. The current member states have already realised many of their aspirations. Their societies seem to forget how much they owe to the success of the integration project. Enlargement provides a perfect opportunity to make each and every European fully aware of it.

First of all, there seems to be little doubt at this stage that all three countries analysed in this paper – Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic – will enter the European Union in the forthcoming wave of accessions. If anything, 11 September has made this clear once and for all. How many other fellow applicants will join them, although they are likely to be quite numerous, is not quite so clear.

That said, all three Central European candidates have gone through an evolutionary (and learning) process as regards the development of ESDP: from scepticism and concern – that it could undermine NATO – to qualified acceptance and more direct involvement. This evolution can be explained by two parallel processes that the contributors have spelt out very clearly. On the one hand, the path to full NATO membership – along which the three candidates increased their interoperability and actual engagement in multilateral peacekeeping – contributed substantially to a broadening of their foreign policy perspectives, while the war in Kosovo further convinced them of the centrality of the United States as a military actor and coalition leader. On the other hand, the path leading to EU accession has made them realise that the Fifteen might engage ever more directly in European security, while an American presence could not necessarily be taken for granted any longer. Since early Union entry has been and still is a key foreign and domestic policy priority for all three – as Hungarian reactions to the recent overall politics of accession negotiations have shown all too well – they have basically decided (whatever their initial scepticism vis-à-vis ESDP, most vocally expressed by Poland) to tone down their ‘Atlanticist’ reservations in order not to endanger their negotiating position. In other words, the fear of potentially ever higher hurdles to overcome – of which the Helsinki and Feira Headline Goals might constitute just one too many – have prompted a more constructive attitude on their part, although they have remained ambivalent over the possible implications and the finalité politique of ESDP.1

1. They probably wanted also to mark a difference vis-à-vis Turkey, the only other EU candidate (though not engaged in accession negotiations) to find itself in a comparable position: see Antonio Missiroli, ‘EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP’, Security Dialogue, XXXIII (2002), no. 1, pp. 9-26.
The only aspect of the EU’s new policy that the three Central European applicants have criticised throughout has been their initial inclusion in the generic category of ‘third’ countries, along with other non-Allied candidates and even such non-candidates as Ukraine or Russia. The quest for formal recognition as European allies, and for a special role in military crisis management, has been constantly reiterated since 1999, and was eventually acknowledged by the Fifteen, at least in part, with the ‘15 + 6’ format envisaged since Nice. Some dissatisfaction with such enhanced ‘third-ness’ has remained, however, although it is mainly political and symbolic in nature: Polish, Hungarian and Czech officials are well aware, in fact, that the EU is unlikely to engage in large-scale autonomous military operations before their entry. 11 September has also increased their awareness of the need for a more comprehensive approach to security, encompassing justice and home affairs (Budapest and Prague have already ‘closed’ the relevant chapter (24) in the negotiations) and the future common policy towards the new neighbours to the East: all three countries, in fact, would prefer to adopt a flexible approach combining more ‘user-friendly’ borders with tighter police controls.

As for the domestic impact of enlargement, there seems to be a mainstream consensus on the economic and political benefits of accession, coupled with some worries about the possible social costs. This was also the main finding of the first opinion poll conducted by Eurobarometer in the applicant countries in October 2001 and released in part the following December. Accordingly, nearly 60 per cent of respondents felt that EU membership would be ‘a good thing’ for their country, with support ranging from 33 per cent in Estonia and Latvia to 80 in Romania; in Hungary it was roughly the average, in Poland a bit lower and in the Czech Republic around 46 per cent. Besides, two-thirds of respondents of voting age declared that they would support their country’s accession to the EU if a referendum had to be held on the issue: once again, Hungarians were the most enthusiastic among the Central Europeans (70 per cent in favour), while 54 per cent of both Poles and Czechs would approve of EU membership. Other opinion polls, however, convey a less optimistic picture. In fact, there is also tangible opposition to some aspects of the integration process, which in the Czech Republic is embodied by the fundamentally Eurosceptic stance of the Civic Democratic Party but in both Hun-

and Poland seems liable to assume slightly more dangerous tones. The recent controversy over the so-called ‘Benes Decrees’ of the immediate postwar years has certainly not helped either bilateral relations (especially between Czechs and Hungarians) or relations with neighbouring Austria and, above all, Germany. At any rate, much will depend on the outcome of the many parliamentary elections that have taken place in 2001 and will take place in 2002, and on the way in which that will impinge upon the countries’ negotiating position in the final stage of the accession process.

Finally, the internal EU debate over the future of Europe initially raised keen interest among the most enlightened élites of Central Europe: suffice it to mention here the early interventions by the Czech President Vaclav Havel and the former Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek (along with his Estonian colleague Tomas Hendrik Ilves). However, the then Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s warning to the EU not to take decisions ‘about us without us’ has shifted the focus to the role and status of the applicants in the process. For its part, the Convention presided by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing has made a special effort to involve the governments and parliaments of all 13 candidates, going as far as to appoint a thirteenth member of the Presidium – the former Slovenian Prime Minister Alojz Peterle – as their virtual representative. The early stages of the discussion, however, have so far revealed a certain (and perhaps understandable) tension within their delegations between a more communautaire approach that emphasises the common European ‘identity’ and common interests, and a more intergovernmental reflex that aims at exerting maximum influence over policy and institutions.

