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<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFET</td>
<td>European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARD</td>
<td>Coordinated Annual Review on Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Capability Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CELAC</td>
<td>Community of Latin American and Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CETA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>European Defence Fund</td>
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<td>EDIP</td>
<td>European Defence Investment Programme</td>
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<td>EDTIB</td>
<td>European Defence Technological and Industrial Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
</tr>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Community</td>
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Abbreviations

EPF
European Peace Facility

ESA
European Security Architecture

EU
European Union

EUGS
EU Global Strategy

EUMA
EU Mission in Armenia

EUMAM
EU Military Assistance Mission

EUMCAP
EU Monitoring Capacity to Armenia

EUMPM Niger
EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger

EUMS
EU Military Staff

EUTM
EU Training Mission

FIMI
Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference

GCC
Gulf Cooperation Council

HEDI
Hub for EU Defence Innovation

IDP
Internally Displaced Person

JCPOA
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

LAC
Latin America and the Caribbean

LNG
Liquefied Natural Gas

MFA
Macro-Financial Assistance

MONUSCO
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDICI
Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument

OSCE
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PESCO
Permanent Structured Cooperation

PKK
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê)

R&D
Research and Development

R&T
Research and Technology

RDC
Rapid Deployment Capacity

SADC
Southern African Development Community

SDGs
Sustainable Development Goals

SWIFT
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications

TEU
Treaty on European Union

UAE
United Arab Emirates

UDCG
Ukraine Defence Contact Group

UK
United Kingdom

UN
United Nations

UNFCCC
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNSC
United Nations Security Council

UNSCR
United Nations Security Council Resolution

UNSE
United Nations Special Envoy

UNSMIL
UN Support Mission in Libya

US
United States
## Country codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Code</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>BE</td>
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<td>Czechia</td>
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The year 2022 was the year that large-scale war returned to Europe. Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine has become the largest war in Europe since 1945, with hundreds of thousands killed and injured, and millions of displaced Ukrainians in and outside the country. In response, the EU and its Member States, and partners from around the world, rallied swiftly around Ukraine, providing unprecedented levels of military support, economic assistance and humanitarian aid. The outbreak of war also saw the transatlantic alliance reinvigorated, with close EU–NATO cooperation and the United States’ commitment to European security reaffirmed.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been a brutal wake-up call for Europe and forced the EU to act rapidly and decisively. EU leaders immediately recognised it as a moment of truth for Europe and the wider defence of the rules-based international order. Accordingly, the EU and its Member States mobilised all tools at their disposal. In ten rounds of heavy sanctions in 2022, the EU and partner countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and many others, put the Russian
financial system, industry and ruling elite under pressure by disconnecting key Russian banks from the SWIFT network and blocking the transactions of Russia’s Central Bank. Breaking the EU’s energy dependence on Russia and the ban on exports of high-technology products and spare parts also took a heavy toll on Russia’s oil and gas industries and grounded many of its civilian airliners, while assets belonging to Russian oligarchs, including private jets, yachts and mansions, were frozen or seized around the world. And in June 2022, in a great show of both solidarity and commitment, the European Council granted Ukraine candidate status in the Union.

Crucially, the EU oversaw the first-ever joint financing and delivery of weapons and ammunition to a country under attack. For the first time, the EU took the decision to use the European Peace Facility (EPF) to pool funds and then reimburse Member States for their arms deliveries to Ukraine. By mobilising €5.6 billion under the EPF, the EU has incentivised the delivery of military assistance by EU Member States to the amount of over €11 billion so far.

In another historical first, the EPF was also used to fund the most ambitious training mission based on EU soil – the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM) for Ukraine. Launched on 15 November 2022, EUMAM will train 30 000 Ukrainian soldiers by the end of 2023 and had by mid-2023 already completed training of some 24 000 troops in close coordination with partners such as the US, the UK, Norway and Canada. The innovative use of the EPF showed how the EU and its Member States can cooperate on defence with third states across the full range of support, from advice and training to supplying arms and ammunition on a large scale.

The EU’s response to Russia’s war against Ukraine also gave renewed impetus to the EU’s overall security and defence agenda. Indeed, just a few weeks after the Russian invasion, the EU adopted the ‘Strategic Compass’. The Strategic Compass is a guiding framework for the EU’s security and defence up to 2030. It sets out concrete actions and timelines in four chapters entitled Act, Secure, Invest, and Partner with more than 80 specific deliverables, of which some 50 were to be implemented by the end of 2022.
In the first year of the Strategic Compass, there has already been significant progress. The EU has become more effective in the deployment of its missions and operations, in terms of speed, flexibility and responsiveness. It has also strengthened its ability to address threats and secure access to strategic domains such as cyber, space and maritime routes. Member States have decided to increase their defence spending and investments in an unprecedented manner. To be effective, they will need to ensure more of that investment is spent jointly, i.e. together. To this end, in addition to co-financing defence R&D with the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Commission has proposed for the first time to incentivise short-term joint procurement of military equipment among Member States through the EU budget. EU support to the EU defence industry, especially in ramping up production capacity, continues to be a key priority in 2023.

While EU support to Ukraine in 2022 was at the top of the agenda, the EU continued to be a security provider in other parts of the world. Drawing on civilian and military assets, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) continues to provide a comprehensive approach towards crisis management in 22 ongoing missions and operations, 13 civilian and 9 military, in which over 4,000 women and men support peace and security while building resilience in fragile societies in Europe, Africa and Asia.

During the year, the EU increased its support to security in the Gulf of Guinea, the Indo-Pacific, the Western Balkans, in the South Caucasus, and elsewhere. EPF funding was also used in line with its comprehensive scope to support African-led peace support operations and individual African countries as well as countries in the Middle East, the Western Balkans and in the eastern neighbourhood. The EU launched a new CSDP mission in Niger and prepared another one in Armenia. The EU Military Partnership Mission (EUMPM) Niger was launched in December 2022 as a new mission model to help implement a capacity-building plan for the Niger Armed Forces. The EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA), in turn, is a civilian mission mandated to observe and report on the security situation along the Armenian side of the international border with Azerbaijan.

The events of 2022 were a stark wake-up call for all Europe, as the EUISS Yearbook clearly illustrates. Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine continues, as does its global fallout. Moreover,
the wider security landscape continues to present a growing set of threats and challenges. As the world becomes more unstable and unpredictable, Europeans must increase their cooperation and collective investment in their common security – and that is exactly what we are doing.

With the Strategic Compass setting out the strategic direction, we are moving from words to action: for the security and defence of our own citizens, for the security of our partners and for greater international peace and security. We have achieved a lot, but even more work remains to be done.
Introduction

As with previous editions, the task of the EUISS Yearbook of European Security (YES) is to present an analytical overview of key events that affected European security in 2022 and EU responses. While the Yearbook aims to provide a comprehensive account of the EU as an international and security actor, a selection must necessarily be made and not every country or region is covered in as much detail as others. For the EU, 2022 was dominated by the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the global responses to this extraordinary and unexpected event. As part of its response to a more hostile and uncertain world, and following a two-year drafting process, the EU adopted a Strategic Compass in March 2022, just a few weeks after the Russian attack on Ukraine, to guide the development of the EU security and defence agenda for the next ten years. To this end, the Yearbook of European Security is this year divided into three main sections covering: (1) the EU’s response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine; (2) the implementation of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence; and (3) External Action. The first section of the volume describes the EU’s efforts to pursue multilateral engagement and its response to the Russian attack on Ukraine, detailing the civilian and military aid provided to Kyiv and facilitated by the EU and its Member States. In the second section, the focus is on the implementation of the Strategic Compass and the EU’s evolution as a defence actor. Out of the over 80 concrete actions proposed in the Strategic Compass, many were already delivered on in 2022. The third section contains subsections on multilateralism and the European Political Community, as well as geographical and regional chapters on North Africa and the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas. To
further enhance the Yearbook, supporting infographics and links to relevant EUISS publications are also included.

We would like to thank Gearóid Cronin for editing the text and Christian Dietrich for the visuals and layout, and Director Gustav Lindström for his enduring encouragement, support and insights. Beyond the EUISS, we wish to thank the Council of the EU, the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the European External Action Service (EEAS), European Defence Agency (EDA), European Commission, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for making their databases available for use. Finally, as always, any errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.
THE EU’S RESPONSE TO THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE
The Russian war of aggression

In Europe, the year 2022 will forever be marked by the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the return of a major conventional war on European soil. All through the autumn of 2021, Russia steadily built up military forces around Ukraine. By December, more than 100,000 Russian troops and thousands of tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery pieces were in place, including in Belarus to the north and in already occupied Crimea to the south. Russian officials repeatedly denied that there were any plans to attack Ukraine but presented two draft treaties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States on 17 December that would legally bind Ukraine not to join the Alliance and reduce the number of NATO troops stationed in eastern Europe, and threatened an unspecified military response if those demands were not met. NATO and the United States rejected these requests while the European Union (EU) warned Russia of ‘swift and severe’ economic sanctions should it attack Ukraine. With the crisis deepening during the winter, Washington repeatedly warned in February 2022 that a Russian invasion was imminent and began evacuating its embassy in Kyiv\(^{(1)}\). Soon other embassies followed suit.

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In the early morning of 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Following a bold plan for a quick victory, Russian airborne and armoured formations swept towards the capital Kyiv in the north and the major population centres in the east and south. However, alerted by Western intelligence, outnumbered Ukrainian forces managed not only to hold Kyiv but also the second-largest city, Kharkiv, in the east after ferocious fighting, but had to retreat from significant parts of the country’s territory. Later in the year, Ukraine launched several successful counteroffensives, retaking about half of the territory lost in the initial phases of the invasion. In November, Russia was forced to withdraw from the key southern city of Kherson as it became impossible for its troops to defend. With winter setting in, there were few further changes in territorial control as the war turned into a static war of attrition. By the end of the year, Russia controlled about 15–20% of Ukrainian territory including much of the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in the east, as well as Crimea in the south.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has become the biggest and most serious war in Europe since 1945 with hundreds of thousands killed and injured, and millions of displaced Ukrainians both in and outside the country. In response to the unprovoked and illegal attack by Russia, the United States, the EU and its Member States, and partners around the world swiftly rallied around Ukraine, providing unprecedented levels of military support, economic assistance and humanitarian aid. The outbreak of war also saw the transatlantic alliance reinvigorated with unprecedented EU–NATO cooperation and the United States’ commitment to European security reaffirmed in the strongest possible way.

The resurgence of a major war in Europe has also radically changed the EU. Individually, EU Member States took historic decisions in 2022: Finland and Sweden abandoned their traditional

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military non-alignment and applied for NATO membership and Denmark decided to abolish its 30 year opt-out from the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Germany in turn reversed its previously cautious defence policy and set up a €100 billion fund to modernise the German armed forces, while Poland vowed to significantly increase its defence spending to create the most powerful land forces in Europe. Indeed, almost all EU Member States increased or announced increases in their defence spending in 2022. While concerns about Russian aggression had been growing for quite some time, and especially since 2014 when Russia first invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea, the Russian reinvasion of Ukraine certainly affected military spending decisions (3).

Support to Ukraine

Equally importantly, the Union acted rapidly and decisively in support of Ukraine. Immediately after the invasion, EU leaders recognised it as a moment of truth for Europe. Fully understanding the war as ‘a clash ... between a rules-based order and a world of naked aggression’ (4) to determine the future of the international system, the EU and its Member States responded with all their might. The EU and partner countries around the world imposed ten rounds of heavy economic sanctions, striking at the core of the Russian financial system and industry. Moreover, ending the EU’s energy dependence on Russia and the ban on exports of high-technology products and spare parts cut off Russia’s all-important oil and gas industries from Western markets and suppliers. To stem the flow of disinformation, the EU suspended the licences of Russian state-owned propaganda outlets, such as Russia Today and Sputnik, and


Support to Ukraine

banned them from operating in the Union. And underlining its strong support, the European Council granted Ukraine EU candidate status in June 2022, following its application for EU membership on 28 February, just four days after the outbreak of war\(^5\).

