Y·E·S 2016
EUISS YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
EUISS Yearbook of European Security
Y·E·S 2016

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European security has entered a whole new phase, and the stakes have become higher. The instability around the European Union’s borders has direct repercussions for our citizens’ lives: everyone can see that, well beyond the confines of foreign policy circles. The public debate might give us the impression that we have a choice to make, between isolation and engagement. In fact, this is a false dilemma: if we do not deal with our surroundings, our surroundings will deal with us.

The good news is we have finally started to realise that our security is a collective matter, and it can only be dealt with collectively. Over the last year we have taken several steps forward on this, both as the European Union and in the wider arena of the international community. I will not try to present a rosy picture of our security situation – it is anything but rosy. But in difficult times, like those through which we are currently living, we cannot underestimate the positive achievements that we have accomplished together. Although we are confronted with a huge number of threats, we are not powerless. We can be a force for good for our citizens, in our neighbourhood and beyond – provided that we learn from our success stories, that we keep building on them, and that we stand united.

Multilateralism, regional diplomacy and national reconciliation

In the Middle East and North Africa – whose instability is linked to both the refugee crisis and the spreading of terrorist ideologies – it is particularly evident that our collective security calls for broad international cooperation, at various levels. To effectively address the various regional conflicts, we need a complex alignment of international, regional and local factors. We need cooperation among international powers – including our European Union, together with the United States, Russia, China and other powers. We need cooperation at the regional level, among medium-sized powers who can make a concrete impact on local dynamics. And we need cooperation with and among local actors: in the end, you cannot make peace without a country’s citizens.
The deal we reached in Vienna last July on Iran’s nuclear programme was the result of intensive international cooperation between global powers. Its relevance as a non-proliferation agreement cannot be overstated, and it is already facilitating further cooperation at the UN level on similar issues. But it has also cleared the way for Iran’s more positive engagement in the resolution of the many outstanding issues in the Middle East. Right after the deal, I began to discuss with the E3+3 group whether we could work on a new format for negotiations on Syria – a format that would reflect the new international conditions produced by the Iran deal. In November we created the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), with 20 international and regional players, including Iran and Saudi Arabia. The choice to hold the ISSG founding meeting in Vienna was not random. At the time of writing, the Support Group has managed to broker a cessation of hostilities, and humanitarian aid has started to reach a number of besieged areas. These are fragile achievements, which will have to be confirmed and consolidated in the coming weeks and months. But we also need to move to the next stage, and facilitate a process of national reconciliation among the Syrian parties: there is no other way to end the war and to finally defeat Daesh. International cooperation has to be deepened and regional tensions must be defused, to help the local actors move beyond five years of civil war.

The same alignment of international, regional and local factors will be crucial to address other crises: from Libya – where a national unity government and the process of building a functioning state need the full support of the international community, together with some crucial regional actors – to the conflict in Israel and Palestine. Since I took office as the Union’s High Representative I have personally pushed for reviving the Middle East Quartet and improving its cooperation with relevant Arab countries; but with no concrete moves from Israeli and Palestinian leaders – to de-escalate tensions, improve security and guarantee better conditions to all those who live in the region – the situation in the Holy Land will remain explosive.

The ‘comprehensive approach’ in action
The European Union is finally taking centre stage in all these developments. It is not a matter of activism: all our partners, today, recognise that the EU has to be part of the solution on most international dossiers. No other global power can mobilise the same array of foreign policy tools as we can – from humanitarian aid to development cooperation, from trade agreements to military assets. In most parts of the world, the EU and its member states are the biggest donors and foreign investors. The impact of a free trade agreement with us on a third country’s economy can be massive. Our joint diplomatic network reaches all corners of the world. If we pool all these resources, we
can claim to be a superpower and a reliable partner on the global stage. While none of our member states, alone, is big enough to thrive in today’s world.

We are seeing this very clearly in our response to the refugee crisis. When we act as a true Union, and a responsible player in our region, our support to countries like Lebanon and Jordan can make a difference – and we need to devote our best efforts to help them deal with the millions of Syrians they are currently hosting. When divisions and unilateral approaches prevail, we are only being short-sighted: in today’s world, my neighbour’s problem is my problem, my neighbour’s weakness is my weakness. Trying to push an issue beyond our national borders can only backfire.

Last summer, when the migration crisis peaked in the Southern Mediterranean, we saw what our European Union can do when it acts cohesively. We decided to take action in the Mediterranean, to stop the traffickers who were exploiting the predicament of so many men, women and children fleeing war and poverty. We set up Operation Sophia in the space of two months, and member states from all parts of the Union contributed with their assets. We showed that the European Union can act swiftly, and in a united and responsible manner: the Operation’s vessels have so far saved over ten thousand lives. And the international community backed our efforts, through a UN Security Council Resolution passed with fourteen votes in favour and just one abstention. The world has endorsed European external action at its best.

We must also keep in mind that the military side of our commitment does not stand alone, and it only makes sense within a broader strategy. Operation Sophia is part of a comprehensive plan: this includes the creation of a Trust Fund for Africa, cooperation with Libya’s southern neighbours in the ‘G5 Sahel’ format, our engagement on the other migrant and refugee routes with strong support to Syrians hosted in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, and efforts to build up a new mechanism for human mobility – a mechanism that favours legal migration and the fight against human trafficking, one that can address the challenge of mass movements of people in the twenty-first century. We know all too well that the use of military might is never sufficient in the absence of an adequate political, economic and diplomatic framework, and risks backfiring.

It is exactly for this reason that we decided to work on a Global Strategy for the European Union. The 2003 Security Strategy was not just outdated: we need a wider perspective on our foreign policy, one that includes security and defence while also encompassing other dimensions. The Global Strategy – which I am about to present to the European Council – will have to be implemented and complemented by sectoral papers, including some kind of ‘White Book’ of European defence. In the meantime, the Commission has also begun to work on the first-ever EU strategies on economic, energy and climate diplomacy, and in 2016 we will also issue the first strategy on cultural diplomacy.
A responsible power in our neighbourhood

Investing in our neighbours’ strength is in our Union’s direct interest, and the interest of all our member states. This is true from Morocco to our Eastern neighbourhood. And it is particularly true in the Western Balkans, where the EU can be the strongest force for peace, reform and economic growth. This was vividly illustrated during the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, facilitated by the EU: 2015 was the year when Serbia and Kosovo signed the highest number of agreements. The talks gained new momentum: in the months ahead they will still be difficult, but both countries have taken a decisive step towards European integration. We opened the first chapters in Serbia’s accession negotiations, while Kosovo signed an Association Agreement. As for the rest of the region, in February 2016 Bosnia and Herzegovina presented its application for membership of the EU, and Albania is on track to open accession negotiations, if it puts in place the ambitious judicial reform for which its citizens long. The region is moving forward, and towards a future in the European Union. Strengthening each and every state in the Western Balkans is even more crucial as we need their help to face a number of common challenges, from migration to radicalisation. We need a stable, prosperous and peaceful neighbourhood, and we can truly make a difference in the Western Balkans.

The same can be said about our Eastern neighbourhood. In Ukraine – as we support the implementation of the Minsk agreements – we have also established a new cooperation with the government in Kiev to bolster its efforts to undertake economic and institutional reform. We have improved our association, free trade and free movement agreements with all countries in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and strengthened our dialogue with Central Asia. This part of the world can be the gateway between our continent, Russia, the Middle East and Asia: it is vital for our own security and prosperity to push for a resolution of all outstanding conflicts, while we also upgrade our economic ties and work with local civil society. Pushing for the respect of fundamental freedoms and the rule of law in our neighbourhood is not just consistent with our values: it is in our direct interest. It is the lack of fundamental freedoms that can destabilise a country. A healthy democratic debate can only help our neighbourhood to be more prosperous and more stable.

A global security provider

But our responsibilities in today’s world go well beyond our immediate neighbourhood. Partners from all parts of the world are increasingly looking for a greater engagement by the European Union in global affairs. In this last year, our relations with historic partners and friends in Latin America have expanded, and new ties have been created. I have followed very closely the negotiations between the Colombian government and
the FARC – both personally and with the decision to appoint Eamon Gilmore as my Special Envoy to the peace process. As soon as an agreement is signed, Colombia will have our help for the implementation of the deal through a dedicated Trust Fund. Cuba has been an important supporter of the peace process. It was an honour to be the first EU representative to visit Cuba, in March 2015, and to sign our first agreement with the island just a year later: in this new phase, we have the opportunity to strengthen the economic and cultural ties that have always bound the island and Europe.

On the other side of the world, Asia has also realised that the European Union can play a major role in the continent’s security. After North Korea’s latest nuclear test, I received calls from Japan and the Republic of Korea, to coordinate our messages and our actions on the international stage. Close international cooperation has led to a new UN Security Council Resolution on DPRK, with China’s support. Throughout 2015 the European Union was asked by the Burmese parties to sign the ceasefire agreement in Myanmar, as an international witness, and we worked with the Philippines to ensure the implementation of the comprehensive peace deal which was signed between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. And we are on the frontline of Afghanistan’s stabilisation, as we get ready to co-host a major international conference here in Brussels. Europe has a stake in Asia’s security, and has a stake in cooperation with Asia. And our Asian partners are increasingly keen on cooperation with the EU as a global security provider, well beyond economic issues. They look for interlocutors of China’s size, not for small nation states. As we engage with Asia, the best asset we have is a truly united Europe.

Our Union’s role in security and defence is changing – as this Yearbook clearly testifies. Last November, after the terrible attacks in Paris, for the first time ever a member state called for military assistance from the rest of our Union. We answered with a very strong message of solidarity, and with concrete action. Common response under Article 42.7 was untested: we are still exploring the whole potential of our Treaties. The task ahead is to use all such potential – which is another core objective of our new Global Strategy. The diversity of our defence assets and the ‘specific character’ of our foreign policies – to quote the Treaties – are far from being a liability: they constitute the strength of our Union. This is the true meaning of ‘unity in diversity’. Still, unity is a very fragile achievement: it has to be confirmed time and again. There is no other avenue towards a more secure Europe and a more peaceful world.

Federica Mogherini
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Brussels, March 2016
2015 coincided with the first full year in office of the new leadership of the EU institutions, and in particular the new HR/VP, Federica Mogherini. Opening this new edition of the Institute’s Yearbook with her own *compte rendu* of 2015 is therefore extremely pertinent and, of course, a great privilege.

2015 was also the year in which the internal security environment of the Union was most directly – and shockingly – affected by external events and developments. It started with the terrorist attacks in Paris (against *Charlie Hebdo*) and it ended with even more murderous violence in a coordinated terrorist operation that took place across the city (at the Bataclan concert hall and elsewhere) in November. Furthermore, since the late spring, an unprecedented flow of refugees – mostly fleeing from the Syrian civil war – entered the Union from Turkey and through the so-called Balkan route, crossing entire countries literally on foot and asking for asylum and support.

While the region to the east remained, by comparison, relatively calm, the combined effect of these two occurrences brought to the fore a strong sense of exposure and vulnerability all across the Union. The drivers of such European insecurity, however, are perceived very differently according to whether one sits in Vilnius, Copenhagen, Paris, Madrid, Athens or, for that matter, Cologne – where the year ended with another unpleasant surprise. Building (or re-building) a shared perception of risks and threats as well as a common narrative of how to deal with them is likely to be the main challenge for the EU leaders in 2016, starting (but not ending) with the Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy that the HR/VP is currently preparing.

2015, however, was not just a sequence of destabilising events. It opened with the final negotiations, chaired by the HR/VP, leading to the April 3+3/5+1 deal on Iran’s nuclear programme, and it ended with another major diplomatic success, namely the final agreement at the COP 21 Conference on climate change held in the same city – Paris – which had so recently been targeted by the terrorists. And it was characterised by
encouraging progress on both the EU accession path for some Western Balkan countries and one of the most complicated diplomatic issues of the past decades – Cyprus. In other words, some quite traditional assets of EU ‘foreign policy’ – its norms-setting approach to multilateralism as well as its transformative influence over its neighbours – proved once again their worth, even in a global environment that has demonstrably become more complex, more connected and more contested. Herein lie, hopefully, useful experiences on which to build with a view to shaping a better Europe in a less secure world – to paraphrase and adapt the title of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS).

As with previous editions, the *Yearbook of European Security* (YES) aims to present a broad and factual picture of the actors, institutions, and policies that constitute the EU’s foreign policy and external action. This fourth, leaner and smarter edition – which we have tried to make even more relevant and comprehensive – has been ably coordinated by Thierry Tardy with methodological thoroughness, precision and consistency. He has choreographed a truly collective effort, supported with dynamism and efficiency by Zoe Stanley-Lockman. Sabina Kajnç-Lange worked in particular on the EU Delegations; Katharina Wolf on defence spending and, along with Annelies Pauwels, the EU agencies; and Rada Youssef on the core documents. Our expectation and hope is that YES 2016 will reinforce its value-added as an indispensable tool for information and consultation on what the EU is, says and does outside its borders.

*Antonio Missiroli*

*Director, EUISS*

*Paris, March 2016*
Instruments, agencies and bodies
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<td>EU’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST)</td>
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1. External Action thematic and geographic instruments

The European Union’s external policies are implemented through the use of specific external and security-related thematic instruments and agencies. These instruments enable the EU to play a role in economic and development activities, humanitarian aid, political, security and defence affairs.

These ‘tools’ are established within the priorities and limits of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), a budgetary plan that translates EU priorities into financial terms and sets the maximum annual amounts which the EU may spend in different areas.

In order to facilitate an overview of EU policies and priorities in this domain, instruments that touch upon external action have been grouped in a single section of the EU budget: Heading 4, ‘Global Europe’. In 2015, three instruments constituted roughly 70% of the commitment appropriations under Heading 4.

Below is a table overviewing the budgets of Heading 4 instruments, the goals, programmes, and scope of which are detailed in the ensuing pages. CFSP is addressed separately from the other Heading 4 instruments, and the European Development Fund (EDF) is reviewed as an additional financial instrument, although it is funded outside of the EU budget. All figures in this section are expressed in 2014 prices.

This chapter also indicates which European Commission service (and Directorate General) manages each of the thematic and geographic instruments. In particular, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) differs from any other service as it is the only one under the direct authority of the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini in her capacity as Vice-President of the European Commission. The FPI’s 170-strong staff in Brussels and in the EU Delegations works in close contact with the EEAS as well as with other European Commission services. In addition to the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and the
Partnership Instrument (PI) (both described in this chapter) the FPI also implements the CFSP budget (see Policies and institutions), prepares the regulations necessary for the implementation of sanctions, and prepared and takes part with the EEAS in Election Observation Missions (under the EIDHR). The FPI also works on the Kimberley Process certification scheme and leads the implementation of the anti-torture regulation No. 1236/2005 which restricts trade in goods that could be used for capital punishment or torture. It also engages with third countries’ young leaders and opinion-moulders by running the European Union Visitors Programme (EUVP) together with the European Parliament. For the 2014-2020 period the FPI’s budget amounts to €5.415 billion.

This section also provides a presentation of CSDP agencies as well as Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies, although the latter are financed differently and therefore do not fall within Heading 4 of the MFF.
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**TABLE 1.1:** HEADING 4, MULTIANNUAL FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK COMMITMENT APPROPRIATIONS, 2014-2020
FIGURE 1.1: HEADING 4, ANNUAL COMMITMENT APPROPRIATIONS, 2014-2016 (€ MILLION)

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<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2,636</td>
<td>2,084</td>
<td>1,637</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Instruments, agencies and bodies**

**Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II)**


**DG:** NEAR (also AGRI, REGIO, EMPL)

**Budget:** €1,605 million (2015); €11.7 billion (2014-2020)

**Goal:** To support the beneficiaries in adopting and implementing the political, institutional, legal, administrative, social and economic reforms required in order to comply with the Union’s values and to progressively align to the Union’s rules, standards, policies and practices, with a view to Union membership.

**Programmes:** Provision of assistance on the basis of country or multi-country indicative strategy papers (‘strategy papers’), established for the duration of the Union’s 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework. These ‘strategy papers’ define the priorities for action and are adopted in accordance with the framework for assistance, taking relevant national strategies into account. The ‘strategy papers’ include the indicative allocation of Union funds per policy area, broken down per year, and shall allow for addressing emerging needs. These ‘strategy papers’ also include indicators for assessing progress.

**Scope:** Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

*This designation [applicable throughout the entirety of this publication] is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with the UNSCR 1244(1999) and the ICJ opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.

**Note:** IPA II is the successor to the first IPA, as set out in the 2007-2013 MFF.

**MAP 1.1: IPA II BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES, 2015 (€ MILLION)**

- **Multi-country programmes**
- **2015-specific special measure for migration in the Western Balkans**
- **Candidate countries**
- **Potential candidate countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount (2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>196.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>255.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>122.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo*</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey*</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)


**DG:** NEAR

**Budget:** €2,027 million (2015); €15.4 billion (2014-2020)

**Goal:** To develop special relationships founded on cooperation, peace and security, mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights with partner countries; to promote enhanced political cooperation, deep and sustainable democracy, and progressive economic integration.

**Programmes:** Bilateral, multi-country and cross-border cooperation programmes, covering inter alia human rights, good governance and the rule of law, institutional cooperation and capacity development, support to civil society actors and their role in reform processes and democratic transitions, sustainable and inclusive economic development, development of social sectors, in particular for the youth, trade and private-sector development, agriculture and rural development, sustainable management of natural resources, the energy sector, transport and infrastructure, education and skills development, mobility and migration management, confidence-building and other measures contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts.

**Scope:** 16 ENI Partner Countries

**ENI South:** Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria (currently suspended), Tunisia

**ENI East:** Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine

**Note:** Replaced the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), as set out in the 2007-2013 MFF.

MAP 1.2: ENI PARTNER COUNTRIES

*Currently suspended.

**This designation, found here and thereafter in this publication, shall not be construed as recognition of a state of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the member states on this issue.
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)


**DG:** DEVCO and FPI

**Budget:** €183 million (2015); €1.3 billion (2014-2020)

**Goal:** To assist in the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, respect for all human rights and uphold fundamental freedoms, by supporting and enhancing participatory and representative democracy, strengthening the overall democratic cycle, and enhancing respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in third countries.

**Programmes:** Strategy papers setting out the Union’s plan of action for assistance, also containing priority areas selected for financing by the Union, specific objectives, expected results and performance indicators; annual action programmes, individual and support measures, and special measures.

**Scope:** Civil society organisations at local, national and international levels, human rights defenders and victims of repression and abuse.

**Recipients:** 90% civil society organisations (€1,199.5 mil, 2014-2020); 10% international organisations (€133.3 mil, 2014-2020)

**Note:** Replaced the European Initiative of 2000-2006.
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)


**DG:** FPI (crisis situations), DEVCO (stable situations)

**Budget:** €321 million (2015); €2.3 billion (2014-2020)

**Goal:** To provide direct subsidiary support for the Union’s external policies by increasing the efficiency and coherence of the Union’s actions in areas of crisis response, conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness, and in addressing global and trans-regional threats.

**Programmes:** Assistance in response to crises or emerging crises, assistance for conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness, assistance in addressing global, trans-regional, and emerging threats, through thematic strategy papers and multiannual indicative programmes, including exceptional assistance measures and interim response programmes.

**Scope:** 140 projects across fragile, developing, emerging, in-transition, industrialised, candidate or potential candidate countries.

**Note:** Replaced the Instrument for Stability (IfS), as set out in the 2007-2013 MFF.

**FIGURE 1.2: ICSP DISTRIBUTION PER REGULATION (€ MILLION)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>2014 (authorised)</th>
<th>2015 (authorised)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 3</td>
<td>Assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts (≥70%)*</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>1637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 4</td>
<td>Assistance for conflict prevention, peace building and crisis preparedness (9%)</td>
<td>211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5</td>
<td>Assistance in addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging crises (21%)</td>
<td>491</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*By definition, the distribution to Article 3 (crisis response component) is not pre-determined.*
**Partnership Instrument (PI)**


**DG:** FPI

**Budget:** €119 million (2015); €1 billion (2014-2020)

**Goal:** To support measures that respond to objectives arising from the Union’s bilateral, regional or multilateral relationships with third countries and to address challenges of global concern and ensure an adequate follow-up to decisions taken at a multilateral level. The Instrument promotes, develops and consolidates *inter alia* the principles of democracy, equality, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.

**Programmes:** Programmes are organised around four key objectives. The PI supports the EU’s bilateral, regional, and inter-regional cooperation partnership strategies to fight against climate change and promote the environmental standards of the EU. Implementation of the international dimension of ‘Europe 2020’ policies and objectives is another PI objective. The PI also seeks to improve access to partner country markets and boost trade, investment and business opportunities for EU companies, while eliminating barriers to market access and investment by means of economic partnerships, business and regulatory cooperation. Lastly, the PI also enhances understanding and visibility of the EU and its role in the world by means of public diplomacy, people-to-people contacts, cooperation in educational and academic matters, think tank cooperation and outreach activities.

**Scope:** All third countries, regions and territories may be eligible for cooperation under the PI, and emphasis is placed on countries of strategic interest to the EU.

**Note:** Replaced the Industrialised Countries Instrument (ICI/ICI+), as set out in the 2007-2013 MFF.

**MAP 1.3: PARTNERSHIP INSTRUMENT FINANCIAL ALLOCATION, 2015 (€ MILLION)**

*Reserve and operational support make up the remaining €86 million*
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)


DG: DEVCO

Budget: €2,468 million (2015); €19.7 billion (2014-2020)

Goal: To reduce and, in the long term, to eradicate poverty by fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development; consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and relevant principles of international law.

Programmes: Geographic and thematic programmes/Pan-African Programme.

Geographic programmes aim at supporting development cooperation with developing countries (as identified in Regulation No 233/2014). Thematic programmes address development-related global public goods and challenges and support civil society organisations and local authorities in partner countries (as identified in the Reference Document). The Pan-African Programme supports the strategic partnership with Africa and subsequent modifications and additions thereto, to cover activities of a trans-regional, continental or global nature in and with Africa.

Scope: Geographic programmes in 47 countries and thematic programmes intended for all developing countries (including those covered by the ENI and EDF).
### FIGURE 1.3: DCI DISTRIBUTION PER PROGRAMME (€ MILLION)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2014-2020 TOTAL</th>
<th>COMMITTED AMOUNT 2015</th>
<th>GEOGRAPHIC PROGRAMMES (60.1%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,813</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>South Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,870</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>North and Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,072</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Central Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>758</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Unallocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>545</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251</td>
<td>226*</td>
<td>Other countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* Afghanistan (199.4) and South Africa (26.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,101</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>THEMATIC PROGRAMMES (35.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,907</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>Global Public Goods and Challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Erasmus +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>845</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>Support Expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAN-AFRICAN PROGRAMME (4.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Instrument for Humanitarian Aid


**DG:** ECHO

**Budget:** €919 million (2015); €6.6 billion (2014-2020)

**Goal:** To provide assistance, relief and protection to people outside the EU that are victims of natural or man-made disasters, while promoting the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.

**Programmes:** Established following Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996, the Instrument aims to provide emergency assistance and support to victims of natural disasters, outbreaks of fighting or other comparable circumstances. The instrument can be activated at the request of a wide range of actors, including NGOs. The measures, which cannot last longer than six months, are grant-financed and cover issues from supplying items during emergencies to the improvement of the Instrument’s own implementation process. In this framework, the Director of DG ECHO is in charge of primary emergency humanitarian actions.

**Scope:** Third countries and NGOs headquartered either in the EU or the third country requesting aid.

**Note:** The Instrument for Humanitarian Aid constitutes 93% of the 2015 budget for DG ECHO.
Instruments, agencies and bodies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Protection and European Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DG:</strong> ECHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Budget:</strong> €20 million (2015); €0.1 billion (2014-2020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal:</strong> To respond to overwhelming natural and man-made disasters both inside and outside Europe. Operating within the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO), the ERCC main tasks include: civil protection, cooperation and development of EU emergency response capacity; coordination platform for civil protection and humanitarian aid; and enhancement of crisis response coordination at the European level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programmes:</strong> The ERCC collects and analyses real-time information on disasters, monitors hazards, prepares plans for the deployment of experts, teams and equipment, works with member states to map available assets and coordinates the EU’s disaster response efforts. The ERCC ensures cooperation and coherence of EU action at an inter-institutional level, focusing on coordination mechanisms with the European External Action Service, the Council and member states. It acts as the central contact point upon invocation of the Solidarity Clause (Article 222 TFEU).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scope:</strong> Disaster monitoring around the globe. In addition to the EU member states, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway and Serbia. Turkey has joined the ERCC in 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Note:</strong> Replaced the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), which was active from 2001-2013.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (EUAV)


**DG:** ECHO

**Budget:** €15 million (2015); €0.1 billion (2014-2020)

**Goal:** To contribute to strengthening the Union’s capacity to provide needs-based humanitarian aid; strengthen the capacity and resilience of vulnerable or disaster-affected communities in third countries, particularly by means of disaster preparedness, disaster risk reduction and by enhancing the link between relief, rehabilitation and development.

**Programmes:** Framework for joint contributions from European volunteers to support humanitarian aid in third countries that applies to: selection, training and deployment of EUAV; actions inside and outside the Union aimed at building the hosting organisations’ capacity for humanitarian aid in third countries.

**Scope:** The EUAV is open to the participation of: citizens and sending organisations from acceding, candidate, potential candidates and partner countries of the ENP; citizens and sending organisations from European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries which are members of the European Economic Area (EEA); and citizens and sending organisations from other European countries.

### Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)


**DG:** DEVCO

**Budget:** €31 million (2015); €0.2 billion (2014-2020)

**Goal:** To support the promotion of high-level nuclear safety, radiation protection, and the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third countries.

**Programmes:** Annual action programmes – specifying objectives pursued, the fields of intervention, the measures and projects envisaged, the expected results, the management procedures and the total amount of financing planned – drawn up on the basis of a strategy paper and multiannual indicative programmes. The action programmes are set out for each third country or region and specify details concerning the implementation of cooperation provided. In the event of unforeseen needs, circumstances or commitments, the Commission may adopt special measures not provided for in the indicative programming documents.

**Scope:** Cooperation may cover all third countries worldwide; priority is given to accession countries and countries in the European Neighbourhood Area. A regional approach is favoured for countries in other regions.
### Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA)


**DG:** ECFIN

**Budget:** €78 million (2015); €0.6 billion (2014-2020)

**Goal:** To address exceptional external financing needs of countries that are geographically, economically and politically close to the EU; to strengthen macroeconomic and financial stability in candidate, potential candidate countries, and in countries in the European neighbourhood, while encouraging the implementation of appropriate structural reforms.

**Programmes:** In 2015, MFA loans were disbursed, *inter alia*, to Georgia, Jordan, Tunisia and Ukraine.

**Scope:** Eligibility extends to candidate and potential candidate countries, ENP countries, and other third countries with geographical, economic, and political proximity to the EU, including: Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Serbia, Tunisia, and Ukraine.

### MAP 1.4: DISBURSEMENT OF MACRO-FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, 2015 (€ MILLION)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Grants</th>
<th>Loans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine (3rd tranche)</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33 Grants

2,208 Loans

23

10

5

200

180

1,800

33

Ukraine

Georgia

Kyrgyz Republic

Tunisia

Jordan
Guarantee Fund for External Actions (GF)


**DG:** ECFIN

**Financial Envelope:** €240 million (2015); €1.2 billion (2014-2020)

**Goal:** To repay the Communities’ creditors in the event of default by the beneficiary of a loan granted or guaranteed by the Communities or of a loan guarantee issued by the European Investment Bank for which the Communities provide a guarantee.

**Programmes:** Operations related to the goal are carried out for the benefit of a third country or for the purpose of financing projects in third countries outside the scope of the regulation governing the Guarantee Fund. The Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs is responsible for the management of the Guarantee Fund, while the European Investment Bank (EIB) is entrusted with the financial management of the Fund’s operations.

**Scope:** Third countries or projects executed in third countries

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European Development Fund (EDF)

**Reference Document:** Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of 2 March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund

**DG:** DEVCO (and ECHO)

**Financial Envelope:** €30.5 billion (2014-2020)

**Goal:** To provide development aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs).

**Programmes:** Created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome and launched in 1959, the EDF funds cooperation activities in the fields of economic development, social and human development as well as regional cooperation and integration.

**Scope:** ACP countries and OCTs

**Note:** The EDF is not part of the MFF, but it covers the same time period (2014-2020). It is financed by direct contributions from EU member states according to a special key and is governed by its own financial rules.

---

**TABLE 1.2: EDF FUNDING ALLOCATION, 2014-2020 (€ MILLION)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount (€ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries</td>
<td>29,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas countries and territories (OCT)</td>
<td>364.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission (support expenditures)</td>
<td>1,052.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
African Peace Facility (APF)

The APF is part of the EDF.

€750 million were initially earmarked from the EDF for 2014-2016 (raised to €900 million in late 2015).

**Goal:** Support the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security to bring peace and stability to the African continent as a basis for sustainable development.

**Programmes:** The APF covers three categories of initiatives: financial support to African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs), operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and support to initiatives under the Early Response Mechanism (ERM). In 2015, the APF financed AU-led peace operations in Somalia (AMISOM), the Central African Republic (MISCA), and marginally the Central African sub-region (Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army). Capacity-building is aimed at strengthening the planning and managing capacities of the African Union (AU) Commission and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and includes APSA elements such as the African Standby Force. The ERM provides immediate funding for the first stages of mediation efforts and for fact-finding missions by the AU or RECs and ad hoc reinforcement of the planning cells ahead of peace support operations, including the Continental Early Warning System.

**Scope:** The direct beneficiaries of the APF are the AU and the RECs/Regional Mechanisms (RMs) with a mandate in Peace and Security as well as the relevant institutions within or related to the APSA.

**FIGURE 1.4: DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN PEACE FACILITY FUNDS, 2014-2016 (€ MILLION)**

- Peace Support Operations (88%)
- Early Response Mechanism (2%)
- Contingencies (2%)
- Operationalisation of the APSA and Africa-EU Dialogue (7%)
- Procurement (1%)
2. CSDP and JHA agencies and bodies

CSDP agencies and related bodies

Alongside the EEAS and operations per se, CSDP is supported by various agencies, among them, the European Defence Agency (EDA), the EU Satellite Centre (SATCEN), the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), and the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).

The budgets of these agencies are replenished directly by member states, as presented in the table below (from 2013 to 2015 in current prices).

**TABLE 1.3: BUDGETS OF CSDP AGENCIES, 2013-2015 (€ MILLION)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>30.531</td>
<td>17.662</td>
<td>0.197**</td>
<td>4.920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>30.531</td>
<td>17.344</td>
<td>0.535</td>
<td>4.990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>30.531</td>
<td>17.976</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>5.254</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Member states and Union institutions bear all costs related to their participation in the ESDC

** Budget from May to December

*** As of 2015, the EUISS presents a consolidated budget which also includes costs related to the EUISS Pension Fund
European Defence Agency (EDA)


Headquarters: Brussels, Belgium

Budget: €30.5 million (2015)

Created in 2004 following a Council Joint Action, the European Defence Agency is the EU’s agency which facilitates and fosters defence cooperation amongst its 27 participating states (the EU-28 bar Denmark) in the areas of defence capabilities development, armaments cooperation, the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), defence equipment market and research and technology. In line with its mission ‘to support the member states and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management’, the EDA cooperates closely with the EU’s member states and connects around 4,000 national based-experts in cooperative defence projects.

The HR/VP is the Head of the Agency, whose function is now enshrined in Article 45 TEU. The EDA is run by a Chief Executive who is answerable to a Board composed by the Ministers of Defence of the 27 participating EU members. The EDA falls under the authority of the Council of the EU, to which it reports and from which it receives guidelines.

Member states contribute to the agency’s annual budget according to a GNP-based formula and approve its work plan. Through the agency’s à la carte approach, member states can decide whether or not to participate in agency projects depending on their strategic priorities, operational requirements, or their interest in a specific project.

Since January 2014, the Agency’s organisational structure is comprised of three operational directorates: Cooperation Planning and Support; Capability, Armament and Technology; and European Synergies and Innovation.

The non-EU members Norway, Switzerland, Serbia and Ukraine participate in the EDA’s projects and programmes on the basis of administrative arrangements negotiated by the HR/VP and approved by the Council.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Union Satellite Centre (SATCEN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reference Document:</strong> Council Decision 2014/401/CFSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Headquarters:</strong> Torrejón, Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Budget:</strong> €17.98 million (2015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SATCEN was founded in 1992 and incorporated as an agency into the EU on 1 January 2002. It is an operational asset in the field of CFSP able to provide classified information to its users. It supports decision-making of the EU through the provision of products and services resulting from the exploitation of space assets and collateral data. Analysis of satellite and aerial images are provided for activities in relation to EU crisis management operations, arms control, non-proliferation and treaty verification, counter-terrorism, counter-crime, humanitarian aid, contingency planning of peacekeeping missions and general surveillance.

SATCEN’s Director reports to a Board chaired by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and composed of the 28 EU member states as well as one Commission delegate. Based in Torrejón de Ardoz near Madrid, it has also an office in Brussels.

Under the supervision of the Political and Security Committee and the operational direction of the HR/VP, SATCEN responds to requests from different users such as the EEAS, member states, the European Commission, third states and international organisations (UN, OSCE, OPCW, NATO, etc.). A copy of every product issued by SATCEN is distributed to all EU member states and to the EEAS, no matter who the original requester is.

SATCEN cooperates with national and international institutions in the field of space. It participates in the Copernicus programme and works closely with the European Defence Agency, the European Commission and the European Space Agency, as well as other institutions and international organisations.

Highlights in 2015 were the visit of the HR/VP in February and the signature of a Service Level Agreement with FRONTEX in March. During the year, SATCEN provided support to its main users within the EEAS crisis management structures (especially CMPD, EUMS, INTCEN and CPCC) and EU missions and operations, but also increasingly to member states, FRONTEX and international organisations such as the OSCE and the OPCW.
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)

**Reference Document:** Council Decision 2014/75/CFSP

**Headquarters:** Paris, France

**Budget:** €4.27 million (2015)

The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is the Union’s agency dealing with the analysis of foreign, security and defence policy issues. The Institute was set up in January 2002 as an autonomous agency under the Common Foreign and Security Policy to foster a common security culture for the EU, support the elaboration and projection of its foreign policy, and enrich the strategic debate inside and outside Europe. Based in Paris, the Institute has a Liaison Office in Brussels.

The Institute organizes conferences, seminars and task forces which are intended to enhance the Union’s analytical capacity and facilitate the shaping of common approaches. They bring together EU officials, national experts, academics, decision-makers, media and civil society representatives from the EU member states and from around the globe. The Institute also releases publications on the topics and regions at the core of the Union’s work which include Chaillot Papers, the Yearbook, Reports, Briefs and Alerts.

The Institute is funded by the EU member states according to a GNI-based formula. It is governed by a Board including all 28 member states and chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which lays down its budgetary and administrative rules and approves its work programme. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises political supervision – without prejudice to the intellectual independence and operational autonomy of the EUISS.

The Institute’s activities in 2015 include support by the EUISS to the HR/VP in the elaboration of the EU Global Strategy, the Annual Conference (held in Brussels) and ‘Washington Forum’ (in cooperation with the Atlantic Council), the ‘EU-Russia Forum’ (in cooperation with Carnegie Europe and the EEAS), contribution to a module of the ESDC High Level Course in partnership with the Austrian National Defence Academy and a number of ‘strategic dialogues’ with partner institutions outside Europe.
## European Security and Defence College (ESDC)

**Reference Document:** Council Decision 2013/189/CFSP  
**Headquarters:** Brussels, Belgium  
**Budget:** €0.54 million (2015) (member states and Union institutions bear all costs related to their participation in the ESDC)

The European Security and Defence College (ESDC) was established in 2005 with the aim of providing strategic-level education in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It followed needs analysis and experimentation phases. The creation of the ESDC was to give CSDP a training and education instrument which promotes a European security culture.

The ESDC is a network college that brings together national civilian and military educational and research institutions in Europe.

EU member states participate in the effort on a voluntary basis. The training audience includes civil servants, diplomats, police officers, and military personnel from the member states and EU institutions involved in CSDP. Partner countries and other international organisations are also invited to participate in some ESDC courses. In its first five years, the ESDC has developed into a strategic CSDP training provider.

The ESDC is a network college that brings together national civilian and military educational and research institutions in Europe.