A similar tension could probably be perceived between and even within the contributions to this paper.


annexes

About the authors

Pal Dunay has been Director of the International Training Course in Security Policy at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy since 1996, prior to which he was deputy director of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs. He has a degree in public international law from Eotvos University, Budapest and a Ph.D. in international relations from Budapest University of Economics. Pal Dunay has done research in a number of institutes on both sides of the Atlantic, including the WEU Institute for Security Studies in 1993. He has published widely in English and German, has been an editor of the OSZE-Jahrbuch since 1995 and is an associate editor of the quarterly Security Dialogue.

Jiri Sedivy is currently Director of the Institute of International Relations in Prague. He has an MA in War Studies from King’s College, London, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Charles University, Prague, where he also teaches International Politics and Security. He has published extensively in the field of international security and Czech foreign and security policy. He is inter alia Vice-President of the Czech Foundation for the Study of International Relations, Chairman of the editorial board of Mezinarodni vztahy (Czech international relations quarterly) and a member of the Council for Science, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Jacek Saryusz-Wolski is President of the Natolin European Centre and a member of the European Integration Committee in Poland. He was Under-Secretary of State for European Integration from 1991 to 1996. Between 1999 and 2001 he was respectively Chief Adviser to the Polish Prime Minister for European Integration and Secretary of State for European Integration. He has an MA in economics and a Ph.D. from the University of Lodz, where he taught as Associate Professor at the Faculty of Economy and Sociology, and deputy spokesman for the Solidarity movement in the region was in the early 1980s. He has also studied in Paris, Lyon, Grenoble and Oxford. He was a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, in 1989-90.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURATOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEADS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PESC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PECSOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PESD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaillot Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°52 Terms of engagement. The paradox of American power and the transatlantic dilemma post-11 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julian Lindley-French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°51 From Nice to Laeken - European defence: core documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compiled by Maartje Rutten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°50 What status for Kosovo?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dana Allin, Franz-Lu&lt;sub&gt;h&lt;/sub&gt;ar&lt;sub&gt;u&lt;/sub&gt; Abram, Marta Dassu, Tim Judah, Jacques Rapnik and Thanos Veremis; edited by Dimitrios Triantaphyllou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°49 Enlargement: a new NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Hopkinson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°48 Nuclear weapons: a new Great Debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thérèse Delpech, Shen Dongh, Lawrence Freedman, Camille Grand, Robert A. Manning, Harald Müller, Brad Roberts and Dmitriy Tremin; edited by Burkard Schmitt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°47 From St-Malo to Nice - European defence: core documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compiled by Maartje Rutten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°46 The southern Balkans: perspectives from the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail Kadare, Predrag Simic, Ljubomir Frckoski and Hylber Hysa; edited by Dimitrios Triantaphyllou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°45 Military intervention and the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Ortega</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°44 Between cooperation and competition: the transatlantic defence market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Adams, Christophe Cornu and Andrew D. James; edited by Burkard Schmitt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°43 European integration and defence: the ultimate challenge?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jolyon Howorth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°42 European defence: making it work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicole Gnesotto, Charles Grant, Karl Kaiser, Andrzej Karkoczyka, Tomas Ries, Maartje Rutten, Stefano Silvestri, Alvaro Vasconcelos and Rob de Wijk; edited by François Heisbourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°41 Europe’s boat people: maritime cooperation in the Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Pugh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°40 From cooperation to integration: defence and aerospace industries in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkard Schmitt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°39 The United States and European defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanley R. Sloan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n°38 CFSP, defence and flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Missiroli</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All three Central European candidates for EU membership have gone through an evolutionary (and learning) process as regards the development of ESDP: from scepticism and worry – that it could undermine NATO – to qualified acceptance and more direct involvement.

This evolution can be explained through two parallel processes that the contributors spell out very clearly. On the one hand, the path leading to full NATO membership – along which the three candidates increased their interoperability and actual engagement in multilateral peacekeeping – has broadened their foreign policy perspectives, while the war in Kosovo further convinced them of the centrality of the United States as a military actor and coalition leader. On the other hand, the path leading to EU accession has made them realise that the Fifteen might engage ever more directly in European security, while an American presence could not necessarily be taken for granted any longer. Since early entry to the Union has been and still is a key foreign and domestic policy priority for all three, they have basically decided to tone down their ‘Atlanticist’ reservations in order not to endanger their negotiating position. However, they have remained ambivalent over the possible implications and the finalité politique of ESDP.

The only aspect that the three Central European applicants have criticised throughout has been their initial inclusion in the generic category of ‘third’ countries, along with other non-Allied candidates and even such non-candidates as Ukraine or Russia. The quest for formal recognition as European allies has been constantly reiterated, and has eventually been partially acknowledged by the Fifteen, although some dissatisfaction with such enhanced ‘third-ness’ has remained. 11 September has also increased their awareness of the need for a more comprehensive approach to security, encompassing justice and home affairs and policy towards the new neighbours to the East: all three countries would prefer to adopt a flexible approach combining more ‘user-friendly’ borders with tighter police controls.

Finally, the internal EU debate over the future of Europe initially raised keen interest among the élites of Central Europe, and the European Convention has made a special effort to involve the governments and parliaments of all candidates. The early stages of the discussion have so far revealed a certain tension within their delegations between a more communautaire approach that emphasises the common European ‘identity’ and common interests, and a more intergovernmental reflex that aims at exerting maximum influence over policy and institutions. Such tension is also palpable between and within the contributions to this paper.