At the EU level, many taboos were also broken in the CSDP. Alongside the imposition of severe sanctions against Russia and unprecedented levels of humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, the EU has jointly financed and delivered weapons and ammunition to a country at war. For the first time, the Council of the EU took the decision to use the European Peace Facility (EPF) to reimburse Member States for their arms deliveries to Ukraine. Out of the estimated €11.5 billion worth in arms deliveries from EU Member States to Ukraine in 2022, the EPF reimbursed Member States with €3.1 billion. The EPF was also used for funding the establishment of the first CSDP mission on EU soil, the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM) in support of Ukraine. Since November 2022, EUMAM and partner countries train Ukrainian soldiers in Germany and Poland and had by the Spring of 2023 already completed training of some 17,000 troops\(^6\). For the first time ever, a third country – Norway – made a financial contribution to the EPF to fund EUMAM, demonstrating Norway’s close cooperation with the EU on security and defence and its strong support to Ukraine\(^7\). The innovative use of the EPF showed how the EU and its Member States can support partners like Ukraine, with everything from advice and training to weapons and ammunition.

The extraordinary growth of the EU in security and defence in 2022 was however the result of a longer process to strengthen the EU’s ability to act as a security provider. This process took on a greater urgency after Brexit and the launch of the EU

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Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016. The EUGS and EU defence initiatives such as the revised EU Capability Development Plan (CDP), the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the European Defence Fund (EDF) all led to a significantly increased role for the EU in security and defence. To further strengthen the EU’s ability to act, the EU and its Member States began formulating a document in 2020 to guide EU action in security and defence for the coming ten years. Preceded by the first-ever joint and classified threat analysis undertaken at the EU level, the EU Member States agreed that a more hostile security environment required the EU to make a quantum leap forward and increase its capacity and willingness to act, strengthen its resilience, and invest more and better in defence.

Support to Ukraine

The EU Member States approved the Strategic Compass document in March 2022, just a few weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, endowing the bloc with an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy by 2030 (9).

Assistance by EU institutions and Member States

The support by the EU, Member States and the European financial institutions to Ukraine in 2022 was unprecedented. In a Team Europe approach, around €49 billion in financial, humanitarian,

emergency budget and military support was made available to Ukraine in the course of the year\textsuperscript{(10)}.

**Economic support**

The outbreak of the war put the Ukrainian economy under heavy pressure. To ensure that Kyiv could maintain macroeconomic stability and continue operating essential public services such as hospitals and schools, and paying wages and pensions, the EU disbursed €7.2 billion in EU macro-financial assistance and €620 million in budget support in 2022. Overall, the support to Ukraine provided or guaranteed by the EU budget during the year amounted to €11.6 billion. In 2022, the EU also suspended import duties on all Ukrainian exports to the EU and all EU anti-dumping and safeguard measures targeting Ukrainian steel exports for one year. In addition, the EU also provided EU guarantees to the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) that enabled them to lend to the Ukrainian government and companies. Moreover, in 2022 the EU also took the decision to deliver a support package for Ukraine of up to €18 billion in the form of highly concessional loans for 2023.

**Humanitarian aid**

The EU provided €485 million in direct humanitarian aid to Ukraine as well as a €330 million emergency package focused on the immediate needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs), including repair of damaged infrastructure such as heating, water and sanitation facilities. Another €114 million was provided in support of rehabilitating schools and school buses. With millions of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war, the EU and Member States provided some €17 billion in assistance to support refugees arriving in the EU.

Support to Ukraine

Military aid

On 27 February 2022, only three days after the Russian invasion began, the EU announced that it would provide weapons to Ukraine through the EPF. While EU Member States had individually already before the war provided arms to Ukraine, the EU would now for the first time send lethal aid to a third state. This unprecedented move signalled a more robust EU foreign policy. Of the estimated €11.5 billion in military assistance sent to Ukraine by EU Member States in 2022, €3.1 billion was reimbursed by the Union through the EPF mechanism. All EU Member States donated military aid to Ukraine individually and/or collectively via EU institutions, except for Hungary, Cyprus and Malta. Most EU Member States also took part in the coordinated monthly meetings of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) that began coordinating the global donation of military aid from the United States, NATO allies, and other countries. A first meeting of the UDCG took place between 41 countries on 26 April 2022, and the coalition had grown to 54 countries by early 2023.

Ukraine as a candidate country

Almost immediately after the Russian invasion, Ukraine applied for EU membership on 28 February 2022, underlining its wish for a future inside the Union. In response, the European Commission issued its Opinion on Ukraine’s application for EU membership in record time, and on 23 June 2022 the European Council granted candidate status to Ukraine\(^{11}\). In its decision, the European Council invited the Commission to report to the Council on the fulfilment of the conditions specified in the Commission’s Opinion on the

## EU support to Ukraine

2022, € million

### Macro-financial assistance to meet urgent needs on the ground

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount (€ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EIB loans to meet financing needs, support strategic state-owned companies, repair damaged infrastructure and ensure municipal services</td>
<td>2300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget support to meet urgent needs on the ground</td>
<td>620</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>485</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of schools, school buses</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis response measures</td>
<td>192</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBRD investment</td>
<td>114</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants, loans and guarantees from EU Member States</td>
<td>7300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military assistance from Member States directly</td>
<td>up to 8400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPF support for the delivery of military equipment</td>
<td>3100</td>
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Data: EEAS, January 2023
The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 upended the European Security Architecture (ESA). The ESA consists of multiple institutions and agreements contributing to European security since the end of World War II. As an architecture that was not pre-planned or pre-conceived, the ESA consists of four major components:

(12) For an overview of global assistance to Ukraine, see Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Ukraine Support Tracker (https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/?cookieLevel=not-set).

1. institutions – primarily NATO, the EU, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE);
2. arms control agreements;
3. confidence and security-building measures; and
4. UN charter obligations.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the ESA is undergoing radical change. Historically, a key contentious issue was Russia’s role in and place in this architecture. The idea of including Russia in the ESA, which had currency especially before the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (e.g. the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act), is no longer realistic. Instead, the ESA is now about how to defend Europe against Russia, keeping the United States engaged in Europe, and managing relations with China.

When it comes to institutions, the EU has reinforced its role in security and the EU and NATO have stepped up cooperation with each other. In June 2022, NATO reaffirmed the centrality of Article V in its Strategic Concept and welcomed the applications of Finland and Sweden in a shift of NATO’s centre of gravity to the north and east. Following the invasion, several NATO members have committed to substantially increase their defence spending to 2 % or above of GDP in line with the 2014 NATO Defence Investment Pledge. Similarly, the EU has taken significant steps in strengthening the role of the Union in security and defence in 2022. While the Strategic Compass was conceived before the war, the Russian invasion of Ukraine led to the Compass being modified prior to its adoption to underscore the need for the EU to play a stronger role as a defence actor.

The OSCE, on the other hand, was effectively non-existent in 2022 (14). The consensus-based organisation became paralysed by Russia blocking most operations and budget negotiations. For example, the mandate of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, which

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(14) One of the initial foundations for the European Security Architecture was the 1975 Helsinki Final Act establishing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, now the OSCE.
The impact on the European security architecture expired on 31 March 2022, was not extended due to a lack of consensus at the OSCE Permanent Council. And after 23 years of activities, the OSCE announced on 30 June 2022 the gradual closure of the office of the Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine since there was no consensus in the OSCE Permanent Council to extend the mandate. However, if it can be maintained, the OSCE may perhaps be able to play a role once the war is over since it is the only format in which Russia and Ukraine are on an equal footing.

There used to be a debate regarding Russia’s role in the ESA but after the invasion, Moscow can no longer be part of the ESA and will not be as long as it violates sovereignty, territorial integrity and human rights. At a broader level, President Putin’s imperial ambitions mean that the future ESA is now about defending the EU and NATO, while supporting countries such as Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and the countries of the Western Balkans against the threat from Russia.

EUISS publications


Jan Joel Andersson, ‘Buying weapons together (or not): Joint defence acquisition and parallel arms procurement’, Brief No 7, 3 April 2023 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/buying-weapons-together-or-not)

Jan Joel Andersson, ‘European defence partnerships: Stronger together’, Brief No 3, 2 March 2023 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/european-defence-partnerships)

Dimitar Bechev, ‘Sailing through the storm: Türkiye’s Black Sea strategy amidst the Russian-Ukrainian war’, Brief No 1, 6 February 2023 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/sailing-through-storm)


András Rácz, ‘Becoming a military district: Deepening military cooperation between Russia and Belarus’, *Brief No 4*, 14 March 2022 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/becoming-military-district)

IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGIC COMPASS FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE
Background

On 21 March 2022, less than one month after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the EU approved the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. A few days later, the same document was endorsed by the EU heads of state and government. The Strategic Compass is a guiding framework for the EU’s security and defence up to 2030. It sets out concrete actions and timelines in four chapters entitled ‘Act’, ‘Secure’, ‘Invest’ and ‘Partner’ with 81 specific deliverables of which more than 50 were to be implemented by the end of 2022. Indeed, in the first year of the Strategic Compass, significant progress was made. Among the most important advances were the increased speed, flexibility and responsiveness of EU missions and operations to act. The EU also strengthened its ability to anticipate threats and secure access to strategic domains such as space and maritime routes. Member States also increased their defence spending and investments in an unprecedented manner. Moreover, the EU also strengthened its partnerships with key actors around the world in security and defence, not least with NATO and the United States.

As has been mentioned above, the EU acted quickly and decisively in support of Ukraine after the Russian invasion. The Military Assistance Mission, EUMAM, was launched in record time to train Ukrainian soldiers and the EU swiftly adapted the mandate of the already existing EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform so that it could provide support to the management of the cross-border flow of refugees and goods and in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. The use of the EPF to reimburse Member States for their military assistance to Ukraine was also ground-breaking.

While much focus was on Ukraine, the EU continued to be a security provider around the world by taking a leading role in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security. In 2022, the EU’s CSDP provided a comprehensive approach towards crisis management in 12 civilian and 9 military missions and operations in Europe, Africa and Asia, in which almost 4,000 men and women supported peace and security (3). Notably, the EU increased its support to security in the Gulf of Guinea, the Indo-Pacific, the Western Balkans, and in the South Caucasus. EPF funding was used in line with its global scope to support African-led Peace Support Operations and individual African countries as well as countries in the Middle East, the Western Balkans and in the eastern neighbourhood. The EU launched a new CSDP mission in Niger and prepared another one in Armenia. The EU Military Partnership Mission (EUMPM) Niger which was launched in December 2022 is a new mission model and will help implement a Nigerien capacity building plan by supporting the

CSDP civilian missions
Personnel (as of 31 Dec 2022) and average annual budget of current mandate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Personnel Internationally contracted</th>
<th>Seconded total</th>
<th>Average annual budget € million</th>
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* Personnel figures for EUMA Armenia were not available as of 31 December 2022 as the mission had not yet been launched.

NB: Does not include Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (KSC/SPO) personnel. Heads of Mission are coded as contracted personnel. Data: SIPRI, Multilateral Peace Operations Database, 2023; Council of Europe, 2023; European Commission, GISCO, 2023
CSDP military missions and operations
Personnel (as of 31 Dec 2022)


Data: SIPRI, Multilateral Peace Operations Database, 2023; EU Military Staff, 2022; European Commission, GISCO, 2023
establishment of a centre for training technicians of the Niger Armed Forces (4). It will provide advice and specialised training requested by the Niger Armed Forces to support the creation of a new communication and command support battalion. The EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) is a civilian mission to observe the security situation along the border between Armenia and the border with Azerbaijan. The EU established EUMA in response to an official request made by the Armenian authorities in December 2022 to deploy a fully-fledged EU civilian mission on the ground following the EU Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) deployed on the Armenian side of the Armenia–Azerbaijan border between 20 October 2022 and 19 December 2022.(5).

The war in Ukraine has underlined the importance of being able to move troops and equipment across borders in Europe.