In 2015, the ESDC organised 87 training activities, including High-Level Courses and pre-deployment training for missions and operations, a seminar on EU Policy on Learning and Training for CSDP in cooperation with the EUISS, an academic session to celebrate the ESDC’s tenth anniversary, a networking conference bringing together training actors from all over the EU. It also provided support to EU partnerships through CSDP training activities with partner countries and organisations.
JHA agencies

The European Union has set up a number of decentralised agencies within the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) to carry out specific legal, technical or scientific tasks. There are currently nine such agencies that depend from the European Commission DGs Migration and Home Affairs and Justice.

The expenditure ceilings of these agencies are laid down under Heading 3 (‘Security and Citizenship’) of the Multiannual Financial Framework.

**TABLE 1.4: HEADING 3 APPROPRIATIONS FOR JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS AGENCIES, 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Budget, 2015 (€ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (FRONTEX)</td>
<td>143.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA)</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Asylum Support Office (EASO)</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Police College (CEPOL)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Police Office (EUROPOL)</td>
<td>95.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST)</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (FRONTEX)**

**DG:** Migration and Home Affairs

**Headquarters:** Warsaw, Poland


**Budget:** €114 million (initial budget 2015); €143.3 million (amended budget 2015); €626.4 million (2014-2020)

**Goal:** To improve integrated management of the EU’s external borders by facilitating cooperation between the border authorities of the EU member states and Schengen-associated countries in relation to control on persons at the EU external borders. FRONTEX provides the member states with technical support and expertise and promotes solidarity between the member states with the aim of bringing assistance to those facing disproportionate pressures at their borders.

**Assets:** FRONTEX does not have its own equipment, but relies on technical equipment and border guards provided by various EU member states. The agency has more than 900 border guards deployed within its operations, of which 470 are in Greece, 350 in Italy and a smaller number at the land borders in Bulgaria and Central Europe (as of December 2015). Additionally, it has established 38 hot spots at land, sea and air borders that deploy small but permanent teams. Within the framework of its operations, Triton and Poseidon Rapid Intervention, FRONTEX coordinates the deployment of 13 offshore and coastal patrol vessels, nine coastal patrol boats, 11 patrol cars, two helicopters, two thermovision vans and two aircraft.

**Tasks:** FRONTEX assesses risks to EU border security, building up a picture of the situation, patterns and trends in irregular migration and cross-border criminal activity at the external borders, including human trafficking.

The agency also coordinates the deployment of specialised guest officers and technical equipment to those external borders where there is a need for additional assistance, as well as, at the request of a member state, the deployment of European Border Guard Teams.

FRONTEX currently runs Operation Triton, which was launched in November 2014. The Operation focuses on border control and surveillance in the Central Mediterranean Sea and involves assets deployed by 29 states (EU member states and Schengen associated countries).

In December 2015 FRONTEX initiated the deployment of 293 officers and 15 vessels to the Greek islands as part of a new operation called Poseidon Rapid Intervention after the Greek request for assistance at its external borders in the Aegean Sea. Poseidon Rapid Intervention replaces the Joint Operation Poseidon Sea with a higher number of officers who are assigned to assist in identifying and fingerprinting incoming migrants.
TABLE 1.5: ONGOING FRONTEX OPERATIONS, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Launch Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Triton</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Central Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focal Points Land</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Designated Border Crossing Points of the Host Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poseidon Rapid Intervention</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Eastern Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA)

**DG:** Migration and Home Affairs

**Headquarters:** Tallinn, Estonia


**Budget:** €67.6 million (2015); €574.1 million (2014-2020)

**Goal:** To manage EU large-scale information systems in the area of freedom, security and justice. The agency supports the implementation of the EU’s border management, asylum and migration policies by fulfilling the operational management tasks for the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), Visa Information System (VIS) and Eurodac.

**Tasks:** The agency must keep all IT systems under its responsibility functioning 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to allow the continuous exchange of data between national authorities using them. The mandate of eu-LISA also ensures that it applies the highest levels of information security and data protection to the information entrusted to it, ensuring that personal information is treated fairly, lawfully and correctly, and in full compliance with the relevant data protection principles and legislation in force.
### European Asylum Support Office (EASO)

**DG:** Migration and Home Affairs  
**Headquarters:** Valletta, Malta  
**Budget:** €15.9 million (2015); €109.3 million (2014-2020)  
**Goal:** To contribute to the implementation of the Common European Asylum System by facilitating, coordinating and strengthening practical cooperation among member states on the many aspects of asylum.  
**Tasks:** EASO acts as a centre of expertise on asylum. It also provides practical and technical support to member states and the European Commission; operational support to member states with specific needs and to member states subject to particular pressure on their asylum and reception systems, including the coordination of asylum support teams composed of national asylum experts; and evidence-based input for EU policymaking and legislation in all areas having a direct or indirect impact on asylum.

### European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)

**DG:** Justice  
**Headquarters:** Vilnius, Lithuania  
**Budget:** €7.6 million (2015); €54 million (2014-2020)  
**Goal:** To contribute to and strengthen the promotion of gender equality, including gender mainstreaming in all EU policies and the resulting national policies, and the fight against sex-based discrimination, as well as to raise EU citizens’ awareness of gender equality by providing technical assistance to the Community’s institutions, in particular, the Commission and the authorities of the member states.  
**Tasks:** EIGE represents a knowledge centre and the front-runner in developing reliable evidence, collecting knowledge, developing methods and tools and sharing useful experiences and expertise on gender equality and gender mainstreaming.
**European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)**

**DG:** Migration and Home Affairs  
**Headquarters:** Lisbon, Portugal  
**Budget:** €15.7 million (2015); €104.4 million (2014-2020)  
**Goal:** To provide the EU and its member states with factual, objective, reliable and comparable information at European level concerning drugs and drug addiction and their consequences.  
**Tasks:** The EMCDDA provides a factual overview of European drug problems. The agency offers policymakers data to draw up drug laws and strategies. It also helps professionals working in the field pinpoint best practice and new areas of research.  
The EMCDDA relies on the European Information Network on Drugs and Drug Addiction (REITOX) for the majority of its data. This network, managed by the agency and composed of a focal point in each of the EU member states, Norway and at the European Commission, contributes to the agency’s core business of collecting and reporting information on drug-related issues across Europe.  
One of the agency’s key tasks is to detect new drugs appearing on the European market. In cooperation with EUROPOL, the European Medicines Agency, the European Commission and EU member states, it carries out early-warning and risk assessment activities that may pave the way for legal controls.
## European Police College (CEPOL)

**DG:** Migration and Home Affairs  
**Headquarters:** Budapest, Hungary  
**Budget:** €8.5 million (2015); €62.1 million (2014-2020)  
**Goal:** To provide training and learning opportunities to senior police officers on issues vital to the security of the European Union and its citizens.  
**Tasks:** CEPOL’s trainings are organised in categories according to priorities in the field of internal security and cover issues ranging from leadership to law enforcement techniques and from EU cooperation to economic crime. Activities are designed to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and best practice and to contribute to the development of a common European law enforcement culture.  
CEPOL also provides tools for trainers, including common curricula on European police cooperation tools and on pan-European crime threats that can be incorporated into national training curricula.

## European Police Office (EUROPOL)

**DG:** Migration and Home Affairs  
**Headquarters:** The Hague, The Netherlands  
**Budget:** €95.4 million (2015); €656.6 million (2014-2020)  
**Goal:** To coordinate responses to international crime and terrorism as an intelligence-led organisation. EUROPOL takes a proactive approach to undermining criminal networks and works closely together with the law enforcement agencies of EU member states, as well as with other partners.  
**Tasks:** EUROPOL is the European law enforcement agency. It provides support for law enforcement operations on the ground, acts as a hub for information on criminal activities and represents a centre of law enforcement expertise.
### EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)

**DG:** Justice  
**Headquarters:** Vienna, Austria  
**Budget:** €21.6 million (2015); €151.1 million (2014-2020)  
**Goal:** To provide independent, evidence-based advice to EU and national decision-makers, thereby allowing for debates, policies and legislation on fundamental rights to be better informed and targeted.  
**Tasks:** The FRA advises EU institutions and national governments on fundamental rights, particularly in the areas of discrimination, access to justice, racism and xenophobia, data protection, victims’ rights and children’s rights. The Agency aims to help promote and protect fundamental rights more effectively across the EU. To do this, it consults and cooperates with its partners on collecting and analysing information and data through socio-legal research, providing assistance and expert advice and raising awareness of rights.

### EU’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST)

**DG:** Justice  
**Headquarters:** The Hague, The Netherlands  
**Reference Document:** Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up EUROJUST with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime (2002/187/JHA)  
**Budget:** €33.8 million (2015); €247.2 million (2014-2020)  
**Goal:** To improve the coordination of investigations and prosecutions among the competent judicial authorities of the EU member states when they deal with serious cross-border and organised crime.  
**Tasks:** To improve cooperation between the competent authorities, in particular by facilitating the execution of international mutual legal assistance and the implementation of European Arrest Warrants. EUROJUST also supports the competent authorities in order to improve the effectiveness of investigations and prosecutions.
Policies and institutions
# Section contents

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1. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) covers ‘all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence’ (Article 24 TEU).

The objectives of CFSP (Article 21.2 TEU) are to:

- safeguard the EU’s values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;
- consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;
- preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accord-ance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;
- foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
- encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;
- help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development, and assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters;
- promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.
CFSP is part of the EU’s external relations, alongside EU activities in the areas of trade, development, humanitarian aid, etc. It is financed from the EU budget (Heading 4 – Global Europe). The CFSP’s funds increase slightly under the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), while its budgetary weight in relation to Heading 4 and the EU budget at large is set to be reduced. The CFSP budget covers expenses related to CSDP civilian missions, EU Special Representatives, preparatory measures for CFSP/CSDP crisis management operations, and the management of grants in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament.

**TABLE 2.1: HEADING 4, CFSP APPROPRIATIONS, 2014-2020**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current MFF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP Budget (million €)</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an integral part of CFSP. It aims at providing the Union with an operational capacity for missions of peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.

The operational – and most visible – part of CSDP has taken the form of the 32 or so military operations and civilian missions created since 2003.

As of December 2015, there were 17 CSDP ongoing operations, 11 civilian and 6 military (see Map 2.1).

Civilian missions

Civilian missions fall within the three categories of strengthening missions, monitoring missions, and executive missions (although this latter category counts only one operation, in Kosovo). Strengthening missions are mainly concerned with capacity-building in the realm of the rule of law. Monitoring missions provide third-party observation of an activity or a process, be it the performance of a given sector (police, justice, border, etc.) or the implementation of an agreement (ceasefire line, peace agreement, etc.). Executive missions are operations that can exert certain functions in substitution to the recipient state.

No civilian mission was formally established in 2015, but EUCAP Sahel Mali was launched in January 2015 after having been created in April 2014. It is mandated to provide strategic advice and training for the three internal security forces in Mali. In addition, the Rule of Law component of EUPOL Afghanistan was concluded in December 2015.

In the DRC, the format of EUSEC RDC was substantially reduced as of July 2015. EUSEC RDC’s new mandate focuses on concrete projects in support of the Armed
MAP 2.1: ONGOING CSDP OPERATIONS AND MISSIONS, 2015*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Operation</th>
<th>Launch Year</th>
<th>No. of Personnel</th>
<th>Name of the Operation</th>
<th>Launch Year</th>
<th>No. of Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR MED</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1,408</td>
<td>EUAM Ukraine</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Rafah Palestine</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Libya</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>EUCAP Sahel</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>EUCAP Sahel</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Mali</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>EUCAP Nestor</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUECOP RD Congo</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>EUNAVFOR Atalanta</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAM Ukraine</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAM Ukraine</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>EUNAVFOR MED</td>
<td>2015*</td>
<td>1,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>EUMAM RCA</td>
<td>2015*</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAM Ukraine</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAM Ukraine</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EEAS

*(As of 31 December 2015)
Forces of the DRC reform plan, while some of the mission’s other activities have been transferred to the defence section of the support programme for security sector reform (PROGRESS), financed by the European Commission.

Contrary to military operations (see below), civilian missions are financed directly by the CFSP budget (as well as through member state contributions via seconded personnel). Usually, the financial reference (budget of each mission) is given in the Council decision establishing the mission and is revised according to further recommendations on the mission.

**Military operations**

Military operations range from executive missions with potentially coercive mandates to training and capacity-building activities. In legal terms, they are established on the basis of a combination of a Council decision and either an invitation by the host state or a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Two military operations have been created in 2015 – in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA) and in the Southern Mediterranean Sea (EUNAVFOR Med) – in addition to the four ongoing operations (see Map 2.1). One military operation came to an end, EUFOR RCA in the Central African Republic (CAR).
### Table 2.2: CSDP Civilian Missions, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>End of current mandate</th>
<th>Budget (million €)</th>
<th>Budgetary Period</th>
<th>EU Member States</th>
<th>Third states</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Total (Male / Female)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>14 June 2016</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>15 June 2015 – 14 June 2016</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>1,455 (1,042/413)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Rafah</td>
<td>30 June 2016</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1 July 2014 – 30 June 2015</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9 (8/1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Rafah</td>
<td>30 June 2016</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1 July 2015 – 30 June 2016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>30 June 2016</td>
<td>9.82</td>
<td>1 July 2014 – 30 June 2015</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>95 (66/29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Mali</td>
<td>15 Jan. 2017</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>15 April 2014 – 14 Jan. 2015</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>100 (76/24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>30 June 2016</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1 July 2015 – 30 June 2016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* as of the end of 2015 (Source: EEAS)
**EUMAM RCA**

EUMAM RCA was launched on 16 March 2015 as a take-over mission from EUFOR RCA that had been deployed in CAR from April 2014 to March 2015. EUMAM RCA is a military advisory mission that is mandated to support security and defence reform of the CAR armed forces. At the end of 2015, its strength was 70.

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**Article 1**

**Mission**

1. The Union shall conduct a CSDP Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA) to support the CAR authorities in the preparation of the upcoming Security Sector Reform by assisting the FACA to manage their existing situation and to build the capacity and quality needed to meet the goal of a future modernised, effective and accountable FACA. It shall concentrate its action in the Bangui area.

2. EUMAM RCA shall operate in accordance with the political, strategic, politico-military objectives as set out in the Crisis Management Concept – approved by the Council on 15 December 2014.

---

**EUNAVFOR MED**

Operation EUNAVFOR Med Sophia was established on 18 May 2015 to respond to the surge of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Libya. It aims to contribute to the ‘disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean’ by ‘efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels used or suspected of being used by smugglers.’ The operation focuses on smugglers rather than on the rescue of the migrants themselves, even though actions to prevent further loss of life at sea are a visible part of the mandate.

EUNAVFOR Med reached its full operational capacity on 27 July 2015, but the operation is being conducted in three sequential phases. The first phase consisted of gathering information on the human trafficking networks; the second phase, which started in October, involves conducting boarding, search, seizure and diversion on the high seas of vessels used for human smuggling, and then repeating this in the territorial and internal waters of Libya, provided that the EU obtains a mandate from the UN Security
Council or the consent of the Libyan authorities. In the third phase, still under a UNSC resolution or conditional on Libyan consent, the operation can take ‘all necessary measures against a vessel and related assets, including through disposing of them or rendering them inoperable’ in the territory of Libya.

**Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a EU military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) [excerpt]**

*Article 1*

**Mission**

1. The Union shall conduct a military crisis management operation contributing to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), achieved by undertaking systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and assets used or suspected of being used by smugglers or traffickers, in accordance with applicable international law, including UNCLOS and any UN Security Council Resolution.

2. The area of operation shall be defined, before the launching of EUNAVFOR MED, in the relevant planning documents to be approved by the Council.

Treaty provisions (Article 41.2 TEU) ban the financing of military operations from the EU budget. As a consequence, the greatest share of expenses arising from military operations is supported by the member states on a ‘costs lie where they fall’ basis. In parallel, some common costs of operations are financed by member states through a mechanism called ATHENA that is replenished according to a GDP-key. The ATHENA Council Decision was revised in 2015 ((CFSP) 2015/528 (27 March 2015)).

The list of costs covered by ATHENA (including transport, infrastructure, medical services, lodging, fuel, and others) is stated in the four annexes of the revised Council Decision. All six ongoing military missions resort to ATHENA for the financing of common costs. The 2015 ATHENA budget was approx. €76 million, versus €78 million in 2014 (for the five military operations).
TABLE 2.3: CSDP MILITARY OPERATIONS, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Personnel*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name</strong></td>
<td><strong>End of current mandate</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>10 Nov. 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>18 May 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR MED – Operation SOPHIA</td>
<td>27 July 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMAM RCA</td>
<td>17 July 2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* as of the end of 2015 (Source: EEAS)

Battlegroups

Battlegroups (BGs) are rapidly deployable expeditionary forces of about 1,500 personnel that can be stand-alone operations or used in the initial phase of larger operations.

In line with the military Headline Goal 2010 and the follow-on EU Civilian and Military Capability Development beyond 2010, which place the emphasis on rapid response and deployability, Battlegroups are employable across the full range of tasks listed in Article 43.1 of the Treaty on European Union.

BGs have been operational since 2007, yet they have never been deployed. They are on standby in six-month rotational semesters (see Table 2.4).
## Table 2.4: EU Battlegroup Offers and Commitments, 2013-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semester</th>
<th>Member States and Third States</th>
<th>Operational Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Historical Battlegroup Arrangements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. – Jun.</td>
<td>Poland (lead), Germany, France</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. – Dec.</td>
<td>UK (lead), Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania and the Netherlands</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. – Jun.</td>
<td>Greece (lead), Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus and Ukraine</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. – Dec.</td>
<td>Belgium (lead), Germany, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain (lead)¹, Greece, Italy and Portugal</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. – Jun.</td>
<td>Sweden (lead), Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia and Norway</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. – Dec.</td>
<td>France (lead) and Belgium</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Detailed Commitments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. – Jun.</td>
<td>Poland (lead), Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Ukraine</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greece (lead), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania and Ukraine</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. – Dec.</td>
<td>UK (lead), Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Sweden² and Ukraine</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany (lead)³, Austria, Czech Republic, Ireland, Croatia, Luxembourg and the Netherlands</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. – Jun.</td>
<td>Italy (lead)⁴, Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France (lead), Belgium⁵</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Greek-Spanish-Italian-Portuguese Amphibious Force. BGs limited to operations in littoral.
²Pending political decision.
³Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg and Poland as Framework Nations of Eurocorps offer to provide the core of the force headquarters for the BGs of the second semester of 2016.
⁴Under the Defence Cooperation Initiative (DECI).
⁵Netherlands Secretary Nation 2018.
⁶Spanish-Italian Amphibious Battlegroup/Spanish-Italian Landing Force (SIAF/SILF) limited to operations in littoral.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Semester</th>
<th>Member States and Third States</th>
<th>Operational Headquarters</th>
<th>Battlegroup Package Commitments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Jan. – Jun.</td>
<td>Poland (lead), Germany, France</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>Spain (lead), Portugal and Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. – Dec.</td>
<td>UK (lead), Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania and the Netherlands</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Jan. – Jun.</td>
<td>Greece (lead), Bulgaria, Romania</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>Greece (lead), Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. – Dec.</td>
<td>Belgium (lead), Germany, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>The Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg (with Benelux lead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>Spain (lead)</td>
<td>Spain (lead), Greece, Italy and Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Jan. – Jun.</td>
<td>Sweden (lead), Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia and Norway</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. – Dec.</td>
<td>France (lead) and Belgium</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>France (lead) and Belgium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Detailed Commitments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Semester</th>
<th>Member States and Third States</th>
<th>Operational Headquarters</th>
<th>Battlegroup Package Commitments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Jan. – Jun.</td>
<td>Poland (lead), Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>Poland (lead), Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. – Dec.</td>
<td>Greece (lead), Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>Greece (lead), Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg (with Benelux lead)</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>The Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg (with Benelux lead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Jan. – Jun.</td>
<td>Italy (lead), Austria, Czech Republic, Croatia and the Netherlands</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>Italy (lead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. – Dec.</td>
<td>Italy (lead) and Spain</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>Italy (lead) and Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Greek-Spanish-Italian-Portuguese Amphibious Force. BGs limited to operations in littoral.
2. Pending political decision.
3. Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg and Poland as Framework Nations of Eurocorps offer to provide the core of the force headquarters for the BGs of the second semester of 2016.
5. Netherlands Secretary Nation 2018.
Partnerships with third states and international organisations

The EU engages with third states and international organisations in a multifaceted manner. Most CSDP operations and missions accommodate contributions by third states. Over the course of 2015, thirteen third states – Albania, Australia, Canada, Chile, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Montenegro, Norway, Moldova, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States – participated in nine CSDP missions: EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali, EUMAM RCA, EUFOR Althea, EULEX Kosovo, EUCAP Nestor, EUPOL COPPS, EUAM Ukraine.

Third countries’ participation in EU crisis management operations can be formalised through the establishment of a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA). Eighteen such agreements were signed as of 31 December 2015, 15 of which have entered into force. In the course of 2015, two were signed with Australia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and FPAs signed with Australia and Chile (signed in 2014) entered into force in 2015. A further agreement was finalised with Morocco.

Capacity-building and inter-institutional cooperation

In 2015, cooperation with third states and international organisations has moved forward with the release of a Joint Communication on ‘Capacity-building in support of security and development – Enabling Partners to Prevent and Manage Crises’ from the High Representative and the Commission. This makes recommendations to facilitate the use of EU financial instruments to build the capacity (in the military domain in particular) of third parties (JOIN(2015) 17 final, 28 April 2015).

On the EU-UN front, a new framework document – the ‘UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management’ covering the period 2015-2018 – has been adopted as a follow-up document to the 2012 EU ‘Action Plan on CSDP support to UN peacekeeping’.

EU-AU relations were further developed through the adoption of the ‘Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020’ (see Documents) on 26 October 2015, which outlines the EU’s comprehensive approach to addressing key issues throughout the region. This Action Plan is a follow-up document to the 2011 EU Horn of Africa Strategic Framework, and includes actions in the field of political dialogue, CSDP missions and targeted development cooperation assistance.
Called ‘restrictive measures’ in EU language, sanctions are CFSP instruments imposed against target governments, commercial entities and individuals to penalise a policy or course of action that contravenes international law and/or political norms. The EU applies restrictive measures in pursuit of the objectives of EU external action as outlined in Article 21 TEU.

The EU applies the following types of sanctions or restrictive measures: diplomatic sanctions; suspensions of cooperation with a third country; boycotts of sport or cultural events; trade sanctions (general or specific trade sanctions, arms embargoes); financial sanctions (freezing of funds or economic resources, prohibition of financial transactions, restrictions on export credits or investment); flight bans; and restrictions on admission.

Prompted by the need to mitigate the unintended negative consequences of comprehensive sanctions (such as large-scale trade or oil embargoes) on civilian populations, EU states have increasingly shifted their sanctions policy to a system of ‘targeted’ or ‘smart’ sanctions such as asset freezes or travel bans. These specifically target commercial entities (both private and state-owned) or top-level decision-makers engaged in the activities that are to be penalised.

As of December 2015, the EU has more than 30 sanctions regimes in place (see Map 2.2) – a fivefold increase compared to 1991 and more than double the number in 1999 – with a record list of targeted non-state entities and individuals. In 2015, the Council passed 56 decisions on restrictive measures. In addition to applying new sanctions on Burundi, 2015 saw significant changes to the existing regimes in Russia/Ukraine, Iran and Belarus.
Russia/Ukraine
There are three sanctions regimes in force against Russia and Ukraine as a result of the crisis in Ukraine. Sanctions are imposed on:

Ukrainian officials from the Yanukovich era;

Crimea-based targets; and

Individuals, companies and parts of the Russian state apparatus.

Sanctions include diplomatic measures, asset freezes and travel restrictions, and economic and financial restrictions.

On 29 January 2015, the Council extended the existing individual restrictive measures, targeting 132 persons and 28 entities for threatening or undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, until September 2015.

On 16 February, an asset freeze and an EU travel ban were imposed on 19 persons and nine entities involved in action against Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

On 5 March, EU restrictive measures targeting the freezing and recovery of misappropriated Ukrainian state funds were extended.

On 13 March, the Council extended until 15 September 2015 the application of EU restrictive measures targeting action against Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.

On 19-20 March, the European Council decided to align the existing sanctions regime with the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

On 19 June, the Council extended until 23 June 2016 the EU restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol.

On 22 June, the Council extended economic sanctions until 31 January 2016.

On 14 September, the Council extended until 15 March 2016 the application of EU restrictive measures targeting actions against Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.

On 21 December, as the Minsk agreements were not completely implemented, the Council prolonged EU economic sanctions against Russia until 31 July 2016.
Iran

Since 2006, international economic sanctions have been the key instrument used to pressure Iranian authorities on their nuclear programme. They have been implemented both multilaterally – through the approval of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions – and unilaterally, through autonomously-imposed measures by individual actors. The latter have included those put in place by the United States, Australia, Canada and Japan, and most notably by the EU member states.

In July 2015, the EU prolonged the suspension of sanctions on Iran, which were initially introduced in November 2013. This was agreed upon to facilitate the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, adopted on 14 July 2015 in Vienna by Iran and the ‘E3/EU+3’, and following the adoption on 20 July 2015 of UNSC Resolution 2231(2015) allowing for certain exemptions to existing restrictive measures and defining the schedule and commitments to be undertaken to lead to the termination of restrictive measures against Iran.

Belarus

On 29 October 2015, the EU updated its sanctions on Belarus for a period of four months. Asset freezes and travel bans applying to three Belarusian entities were suspended, and while the sanctions remain in force, their application was suspended for everyone save four individuals. Four entities were also de-listed and other Belarusian entities won applications to be de-listed in October.

The various changes to existing restrictive measures regimes are outlined in Table 2.5.
### TABLE 2.5: CHANGES TO EU RESTRICTIVE MEASURES REGIMES, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Added Listings</th>
<th>De-listed/Suspended</th>
<th>Renewed/Extended</th>
<th>Repealed</th>
<th>Updated/Amended*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia/Ukraine</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* De-listing of deceased individuals.
All nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions lifted on 16 January 2016, as set out in the JCPOA.

*Includes cultural property. **The EU has maintained protection against certain effects of sanctions applied by the United States for EU entities carrying out business in Cuba, Iran and Libya since 1996.
NOTE: This is a simplified version of the EEAS organisational chart that does not include all divisions of the EEAS. EU Special Representatives also report to the HR/VP. Additionally, the Special Envoys, CSDP agencies (see Instruments, agencies and bodies) and the Activated EU Operations Centre work closely with the EEAS.

Source: EEAS Organisation Chart, accessed 16 December 2015
This is a simplified version of the EEAS organisational chart that does not include all divisions of the EEAS. EU Special Representatives also report to the HR/VP. Additionally, the Special Envoys, CSDP agencies (see Instruments, agencies and bodies) and the Activated EU Operations Centre work closely with the EEAS.
The Lisbon Treaty endowed the EU with legal personality and stated that ‘Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations shall represent the Union.’ (Article 221.1 TFEU). It placed EU Delegations under the authority of the HR/VP and instructed them to ‘act in close cooperation with member states’ diplomatic and consular missions.’ (Article 221.2 TFEU). The EU Delegations’ staff is comprised of the EEAS staff, including the personnel from diplomatic services of member states appointed as temporary agents and, in specific cases, specialised seconded national experts (Council Decision 2010/427 EU, Article 6.2, para. 3) and staff coming from the Commission, working on implementing the Union’s budget and policies outside of the EEAS remit experts (Council Decision 2010/427 EU, Article 5.2, para 3).

In 2015, 139 EU Delegations and offices around the world operated, headed by 134 Heads of Delegations. Map 2.3 shows the presence of EU Delegations around the world. In two delegations (in Afghanistan and in Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Head of Delegation also serves as the EU Special Representative (EUSR). In Kosovo, the EUSR is also the Head of the EU Office.

In 2015, the total staff in EU Delegations was 5,438 strong (excluding those in junior professionals programme, interns, and interim staff). Of these about 36% come from the EEAS and the rest is staff from the European Commission.
FIGURE 2.1: PERCENTAGE OF HEADS OF DELEGATIONS COMING FROM THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICES OF MEMBER STATES VS. EU OFFICIALS

FIGURE 2.2: DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF OF EU DELEGATIONS BY INSTITUTION AND TYPE OF CONTRACT
Experts or advisors working on issues related to security, military or defence were posted in some 20 delegations in 2015. Counter terrorism/security experts positions in Algeria, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia (dealing with all GCC countries), Tunisia and Turkey were established in 2015 as part of the efforts to strengthen the capacity of key EU Delegations to contribute to counter terrorism efforts. These new positions come in addition to a small number of experts or advisors working on issues related to security, military or defence posted mostly in delegations to African countries, as well as in delegations to the United Nations in New York and to the African Union in Addis Ababa.

EU Delegations cooperate with member states’ diplomatic and consular missions. In addition to showcasing accredited EU Delegations, Map 2.3 also illustrates the density of member states’ diplomatic missions in countries with an accredited EU delegation. In recent years, cooperation between EU Delegations and member states’ embassies in third countries expanded. Colocation agreements between the EU delegation and at least one member state are in place in 19 countries (arrangements in five of these countries precede the EEAS, i.e. they were already in place between the Commission delegations and the member states). In most cases there is a colocation agreement between the EU delegation and one member state, but examples of more member states (for example up to seven in the case of Nigeria) co-located within the EU delegation also do exist. In Tanzania the premises are co-owned by the EU and the United Kingdom. Altogether 14 member states participate in colocation arrangements.
There are 128 countries that host EU delegations. The EU also has seven delegations to international organisations and four offices.
6. EU Special Representatives

In accordance with Article 33 TEU, the Council may, ‘on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues’. The Special Representative shall ‘carry out his mandate under the authority of the High Representative.’ While most special representatives have a regional focus, some also have thematic responsibilities.

In addition to the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), the EEAS has two thematic special envoys. Jacek Bylica has been the EEAS Principal Adviser and Special Envoy for Non-proliferation and Disarmament since 2013, when the role was created. Claude-France Arnould became the first Special Envoy for Space, which leads a space taskforce, at the beginning of 2015. In October 2015, François Rivasseau assumed this position.

There were nine EUSRs as of December 2015. The following table provides a list of the nine EUSRs together with information on their respective mandates and budgetary allocations. Each EUSR finances its office, staff, equipment and the operational costs of its mission with the financial reference amount mentioned in the related Council Decisions and Joint Actions.
### TABLE 2.6: AREAS COVERED BY EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES (EUSRS), 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Special Representative (SR)</th>
<th>SR’s Mandate End Date</th>
<th>Financial amount of reference (€ million)</th>
<th>Dates corresponding to financial amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.625</td>
<td>1 Nov. 2015 – 28 Feb. 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>[No EUSR]*</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>1 July 2014 – 30 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1 Nov. 2015 – 28 Feb. 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>Janos Herman</td>
<td>15 April 2015</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Burian</td>
<td>30 Apr. 16</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>15 April 2015 – 30 April 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
<td>Alexander Rondos</td>
<td>28 Feb. 17</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1 Nov. 2014 – 28 Feb. 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1 March 2015 – 31 Oct. 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1 Nov. 2015 – 28 Feb. 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Stavros Lambrinidis</td>
<td>28 Feb. 17</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1 July 2014 – 28 Feb. 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Samuel Žbogar</td>
<td>28 Feb. 17</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1 July 2014 – 28 Feb. 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1 March 2015 – 31 Oct. 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.135</td>
<td>1 Nov. 2015 – 28 Feb. 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Peace Process</td>
<td>[No EUSR]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fernando Gentilini</td>
<td>30 Apr. 16</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>15 April 2015 – 30 April 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1 March 2015 – 31 Oct. 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1 March 2015 – 31 Oct. 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1 Nov. 2015 – 28 Feb. 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Robert Stockdale acted as the Interim Head of Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to the appointment of Lars-Gunnar Wigemark.
In 2015, the UN Security Council adopted 64 resolutions, out of which ten had non-unanimous votes.
During that year, the voting record of the four EU member states sitting in the Security Council – France, Great Britain, Lithuania and Spain – converged in all 64 adopted resolutions, and additionally on the two draft resolutions vetoed by the Russian Federation.

The last time EU member states diverged on a UNSC vote was on 30 December 2014, when Great Britain and Lithuania abstained while France and Luxembourg voted in favour of a draft resolution (S/2014/916) on the Israeli-Palestinian situation that was vetoed by the United States.
**TABLE 2.7: VOTING RECORD OF NON-UNANIMOUS UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, 2013-2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>EU Voting</th>
<th>Total Voting*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2015</strong></td>
<td><strong>GB</strong></td>
<td><strong>FR</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/2209 (2015)</strong> on the situation in the Middle East</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 March 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/2216 (2015)</strong> on the situation in the Middle East</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 April 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/2220 (2015)</strong> on small arms</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Draft Resolution S/2015/508</strong> on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Draft Resolution S/2015/562</strong> on the Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 July 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/2240 (2015)</strong> on the Maintenance of international peace and security</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Oct. 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/2241 (2015)</strong> on the Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Oct. 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/2244 (2015)</strong> on the situation in Somalia</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Oct. 2015</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/2252 (2015)</strong> on the Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Dec. 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/2256 (2015)</strong> on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Dec. 2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document</td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2014</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Draft resolution (S/2014/189) on the situation in Ukraine</td>
<td>15 March 2014</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft resolution (S/2014/348) on the situation of human rights violations in Syria</td>
<td>22 May 2014</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/2182 (2014) on the reaffirmation of the arms embargo on Somalia</td>
<td>24 Oct. 2014</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/2183 (2014) on the situation in Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>11 Nov. 2014</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/2193 (2014) on the International Tribunal in former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>18 Dec. 2014</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2013</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/2089 (2013) on the extension of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 31 July 2013</td>
<td>24 Jan. 2013</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/2114 (2013) on the extension of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 31 Jan. 2014</td>
<td>30 July 2013</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/2117 (2013) on small arms</td>
<td>26 Sep. 2013</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/2130 (2013) on the extension of the terms of office of permanent and <em>item</em> judges at the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), who are members of the Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber, until 31 Dec. 2014 or until the completion of the cases to which they are assigned</td>
<td>18 Dec. 2013</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Non-EU Security Council members mentioned in the table include: Angola (AO), Australia (AU), Azerbaijan (AZ), Chad (TD), China (CN), Jordan (JO), Nigeria (NG), Pakistan (PK), Republic of Korea (KR), Russian Federation (RU), Rwanda (RW), the United States (US), and Venezuela (VE).
Defence record
1. Defence spending 89
2. European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) 97
1. Defence spending

In 2015, total defence expenditure by all 28 EU member states amounted to €203.143 billion. This corresponds to an annual decrease by 0.4% compared to 2014 and a decline of 14.5% since 2007 in real terms. On average, each EU member state spent €7.26 billion, 1.22% of GDP and €290 per person on defence in 2015. The EU’s biggest defence spenders are the United Kingdom with a budget of €50.15 billion, France – €42 billion – and Germany – €33 billion in 2015.

However, the whole EU picture is more complex than this. Motivated largely by concerns about Russian aggression in the east and destabilisation in the south, it appears that European defence spending has bottomed out, meaning that decelerated declines are likely to develop into increases in defence spending in the coming years. Regionally, the increases in defence spending are most pronounced in the eastern and northern member states. Southern and northern member states are perking up at a slower pace, whereas the turnaround is forthcoming in western Europe.

The graphs in Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the evolution and recent trends in EU states’ defence spending individually, regionally and at the EU level. Figure 3.5 puts EU defence spending into a global context and compares it to spending patterns in other regions.

This section brings together and processes data collected from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)¹ and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)² to track recent trends in EU states and defence expenditures. Trends and figures illustrated in this section draw upon data offered by the IISS since NATO data does not include defence spending of non-member countries.

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2. IISS data are taken from the Military Balance 2009-2016.
Data in all figures and tables are converted into euro using annual average exchange rates which can be found in the Statistical Data Warehouse of the European Central Bank. Defence expenditure in constant 2007 euro is based on annual consumer price indices (taking 2007 as the base year) and 2007 market average exchange rates to deflate values. Data on per capita spending are calculated using the defence expenditure in euro and yearly population statistics provided by the UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA).