In the Strategic Compass, the EU made clear that increasing its ability to respond quickly and decisively to imminent crisis situations outside the Union has become even more urgent. The operationalisation of a new EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (EU RDC) by 2025 will be key to make this a reality. In 2022, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) worked on the RDC’s conceptual development which draws on modified EU Battlegroups, and on pre-identifying Member States’ military forces and capabilities. During the year, two operational scenarios for the EU RDC (on rescue and evacuation and on the initial phase of stabilisation) were also developed while work began on several others.

The war in Ukraine has underlined the importance of being able to move troops and equipment across borders in Europe. A new Action Plan on Military Mobility was adopted in November 2022, addressing infrastructure, regulatory bottlenecks, partnerships, as well as preparedness against cyberattacks and hybrid threats. By effectively using the available budget for military mobility and accelerating the calls for proposal, the EU was able to increase its efforts


to adapt dual-use transport infrastructure. The financial support by the Commission to dual-use transport infrastructure for military mobility amounted up to €1 billion in 2022 (6).

Another key aspect of the Strategic Compass is to make the EU faster, more capable and more effective in its ability to decide and act as a security provider. This requires the full use of the Treaties. A key component of the CSDP toolbox is Article 44 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which allows the Council to entrust to an able and willing group of Member States responsibility for planning and conducting a mission or operation within the EU framework and in association with the High Representative (7). In 2022, Member States agreed on the practical modalities of Article 44 which now gives the Union more ‘unanimity-enabled’ flexibility in CSDP missions and operations. To strengthen the EU and its Member States’ ability to provide mutual assistance in case of an armed aggression, exercises were held during the year on Article 42(7) TEU in scenarios involving cyber and hybrid threats (8).

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**EUISS publications**


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Secure – Resilience

The EU took several important steps in strengthening the EU’s resilience in the course of 2022. Among the many deliverables to be completed in 2022, the following can be especially mentioned in the area of resilience. The Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) began reviewing the EU threat analysis and the EU strengthened its ability to anticipate and counter hybrid threats by designing and approving new tools for cyber defence, such as a new European Cyber Resilience Act, and enhancing the cyber diplomacy toolbox. Work on the Joint Cyber Unit continued and a foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) toolbox was developed (9).

The EU’s approaches to maritime security and defence in space were also enhanced with the preparations for new strategies for the maritime domain and for defence in space, both approved in early 2023 (10). The EU also explored the use of solidarity, mutual assistance, and crisis response mechanisms in the event of attacks originating from space or threats to space-based assets.

In 2022, the EU also continued implementing the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap. This will help Member States mitigate the carbon footprint of their armed forces. During the year, the EEAS also established a Crisis Response Centre in July 2022 in order to strengthen the EU’s ability to assist Member States in their efforts to protect and rescue EU citizens abroad in case of security or consular crises. It now ‘serves as a permanent response capability,

(9) For example, on 1 January 2023, the EUISS launched a 3-year, multi-million EU-funded project that focuses on enhancing knowledge and developing EU methodologies and tools to detect, analyse, assess, and prevent, deter and counter threats emerging in the information space (https://www.iss.europa.eu/projects/countering-foreign-interference).

In 2022, Member States increased defence spending and investments. Collectively, since the start of the war against Ukraine, EU Member States have announced increases in defence spending that are estimated to amount to an extra €70 billion by 2025. This represents a major opportunity to progress towards stronger European capabilities and more collaboration. During the year, Member States have addressed capability development and exchanged on how to better ensure that defence spending matches security needs. The Commission and the EDA prepared an

Defence expenditure
Current $ billion, 2020–2022

Data: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2022; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2022
### Defence expenditure

**% of GDP, 2020–2022**

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Data: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2022; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2022
analysis on defence investment gaps in May 2022 and a Defence Joint Procurement Task Force was set up by the EDA, EEAS, and the Commission to identify Member States’ most pressing needs as well as the production capacities of the European defence industry. A European defence innovation hub within the European Defence Agency (HEDI) was also established (12).

As a follow-up to the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis from May 2022, the Commission proposed a short-term instrument to incentivise joint procurement of military equipment among Member States. The proposed European Defence Industrial Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), with a potential financial envelope of €500 million (later reduced to €300 million) over two years allocated from the EU budget aims to boost the competitiveness and efficiency of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). Preparations were also being made for a long-term European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) to further strengthen the EU defence industry and support Member States on defence joint procurement.

EU financial support to defence research and capability development continued in 2022. The European Defence Fund supported collaborative R&D projects with a total EU support of almost €1.2 billion during the year. Further calls for proposals were published in June 2022 and 41 collaborative defence research and development projects for a total EU support of almost €832 million were selected for funding. They generated significant interest from European industry (134 proposals from entities in 26 Member States and Norway) and a strong involvement of small and medium-sized enterprises (39% of entities in selected projects) (13). Moreover, in 2022, Member States cooperated in nearly 100 capability development, training, joint procurement, Research and Technology (R&T) and innovation projects in the framework of the EDA amounting in total to €672


Also the PESCO initiative progressed in 2022. Through PESCO, Member States have agreed to deepen defence cooperation and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending. A total of 60 collaborative projects contribute to delivering critical capabilities and a new wave of projects was prepared during the year and was approved in Spring 2023.

A historic shift or turning point has occurred in Brussels and in several EU capitals when it comes to defence. Some have called it a ‘strategic awakening’ for Europe but the necessary investments have only just begun.

**EUISS publications**

Jan Joel Andersson, ‘Buying weapons together (or not): Joint defence acquisition and parallel arms procurement’, *Brief* no 7, 3 April 2023 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/buying-weapons-together-or-not)

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**Partner – EU partnerships**

Partnerships are at the core of the EU’s vision of its role as a security and defence actor. In 2022 and as part of the Strategic Compass, the EU continued to invest in multilateralism, and worked to uphold the rules-based international order.
with the United Nations at its centre. The EU cooperated closely with the UN on agreed priorities and in missions and operations. The EU and the UN coordinated and cooperated in countries such as the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia, and worked together in support of the peace process in Yemen.

The EU’s partnerships with the United States and NATO were considerably strengthened during the year as the very strong and coordinated support to Ukraine showed. Political dialogue continued and intensified, including through the first ever transatlantic Leaders’ dinner in June 2022. The third Joint Declaration on EU–NATO cooperation in January 2023 further expanded cooperation in areas such as resilience, emerging and disruptive technologies, outer space, the security implications of climate change, and countering foreign information manipulation and interference(15).

The EU’s cooperation with the African Union (AU) in promoting security on the African continent and countering the global effects of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine progressed in 2022. High-level bilateral dialogues were held in support of African–led Peace Support Operations, including through €730 million under the EPF for 2021–2024 to the Multi-National Joint Task Force against Boko Haram, the AU Transition Mission in Somalia, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission to Mozambique, among others. The EU’s cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) based on the shared interest in a free, open and secure Indo-Pacific region continued.

Bilaterally, the EU worked closely with the United States to coordinate the massive political, military, economic and humanitarian support for Ukraine. The EU, the United States and other NATO allies have held regular military exchanges in the framework of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group as well as in the EU Military

# 60 PESCO projects

Number of PESCO projects by participating countries and project category, 2022

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Data: PESCO Secretariat, Projects, 2022
Staff Clearing House Cell. The EU–US relationship was further enhanced through the new EU–US security and defence dialogue on crisis management, defence initiatives, and support to Ukraine. In addition, the EDA and the US Department of Defense finalised negotiations on an Administrative Arrangement in 2022, and signed in April 2023, which will allow formal cooperation and information exchange. Also, the very first EU–US naval exercise in the Indo-Pacific region was planned in 2022 and held in March 2023, paving the way for further military exchanges and cooperation.

In 2022, the EU also held strategic dialogues with Norway and Canada on a wide range of security and defence issues. The cooperation with Norway and Canada in supporting Ukraine has been
very close, including through the EU Military Staff Clearing House Cell. Norway offered a financial contribution (approximately €14.5 million) to the EPF in support of EUMAM Ukraine and deployed training experts. The EU intensified informal contacts and coordination with the United Kingdom regarding support to Ukraine, and for the possible participation of the UK in the PESCO project Military
Mobility. The EU also stepped up engagement with Switzerland and initiated new contacts with Iceland.

Security and defence dialogues and consultations were also held with Georgia and Moldova during the year. Both countries were provided with support through the EPF and other tools aiming to enhance their resilience against both hybrid and conventional threats. EU support to partners in the Western Balkans was maintained in 2022, including through the continued presence of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EULEX in Kosovo and EPF support across the region, as well as cooperation on counter-terrorism. The EU also continued engaging with partners in the southern neighbourhood, on issues such as terrorism, violent extremism, cyber and hybrid threats, organised crime and irregular migration.

Enhancing the security of partners in Africa remained a key priority in 2022. Efforts to counter the global consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in Africa, including food security, were ramped up. Security and defence exchanges were developed with Kenya, South Africa and Rwanda. Funds from the EPF were mobilised to train and equip troops of partner countries, such as Mozambique and Niger.

The EU is committed to develop a distinctive role in the Indo-Pacific region, including by deepening security and defence relationships with Japan, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and Australia, among others. Port calls and joint naval exercises were held in 2022, such as between Operation Atalanta and India and Indonesia, and the expansion of the EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presence concept in the north-west Indian Ocean. The annual dialogues with Chile, Colombia and Peru were also conducted during the year, including on security and defence matters.

EUISS publications

Jan Joel Andersson, ‘European defence partnerships: Stronger together’, Brief No 3, 2 March 2023 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/european-defence-partnerships)
Multilateralism

For the EU, the year 2022 brought the challenge of reconciling steadfast commitment to supporting Ukraine ‘for as long as it takes’, while paying similar levels of attention to the many other global crises and conflicts. This challenge has underpinned the Union’s activities on the international stage during the past year. Described as a ‘perfect storm’, the current global environment characterised by the ‘triple planetary crises’ of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution as well as the still prevalent consequences of the Covid–19 pandemic was further impacted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its effects on global food security, migration and international economic stability.

While acknowledging that ‘the multilateral system is under pressure like never before’, the EU reiterated its commitment to multilateralism with the UN at its centre on numerous occasions in 2022. In line with the UN Secretary General’s 2021 report ‘Our Common Agenda’, the objective to make the UN-centred multilateral system ‘fit for tomorrow’ featured prominently in the 2022

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Council conclusions on EU priorities at the United Nations. Some key points from the Council conclusions can be highlighted. First, the conclusions frame the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine as ‘one of the greatest challenges to global peace and security’ and ‘an affront against humanity’, which, amidst all the other ongoing global challenges, requires the world ‘to demonstrate solidarity and show that multilateralism works in times of crisis’.

This echoes the strong condemnations of the war EU officials have made since its outbreak. Acknowledging a ‘growing deficit in multilateralism’ when attending a UN Security Council Session in June 2022, HR/VP Borrell emphasised that ‘this is a not a European war’ but ‘an attack on the foundations of the UN (...), by a permanent member of the Security Council’.

To decisively counter this attack and other conflicts around the world, in the second part of its conclusions, the Council calls for an ambitious ‘New Agenda for Peace’, again directly referring to what the UN Secretary General had also called for in his ‘Our Common Agenda’ report. For the EU, this ‘New Agenda for Peace’ should (i) make the UN focus more on crisis prevention and mediation through a full use of the Secretary General’s diplomatic toolbox; (ii) increase the efficiency of peacekeeping missions; (iii) strengthen cooperation on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism, transnational crime, human trafficking, and hybrid threats; as well as (iv) advance disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

While now summarised in this new agenda and the 2022 Council conclusions, these objectives are consistent with the priorities the EU has been pursuing at the UN for several years. Similarly, under the subchapter ‘Leaving no one behind’, the Council highlights the strong interlinkages between peace and security and other

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(6) Ibid., p. 2.

global challenges, referenced in the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. Those include ending poverty, reducing inequalities, tackling the ‘triple planetary crisis’, and promoting global health, gender equality, universal social protection and decent working conditions. In this context, the conclusions reiterate the contributions that the EU’s Global Gateway can make to realising the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (8). Reflecting the EU’s priorities for the UN human rights forums in 2022 (9), the conclusions further reaffirm the Union’s commitment to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as its objective to promote better education and life-long learning activities for everyone in all areas of its external action (10). In the subsequent sub-chapter entitled ‘Preparing better for the future’, the conclusions further elaborate on how the EU aims to (i) strengthen global health security and preparedness, especially in light of the ongoing consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic; (ii) urgently address climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, referencing the commitments made at previous UN Climate Change Conferences (COPs); (iii) promote an ‘open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet’ for instance by implementing the Declaration for the Future of the Internet, as well as (iv) sustainably empower the world’s future generations (11).

In light of this extensive list of challenges and objectives, the emphasis in the third section of the conclusions on ‘the need for a UN that is ready for the future’, a ‘UN 2.0’, comes naturally. The Council substantiates Member States’ commitment to shifting from merely reacting to these global crises to being able to prevent and anticipate them. The conclusions, therefore, set high expectations for the UN’s Summit of the Future now to be held in September 2024, where initiatives like the ‘Quintet of Change’ with its focus


(11) Ibid. p. 16.
Multilateralism

on stronger capabilities for data, innovation, strategic foresight, behavioural science and results, proposals like an Emergency Platform to improve collective crisis management approaches and more sustainable funding mechanisms should be discussed (12).

EU voting at the United Nations

In 2022, the UN Security Council was, alongside its five permanent members, composed of Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Norway and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), meaning that besides permanent member France, Ireland was the only other EU Member State in this configuration. Over the year, 52 individual UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) were voted, with only one of them having been vetoed by the Russian Federation (13). Unsurprisingly, this was resolution 2623 on convening an emergency special session of the UN General Assembly on Ukraine three days after the Russian invasion on 24 February (14). In his EEAS blog entry ahead of the 77th UN General Assembly high-level week in September, HR/VP Borrell referred to this Russian veto as having ‘predictably disqualified the Security Council from taking any meaningful outcomes on the war against Ukraine, the worst and most flagrant violation of the UN charter since Iraq invaded Kuwait’ (15).

Notably, China, India and the UAE had abstained from this resolution. In reaction to the Russian veto, the EU together with Ukraine and countries from around the world prepared a UN General Assembly resolution that demanded that Russia immediately withdraw its forces and abide by international law. When the General

(12) Ibid. p. 18.
### UN Security Council voting

By permanent and non-permanent members, 2022

- **Veto**
- **Abstention**
- **Yes**

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Assembly convened on 2 March 2022, this resolution was adopted with an overwhelming majority of 141 against 5, with only Russia itself, Belarus, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Eritrea and Syria voting against. Despite the symbolic nature of General Assembly resolutions, the vote still demonstrated – in the words of the EU Ambassador to the UN, Olof Skoog – Russia's isolation from the rest of the international community. In his eyes, ‘the world ha[d] spoken’ and ‘this [was] not just about Ukraine’ but about ‘defending an international order based on rules we [UN member countries] had all signed up to’ (16).

Out of 52 UNSCRs in 2022, 35 were adopted unanimously, most of which were dedicated to extensions of existing UN mission mandates. With regard to the remaining 17, Russia vetoed the one on Ukraine discussed above and abstained 11 times, making it the Security Council member that abstained from the most resolutions in 2022. It was closely followed by China, which abstained a total of nine times. UNSCRs which both Russia and China abstained from included, for instance, the ones on the extension of UN mission mandates in South Sudan and Iraq, the renewal of the arms embargo against the Democratic Republic of Congo, the renewal of measures against the Central African Republic, or on ending all forms of violence in Myanmar.

While sometimes in different constellations, the three African members of the Security Council, Gabon, Ghana and Kenya, tended to coordinate their abstentions, often from resolutions directly related to political dynamics and conflicts on their continent. Accordingly, all three abstained from the resolutions on Congo as well as on the extension of the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). Gabon and Kenya jointly abstained from the one on South Sudan, and Gabon and Ghana did the same with the one on the Central African Republic. The two EU Member State representatives, France and Ireland, only abstained from one resolution, respectively. For Ireland, this was the one on the extension of

sanctions against Yemen, and for France, it was one on a six-month renewal of cross-border aid operations into Syria, from which two other permanent members, the United Kingdom and United States, abstained as well given the renewal’s very short timeframe and requirement of an additional resolution to be passed a couple of months later\(^{(17)}\).

Very much in sync with statements and activities by EU officials, such as the HR/VP, but more explicitly, the European Parliament also made statements on a number of international issues in 2022. In its annual report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), adopted first by the foreign affairs committee (AFET) on 30 November 2022 and then as a resolution in the plenary on 18 January 2023, the Parliament again condemned Russia’s unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine in the strongest terms\(^{(18)}\). The implementation report stresses the war’s numerous first and second-order effects, including global economic uncertainty, soaring energy prices, an exacerbated climate crisis and general destabilisation not only within Member States, but particularly in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries. Framing the Russian aggression as a wake-up call for the EU, the Parliament called for ‘stronger, more ambitious, credible, strategic and unified’ actions of the Union on the world stage. This so-called ‘geopolitical redefinition’ would include the creation of a genuine military and defence union based on (i) adapted institutional and decision-making arrangements through the use of the passerelle clauses and a switch to qualified majority voting in the CFSP; (ii) operationalised strategic autonomy and solidarity through a full implementation of the Versailles Declaration and the Strategic Compass as well as strengthened defence capabilities and cooperation with NATO; (iii) reinforced multilateralism through the strengthening of existing and building of new partnerships, and (iv) enhanced parliamentary diplomacy\(^{(19)}\).


\(^{(19)}\) Ibid.
Travels of the High Representative in 2022

The emphasis on the need for the EU to reinforce multilateralism and partnerships, which can be found in both the European Parliament’s 2022 annual report on the implementation of the CFSP and even more explicitly, in the chapter dedicated to partnerships in the Strategic Compass (20), has also been reflected in the travels HR/VP Borrell undertook in 2022. During the year, the HR/VP travelled to some 30 different countries (21). The bilateral and minilateral meetings he held around the world not only underline the EU’s goal to strengthen ties with its global partners given the many challenges but also worldwide opportunities for cooperation.

Given their immediate exposure to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the Eastern Partnership countries like Moldova and countries in the Western Balkans, including the EU candidate countries North Macedonia and Albania, received the special attention of the HR/VP in 2022 and were prioritised in the EU’s external action. In early January, HR/VP Borrell visited the original line of contact between Ukrainian and pro-Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine, reaffirming the EU’s full support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (22). Three months later, and after the Russian full-scale invasion had begun, the HR/VP, this time together with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, again

In early January, HR/VP Borrell visited the original line of contact between Ukrainian and pro-Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine.


travelled to Kyiv to meet with President Zelenskyy and discuss further EU assistance measures to Ukraine (23). In the meantime, the HR/VP had already travelled to Moldova in March to underscore the Union’s solidarity with the country, given its proximity to the war in Ukraine (24). Shortly thereafter, the HR/VP also visited North Macedonia and Albania, respectively reviewing the EU’s bilateral relations with the two countries under their Stabilisation and Association Agreements, where he also met with the Commander of EUFOR Althea, Major General Wessely, in Bosnia–Herzegovina (25).

For the EU–Western Balkans Summit, the HR/VP would again travel to the Albanian capital at the end of the year (26).

Another region that was visited by the HR/VP in 2022 was East Africa. To deepen bilateral ties and launch dialogues on global challenges, including the state of the multilateral order, the food and energy crises, HR/VP Borrell travelled to Kenya and Mozambique twice during the year, first in January and then again in September (27). In September, he also visited Ethiopia and Somalia and paid a visit to the flagship of the EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta right off the coast of the Horn of Africa in the Western Indian Ocean (28). Efforts to enhance existing and build new partnerships in the Middle East were reflected in the HR/VP’s visit to Qatar for the 2022 Doha Forum.

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which focused on the topic of ‘Rethinking Global Cooperation’; to Kuwait for meetings with the crown prince, prime minister and foreign minister; to Iran for meetings with the minister for foreign affairs as part of the efforts to bring the JCPOA back to full implementation; to the UAE for bilateral meetings and to attend the Sir Bani Yas Forum; as well as to the southern neighbourhood partner Jordan, where the HR/VP, alongside Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi, participated in the 14th EU–Jordan Association Council, which adopted new EU–Jordan Partnership Priorities until 2027.

A region that also stands out with two separate visits encompassing four different countries in 2022 is Latin America. While Latin America has at times been perceived by some as ‘neglected’ in the EU’s external action in the past, HR/VP Borrell travelled to Chile and Panama in the beginning of May 2022, and then visited Uruguay – for the first time – as well as Argentina at the end of October. All four visits allowed the HR/VP to contribute to the upgrading of...
The HR/VP’s travels

2022

Data: European External Action Service, 2022
existing bilateral agreements, such as the EU’s Association Agreement with Chile, to hold discussions on agreements that have not yet entered into force, such as the Mercosur Trade Agreement, as well as to attend regional high-level meetings like the Special Joint Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Central American Integration System (SICA) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) or the EU-CELAC ministerial meeting, which, according to its final joint communiqué, ‘marked the resumption of a bi-regional dialogue based on a forward-looking, substantive and positive agenda’ (36). At these meetings, the Global Gateway initiative was featured prominently. With EU institutions and Member States committed to mobilising up to €300 billion of investments for sustainable and high-quality projects, the Global Gateway can be a key tool for the EU to enhance its partnerships in Latin America by boosting ‘smart, clean, and secure links in digital, energy and transport sectors and strengthen health, education and research systems’ (37).

A region where Global Gateway projects are increasingly being developed and implemented is Central Asia. Accordingly, in November 2022, the HR/VP co-hosted the EU–Central Asia Connectivity Conference for Sustainable Development in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, where he also announced the launch of two Global Gateway flagship initiatives on water, energy and climate, and on digital connectivity (38). Prior to that conference, the High Representative met with the Kazakh President and Foreign Minister in Astana, Kazakhstan (39).

The Global Gateway can be a key tool for the EU to enhance its partnerships in Latin America.
Amidst these visits to further develop EU partnerships around the world, the HR/VP’s trips to meetings and conferences with and in Member States and with established strategic partners should not be neglected. In February alone, the High Representative held a bilateral meeting with the United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Washington D.C., participated in the 2022 Munich Security Conference as well as in the Ministerial Forum for Cooperation in the Indo–Pacific in Paris (40). Some of his additional meetings included the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in the south of Germany, the G20 Summit in Bali, various forums of the 77th Session of the UN General Assembly in New York, and the ninth edition of the Berlin Summit, as well as the annual OSCE Ministerial Council in Lodz, Poland, where he also visited the EU Military Assistance Mission for Ukraine (41).


The European Political Community

In 2022, the EU made considerable efforts to strengthen and expand its circle of partners around the world, but during the year the Union’s leaders also looked closer to home. When speaking to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 9 May, French President Macron called for the establishment of a ‘European Political Community’ (EPC), an intergovernmental grouping distinct from the EU, to encourage dialogue and cooperation across the European continent. Some five months later, the EPC came into existence. On 6 October 2022, heads of state and government from the 27 EU Member States, 17 non-EU countries, including Türkiye, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, as well as the presidents of the European Commission and the European Council came together in Prague for a first meeting of this new grouping. The leaders confirmed that the EPC would not replace any existing organisation, structure or process, but aims to serve as a platform for political coordination where dialogue and cooperation on matters of common interest are fostered and security, stability and prosperity can be strengthened. At their first meeting on 6 October – directly ahead of an informal meeting of the EU’s 27 heads of state and government – this new group of 44 focused their discussions on Russia’s war in Ukraine and the emerging energy crisis. Their next meetings are set to take place in Moldova in 2023, followed by meetings in Spain, and then in the United Kingdom. The exact added value of the EPC and potential deliverables remains to be seen, but as European Council President Charles Michel stated, ‘at a time when Europe’s


stability and security is being threatened, we need more dialogue, more listening, more mutual understanding, not less’ and this can be an added value in and of itself(44).