**TABLE 3.1: TOTAL EU-28 DEFENCE SPENDING, 2010-2015 (€ MILLION)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015 current prices</td>
<td>193,203</td>
<td>197,853</td>
<td>197,316</td>
<td>198,357</td>
<td>198,678</td>
<td>203,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 constant prices</td>
<td>191,894</td>
<td>191,300</td>
<td>183,020</td>
<td>183,143</td>
<td>180,446</td>
<td>179,797</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 3.1: EVOLUTION OF EU DEFENCE SPENDING, 2007-2015**

---


FIGURE 3.2: COMPARATIVE REGIONAL DEFENCE SPENDING IN THE EU, 2007-2015 (2007=100%)


**Northern Europe**: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden  
**Eastern Europe**: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia  
**Southern Europe**: Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain  
**Western Europe**: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom
**FIGURE 3.3:** DEFENCE SPENDING OF EU MEMBER STATES, 2007/2011/2015

**FIGURE 3.4:** DEFENCE SPENDING OF EU MEMBER STATES AS % OF GDP, 2013-2015
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>NATO 2013 Current million €</th>
<th>NATO 2013 Constant 2007 million €</th>
<th>NATO 2013 % of GDP</th>
<th>Per capita (current prices)</th>
<th>NATO 2015 Current million €</th>
<th>NATO 2015 Constant 2007 million €</th>
<th>NATO 2015 % of GDP</th>
<th>Per capita (current €)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3,964</td>
<td>3,452</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>3,913</td>
<td>3,391</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria*</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1,618</td>
<td>1,305</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3,175</td>
<td>2,812</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>3,054</td>
<td>2,694</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>39,402</td>
<td>35,516</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>39,199</td>
<td>35,119</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>34,593</td>
<td>31,233</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>34,749</td>
<td>31,131</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3,999</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>3,939</td>
<td>3,496</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>20,078</td>
<td>17,598</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>18,427</td>
<td>16,110</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7,702</td>
<td>6,842</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>7,788</td>
<td>6,896</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>6,782</td>
<td>6,229</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>7,618</td>
<td>6,969</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2,457</td>
<td>2,229</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>2,263</td>
<td>2,056</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1,847</td>
<td>1,793</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2,028</td>
<td>1,954</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>9,495</td>
<td>8,358</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>9,508</td>
<td>8,385</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>46,893</td>
<td>48,327</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>49,602</td>
<td>47,795</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>771</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data do not include pensions
### TABLE 3.3: DEFENCE SPENDING OF EU MEMBER STATES, 2013-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>IISS 2013</th>
<th>IISS 2014</th>
<th>IISS 2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current million €</td>
<td>Constant 2007 million €</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators</strong></td>
<td>Per capita (current €)</td>
<td>Current million €</td>
<td>Constant 2007 million €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Per capita (current €)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria a,f</td>
<td>2,590</td>
<td>2,266</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium a,b,f</td>
<td>3,960</td>
<td>3,449</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria b,c,f</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia b,f</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus f</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic a,b,f</td>
<td>1,617</td>
<td>1,304</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark a,b,f</td>
<td>3,433</td>
<td>3,040</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia a,b,f</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland c,f</td>
<td>2,820</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France a,b,f</td>
<td>39,400</td>
<td>35,514</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany a,b,f</td>
<td>36,700</td>
<td>33,135</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece g,f</td>
<td>4,280</td>
<td>3,746</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary b,c,f</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland d,f</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy a,b,f</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>16,653</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia a,b,f</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania a,b,f</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg b,f</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta c,f</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands a,b,f</td>
<td>7,780</td>
<td>6,911</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland a,b,f</td>
<td>6,837</td>
<td>6,280</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal b,f</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,268</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1,962</td>
<td>1,905</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>9,610</td>
<td>8,459</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4,889</td>
<td>4,145</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>45,451</td>
<td>46,842</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\*b The 2013 and 2014 data for Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom refer to the NATO definition of defence spending.


\*d Data for Ireland (2013-2015) include military pensions and capital expenditure.

\*e Data for Sweden (2013) exclude military pensions and peacekeeping expenditure.

\*f 2015 data for all EU countries and data for Finland (2013/2014) and Sweden (2013) refer to defence budgets.

\*g Data for Greece (2015) include military pensions and peacekeeping operations allocations.

\*h Data for the United Kingdom (2015) refer to Net Cash Requirement figures. These will differ from official figures based on Resource Accounting & Budgeting.
The European Council conclusions of December 2013 noted that an integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive EDTIB would enhance European strategic autonomy, ensure operational effectiveness and help guarantee security of supply. The EDTIB is the manufacturing and services base for military-industrial activities. Lacking an agreed-upon official definition, these defence economic operators can range from those designing, building and servicing equipment (including components) to constructing military infrastructure. Because military-relevant technology is increasingly dual-use, or has both civilian and military applications, the boundaries between defence and commercial firms are increasingly blurred.

The majority of defence production is concentrated in the ‘Letter of Intent’ (LoI) countries – France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom – that signed the LoI Framework Agreement treaty in 2000 to create a legal and political framework for what has become the EDTIB. This framework was further concretised with the 2007 ‘Defence Package’ (passed in 2009), which included two key directives that are now the regulatory backbone of the EDTIB. The two directives, Directive 2009/43/EC (the Intracommunity transfers, or ICT, Directive) and Directive 2009/81/EC respectively serve to streamline intra-Community licensing processes and regulate contract award procedures by minimising discrimination, inequality, and lack of transparency (namely in the form of offsets) from procurement processes.
Incentives and investment

Defence and industrial policies alike – ranging from financing opportunities, industrial policy that reduces regulatory and non-regulatory barriers, intellectual property rights, access to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and synergies between civilian and military realms – help ensure the development of the EDTIB. One crucial incentive to defence industrial development is the provision of research, technology and development (RT&D) funding. Taking into account that R&D decreased by 11% and R&T (as a subset of R&D) decreased by 21% between 2006 and 2013, the EU took several steps in 2015 to increase R&D funding for collaborative projects.

Most notably, the European Commission announced the upcoming launch of the Preparatory Action for CSDP-related research for 2017, ahead of the 12th Multiannual Financial Framework. For the first time, the Preparatory Action will provide funding for defence research – and not just dual-use or strictly security-related – projects. Also in 2015, the European Commission and EDA signed their first agreement, which allocates €1.4 million to dual-use projects as a pilot project ahead of the launch of the Preparatory Action.

Other incentives for defence cooperation introduced in 2015 include EDA support for collaborative dual-use research and technology projects to be funded by European Structural and Investment Funds, and value-added tax exemptions for cooperative defence projects and programmes.

Concrete projects and programmes initiated in 2015 include the EDA-administered project Lightweight Armoured Multi-Purpose Vehicles (L-AMPV) and an ad hoc Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (MALE RPAS), also known as Euromale, the latter of which is a direct follow-up to the pilot projects as defined in the December 2013 European Council conclusions. Both projects are led by Germany. Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain are also partaking in the L-AMPV project and France, Italy and Spain are the other participants in the MALE RPAS study which aims to operationalise the system by 2025.

Industrial players

Table 3.4 below displays a selection of the largest European firms involved in military production and services. These are mostly original equipment manufacturers and top-tier suppliers, meaning they build systems and platforms (or large components, such as engines) and interact more directly with government customers. The size of the EDTIB extends far beyond these top tiers, which then sub-contract to other firms. Between
independent R&D funding and business opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprisers, such firms are vital to competitiveness and innovation for heavy industries. Per SIPRI determinations, 29 of the top 100 defence firms (excluding China) are based on European territory (see Table 3.4).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Sales ($ million)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Sales</th>
<th>Employment (Defence &amp; Civilian)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arms Sales</td>
<td>Total Sales</td>
<td>Defence Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Source: SIPRI)</td>
<td>(Source: French MoD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patria Industries</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>2,290</td>
<td>5,780</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dassault Aviation Group</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>4,881</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCNS</td>
<td>3,920</td>
<td>4,066</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nexter</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safran</td>
<td>5,130</td>
<td>20,365</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thales France</td>
<td>8,600</td>
<td>17,207</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauss-Maffei Wegmann</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rheinmetall</td>
<td>2,970</td>
<td>6,220</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ThyssenKrupp</td>
<td>2,310</td>
<td>54,802</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fincantieri</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td>5,837</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finmeccanica</td>
<td>10,540</td>
<td>19,455</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AgustaWestland</td>
<td>3,510</td>
<td>5,806</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Finnmeccanica subsidiary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alenia Aermacchi</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>4,170</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Finmeccanica subsidiary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selex ES SpA</td>
<td>2,120</td>
<td>2,708</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Finnmeccanica subsidiary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Sources: SIPRI, Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies, December 2015; French MoD, Calepin des entreprises internationales de Défense, 2015
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Sales ($ million)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Sales</th>
<th>Employment (Defence &amp; Civilian)</th>
<th>Employment (Arms Sales)</th>
<th>Employment (Total Sales)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Polish Armaments Group</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Saab</td>
<td>2,710</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Babcock International Group</td>
<td>3,560</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>10,840</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BAE Systems</td>
<td>2,5730</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>83,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cobham PLC</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>12,710</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GKN PLC</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>51,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meggitt PLC</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>10,820</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rolls-Royce</td>
<td>5,430</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>54,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serco</td>
<td>2,180</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>118,620</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thales UK</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6,420</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>QinetiQ</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6,250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (Transnational)</td>
<td>Airbus Group</td>
<td>14,490</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>138,620</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CNH Industrial</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>69,210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MBDA (Airbus, BAE Systems, Finmeccanica)</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>10,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: SIPRI, Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies, December 2015; French MoD, Calepin des entreprises internationales de Défense, 2015.
Industry restructuring

In efforts to reduce the fragmentation and improve the competitiveness of the supplier base, 2015 was an active year for EDTIB restructuring. The French firm Nexter and German firm Krauss Maffei Wegmann finalised the terms to merge into KANT, a new entity that will be headquartered in the Netherlands with 50:50 ownership. The multinational firm Airbus, which previously announced its intention to spin off its Germany-based defence electronics unit (except its border security business), has short-listed the private equity firms Carlyle Group and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts as the sale moves into the final stages. In France, Airbus Safran Launchers (ASL) signed an agreement to increase its Arianespace shares to 74% in what ASL called ‘an overhaul of the governance of the European launcher industry’. In the United Kingdom, Meggitt PLC acquired the Cobham PLC composites business.

On top of mergers and acquisitions, the Italian firm, Finmeccanica, announced management changes and re-branding for Finmeccanica companies. In Table 3.2 above, therefore, 2015 is the last year that Finmeccanica subsidiaries, including AgustaWestland, Selex ES SpA and Alenia Aermacchi, will be separately displayed.

Arms exports

Based on SIPRI data, the 28 EU member states (EU-28) transferred $7.97 billion (1990=100 for all figures in Arms Transfers section) worth of arms exports in 2015. In 2015, 21% ($1.66 billion) of EU-28 exports went to other member states. Figure 3.5 compares this against third-state export destinations by region. This graphic also illustrates that over 50% ($4.30 billion) of EU-28 exports were transferred to Middle Eastern and Asian destinations.

Because year-on-year arms transfers can change dramatically, Figures 3.6 and 3.7 focus on the most recent five-year period. In these figures below, the size of each bubble represents the aggregated imports and exports (note: not sales prices) from 2011-2015. Along with the Netherlands, Figure 3.6 illustrates that the LoI Six compose the brunt of EU arms exports; these seven member states account for over 95% of EU-28 arms exports. Of the 20 member states that exported arms between 2011-2015, 11 are more export-oriented, meaning that export levels outweigh import levels in both real terms and as percentages of total transfers. Figure 3.7 also shows that, when aggregated, the EU-28 is the world’s largest importer and second largest arms exporter (after the United States).

This said, EU arms exports levels have declined. Comparing 2011-2015 to the previous five-year period, global arms exports increased by 14%; however the EU share from 2011-
2015 decreased by 23% (from one-third to one-fourth of global exports) in comparison to the previous five-year period. Over the same time periods, the larger shares of global arms exports are now held by Asian countries and the EU’s eastern neighbours.

**FIGURE 3.5: EU-28 ARMS EXPORTS BY DESTINATION, 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intra-EU (21%)</td>
<td>3,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (2%)</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (16%)</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean (7%)</td>
<td>1,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East (38%)</td>
<td>1,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU Europe and Russia (8%)</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America (6%)</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania (2%)</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (&lt;1%)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database 2016
**FIGURE 3.6: ARMS TRANSFERS OF EU MEMBER STATES, 2011-2015 ($ MILLION, CONSTANT 1990 PRICES)**

Source: SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database 2016
FIGURE 3.7: COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, 2011-2015 ($ MILLION, CONSTANT 1990 PRICES)

Source: SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database 2016
Timeline 2015
## Timeline 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>January</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><em>EU Presidency</em></td>
<td>Beginning of Latvia Presidency of the Council of the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Battlegroup</em></td>
<td>Swedish-led Battlegroup on Standby (with Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia and Norway)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td><em>Rapid response</em></td>
<td>Revision of 2014 EU Military Rapid Response Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td><em>Sanctions on Ukraine/Russia</em></td>
<td>Extension of existing individual restrictive measures targeting persons and entities undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>February</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><em>European Defence Agency</em></td>
<td>Beginning of Jorge Domecq’s term as Chief Executive of the EDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Counter-terrorism</em></td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on counter-terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td><em>Sanctions on Ukraine/Russia</em></td>
<td>Imposition of travel bans and asset freezes on persons and entities undermining Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Outer space</em></td>
<td>Council Decision in support of the Union proposal for an international Code of Conduct for outer-space activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td><em>Russia/Ukraine: Minsk II agreement</em></td>
<td>Implementation of ceasefire agreement in Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td><em>Sanctions on Ukraine/Russia</em></td>
<td>Imposition of additional travel bans and asset freezes on persons and entities undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Defence cooperation</em></td>
<td>Launch of Request for Proposals on EDA-supported dual-use technologies to benefit from European Structural and Investment Funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td><em>European Defence and Security Policy</em></td>
<td>Appointment of Michel Barnier as Special Adviser on European Defence and Security Policy to President J.-C. Juncker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td><em>Energy Union</em></td>
<td>Commission Communication on ‘A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 5</td>
<td>Sanctions on Russia/Ukraine</td>
<td>Adjustment and extension of restrictive measures related to misappropriated Ukrainian state funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Sanctions on Russia/Ukraine</td>
<td>Extension of EU restrictive measures against persons and entities undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (until 15 Sep. 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>CSDP military operation</td>
<td>Council launches EUMAM RCA in Central African Republic (following establishment on 19 Jan. 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism and destabilisation</td>
<td>Adoption of regional strategy for Syria and Iraq and ISIL/Daesh threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>CSDP military operation</td>
<td>Extension of EUTM Somalia (until 31 Dec. 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-20</td>
<td>Sanctions on Russia/Ukraine</td>
<td>Decision to enforce economic sanctions until the end of 2015 and align existing sanctions with the implementation of Minsk agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Preparatory Action for CSDP-related research</td>
<td>First meeting of Group of Personalities on CSDP-related research to be launched in 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Commission Communication ‘A European Agenda on Migration’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Council meeting aiming to prevent further loss of life at sea and fight human smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean in cooperation with countries of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>Joint Communication of the Commission and HR, ‘Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development: Enabling Partners to Prevent and Manage Crises’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Agenda on Security</td>
<td>Commission Communication identifying three priority areas in the ‘European Agenda on Security’: terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>HR/VP visit to Asia</td>
<td>HR/VP in South Korea and China during her first official visit to Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>CSDP military operation</td>
<td>Approval of Crisis Management Concept for EUNAVFOR Med</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASEAN Partnership</td>
<td>Joint Communication of the European Commission and the HR, ‘The EU and ASEAN: A Partnership with a Strategic Purpose’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sanctions on Russia/Ukraine</td>
<td>Extension of asset freezes (with 6 June 2015 as original end date)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
<td>Follow-up report from the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator on the implementation of the European Council statement on counter-terrorism (from 12 February 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>EU-CELAC Summit</td>
<td>New regional funding programme of €346 million with the Caribbean region until 2020 from Facility for International Cooperation and Partnership; MoUs with Chile and Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
<td>Entry into force of SSA between EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina (following signature in June 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Sanctions on Russia/Ukraine</td>
<td>Extension of restrictive measures in response to illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol (until 23 June 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Sanctions on Russia/Ukraine</td>
<td>Council extends sanctions on financial, energy, defence sectors and dual-use sectors (until 31 January 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>CSDP military operation</td>
<td>Launch of military operation EUNAVFOR Med in the Southern Central Mediterranean (following establishment on 18 May 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-6</td>
<td>European Council</td>
<td>Second European Council summit to follow up on defence matters from Dec. 2013 meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>EU-China Summit</td>
<td>Celebration of 40 years of EU-China relations and discussions of political and economic relations and climate change negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>EU Presidency</td>
<td>Beginning of Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the EU Battlegroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sanctions on DPRK</td>
<td>Addition of new persons and one entity to restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sanctions on Syria</td>
<td>Declaration by the HR/VP on the alignment of certain third countries concerning restrictive measures against Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran nuclear programme)</td>
<td>Conclusion of negotiations on Iran nuclear programme from E3/EU+3 and Iran; Prolongation of suspension of EU restrictive measures on Iran (until 14 Jan. 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Climate and energy diplomacy</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on Climate Diplomacy and Energy Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Adoption of the Reform Agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Sanctions on Belarus</td>
<td>Declaration by the HR/VP on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures against Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td><strong>5-6</strong> ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
<td>Attendance of HR/VP to Asean Regional Forum’s annual Ministerial Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>27</strong> Western Balkans</td>
<td>Second Summit meeting on the Western Balkans in the framework of the ‘Berlin Process’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>9</strong> State of the Union</td>
<td>State of the Union address from European Commission President J.-C. Juncker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>10</strong> European Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Issuance of package of €235.7 million from European Neighbourhood Instrument to assist Southern Neighbourhood partner countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>14</strong> Sanctions on Russia/Ukraine</td>
<td>Extension of asset freezes and travel bans against persons and entities undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (until 15 March 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td><strong>15</strong> FPA</td>
<td>Signature of EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Framework Partnership Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>17</strong> EU Ambassador to ASEAN</td>
<td>Term commencement of first EU Ambassador to Asean, Francisco Fontan Pardo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>18</strong> Climate change</td>
<td>Council support for climate change agreement (ahead of UN conference in Paris in Dec. 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>23</strong> Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>Commission proposal to increase humanitarian budget (€200 million for 2015 and €300 million for 2016) for Syria crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td><strong>Migration</strong></td>
<td>EU provision of €17 million to Serbia and The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to help with refugee influx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>8</strong> EU Global Strategy</td>
<td>Launch of strategic semester to draft the EU Global Strategy at EUISS annual conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>12</strong> Defence cooperation</td>
<td>Revision of EDA statute, seat and operational rules, including Value Added Tax exemption for EDA projects to incentivise defence cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>15</strong> Ceasefire agreement in Myanmar/Burma</td>
<td>Invitation for the EU to sign a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Myanmar/Burma as an international witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>19</strong> EU-AU relations</td>
<td>EU acts as partner in Amani II, military training exercise of the African Union (Nov. 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>26</strong> Regional Action Plan</td>
<td>Council conclusion ‘EU Regional Action Plan for Horn of Africa 2015-2020’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>27</strong> Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
<td>Signing of EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Commission and EU Global Strategy</strong></td>
<td>Commission support for the EU Global Strategy in the ‘Commission Work Programme 2016’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><strong>EU Military Committee</strong></td>
<td>Commencement of General Mikhail Kostarakos as Chairman of the EU Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-12</td>
<td><strong>Migration</strong></td>
<td>Action plan and political declaration from EU and African leaders at Valletta Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td><strong>Invocation of Article 42.7</strong></td>
<td>First invocation of Article 42.7 (TEU) following 13 November terrorist attacks in Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td><strong>Justice and Home Affairs</strong></td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting including discussion of Passenger Name Record, firearms, border controls, information sharing and terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td><strong>European UAV study</strong></td>
<td>Announcement of a Remotely Piloted Aircraft System study (RPAS) from France, Germany, Italy and Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td><strong>EU-Turkey</strong></td>
<td>EU-Turkey meeting to discuss EU-Turkey relations and migration following Joint Action Plan from 15 Oct. 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>EU-Vietnam FTA</strong></td>
<td>Conclusion of EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (launched in June 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td><strong>CSDP civilian mission</strong></td>
<td>Conclusion of Rule of Law component of EUPOL Afghanistan</td>
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1. Security, defence and development


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The European Union aims to ensure that people live in an area of freedom, security and justice, without internal frontiers. Europeans need to feel confident that, wherever they move within Europe, their freedom and their security are well protected, in full compliance with the Union’s values, including the rule of law and fundamental rights.

In recent years new and complex threats have emerged highlighting the need for further synergies and closer cooperation at all levels. Many of today’s security concerns originate from instability in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and changing forms of radicalisation, violence and terrorism. Threats are becoming more varied and more international, as well as increasingly cross-border and cross-sectorial in nature.

These threats require an effective and coordinated response at European level. All the EU institutions have agreed that we need a renewed Internal Security Strategy for the coming five years. To meet this objective, this European Agenda on Security sets out how the Union can bring added value to support the member states in ensuring security. As President Jean-Claude Juncker said in his Political Guidelines, ‘Combating cross-border crime and terrorism is a common European responsibility’. Member states have the front line responsibility for security, but can no longer succeed fully on their own.

1. **WORKING BETTER TOGETHER ON SECURITY**

This Agenda will drive better information exchange, increased operational cooperation and mutual trust, drawing on the full range of EU policies and tools. It will ensure that the internal and external dimensions of security work in tandem. Whilst the EU must remain vigilant to other emerging threats that might also require a coordinated EU response, the Agenda prioritises terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime as interlinked areas with a strong cross-border dimension, where EU action can make a real difference.

The Agenda sets out a shared approach for the EU and its Member states that is comprehensive, results-oriented and realistic. To maximise the benefits of existing EU measures and, where necessary, deliver new and complementary actions, all actors involved have to work together based on five key principles.

First, we need to ensure full compliance with fundamental rights. Security and respect for fundamental rights are not conflicting aims, but consistent and complementary policy objectives. The Union’s approach is based on the common democratic values of our open societies, including the rule of law, and must respect and promote fundamental rights, as set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

[...]

**EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMMUNICATION, ‘THE EUROPEAN AGENDA ON SECURITY’, 28 APR. 2015 11**

[excerpt – some footnotes have also been deleted]
The impact of any new initiative on free movement and the protection of personal data must be fully in line with the proportionality principle, and fundamental rights. This is a shared responsibility for all EU and member state actors. EU bodies such as the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the European Data Protection Supervisor have an important role in assisting EU institutions and other EU agencies to uphold and promote our values.

Second, we need more transparency, accountability and democratic control, to give citizens confidence.

Twice a year the Commission will update the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of this Agenda. The Commission will also develop performance indicators for key EU instruments. To further enhance transparency and participation, the Commission will set up in 2015 an EU Security Consultative Forum bringing together member states, the European Parliament, EU agencies, and representatives of civil society, academia and the private sector.

Third, we need to ensure better application and implementation of existing EU legal instruments. One of the Commission’s priorities will be to help member states to further develop mutual trust, fully exploit existing tools for information sharing and foster crossborder operational cooperation between competent authorities. Peer evaluation and effective monitoring of the implementation of European measures both have a role to play.

Fourth, we need a more joined-up inter-agency and a cross-sectorial approach. Given the increasing nexus between different types of security threats, policy and action on the ground must be fully coordinated among all relevant EU agencies, in the area of Justice and Home Affairs and beyond.

The Commission will launch a reflection on how to maximise their contribution, through closer inter-agency cooperation, coordination with member states, comprehensive programming, careful planning and targeting of resources.

This Agenda has to be seen in conjunction with the forthcoming European Agenda on Migration, which will address issues directly relevant to security, such as smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings, social cohesion and border management.

Fifth, we need to bring together all internal and external dimensions of security. Security threats are not confined by the borders of the EU. EU internal security and global security are mutually dependent and interlinked. The EU response must therefore be comprehensive and based on a coherent set of actions combining the internal and external dimensions, to further reinforce links between Justice and Home Affairs and Common Security and Defence Policy. Its success is highly dependent on cooperation with international partners. Preventive engagement with third countries is needed to address the root causes of security issues.

Finally, the Union should further develop its relations with international organisations, such as the UN, the Council of Europe, and Interpol, and use multilateral forums such as the Global Counter Terrorism Forum more actively to promote best practices and meet common objectives.

External aspects of security will be more comprehensively developed in the framework of the Strategic Review that the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission has initiated, as well as in the ongoing review of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

2. STRENGTHENING THE PILLARS OF THE EU ACTION

In operational terms, working better and more closely together means, above all, that all actors involved – be it EU institutions and agencies, member states or national law enforcement authorities – fully implement existing instruments. This also calls, where necessary, for new or more developed
tools to maximise the added value of EU measures for information exchange, operational cooperation and other support.

2.1 Better information exchange

[...] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the most widely used information-sharing instrument today. Competent national authorities can use it to consult alerts on wanted or missing persons and objects, both inside the Union and at the external border.

[...] The Commission will look into possibilities to help member states to implement travel bans set at national level. The Commission will evaluate the SIS in 2015-2016 to assess whether new operational needs require legislative changes, such as introducing additional categories to trigger alerts. To further strengthen security at the external borders, there should be fuller use of the SIS together with Interpol’s database on Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD).

[...] The Commission is also updating the handbook for border guards to better target border checks and to promote the full use of the SIS and the SLTD.

[...] Tracking the movements of offenders is key to disrupting terrorist and criminal networks. It is now urgent that the co-legislators finalise their work on the establishment of an EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) system for airline passengers that is fully compatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights while providing a strong and effective tool at EU level. [...] Once adopted, the PNR Directive will ensure better cooperation between national systems and reduce security gaps between member states. Common risk indicators for the processing of PNR data will help to prevent criminals escaping detection by travelling through another member state. EUROPOL and FRONTEX can again play a key role in developing and distributing such risk indicators on the basis of information received from member states.

[...] Common rules on data protection will enable law enforcement and judicial authorities to cooperate more effectively with each other, as well as building confidence and ensuring legal certainty. Agreement by the end of 2015 on the Data Protection reform as a whole is key, and particularly on the proposal for a Data Protection Directive for police and criminal justice authorities. In addition, the European Union is negotiating with the United States government an international framework agreement (‘Data Protection Umbrella Agreement’) in order to ensure a high level of protection of personal data transferred between the EU and the US for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, including terrorism.

Communications data can also contribute effectively to the prevention and prosecution of terrorism and organised crime. Following the judgment of the European Court of Justice on the Data Retention Directive, the Commission will continue monitoring legislative developments at national level. Fighting criminal organisations active in several EU countries also requires information exchange and cooperation between judicial authorities. 26 member states are using the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), which allows for information exchange on previous convictions for EU nationals. However, it does not work effectively for non-EU nationals convicted in the EU. The Commission will accelerate the work already under way to improve ECRIS for non-EU nationals and is ready to contribute to its effective implementation.

[...]
2.2 Increased operational cooperation

The Lisbon Treaty provides legal and practical arrangements to make operational cooperation between authorities of different member states effective.

Through the EU Policy Cycle for serious and organised crime, member states authorities coordinate common priorities and operational actions. The Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) plays a central role. The Policy Cycle provides a methodology for an intelligence-led approach to internal security, based on joint threat assessments coordinated within EUROPOL. It targets available resources in view of immediate, mid-term and long-term security threats and risks. The Policy Cycle should be used more by member states to launch concrete law enforcement operations to tackle organised crime, including with third countries. Operation Archimedes, coordinated by EUROPOL in September 2014 to address a variety of serious crimes across member states and third countries, provided a practical example of how this can help. Such operations should be evaluated regularly in order to identify best practices for future action.

[…] The revised cooperation agreement between EUROPOL and FRONTEX, once implemented, will allow such synergies by enabling the two agencies to share personal data with appropriate data protection safeguards. EUROJUST and EUROPOL should further enhance their operational cooperation. […]

Coordination hubs can facilitate a coherent European response during crises and emergencies, avoiding unnecessary and expensive duplication of efforts. In the framework of the Solidarity Clause, a member state can request EU assistance in case of crisis, including terrorist attacks. The EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre acts as the main 24/7 coordination and support platform for all crises under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, the Solidarity Clause and the Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements (IPCR). It relies on inputs from the Commission, EU agencies and member states. With increasing and new disaster risks, member states and the Commission need to work together to fully implement and operationalise the 2013 civil protection legislation, including following up on the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. The EU should continue reinforcing crisis management preparedness for a more efficient and coherent EU response to crises sparked by criminal acts, impacting on borders, public security and critical systems. This includes running more joint field exercises.

 […] Judicial cooperation in criminal matters also relies on effective cross-border instruments. Mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions is a key element in the security framework. Tools like the European Arrest Warrant have proved effective but other instruments, such as freezing and confiscation of criminal assets, are not yet used systematically in all appropriate cases. National judges should take advantage of the European Judicial Network (EJN) for the execution of European Arrest Warrants and freezing and confiscation orders. The implementation of the European Investigation Order will add a further essential tool. Member states should use EUROJUST more often to coordinate cross-border investigations and prosecutions. EUROJUST can also be a great help for complex mutual legal assistance requests with countries outside the EU, especially with the network of the EUROJUST contact points.

Finally, establishing the European Public Prosecutor’s Office will provide a new dimension to the specific issue of protecting losses to the EU budget from criminal activity.

2.3 Supporting action: training, funding, research and innovation

In addition to information exchange and operational cooperation, the EU provides support to security-related actions through training, funding and the promotion of security-related research and innovation. The Commission seeks to target this support in a strategic and cost-effective way. The effectiveness of cooperation tools relies on law enforcement officers in member states knowing
how to use them. Training is essential to allow authorities on the ground to exploit the tools in an operational situation.

[...]

The Commission has also established a European Security Training Centre that enables member states to improve their capabilities in detecting and identifying illicit nuclear or radioactive materials for threat prevention.

The recently created Internal Security Fund provides a responsive and flexible tool to address the most crucial challenges up to 2020. This Agenda provides strategic direction for the Fund, with a focus on those areas where financial support will bring most value added. Priority uses of the fund should include updating national sections of the Schengen Information System, implementing the Prüm framework and setting up Single Points of Contact. The Fund should also be used to strengthen cross-border operational cooperation under the EU Policy Cycle for serious and organised crime, and to develop ‘exit strategies’ for radicalised persons with the help of best practices exchanged in the Radicalisation Awareness Network. Other EU funding instruments, such as Horizon 2020 for research and innovation, the European Structural and Investment Funds, the EU Justice Programmes, the Customs 2020 Programme and financial instruments for external action can also contribute, in their respective areas, to support the priorities of the Agenda on Security.

The mid-term review of the Internal Security Fund in 2018 will provide an opportunity to take stock of how funding has helped to deliver the priorities of the Agenda and reprioritise as necessary.

Research and innovation is essential if the EU is to keep up-to-date with evolving security needs. Research can identify new security threats and their impacts on European societies. It also contributes to creating social trust in research-based new security policies and tools.

[...]

Horizon 2020 can play a central role in ensuring that the EU’s research effort is well targeted, including factoring in the needs of law enforcement authorities by further involving end-users at all stages of the process, from conception to market. More focus on innovation is also needed in the area of civil protection, where the creation of a knowledge centre in the framework of the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre, as well as the building of a community of users, will contribute to building an interface between research and end-users in member states.

[...]

3. Three priorities

In the coming five years, this framework for working better and more closely together should be deployed to address three main priorities for European security, while it is adaptable to other major threats that might evolve in the future.

- Terrorist attacks in Europe – most recently in Paris, Copenhagen, Brussels – have highlighted the need for a strong EU response to terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters. European citizens continue to join terrorist groups in conflict zones, acquiring training and posing a potential threat to European internal security on their return. While this issue is not new, the scale and the flow of fighters to on-going conflicts, in particular in Syria, Iraq and Libya, as well as the networked nature of these conflicts, are unprecedented.

- At the same time, serious and organised cross-border crime is finding new avenues to operate, and new ways to escape detection. There are huge human, social and economic costs – from crimes such as trafficking in human beings, trade in firearms, drug smuggling, and financial, economic and environmental crime. Organised crime groups involved in the smuggling of migrants exploit the vulnerabilities of people seeking protection or better economic opportunities and are responsible for the loss of lives in the name of profit.
Organised crime also feeds terrorism and cybercrime through channels like the supply of weapons, financing through drug smuggling, and the infiltration of financial markets. Finally, cybercrime is an ever-growing threat to citizens’ fundamental rights and to the economy, as well, to the development of a successful Digital Single Market. As commerce and banking shift online, cybercrime can represent a huge potential gain to criminals and a huge potential loss to citizens. [...] Criminals abuse anonymisation techniques and anonymous payment mechanisms for illicit online trade in drugs or weapons, for criminal transactions and money laundering. Cybercrime is also closely linked to child sexual exploitation, with a growing and alarming trend of child abuse through live streaming.

Terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime are the three core priorities which are highlighted in this Agenda for immediate action. They are clearly interlinked and cross-border threats, and their multifaceted and international dimension shows the need for an effective and coordinated response at [sic] EU level.

[...]

4. THE WAY FORWARD
The European Agenda on Security sets out the actions necessary to deliver a high level of internal security in the EU. It must be a shared agenda. Its successful implementation depends on the political commitment of all actors concerned to do more and to work better together. This includes EU institutions, member states and EU agencies. It requires a global perspective with security as one of our main external priorities. The EU must be able to react to unexpected events, seize new opportunities and anticipate and adapt to future trends and security risks.

The Commission invites the European Parliament and the Council to endorse this Agenda as the renewed Internal Security Strategy, with a view to the forthcoming European Council of June 2015. [...]

***

[excerpt – some footnotes have also been deleted]

1. INTRODUCTION
Events in Africa, in Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond point to a dramatic and deteriorating global security situation, with more than 1.5 billion people living in fragile and conflict affected regions worldwide. On current trends, this number is projected to grow to 2 billion by 2030. Countries in fragile situations have not reached the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), making violent conflict and poor governance continuing crucial developmental challenges. Fragility and violence have also been fuelled by new threats such as terrorism and organised crime.
Coordinated external action that makes use of the European Union’s (EU) diplomatic, security, development and humanitarian tools is essential to restore confidence and ensure that partner countries’ institutions are equipped to meet the challenges. The EU’s external action instruments have different and complementary roles. The link between security and development is a key underlying principle of the EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises and complementary to the internal security policies, maritime security and others. However, the EU’s comprehensive approach needs to be strengthened to cover gaps in the current EU response. For example, this may be the case where training has been provided by Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, but its sustainability and effectiveness has been hampered by a lack of basic partner country equipment.

On the basis of the December 2013 European Council conclusions and the April 2014 EU-African Union (AU) Summit Declaration, this Joint Communication identifies shortcomings and proposes remedial measures. While it addresses the issue of equipment to support partner countries’ security capacity building, it does not address the provision of lethal weapons. The EU will not provide such equipment.

2. THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN EU POLICIES

The primary objective of the EU’s development policy is the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty, but development policy also addresses sustainable development, inequalities, social injustice and human rights violations. This is essential in addressing the root causes of insecurity and conflict. At the same time, development cooperation objectives have to be taken into account in other EU policies that are likely to affect developing countries.

The EU is also responsible for defining and implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the progressive framing of a common defence policy. The CSDP, which forms an integral part of the CFSP, provides the EU with operational implementation capacities. The EU may use CSDP assets on missions outside its territory for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and perform as such a wide range of tasks.

The need for mutually reinforcing interventions in the areas of security and development is clear. The EU has consistently underlined that ‘security is a precondition for development’ and that ‘without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace’. Creating and fostering the political, social and economic conditions for stability is essential for a country’s security and a prerequisite for its development. This security-development nexus is central to maximising the effectiveness of the EU’s external action.

For any country to ensure its security and development, it must have or acquire adequate capacities in all critical sectors, including security and defence. This will not only stabilise that country but also enable it to contribute constructively to peace, stability and crisis prevention in its region.

2.1 Current efforts in capacity building

Peace and security actions are currently financed by the EU budget, inter alia, through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and its precursor, the Instrument for Stability (IFS). For example, the IcSP provides, as part of a larger capacity building project, equipment to the Cameroon police to support the fight against Boko Haram (as the latter is a destabilising factor in West Africa and as such puts at risk EU and partner countries’ development and stability).
Within the European Development Fund (EDF), the African Peace Facility (APF) provides support to the African Union and regional economic communities to prevent and if necessary manage crises. Funding covers, *inter alia*, operational costs for African peacekeeping operations (excluding salaries), the financing of training and exercises, command, control and communication systems, or fact-finding missions. Since its creation in 2003, the APF has channelled more than EUR 1.2 billion to African peace-building efforts. Recent examples of financial support to African-led peace support operations include the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM has been supported with around EUR 800 million since 2007. It plays a critical role in providing minimum security conditions for the political process in Somalia and for the provision of humanitarian assistance by humanitarian actors. It also helps creating favourable conditions for reconstruction, reconciliation and sustainable development in the country. Finally, EU financial support to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) seeks to strengthen the capacity and effective functioning of APSA and to improve cooperation to prevent and, if necessary, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa.