The eastern neighbourhood

Eastern Partnership

The Eastern Partnership is the specific Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which, in turn, governs the EU’s relations with 16 of its closest eastern and southern neighbours. With the objective to strengthen the EU’s political and economic relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the Eastern Partnership was launched in 2009(45). As stipulated by the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy, it sets out to increase the stability, prosperity and resilience of the Union’s eastern neighbours. Notably, in reaction to the brutal crackdown on protesters following the 2020 Belarusian presidential elections, the EU has progressively imposed restrictive measures on Minsk, which, as of June 2021, suspended its participation in the Eastern Partnership(46). Throughout the 13 years of its existence, however, the Eastern Partnership policy and the EU’s engagement in the region, overall, have often been criticised for their alleged ‘one-size–fits–all’ characteristics. In response, multiple reform agendas with

(44) Ibid.
concrete deliverables have been adopted, with the most recent one outlined in the Council Conclusions on Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020 from May 2020 (47), and a Joint Staff Working Document from July 2021 entitled ‘Recovery, resilience and reform: post-2020 Eastern Partnership priorities’ (48).

As a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Eastern Partnership experienced significant changes in 2022 and arguably became even less homogeneous than before. What remains true for the region is its acute vulnerability to Russia’s military, economic and energy dominance. With a war on their doorstep in Ukraine and Russia’s ability to create an energy crisis from one day to another as happened in Moldova in 2021, Eastern Partnership leaders are facing a balancing act between implementing the domestic reforms demanded by the EU to generate closer integration on the one hand, while managing Russian pressure on the other (49). Countries differ in terms of towards which side they gravitate in their political decision-making, however. War-torn Ukraine and neighbouring Moldova have made their decision, and accordingly, on 23 June, the EU’s heads of state and government granted the two countries EU candidate status (50). Their paths toward fulfilling the conditions of membership might still be long, but their commitment to EU integration is clear.

The Eastern Partnership region is acutely vulnerable to Russia’s military, economic and energy dominance.
As part of the same European Council conclusions from 23 June 2022, EU leaders also showed themselves ‘ready to grant candidate status to Georgia’, but only once the 12 priorities the Commission had identified in its Opinion submitted prior to the European Council Summit have been fulfilled (51). Those priorities include that the Georgian government addresses the issue of its internal political polarisation, implements a transparent and effective judicial reform strategy, engages in ‘de–oligarchisation’ as well as in several other reforms deemed necessary for its alignment with EU values and rules. However, there seems to be a ‘dissonance between Georgian foreign policy and public opinion’, hampering Georgia’s progress towards EU integration (52). Nevertheless, EU and Georgian representatives convened in Brussels in September 2022 for the 7th EU–Georgia Association Council, which resulted in the adoption of a revised EU–Georgia Association Agenda for the period 2021 to 2027. The revised agenda outlines a newly agreed set of priorities, including on trade and the joint commitment to improving the lives of Georgian citizens (53).

Also balancing between EU priorities and Russian pressure, while simultaneously facing their own decades-old border conflict, are Armenia and Azerbaijan. Following renewed Azerbaijani attacks on several Armenian cities and occupation of territories along the border in September 2022, European Council President Michel and French President Macron met with the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, and the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, in the margins of the first meeting of the European Political Community on 6

(51) Ibid.
October \(^{(54)}\). The quadrilateral meeting resulted in the agreement on the deployment of an EU civilian mission alongside the Armenia–Azerbaijan–border. Some two weeks later, on 17 October, the Council approved the mission. Only three days later, on 20 October, the EU Monitoring Capacity in Armenia (EUMCAP) became operational when 40 experts were sent from the existing EU mission in Georgia to the Armenian side of the international border to monitor, analyse, and report on the situation in the region. Their overarching objectives were to facilitate the restoration of peace and security in the border area, build confidence between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and fix the boundaries between the two states’ international border \(^{(55)}\).

At the end of the year, the EU’s commitment to its Eastern Partnership policies was reaffirmed in the context of a meeting between the 27 EU foreign ministers and their counterparts from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in Brussels. The foreign ministers agreed on the need to make the Eastern Partnership more flexible and better tailored to the individual needs of each of the five active members. To ensure their security, resilience and stability considering Russia’s ongoing aggression, the EU confirmed its continuous support through various types of cooperation and engagement, including on cyber, hybrid and non-military means \(^{(56)}\). Furthermore, the Union’s ministers also expressed interest in exploring opportunities to invite partners from neighbouring regions, such as Central Asia, to Eastern Partnership meetings, and discuss a joint approach towards improving regional connectivity.


Türkiye and the Western Balkans

Türkiye

Of all the currently eight EU candidate countries, Türkiye has held the status for the longest, since 1999 (57). After the EU’s General Affairs Council effectively paused accession talks in June 2018, Türkiye’s AKP-led government has only continued to further distance itself from fulfilling the Union’s accession eligibility rules, i.e., the so-called Copenhagen Criteria stipulating that candidate countries have institutions that guarantee democracy, the

rule of law and human rights as well as a well-functioning market economy\(^{(58)}\). While a survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund in March 2022 indicated that the Turkish population holds favourable views of both the EU as Türkiye’s closest partner and their country’s EU accession, official EU–Türkiye relations remain effectively at an impasse \(^{(59)}\). According to the 2022 Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Türkiye falls into the category of a ‘moderate autocracy’ \(^{(60)}\).

The European Commission’s yearly country report in 2022 reflects Türkiye’s democratic backsliding. Deficiencies in the country’s democratic institutions, ranging from structural deficits in the presidential system to a parliament without any means to hold the government accountable and a general absence of checks and balances, translate into a continuous disregard of recommendations from the Council of Europe or rulings from the European Court of Human Rights \(^{(61)}\). Economic vulnerability remained high with inflation reaching over 85 % in October 2022.

Turkish foreign policy was also confrontational, often at odds with EU CFSP priorities \(^{(62)}\). The Commission’s 2022 country report on Türkiye of October 2022 pointed towards a very low alignment rate of only 7 % between Turkish and EU foreign policy \(^{(63)}\). This stemmed, among other factors, from Ankara’s unilateral military activities in Syria and Iraq, which intensified throughout 2022. These were framed as anti-terror operations:

\[\text{Turkish foreign policy was also confrontational, often at odds with EU CFSP priorities.}\]

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\(^{(63)}\) European Commission, ‘Key findings of the 2022 Report on Türkiye’, op.cit.
Türkiye’s military has been targeting militants considered to be part of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) but whose affiliations are often not clearly identifiable. In reaction to a street bombing in Istanbul in November 2022, which killed six people and left over 80 wounded, Ankara immediately blamed Kurdish militants and relaunched airstrikes across north and northeast Syria targeting densely populated Kurdish areas (64).

Another source of concern in EU–Türkiye relations in 2022 was Ankara’s continued engagement with Moscow. While Türkiye condemned the Russian aggression against Ukraine, and invoked Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, banning Russian and Ukrainian warships from transiting the Turkish Straits unless they are returning to their homeports, it refused to align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia (65). This lack of alignment allows for loopholes and weakens the EU’s sanctions packages, but, at the same time, also allowed Türkiye to act, to some extent, as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine. Most importantly, it facilitated the conclusion of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, often referred to as the ‘Grain Deal’, which enables the continuation of commercial food and fertiliser exports from three Ukrainian seaports in the Black Sea (66). Thanks to Türkiye’s and the UN’s involvement in the difficult negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, the fragile deal eased the global food crisis that had been expected following the blockade of Ukrainian ports by the Russian Navy at the inception of the war. Notably, Ankara’s mediation efforts are very much in line with the preferences expressed by 43.7 % of respondents in the survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund in March 2022 mentioned above. Besides those 43.7 % who advocated for Türkiye playing the role of a mediator in the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, 40 % favoured a completely neutral role, whereas 8.5 %

would support their country if it took sides with Ukraine and only 4.4% with Russia (67).

Despite their lack of alignment on several foreign policy matters, EU and Turkish officials still tried to maintain regular dialogue on other topics. In March 2022, for the first time in three years, the EU–Türkiye Joint Parliamentary Committee convened in Brussels (68). This was followed by high-level dialogues on climate and agriculture, as well as a meeting of political directors in Ankara in May (69). As stated in the Council conclusions on ‘Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process’ from December 2022, Türkiye formally ‘remains a candidate country and a key partner in many areas of joint interest’ (70).

EUISS publications

Dimitar Bechev, ‘Sailing through the storm: Türkiye’s Black Sea strategy amidst the Russian–Ukrainian war’, Brief No 1, 6 February 2023 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/sailing-through-storm)


The Western Balkans continued to be of central interest to the EU in 2022. The objective of gradual rapprochement with the countries in the region through bilateral contractual relations, financial assistance, political dialogue, trade and regional cooperation remained. Formalised through the so-called Stabilisation and Association Process, the EU’s official engagement with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia reaches back to 1999. After the 2003 European Council in Thessaloniki had reaffirmed the potential of those six countries to obtain EU membership, all of them progressively submitted their applications\(^{(71)}\). Montenegro, which was granted candidate status in 2010 and entered accession negotiations in 2012, is one of the most advanced but only three of the 33 opened chapters have so far been provisionally closed. In contrast, Kosovo, whose future EU integration remains dependent on the normalisation of its relations with another long-time EU candidate country, Serbia, still only holds the status of ‘potential candidate country’\(^{(72)}\).

After a series of attempts and vetoes in previous years, accession negotiations with both Albania and North Macedonia were finally opened in July 2022\(^{(73)}\). This followed a vote in the North Macedonian Parliament on settling a long-standing dispute with neighbouring EU Member State Bulgaria. The dispute over the recognition of Bulgarian minorities in North Macedonia had long caused Sofia to block any advancements in the accession processes for both North Macedonia and Albania as they, upon a recommendation by the Commission, were treated as a ‘package’\(^{(74)}\). Following the final endorsement by the European Council of the launch of


\(^{(72)}\) Ibid.


accession negotiations, the Commission prepared proposals for the guidelines and principles that should govern those negotiations, based on which the 35 negotiating chapters of the *acquis communautaire* could be progressively opened (75).

The generally increased importance the EU gave to the Western Balkans and its enlargement policy in 2022 was demonstrated at the EU-Western Balkans Summit in December. For the first time, the Summit did not take place in Brussels, but in the region, in Tirana, Albania. EU leaders reaffirmed their ‘full and unequivocal commitment to the European Union membership perspective’ of the six Western Balkan countries (76). Shortly after, on 13 December, the Council of the EU not only approved new conclusions on the Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process, which re-iterate the concrete demands the EU poses towards each accession and candidate country to advance in their respective EU integration procedures, but also recommended to grant candidate country status to Bosnia and Herzegovina (77). At the same European Council Summit in June when Ukraine and Moldova had obtained candidate status, EU leaders had also reaffirmed their readiness to approve the status for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which led to a review of the reforms BiH had implemented by the Commission and eventually to the positive Council decision in December (78).

Also Kosovo submitted its EU membership application in 2022. While presenting the application in Prague to then holder of the EU Council presidency, the Czech Republic, in December, the prime minister of Kosovo emphasised that his country was not expecting

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any ‘back door’ or ‘fast-track’\(^{(79)}\). Given Kosovo’s still difficult status in international affairs, not being a member of the United Nations and remaining unrecognised by Serbia and five EU Member States (Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus), it will be a long process for Pristina\(^{(80)}\). Since the Kosovo war in 1998–1999 and particularly since Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia, relations between the two countries remain tense\(^{(81)}\). In 2022, throughout the summer and then again in December, controversies surrounding the mutual recognition of ID-cards and licence plates escalated into protests and roadblocks in the border region\(^{(82)}\), and later into Serbia’s placing of its border security forces in a ‘full state of combat readiness’\(^{(83)}\).