These examples show that security sector capacity building may be focused on civilian and/or police forces but also on the military. Security-related functions may follow different organisational structures in different countries. For instance, civil protection, border control and coast guard functions may be military, civilian or hybrid in nature.

2.2 Challenges to effective delivery on the ground: the pilot cases

[...]

3. IMPROVING THE DELIVERY OF CAPACITY BUILDING IN SUPPORT OF SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

3.1 The framework

From the point of view of primary law, two fundamental principles need to be considered. The same action cannot be financed both by a CFSP measure and an instrument based on Articles 209/212 TFEU. This means, to give an example, that capacity building in the security sector under a potential new instrument may be undertaken in the framework of the EU’s development cooperation if its objective and content fall within the scope of development policy. The Treaties exclude the possibility of using the EU budget for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications (see Article 41(2) TEU). This makes the European Development Fund and the African Peace Facility as instruments outside the EU budget particularly relevant in the current efforts to ‘bridge’ the gap between CSDP and various development instruments when attempting to comprehensively address security-development nexus issues. In addition, financing of capacity building in the security sector under Articles 209 and 212 TFEU is not per se excluded, regardless of the civilian or military nature of the beneficiary but requires a case-by-case assessment. [...]

3.2 Making more of our current instruments

Existing instruments within the EU budget

A significant part of external assistance programmes funded by the EU’s development and technical cooperation instruments already tackles security and development challenges. In the current MFF, nine national and eight regional or thematic programmes aim to support conflict prevention and resolution and peace and security-related activities. In addition, in 45 countries programmes are being developed with a broader focus on governance and the rule of law, including possible support to transition from missions and operations under CSDP to other instruments.
However, under the IcSP, IPA, ENI, DCI and EIDHR, financial support in favour of capacity building in the security sector is subject to various limitations, as explained above. As a consequence, there is currently no EU budget instrument designed to provide a comprehensive financing to security capacity building in partner countries, in particular its military component. This has been the case for the past decade. When in 2004 the European Commission proposed an earlier Instrument for Stability, it did propose to extend the legal basis to the financing of long-term support for capacity building in the field of military peace support operations. However, the final text did not contain references to military or peace-support operations due to opposition from the co-legislators. Civil society had also voiced opposition.

Existing instruments outside the EU budget
Outside the EU budget, the EDF provides further operational resources to implement the EU’s development cooperation policy with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.

[...]
Member states have repeatedly raised the issue of its financial sustainability and of the need to consider alternative funding options to EDF.

[...]
However, the EU and partner countries and regions have identified peace and security or security sector reform as a priority sector in several regional and national indicative programmes under the EDF. While financing security capacity building, including of the military, is possible under the APF, it is subject to a number of other limitations which may prevent the effective use of this Facility in addressing all situations with which the EU is confronted.

Last but not least, resources for EU military operations are also allocated outside the EU budget by member states, either directly by those participating in CFSP/CSDP operations or through the ATHENA mechanism. ATHENA manages the financing of common costs relating to EU military operations under the CSDP. These costs concern, *inter alia*, headquarters’ implementation and running costs, infrastructure, logistics and mission support. Currently, ATHENA does not cover the costs incurred by a partner country supported through a mission or operation. Recently, the Council adopted a review of the ATHENA Council Decision which, *inter alia*, allows the ATHENA mechanism to implement EU budget funds, in conformity with existing rules and procedures.

Coordination and coherence
Despite the limitations described above, more could be achieved within the existing framework through the application of a more coherent and a more coordinated approach.

[...]
While respecting the existing institutional and legal frameworks, the following practical measures could improve coordination within the EU, including with and among member states at strategic and operational levels:

i. Enhance information sharing of ongoing and planned capacity building support activities in the broader crisis prevention management areas (including support to justice and security sectors) conducted through the bilateral cooperation of member states, the EU development and technical cooperation instruments and CSDP activities.

ii. Extend information sharing to the EU’s multilateral partners (including the UN, NATO and OSCE) and other third countries and strategic partners with whom the EU shares convergent and complementary priorities.

iii. Draw on the introduction of the Political Framework for Crisis Approach process to intensify the ties between services handling development cooperation and security policy
matters. This will foster a comprehensive analysis of the EU’s engagement in a given context before deciding upon new CSDP or non-CSDP actions.

iv. CSDP actions should make better use of development cooperation expertise. Equally, development programmes can benefit from CSDP and member state expertise. This includes ensuring coherence, including between the work of the instrument-specific management committees and the work of the CSDP Council working parties.

v. Organise more regular and systematic interaction between EU Delegations and the CSDP mission and/or operations at partner country level. Establish joint reporting to respective management chains in headquarters. Standardise the secondment of CSDP mission and operation liaison officers to EU Delegations and include this in the staffing and calls for contributions for the CSDP missions and operations.

To support and implement these commitments, the following initiatives should be further developed through relevant proposals from the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High Representative):

i. An EU-wide strategic framework, shared by CSDP and development cooperation policy, for Security Sector Reform. A common Security Sector Reform policy framework should respect the regulatory constraints of existing instruments.

 [...]  

ii. A shared evaluation, monitoring and results framework for security capacity building and Security Sector Reform-related activities, irrespective of the policy framework under which they are conducted.

iii. A dedicated risk management methodology on EU support to the security sector of partner countries or organisations. This could draw, for example, on the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy developed to guide UN engagement in support of the security sector, and on the risk management framework developed for EU Budget Support operations.

4. WAY FORWARD: A NEW COMMITMENT TO DELIVER ON PEACE AND STABILITY WITH OUR PARTNERS

The EU remains committed to its ambition to play a key role in ensuring international peace and stability, preventing conflicts and creating conditions for global sustainable development. Enabling partner countries and regional organisations to increasingly prevent and manage crises by themselves through efficient EU support to their security capacity building is one of the most important tools in this endeavour.

Building on experience so far, it is time to step up efforts. We expect the European Council of June 2015 to provide further political commitment and guidance on better addressing the security-development nexus. [...] 

Given the broad nature of the challenge, existing limitations should not only be addressed through ad hoc arrangements. Instead, the European Commission and the High Representative are of the opinion that the practical feasibility of the three following actions should be considered:

i. A proposal to adapt the African Peace Facility to address its limitations;

ii. The establishment of a facility linking peace, security and development in the framework of one or more existing instruments;

iii. A dedicated instrument to this effect.

Any proposals would have to be subject to prior impact assessments which should analyse, inter alia, potential political, reputational and budgetary consequences, as well as the impact on fundamental rights. The Commission’s political commitment to propose to budgetise the EDF needs to be taken into account with regard to this debate.
Member states are also invited to consider extending the ATHENA mechanism to include capacity building in partner countries. […]

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EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS, 25-26 JUNE 2015 [excerpt]

I. MIGRATION

Europe needs a balanced and geographically comprehensive approach to migration, based on solidarity and responsibility. Following the decisions taken by the European Council last April, concrete measures have been taken to prevent further loss of life at sea, to find new ways of confronting smugglers and to intensify cooperation with countries of origin and transit, while respecting the right to seek asylum. The launch of the EUNAVFOR MED mission, decided on 22 June by the Council, is an important contribution in this respect. Operational action to tackle the traffickers and smugglers in accordance with international law is an essential part of our comprehensive approach.

Further to the Commission’s European Agenda on Migration, work should be taken forward on all dimensions of a comprehensive and systemic approach.

Wider efforts, including the reinforcement of the management of the Union’s external borders, are required to better contain the growing flows of illegal migration. Today, the European Council focused on three key dimensions which must be advanced in parallel: relocation/resettlement, return/readmission/reintegration and cooperation with countries of origin and transit. The Council will regularly assess progress in all three strands and report back later in the year.

Relocation/resettlement

In the light of the current emergency situation and of our commitment to reinforce solidarity and responsibility, and in line with its April decision in all its regards, including paragraph 3, the European Council agreed on the following interlinked measures to help 60,000 people:

(d) the temporary and exceptional relocation over two years from the frontline member states Italy and Greece to other member states of 40,000 persons in clear need of international protection, in which all member states will participate;

(e) the rapid adoption by the Council of a Decision to this effect; to that end, all member states will agree by consensus by the end of July on the distribution of such persons, reflecting the specific situations of member states;

(f) the setting up of reception and first reception facilities in the frontline member states, with the active support of member states’ experts and of EASO, FRONTEX and EUROPOL to ensure the swift identification, registration and fingerprinting of migrants (‘hotspots’). This will allow to determine those who need international protection and those who do not. The Commission will draw up, in close cooperation with the hosting member states, a roadmap by July 2015 on the legal, financial and operational aspects of these facilities;

(g) the immediate provision of enhanced financial assistance to the frontline member states to help alleviate the costs of receiving and processing applications for international protection;

(h) the agreement that all member states will participate including through multilateral and national schemes in the resettling of 20,000 displaced persons in clear need of international protection, reflecting the specific situations of member states.
**Return/readmission/reintegration**

Effective return, readmission and reintegration policies for those not qualifying for protection are an essential part of combating illegal migration and will help discourage people from risking their lives. All tools shall be mobilised to promote readmission of irregular migrants to countries of origin and transit, building on the ideas presented by the Commission at the Council on 16 June. In particular:

(a) High-level dialogues with the main countries of origin of irregular migrants should be launched by the High Representative as soon as possible, in close cooperation with the member states. The Council, together with the Commission, will prepare a global package to support the negotiations with the third countries concerned;

(b) The Commission will ensure that readmission commitments are implemented effectively as soon as possible, notably those under the Cotonou Agreement, and that ongoing negotiations on readmission agreements are accelerated and concluded as soon as possible, while new negotiations will be launched with other third countries;

(c) Building on the ‘more-for-more’ principle, EU assistance and policies will be used to create incentives for implementing existing readmission agreements and concluding new ones. Commitments set out in trade agreements regarding the temporary presence of persons for the provision of services should be used as an incentive to conclude readmission agreements; development policy tools should reinforce local capacity building, including for border control, asylum, counter-smuggling and reintegration;

(d) Member states will fully implement the Return Directive, making full use of all measures it provides to ensure the swift return of irregular migrants; return decisions issued by the member states will be introduced in the Schengen Information System;

(e) The Commission will set out by July 2015 how FRONTEX will bring immediate support to frontline States on return. The Commission has announced its intention to propose to amend the FRONTEX Regulation to strengthen the role of FRONTEX, notably so that it can initiate return missions;

(f) In order to accelerate the treatment of asylum applications, the Commission will set out by July 2015 measures to be taken to use EASO to coordinate the implementation of the ‘safe country of origin’ provisions in the Asylum Procedures Directive. The Commission has indicated its intention to strengthen the ‘safe country of origin’ provisions in the Asylum Procedures Directive, including the possible establishment of a common EU list of safe countries of origin;

(g) Adequate means will rapidly be made available in support of an effective EU return policy; furthermore, the Commission is invited to make proposals in this respect in the context of the 2016 EU budget, and to set up a dedicated European Return Programme.

**Cooperation with countries of origin and transit**

It is crucial to reinforce our overall cooperation with countries of origin and transit, both on stemming the flows of irregular migrants and on tackling the root causes of migration so as to reduce the incentives for illegal migration and to combat the smuggling networks. Development assistance will play an important role in this respect.

A true partnership between European and African countries, working together to tackle illegal migration in an integrated way, is essential. The Valletta Summit will seek in particular to achieve, together with the African partners:

(h) Assistance to partner countries in their fight against smugglers;

(i) A strengthened cooperation on an effective return policy;
better targeting of development cooperation and enhancing investments in Africa to address the root causes of migration, as well as providing economic and social opportunities.

The Council will prepare proposals for areas of cooperation with countries of origin and transit for the Valletta Summit.

The EU will also step up its cooperation with Turkey and the relevant countries in the Middle East (notably Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon).

A high-level conference will be organised to address the challenges of the Western Balkans route.

II. Security and Defence

Europe’s security environment has changed dramatically. This requires action in three interconnected areas:

(a) further to the Commission’s ‘European Agenda on Security’ and the Council conclusions of 16 June 2015, work will be taken forward on the renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy; full implementation of the orientations on the fight against terrorism agreed at the February 2015 meeting remains a priority;

(b) the High Representative will continue the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with member states, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016;

(c) in line with the European Council conclusions of December 2013 and the Council conclusions of 18 May 2015, work will continue on a more effective, visible and result oriented CSDP, the further development of both civilian and military capabilities, and the strengthening of Europe’s defence industry, including SMEs. The European Council recalls the need for:

- the member states to allocate a sufficient level of expenditure for defence and the need to make the most effective use of the resources;
- the EU budget to ensure appropriate funding for the preparatory action on CSDP-related research, paving the way for a possible future defence research and technology programme;
- fostering greater and more systematic European defence cooperation to deliver key capabilities, including through EU funds;
- mobilising EU instruments to help counter hybrid threats;
- intensifying partnerships, namely with the UN, NATO, OSCE and AU;
- empowering and enabling partners to prevent and manage crises, including through concrete projects of capacity building with a flexible geographic scope.

The European Council will keep security and defence policy regularly on its agenda.

[...]

IV. UNITED KINGDOM

The UK Prime Minister set out his plans for an (in/out) referendum in the UK. The European Council agreed to revert to the matter in December.

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State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity, President J.-C. Juncker, 9 Sept. 2015
[excerpt]

Mr President,
Honourable Members of the European Parliament,
Today is the first time during my mandate as President of the European Commission that I have the honour to address this House on the State of our European Union.
[...]
This is why I said last September before this House that I wanted to lead a political Commission. A very political Commission.
I said this not because I believe we can and should politicise everything.
I said it because I believe the immense challenges Europe is currently facing – both internally and externally – leave us no choice but to address them from a very political perspective, in a very political manner and having the political consequences of our decisions very much in mind.
Recent events have confirmed the urgent need for such a political approach in the European Union. This is not the time for business as usual. This is not the time for ticking off lists or checking whether this or that sectorial initiative has found its way into the State of the Union speech. This is not the time to count how many times the word social, economic or sustainable appears in the State of the Union speech.
Instead, it is time for honesty. It is time to speak frankly about the big issues facing the European Union. Because our European Union is not in a good state. There is not enough Europe in this Union.
And there is not enough Union in this Union. We have to change this. And we have to change this now.
The Refugee Crisis: The Imperative to Act as a Union
Whatever work programmes or legislative agendas say: The first priority today is and must be addressing the refugee crisis.
[...]
Now is not the time to take fright. It is time for bold, determined and concerted action by the European Union, by its institutions and by all its member states.
This is first of all a matter of humanity and of human dignity. And for Europe it is also a matter of historical fairness.
We Europeans should remember well that Europe is a continent where nearly everyone has at one time been a refugee. Our common history is marked by millions of Europeans fleeing from religious or political persecution, from war, dictatorship, or oppression.
[...]
We Europeans should know and should never forget why giving refuge and complying with the fundamental right to asylum is so important.
I have said in the past that we are too seldom proud of our European heritage and our European project. Yet, in spite of our fragility, our self-perceived weaknesses, today it is Europe that is sought as a place of refuge and exile. It is Europe today that represents a beacon of hope, a haven of stability in the eyes of women and men in the Middle East and in Africa. That is something to be proud of and not something to fear. Europe today, in spite of many differences amongst its member states, is by far the wealthiest and most stable continent in the world. We have the means to help those fleeing from war, terror and oppression. I know that many now will want to say that this is all very well, but Europe cannot take everybody. [...]
There has been a lot finger pointing in the past weeks. Member states have accused each other of not doing enough or of doing the wrong thing. And more often than not fingers have been pointed from national capitals towards Brussels.

We could all be angry about this blame-game. But I wonder who that would serve. Being angry does not help anyone. And the attempt of blaming others is often just a sign that politicians are overwhelmed by unexpected events.

Instead, we should rather recall what has been agreed that can help in the current situation. It is time to look at what is on the table and move swiftly forwards.

We are not starting anew. Since the early 2000s, the Commission has persistently tabled legislation after legislation, to build a Common European Asylum System. And the Parliament and the Council have enacted this legislation, piece by piece. The last piece of legislation entered into force just in July 2015.

Across Europe we now have common standards for the way we receive asylum seekers, in respect of their dignity, for the way we process their asylum applications, and we have common criteria which our independent justice systems use to determine whether someone is entitled to international protection. But these standards need to be implemented and respected in practice. […] Common asylum standards are important, but not enough to cope with the current refugee crisis. The Commission, the Parliament and the Council said this in spring. The Commission tabled a comprehensive European Agenda on Migration in May. And it would be dishonest to say that nothing has happened since then.

We tripled our presence at sea. Over 122,000 lives have been saved since then. Every life lost is one too many, but many more have been rescued that would have been lost otherwise – an increase of 250%.

Twenty-nine member states and Schengen Associated countries are participating in the joint operations coordinated by FRONTEX in Italy, Greece and Hungary. 102 guest officers from 20 countries; 31 ships; 3 helicopters; 4 fixed wing aircrafts; 8 patrol cars, 6 thermo-vision vehicles and 4 transport vehicles – that is a first measure of European solidarity in action, even though more will have to be done.

We have redoubled our efforts to tackle smugglers and dismantle human trafficker groups. Cheap ships are now harder to come by, leading to less people putting their lives in peril in rickety, unseaworthy boats. As a result, the Central Mediterranean route has stabilised at around 115,000 arriving during the month of August, the same as last year. We now need to achieve a similar stabilisation of the Balkans route, which has clearly been neglected by all policy-makers.

The European Union is also the number one donor in the global efforts to alleviate the Syrian refugee crisis. Around €4 billion have been mobilised by the European Commission and member states in humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation assistance to Syrians in their country and to refugees and their host communities in neighbouring Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt. Indeed just today we launched two new projects to provide schooling and food security to 240,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey.

We have collectively committed to resettling over 22,000 people from outside of Europe over the next year, showing solidarity with our neighbours. Of course, this remains very modest in comparison to the Herculean efforts undertaken by Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, who are hosting over 4 million Syrian refugees. I am encouraged that some member states are showing their willingness to significantly step up our European resettlement efforts. This will allow us very soon to come forward with a structured system to pool European resettlement efforts more systematically.

Where Europe has clearly under-delivered, is on common solidarity with regard to the refugees who have arrived on our territory. To me, it is clear that the member states where most refugees first arrive – at the moment, these are Italy, Greece and Hungary – cannot be left alone to cope with this challenge. This is why the Commission already proposed an emergency mechanism in May, to relocate initially 40,000 people seeking international protection from Italy and Greece. And this is why today we are proposing a second emergency mechanism to relocate a further 120,000 from Italy, Greece and Hungary.

[...]
I call on member states to adopt the Commission proposals on the emergency relocation of altogether 160,000 refugees at the Extraordinary Council of Interior Ministers on 14 September. We now need immediate action. We cannot leave Italy, Greece and Hungary to fare alone. Just as we would not leave any other EU member state alone. For if it is Syria and Libya people are fleeing from today, it could just as easily be Ukraine tomorrow.

Europe has made the mistake in the past of distinguishing between Jews, Christians, Muslims. There is no religion, no belief, no philosophy when it comes to refugees.

[...]

Of course, relocation alone will not solve the issue. It is true that we also need to separate better those who are in clear need of international protection and are therefore very likely to apply for asylum successfully; and those who are leaving their country for other reasons which do not fall under the right of asylum. This is why today the Commission is proposing a common EU list of safe countries of origin. This list will enable member states to fast track asylum procedures for nationals of countries that are presumed safe to live in. This presumption of safety must in our view certainly apply to all countries which the European Council unanimously decided meet the basic Copenhagen criteria for EU membership – notably as regards democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights. It should also apply to the other potential candidate countries on the Western Balkans, in view of their progress made towards candidate status.

[...]

I also believe that beyond the immediate action needed to address current emergencies, it is time we prepare a more fundamental change in the way we deal with asylum applications – and notably the Dublin system that requires that asylum applications be dealt with by the first country of entry.

We need more Europe in our asylum policy. We need more Union in our refugee policy. A true European refugee and asylum policy requires solidarity to be permanently anchored in our policy approach and our rules. This is why, today, the Commission is also proposing a permanent relocation mechanism, which will allow us to deal with crisis situations more swiftly in the future.

A common refugee and asylum policy requires further approximation of asylum policies after refugee status is granted. Member states need to take a second look at their support, integration and inclusion policies. The Commission is ready to look into how EU Funds can support these efforts. And I am strongly in favour of allowing asylum seekers to work and earn their own money whilst their applications are being processed.

A united refugee and asylum policy also requires stronger joint efforts to secure our external borders. Fortunately, we have given up border controls between the member states of the Schengen area, to guarantee free movement of people, a unique symbol of European integration. But the other side of the coin to free movement is that we must work together more closely to manage our external borders. This is what our citizens expect. The Commission said it back in May, and I said it during my election campaign: We need to strengthen FRONTEX significantly and develop it into a fully operational European border and coast guard system. It is certainly feasible. But it will cost money. The Commission believes this is money well invested. This is why we will propose ambitious steps towards a European Border and Coast Guard before the end of the year.

A truly united, European migration policy also means that we need to look into opening legal channels for migration. Let us be clear: this will not help in addressing the current refugee crisis. But if there are more, safe and controlled roads opened to Europe, we can manage migration better and make the illegal work of human traffickers less attractive. Let us not forget, we are an ageing continent in demographic decline. We will be needing talent. Over time, migration must change from a problem to be tackled to a well-managed resource. To this end, the Commission will come forward with a well-designed legal migration package in early 2016.

A lasting solution will only come if we address the root causes, the reasons why we are currently facing
this important refugee crisis. Our European foreign policy must be more assertive. We can no longer afford to be ignorant or disunited with regard to war or instability right in our neighbourhood.

[...] Today I call for a European diplomatic offensive to address the crises in Syria and in Libya. We need a stronger Europe when it comes to foreign policy. And I am very glad that Federica Mogherini, our determined High Representative, has prepared the ground for such an initiative with her diplomatic success in the Iran nuclear talks. And that she stands ready to work closely together with our member states towards peace and stability in Syria and Libya.

To facilitate Federica’s work, today the Commission is proposing to establish an emergency Trust Fund, starting with €1.8 billion from our common EU financial means to address the crises in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions, the Horn of Africa, and the North of Africa. We want to help create lasting stability, for instance by creating employment opportunities in local communities, and thereby address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and illegal migration. I expect all EU member states to pitch in and match our ambitions.

I do not want to create any illusions that the refugee crisis will be over any time soon. It will not. But pushing back boats from piers, setting fire to refugee camps, or turning a blind eye to poor and helpless people: that is not Europe.

[...] A fair deal for Britain

Since I took office, things have become clearer as regards the United Kingdom: before the end of 2017, there will be a referendum on whether Britain remains in the Union or not. This will of course be a decision for voters in the United Kingdom. But it would not be honest nor realistic to say that this decision will not be of strategic importance for the Union as a whole.

I have always said that I want the UK to stay in the European Union. And that I want to work together with the British government on a fair deal for Britain. The British are asking fundamental questions to and of the EU. Whether the EU delivers prosperity for its citizens. Whether the action of the EU concentrates on areas where it can deliver results. Whether the EU is open to the rest of the world. These are questions to which the EU has answers, and not just for the sake of the UK. All 28 EU member states want the EU to be modern and focused for the benefit of all its citizens. We all agree that the EU must adapt and change in view of the major challenges and crisis we are facing at the moment. This is why we are completing the Single Market, slashing red tape, improving the investment climate for small businesses.

[...] Over a year ago, when I campaigned to become President of the Commission, I made a vow that, as President, I would seek a fair deal for Britain. A deal that is fair for Britain. And that is also fair for the 27 other member states.

[...] In key areas, we can achieve much more by acting collectively, than we could each on our own. This is in particular the case for the tremendous foreign policy challenges Europe is currently facing and which I will address in the next part of this speech.

United alongside Ukraine

[...] We have more than 40 active conflicts in the world at the moment. While these conflicts rage, whilst families are broken and homes reduced to rubble, I cannot come to you, almost 60 years after the birth of the European Union and pitch you peace. For the world is not at peace. If we want to promote a more peaceful world, we will need more Europe and more Union in our foreign policy. This is most urgent towards Ukraine.
We have already done a lot, lending €3.41 billion in three Macro-Financial Assistance programmes, helping to broker a deal that will secure Ukraine’s winter gas supplies and advising on the reform of the judiciary. The EU and all its member states must contribute if we are to succeed. We will also need to maintain our unity. We need unity when it comes to the security of our Eastern member states, notably the Baltics. The security and the borders of EU member states are untouchable. I want this to be understood very clearly in Moscow. We need more unity when it comes to sanctions. The sanctions the EU has imposed on Russia have a cost for each of our economies, and repercussions on important sectors, like farming. But sanctions are a powerful tool in confronting aggression and violation of international law. They are a policy that needs to be kept in place until the Minsk Agreements are complied with in full. We will have to keep our nerve and our unity.

The EU must show Russia the cost of confrontation but it must also make clear it is prepared to engage. I do not want a Europe that stands on the sidelines of history. I want a Europe that leads. When the European Union stands united, we can change the world.

This is simply not good enough if we want to cope with the present, immense challenges. We have to change our way of working. We have to be faster. We have to be more European in our method. Not because we want power at European level. But because we need urgently better and swifter results. We need more Europe in our Union. We need more Union in our Union.

It is a pleasure to be here and thank you very much for arranging this. I know that over the past two days you have been discussing ‘why strategy matters’. In a world that is more connected, conflictual and more complex, strategy matters to provide us with a sense of direction; to help us navigate choppy waters; to be proactive in the protection and in the pursuits of our interests. And, I know already what you are going to ask. This is normally the first question I get. It is about interests and values. I know you. So let me be clear: I believe that our interests and our values can only go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our values around the globe. And the way we articulate our interests has to embed our fundamental values. So, we need a strategy to protect proactively our interests, keeping in mind that promoting our values is an integral part of our interests. I hope this clarifies (this point) from the very beginning.

Many of you have been advocates of a new strategy for the European Union – for months now, and probably for years for some of you. So I do not need to convince you why this is an important project. Still, I would like to take a few minutes today to outline what we want to achieve with the European Union Global Strategy and why now it is such a crucial moment for doing this. We live in very un-strategic times. Policy issues get under the spotlight following emotional waves: a YouTube video, or a tragic picture... Sometimes emotions push in the right direction - we have
seen it recently – sometimes they don’t. But emotions are never enough. As policy makers, we need to move beyond emotions and think strategically. Reacting to crises is essential. But reaction alone is not enough. This is a basic rule of politics and of foreign policy, since the ancient times. I never quote anyone, but in this case I think I can make an exception quoting Demosthenes, who warned his fellow Athenians: do not behave like the boxer who gets struck and “always clutches the place. He gets hit on the other side, and there go his hands. He neither knows nor cares how to parry a blow, or how to watch his adversary”. We must think about our next move, and the following one. This means being strategic.

Unless we cast our response in a clear framework, unless we make plans to stay engaged even after the eyes of the international media have turned away, we will forever be chasing one crisis after the next. And the list is very long. We cannot let sensationalism dictate our agenda. We need a sense of direction, and a common one; we need conflict prevention and post-crisis management, we need a strong narrative to underpin our day-to-day work. And at the same time, in a world – and in a Union – of limited resources, we need to prioritise. We need to define where we can, where we must, and where we want to make a difference.

Do not get me wrong: I do not believe that more attention from the media on foreign policy is a bad thing, or that emotions on foreign policy are a bad thing – on the contrary. As the link between internal and external security tightens, and the world becomes more connected, more people are beginning to care about what happens elsewhere. And actually ‘elsewhere’ is becoming quite an indefinite criterion. Think of the events of recent months and weeks: it is perfectly clear to everybody that the ‘out there’ often has a direct impact on ‘right here’. Foreign policy is no longer the exclusive domain of diplomats, or of policy makers, or even of the foreign policy community – that, I see, is very well represented in this room. Foreign policy concerns all of us, European citizens and not only Europeans. And this opens important chances for us.

It opens a chance to show that Europe matters to its citizens. That our foreign policy is connected to our citizens’ needs, to their own priorities. Think of our response to migration. You might be surprised that I give you this example, because this is one of the most difficult issues that we have tackled in these recent months. But think of our naval operation in the Mediterranean, this sends a message, a powerful one, to our Europeans citizens that faced with a tragedy right off our shores: Europe got together, and in less than two months our ships where ready to sail, to chase smugglers of migrants and to save lives. So, in this case our foreign policy helped – I believe – reconnect our citizens to the European project. It is a small part of the puzzle but if you multiply that small part of the puzzle, you might have a good picture in the end.

This is the sense of our strategy, a strategy that is not only about foreign policy, it is not only about our role in the World, but it can be and must be very much about us, about Europe, about who we are, how we work together, what as Europeans we share in terms on common foreign and security policy. It is about making a European public opinion on foreign policy and security policy emerge.

That is why we all have a role to play in shaping it. This is the reason why an EU Global Strategy cannot be drawn up behind closed doors. We are gathering as many voices as possible to feed into the debates on an EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy. Your ideas, the ideas of the European community on foreign and security policy are a crucial input to this debate and to the strategy that will spring from our exchanges over the coming months. I am here today because I believe that when it comes to strategy-making in the European Union, the process is as crucial as the document that will come out of it.

This is the moment to open up beyond the circles of the foreign policy community and get everybody involved. If we get the process right, it will bode well for the future of the strategy. I want a strategy that responds to the ideas, the fears, and even the dreams of the European citizens, the young and the older generations. The North, the South, the East and the West of our continent, the capital cities and the small villages – not only Europe as we normally think of it, but the Europeans.
The document we are working on will have to be a living document. We will need to have it constantly updated through time. In these months, we are also putting together a community. A community that will help us review and adapt the Strategy to future challenges. What makes our Union so special is its diversity, the way it brings together different histories, perspectives, and interests, and forges a common vision of the world. We can and we must use this diversity as our main point of strength. The diversity of our backgrounds and of our instruments is our natural resource. It is the European natural resource – provided that we put it in the service of our common purpose, of our common strategy. Let us not forget what we are good at as Europeans. The European Union has many strings in its bow. From diplomacy to development, from trade to energy, from migration to cyber policies. We are still exploring the full potential of the Lisbon Treaty. My task as High Representative, and at the same time Vice President of the European Commission, is to bring these tools together in a coherent way, to form a whole, a European Union policy.

This is the reason why I was determined to work not just on a narrow security strategy, but on a ‘global strategy’. And by ‘global’ I am not referring only to geography, but also to the whole range of instruments at our disposal. The threats we face are changing in nature. Think of Daesh. Conflicts for the control of land and resources have made an unexpected comeback in recent years. But at the same time, and in the very same conflicts, we need to cope with new kinds of propaganda and information war. Hybrid threats are the new normal. To stabilise places like Iraq, or Libya, we will need to train their security forces as much as we will need to strengthen their other institutions, or to foster development. Security and defence will no doubt occupy an important place in the strategy. But the value of our work on what we commonly traditionally define security and defence will be enhanced – and not diluted – by being discussed together with other instruments we have and can be complemented.

So, we need first of all to agree on some core principles. The Strategy cannot just list the current crises and explain our relevant policies. This would not be a strategy, this would be a state of play, this would be a collection of Council conclusions. Strategy needs to provide a direction for the future, to tackle future crises and to prevent new ones. As we begin our common conversation of what this should entail, I would like to outline some of the key ideas I would like to see reflected in the strategy.

The first is engagement. In a more connected world we need to engage. We face seemingly innumerable crises – let alone stronger financial constraints. Our instinct can be – and in same case is, in parts of Europe – to turn inwards. But closure is not an option for our Union. Building walls, physical or psychological ones, will not protect us. They cannot keep the messy world outside, while we wrap ourselves in cotton wool. Just think about the phenomenon of foreign fighters: the reality is that our continent exports more than imports terrorism; it is European citizens that go off to wage violent jihad in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere; not the reverse. They have European Union passports. Walls are of little use when there is no fine line separating the inside from the outside. In a world where the traditional boundaries between internal and external policies no longer hold, turning inwards will only make us more vulnerable, not protected. Or look at it at from a different angle. Closure also means that we will miss out on the opportunities that our global links present. Be it in terms of trade, human mobility or technology – a more connected world offers us, Europeans, unprecedented opportunities. Engaging is a choice, it is up to us. We can make the most of the opportunities which a more connected world presents. Let us not stick our heads in the sand. We must embrace change. Europe has been able to do that is past centuries. We must seek to shape a world order, in which cooperation thrives over confrontation.

The second main principle I would like to see reflected in this strategy, is responsibility. Because we must engage, but we need to rethink how we do so. In a world that is more conflictual and chaotic we need to be guided by a clear sense of responsibility. Now, what do we mean by responsibility? Responsibility to me does not mean that we should carry the weight of the world on our shoulders. And here, let me say that sometimes I have the impression that we move from one opposite to the other. Sometimes we move from a sense of being completely irrelevant and frustrated about not being able to do anything at all, to
the opposite, the need to take care of all that is happening in the world. Now, we need to find a balance. A realistic, pragmatic one that, to me, means also an ambitious one. To me, our pragmatic approach means also being very ambitious. But let me be clear on one thing: the illusion of a ‘global policeman’ is long gone. There is no ‘one size fits all’ solution to conflicts. Less still solutions that can be imposed from outside, be it by the European Union or by other global actors. In a world where power is more fractured, global security can only be the result of a collective effort.

We therefore need to pioneer the way towards a new form of engagement in conflicts. In responsibility, in sharing responsibility. A way that works from the bottom up. That supports local and regional initiatives aimed at reconciliation and resilience. We need to work on creating the broader international conditions and partnerships – I will come back to that – to support local and regional peace efforts, so as to embed them into a broader international framework. Be it in Syria, Libya, Yemen or elsewhere, and together with our international partners, we need to think long, act local and broker regional. There is no magic wand solution to put things right overnight, from above. And even if we really wanted to believe in this sort of Cinderella approach, we should remember the magic lasts only until midnight. Then the carriage turns into a pumpkin again. So we would live an illusion.

This brings me to a third key principle: no magic solutions but hard work and partnership. Partnership, I think, is embedded in the European DNA. The notion of partnership. In the face of current challenges no one can go it alone, it is clear to everyone. Nor, in a world that is so much more connected and complex, should we have to. As Europeans we have practiced building common grounds over decades, after centuries of making war. Remaining united as Europeans now is more important than ever. In this regard I am always a little bit surprised – but in the end of the day it is only rational – to see the importance that all of our partners give – for good or for bad – to our internal unity. Ever since the conflict over Ukraine erupted, this is the one demand that Ukrainians have always consistently made to us. Maintaining our internal unity is our strength, this is the one thing that President Poroshenko tirelessly insists on. And I am proud we managed to respond always positively. And let me say, I believe (unity) is also the one thing that President Putin was most probably surprised about.

Forging internal unity within the EU is essential. But in a complex world in which new powers rise and power diffuses, we need to rethink partnerships at the regional and global level too. This means promoting our principles and interest, but also listening to our partners’ views and priorities. A true partnership can never be built on one party determining the rules of the game or the content of the story you want to tell together. Partners are equal, have to be. And the partnership is as strong as each of the partners is. We need strong powers, not to be the strongest part of the partnership.

Time and again, we are learning that the best way to promote our values and interests is through cooperation on a global scale. The deal with Iran shows the way. It shows that multilateralism is still the most powerful tool that we have in our hands, if and when we manage to make it work. We need to keep on that path. Cooperation can benefit everyone and we can pivot a global network of regional and international networks towards a rules-based and cooperative world order. The essence of the European Union, together with the idea of partnerships – I believe – is the win-win concept. Never as today, the world needs it; the peoples of the world need it.

Because when we rethink partnerships we need to reach out much beyond governments. Depending on the challenge at hand, our partnerships can involve states, regional and international organizations, but they can also include civil society and the private sector, all of which are necessary to build stable and prosperous and resilient societies. And let me mention in this respect that the Nobel Peace Prize that was awarded today is, I believe, a very clear reminder of the role that the civil society and the private sector can have in making societies and countries resilient and peaceful.

To conclude, a Global strategy for the Union’s foreign and security policy will help us prioritise and focus our actions, deal with events effectively and shape some of the events of the future. Our strategy will strengthen a common European vision. Today more than ever, we need a common project rather than
just a list of things to do together. We need a document that can respond to the challenges of our day and still stand the test of time.

A strategy will not only help us be more effective in facing new and persistent challenges. By agreeing on a joint path ahead, we also have an opportunity to forge a stronger and more effective European Union. Cooperation among the 28 does not mean that national policies should be thrown to the winds. The strength of a member state can be the strength of the whole Union. Our different histories, geographies and diplomatic services can and should live side by side. They can complement each other, on one condition: that they do not compete with each other. And we have a chance to help our Union somehow to come out of an identity crisis on its own nature.

European citizens believe now that global challenges call for a European response. You see it every day. When we confront all different kinds of difficulties, our citizens tend to turn to Brussels and ask what Brussels is doing. This is positive. This is a demand of Europe we had been missing for many years. We have to respond to that. It is now clear to everybody that we must act together when faced with challenges on a global scale. In times of Euroscepticism, of populist approach or even isolationist narratives, this is not a minor issue. It is about our role in the world, but it is also – and maybe first and foremost – about us. About shaping a common European sense of direction and purpose. Not about us, European institutions, but about us, Europeans.

This is why I am convinced that we need to reach out in this process. Reach out also beyond the ‘usual suspects’ that might be in this room. We do not want to simply receive input or papers – they are welcome, they are more than welcome. But we want to work together on a common vision for our common European role in the world. This is a chance that we cannot miss. To make this common sense of being a community emerge in our continent and in our Union. That is why I am looking forward to engaging with all of you in the months ahead to shape together this common vision. Thank you.

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMMUNICATION,
‘COMMISSION WORK PROGRAMME 2016: NO TIME FOR BUSINESS AS USUAL’, 27 OCT.2015
[excerpt]

One year ago, this Commission made a new start. Based on the Political Guidelines, we defined the priorities of the Commission and committed to focus on the big things where citizens expect Europe to make a difference. We decided we would change the way we work, and be open and accountable for our actions. And we invited the European Parliament and the Council to work together with us to deliver this change, because delivering results together on the things that really matter is the only way to regain Europeans’ trust that our Union is there to serve them.

[...]

Doing different things

Last year we said we would do different things and concentrate on the big things. Since then we have set out our vision and the concrete measures that need to be taken in the Investment Plan, the Digital Single Market, the Energy Union, the European Agenda on Security, the European Agenda on Migration, the Capital Markets Union, the Action Plan for Fair and Efficient Corporate Taxation, the new
Trade Strategy and our most recent proposals to deepen and strengthen our Economic and Monetary Union. This week we present our Single Market Strategy for goods and services, and we will complete the picture with our plans for a sustainable circular economy, labour mobility and better management of our external borders before the end of the year. All these actions are underpinned by the Commission’s new Better Regulation Agenda.

Following a continuous dialogue with the European Parliament and the Council launched by the President’s State of the Union address of 9 September, this Work Programme sets out the key initiatives we will take in the next twelve months to deliver on these commitments.

[...]

The directly elected European Parliament and the Council of ministers of each national government, which are the EU’s co-legislators, have agreed with unprecedented speed the Commission’s proposals for the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), for amending the EU budget for 2015 in order to strengthen financial support in the context of the refugee crisis, for a €35 billion package for jobs and growth in Greece and for the emergency decisions for relocation within the EU of refugees in need of international protection. This joint effort to deliver rapidly where decisions are quickly and most needed should no longer be the exception but must become the norm.

So before designing this Work Programme the Commission has engaged in intensive and constructive discussions with our institutional partners to build a common understanding of where the focus should be. The best proposals will change nothing if they lie on the negotiating table for years without agreement. That is also why we have identified some existing proposals which merit speedy adoption by the co-legislators, and why we intend to withdraw a number of earlier Commission proposals which are no longer relevant, have been blocked or no longer meet the necessary level of ambition, in order to free up space to focus on the priority proposals which do have a good chance of being agreed.

[...]

1. A Stronger Global Actor

In an increasingly connected, contested and complex world marked by dynamic changes, the coherence of the EU’s external action and our ability to use all available instruments in a joined up manner to achieve our objectives and complement our internal policies are ever more important. Challenges such as migration, access to energy and other resources, and climate change demonstrate the need for an effective external dimension to deliver on major internal policy objectives and to allow the EU to take advantage of opportunities to advance its values, such as democracy, human rights, equality and solidarity, as well as European history and culture, in the wider world. The Commission will therefore make a substantive contribution in support of the work of the High Representative/Vice-President on a new Global Strategy on foreign and security policy.

In addressing acute crisis such as the conflicts in Syria, Libya and Ukraine, the Commission will continue to be pro-actively engaged in support of international actors such as the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, drawing on the full range of policies, financing and other tools at its disposal. We will review and further develop our instruments to enhance security and development in partner countries, and will bring forward measures to support them in improving security sector governance and capacity building.

Following the ongoing public consultation, we will present a new post-Cotonou policy framework to govern relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and regions. The Commission’s development policy, as well as the new Trade and Investment Strategy, will also promote economic development, support social and environmental protection, defend human rights, tackle corruption, and improve migration management whilst addressing its root causes.

The Commission will continue to work towards a further concretisation of the accession perspective of
the candidate countries. In this context, we will strengthen our partnership with Turkey, including by implementing the action plan on migration and modernising the customs union. The new European Neighbourhood Policy will provide a more focussed and tailor-made framework for the support of the stabilisation and democratic development of the countries in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. We will also support the High Representative/Vice-President in deepening bilateral relations with the EU’s key partners. Tailored strategic approaches will need to be regularly updated, with the EU policy on China being a first example. Following on from the successful conclusion of the nuclear negotiations with Iran, a renewed framework for the EU’s engagement with the country could be envisaged subject to the full implementation of the agreement.

[...]

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EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS, 17-18 DECEMBER 2015
[excerpt]

I. MIGRATION

Over the past months, the European Council has developed a strategy aimed at stemming the unprecedented migratory flows Europe is facing. However, implementation is insufficient and has to be speeded up. For the integrity of Schengen to be safeguarded, it is indispensable to regain control over the external borders. Deficiencies, notably as regards to hotspots, relocation and returns, must be rapidly addressed. The EU institutions and the member states must urgently:

(a) address the shortcomings at the Schengen external borders, notably by ensuring systematic security checks with relevant databases, and prevent document fraud;

(b) address deficiencies in the functioning of hotspots, including by establishing the necessary reception capacity to achieve their objectives; rapidly agree a precise calendar for further hotspots to become operational; ensure that FRONTEX and EASO have the necessary expertise and equipment;

(c) ensure systematic and complete identification, registration and fingerprinting, and take measures to tackle refusal of registration and stem irregular secondary flows;

(d) implement relocation decisions as well as consider including among the beneficiaries of existing decisions other member states under high pressure who have requested this;

(e) take concrete measures to ensure the actual return and readmission of people not authorised to stay and provide support to member states as regards return operations;

(f) enhance measures for fighting smuggling and trafficking of human beings;

(g) ensure implementation and operational follow up to:

- the High Level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean - Western Balkans route; in this context, it is important to help non EU member states along the Western Balkans route to accomplish registration according to EU standards;
- the Valletta Summit, particularly as regards returns and readmission, and
- the EU-Turkey Statement of 29 November 2015 and the EU-Turkey Action Plan; in this context COREPER is asked to rapidly conclude its work on how to mobilise the 3 billion euro for the Turkey Refugee Facility;

(h) continue implementing the agreed resettlement scheme;
(i) continue to closely monitor flows along migration routes so as to be able to rapidly react to developments

The Council should continue work on the crisis relocation mechanism taking into account experience gained, and rapidly decide on its position on the list of safe countries of origin. The Council is invited to rapidly examine the situation concerning Afghanistan. The Council should rapidly examine the Commission proposals of 15 December on a ‘European Border and Coast Guard’, the Schengen Borders Code, ‘A voluntary humanitarian admission scheme’, and travel documents for returns. The Council should adopt its position on the ‘European Border and Coast Guard’ under the Netherlands Presidency. The Commission will rapidly present the review of the Dublin system; in the meantime, existing rules must be implemented. It will also soon present a revised proposal on Smart Borders.

The Presidency, the Commission and the High Representative will report back on progress before the February meeting of the European Council.

II. FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

The Paris terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015 have only strengthened our resolve to continue our uncompromising fight against terrorism and to make full use of all the tools at our disposal, including close cooperation with key partners such as the United States. The measures set out in the Statement of the Heads of State or Government of 12 February 2015, including those operationalised by the Council conclusions of 20 November 2015, need to be urgently implemented. The European Council will keep the situation regularly under review.

The recent terrorist attacks demonstrate in particular the urgency of enhancing relevant information sharing, notably as regards:

(j) ensuring the systematic entry of data on foreign terrorist fighters into the Schengen Information System II;
(k) ensuring the systematic sharing of criminal records data for people connected to terrorism (and serious and organised crime) and the extension of European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) to third country nationals;
(l) ensuring the interoperability of the relevant databases with regard to security checks;
(m) improving information exchange between member states’ counter-terrorism authorities, supporting the work of the new EUROPOL CT Centre, and
(n) increasing member states’ contributions to EUROPOL databases, as well as providing for the access of EUROPOL and FRONTEX to relevant databases.

The agreement between the co-legislators on the proposal for a Directive on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime paves the way for its rapid adoption and implementation which will constitute a crucial step in the fight against terrorism. The European Council recalls the commitment of all member states to apply the PNR to intra-EU flights, as well as to non-air-carriers such as travel agencies and tour operators.

The commitment made by the Heads of State or Government last February for deeper cooperation between security services should be further pursued, in full respect of member states’ sole responsibility for national security, notably by structuring further their information exchange so that interested member states can engage in enhanced joint operational threat analysis.

It is also crucial that member states implement systematic and coordinated checks at external borders, including on individuals enjoying the right of free movement.

The Council will rapidly examine the Commission proposals on combatting terrorism and on firearms, in particular on high-powered semi-automatic weapons. Member states should fully implement the Regulation on explosives precursors.
The Council and the Commission will take rapidly further action against terrorist finance in all domains identified by the Council of 20 November; regarding in particular asset freeze and other restrictive measures, priority should be given to strengthening and, if need be, extending the existing measures to tackle ISIL/Daesh-related activity throughout the EU.
The EU will urgently strengthen counter-terrorism engagement with partners in North Africa, the Middle East, Turkey and the Western Balkans.
To support criminal investigations, work will be taken forward on obtaining electronic evidence, especially when located abroad. This will include further engagement with the internet industry.
The Commission, the High Representative and the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator will monitor the situation closely and report to the Council.
[...]

VI. UNITED KINGDOM
The European Council had a political exchange of views on the UK plans for an (in/out) referendum. Following today’s substantive and constructive debate, the members of the European Council agreed to work closely together to find mutually satisfactory solutions in all the four areas at the European Council meeting on 18-19 February 2016.

VII. EXTERNAL RELATIONS
The European Council fully supports the efforts of the International Syria Support Group to end the conflict in Syria through a political process in line with the 2012 Geneva Communique, and the efforts of the Global Coalition to defeat the regional and global threat posed by ISIL/Daesh. There cannot be a lasting peace in Syria under the present regime. The EU is committed to continue its active engagement in the International Syria Support Group and in the Global Coalition against ISIL/Daesh. The European Council looks forward to the Syria Conference to be co-hosted by Germany, Norway, Kuwait, the UK and the UN on 4 February 2016.
The European Council notes that the objective of providing an additional 1 billion euro to respond to the urgent needs of refugees in the region to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme and other agencies has been exceeded and that it will remain attentive to the needs of the countries of the region.
The EU welcomes the signing in Skhirat of the Libyan political agreement as a very important step and stands ready to support the Government of National Accord as soon as it is formed. It urges all other parties not yet involved to join into the process.
The Council strongly condemns the recent attacks, which have been carried out by terrorist groups and individuals in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Terrorism poses a direct threat to all countries and all people regardless of their ethnic background, religion or belief. In a globalised world, such threats can only be countered through international cooperation and determined national action. In this context, the Council reiterates the EU’s strong support to relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, in particular Resolutions 2170 and 2178, and calls on all countries to take the necessary measures to ensure their swift implementation with full respect for human rights and the Rule of Law.

The Council calls for comprehensive action against terrorism in line with the 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy and in full compliance with international law, fundamental values and international human rights standards. While member states have the primary responsibility for addressing terrorism, the EU as such can add value in many ways. The actions taken in the area of justice and home affairs need to be complemented by external engagement and outreach, especially to countries in the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel and the Gulf. Close coordination between internal and external action on the one hand, and between relevant EU actors and EU member states on the other hand, will enhance the impact of our common efforts. We need to put more emphasis on the prevention of terrorism, in particular countering radicalisation, on recruitment, equipment and financing of terrorism, and address underlying factors such as conflict, poverty, proliferation of arms and state fragility that provide opportunities for terrorist groups to flourish.

Against this background, the Council decides to step up, as a matter of urgency, its external action on countering terrorism in particular in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, including Yemen, and North Africa, in particular also Libya, and the Sahel. Counter-terrorism (CT) will be mainstreamed fully into EU foreign policy. It calls for accelerated implementation of the EU Syria and Iraq and Counter-Terrorism/Foreign Fighters Strategy (adopted on 20 October 2014) with a particular focus on foreign terrorist fighters and the EU’s Maghreb Communication. The Council welcomes the Joint Communication on EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Daesh threat and looks forward to its implementation as soon as possible.

More specifically, the Council welcomes the following initiatives to be implemented in the course of 2015, building on those actions that are already taking place in the field of Justice and Home Affairs and in Foreign and Security Policy.
STRENGTHENING PARTNERSHIPS WITH KEY COUNTRIES

- Mainstreaming counter-terrorism in the EU’s political dialogue with third countries to promote international cooperation and implementation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.
- Conducting targeted and upgraded security and counter-terrorism dialogues with Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Cooperation with Turkey should also be enhanced in line with the GAC conclusions of December 2014.
- Strengthening political dialogue with the League of Arab States, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the African Union and other relevant regional coordination structures, such as the G5 Sahel.
- Developing counter-terrorism action plans starting with Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, including on measures to dissuade and disrupt foreign terrorist fighters’ travel as well as to manage their return. Attention will also be given to targeted CT/CVE cooperation with the Western Balkan countries as well as with other countries affected by foreign terrorist fighters’ phenomenon. Given the importance of the creation of networks of policy makers and security experts on both sides of the Mediterranean, a Ministerial segment will be added to the Euromed group on foreign terrorist fighters established by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the EEAS.
- Deploying security/counter-terrorism experts in a number of key EU Delegations to strengthen their capacity to contribute to European counter-terrorism efforts and to liaise more effectively with relevant local authorities, while further building-up of counter-terrorism capacity within the EEAS.

SUPPORTING CAPACITY BUILDING

- Launching further capacity-building projects and activities with interested MENA countries addressing law enforcement, criminal justice, security sector reform, including crisis infrastructure, crisis and emergency response, border control and aviation security, strategic communication, radicalisation, dealing with the foreign terrorist fighters threat, recruitment and financing of terrorism, paying due regard to international human rights standards, in close cooperation with EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX and CEPOL.
- The EU will respond positively to Iraq’s request of CT assistance. Projects will be launched shortly to assist countries in the MENA region to implement UNSCR 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters, to prevent radicalization in Jordan and the Maghreb. Further CT capacity building assistance to countries in the region will be provided in the coming months, in particular related to the threat of foreign terrorist fighters, including fighters returning to their countries of origin and security sector reform. The Radicalization Awareness Network will work with interested countries in the region on prevention of radicalisation.

[...]

COUNTERING RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

- Supporting international initiatives on countering radicalisation and terrorism such as the first International Centre of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism (‘Hedayah’) in Abu Dhabi, and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) in Geneva, while the successful EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) offers expertise to engage with local communities as well as with third countries. The High Representative, the Commission and the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator will participate in the upcoming
Summit on Countering Violent Extremism and related side events in Washington DC on 18-20 February 2015.

- Improving strategic communication, developing an outreach strategy to the Arab World, including developing counter-narratives to terrorist propaganda, promoting fundamental rights, and taking into account the increasingly frequent misuse of the internet in radicalisation, engaging through social media and enhancing communication in Arabic. In this process, we can draw on the expertise of the Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team.

- Facilitating interfaith dialogue, civil society dialogue, people-to-people contacts, academic and cultural exchanges. Exploring the possibility of creating a Round of Eminent Persons from Europe and the Muslim world, to encourage more intellectual exchanges and promote wider thematic dialogues on the roots and ramifications of terrorism and radicalisation on our societies. In this context, inviting relevant EU Institutions to explore further cooperation opportunities with actors such as the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures in Alexandria, the UN Alliance of Civilisations in New York and the King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and intercultural dialogue in Vienna.

- Addressing the underlying factors of radicalization by supporting initiatives across the region with regard to youth, education, vocational training, job opportunities, civil society, security sector reform, role of women. The EU will work with faith-based organisations, as appropriate.

- Inviting the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to continue his efforts to defend and advocate freedom of expression, freedom of religion or belief and other universal values in particular in the MENA region.

**PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

- Continue supporting cooperation with the UN on counter-terrorism capacity building initiatives in the MENA region. The EU will enhance further its engagement in the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), including by actively shaping GCTF inspired initiatives such as Hedayah in Abu Dhabi, the Global Community Engagement Resilience Fund (GCERF) and the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law in Malta.

- Enhancing cooperation with key partners and countries on countering financing of terrorism, in particular Daesh financing. The EU hosted a workshop to counter Daesh financing together with US, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Norway, Japan, and UN agencies in Brussels on 4-5 February 2015 with the aim to step up outreach and capacity building efforts in third countries. The EU will engage with countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council in a dialogue on countering financing of terrorism, in particular Daesh financing, and will closely cooperate with partners, including in the anti-ISIL coalition.

- Reinforcing, within the existing parameters, the role of EU INTCEN as the hub for strategic intelligence assessment at EU level, including on counter-terrorism.

- Regarding the Passenger Name Record data (PNR), we fully endorse the Riga JHA Ministers Joint Statement, and are looking for sound solutions to the exchange of PNR with relevant third countries.

- Combating illicit accumulation and trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons and their ammunition in line with the 2005 EU Strategy, in particular in the Western Balkans and Libya, and promotion of the Arms Trade Treaty in our Southern Neighbourhood.
ADDRESSING UNDERLYING FACTORS AND ONGOING CRISES

- Given the role unresolved conflicts play in the context of radicalisation and recruitment, the EU will mobilise even more to attempt finding solutions and re-think current policies and approaches. The EU will mitigate terrorist and stability threats through its comprehensive approach combining diplomatic, socio-economic, development, conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis management tools.
- Inviting the High Representative and the Commission to continue to ensure sufficient funds and coherent use of instruments to address the threat of terrorism and move effectively from early warning to early action. CT, including prevention of radicalisation, will, where appropriate, be mainstreamed into programming of assistance, making full use of the OECD guidelines on terrorism prevention. The EU Delegations in the region have been asked to work with their host governments to identify quickly opportunities for twinning and TAIEX projects in the CT context.

These conclusions will serve as an input of the Foreign Affairs Council for discussion at the informal meeting of EU Heads of State and Government on 12 February 2015. The Council agreed to review progress in implementation at its next meetings, also in view of upcoming European Council meetings.

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REMARKS, ‘COUNTERING THE TERRORIST THREAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA’, HR/VP F. MOGHERINI AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 30 SEP. 2015
[excerpt]

[...] It is time for the international community and for all of us to take a step forward. It is time, we believe, to leave behind the divisions of the past. Today we are here to discuss two top priorities for all of us: the political solution of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa and the fight against terrorist groups such as Daesh and Al-Qaida’s affiliates.

For too long these two priorities were perceived as conflicting goals. For too long we discussed whether to prioritize the political processes or the fight against Daesh and terrorism. These divisions over the years have weakened our action on both tracks. They weaken the international community. I believe we can now finally be ready to move on. I believe we are now finally ready to realize that these two goals can only go hand in hand and that they are, and have to be, our real focus while we mobilize at the same time all the humanitarian support needed to respond to the urgent needs of the symptoms of this crisis, starting from the humanitarian situation of the huge number of refugees that are hosted in the region and in Europe.

The two top priorities are fighting terrorism and finding political solutions to the main crisis — starting from the two key ones, the one in Libya and the one in Syria. It is absolutely necessary to address the military dimension of the threats posed by Daesh and Al-Qaida. The European Union in itself is not directly involved in the anti-Daesh military campaign. But, as members know, a number of our member states are; and the European Union itself as such is concretely working on some complementary dimensions of this collective effort, in full cooperation with our regional and international partners.

That means, for instance cutting off the supply lines of terrorist groups. We have provided more than
1,300 intelligence leads on foreign fighters and other terrorists in Syria and Iraq. We are assisting our partners on criminal justice issues and in improving their capacity to investigate and prosecute foreign fighters. We are supporting the different security agencies in Iraq to better share information and coordinate their efforts.

We are working on another crucial element, namely, stabilizing liberated areas. That also means building a future for the territories liberated from Daesh. The European Union has launched the first concrete action to remove mines and improvised explosive devices in the Iraqi regions freed from Daesh. Together with the United Nations Mine Action Service, the European Union is coordinating the work on booby traps. Our action is aimed at helping people return to their homes once their homes are safe and at starting to rebuild their communities and countries. The European Union is engaged in very concrete terms on the ground, but we all know very well that, in this aspect of the fight, military power will not be enough to defeat Daesh. Military might alone will not solve the crisis, either in Syria or elsewhere. In Syria it is urgent to start the process leading to a peaceful, inclusive political transition.

[...]

Let us focus on the way forward. Let us be united and concrete. If we, the international community, cannot manage to do it, and to do it in a united way, how can we think we can unite the region and the actors in Syria on a common agenda that can defeat Daesh and bring peace and democracy to the country? That is the question. That is why the European Union supports the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy. We are working together with Mr. Staffan de Mistura and his team in a very active way to start the process start and advance with strength and a sense of urgency. We actively support his work and actively support his proposal on the working groups and on a contact group on Syria.

All regional and international Powers should put their rivalries aside and find ways to cooperate on a common agenda built on a collective interest in security, peace and democracy. Only in a more cooperative regional environment can we hope to build peace in Syria and defeat Daesh. That is true for reconciliation processes not only in Syria but throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

In Iraq and in Libya we need a Government of national accord to start not within weeks but within days to stop the internal divisions, to fight Daesh and to begin rebuilding the country. Daesh has nothing to do with the history of Libya. It built its strengths on the civil war and the divisions among factions and militias. Unity among Libya’s actors and factions is the most effective and the only weapon against Daesh. Daesh needs to ally with local militias to keep control of the ground. Where it does not manage to find allies, Daesh is easier to eradicate. It is politics that holds the key to its defeat. Conflicts only strengthen terrorist groups. That is what war does. Conflicts are powerful and probably the most powerful source of radicalization. Think of the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, including the most recent flare-ups. That is why the European Union believes that relaunching the Middle East peace process and achieving results both for the Israelis and the Palestinian people could send a very powerful message of reconciliation to the whole region and far beyond that, to the world. The key is political will and unity among the regional international players. But we know that the current crisis is not only political, it is also cultural. Over past years and decades too many forces have bet on the rise of sectarianism, with the disastrous results that we all see. That trend must be reversed. We need to help communities stick together, and not tear them apart. We need inclusive societies and democratic political processes. All communities and minorities must be granted security, freedom and the right to contribute to their country’s public life, if we want resilient and strong societies across the region. Only democracy and inclusiveness bring about stability, and they are the most powerful weapons against terror. Too many times we are faced with a narrative opposing democracy and security. That is a false dilemma. We know that very well in Europe. A society can be stable and safe only when it is fully democratic.

The region and the world need a new order, and this crisis might be an opportunity. There might be differences among us. There have also been differences around this table this morning. But as Foreign
Minister Steinmeir mentioned just a few interventions ago, there are also many things on which we can unite. We have differences also on how a new order in the region and in the world should look, but I believe there is something on which we can all agree. The only alternative to a new world order, and a new regional order, is chaos. That is the enemy we are fighting today – perennial conflict, constant instability, global disorder – our common enemy is chaos. At this seventieth anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations let us join forces, as we did successfully in the Iranian deal negotiations. Let us all choose cooperation over conflict. Finally, let us build a cooperative world order. Europe is ready.

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[excerpt]

COUNTER-TERRORISM

The Council adopted the following conclusions:
The Council is appalled by the heinous terrorist attacks which took place in Paris on 13 November 2015 and expresses its deepest condolences to the victims of these attacks, their families and friends. The Council emphasises its solidarity with the people of France and pays tribute to the courage and decisive actions of the French authorities. The attacks were an assault on the European values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This is not the first time that the EU has been confronted with a major terrorist attack and important measures have already been decided. The Council underlines the importance of accelerating the implementation of all areas covered by the statement on counter-terrorism issued by the Members of the European Council on 12 February 2015 and in particular of the measures outlined below.

PNR

The Council reiterates the urgency and priority to finalise an ambitious EU PNR before the end of 2015, which should include internal flights in its scope, provide for a sufficiently long data period during which PNR data can be retained in non-masked-out form and should not be limited to crimes of a transnational nature.

Firearms

The Council:

(a) welcomes the adoption of the Implementing Regulation on common deactivation standards on 18 November 2015,
(b) welcomes the presentation by the Commission on 18 November 2015 of a proposal to revise the current Directive on Firearms, on which work will start without delay,
(c) is committed to increasing operational cooperation through EUROPOL under the EU Policy Cycle on serious and organised crime, notably within the Operational Action Plan Firearms. All member states affected by the problem are invited to join these efforts by the end of 2015,
invites FRONTEX and EUROPOL to assist the member states bordering the Western Balkans region in increasing controls of external borders to detect smuggling of firearms, and to enhance cooperation with countries in the region, inter alia by using operational regional platforms such as the Western Balkans counter-terrorism initiative.

**Strengthening controls of external borders**

Member states undertake to:

(a) implement immediately the necessary systematic and coordinated checks at external borders, including on individuals enjoying the right of free movement,

(b) in the basis of a quick identification of urgent needs and possible solutions to be communicated by the Commission before the end of 2015, upgrade the Schengen member states’ border control systems (electronic connection to the relevant Interpol databases at all external border crossing points, automatic screening of travel documents) by March 2016,

(c) in the context of the current migration crisis, carry out a systematic registration, including fingerprinting, of third country nationals illegally entering the Schengen area, whether migrants or applicants for international protection, and perform systematic security checks by using relevant databases, in particular SIS II, Interpol databases, VIS and national police databases, with the support of FRONTEX and EUROPOL, and ensure that hotspots are equipped with the relevant technology. EUROPOL will deploy guest officers to the hotspots in support of the screening process, in particular by reinforcing secondary security controls,

(d) strengthen the control at the external borders which are most exposed, in particular by deploying, when the situation so requires, rapid border intervention teams (RABITs) and police officers in order to ensure systematic screening and security checks.

The Council reiterates its Conclusions of 9 November 2015 and invites the Commission:

(a) as it updates its proposals on Smart Borders, to present a proposal for a targeted revision of the Schengen Borders Code to provide for systematic controls of EU nationals, including the verification of biometric information, against relevant databases at external borders of the Schengen area, making full use of technical solutions in order not to hamper the fluidity of movement,

(b) to provide, in its proposal to update the FRONTEX Regulation, a solid legal basis for the contribution of FRONTEX to the fight against terrorism and organised crime and access to the relevant databases.

FRONTEX will:

(a) contribute to the fight against terrorism and support the coordinated implementation of the Common Risk Indicators (CRIs) before the end of 2015,

(b) assist the member states in tightening controls at external borders so that suspicious travel by foreign terrorist fighters and smuggling of firearms can be better detected, in cooperation with EUROPOL,

(c) work closely with EUROPOL and EUROJUST, in particular in the context of the hotspots, and exchange data with EUROPOL on the basis of the cooperation agreement to exchange personal data. The latter should be concluded without delay so that FRONTEX and EUROPOL can start exchanging data as of 1 January 2016.
Information sharing
The Council decides to step up law enforcement cooperation:

(a) Member states will ensure that national authorities enter systematically data on suspected foreign terrorist fighters into the SIS II, in particular under Article 36.3, carry out awareness raising and training on the use of the SIS and define a common approach to the use of the SIS II data relating to foreign fighters,

(b) Member states will speed up full implementation and effective use of the Prüm acquis (interconnection and consultation of national databases on DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registration),

(c) EUROPOL will launch the European Counter Terrorist Centre (ECTC) on 1 January 2016 as a platform by which member states can increase information sharing and operational cooperation with regard to the monitoring and investigation of foreign terrorist fighters, the trafficking of illegal firearms and terrorist financing. The new EUROPOL Regulation, on which an agreement should be reached between the co-legislators before the end of the year, should be consistent with the mandate and objectives of the ECTC, including the IRU,

(d) Member states will second CT experts to the ECTC to form an enhanced cross-border investigation support unit, capable of providing quick and comprehensive support to the investigation of major terrorist incidents in the EU. EUROJUST should also participate,

(e) (The Commission is invited to propose that EUROPOL be reinforced with the necessary resources to support ECTC and to submit a legislative proposal in order to enable EUROPOL to systematically cross-check the EUROPOL databases against the SIS II,

(f) The Commission is invited to undertake efforts to achieve interoperability of the relevant databases with regard to security checks, notably SIS II, Interpol’s SLTD and iARMS. In this framework, member states, with the support of the Commission, are invited to establish Single Points of Contact for the facilitation of the information exchange,

(g) Member states will make maximum use of these capabilities to improve the overall level of information exchange between CT authorities in the EU. Member states will ensure that the relevant national authorities significantly increase their contributions to Focal Point Traveller at EUROPOL to reflect the threat and connect to relevant EUROPOL information exchange systems.

Financing of terrorism
The Council:

(a) invites the Commission to present proposals to strengthen, harmonise and improve the powers of, and the cooperation between Financial Intelligence Units (FIU’s), notably through the proper embedment of the FIU.net network for information exchange in EUROPOL, and ensure their fast access to necessary information, in order to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in conformity with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, to strengthen controls of non-banking payment methods such as electronic/anonymouse payments, money remittances, cash-carriers, virtual currencies, transfers of gold or precious metals and pre-paid cards in line with the risk they present and to curb more effectively the illicit trade in cultural goods,

(b) is committed to ensure a swift and effective freezing of terrorist assets throughout the Union, whether through autonomous EU decisions or in compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions.
**Criminal justice response to terrorism and violent extremism**

The Council welcomes the signing in Riga on 22 October 2015 by the EU of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism and of its additional Protocol on Foreign Terrorist Fighters and welcomes the intention of the Commission to present a proposal for a directive updating the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism before the end of 2015 with a view to collectively implementing into EU law UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) and the additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention.

Member states will use ECRIS at its full potential. The Council welcomes the intention of the Commission to submit by January 2016 an ambitious proposal for the extension of ECRIS to cover third country nationals.

The Council invites the Commission to allocate as a matter of urgency the necessary financial resources to implement the Council Conclusions on enhancing the criminal justice response to radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism. This should notably support the development of rehabilitation programmes as well as risk assessment tools in order to determine the most appropriate criminal justice response, taking into account the individual circumstances and security and public safety concerns.

**Funding**

The Council invites member states to use the Internal Security Fund to support the implementation of these conclusions and to prioritise relevant actions under the national programmes to this effect, and calls on the Commission to prioritise the funding available under centrally managed funds to the priorities identified in these conclusions, including operational costs.

**Implementation**

In view of its role in ensuring that operational cooperation on internal security is promoted and strengthened within the Union, COSI will liaise with competent Working Parties of the Council and with the Commission and EU agencies to ensure effective implementation of operational measures agreed. In this context, COSI will examine the possibility to develop a methodology for a structured and multilateral approach for operational cooperation on countering terrorist threats. The EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator will monitor the overall implementation of these conclusions.
Thank you for the invitation that we value very much. We are here to share with you the urgent need to face the tragedies unfolding in the Mediterranean. 2015 looks even worse than the previous year and consider that in 2014, 3300 migrants died trying to enter the European Union by sea. Which means that three out of four people who perished by crossing a border in the world, died in the Mediterranean Sea. This tells us that our first priority must be to save lives; to prevent the loss of lives at sea. We believe, in the European Union, that this is a huge responsibility that we all share, not only as Europeans but also globally. It is an unprecedented situation, an exceptional situation that requires an exceptional and coordinated response. There is an urgent need to respond in an immediate and joint way. An emergency response to a structural phenomenon that is here to stay if we don’t act effectively on its deep real causes: poverty, conflicts, crisis, human rights violations all the way through Africa and the Middle East and beyond, including the situations in Syria, Afghanistan or the Horn of Africa. It is not only a humanitarian emergency, but also a security crisis, since smuggling networks are linked to, and in some cases finance, terrorist activities, which contributes to instability in a region that is already unstable enough. Addressing this situation is first of all a moral duty for us, but it is also a shared interest of all countries involved; the ones around the Mediterranean as well as the countries of origin and transit. We are here to act immediately and to act together. We need an exceptional response. Let me say that the European Union is finally ready to take its own responsibilities: saving lives, welcoming refugees, addressing the root causes of the phenomenon, dismantling criminal organisations. We need to address these challenges with two basic principles. The first is Partnership. We need close partnership with the countries in the region, regional organisations starting with the African Union, the wider international community and in particular with the UN Security Council. The second is in a comprehensive way with a comprehensive approach, addressing all related issues, the immediate humanitarian emergency, the security situation, as well as the root causes in countries of origin and transit. And let me stress that sometimes the countries of transit become countries of destination themselves. Tackling the root causes means tackling poverty, unequal access to resources (be it natural or financial), conflicts and crisis, violation of human rights.
What we need today is shared solidarity, long term vision and immediate action, in full partnership at regional and global level. That is why it is so important for me to be here today. The European Union will do its part. We already discussed how to face these tragedies here in New York last month. As I stressed then, the European Union is increasing its work to address the root causes of the tragedies as well as tackling trafficking and smuggling in the Mediterranean. Since then, we have worked on this with the African Union, namely doing our ‘college-to-college’ meeting in Brussels a few weeks ago. And next Wednesday, in just two days, the European Commission will present a new European Agenda on Migration, offering solutions to both the immediate challenges and ways to better manage migration in all aspects in the longer term, taking a new approach and taking new responsibilities.

We will propose to increase our resettlement efforts and enhance legal opportunities to reach Europe. As European Commission President Juncker said in the European Parliament a few days ago: “if we close the door to all, people will come in through the windows”.

On the other side, you, the UN Security Council, also called for the full implementation of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants and urged all member states to address illicit migration flows, and contribute to dismantling smugglers networks in the region.

We all know that we need to work on the whole set of issues related to these tragedies. Tackling only one aspect will not lead to a solution. And we need to work together, as Europeans first of all - we have understood this - but also with the regional and global community.

As Europeans on 23 April we decided to step up our efforts to tackle the humanitarian tragedy in the Mediterranean. This includes also efforts to disrupt trafficking and smuggling networks. The European Council decided to strengthen immediately the European Union presence at sea, enforcing the existing operations Triton and Poseidon. Their capacities are being strengthened by trebling the financial resources available to them and the sending of additional maritime assets.

European leaders, on that occasion, also asked me to propose actions to disrupt the business model of human trafficking networks across the Mediterranean. Let me quote the statement of the European Council on 23 April, asking ‘...the High Representative to undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and destroy vessels before they are used by traffickers in accordance with international law’.

With this, my presence here at the Security Council today is so important for us. We have in these weeks prepared for a possible naval operation in the framework of the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy. The mandate of this operation is currently being elaborated with the EU member states in Brussels, and will be discussed by the meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, in a week from now, in exactly a week from now on 18 May, with a possibility of taking decisions, the first decisions already.

We want to work with the United Nations, in particular with the UNSC. We also want to work with the UNHCR. Yesterday, I spoke again with António Guterres. Our teams have already intensified the common work, as it is our firm intention to always respect international law, international humanitarian law and human rights.

This is a core fundamental value, on which the European Union was built and as I said, it is our firm intention to honour it. We are taking responsibilities, we are working hard and fast, but we do not want and we cannot work alone. We need partnerships if we want to put an end to these tragedies. We need to think and act together, we need to share responsibilities. It is a European responsibility and a global responsibility.

For the European Union, multilateralism is key. Work in partnership is key; respect and promotion of human rights and international law is key. And on issues like this, more than ever.