Without any significant progress, the EU has been trying to facilitate the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo since 2011. The overarching objective of the so-called ‘Belgrade–Pristina Dialogue’ is to negotiate a comprehensive legally binding normalisation agreement allowing both countries to progress on their respective paths towards European integration\(^{(84)}\). In reaction to the massively heightened tensions throughout the second half of 2022 and as the latest step in this long-standing formal dialogue process, the EU put forward a new proposal for engagement in September. Subsequently renamed ‘Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia’, both parties would agree to the proposal in February 2023, committing themselves to working

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out a roadmap towards an eventual, at least implicit recognition of each other’s statehood and mutual support of their respective EU membership aspirations (85). How long and cumbersome the negotiations surrounding the actual implementation of the new agreement will be, remains to be seen. In any case, the Western Balkans and EU enlargement in the region will remain on the EU’s agenda for many years to come.


The southern neighbourhood

North Africa, Middle East, and the Gulf Region

Like the Eastern Partnership, the EU’s engagement with its southern neighbourhood takes place within the formal framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The EU’s southern neighbourhood encompasses partnerships with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia, but bilateral cooperation with Syrian authorities has been suspended since 2011. Overshadowed by the war in Ukraine and events in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood in 2022, EU relations with the nine southern partners featured less prominently during the year. That the southern neighbourhood only came up as an agenda item for the last European Council Summit in December and without any adopted conclusions, shows the region’s less prominent role in EU external affairs in 2022.

Nevertheless, engagement on migration, food and energy security as well as digital infrastructure investments under the Global Gateway continued and should not be omitted. Especially after the adoption of the EU’s ‘New Agenda for the Mediterranean’ in April 2021, the newly launched Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), under which the

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EU aims to mobilise up to €7 billion for the implementation of an Economic and Investment Plan for the region, began to be used\(^{(88)}\). At a plenary debate of the European Parliament in September, the European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Olivér Várhelyi, stated that the Economic and Investment Plan was ‘well underway’\(^{(89)}\). Some examples included a trilateral energy agreement with Egypt and Israel, which, among other goals, aims to expand liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments from Israel via Egypt to the EU, cooperation with the European Investment Bank (EIB) to finance the development of a high-speed fibre-optic submarine cable connection under the Mediterranean, as well as larger infrastructure projects like waste and desalination programmes in Jordan. Furthermore, at the margins of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Sharm el-Sheikh in November, the European Commission, represented by Executive Vice-President Timmermans and Commissioner Simson, and Egypt’s Ministers for Petroleum and Electricity and Renewable Energy, respectively, signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a strategic partnership on renewable hydrogen\(^{(90)}\). This partnership will contribute to the EU’s ambition of achieving 20 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen consumption in 2030 and accelerate Egypt’s energy transition. This project also aligns with one of the new EU–Egypt partnership priorities on ‘energy, environment and climate action’ that had been identified at the EU–Egypt Association Council in June\(^{(91)}\).

The EU is also cooperating with Egypt on stabilising the common neighbourhood, crisis management, and security and terrorism, as well as migration and mobility\(^{(92)}\). However, EU engagement on


\(^{(92)}\) Ibid.
these issues was not only with Egypt, but with Northern African and Middle Eastern countries throughout the region. In February 2022, the European Commission announced that its humanitarian funding for North Africa for the year would amount to €18 million (93). Specifically, half of the sum would be provided to Algeria to help meet the most urgent humanitarian needs, including access to food, nutrition, safe water and basic healthcare for the more than 173,000 vulnerable Sahrawi refugees who have been living in the Algerian desert for nearly 50 years following the armed conflict with the Polisario Front in 1975 (94). Egypt (€5 million) and Libya (€4 million) both received EU support in 2022 to address the basic humanitarian needs of vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers stranded on the outskirts of urban centres (95).

Humanitarian aid does not address the root causes nor the challenges of irregular migration. However, in November 2022 the European Commission proposed an Action Plan on the Central Mediterranean with 20 measures designed to reduce irregular and unsafe migration. Focused around three pillars, the Action Plan aims to strengthen the capacities of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia to ensure better border and overall migration management, and a more coordinated approach to search and rescue. Alongside the overarching framework of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, which the EU already proposed in 2020, this new Action Plan remained under

In April, the Commission presented an initiative for a regional ‘Food and Resilience Facility’ worth €225 million.

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discussion among Member States in the Justice and Home Affairs Council at the end of 2022 (96).

Besides reinforcing its partnerships with Northern African countries on infrastructure investments and humanitarian support, much of the EU’s efforts in the region in 2022 focused on mitigating the second-order effects of the Russian war in Ukraine on food and energy security. Many of the southern neighbourhood partners, including Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco and Palestine, are structurally dependent on the imports of cereals and fertilisers, the majority of which have been exported from Ukraine and/or Russia. In response to the suddenly disrupted supply chains and overall scarcity of supply – especially before the conclusion of the ‘Black Sea Grain Initiative’ facilitated by the UN and Türkiye – in April, the Commission presented an initiative for a regional ‘Food and Resilience Facility’ worth €225 million (97). Also funded through the NDICI–Global Europe instrument, the Facility aimed at responding to commodity shortages and balance of payment stabilisation emergencies in the short term, while also helping to sustain local agricultural systems and more climate-relevant practices in the medium term. Accordingly, when Commission President von der Leyen visited Israel, Jordan and Egypt in June 2022, her bilateral meetings with President Herzog of Israel, King Abdullah II of Jordan and President Al-Sisi of Egypt also focused on the challenges of food security, energy security, and on a just and green energy transition (98).

While not formally taking place within the framework of the Southern Neighbourhood Policy, the EU also had important interactions with countries in the Persian Gulf in 2022. In June, Member States agreed on building a strategic partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its member states Saudi Arabia,


Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Oman. The respective Council conclusions consider a ‘stable, secure, green and prosperous Gulf region’ a ‘shared strategic priority and fundamental interest for both the EU and its Gulf partners’ (99). Accordingly, the new partnership focuses on a wide range of policy fields, including climate change and green transition as well as global humanitarian and development needs (100).

In contrast, EU relations with Iran went from initially high hopes in early 2022 for a revived or renegotiated Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in the ‘Vienna talks’ to an impasse in August (101). Moreover, in reaction to both the brutal human rights violations surrounding the death of the 22 year-old Iranian woman Mahsa Amini and the subsequent crackdown on protesters (102), as well as the delivery of drones to Russia for its war against Ukraine (103), the EU imposed a series of new sanctions packages on Iran. Accordingly, EU relations with Iran reached their lowest point in years and are unlikely to improve any time soon.

In 2022, the EU also continued to closely follow the stalemate in the political situation in Yemen. The Union expressed its extreme concern about the catastrophic humanitarian situation in the country, where over 70% of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance. Over the past year, the EU’s engagement with Yemen has both broadened and deepened. The EU and its institutions were key actors in the international support for UN peace efforts, as well

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(101) Davenport, K., ‘Iran’s nuclear program is advancing. So too should negotiations’, Atlantic Council, 2 March 2023 (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/irans-nuclear-program-is-advancing-so-too-should-negotiations/).


as in humanitarian affairs. This included the close coordination between the UN Special Envoy, EU institutions and the EU Member States. In particular, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen, and gave its full support to the UN peace efforts and United Nations Special Envoy (UNSE) Hans Grundberg in his mediation efforts. The EU also urged the Houthis to abandon their maximalist positions and engage constructively with UNSE Grundberg.  

EUISS publications

Dalia Ghanem, ‘The summit of Arab States: Merely a forum for collective legitimisation?’, Brief No 14, 1 December 2022 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/summit-arab-states)

Dalia Ghanem, ‘Footprints in the sand: China’s and India’s low-key but growing presence in the Maghreb’, Brief No 4, 15 March 2023 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/footprints-sand)

Sub-Saharan Africa

In February 2022, heads of state and government of the EU Member States and the African Union convened in Brussels for the 6th EU-AU Summit. It was for the first time since 2017. At the summit, the leaders agreed on a ‘joint vision for a renewed partnership’. This new ‘Joint Vision for 2030’ should have significant implications for this very large and diverse region. Under the title ‘Two Unions, a joint vision’, the commitments involve renewed and deepened cooperation on development, peace and security, an enhanced and reciprocal partnership for migration and mobility and multilateralism and the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package of


€150 billion. An additional ‘immediate challenge’ on which the two Unions aim to focus their efforts is the fair and equitable access to vaccines, which is why EU leaders also committed themselves to providing 450 million vaccine doses to Africa by mid-2022 (106).

In November 2022, the Commissions of the AU and EU reconvened to take stock of the implementation of the objectives defined nine months earlier. Noting the adverse effects Russia’s war in Ukraine had on both Union’s economies throughout 2022 and expressing deep concern about the state of global food and energy security, the two Commissions agreed on enhancing their efforts to ‘identify, facilitate and support strategic, transformative and innovative programmes’ (107). Under the Global Gateway Africa–Investment Package, many such programmes were already underway, such as the launch of a €750 million infrastructure investment package in the areas of transport, digitalisation and energy connectivity. The two Commissions also welcomed the progress in the operationalisation of the African Medicine Agency and its immediate contributions to increasing African autonomy in the production of medicines and vaccines, as well as the EU’s additional mobilisation of €570 million in support of food security across Africa. The establishment of a high-level dialogue on economic integration, a joint initiative on detecting and mitigating the effects of climate change, EU investments in countering Africa’s energy challenge, as well as their partnership in the field of peace, security and governance, are of paramount importance. The EU’s €600 million assistance measure to support CSDP missions and operations in Africa under the EPF were on this Commission–to–Commission meeting agenda as well (108).

The €600 million assistance measure under the EPF adopted by the Council in April 2022 was a concrete sign of the EU’s commitment to strengthening peace and security across the African continent. It was also reflected in the six military and four civilian CSDP


(108) Ibid.
missions conducted in the region in 2022. In addition to the long-established military training and civilian capacity-building missions in countries like Somalia, Mozambique and the Central African Republic, in December the EU launched a new military partnership mission (EUMPM) in Niger. In close coordination with the civilian mission EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUMPM Niger aims to enhance the military capacity of the Nigerien Armed forces in support of Niger’s fight against terrorist armed groups. For this, the Council agreed on a reference amount for the common costs of €27,300,000.

According to the 2022 Global Peace Index by the Institute for Economics and Peace, five of the ten least peaceful countries globally were in sub-Saharan Africa, including the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. The Institute’s Global Terrorism Index ranked Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia among the top ten countries worldwide most impacted by terrorism. These findings are also consistent with the 2022 mid-year report on the Sahel by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which assessed 2022 to ‘be on track’ to become the deadliest year for both Burkina Faso and Mali since the outbreak of the Sahel crisis over a decade ago. The report further found that violence against civilians involving state forces had reached its highest level since a major spike in early 2020. The activities of Malian and Burkinabe state forces, Russian Wagner Group mercenaries, on the one hand, and jihadist militant groups such as the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) and the al Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat

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The southern neighbourhood

al–Islam wal–Muslimin (JNIM), on the other hand, were considered responsible for this extreme scale of atrocities against civilians (111).

An example of the region’s instability, Burkina Faso alone experienced two coup d’états in 2022, one in January leading to the appointment of Paul–Henri Sandaogo Damiba as interim president and one in September removing him from his position. In a speech to the European Parliament in October, HR/VP Borrell called this ‘coup in the coup’ particularly regrettable, given the strong mediation support the EU has been providing to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The HR/VP also remarked that the Union needed some time to assess whether its partnership with the new authorities in Burkina Faso could continue (112). Even more detrimentally, closer relations between Mali’s ruling military junta and Russian Wagner mercenaries over the past two years caused France, Germany and allied EU Member States to progressively wind down their security operations in Mali in 2022. In February, France announced its intention to withdraw its forces over a period of ten months. Two months later, HR/VP Borrell declared the EU’s military training mission EUTM Mali suspended, and the German government aims to withdraw its forces deployed to both EUTM Mali and UN’s peacekeeping mission MINUSMA by May 2024 (113). What the concrete impact of these wide-ranging withdrawals will be and how the security situation in the Western African country will develop remains to be seen but considering atrocities like the killing of more than 300 civilians by Malian and Wagner forces in Moura at the end of March 2022, hopes

In the Horn of Africa, developments at the end of 2022 allowed for a possibly more positive outlook for 2023.


for stability and security in the country and the region are very low (114).