Let me explicitly assure you that no refugees or migrants intercepted at sea will be sent back against their will. Their rights under Geneva conventions will be fully honoured.
Let me be very clear also on another critical point, Libya. This is not all about Libya, we know that very well. This can happen in other parts of the world. But we all know also very well that the vast majority of human trafficking and smuggling in these months is happening in Libya, or rather, through Libya. As long as there is not a Unity Government that can exercise its legitimate authority over the entire territory of the country and its land and sea borders, the situation is likely to continue this way. That is why the European Union is actively and with full determination supporting the UN-led process of dialogue to reach an agreement on the formation of a Government of National Unity.

The European Union is politically, logistically, financially supporting this process. I am myself in close, daily, contact with Bernardino León in this respect. We hosted a meeting of Mayors and Municipalities of all Libya recently, as well as a business dialogue, in Brussels.

I was 10 days ago in Tunis with Bernardino León to meet and talk to all Libyan parties taking part in the dialogue. Our message to all Libyans is clear. The European Union is ready to support you in any possible way, to make sure that Libya can be the prosperous and stable country it can be, and deserves to be. Unite against all challenges your country and your people are facing, and Europe will be at your side, in the ways you will decide and determine.

In the meantime, we need to work together in partnership, Europeans and Libyans to fight trafficking and smuggling organisations. This is a Libyan interest and responsibility, this is a Mediterranean interest and responsibility, this is a European interest and responsibility, this is also an African interest and responsibility and I would say, it is a global interest and responsibility. We don’t and won’t act against anyone but in partnership with all. We need to work together and we are here to work together.

This is also why we are stepping up our cooperation and support to key countries in Africa and in the Arab World such as Tunisia, Egypt, as well as Sudan, Mali and Niger. We are also stepping up cooperation with Turkey in view of the situation in Syria and Iraq. We are increasing our work within existing dialogues and partnerships as well as regional efforts such as the Rabat and Khartoum processes. These are fundamental elements of our comprehensive approach to address all migration related issues. We have already established Mobility partnerships with Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and a dedicated dialogue with Lebanon. These are comprehensive partnerships which cover our migration related aspects: legal migration and mobility (visa facilitation), fight against irregular migration, asylum and international protection, and migration and development.

We are working with regional partners in building capacity for maritime border management and search and rescue operations.

It is also important that the EU and the countries party to the Rabat and Khartoum processes as well as the African Union work in close partnership on this issue. We therefore very much welcome the perspective of a special summit, in Malta in the autumn, as I discussed already with Mrs Zuma recently. We are addressing the issue of poverty, together, of wars, of human rights, of unequal distribution and access to resources, be it financial or other kind of resources. We need to do it in partnership with all the countries involved in this, on an equal footing in full and mutual respect.

The European Union is ready to do its part. It has not always been the case, I know. Now, I believe, we are ready to do it. I believe we are ready to address challenges that affect us all and to do it not only from a security perspective but first and foremost from a humanitarian perspective. The EU can do a lot, we will do a lot but we cannot do it alone. This has to be a common, global effort. That’s why we count on your support to save lives and dismantle criminal organisations that are exploiting people’s desperation. Let me end by quoting Pope Francis when he says “their stories make us cry and make us ashamed”. I call on you today to help us all to stop crying and stop feeling ashamed.

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION COMMUNICATION,
‘A EUROPEAN AGENDA ON MIGRATION’, 13 MAY 2015
[excerpt – some footnotes have been deleted]

I. INTRODUCTION
This Agenda brings together the different steps the European Union should take now, and in the coming years, to build up a coherent and comprehensive approach to reap the benefits and address the challenges deriving from migration.

The immediate imperative is the duty to protect those in need. The plight of thousands of migrants putting their lives in peril to cross the Mediterranean has shocked us all. As a first and immediate response, the Commission put forward a ten point plan for immediate action. The European Parliament and the European Council have lent their support to this plan and member states have also committed to concrete steps, notably to avert further loss of life.

The response was immediate but insufficient. This cannot be a one-off response. Emergency measures have been necessary because the collective European policy on the matter has fallen short. While most Europeans have responded to the plight of the migrants, the reality is that across Europe, there are serious doubts about whether our migration policy is equal to the pressure of thousands of migrants, to the need to integrate migrants in our societies, or to the economic demands of a Europe in demographic decline.

To try to halt the human misery created by those who exploit migrants, we need to use the EU’s global role and wide range of tools to address the root causes of migration.

This calls for a set of core measures and a consistent and clear common policy. We need to restore confidence in our ability to bring together European and national efforts to address migration, to meet our international and ethical obligations and to work together in an effective way, in accordance with the principles of solidarity and shared responsibility. It is clear that we need a new, more European approach. All actors: member states, EU institutions, International Organisations, civil society, local authorities and third countries need to work together to make a common European migration policy a reality.

II. IMMEDIATE ACTION
The first part of this European Agenda on Migration responds to the need for swift and determined action in response to the human tragedy in the whole of the Mediterranean.

This swift response must also serve as the blueprint for the EU’s reaction to future crises, whichever part of the common external border comes under pressure from East to West and from North to South.

Saving lives at sea
Search and rescue efforts will be stepped up to restore the level of intervention provided under the former Italian ‘Mare Nostrum’ operation. To triple the budget for the FRONTEX joint-operations Triton and Poseidon, the Commission has already presented an amending budget for 2015 and will present its proposal for 2016 by the end of May. When implemented, this will expand both the capability and the geographical scope of these operations, so that FRONTEX can fulfil its dual role of coordinating operational border support to member states under pressure, and helping to save the lives of migrants at sea. In parallel to this increase in EU funding, assets (ships and aircrafts) are being deployed by several member states.
Targeting criminal smuggling networks
The criminal networks which exploit vulnerable migrants must be targeted. The High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) has already presented options for possible Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations to systematically identify, capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers. Such action under international law will be a powerful demonstration of the EU’s determination to act. More will be done to pool and better use information to identify and target smugglers. EUROPOL will immediately strengthen its recently established joint maritime information operation (JOT MARE) – and its focal point on migrant smuggling. FRONTEX and EUROPOL will also develop profiles of vessels which could be used by smugglers, following patterns to identify potential vessels and monitor their movements. Finally, EUROPOL will identify illegal internet content used by smugglers to attract migrants and refugees, and request its removal.

Responding to high-volumes of arrivals within the EU: Relocation
Member states’ asylum systems today face unprecedented pressure and, with the summer arriving, the flow of people to frontline member states will continue in the months to come. The EU should not wait until the pressure is intolerable to act: the volumes of arrivals mean that the capacity of local reception and processing facilities is already stretched thin. To deal with the situation in the Mediterranean, the Commission will, by the end of May, propose triggering the emergency response system envisaged under Article 78(3) TFEU. The proposal will include a temporary distribution scheme for persons in clear need of international protection to ensure a fair and balanced participation of all member states to this common effort. The receiving member state will be responsible for the examination of the application in accordance with established rules and guarantees. A redistribution key based on criteria such as GDP, size of population, unemployment rate and past numbers of asylum seekers and of resettled refugees can be found in the Annex.

[...]

A common approach to granting protection to displaced persons in need of protection: Resettlement
The EU has a duty to contribute its share in helping displaced persons in clear need of international protection. This is a joint responsibility of the international community, with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) given the task of identifying when people cannot stay safely in their own countries. There must be safe and legal ways for them to reach the EU. The UNHCR has endorsed a target of 20,000 resettlement places for the EU per year by the year 2020. Some member states have already made a major contribution to global resettlement efforts. But others offer nothing – and in many cases they are not making an alternative contribution in terms of receiving and accepting asylum requests or helping to fund the efforts of others. By the end of May, the Commission will make a Recommendation proposing an EU-wide resettlement scheme to offer 20,000 places. This scheme will cover all member states, with distribution criteria that can be found in the Annex, such as GDP, size of population, unemployment rate and past numbers of asylum seekers and of resettled refugees, and will take account of the efforts already made on a voluntary basis by member states. In addition, member states should use to the full the other legal avenues available to persons in need of protection, including private/non-governmental sponsorships and humanitarian permits, and family reunification clauses.
Working in partnership with third countries to tackle migration upstream

The EU can also take immediate action to intervene upstream in regions of origin and of transit. The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) will work together with partner countries to put in place concrete measures to prevent hazardous journeys.

First, the EU should step up its support to the countries bearing the brunt of displaced refugees. Regional Development and Protection Programmes will be set up or deepened, starting in North Africa and the Horn of Africa, as well as by building on the existing one in the Middle East. EUR 30 million will be made available in 2015/2016 and should be complemented by additional contributions from member states.

Second, a pilot multi-purpose centre will be set up in Niger by the end of the year. Working with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the UNHCR and the Niger authorities, the centre will combine the provision of information, local protection and resettlement opportunities for those in need. Such centres in countries of origin or transit will help to provide a realistic picture of the likely success of migrants’ journeys, and offer assisted voluntary return options for irregular migrants.

Third, migration will become a specific component of ongoing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions already deployed in countries like Niger and Mali, which will be strengthened on border management. A dedicated summit will be organised in Malta in the autumn with key partners, including the African Union, to develop a common approach with the region addressing the causes of irregular migration and the protection of people in need, as well as smuggling and trafficking of people.

[...]

Using the EU’s tools to help frontline member states

More will be done to help deal with the immediate challenge faced by member states in the frontline of migrant arrivals.

First, the Commission will set up a new ‘Hotspot’ approach, where the European Asylum Support Office, FRONTEX and EUROPOL will work on the ground with frontline member states to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants. The work of the agencies will be complementary to one another. Those claiming asylum will be immediately channelled into an asylum procedure where EASO support teams will help to process asylum cases as quickly as possible. For those not in need of protection, FRONTEX will help member states by coordinating the return of irregular migrants. EUROPOL and EUROJUST will assist the host member state with investigations to dismantle the smuggling and trafficking networks.

Second, the Commission will mobilise an additional EUR 60 million in emergency funding, including to support the reception and capacity to provide healthcare to migrants in the member states under particular pressure. An evaluation of needs is under way.
### III. FOUR PILLARS TO MANAGE MIGRATION BETTER

The migration crisis in the Mediterranean has put the spotlight on immediate needs. But it has also revealed much about the structural limitations of EU migration policy and the tools at its disposal. This is an opportunity for the EU to face up to the need to strike the right balance in its migration policy and send a clear message to citizens that migration can be better managed collectively by all EU actors. As outlined by President Juncker in his Political Guidelines, a robust fight against irregular migration, traffickers and smugglers, and securing Europe’s external borders must be paired with a strong common asylum policy as well as a new European policy on legal migration. Clearly, this requires an enhanced coherence between different policy sectors, such as development cooperation, trade, employment, foreign and home affairs policies.

A clear and well implemented framework for legal pathways to entrance in the EU (both through an efficient asylum and visa system) will reduce push factors towards irregular stay and entry, contributing to enhance security of European borders as well as safety of migratory flows.

The EU must continue to offer protection to those in need. It must also recognise that the skills needed for a vibrant economy cannot always immediately be found inside the EU labour market or will take time to develop. Migrants who have been legally admitted by member states should not be faced with reluctance and obstruction – they should be given every assistance to integrate in their new communities. This should be seen as central to the values Europeans should be proud of and should project to partners worldwide.

But by the same token, the EU needs to draw the consequences when migrants do not meet the criteria to stay. Unsuccessful asylum claimants who try to avoid return, visa overstayers, and migrants living in a permanent state of irregularity constitute a serious problem. This corrodes confidence in the system. It offers strong arguments for those looking to criticise or stigmatise migration. It makes it harder to integrate those migrants staying in the EU as of right.

[...]

### Key Actions

- A funding package to triple the allocation for Triton and Poseidon in 2015-16 and to finance an EU-wide resettlement scheme.
- Immediate support to a possible CSDP mission on smuggling migrants.
- A legislative proposal to activate the emergency scheme under Article 78(3) TFEU by the end of May, on the basis of the distribution key included in the Annex.
- A proposal for a permanent common EU system for relocation for emergency situations by the end of 2015.
- A Recommendation for an EU resettlement scheme by the end of May followed if required by a proposal for more permanent approach beyond 2016.
- EUR 30 million for Regional Development and Protection Programmes.
- Pilot multi-purpose centre established in Niger by the end of 2015.
III.1 Reducing the incentives for irregular migration

There are many different motivations behind irregular migration. But often, it ends in deep disappointment. It is in the interests of all to address the root causes which cause people to seek a life elsewhere, to crack down on smugglers and traffickers, and to provide clarity and predictability in return policies. Addressing the root causes of irregular and forced displacement in third countries. Many of the root causes of migration lie deep in global issues which the EU has been trying to address for many years. Migration should be recognised as one of the primary areas where an active and engaged EU external policy is of direct importance to EU citizens.

Partnership with countries of origin and transit is crucial and there are a series of established bilateral and regional cooperation frameworks on migration in place. These will be enriched by stepping up the role on migration of EU Delegations in key countries. Delegations will in particular report on major migratory related developments in the host countries, contribute to mainstream migration issues into development cooperation and reach out to host countries to ensure coordinated action. European migration liaison officers will be seconded in EU Delegations in key third countries, in close cooperation with the Immigration Liaison Officers Network and with local authorities and civil society, with the purpose of gathering, exchanging and analysing information.

A good example of where there is much to be gained from stepping up cooperation is Turkey. Since the beginning of 2014, Turkey has received EUR 79 million to contribute to its efforts to deal with the pressure on its refugee management system and to help prevent hazardous journeys in the Eastern Mediterranean. Deploying a dedicated FRONTEX liaison officer in Turkey will take cooperation one step further. […]

The fight against smugglers and traffickers

Action to fight criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers is first and foremost a way to prevent the exploitation of migrants by criminal networks. It would also act as a disincentive to irregular migration. The goal must be to transform smuggling networks from ‘low risk, high return’ operations for criminals into ‘high risk, low return’ ones. An action plan will be brought forward by the Commission by the end of May. Cooperation with third countries is of critical importance. Most of the smugglers are not based in Europe, and those who are arrested on the boats in the Mediterranean are normally the last link in the chain. EU Agencies can also assist member states’ authorities in intensifying their action against criminal networks of smugglers. Agencies help identify smugglers, investigate them, prosecute them, freeze and confiscate their assets. Action will build on immediate efforts to identify, capture and destroy vessels before they are used by criminal networks (see above). Proactive financial investigations, aiming at seizures and recovery of criminal assets, and actions against money laundering connected to migrant smuggling will be supported through enhanced cooperation with Financial Intelligence Units on financial flows and new cooperation with financial institutions, such as banks, international money transfer services, and credit card issuers. This will also draw on the improved information-sharing set out in the European Agenda on Security.

In order to strengthen the instruments available to prosecutors to address smuggling networks, the Commission will improve the existing EU legal framework to tackle migrant smuggling and those who profit from it. In order to take specific action against traffickers’ networks and provide assistance to victims of trafficking, the Commission will also complete the initiatives foreseen in the current strategy against Trafficking in Human Beings and look at how work can be further improved in 2016. Another potential source of exploitation comes from employers inside the EU. Whilst promoting better integration into the labour market of legal migrants, the Commission will step up action against illegal employment of third country nationals, inter alia through better enforcement and application of the Employers Sanctions Directive, which prohibits the employment of third-country nationals who have no right to stay in the EU. It will also prioritise infringement procedures relating to this Directive.
Return

One of the incentives for irregular migrants is the knowledge that the EU’s return system – meant to return irregular migrants or those whose asylum applications are refused – works imperfectly. Smuggling networks often play on the fact that relatively few return decisions are enforced – only 39.2% of return decisions issued in 2013 were effectively enforced.

To increase the enforcement rate, we first need to ensure that third countries fulfil their international obligation to take back their own nationals residing irregularly in Europe. The EU should be ready to use all leverage and incentives at its disposal. The recently agreed Pilot Project on Return to Pakistan and Bangladesh will offer an important practical demonstration of the way forward. The EU will help third countries to meet their obligations by offering support such as capacity building for the management of returns, information and awareness campaigns, and support for reintegration measures. The Commission will also revise its approach to readmission agreements, prioritising the main countries of origin of irregular migrants.

In parallel, member states have to apply the Return Directive. The Commission will give priority to monitoring implementation of the Directive, with a more swift return system going hand-in-hand with the respect of the procedures and standards that allow Europe to ensure a humane and dignified treatment of returnees and a proportionate use of coercive measures, in line with fundamental rights and the principle of non-refoulement. The implementation of the EU rules on the return of irregular migrants is now being assessed thoroughly in the framework of the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism, and a ‘Return Handbook’ will support member states with common guidelines, best practice and recommendations. While the EU has common rules on return, it lacks effective operational cooperation. FRONTEX is currently offering considerable support to member states, but its mandate must be reinforced to increase its capacity to provide comprehensive operational assistance. Currently, FRONTEX can only coordinate return missions but not initiate its own. On the basis of the ongoing evaluation to be concluded this year, the Commission will propose to amend the FRONTEX legal basis to strengthen its role on return.

Key Actions

• Addressing the root causes through development cooperation and humanitarian assistance.
• Making migration a core issue for EU Delegations.
• An action plan on smuggling in May 2015.
• Stronger action so that third countries fulfil their obligations to readmit their nationals.
• Adoption of a Return Handbook and monitoring of the implementation of the Return Directive.
• Reinforcement and amendment of the FRONTEX legal basis to strengthen its role on return.

III.2 Border Management – Saving Lives and Securing External Borders

The measures described above to address the situation in the Mediterranean today have been developed as emergency measures in response to a specific crisis. It would be a illusion to believe that this is a short-term need which will not return. The reinforcement of FRONTEX and the setting up of new forms of cooperation with member states should be seen as a level of support and solidarity which is here to stay. The rules of engagement agreed for Triton operations should be seen as the model for future action on the whole of the external land and sea border. Every crisis will be different, but the EU needs to heed the lesson and be prepared to act in anticipation of a crisis, not just in reaction.
Coastguards have a crucial role both for saving lives and securing maritime borders. Their effectiveness would be improved through greater cooperation. The Commission, together with relevant agencies, will support such cooperation and, where appropriate, the further pooling of certain coast guard functions at the EU level.

Identifying risk trends is increasingly necessary for effective operational preparedness. The roll-out of Eurosur has provided a good model on which to build and should be used to the full by all civilian and military authorities with a responsibility for maritime border surveillance. The relevant agencies should develop an effective situational picture to feed into policy-making and response preparation at national and European levels.

The EU has an established policy to help member states build up sound and consistent external borders. The Internal Security Fund already provides over €2.7 billion to member states for the period from 2014-2020. But while rules on border control are in place, border management today varies, based on a patchwork of sectorial documents and instruments. In 2016, the Commission will consolidate this into a Union standard for border management to cover all aspects of the Union’s external border management. Managing our borders more efficiently also implies making better use of the opportunities offered by IT systems and technologies. The EU today has three large-scale IT systems, dealing with the administration of asylum (Eurodac), visa applications (the Visa Information System), and the sharing of information about persons or objects for which an alert has been created by the competent authorities (Schengen Information System). The full use of these systems can bring benefits to border management, as well as to enhance Europe’s capacity to reduce irregular migration and return irregular migrants. A new phase would come with the ‘Smart Borders’ initiative to increase the efficiency of border crossings, facilitating crossings for the large majority of ‘bona fide’ third country travellers, whilst at the same time strengthening the fight against irregular migration by creating a record of all cross-border movements by third country nationals, fully respecting proportionality. Following initial discussions on the first proposal and to take into account concerns raised by the co-legislators, the Commission intends to present a revised proposal on Smart Borders by the beginning of 2016.

The development of high standards inside the EU will also make it easier for Europe to support third countries developing their own solutions to better manage their borders. Initiatives in key African and neighbourhood countries could be supported by FRONTEX as well as by EU funding and related initiatives in the context of EU neighbourhood and development policies. The goal should be to encourage more secure borders, but also to strengthen the capacity of countries in North Africa to intervene and save lives of migrants in distress.

### Key Actions

- Strengthening FRONTEX’s role and capacity.
- Union Standard for border management.
- Strengthening EU coordination of coast guard functions.
- A revised proposal on Smart Borders.
- Strengthening the capacity of third countries to manage their borders.
III.3 Europe’s Duty to Protect: A Strong Common Asylum Policy

The EU needs a clear system for reception of asylum-seekers inside the EU. In 2014, a record 600,000 people applied for asylum in the EU. All asylum applications must be processed and protection granted to those who qualify. One of the weaknesses exposed in the current policy has been the lack of mutual trust between member states, notably as a result of the continued fragmentation of the asylum system. This has a direct impact on asylum seekers who seek to ‘asylum shop’, but also on EU public opinion: it encourages a sense that the current system is fundamentally unfair. But the EU has common rules which should already provide the basis for mutual confidence, and a further development of these rules will allow for a fresh start.

A coherent implementation of the Common European Asylum System

The priority is to ensure a full and coherent implementation of the Common European Asylum System. This will be supported by a new systematic monitoring process, to look into the implementation and application of the asylum rules and foster mutual trust. In addition, working with the member states and European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the Commission will give further guidance to improve standards on reception conditions and asylum procedures to provide member states with well-defined and simple quality indicators, and reinforcing protection of the fundamental rights of asylum-seekers, paying particular attention to the needs of vulnerable groups, such as children. The Commission will also prioritise transposition and implementation in practice of the recently adopted legislation on asylum rules when considering infringement procedures. EASO will at the same time step up practical cooperation, developing a role as the clearing house of national Country of Origin Information – the factual information on which asylum decisions are based. This would encourage more uniform decisions. Other key measures are training and a new dedicated network of reception authorities, which could lay the foundation for pooling reception places in times of emergency.

Strengthening the Common European Asylum System also means a more effective approach to abuses. Too many requests are unfounded: in 2014, 55% of the asylum requests resulted in a negative decision and for some nationalities almost all asylum requests were rejected, hampering the capacity of member states to provide swift protection to those in need. The legislation includes specific provisions to fight against abuses, for example by allowing swift processing of unfounded asylum applications. To reinforce this, the Commission will work with EASO and member states to develop guidelines to maximise such possibilities.

Another problem arises with asylum applications from third country nationals who do not require a visa to come to the EU. These cases can be dealt with in part through the post-visa liberalisation monitoring mechanisms. To reinforce this, the Commission will also propose strengthening Safe Country of Origin provisions of the Asylum Procedure Directive to support the swift processing of asylum applicants from countries designated as safe.

Dublin system – greater responsibility sharing across member states

Though the recent legal improvements date only from 2014, the mechanism for allocating responsibilities to examine asylum applications (the ‘Dublin system’) is not working as it should. In 2014, five member states dealt with 72% of all asylum applications EU-wide. The EU can provide further assistance, but the rules need to be applied in full.

Member states are responsible for applying the Dublin system. In particular, they should allocate the resources needed in order to increase the number of transfers and cut delays, proactively and consistently apply the clauses related to family reunification, and make a broader and regular use of the discretionary clauses, allowing them to examine an asylum application and relieve the pressure on the
frontline member states. At Union level, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) will support member states by establishing a dedicated network of national Dublin Units. Member states must also implement fully the rules on taking migrants’ fingerprints at the borders. Member states under particular pressure will benefit from the Hotspot system for providing operational support on the ground (see above). The Commission will provide, by the end of May, guidance to facilitate systematic fingerprinting, in full respect of fundamental rights, backed up by practical cooperation and exchange of best practices. The Commission will also explore how more biometric identifiers can be used through the Eurodac system (such as using facial recognition techniques through digital photos).

When the Dublin system was designed, Europe was at a different stage of cooperation in the field of asylum. The inflows it was facing were of a different nature and scale. When the Commission undertakes its evaluation of the Dublin system in 2016, it will also be able to draw on the experience from the relocation and resettlement mechanisms. This will help to determine whether a revision of the legal parameters of Dublin will be needed to achieve a fairer distribution of asylum seekers in Europe.

**Key Actions**

- Establishing a new monitoring and evaluation system for the Common European Asylum System and guidance to improve standards on reception conditions and asylum procedures.
- Guidelines to fight against abuses of the asylum system.
- Strengthening Safe Country of Origin provisions of the Asylum Procedure Directive to support the swift processing of asylum applicants from countries designated as safe.
- Measures to promote systematic identification and fingerprinting.
- More biometric identifiers passed through Eurodac.
- Evaluation and possible revision of the Dublin Regulation in 2016.

**III.4 A New Policy on Legal Migration**

Europe is competing with other economies to attract workers with the skills it needs. Changes in the skills required by the EU between 2012 and 2025 are expected to show a sharp increase in the share of jobs employing higher-educated labour (by 23%). Shortages have already been seen in key sectors such as science, technology, engineering and healthcare. Europe needs to build up its own skills base and equip people for inclusion in today’s labour market. The Commission will present a new Labour Mobility Package and a new Initiative on Skills in 2015, but even with a determined effort over the medium and long term we are unlikely to be able to fully match the needs.

The EU is also facing a series of long-term economic and demographic challenges. Its population is ageing, while its economy is increasingly dependent on highly-skilled jobs. Furthermore, without migration the EU’s working age population will decline by 17.5 million in the next decade. Migration will increasingly be an important way to enhance the sustainability of our welfare system and to ensure sustainable growth of the EU economy.

This is why, even if the case for legal migration will always be difficult at a time of high unemployment and social change, it is important to have in place a clear and rigorous common system, which reflects the EU interest, including by maintaining Europe as an attractive destination for migrants.
Well managed regular migration and visa policy

Decisions on the volume of admissions of third country nationals coming to seek work will remain the exclusive competence of member states. But there is a specific role for the EU. Over the next seven years, European programmes such as Horizon 2020 and Erasmus+ will attract talented individuals to the EU. The Directive on Students and Researchers, now under negotiation by the co-legislators, aims to give these groups new mobility and job-seeking opportunities. The swift adoption of the legislation would allow these strategically important groups to see the EU as a welcoming environment for their work.

The next step should be an attractive EU-wide scheme for highly qualified third-country nationals. The Blue Card Directive already provides such a scheme, but in its first two years, only 16,000 Blue Cards were issued and 13,000 were issued by a single member state. By the end of May, the Commission will launch a public consultation on future of the Blue Card Directive. A review of the Directive will look at how to make it more effective in attracting talent to Europe. The review will include looking at issues of scope such as covering entrepreneurs who are willing to invest in Europe, or improving the possibilities for intra EU mobility for Blue Card holders.

The efforts to develop our new legal migration policy mirror the modernisation of our visa policy. In 2014, the Commission tabled a revision of the Visa Code and proposed the establishment of a new type of visa: the Touring Visa. The adoption of these proposals will provide the EU with more flexible visa policy tools, aiming to maximise the positive economic impact of attracting more tourists, and visitors on personal or professional grounds while minimising the risks of irregular migration and security. The Commission will also conclude by the end of 2015 its current review of which nationalities require visas and may propose to lift visa requirements for some nationalities, on a reciprocal basis, or to re-impose visa requirements for others. This will take into account the ongoing political dialogues with key countries on migration and mobility matters.

Effective integration

Our migration policy will succeed if underpinned by effective integration policies. Although the competence lies primarily with member states, the European Union can support actions by national governments, local authorities and civil society engaged in the complex and long term process of fostering integration and mutual trust.

Funding is provided by the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). But the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) can also be of particular importance. For the new programming period (2014-20), at least 20% of ESF resources will contribute to social inclusion, which includes measures for the integration of migrants with a particular focus on those seeking asylum and refugees as well as on children. The funds can support targeted initiatives to improve language and professional skills, improve access to services, promote access to the labour market, inclusive education foster inter-cultural exchanges and promote awareness campaigns targeting both host communities and migrants.

Maximising the development benefits for countries of origin

The EU’s legal migration policy should also support the development of countries of origin. The United Nations will shortly adopt the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and migration-related targets should be included, alongside targets in areas such as promoting decent work, youth employment, wage and social protection policies which can help countries of origin to create better economic opportunities at home. The EU will continue to actively support migration-related targets as part of the final overall framework, and to emphasise the importance of harnessing the positive effects of migration as a horizontal means of implementation for the post-2015 development agenda. This would
complement the work of the EU’s Mobility Partnerships and our efforts to mainstream migration issues into key development sectors.

The Commission will also make available at least EUR 30 million to support partners with capacity building on effective management of labour migration, focusing on empowering migrant workers and tackling exploitation. To mirror the success of Europe in establishing a single market underpinned by labour mobility, the EU has also launched a EUR 24 million initiative to support free movement in the Economic Community of West African States. Regional labour mobility schemes encouraging South-South mobility can bring an important contribution to local development. The Commission will also promote ethical recruitment in sectors suffering from a lack of qualified workers in countries of origin by supporting international initiatives in this field.

One way in which the EU can help to ensure that countries of origin benefit from migration is through facilitating cheaper, faster and safer remittance transfers. Adoption of the proposal for a ‘EU Payment Services Directive II’ would help to strengthen the regulatory environment for remittances, and at least EUR 15 million will be made available through the Development Cooperation Instrument to support flagship initiatives in developing countries.

**Key Actions**

- Modernisation and overhaul of the Blue Card scheme.
- A platform for dialogue with social partners on economic migration.
- Stronger action to link migration and development policy.
- Re-prioritising funding for integration policies
- Cheaper, faster and safer remittance transfers.

**IV. Moving Beyond**

This Agenda primarily focuses on offering solutions that will allow Europe to move forward in these areas in the short and medium term. But if we are to address these issues in an effective and sustainable manner in the longer term, European cooperation in the area of migration needs to go further.

The initiatives contained in the Agenda will be critical in shaping an effective and balanced European migration policy. Within the scope of the Treaties and its relevant Protocols, the Commission will launch parallel reflections on a number of areas:

1. The completion of the Common European Asylum System: The EU Treaties looks forward to a uniform asylum status valid throughout the Union. The Commission will launch a broad debate on the next steps in the development of Common European Asylum System, including issues like a common Asylum Code and the mutual recognition of asylum decisions. A longer term reflection towards establishing a single asylum decision process will also be part of the debate, aiming to guarantee equal treatment of asylum seekers throughout Europe.

2. A shared management of the European border: The scaling up of action in the Mediterranean exposes the reality of the management of external borders increasingly being a shared responsibility. As well as a European System of Border Guards, this would cover a new approach to coastguard functions in the EU, looking at initiatives such as asset sharing, joint exercises and dual use of resources as well as the possibility of moving towards a European Coastguard.
3. A new model of legal migration: The EU Treaties reserves the final decision on the admission of economic migrants for member states. However, the EU needs to look at how to marry this limitation with the collective needs of the EU economy. In particular, the Commission will look at the possibility of developing, with the member states, an ‘expression of interest system’. This would use verifiable criteria to automatically make an initial selection of potential migrants, with employers invited to identify priority applicants from the pool of candidates, and migration taking place after the migrant is offered a job. This would allow for the creation of an ‘EU-wide pool’ of qualified migrants, accessible to both employers and member states’ authorities – but with the actual selection and the admission procedure remaining national, based on member states’ actual labour market needs.

[...] ***

COUNCIL OF THE EU, ‘HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE ON THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN WESTERN BALKANS ROUTE’, 8 OCT. 2015

[excerpt – some footnotes have been deleted]

In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in flows of refugees and migrants towards countries neighbouring Syria and thereafter along the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans route. The majority are persons in need of international protection. This is placing reception capacities of most affected countries under severe pressure, with serious humanitarian consequences. It poses significant challenges to border management and asylum systems, as well as security challenges. International protection and assistance must be granted to all those entitled to it, in full respect of the principle of non-refoulement. In parallel, irregular migrants who are not in need of international protection must be effectively returned to their countries of origin, according to existing and future agreements, as well as mutually agreed arrangements.

Relevant rules in the crossing of borders must be respected in order to ensure safe and well-managed traffic. Irregular crossing of borders threatens security and can fuel organised crime. Effective management of borders and fight against organised crime responsible for migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings are essential. It is therefore of utmost importance to step up our joint efforts aimed at establishing comprehensive border management.

We are facing a common challenge. As partners, we need to respond collectively with solidarity. We also need to increase the engagement of the broader international community. Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey are at the forefront of efforts. We commend them for their generosity in hosting and addressing the needs of over 4 million Syrian refugees. The Western Balkans, at present in particular Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, are part of transit routes for refugees and migrants heading to EU member states and are hosting persons in need of international protection. We appreciate the assistance they provide to many thousands of persons in need of international protection and their willingness to fully assume their own responsibilities, including readmission of their nationals as safe countries of origin. Finally, many EU member states are also under strong pressure as countries of transit and destination.

Today, in addressing these challenges, we reiterate our firm commitment to respect international obligations and human rights. Respect for the dignity of refugees and migrants and protection of
their human rights remain our priority at all times. Particular attention shall be given to the protection of vulnerable groups. We also reiterate our commitment to work with relevant United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, international organisations, as well as with relevant international and national NGOs that are supporting refugees in the region.

Collective responsibility must be translated into collective action. From the solid base of stabilisation and association, enlargement or neighbourhood processes that anchor our relations, we agree today to step up our engagement in response to the current refugee crisis.

To this effect, we shall pursue the following key actions:

**A) Support to Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey**

Mobilise increased development support to host governments and host communities, and make this support more effective. Enhance measures to support host countries through economic incentives, including private sector contributions, and support for national economies and public infrastructure heavily strained by the massive refugee influx and continued presence of large numbers of refugees.

Ensure that persons in need of international protection receive the necessary information, documentation and assistance, including legal assistance, to register in host countries – responsibility of which lies primarily with host countries in cooperation with international organisations – with special attention to vulnerable groups. On this basis, continue to provide immediate and principled humanitarian aid and development assistance, improving as required access for humanitarian actors, in order to address the most urgent humanitarian needs of refugees based on their vulnerability, including shelter, protection, food, health, water and sanitation. This should be based on a joint-up approach with sustainable development assistance to cover as well resilience needs. Reception and registration capabilities in host countries will be enhanced to face increasing pressure, including in order to enhance ownership of national and local authorities.

Improving refugees’ access to education, including higher-education and vocational training, while recognising the strain placed on host countries’ education system and the need to support the education sector. Improving refugees’ access to labour market and employment opportunities and to basic services. All this will be implemented in line with national capabilities and in compliance with applicable legal frameworks. Invite the donor community to contribute to finance income generating initiatives for refugees which would enhance their self-reliance, without prejudice to the temporary nature of their presence, and benefit host communities and promote social cohesion. Enhancement of resilience and livelihood opportunities should target both refugees and host communities. Inform refugees and migrants, including through information campaigns and in cooperation with UNHCR and IOM, about risks of irregular migration channels and about alternative legal opportunities to enter Europe (e.g. family reunification, students’ mobility, private sponsorship programmes etc.). Where possible, consider whether such legal opportunities for mobility should be enhanced. Work in close cooperation with UNHCR and IOM to ensure that the international community provides more resettlement opportunities to refugees, including in particular Syrian refugees, and honours pledges made.

Improve and share data collection, tracking of movements of population, joint needs assessments, mapping or analysis of socio-economic impact in order to ensure a more targeted and effective response and anticipate trends, while respecting privacy of personal data and legal safeguards.

**B) Support to affected transit countries**

Provide immediate first line principled humanitarian assistance, such as food, shelter, health care, psycho-social support, protection, water and sanitation, to refugees, asylum seekers and migrants transiting. Enhance reception and accommodation facilities, as required, to ensure that refugees and migrants are received in a dignified manner and are provided with the necessary information referral and assistance, including legal assistance, to get registration and access to basic services and tailored support to the most vulnerable.
Enhance capacity to manage borders and to ensure prompt registration of all refugees and migrants and effective, rapid and quality processing of asylum applications, in full respect of human rights and in line with international standards. Support swift return to their countries of origin of persons not entitled to international protection, in full respect of the principle of non-refoulement.

Undertake awareness-raising and outreach activities at community level to prevent tensions and counter xenophobia.

Enhance regional coordination and information exchange, including through national authorities and other international and regional actors, to better coordinate the management of migration flows.

C) Cooperation to fight organised crime responsible for migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings

Enhance border management (checks at crossing points and surveillance) in full respect of human rights. The agreement between Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria concluded in May 2015 provides a good example. In order to ensure better coherence in managing migration flows, regional cooperation on border management will be fostered.

Enhance police and judicial cooperation, including intelligence-gathering, sharing and analysing, as well as capacity building of law enforcement and judicial authorities, with a specific focus on the conduct of financial investigations.

Ensure support to and protection of victims of migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, with special attention to vulnerable groups, such as women and children.

Enhance cooperation with relevant EU agencies and international organisations (e.g. FRONTEX, EASO, EUROPOL, EUROJUST, Interpol and UNODC), making best use of existing regional arrangements.

D) Addressing the root causes of forced displacement

Address structural causes of instability in a comprehensive way. In this context, intensify our diplomatic engagement with all relevant international partners, including in full support of the United Nations Secretary General Special Envoy’s efforts, to reach a political solution to the conflict in Syria, which would include a safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons. Intensify our efforts for the development of Afghanistan’s institutions to provide the resilience needed for the building of an effective and ultimately sustainable Afghan State. Intensify our support for the Iraqi Government with a view to achieving inclusiveness, national reconciliation and long-term peace, stability and unity.

Step up our efforts in the fight against terrorism and violent extremist groups, including in particular against ISIL/Daesh. These efforts shall also comprise counter-radicalisation programmes, in particular targeting youth.

In complement to our actions addressing the root causes and in line with the humanitarian imperative and mandate, we will increase needs-based principled humanitarian assistance to support internally displaced people and other affected populations, as well as affected host communities, in Syria and Iraq with food, water, hygiene, shelter, health, education and protection, in all accessible locations, in line with humanitarian principles, based on vulnerability and needs and in line with relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Delivery of humanitarian aid to besieged and hard-to-reach areas should be pursued.

In addition, increase our efforts through stabilisation assistance, including support for local governance, rule of law and re-establishment of basic public services, where possible.

E) Engagement with countries of origin of irregular migrants

Enhance engagement with countries of origin of irregular migrants, mobilising all instruments and processes of dialogue to achieve full and effective implementation of mutual obligations with regard to return, including through readmission agreements.

Support assisted voluntary return programmes as well as reintegration programmes to facilitate the
return of migrants not entitled to international protection into their countries of origin, in full respect of international human rights standards and the principle of non-refoulement.
Increase investments in improving socio-economic conditions in these countries, focusing particularly on education and creating opportunities for youth, promoting their participation in social, economic and political institutions, as well as women’s rights.

Way forward

Broader international engagement
We commit to further engaging the broader international community in an effort to find a political solution to the Syrian conflict and enhance financial support as well as resettlement opportunities and other forms of humanitarian admission, to address the refugee crisis. We recall the importance of respecting international humanitarian law. We welcome the offer of Norway, Germany and the United Kingdom to host early next year an international donors’ conference to help Syrians displaced by war. We encourage all States to make substantial contributions in response to this severe crisis.
We recognize the key role of the United Nations and its relevant agencies, funds and programmes, other international organisations, non-governmental organisations and civil society in supporting these efforts and we therefore commit to reinforce our cooperation and partnership with them.

EU support
The EU will support these efforts through both increased financial resources and technical cooperation through FRONTEX, EASO, EUROPOL and EUROJUST. In consultation and coordination with candidate countries and potential candidates, the EU will use the financial instruments available within the accession/stabilisation and association process, including the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, to strengthen cooperation with candidate countries and potential candidates and provide support for their efforts.
The EU will increase its humanitarian funding in Syria and Iraq, and to respond to the rapidly growing needs in neighbouring countries and those on the Eastern Mediterranean/Western Balkans route, bearing in mind its changing nature. Assistance will be provided through partner organisations, including UN agencies, international organisations and national and international non-governmental organisations, in coordination, where appropriate, with local authorities. Additional support can be provided through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism.
The EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis can improve efficiency, flexibility and speed of delivery of EU support across the neighbouring countries affected by the Syrian crisis in order, inter alia, to increase resilience of affected communities. The extension of the scope of the Trust Fund to the Western Balkans is being proposed and additional contributions are being considered. The EU will make full use of the Regional Development and Protection Programme for the Middle East to support refugees and host communities in the region. The EU will step up its conflict prevention and resolution efforts, notably by mobilizing the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace for stabilization programmes in areas of conflict but also in neighbouring countries, in particular Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. The EU will ensure that its support is provided in a coordinated way among the various financial instruments and actors involved. The EU will further promote resettlement as agreed by its member states.

Follow-up
The follow-up to this Declaration will be ensured through regular contacts both at political and technical level and, as appropriate, relevant action plans will be developed. Where relevant, existing bilateral and regional frameworks for dialogue and cooperation will be used, including the EU stabilisa-
tion and association, enlargement or neighbourhood processes and high-level dialogues. The Mobility Partnership with Jordan and the Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security with Lebanon also provide important frameworks, including with a view to future possible agreements on visa facilitation/readmission. The Silk Route Partnership for Migration under the Budapest process will provide an opportunity for further engagement between main countries of origin, transit and destination. The Prague process will also provide a useful platform of cooperation. Other regional initiatives, such as MARRI and the Brdo process, will contribute further to this goal.

Specific challenges caused by large numbers of asylum seekers coming from the Western Balkans will be addressed in the upcoming Justice and Home Affairs EU-Western Balkans Ministerial Forum, including through concrete and appropriate measures concerning all aspects of the phenomenon. We agree to keep the situation under review. Senior officials of the participants will meet to examine the follow up to this Declaration in early 2016.

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VALLETTA SUMMIT ACTION PLAN, 11-12 NOV. 2015

[excerpt ]

INTRODUCTION

The following Action Plan is built around five priority domains. Its actions are part of one package and will be implemented in full coherence with countries’ sovereignty, national legislations and taking into account national specificities. Sixteen priority initiatives will be launched before the end of 2016. The existing mechanisms of the Rabat Process, the Khartoum Process and of the Joint EU-Africa Strategy will be used to monitor implementation. In doing so, lessons learned from many actions which have been launched successfully with partners like Cabo Verde, Morocco and Niger will be duly taken into account. The next Khartoum and Rabat process Senior Officials Meetings to be organised by end 2015 will agree on the best way for each of the processes to follow up and monitor the progress made in the implementation of this Action Plan. The state of play of the implementation of the Action Plan will also be regularly on the agenda of the meetings organised in the framework of the Africa-EU Strategy as well as our bilateral political dialogues and a dedicated Senior Officials Meeting to be held no later than January 2017.

To support the implementation of the Action Plan, the EU, its member states and associated countries will use their relevant financial instruments available for cooperation with African partners in line with their legal and financing frameworks. Substantial EU funds are available to implement actions in the areas prioritised by this Action Plan. The EU, its member states and associated countries will step up efforts to mainstream migration into their development cooperation. In parallel, the newly established EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa will provide additional funding and will contribute to a flexible, speedy and efficient delivery of support to foster stability and to contribute to better migration management. More specifically, the Trust Fund will help address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration, by promoting economic and equal opportunities, strengthening resilience of vulnerable people, security and development. Moreover, the European Investment Bank, in cooperation with African partners, the Commission and other financial institutions, can provide financing to support the re-establishment of the conditions for self-sustaining economic growth and the development of human capital.
1. DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS OF MIGRATION AND ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT

1.1 Investing in development and poverty eradication

- **Mainstream migration in development cooperation**
  - Support African countries, regional and pan-African institutions, in particular the African Union, in developing or further strengthening national and regional migration strategies while taking note of individual countries specificities
  - Develop options for migration mainstreaming processes that are based on principles of ownership, involvement and participation of key actors
  - Integrate migration in development and poverty eradication strategies and programmes, in particular in the areas such as labour market/employment, private sector development, education, health, social protection and security, while ensuring full policy coherence
  - Encourage triangular cooperation between Sub-Saharan countries, Southern Mediterranean countries and European ones on migration-related topics to foster development in regions of origin and transit
  - Conduct a joint EU-Africa analysis of the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement to improve the evidence-base of public policies
  - Pursue strategic reflection to further promote regional economic integration between European, Southern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan countries

- **Boost socio-economic development**, particularly by creating job opportunities, especially for young women and men
  - Enhance employment opportunities and revenue-generating activities in regions of origin and transit of migrants, including through public and private investment in favour of agriculture and rural economy development (e.g. the ‘terres fermes’ policy devoted to value chain development, support to agri-business and family farming)
  - Step up assistance to youth to acquire labour market-relevant skills through education, vocational training, access to digital technologies, while ensuring equal opportunities for young women and men (e.g. AU/NEPAD new skills initiative)
  - Create new economic opportunities for young women and men through initiatives focused on, among others, targeted measures to create jobs and employment opportunities and stimulate entrepreneurship, and programmes with civil society to foster youth participation in the public sphere
  - Develop networks between European and African vocational training institutions, with a view to ensuring that vocational training matches labour market needs
  - Step up support to micro, small and medium sized enterprises (SME) in the formal and informal sector including through access to finance and micro-loans, training and incubation with particular focus on women, youth and rural populations
  - Support and boost the local information and communications technology sector, including ICT start-up communities, and work with them (for example through practical trainings, workshops, mentoring)
  - Support economic cross-border activities in border cities and markets

- **Support resilience**, in particular to the benefit of the most vulnerable, in particular women and children, and communities hosting protracted refugee populations, including through rural development, food and nutrition security, health, education and social protection
· Enhance the resilience agenda aiming at reducing food insecurity and under-nutrition and increase the delivery of basic services notably through the AGIR (Sahel) and Share 2.0 (Horn of Africa) initiatives
· Address environmental and climate change issues in the most affected regions, including adaptation to climate change and development of sustainable and renewable energies, notably via consensual electrification projects. Provide satellite data and information (Copernicus programme) to support rural development, the improvement of food security and the management of natural resources in a sustainable way. The existing access to Copernicus data and information products by African countries will be further facilitated
· **Enhance sustainable livelihoods and self-reliance** opportunities for displaced persons, as well as to host communities
  · Promote economic opportunities for displaced persons that would also benefit the host communities and reduce dependency on humanitarian assistance
  · Enhance the provision of basic services for displaced persons and host communities such as increased access to education, water, health services, and vocational training in cooperation with regional and local authorities

### 1.2 Development benefits of migration
· **Promote cheaper, safer**, legally-compliant and faster transfers of remittances and facilitate productive domestic investments
  · Implement country specific programmes, maximising the impact of remittances notably in rural areas
  · Support financial education and inclusion of migrants and their families
  · By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%. In addition, identify corridors for remittances transfers where the partners commit to substantially reduce the costs by 2020, from Europe to Africa and within Africa, in compliance with existing national legislation
  · Explore, identify and promote innovative financial instruments to channel remittances for development purposes and to increase the volume of transfers through the formal remittance channels
· **Promote diaspora** engagement in countries of origin
  · Develop country specific actions aiming at enhancing the development impact of migrant diasporas, both in the EU and associated countries and in Africa, to their country of origin. In this context, develop diaspora investment models aimed at leveraging migrants’ savings for local business development and as a means of boosting local economic development
  · Further enhance the countries’ outreach to and the knowledge of their diaspora

### 1.3 Addressing instability and crises
· Take action with regard to conflicts, human rights violations and abuses that generate internal displacement, irregular migration and refugee flows. Special focus should be given to the situation in individual countries in Africa, and notably in the regions of Sahel, Lake Chad and the Horn of Africa.
  · Reinforce support to diplomatic initiatives, including mediation efforts, for some of the most urgent crisis situations in Africa
Consolidate and support the implementation of crisis settlement processes in terms of peace agreements and reconciliation by the international community

Prevent new conflicts
- Reinforce the support to the different subregional initiatives and mechanisms for conflict prevention and management, as well as to development and implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture and the African Governance Architecture
- Consider cooperation regarding early warning and analysis of potential future conflicts of any nature, which might lead to displacement of the population
- Launch measures to prevent and counter radicalisation and violent extremism, in particular among the youth, notably in the Sahel, Lake Chad, North Africa and Horn of Africa regions, taking into account inter alia ElAzhar’s leading role in this regard, the Moroccan experience regarding the education of imams and the outcome of the International Conference on Violent Extremism and Deradicalisation held in Algeria on 22 and 23 July 2015
- Support national, regional, and local administrations and civil society organisations in their efforts to foster community cohesion and address human rights violations that contribute to instability in accordance with national law

Support State-building, rule of law and good governance
- Strengthen capacities of public administration in security and rule of law as well as improve border management
- Support cross-border cooperation and specific actions with both security and development dimensions in remote border areas
- Promote police and judicial cooperation between origin, transit and destination countries
- Protect and promote respect for Human Rights for all, including migrants and refugees, in countries of origin, transit and destination. Work together to ensure the African Year of Human Rights in 2016 is a success

Reinforce State capacity to ensure security and fight terrorist threats, including through continuation of existing efforts to the benefit of local populations
- Develop activities of EUCAP Sahel Niger in the Agadez region, while increasing coordination with EUCAP Sahel Mali
- Strengthen capacity to fight terrorism and organised crime, in a human rights compliant manner, including through training and professionalisation of the internal security forces as well as judicial authorities including through regional cooperation
- Encourage exchange of information at regional level (e.g. support to G5 Sahel Security Platform) as well as with destination countries
2. LEGAL MIGRATION AND MOBILITY

- Promoting regular channels for migration and mobility from and between European and African countries
- Reinforce cooperation and create networks between relevant agencies and institutions in the field of job/employment creation and development with a view to facilitating placements and job opportunities
- Strengthen cooperation on pre-departure measures (e.g. foreign language and vocational training) as well as rights awareness
- Step up efforts to promote legal migration and mobility within bilateral cooperation frameworks such as Mobility Partnerships and Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility.
- Identify, as a pilot, one or more professions where participating States commit to make progress on facilitating recognition of skills and qualifications (including for migrants who decide to return to their country of origin – circular migration schemes)
- Treat the portability of social rights of lawfully residing migrants, in conformity with international conventions, bilateral conventions, and national laws applicable in this area
- Support continental, regional and sub-regional frameworks for mobility and migration, such as the Joint Labour Migration Programme adopted at the African Union Summit in January 2015 and other initiatives developed by ECOWAS and IGAD
- Promoting mobility of students, researchers and entrepreneurs between Africa and Europe

We commit to implement the following initiatives by end 2016 at the latest:

- Launch projects to enhance employment opportunities and revenue-generating activities in regions of origin and transit of migrants in East, North and West Africa to enhance the professional skills and employability of young people, including the AU/NEPAD skills initiative, access to digital technologies, support to micro, small-and medium-sized enterprises in the formal and informal sectors and increased access to finance
- Launch projects linking relief, rehabilitation and development in peripheral and most vulnerable areas characterised by instability, forced displacement and irregular migration, providing a targeted response to tackle the main determinants of vulnerability (poverty, marginalisation, exclusion, destitution) and targeting populations at risk (especially youth)
- Operationalise the African Institute on Remittances to serve as a focal point for all stakeholders in African remittances, a centre of excellence on African remittances as regards research, advocacy and private sector engagement; and a hub through which technical assistance and capacity building regarding remittances would be provided to African Union member states’ organisations (central banks, ministries, banks, and non-bank financial institutions)
- Facilitate responsible private investment in African agriculture, agri-business and agro-industries and boost intra-African trade and exports of agricultural products through agricultural finance initiatives and by working with like-minded organisations, with immediate effect, with a view to contributing to rural economic transformation, taking due note of the African Union’s Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods.
We commit to implement the following initiatives by end 2016 at the latest:

- Double the number of scholarships for students and academic staff through the EU supported Erasmus+ programme in 2016 compared to 2014.
- While respecting the national selection and admission procedures, launch pilot projects that pool offers for legal migration (e.g. for work, study, research, and vocational training) by some EU member states or associated countries to selected African countries as an element of the comprehensive logic of the Action Plan.
- Organise, in the framework of the Rabat and Khartoum processes and the Migration and Mobility Dialogue, workshops on visa facilitation.

3. PROTECTION AND ASYLUM

3.1 Protection

- Reinforce the protection of refugees and other displaced persons, uphold the human rights of all migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, support the integration of long term refugees and displaced persons in host communities and strengthen capacities of countries of first asylum, transit and destination.
• Further work to prevent the loss of life at sea by continued search and rescue efforts by all sides, including, where appropriate through joint action at sea and on land when agreed with the countries concerned
• Enhance the protection capacities of countries which are hosting large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, including security in refugee camps, support local development for host communities and forcibly displaced persons, and enable better management of forced displacement
• Support countries in their efforts to adhere to and comply with the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol
• Facilitate access to justice, legal assistance, witness-protection, health and socio-psychological support for refugees, migrants and asylum-seekers victims of serious crimes
• Further engage with actors from civil society organisations on how to ensure a more accessible, equitable and effective international protection
• Jointly explore the concept of enhanced capacities in priority regions along the main migratory routes, with a view to developing possible pilot projects, in cooperation with UNHCR

3.2 Humanitarian response
• Enhance efforts of countries to provide humanitarian assistance in countries most affected by forced displacement
• Ensure provision of life-saving emergency assistance, in affected countries, that focuses on basic services (education, health and nutrition), food assistance, shelter, water and sanitation and protection. Assistance targets the most vulnerable, regardless of their status
• Strengthen the link between humanitarian assistance and longer term development measures to improve livelihoods, self-reliance opportunities and to facilitate durable solutions

We commit to implement the following initiatives by end 2016 at the latest:
• Regional Development and Protection Programmes in the Horn of Africa and North Africa should be up and running by mid-2016. Their aim is to address the protection and developmental needs of people suffering long-term displacement and their host communities. The programmes will focus on durable solutions, enhancing protection capacities of hosting countries, and creating development and livelihood opportunities for displaced populations and host communities, including in areas such as income-generation, jobs, and education
• Carry out trainings and improve the quality of the asylum process, in close cooperation with UNHCR and with the support of EASO, in countries of origin, transit and destination
• Develop targeted projects to improve resilience, safety and self-reliance of refugees in camps and host communities in countries most affected by forced displacement in close coordination with host countries, international organisations
4. PREVENTION OF AND FIGHT AGAINST IRREGULAR MIGRATION, MIGRANT SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS

- Support in drafting and implementing appropriate legislative and institutional frameworks, in line with the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, UN Protocols on Smuggling of Migrant by Land, Sea and Air and on Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, and the 2014 Protocol to the ILO Forced Labour Convention
- Support to the rule of law and law enforcement, judiciary and border management authorities in order to tackle smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, including on tracing and seizing assets and criminal proceeds, as well as on crime investigation and prosecution. Support could include capacity building and provision of relevant equipment. Human rights dimension will be fully reflected in capacity-building and training projects
- Train law enforcement and judicial authorities e.g. on proactive and reactive investigation methods and judicial treatment of victims/witnesses and assisting in setting up specialised anti-trafficking and smuggling police units
- Step up capacity building to counter the production and use of forged and fraudulent documents, including by engaging FRONTEX and EUROPOL
- Ensure effective implementation by relevant national authorities of existing legislation and measures against employers who exploit irregular migrants
- Step up efforts for effective investigation and prosecution of migrant smugglers and traffickers in human beings and more effective protection of victims that complies with fundamental rights and takes the gender of victims into account
- Contribute to prevent and address irregular migration and to fight related organised crime, such as migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, including through agreed actions and missions
- Provide protection, support and/or assistance to stranded/vulnerable migrants, refugees and victims of trafficking. Special attention should be given to vulnerable groups, notably women and children
- Support establishing standard operating procedures for the referral of victims of trafficking at national and cross-border levels, and the provision of systematic and predictable consular assistance to stranded migrants, including in regard to the issuance of travel documentation and the facilitation of transit and re-entry into the country of origin
- Support relevant authorities and civil society organisations to provide protection and rehabilitation services, including in the framework of post-return reintegration, notably medical and socio-psychological counselling, training, requalification and assistance
- Support regional initiatives on children at risk, in order to ensure comprehensive and sustainable child protection to prevent and to respond to violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation of children
- Improve intelligence gathering
- Encourage all States to gather intelligence on smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, with the support of Interpol and other appropriate agencies
- Support Interpol intelligence gathering exercises in relation to migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings
- Improve information and intelligence sharing
- Enhance cooperation in particular with Interpol National Central Bureaux (NCBs) and regional bureaux in African countries in order to foster policing improved intelligence sharing, between African states.
• Support information exchange between Interpol and EUROPOL.
• Foster operational police and judicial cooperation
  • Enhance operational police cooperation and exchange of information between countries of origin, transit and destination of migration, including, where appropriate, through Joint Investigation Teams with the agreement of countries concerned. This cooperation should involve, where appropriate, Interpol and EU agencies, in particular EUROPOL
  • Facilitate timely exchanges between States regarding mutual legal assistance in cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons
• Develop further and maintain, where appropriate, communication networks between EU and African countries to support maritime surveillance and to save lives at sea in compliance with fundamental rights and data protection standards
• Fight corruption and develop alternative income generation opportunities in countries where migrant smuggling and services for migrants are important economic factors
• Provide easy and continuous access to adequate and credible information on legal migration opportunities and dangers of engaging in irregular migration, as well as giving a realistic view of living conditions in European countries
  • Support mechanisms in countries along the main migratory routes upon request starting with a ‘multi-purpose centre’ in Agadez (Niger), which aims at ensuring provision of direct assistance and information to migrants, registration of migrants, as well as providing opportunities for safe and voluntary return and reintegration in cooperation with countries of origin. These mechanisms should also include support to local communities and should be complementary to initiatives aiming at reinforcement of local and national capacities to manage migration
• Provide capacity building and financing for investments in improved border management systems at regional and national level
  • Support national capabilities to control land, sea and air borders as well as maritime surveillance capabilities for the purpose of prevention of irregular migration, cross-border crime, terrorism as well as enhanced search and rescue
  • Promote development and implementation of national and regional strategies and action plans on integrated border management
  • Strengthen the capacities in border management on respect for human rights of migrants
  • Promote or further enhance platforms that provide for the exchange of strategic knowledge and joint analysis engaging authorities from non-EU Partner Countries, EU member states and associated countries (e.g. Liaison Officers) and EU Agencies (e.g. FRONTEX African Intelligence Community – AFIC)
• By the end of 2016, develop training mechanisms for border guards and police, including regional training centres and common curricula
5. RETURN, READMISSION AND REINTEGRATION
Strengthen cooperation in order to facilitate the return and sustainable reintegration of irregular migrants, both from EU member states and associated countries and from African countries of transit and destination, bearing in mind the obligation of each state under international law including Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement for its signatory parties to readmit its own nationals in full respect of human dignity and of the principle of non-refoulement. In accordance with the 9th paragraph of the Valletta Summit on Migration final declaration (We are determined to strengthen the fight against irregular migration in line with existing agreements and obligations under international law, as well as mutually agreed arrangements on return and readmission. We agree to give preference to voluntary return and reaffirm that all returns must be carried out in full respect of human rights and human dignity. We will improve cooperation on return and sustainable reintegration which can only enhance migration and mobility policy and make it more effective and comprehensive), we agree to:

- Develop practical cooperation arrangements and bilateral dialogues on implementation of returns with regard, in particular, to identification and issuance of travel documents
  - In the first half of 2016, organise a seminar on best practices in the field of return and readmission procedures, including on identification procedures as practiced by European countries, the issuing of identification documents, and documentation processing
  - Pay special attention to unaccompanied minors taking into account the principle of the best interest of the child. Child protection systems in countries of origin and transit should be supported so as to offer a safe environment for vulnerable children including unaccompanied minors upon their return
  - Explore return pilot projects between the EU, associated countries, and African countries
  - Provide comprehensive and developmental packages for safe return and reintegration, whereby a partner country commits to cooperate closely with the EU on return and re-

We commit to implement the following initiatives by end 2016 at the latest:

- Establish or upgrade national and regional anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking legislation, policies and action plans in countries and regions of origin and transit of migration. Identify single national contact points for anti-smuggling and trafficking activities to enhance cooperation, including with counterparts in EU member states and associated countries and in EUROPOL
- Implement projects focused on strengthening institutional capacities to fight against the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings networks, both in origin and transit countries located along the West Sahel routes, and raise awareness on this problem among the populations concerned
- Set up a joint investigation team in Niger against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings networks, as a pilot project to be potentially replicated in other countries or regions at their request
- Organise information campaigns in countries of origin, transit and destination, to raise awareness of the general public and potential migrants and victims on the dangers of trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants, their recruitment processes, including through public broadcasting services programmes aimed at informing the general public and potential migrants about the migratory situation in Europe
admission, notably on identification and travel documentation, and receives support for the individual reintegration of its own nationals, visa facilitation and a tailor-made package of support, including on other policy areas.

- Further promote programmes on assisted voluntary return and reintegration
- Strengthen the capacity of authorities and civil society organisations in their field of competence of countries of origin and transit to manage voluntary returns and support reintegration of all returnees, including through support to the development of policy frameworks and community-based reintegration measures, in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration
- Cooperate with countries of origin on addressing the absence of identification documents – and the absence of civil registry which is often the cause of it – as one of the main difficulties in the application of return and readmission policies
- Strengthen the capacity of authorities of countries of origin to respond in a timely manner to readmission applications, including through support to modernise civil registry systems and fingerprints digitalisation

We commit to implement the following initiatives by end 2016 at the latest:

- Strengthen the logistical and operational capacity of authorities of countries of origin to respond in a timely manner to readmission applications, including through missions by immigration officials from African countries to European countries in order to verify and identify nationalities of irregular migrants who are not in need of international protection with a view to being returned. Such identification missions will take place in the first quarter of 2016 with at least 10 African countries on a voluntary basis
- Launch projects in countries of origin to support the reintegration of returnees into their communities aiming at capacity building for authorities and civil society organisations involved in the return and reintegration processes in their field of competence, in particular by integrating the returning migrants in the local community, labour market and social system
I. INTRODUCTION. A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

We need a stronger Europe when it comes to foreign policy. With countries in our neighbourhood, we need to step up close cooperation, association and partnership to further strengthen our economic and political ties.

Article 8(1) of the Treaty on European Union states that ‘the Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation’.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was designed in 2003 (Communication ‘Wider Europe’) to develop closer relations between the EU and its neighbouring countries including by giving the opportunity of closer economic integration with the EU and the prospect of increased access to the EU’s Internal Market. The plan was for integration to be progressive, through the implementation of challenging political, economic and institutional reforms, and a commitment to common values.

Over the past ten years, there have been significant political developments in the neighbourhood. Today’s neighbourhood is less stable than it was ten years ago. For example, in the East, growing challenges to a number of Eastern Partnership countries, from the crisis in Georgia in 2008 to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, have been caused by an increasingly assertive Russian foreign policy, which has also resulted in exacerbating divisions between Russia and the EU. In the South, Syria has been afflicted by civil war since 2011 which has had a serious impact on its neighbours. Libya is currently a country in conflict. Over the past three years, Egypt has also undergone complex political change. Despite considerable efforts, the Middle East Peace Process is still stalled and there have been several outbreaks of hostilities, including in 2014 in Gaza. These events have served to increase the challenges faced by both the EU and its partners, aggravating economic and social pressures, irregular migration and refugee flows, security threats and leading to diverging aspirations.

The ENP has evolved over this period: the regional component has been strengthened as the Barcelona Process evolved into the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008 and the Eastern Partnership was launched in 2009. The content of the policy has also significantly increased. Neighbouring countries now have the prospect of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, as well as Mobility Partnerships or a visa free regime. Some of these have already been concluded. In addition, the ENP was reviewed in 2011 to design a response to the events of the Arab Spring, during which popular uprisings and ensuing consequences led to some progress, such as in Tunisia, but also to wider instability and political tension. The transitions have been very different in nature depending on the country.

The ENP has not always been able to offer adequate responses to these recent developments, nor to the changing aspirations of our partners. Therefore, the EU’s own interests have not been fully served either.
Partners have demonstrated increasing differences of engagement with the EU as a whole and in relation to different policy sectors. The ENP has extended the EU’s influence in some respects, but in a number of areas, the reform agenda has stalled, in part due to competing interests, in part because not all partners seem equally interested in a special partnership with the EU under the model of pluralism and integration. The EU has also experienced a major economic crisis in recent years, which has inevitably had an impact on our neighbours.

Political and economic reforms have a deep effect on societies and economies, as the EU’s own experience has shown. Partners assess the benefits in the long term, but also the costs that arise in the short term as a result of their relationship with the EU under the ENP. Our neighbours’ strategic orientations determine the extent to which each of them wishes to engage with different actors including the EU. Some partners have chosen to engage on a path of closer association with the EU, and the EU is ready to deepen its relations with them. Others prefer to follow a different path. The EU respects these sovereign choices and is ready to seek other forms of engagement.

Given all this, there is now a clear need to review the assumptions on which the policy is based, as well as its scope, and how instruments should be used, including how different policy sectors can better contribute to cooperation, ensuring linkages between internal and external priorities. The purpose of such a review is to ensure the ENP can, in the future, support more effectively the development of an area of shared stability, security and prosperity with our partners. It also has to explore whether the ‘special relationship’ is reaching its full potential, and what can be done to strengthen it in the interests of both the EU and its partners.

A clearer analysis of the interests, both of the EU and its partners is needed to make the ENP fit for purpose. On one hand, it is essential to consult partners on their interests and ambitions for this partnership. On the other, the EU needs to define more clearly its own aims and interests, while promoting the values on which it is based.

The review needs to answer the demands of partners with very different levels of ambition. Where there is already full engagement and commitment to integration, the review should consider how we can take forward and deepen our partnership. The EU remains committed to ensuring that the full potential of each partnership is reached, building on achievements to date.

Where partners have shown less engagement, or none at all, the review of the ENP should consider the reasons for this, and examine ways to fit better the aspirations on both sides. Some partners currently outside the neighbourhood may be needed to be more closely associated. It should also be considered how the EU should best respond to crises and conflict situations, including protracted ones, taking into account the sources of influence and pressure on our partners that determine their political positions, including towards the EU.

In this regard, an effective ENP needs to be closely integrated into an overall EU Foreign Policy with a comprehensive approach using all instruments both of the EU and of member states.

It is in this context that President Juncker decided that the ENP will be reviewed within the first year of the new Commission’s mandate. EU member states have also called for a review, and have already made proposals. Partner countries have expressed the need to revisit the policy; as have external stakeholders, including civil society organisations and social partners’ organisations.

In parallel the Commission is refining the Enlargement policy, which remains distinct from the ENP. In this context, President Juncker has stated in his Political Guidelines that no further enlargement will take place over the next five years.

The aim of this document is to frame the discussion for a thorough re-examination of the ENP. In section II, we set out some preliminary findings in terms of lessons learned from the ENP to date. In section III, we develop some suggested first elements of response towards developing a stronger partnership and identify a number of key questions for discussion with key partners and stakeholders. In section IV, we summarise the next steps with regard to structuring public consultation. The results of the consultation
will contribute to a further Communication in the autumn of 2015, setting out concrete proposals for the future direction of the ENP.

II. LESSONS LEARNED AND QUESTIONS ON THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF ENP

This section draws on the experience of ten years of implementation of the policy, as reflected by regular and frequent contacts with EU member states and ENP partner countries and the current period of informal consultation, to which many have already contributed.

Since 2004, the ENP has provided a framework for the EU’s relations with its neighbouring countries, enabling the EU member states to reach consensus on greater engagement with neighbours both to the East and to the South. The EU’s relations with neighbourhood countries have significantly intensified through the ENP, as a result of clear commitments spelled out by both sides in the ENP Action Plans. The ENP has provided a way to respond to the partners’ own demands for greater engagement with the Union. After 10 years, the partnerships with the neighbours have a higher profile in EU affairs; the EU is the main trading partner for most partner countries; passenger and migration flows between the ENP and EU have been constantly on the rise. The EU has used the ENP to foster and evaluate, on an annual basis, reform efforts in each country, in particular on governance issues, on the basis of action plans agreed with the individual partners.

However, some shortcomings have been identified. Some partners are actively seeking closer integration with the EU. Others are not, or not currently, attracted by it, calling into question some of the assumptions on which the ENP has been constructed. Although the concept of differentiation has been present from the start, individual countries do not always find their specific aspirations sufficiently reflected. The lack of a sense of shared ownership with partners prevents the policy from achieving its full potential.

The approach of ‘more for more’ underlines the EU’s commitment to its core values, but has not always contributed to an atmosphere of equal partnership, and has not always been successful in providing incentives further reforms in the partner countries.

The questions raised in this Communication seek to explore how the ENP can become a more effective vehicle for promoting both the EU’s interests and those of its partners, and a framework more conducive to developing fuller partnerships in which both sides find their aspirations better reflected.

- The importance of building deeper relationships with the EU’s partners is not in question.
- Should the ENP be maintained? Should a single framework continue to cover both East and South?
- The current framework of the ENP covers 16 neighbouring countries. However, many of the challenges that need to be tackled by the EU and its neighbours together, cannot be adequately addressed without taking into account, or in some cases cooperating with, the neighbours of the neighbours.
- Should the current geographical scope be maintained? Should the ENP allow for more flexible ways of working with the neighbours of the neighbours? How can the EU, through the ENP framework, support its neighbours in their interactions with their own neighbours? What could be done better to ensure greater coherence between the ENP and the EU’s relations with Russia, with partners in Central Asia, or in Africa, especially in the Sahel and in the Horn of Africa, and with the Gulf countries?
- While the ENP is conducted through the EU institutions, greater member state involvement could lead to greater results.
- How could a more comprehensive approach with more active involvement by member states give the policy greater weight? Would stronger co-ownership of the policy be preferred by partners?
• The ENP has developed and applied tools for closer political association and economic integration of partners aspiring towards this goal, including far-reaching agreements such as the Association Agreements and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (AAs/DCFTAs).
• Are the Association Agreements and DCFTAs the right objective for all or should more tailor-made alternatives be developed, to reflect differing interests and ambitions of some partners?
• ENP Action Plans have framed the development of relationships between the EU and most ENP partners.
• Are the ENP Action Plans the right tool to deepen our partnerships? Are they too broad for some partners? Would the EU, would partners, benefit from a narrower focus and greater prioritisation?
• ENP Progress Reports have helped the EU monitor closely progress with each of the ENP partners that have Action Plans, against the jointly agreed objectives set out in those Plans.
• Is this approach appropriate for all partners? Has it added value to the EU’s relations with each of its partners? Can EU and/or partner interests be served by a lighter reporting mechanism? Should the reporting be modulated according to the level of engagement of the ENP partner concerned? How can we better communicate key elements?
• The ENP has provided a framework for sector cooperation across a broad range of areas (including energy, transport, agriculture and rural development, justice and home affairs, customs, taxation, environment, disaster management, research and innovation, education, youth, culture, health, etc.).
• Can partnerships be focussed more explicitly on joint interests, in order to increase ownership on both sides? How should the ENP accommodate the differentiation that this would entail? Are new elements needed to support deeper cooperation in these or other fields?
• Visa liberalisation and visa facilitation processes have eased travel and cemented reforms; mobility partnerships have furthered contacts, with programmes supporting these processes.
• What further work is necessary in this area, which is regarded as key by all ENP partners? How can the ENP further support the management of migration and help to draw the benefits of mobility?
• The EU seeks to promote prosperity on its borders. Prosperity in the partner countries is negatively affected by structural weaknesses such as inequalities, poverty, the informal economy and deficiencies in democracy, pluralism and respect for the rule of law. In addition, much of the ENP partners’ economic and social development has been disrupted by turbulence due to conflict or rapid internal change.
• How can the EU do more to support sustainable economic and social development in the ENP partner countries? How can we empower economically, politically and socially the younger generation? How to better promote sustainable employment? And how can these objectives be better linked to indispensable reforms in the fields of anti-corruption, judicial reform, governance and security, which are prerequisites for foreign direct investment?
• The EU seeks to promote stability on its borders. To address existing challenges effectively, the EU has to draw on all its cooperation instruments. Activities under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have until now been conducted outside of the ENP framework. The level of instability in some partner countries not only disrupts progress towards democracy but also threatens the rule of law, violates human rights and has serious impacts on the EU, such as irregular migratory flows and security threats.
• How should the ENP address conflicts and crises in the neighbourhood? Should CFSP and CSDP activities be better integrated in the ENP framework? Should it have a greater role in de-
developing confidence-building measures and post-conflict actions as well as related state- and institution-building activities?
- Should the ENP be given a strengthened focus on working with partners on the prevention of radicalisation, the fight against terrorism and organised crime?
- Should security sector reform be given greater importance in the ENP?
- The ENP includes a clear objective to promote regional cooperation. Together with partners, the EU has pursued such cooperation through the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in the South and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in the East.
- Is the multilateral dimension able to deliver further added value? Are these formats fit for purpose? How can their effectiveness be strengthened? Can we more effectively use other, more flexible frameworks? Can we better cooperate with other regional actors (Council of Europe, OSCE, League of Arab States, Organisation of the Islamic Conference, African Union)?
- The ENP works extensively with governments, but also seeks to engage with civil society, including enhancing its monitoring function, particularly in countries where civil society is free, or largely free, to operate.
- How should the ENP further develop engagement with civil society in its widest sense? Can more be done to network different parts of the partner populations?
- What more can be done to promote links between business communities? With and between Social Partners (trade unions and employers’ organisations) and to promote social dialogue? What can be done to promote links between scientific communities, universities, local authorities, women, youth, the media?
- The ENP seeks real partnership with the EU’s neighbours, and this must reflect and embrace diversity.
- How can the ENP do more to foster religious dialogue and respect for cultural diversity, and counter prejudice? Should increasing understanding of each other’s cultures be a more specific goal of the ENP and how should this be pursued? How can the ENP help tackle discrimination against vulnerable groups?