In the Horn of Africa, developments at the end of 2022 allowed for a possibly more positive outlook for 2023. After two years of intense fighting in the Tigrayan region in northern Ethiopia, in November, the Ethiopian government and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front signed a peace agreement. Following the announcement of the November peace deal, HR/VP Borrell reaffirmed the EU’s readiness to support the peace efforts, while also remarking that any future EU cooperation with Ethiopia would depend on that peace deal’s implementation. To put an end to the conflict that had caused thousands of deaths and a serious aggravation of the country’s humanitarian situation, preceding negotiations had been facilitated by the AU’s High Representative for the Horn of Africa and observed by the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the United Nations, and the United States. Yet the implementation of the peace agreement proved challenging. Lifting the blockades on energy, communications, and even on the delivery of urgently needed humanitarian aid that had been put in place by the Ethiopian government during the conflict took a long time, and to a certain extent, abuse and killing still continued (115).

EUISS publications


Ben Leyka, ‘The future of African food security: Becoming the world’s breadbasket – or not’, Brief No 12, 18 November 2022 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/future-african-food-security)


In August 2021, the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan collapsed following the withdrawal of international troops. The hopes that the Taliban would moderate the policies they had previously imposed would however prove illusory in 2022. The ban on teenage girls attending school and the imposition of numerous rules and laws excluding Afghan women from all aspects of social, economic and political life showed the true intentions of the Taliban.

While the EU strongly rejects the policies of the Taliban, the Union in 2022 continued to support the development of a stable, peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan through its engagement and assistance for the humanitarian and basic needs of the Afghan people, inside and outside Afghanistan. The EU reiterated during the year that the Taliban must adhere to the international treaties to which Afghanistan is a State Party, including by upholding and protecting economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, and allow for full, equal and meaningful representation and participation of all Afghans in the governing of the country. The EU particularly emphasised its concern over the rights of Afghan women and girls who have had their freedom and access to basic services such as education systematically denied. The EU also made clear that Afghanistan must not pose a security threat to any country as reflected in the UN Security Council Resolution 2593(117).

EUISS publications


Viola Fee Dreikhausen & Florence Gaub, ‘Taliban in or Out? Afghanistan in 2025’, Brief No 5, 5 April 2022 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/taliban-or-out)

Central Asia

Bordering Russia in the north and China in the east, Central Asia has often been exposed to regional power dynamics. In 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine added a new dimension to these dynamics. While the EU has maintained diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan since 1992, it took some time for the Union to develop deeper relations with the region. However, since the adoption of the ‘The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership’ strategy in 2019 several so-called ‘Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements’ have been concluded. Meanwhile, except for Kazakhstan, the Central Asian countries are increasingly indebted to China, and Russia continues to keep its labour market open to economic migrants from the region, serving as a critical source of poverty alleviation in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

In early 2022, President Tokayev of Kazakhstan urgently requested the deployment of a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan. This was thought to be the beginning of renewed Russian-dominated security cooperation in the region, but then quite the opposite unfolded. Given the significantly altered geopolitical situation since the war in Ukraine, Central Asian leaders have expanded their foreign policy options, including with the EU (118). European Council President Charles Michel met with Central Asian heads of state and government in October 2022 (119), and HR/VP Borrell visited Kazakhstan and the EU-Central Asia Connectivity Conference for Sustainable Development in Uzbekistan.

Russian and Chinese influence in the region need to be kept in mind when analysing future EU–Central Asian relations.


in November\(^{(120)}\). These visits showed the intensified dialogue between the EU and Central Asia in 2022, particularly on issues such as resilience and regional cooperation on digital connectivity and environmental protection\(^{(121)}\). However, Russian and Chinese influence in the region as well as regularly recurring tensions between the five Central Asian countries, such as between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in September, need to be kept in mind when analysing future EU–Central Asian relations.

### China

In 2022, the security challenges posed by China continued to be an increasing issue of concern for Europe. Ranging from economic, through cyber and hybrid to more traditional threats – in the context of potential military action against Taiwan – these challenges exist in multiple domains\(^{(122)}\). Indeed, while the European Commission’s 2019 ‘Strategic Outlook’ with its framing of China as partner, economic competitor and systemic rival remains the principal guiding framework for EU engagement with China, the third dimension of the ‘systemic rival’ has proved to be more dominant in recent years. Beijing’s engagement in economic coercion, cyber and hybrid attacks, as well as its ostentatious display and continued build-up of military capabilities, especially \textit{vis-à-vis} Taiwan, have led to a marked shift in attitudes in Brussels and Member States’ capitals\(^{(123)}\). China’s ‘no-limits partnership’ with Russia, underlined by

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\(^{(123)}\) Ibid.
the joint declaration of President Xi and President Putin released only a few weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which China has continued to refuse to condemn ever since, further amplified the EU’s concerns (124). Those concerns were clearly expressed in the EU’s Strategic Compass published in March 2022, and translated into rather frosty interactions at the virtual EU–China Summit in April, which ended without any joint declaration and was described by HR/VP Borrell as a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ (125).

In October, the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party signalled a further consolidation of power by the CCP’s General Secretary Xi Jinping, who a few months later would secure an unprecedented third term as President of China (126). By dominating the selection of members of the new Politburo Standing Committee, Xi ensured that he would continue to be surrounded by loyalists and able to further tighten party control (127).

Despite a basic consensus in Europe on the growing challenges in the relationship with China, Member States diverge on the question of how to act. Many of them are also working on their own national strategies vis-à-vis China (128). In 2021, the European Parliament tried to accelerate inter-institutional debates on a new EU strategy on China by setting out its own vision (129). Events throughout 2022, including Beijing’s stance on the Russian war in Ukraine, have added an even greater urgency to these debates. In May 2023, HR/VP Borrell seized the occasion of the informal meeting of foreign affairs

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ministers in Stockholm to present a paper on how to ‘recalibrate’ the EU’s China policy (130). How his paper and suggestions will be taken up and carried forward by Member States in the Council remains to be seen, but at least with German Chancellor Scholz and also European Council President Michel visiting Beijing at the end of 2022, and with French President Macron and European Commission President von der Leyen doing likewise in April 2023, there seems to be an interest in keeping direct communication channels open (131).

EUISS publications

Alice Ekman, ‘China’s Global Security Initiative: When the process matters more than the content’, Brief No 5, 22 March 2023 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/chinas-global-security-initiative)

Dalia Ghanem, ‘Footprints in the sand: China’s and India’s low-key but growing presence in the Maghreb’, Brief No 4, 15 March 2023 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/footprints-sand)

Sophie Wintgens, ‘China’s footprint in Latin America: Recent developments and challenges ahead’, Brief No 9, 15 September 2022 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/chinas-footprint-latin-america)


Indo-Pacific

Exposed to China’s increasing foreign policy assertiveness described above, the Indo-Pacific is an area both fraught with geopolitical tensions and of growing importance for the EU. The region


is described by some analysts as becoming ‘the centre of gravity of global military competition, economic growth, and technological innovation’ (132). With 40% of the EU’s foreign trade passing through the South China Sea, stability in the Indo-Pacific is a clearly shared concern. Accordingly, in February 2022, the EU published its first-ever Indo-Pacific strategy. It is a ‘strategy for cooperation’ that, alongside its Global Gateway investment projects, aims to support EU efforts to contribute to the region’s stability, security, prosperity and sustainable development. The strategy includes seven priority areas for enhanced cooperation, ranging from secure, sustainable and diversified trade to climate change mitigation to digitisation to security and defence with regard to sea lines of communication and capacity-building (133).

Besides the economic, technological and military pressures China is exercising in the region, especially vis-à-vis Taiwan where tensions escalated during the visit of then-Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi in the summer of 2022, there are several other concerns and considerations that are driving the EU’s increased focus on the Indo-Pacific. Opportunities are clearly arising from the Union’s strategic partnership with Japan, which had been highlighted in their 2019 Strategic Partnership Agreement and have intensified over the past few years. At the 28th EU–Japan Summit in Tokyo in May 2022, European Council President Michel described Japan as the EU’s ‘closest strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific’, while further emphasising that Russia’s war against Ukraine has made deeper cooperation ‘a vital necessity’ and not just ‘a luxury’ (134). Accordingly, EU and Japanese leaders agreed on continuing their coordinated


political, financial, material and humanitarian support to Ukraine, while further expanding their overall cooperation on security and defence, from cyber and hybrid threats to maritime security and crisis management. Going forward, this expanded security partnership could be particularly fruitful, considering Japan’s ambitions to counter threats from China and North Korea by increasing its defence expenditure from currently 1 % to 2 % of its GDP by 2027\(^{(135)}\).

Discussions at the EU–Japan Summit also centred on North Korea’s continued unlawful testing of ballistic missiles as well as confrontations in the East and South China Seas, leading EU and Japanese leaders to reaffirm their shared objective of promoting a ‘free and open Indo–Pacific’. In addition to the EU–Japan Green Alliance, which was launched at the summit in 2021 to enhance cooperation on cleaner hydrogen, nuclear safety, renewable energy and carbon recycling, the leaders also launched a Digital Partnership in the areas of 5G and 6G technologies, safe and ethical artificial intelligence application, green data infrastructure, and the resilience of global semiconductor supply chains\(^{(136)}\).

Another strategic, yet less close partner for the EU in the region is India. Given its size, population, technological, economic and military capabilities, India provides a natural counterweight to China in the Indo–Pacific. While having avoided any confrontation with Beijing for a long time, in recent years New Delhi has become increasingly concerned about China’s strategic partnership with Pakistan as well as its deepening ties with India’s neighbours Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Despite its tradition of non-alignment, India has been increasingly engaged in consolidating bilateral and multilateral partnerships, especially with Japan, the United States and Australia within their Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the ‘Quad’.


In 2022, the EU and India marked 60 years of bilateral relations. With the EU being a leading foreign investor in India, trade and investment figures are arguably among the best indicators by which to measure the strength of this 60-year-old partnership. Since 2020, the EU and India have been ‘strategic partners’. At the 15th EU–India Summit, they adopted a roadmap to guide their joint action over the coming five years up to 2025, with foreign policy and security cooperation topping the agenda and expressing shared objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament, maritime security, counter-terrorism as well as overall strengthened military-to-military relations, such as between the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Atalanta and the Indian Navy. Fittingly, in June 2021, the EU and India held a successful joint naval exercise in the Gulf of Aden, which paved the way for further discussions on maritime domain awareness and capacity-building at the second EU–India maritime security dialogue that took place in February 2022. Judging from the wide range of areas in which the EU and India have expressed their interest in engaging in cooperation in their 2020 Roadmap, the partnership is multidimensional and holds a lot of potential.

Yet differences between the EU’s and India’s foreign policy objectives and priorities are real and have caused unease in Europe, particularly in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. To date, India has refused to condemn the Russian aggression, and has abstained from votes on related resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly and the Human Rights Council\(^\text{(137)}\). However, analysts have cautioned against interpreting these abstentions as indicating support or sympathy for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Not only is the Russian war in flagrant contradiction with India’s usually strong support for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity but it has also reinforced Sino-Russian ties at a time when Sino-Indian border disputes are still ongoing\(^\text{(138)}\). Despite its resulting discomfort with the war, India remains heavily dependent on imports of Russian arms and technology, and while India is


actively working on reducing these dependencies, its formal neutrality vis-à-vis the Russian aggression will, at least in the short-to-medium term, likely remain consistent with New Delhi’s foreign policy priorities.

Alongside the Indo-Pacific and the ‘Asian triangle’ of global powers formed by China, India and Japan, developments in the EU’s relations with other Indo-Pacific nations should also be mentioned. To celebrate 45 years of diplomatic relations, the EU hosted the first-ever EU-ASEAN Summit in Brussels in December 2022. Bringing together Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam as its Member States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations constitutes the EU’s third-largest trading partner, after the United States and China. In addition to enhancing their strong economic and trade cooperation, EU and ASEAN leaders seized the occasion of the Summit to identify further shared objectives in the areas of peace and security, ranging from countering transnational crime to maritime and cyber security, connectivity and digital transition, for which the EU announced the mobilisation of €10 billion to accelerate infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia under the Global Gateway, as well as climate change mitigation and sustainable development measures. The Summit was concluded with a joint statement, which stipulates that the long-standing EU-ASEAN relationship be upgraded to a strategic partnership. How this strategic partnership, including the many identified shared objectives, is going to translate into actions in this highly geostrategic region will be worth observing in the years to come.

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The year 2022 was characterised by an unprecedented united transatlantic response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine – a response that could build upon the close relationships the EU has long forged with the United States and Canada. The close coordination of sanctions against Russia, and the military and humanitarian support for Ukraine, underlined that the United States remains the EU’s most important partner with which mutually beneficial cooperation in security and defence must be deepened. EU cooperation with Canada in security and defence also remains important as their long-standing cooperation in this
domain demonstrates their joint commitment to peace and security, as framed in the Strategic Compass\(^{(141)}\).

The transatlantic relationship with the United States was described as ‘irreplaceable’ in the 2003 European Security Strategy and remains so today. In the 2022 Strategic Compass, the United States is also listed first among the EU’s bilateral partnerships. The EU and United States already have developed closer military-to-military cooperation, notably in Africa, and work closely together on non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as on cyber issues. But the 2021 EU–US Summit provided a strong impetus for more defence cooperation and the subsequent establishment of a dedicated dialogue on security and defence in 2022.

**The EU’s growing role in defence offers more opportunities for engaging the United States.**

The EU’s growing role in defence offers more opportunities for engaging the United States, as demonstrated by both the invitation to the US to join the PESCO Military Mobility project in 2021 and the strong coordination on weapons deliveries to Ukraine and sanctions in 2022. The negotiations of an Administrative Arrangement between the EDA and the US Department of Defense that were conducted in 2022 and concluded in early 2023 have provided a new framework to explore further opportunities, even if capability development and research & technology (R&T) activities remain outside the initial scope of cooperation. However, as almost all EU Member States have their own bilateral security and defence partnership agreements with the United States, it is important to identify the areas where Member States see a common need to discuss defence with the United States at the EU level. Here, protecting the global commons, and securing maritime routes, space assets and seabed infrastructure like undersea communication cables and energy pipelines could provide new areas for such EU–US security cooperation.

Canada, in turn, is a long-standing partner of the EU in security and defence. Based on a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA)

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signed in 2016, strategic dialogues on cybersecurity, development and counter-terrorism have been conducted. The first meeting of the EU–Canada Joint Ministerial Committee in December 2017 identified deeper security and defence cooperation as one of three top priorities. Like Norway, Canada has contributed troops to CSDP missions and operations and in 2021, Canada was invited to join the EU PESCO project on Military Mobility.

In 2022, EU and Canada discussed how to respond to the Russian invasion and its global ramifications on several occasions. The Canadian Foreign Minister participated twice in the EU Foreign Affairs Council (4 March and 16 May) together with the Ukrainian Foreign Minister and in March 2022, the European Commission and Canada launched the global fundraising campaign ‘Stand up for Ukraine’, which raised €9.1 billion for people fleeing the Russian invasion. Moreover, during the year, Canada has also been coordinating informally with the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine). Among other areas of cooperation, it can be mentioned that the EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) had been ratified as of December 2022 by 17 EU Member States.

EUISS publications

Jan Joel Andersson, ‘European defence partnerships: Stronger together’, Brief No 3, 2 March 2023 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/european-defence-partnerships)
Latin America and the Caribbean

In 2022, there was renewed European interest in the 33 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) (142). In July, the Spanish Foreign Minister, José Manuel Albares, argued that Latin America was by far the most ‘Europe-compatible’ region on the planet, HR/VP Borrell in turn declared that 2023 will be ‘the year for Latin America in Europe and of Europe in Latin America’. Notably, Spain is going to hold the EU Council Presidency in the second half of 2023, which is expected to open a window of opportunity for deeper EU–LAC relations (143). This interest stems from LAC countries’ political significance, including vis-à-vis the EU’s multilateral agenda at the United Nations, the economic opportunities generated by their rich endowment in raw materials and their consequent potential to contribute to green energy transitions in their own region as well as in Europe.

The High Representative visited Latin America twice in 2022, with a first trip to Chile and Panama in May and a second one to Uruguay and Argentina in October. At the end of his second visit, he co-chaired the 3rd Meeting of Foreign Ministers from the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) (144). Coming four years after their last meeting, both parties considered it to mark the ‘resumption of a bi-regional dialogue based on a forward-looking, substantive and positive agenda’ and hence ‘the beginning of a major overhaul of relations between the two regions’. The Foreign Ministers agreed to focus efforts on an inclusive, equitable and sustainable post-pandemic economic recovery, including by deepening cooperation on food security, energy, health, social

(142) The framework for the EU’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is the joint communication entitled ‘Joining forces for a common future’ from 2019.


(144) Ibid.
justice and a better integration of production systems and value chains. Discussions further centred around joint commitments to countering climate change and environmental mitigation, strengthening multilateralism and upholding shared values, including human rights and fundamental freedoms (145).

While these broad reaffirmations of shared interests mark a promising starting point to revive bi-regional relations, there are still challenges in terms of the compatibility between the EU’s and LAC countries’ foreign policy objectives and priorities. In attempts to characterise LAC countries’ strategic positioning especially towards conflicts between ‘West’ and ‘East’, i.e., between the United States and Europe on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other, analysts have framed the concept of ‘active non-alignment’. Active non-alignment implies the region’s refusal to take sides, while still taking a stance on certain international issues based on countries’ individual national interests (146). Brazil’s stance on the Russian war in Ukraine provides an example of this approach. President Lula da Silva’s narrow victory over former President Jair Bolsonaro in the October 2022 elections raised high hopes in Europe for closer foreign policy alignment, but Brazil positions itself as a strong advocate for peace negotiations, possibly even at the expense of Ukrainian territory (147). The Brazilian president continues to promote an official position of neutrality but has not shied away from openly criticising the United States and Europe for allegedly prolonging the war by supplying weapons to Ukraine (148).

However, each of the 33 countries considered to be part of the LAC region pursues complex foreign policy agendas, with some priorities clearly aligning with those of EU Member States and others


(147) Libardi, M., ‘Western reaction to Lula’s speech on Ukraine shows the Global South’s power’, openDemocracy, 20 April 2023 (https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/russia-ukraine-brazil-lula-global-south-neutrality/).

not at all. As in any other world region with which it engages, the EU will have to identify the priorities that are already or can possibly be aligned. Whether this might eventually include the joint ratification of the Mercosur trade agreement with Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay\(^{(149)}\), enhanced efforts to negotiate investment deals under the Global Gateway, a renewed focus on countering human rights violations and democratic backsliding in LAC countries, remains to be seen.

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**EUISS publications**

Sophie Wintgens, ‘China’s footprint in Latin America: Recent developments and challenges ahead’, *Brief* No 9, 15 September 2022 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/chinas-footprint-latin-america)


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ANNEX
## Statistical annex

### CSDP civilian missions
Personnel (as of 31 Dec 2022) and average annual budget of current mandate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSDP Civilian Mission</th>
<th>Seconded Personnel</th>
<th>Contracted Personnel</th>
<th>Average annual budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>€ million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contracted</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>international and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>local personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAM Ukraine</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUUMM Georgia</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Rafah</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAM Iraq</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAp Somalia</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAp Sahel Niger</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>EUBAM Libya</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAp Sahel Mali</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>77</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAM RCA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI, Multilateral Peace Operations Database, 2023; Council of Europe, 2023
# CSDP military missions and operations
Personnel totals as of 31 Dec 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission/Operation</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea (Bosnia Herzegovina)</td>
<td>906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR Atalanta (Horn of Africa/Somalia)</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM RCA (Central African Republic)</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR Med Irini</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Mozambique</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMAM Ukraine</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMPM Niger</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: SIPRI, Multilateral Peace Operations Database, 2023

# EEAS employees at EU delegations
2022

<table>
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<th>Position</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrators</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistants</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretaries/Clerks</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Agents</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Agents</td>
<td>1,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seconded National Experts</td>
<td>58</td>
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</table>

Source: European External Action Service, 2022
## PESCO projects

Number of PESCO projects by participating countries and project category, 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Enabling, Joint</th>
<th>Land, Formations, Systems</th>
<th>Space</th>
<th>Cyber, C4ISR</th>
<th>Maritime</th>
<th>Training, Facilities</th>
<th>Air, Systems</th>
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Source: PESCO Secretariat, Projects, 2022
# UN Security Council voting

By permanent and non-permanent members, 2021

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<th>Voting Date - Resolution</th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
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<td>27 January 2022 - Resolution 2618 (2022) on extension of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 31 July 2022</td>
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<td>21 October 2022 - Resolution 2653 (2022) on sanctions against individuals and entities threatening the peace, security, and stability of Haiti</td>
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<td>27 October 2022 - Resolution 2654 (2022) on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 31 October 2023</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>27 October 2022 - Resolution 2655 (2022) on extension of the mandate of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia until 31 October 2023</td>
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<td>28 October 2022 - Resolution 2656 (2022) on extension of the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 31 October 2023</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<td>2 November 2022 - Resolution 2658 (2022) on renewal of the authorisation of the European Union-led Multinational Stabilization Force (EUFOR ALTHEA) in Bosnia and Herzegovina for a further period of 12 months</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>14 November 2022 - Resolution 2659 (2022) on extension of the mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) until 15 November 2023</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>Resolution</td>
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<td>14 November 2022</td>
<td>Resolution 2660 (2022) on extension of the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) until 15 November 2023</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>15 November 2022</td>
<td>Resolution 2661 (2022) on extension of the Security Council resolution 1607 (2021) until 17 November</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>17 November 2022</td>
<td>Resolution 2662 (2022) on extension of the exemptions for the arms embargo and enforcement authorisations for the ban on illicit trade and on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia until 15 December 2023</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>30 November 2022</td>
<td>Resolution 2663 (2022) on extension of the mandate of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) concerning Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons until 30 November 2032</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>9 December 2022</td>
<td>Resolution 2665 (2022) on humanitarian exemptions to asset freeze measures by UN sanctions regimes</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>16 December 2022</td>
<td>Resolution 2666 (2022) on extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) until 20 December 2023</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>20 December 2022</td>
<td>Resolution 2667 (2022) on lifting advance notification requirements to the 1533 Sanctions Committee concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo as imposed by Security Council resolution 1807 (2008)</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>21 December 2022</td>
<td>Resolution 2668 (2022) on mental health and psychological support for personnel of peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>21 December 2022</td>
<td>Resolution 2669 (2022) on ending all forms of violence in Myanmar</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>21 December 2022</td>
<td>Resolution 2670 (2022) on extension of the authorisations of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) until 30 June 2023</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>22 December 2022</td>
<td>Resolution 2671 (2022) on extension of the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) until 30 June 2023</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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</table>

Key: Yes = Y, Abstention = A, Veto = V
Source: United Nations, 2023
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been a brutal wake-up call for Europe and forced the EU to act rapidly and decisively. EU leaders immediately recognised it as a moment of truth for Europe and the wider defence of the rules-based international order.’

JOSEP BORRELL FONTELLES
High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Vice-President of the European Commission

The 2023 Yearbook of European Security provides an overview of events in 2022 that were significant for European security – in particular, inevitably, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The first section of the volume explores the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine and the far-reaching repercussions of this unprecedented event for Europe’s security and defence architecture.

The second section assesses the implementation of the Strategic Compass, the guiding framework for the Union’s security and defence up to 2030, and the EU’s evolution as a defence actor. The third section focuses on multilateralism, and contains geographical and regional thematic chapters on North Africa and the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas.

To further enhance the Yearbook, supporting infographics and links to relevant EUISS publications feature throughout the text, which also includes a statistical annex.