III. TOWARDS A PARTNERSHIP WITH A CLEARER FOCUS AND MORE TAILORED COOPERATION

Experience and initial comments by a number of EU member states and ENP partner countries to this review point to four priority areas which require further consultation and reflection:
- Differentiation
- Focus
- Flexibility
- Ownership & visibility

1. The Challenges of Differentiation

Some partners in the East are embarking on DCFTAs, and aspire to the closest possible relationship with the EU. Although the large scope of the relationship is far from exhausted in any of these cases, there is an aspiration on their side to set a further horizon beyond their Association Agreements/DCFTAs.

In the South, there are increasing divergences in the aspirations of partner countries and instability arising from armed conflict. The events in the Arab world in 2011 and thereafter have fundamentally changed the region. For some Southern partners, this has led to positive political change; others are undergoing complex transitions, remain heavily exposed to the fallout of the Syrian crisis, or remain caught in protracted conflicts.
Should the EU gradually explore new relationship formats to satisfy the aspirations and choices of those who do not consider the Association Agreements as the final stage of political association and economic integration?

How should the EU take forward the tasking of the 2013 Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius of the long-term goal of a wider common area of economic prosperity based on WTO rules and sovereign choices throughout Europe and beyond?

Is there scope within the ENP for some kind of variable geometry, with different kinds of relationships for those partners that choose different levels of engagement?

2. Focus

Our cooperation with ENP partners, as set out in the Action Plans, is currently very broad. Experience suggests that the ENP will be most effective when the agenda of the EU and its partner is truly shared. The review needs to clarify what are the interests of the EU and each partner, and those areas of strongest common interest. This will help strengthen the partnership between the EU and our neighbouring countries going forwards.

On the basis of our informal consultations to date, the initial assessment is that the EU and our partners have strongest common interest in the following areas:

- Promoting trade and inclusive and sustainable economic development and enhancing job opportunities are priorities for our Neighbours and are also in the interests of the EU itself, in areas ranging from traditional rural livelihoods to research and digital markets.
- Both also have strong shared interests in improving connectivity, notably in the fields of sustainable transport and energy. There is also a shared interest in increasing energy security and efficiency, as well as energy safety.
- There are currently a number of conflicts affecting the neighbourhood region. Stability is a prerequisite for working together on enhanced prosperity. The EU and its member states need to do more together with our partners to address the security threats that arise from conflict situations, from organised crime and from terrorism, and to develop our ability to jointly manage crises and disasters.
- Our partners face governance challenges. Ensuring rule of law, human rights and democracy is first and foremost key for their own citizens. By enhancing legal certainty, they also address issues that are important for domestic and foreign investors, such as fighting corruption and fraud and strengthening public finance management, including public internal control based on international standards.
- Migration and mobility is a key area of cooperation for the EU and our partners. Enhancing mobility, especially for education, scientific, cultural, training and professional purposes, has positive effects on economies and societies alike. Tackling people smuggling and illegal migration is a common challenge.
- Other common challenges with impacts across borders are health security, threats to the environment and climate change.
- Increasing engagement with young people, including through educational exchanges and other networks, can play a major role in developing a common vision for the future. The EU will continue to support increased opportunities for women.
- The review is an opportunity to establish a firm understanding between the EU and our partners of those areas of strongest common interest. This will be the basis for a stronger partnership going forwards.

In that regard, we would propose to focus the consultations on the following questions:

- Do you agree with the proposed areas of focus? If not, what alternative or additional priorities would you propose?
3. Flexibility – Towards a More Flexible Toolbox

Over the past ten years, the EU has developed and expanded the instruments of the ENP. It is currently based on the following central elements:

- Relations between the EU and the majority of ENP partner countries are structured in the legal framework provided by Association Agreements (AAs) or Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs).
- Action Plans or Association Agendas have been agreed to date with 12 ENP partner countries; for each of these countries, there is an annual report on implementation of Action Plan priorities.
- In addition to annual progress reports, the Annual Neighbourhood Package also comprises one strategic communication and two reports on implementation of regional cooperation priorities, one on the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with Southern partners and the other on the Eastern Partnership.
- The EU holds regular bilateral dialogues with most ENP partner countries in different formats. This includes formal exchanges foreseen in the AAs or PCAs (Association/Cooperation Councils, Association/Cooperation Committees, sectoral subcommittees). There are also numerous other interfaces, such as Human Rights Dialogues and other sector-specific dialogues.
- Substantial targeted financial support has already been provided to ENP partner countries. A further EUR 15 billion is foreseen for the period 2014-2020. A mid-term review is scheduled for 2017, which will be a major opportunity to adjust the allocation and implementation of funding from the European Neighbourhood Instrument in the light of the results of this review and to ensure that the EU is better able to respond more flexibly through its financial cooperation to rapidly changing developments in the region.
- How to streamline Action Plans to adapt them better to individual country needs and priorities?
- Is annual reporting needed for countries which do not choose to pursue closer political and economic integration?
- How should the EU structure relations with countries that do not currently have Action Plans?
- How can the EU adapt the ‘more for more’ principle to a context in which certain partners do not choose closer integration, in order to create incentives for the respect of fundamental values and further key reforms?
- How to assess progress against jointly agreed reform targets when a partner country experiences significant external pressure, for instance armed conflict or refugee flows?
- How can the EU engage more effectively and respond more flexibly to developments in partner countries affected by conflict situations?
- What tools would the EU need to respond more effectively to fast-changing developments in its neighbourhood?
- Are the choice of sectors and mechanisms for delivery of EU financial support appropriate? How could its impact and visibility be enhanced?
4. Ownership & Visibility

One of the most often repeated criticisms of the ENP is a lacking sense of ownership with partners, across their societies, and the general public’s weak awareness of the policy’s aims and impact. It is clear that substantial efforts are needed in the context of the ENP review to improve both the ownership of this policy by partner countries and to improve communication of its objectives and results both within the EU and in the partner countries.

What do partners seek in the ENP? How can it best accommodate their interests and aspirations?

Can ways of working be developed that are seen as more respectful by partners and demonstrate a partnership of equals? How should this impact on annual reporting?

Can the structures of the ENP be made more cooperative, to underline the partners’ own choices and to enable all civil society actors across partner countries to take part?

Can the ENP deliver benefits within a shorter timeframe, in order that the value of the policy can be more easily grasped by the public? What would this require from the EU? And from the partner country?

How can the EU financial support be recast in an investment rather than donor dynamic, in which the partner country’s active role is clearer?

How can EU member states be involved more effectively in the design and implementation of the policy, including as concerns foreign policy and security related activities? How can the activities in EU member states be better coordinated with the ENP?

This phase of public consultation will be crucial in helping to build greater ownership and to pave the way for more effective communication in the future of the ENP.

IV. NEXT STEPS

The purpose of this document is to frame a policy debate on the future direction of the ENP. The aim is to consult as widely as possible both with partners in the neighbouring countries and with stakeholders across the EU. We will consult with member states and partners, but also with a wide range of actors from parliaments, including the European Parliament, civil society and think tanks, and from the social partners, business and academic communities. We will engage with key international organisations active in the neighbourhood, including notably the Council of Europe, the OSCE as well as the major international financing institutions. Interested members of the public will also have an opportunity to submit written contributions. The consultation on this document is foreseen until the end of June.

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[excerpt]
and the rule of law and economic openness and the new ENP will take stabilisation as its main political priority in this mandate. Differentiation and greater mutual ownership will be the hallmark of the new ENP, recognising that not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards, and reflecting the wishes of each country concerning the nature and focus of its partnership with the EU. The EU cannot alone solve the many challenges of the region, and there are limits to its leverage, but the new ENP will play its part in helping to create the conditions for positive development.

The review, proposed by President Juncker and requested by EU member states, has brought over 250 responses to the public consultation from member states, partner governments, EU institutions, international organisations, social partners, civil society, business, think tanks, academia and members of the public, which largely confirm the need for change in the ENP both in substance and in methodology. More effective ways will be sought to promote democratic, accountable and good governance, as well as to promote justice reform, where there is a shared commitment to the rule of law, and fundamental rights. Open markets and growth, inclusive economic development, and in particular the prospects for youth, is highlighted as a key to stabilising societies in the neighbourhood. There will be greater attention to the energy security and climate action both of the EU and of the partners themselves. There will be a new focus on stepping up work with our partners on security sector reform, conflict prevention, counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation policies, in full compliance with international human rights law. More than ever after the November 13th terrorist attacks in Paris, intensified cooperation with our neighbours is needed in these areas. Safe and legal mobility and tackling irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling are also priorities.

The new ENP will seek to deploy the available instruments and resources in a more coherent and flexible manner. Additionally, it will be important to seek a deeper involvement of EU member states in re-energising work with our neighbours. Equally, the aim will be a deeper engagement with civil society and social partners.

On a regional level, the Eastern Partnership will be further strengthened in line with commitments at the Riga Summit in 2015. The Union for the Mediterranean can play an enhanced role in supporting cooperation between southern neighbours. The new ENP will now seek to involve other regional actors, beyond the neighbourhood, where appropriate, in addressing regional challenges.

II. STABILISING THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

The ENP is a long-term engagement with the EU’s neighbours, but it also needs to take account of the most pressing needs. In the next three to five years, the most urgent challenge in many parts of the neighbourhood is stabilisation.

III. STRONGER NEIGHBOURHOOD, STRONGER PARTNERSHIPS

Most interlocutors in the consultation on the ENP wished to see some form of a common policy framework for the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. However there was a clear demand for change, with more tailor-made, more differentiated partnerships between the EU and each of its neighbouring partners to reflect different ambitions, abilities and interests.

Where a partner wishes to pursue deeper relations with the EU based on shared values, work will develop on the existing basis.

The EU proposes to start a new phase of engagement with partners in 2016, consulting on the future nature and focus of the partnership. The expectation is that different patterns of relations will emerge,
allowing a greater sense of ownership by both sides. The EU is ready to discuss the possibility to jointly set new partnership priorities, which would focus each relationship more clearly on commonly identified shared interests.

There will no longer be a single set of progress reports on all countries simultaneously. Instead the EU will seek to develop a new style of assessment, focusing specifically on meeting the goals agreed with partners.

[...]

IV. GOOD GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY, RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Ensuring the rule of law and independent and effective justice systems will remain priorities for the EU. They are crucial to social and economic stability, to create trust in state institutions and to provide legal certainty. An independent, transparent and impartial judicial system free from political influence which guarantees equal access to justice, protection of human rights, gender equality and non-discrimination, and full application of the law will continue to be a goal of the EU with all its partners. Accountable public administration at central and local government level is key to democratic governance and economic development [...] This includes strengthening democratic and independent institutions; developing local and regional authorities; depoliticising the civil service, developing eGovernment and increasing institutional transparency and accountability. The EU will also support work to improve partner’s capacity in policy development, service delivery and management of public finances, and support the work of national parliaments.

Effective anti-corruption measures, mostly on the preventive side, should be implemented in relation to large-scale public procurement, (re)privatisations, reform of state-owned/controlled companies or similar areas where vulnerabilities to corruption are high, including by supporting the key role of civil society. [...] The EU will engage with all partners in an inclusive dialogue on human rights and democracy issues, including on areas where experiences may differ. Human rights and democracy will continue to be an agenda item in our political dialogue with all partners in mutually agreed formats. Support will be provided to civil society fora.

Particular attention will be paid to implementing the EU Gender Action Plan 2016-2020, which should inform ENI programming, and to supporting ENP partners in delivering on their commitments to gender equality and girls’ and women’s empowerment, in line also with the universal 2030 Agenda. [...]
Some new, but also many existing instruments can be deployed more effectively to help create better conditions for jobs and growth. The EU should step up cooperation with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), notably the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and relevant international organisations on private sector development and initiatives that promote inclusive growth and employment and improve living conditions for citizens.

Trade

A key instrument in promoting prosperity in the ENP so far has been granting access to the EU market. Some neighbours have chosen a path of close economic integration with the EU. Three agreements on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) have been concluded with Eastern partners (with Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia) as part of Association Agreements (AAs). In the Southern neighbourhood, one DCFTA is under negotiation (with Morocco), while negotiations with Tunisia have just been launched. The EU will support the ongoing negotiations with Southern Mediterranean partners, including through a differentiated, progressive and asymmetric approach based on mutual priorities.

Full and effective implementation of these agreements is a key priority for the AA/DCFTA partners. It will foster reforms and sustainable growth. As set out at the Eastern Partnership summits in Vilnius in 2013 and Riga in 2015, the implementation of AA/DCFTAs, accompanied by reforms, will result in the partners’ comprehensive approximation with international standards and EU legislation and standards. This will lead to the gradual economic integration of partners in the EU internal market and therefore to the creation of an economic area.

 [...] The EU remains committed to encouraging trade between the EU, ENP partner countries and their trading partners.

Economic Modernisation and Entrepreneurship

 [...] Employment and Employability: Focus on Youth

 [...] Partnerships for Growth

 [...] Transport and Connectivity

Energy Security and Climate Action

With the goal of building a resilient Energy Union, with an ambitious climate policy at its core, the EU is committed to strengthen its energy dialogue with neighbourhood countries in energy security, energy market reforms and the promotion of sustainable energy. The EU strongly relies on its neighbourhood for safe, secure and predictable generation and transportation of energy and therefore needs to strengthen its dialogue with partner countries on energy security and sustainable production. Equally, energy is key to the stable development and resilience of the partners themselves.

 [...] Increased cooperation on energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, on demand management and on action to mitigate and adapt to climate change will help to develop economies that are more efficient, competitive, resilient and stable while increasing energy sovereignty and reducing emissions. The promotion of the full implementation of the expected Paris Climate Agreement and its subsequent developments including in particular the commitments by our partners are important to meet these goals. The EU will work to share best practice and undertake joint research, including on the phasing out of subsidies for fossil fuels, introducing robust emissions monitoring, reporting and verification frameworks,
including in the longer term, emission trading systems, which could be linked to the EU emissions trading system as they become ready.

V.2 The Security Dimension

In June 2015, the European Council restated the need to empower and enable partners to prevent and manage crises, including through concrete projects of capacity building with a flexible geographic scope. Given the specific security challenges partners are facing, the EU should focus on enhancing cooperation on security sector reform. Building further on the European Agenda on Security, the new ENP will prioritise tackling terrorism and preventing radicalisation; disrupting serious and organised cross-border crime and corruption; improving judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and fighting cybercrime, in full compliance with the rule of law and international law, including international human rights law. Proactive engagement with partners in the neighbourhood is necessary to address root causes of cross-border threats and to contribute to securing common borders. Together with interested partner countries, information-sharing and capacity building to tackle cross-border threats should be stepped up. In addition, the new ENP will tackle cross-cutting migration related security challenges, such as smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings, social cohesion and border protection/management. Further efforts will be made to mainstream and strengthen the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security, its follow-up resolutions and a gender perspective in Common Security and Defence Policy planning, implementation and review.

Security sector reform: the EU intends to step up outreach to partner countries’ authorities who deal with matters related to security. Interested partner countries should be supported in their reform of the civilian and military security. Such cooperation may include strategic and policy advice, institution and capacity building activities, dialogues with civil society, and support for community security programmes.

Tackling terrorism and preventing radicalisation: The threat of terrorism and radicalisation is affecting both Europe and its neighbours. The EU will therefore step up work with partners on counter-terrorism, including preventing radicalisation, countering violent extremism, supporting criminal justice responses to counter-terrorism, and countering and suppressing the financing of terrorism via appropriate anti-money laundering frameworks. Involving civil society, especially youth organisations, in preventing radicalisation will be crucial. The existing Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) and its recently established Centre of Excellence will be a crucial platform for exchange and cooperation. Tackling broader issues such as ineffective justice, gender inequality, hate speech, youth unemployment, and illiteracy will all also be part of a wider de-radicalisation effort. Cross-cultural dialogue, such as that promoted by the Anna Lindh foundation, will be key.

Disrupting organised crime: organised crime and corruption can threaten stability in the wider region. The EU should increase support to partner countries in their fight against serious and organised international crime, including in the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking of human beings and dismantling criminal networks through promoting the use of financial investigations as a complement to purely criminal law tools. To this end, European Agenda on Security committed to extending the work of the ‘Policy Cycle’ (on serious and organised crime) to neighbouring countries. The EU should also explore the possibility of involving partner countries in existing financial investigation networks (such as networks of Financial Intelligence Units). Furthermore, the EU will continue to work with partner countries on countering the illicit trafficking in human beings, the illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons and drug cooperation and support them on the implementation of integrated and balanced national drug policies. [...] 

Fighting cybercrime: The EU Cybersecurity Strategy provides the operational framework for further engagement with partners in the neighbourhood. The EU should offer assistance for capacity building on
cybersecurity and resilient information infrastructures, on the fight against cybercrime and cyber terrorism, including through threat analysis, fostering specialisation in law enforcement, judicial training and supporting the creation of relevant national policies, strategies and institutions in third countries. The EU will continue to promote the ratification and implementation of the Budapest Convention on cybercrime with its partners in the neighbourhood. The Convention provides a model for drafting national cybercrime legislation and a basis for international cooperation in this field.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Risk Mitigation: help partners improve their preparedness and response capacity, including through the EU-funded Centres of Excellence.

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) cooperation and dealing with protracted conflicts: Structures set up under the EU’s security and defence architecture can be a forum for an exchange of best practice, for cooperation on common objectives, and for capacity building. Thus, a new impetus will be given to cooperation on matters related to the CSDP. In order to foster a spirit of partnership and of shared responsibilities – on a case by case basis – the participation of partner countries should be promoted in CSDP missions and operations, EU Battlegroups, and their association to relevant programmes and agencies such as the European Defence Agency and the European Security and Defence College. The EU will seek to establish security and defence dialogues with partner countries and facilitate the participation of officials and officers from partner countries in courses at relevant defence colleges. In line with the EU’s Comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, all means available will be used, including – where necessary, CSDP missions and operations or the EU’ Special Representatives – to support the management of crises and the settlement of protracted conflicts in the neighbourhood.

Crisis management and response: The EU should build up partners’ early warning, prevention and preparedness capacity offering close partnerships in civil protection and cooperation with the EU’s civil protection mechanism. The EU will also put stronger emphasis on health security aspects by strengthening country capacities to respond effectively to health threats including communicable diseases. Subject to an ad hoc decision, access to imagery provided by the EU Satellite Centre could also be considered in light of crisis response needs. Flexibility in programming and the use of ENP and other financial instruments will be crucial in this approach. Therefore close coordination will be ensured between the security work done under the ENI with wider CFSP/CSDP activities, with the work of EU member states bilaterally and with relevant international organisations. Synergies with other instruments should also be explored together with links to work on principled and needs-based humanitarian aid, as well as resilience and stabilisation. In line with the comprehensive approach, involvement of EU member states and EU agencies will be key both in the design and implementation of support in the security sector.

V.3 Migration and Mobility
As the recent refugee crisis shows, addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement is central to stabilisation in the Neighbourhood.

The European Agenda on Migration; European Council conclusions of 25-26 June and 15-16 October; the High-Level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean/Western Balkans Route of 8 October and the Valletta Summit on Migration of 11-12 November 2015 – all confirm the new political impetus for deeper cooperation with ENP partners.

Develop partnerships based on an integrated approach
The EU is committed to reinforcing cooperation with neighbours and beyond – not least with the Western Balkans, Turkey, countries of the wider Middle East, the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa. In order to foster reforms and reinforce the commitment of our partner countries to work in closer partnership, differentiation between partner countries will be developed, working more closely on visa and mobility issues with those that are willing to engage with the EU, including visa liberalisation and facilitation dialogues with partners.
There are already ongoing regional dialogues such as the Rabat and Khartoum processes in the South and the Budapest and Prague processes in the East as well as on the Eastern Partnership panel on Migration and Asylum for intra-regional cooperation and programming. 

Ensuring protection for those in need
The EU’s wider neighbourhood contains several major protracted crises and hosts close to 40% of the world’s refugees and internally displaced persons. Therefore, the EU needs a more integrated and more comprehensive response promoting close linkages between short-term humanitarian needs and longer-term development and security responses. The EU should assist partner countries in developing their asylum and protection systems by supporting those displaced by conflicts, with particular consideration to unaccompanied refugee children, to ensure that their basic needs are guaranteed, their human rights are protected and their socio-economic and human potential is not wasted and is made available to host societies and communities.

Tackling irregular migration
The EU will work with the ENP countries to address and mitigate the root causes of irregular migration both of their nationals and of those transiting their countries. The EU will work with to return in a dignified and sustainable manner those who do not, or no longer, have the right to stay in the EU, including through the conclusion and full implementation of readmission agreements and voluntary return and readmission schemes, in line with the Commission’s Action Plan on return. The EU will also assist ENP countries to develop their own return policy allowing them to return persons to third countries of origin. Appropriate mechanisms should be further developed to ensure that those returning to their countries of origin can reintegrate and contribute, to the local economy and society. All tools will be mobilised to increase cooperation on return and readmission, thus giving readmission a central place in all dialogues with countries of origin and transit of irregular migrants. The EU should increase support for efforts to devise national and regional strategies addressing migrant smuggling and to build integrated border management standards, working with relevant EU agencies.

Stepping up cooperation on border management
Proactive engagement with partners in the neighbourhood in the field of border management is necessary to better manage migratory pressures. Together with interested partner countries, the EU will further intensify work on information exchange, administrative capacity and operational and technical cooperation. This could be done via training, research, capacity-building projects and pilot projects with partner countries, notably working through relevant EU Agencies, including FRONTEX and EUROPOL.

VI. THE REGIONAL DIMENSION
In 2009, the EU and its six Eastern partners launched the Eastern Partnership ( EaP ), based on a commitment to fundamental values (including democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms) a market economy, sustainable development and good governance. Since then, the EaP has developed into a vibrant forum for exchange and cooperation on issues ranging from trade to energy, transport and education or environment. The 2015 EaP Summit in Riga listed the strengthening of institutions and good governance, mobility and people-to-people contacts, market opportunities and interconnections as shared priorities which will be taken forward with partners, including in the multilateral framework of the EaP. It is the sole right of the EU and its partners to decide how they want to proceed in their relations.
The EU’s relations with the Russian Federation have deteriorated as a result of the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sebastopol and the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. There are several issues pertaining to the region on which constructive cooperation would be helpful in terms of addressing common challenges and exploring further opportunities, when conditions allow.

Cooperation in other fora will complement these regional engagements. The EU should increase its outreach to partners in sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel region and in this context ensure coherence with ongoing work on the post-Cotonou agenda. The EU should also engage all relevant partners in the Middle East and North Africa in the areas of political dialogue, investment and aid. This will include further development of the dialogue with the League of Arab States, cooperation with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the African Union, the Arab Maghreb Union and the work within the framework of the Western Mediterranean Forum (5+5 Dialogue). The Black Sea Synergy Initiative has developed as an important forum for tackling common problems whilst encouraging political and economic reform. The EU should continue to promote regional cooperation and increase coordination with the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation on Europe (OSCE) and its bodies.

The EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Daesh threat outlines actions that the EU and its member states are taking to help restore peace and security in Syria and Iraq. As concerns Iran, as the recent deal is implemented, there is scope for further cooperation on regional issues, including energy. Given Central Asia’s strategic importance, the EU should expand its outreach to relevant partners with a view to establishing strong, durable and stable relationships with countries in the region.

VII. MORE EFFECTIVE DELIVERY

VII.1 Flexibility of Financial Instruments

The EU has committed substantial resources to support the major stabilisation challenge in the neighbourhood, with over €15 billion being available through the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) over the period 2014-20. To further maximise impact, the EU will seek to leverage considerable additional funding by further enhancing its cooperation with major International Financial institutions and through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF). The EU will modernise and strategically align its technical assistance instruments (TAIEX and Twinning) to provide tailor-made support. The EU and the partner countries will continue to work together to ensure that the EU financial assistance reaches the intended beneficiaries and is not diverted by fraud.

Association Agendas and partnership priorities will be the basis for setting priorities for assistance. Bilateral allocations to partner countries will reflect the priorities of the ENP and the level of their ambitions, and commitment to and implementation of reform will continue to guide the allocation of funds under the ENP umbrella programme.

Developments in the neighbourhood countries have indicated a growing need for international financial and economic support to underpin necessary transition and stability. The European Union’s existing toolbox provides for resources that are targeted to a variety of issues, but in many cases limited in size when compared to the needs that have and can be identified. The Commission will therefore conduct an in-depth assessment over the coming months with a view to developing options, including an instrument, that could better and more efficiently address the financial needs of neighbourhood countries, at the same time supporting their ongoing necessary reform efforts.

The response to the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine and the use of Trust Funds are examples of how the EU’s financial instruments can react quickly and flexibly. However, more needs to be done to accelerate assistance and to ensure it is better adapted to rapidly evolving political circumstances and priorities. The Commission and the High Representative will seek to speed up aid delivery by streamlining pro-
They will examine the case for a ‘flexibility cushion’ within the ENI, i.e. to set aside resources until used for urgent programming of unforeseen needs, particularly for conflict and post-conflict needs; refugee support; crises and disaster response; and for security and stabilisation programmes. Improved donor coordination is essential to maximise resources, but also to make the EU’s contribution more visible. Wherever possible a joint EU response in the region should be shaped around the EU brand enhancing the use of joint programming with EU member states on and of shared analysis from all EU sources, (including EU Delegations, CSDP missions and EU Special Representatives). Simplified approaches should facilitate joint projects with EU member states and agencies.

The EU will strengthen effective donor co-ordination with other EU funding mechanisms and with major international financial institutions and with the African Union, the League of Arab States, and the Gulf Cooperation Council as well as working through the Union for the Mediterranean, the Eastern Partnership and regional fora.

VII.2 Visibility, Communication and Outreach

Better communicating and promoting EU policies will be at the heart of the new ENP. Improved public diplomacy will contribute to better explaining the rationale of EU policies and the positive impact of concrete EU actions. EU should seek to ensure greater visibility for the use of EU funds for the neighbourhood in the period 2014-2020. Visibility for the EU should be made a condition of working with implementing partners.

[...]

Partnerships for Youth

[...]

VIII. NEXT STEPS

This Joint Communication concludes the formal consultation process on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Over the course of 2016, we intend to discuss the proposals contained in this Joint Communication, as well as subsequent positions taken by the EU, with partner countries, with a view to jointly determine the shape of our future relations, based on the recommendations outlined in this Joint Communication.
The Council of the European Union,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 42(4) and Article 43(2) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the High Representative),
Whereas:
[...]
(2) In its conclusions of 17 and 18 November 2014, the Council recognised the need for common approaches with the UN in the CAR in the reform of its security forces, including the armed forces, in order to stabilise the situation in support of the political process. In this regard, it acknowledged the added value of a potential further role for the Union in the reform of the security sector, in support of UN efforts, while ensuring local buy-in.
[...]
(3) On 15 December 2014, the Council approved a Crisis Management Concept on a possible Union CSDP military advisory mission in the CAR to contribute to the reform of the FACA.
(4) By letter dated 16 January 2015, the Chef de l’État de Transition of the CAR invited the Union to deploy an EU military advisory mission in the CAR.
[...]
Has adopted this decision:

**Article 1**

Mission
1. The Union shall conduct a CSDP Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA) to support the CAR authorities in the preparation of the upcoming Security Sector Reform by assisting the FACA to manage their existing situation and to build the capacity and quality needed to meet the goal of a future modernised, effective and accountable FACA. It shall concentrate its action in the Bangui area.
2. EUMAM RCA shall operate in accordance with the political, strategic, politico-military objectives as set out in the Crisis Management Concept approved by the Council on 15 December 2014.
Article 2

Appointment of the EU Mission Commander
1. Brigadier General Dominique LAUGEL is hereby appointed EU Mission Commander of EUMAM RCA (the Mission Commander).
2. The Mission Commander shall exercise the functions of EU Operation Commander and EU Force Commander.

Article 3

Designation of the Mission Headquarters
1. The Mission Headquarters of EUMAM RCA shall be located in Bangui, CAR. It shall perform the functions of both Operational Headquarters and Force Headquarters.
2. The Mission Headquarters shall include a support cell in Brussels.

Article 4

Planning and launch of EUMAM RCA
1. The Rules of Engagement required for the preparatory phase of EUMAM RCA shall be approved by the Council as soon as possible after the adoption of this Decision.
2. EUMAM RCA shall be launched by a Council Decision on the date recommended by the Mission Commander once it has reached its Initial Operating Capability (IOC), following approval of the Mission Plan and, if required, of additional Rules of Engagement.

[...]

Article 10

Financial arrangements
1. The common costs of EUMAM RCA shall be administered in accordance with Decision 2011/871/CFSP.
2. The financial reference amount for the common costs of EUMAM RCA shall be EUR 7.9 million. The percentage of the reference amount referred to in Article 25(1) of Decision 2011/871/CFSP shall be 50 % and the percentage for commitment referred to in Article 32(3) of Decision 2011/871/CFSP shall be 70 %.

Article 11

Project cell
1. EUMAM RCA shall have a project cell for identifying and implementing projects, to be financed by member states or third States, which are consistent with its objectives and contribute to the delivery of the mandate.
2. Subject to paragraph 3, the Mission Commander shall be authorised to seek recourse to financial contributions from the member states or third states in order to implement projects identified as supplementing EUMAM RCA’s other actions in a consistent manner. In such a case, the Mission Commander shall conclude an arrangement with those states, covering in particular the specific procedures for dealing with any complaint from third parties concerning damage caused as a result of acts or omissions by EUMAM RCA in the use of the funds provided by those States.
3. Under no circumstances shall the Union or the High Representative be held liable by contributing States as a result of acts or omissions by EUMAM RCA in the use of the funds provided by those States.
4. The PSC shall agree on the acceptance of a financial contribution from third States to the project cell.

[...]
Article 13

Entry into force and termination

1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. EUMAM RCA shall end no later than 12 months after having reached FOC.
3. This Decision shall be repealed as from the date of closure of the Mission Headquarters in accordance with the plans approved for the termination of EUMAM RCA, and without prejudice to the procedures regarding the audit and presentation of the accounts of EUMAM RCA, as laid down in Decision 2011/871/CFSP.

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COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2015/778 OF 18 MAY 2015 ON A EUROPEAN UNION CSDP MILITARY OPERATION IN THE SOUTHERN CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN (EUNAVFOR MED)

[excerpt]
Has adopted this decision:

Article 1

Mission

1. The Union shall conduct a military crisis management operation contributing to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), achieved by undertaking systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and assets used or suspected of being used by smugglers or traffickers, in accordance with applicable international law, including UNCLOS and any UN Security Council Resolution.

2. The area of operation shall be defined, before the launching of EUNAVFOR MED, in the relevant planning documents to be approved by the Council.

Article 2

Mandate

1. EUNAVFOR MED shall operate in accordance with the political, strategic and politico-military objectives set out in the Crisis Management Concept approved by the Council on 18 May 2015.

2. EUNAVFOR MED shall be conducted in sequential phases, and in accordance with the requirements of international law. EUNAVFOR MED shall:

   (a) in a first phase, support the detection and monitoring of migration networks through information gathering and patrolling on the high seas in accordance with international law;

   (b) in a second phase,

      i. conduct boarding, search, seizure and diversion on the high seas of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking, under the conditions provided for by applicable international law, including UNCLOS and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants;

      ii. in accordance with any applicable UN Security Council Resolution or consent by the coastal State concerned, conduct boarding, search, seizure and diversion, on the high seas or in the territorial and internal waters of that State, of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking, under the conditions set out in that Resolution or consent; 19.5.2015 L 122/32 Official Journal of the European Union EN (1) Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 of 27 March 2015 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (ATHENA) and repealing Decision 2011/871/CFSP (OJ L 84, 28.3.2015, p. 39).

   (c) in a third phase, in accordance with any applicable UN Security Council Resolution or consent by the coastal State concerned, take all necessary measures against a vessel and related assets, including through disposing of them or rendering them inoperable, which are suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking, in the territory of that State, under the conditions set out in that Resolution or consent.

3. The Council shall assess whether the conditions for transition beyond the first phase have been met, taking into account any applicable UN Security Council Resolution and consent by the coastal States concerned.

[…]

Article 3

Appointment of the EU Operation Commander

Rear Admiral Enrico Credendino is hereby appointed EU Operation Commander of EUNAVFOR MED.
Article 4

Designation of the EU Operation Headquarters
The Operation Headquarters of EUNAVFOR MED shall be located in Rome, Italy.

Article 5

Planning and launch of the operation
The Decision to launch EUNAVFOR MED shall be adopted by the Council, upon the recommendation of the Operation Commander of EUNAVFOR MED following approval of the Operation Plan and of the Rules of Engagement necessary for the execution of the mandate.

[...]

Article 11

Financial arrangements
2. The financial reference amount for the common costs of EUNAVFOR MED shall be EUR 11,82 million. The percentage of the reference amount referred to in Article 25(1) of Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 shall be 70 % in commitments and 40 % for payments.

[...]

Article 13

Entry into force and termination
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
EUNAVFOR MED shall end no later than 12 months after having reached Full Operational Capability (FOC).
1. WHY WE NEED AN ENERGY UNION

The goal of a resilient Energy Union with an ambitious climate policy at its core is to give EU consumers - households and businesses - secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy. Achieving this goal will require a fundamental transformation of Europe’s energy system.

[...]

To reach our goal, we have to move away from an economy driven by fossil fuels, an economy where energy is based on a centralised, supply-side approach and which relies on old technologies and outdated business models. We have to empower consumers through providing them with information, choice and through creating flexibility to manage demand as well as supply. We have to move away from a fragmented system characterised by uncoordinated national policies, market barriers and energy-isolated areas.

Today, the European Union has energy rules set at the European level, but in practice it has 28 national regulatory frameworks. This cannot continue. An integrated energy market is needed to create more competition, lead to greater market efficiency through better use of energy generation facilities across the EU and to produce affordable prices for consumers.

[...]

2. THE WAY FORWARD

The Energy Union strategy has five mutually-reinforcing and closely interrelated dimensions designed to bring greater energy security, sustainability and competitiveness:

- Energy security, solidarity and trust;
- A fully integrated European energy market;
- Energy efficiency contributing to moderation of demand;
- Decarbonising the economy, and
- Research, Innovation and Competitiveness

2.1. Energy security, solidarity and trust

In May 2014 the Commission set out in its Energy Security Strategy how the EU remains vulnerable to external energy shocks and called on policy makers at national and EU level to make clear to citizens the choices involved in reducing our dependency on particular fuels, energy suppliers and routes. The Energy Union builds on this strategy.
The key drivers of energy security are the completion of the internal energy market and more efficient energy consumption. It depends on more transparency as well as on more solidarity and trust between the member states. The EU’s energy security is closely linked with its neighbours. Joint approaches in the field of energy can make all parts of the European Union stronger, for instance in case of supply shortages or disruptions. The spirit of solidarity in energy matters is explicitly mentioned in the Treaty and is at the heart of the Energy Union.

Diversification of supply (energy sources, suppliers and routes)
The political challenges over the last months have shown that diversification of energy sources, suppliers and routes is crucial for ensuring secure and resilient energy supplies to European citizens and companies, who expect access to affordable and competitively priced energy at any given moment. [...] Constructing the infrastructure to deliver new sources of gas to the EU involves many partners, and is both complex and expensive. Resolving these issues requires resolute action at EU level. The Commission will reinforce its support for this process through the use of all available Community funding instruments in particular the future European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), and fully involving European financial institutions. However, the necessary infrastructure must also be in place inside the EU, including the possibility of reverse flows, to bring the gas to where it is needed. [...] Domestically produced energy also contributes to decreasing Europe’s energy import dependence. This includes notably renewables, needed for decarbonisation, as well as conventional and - for those member states that choose it - non-conventional fossil resources. Producing oil and gas from unconventional sources in Europe such as shale gas is an option, provided that issues of public acceptance and environmental impact are adequately addressed.

Working together on security of supply [...] Member states should be assured that in situations of tight supply, they can rely on their neighbours. The Commission’s 2014 Report on short-term resilience in the gas sector stressed the need for stronger cooperation in responding to a potential supply disruption. To introduce common crisis management, the Commission will propose preventive and emergency plans at regional and EU level, including the Energy Community contracting parties. Solidarity among member states, in particular in times of supply crisis, has to be strengthened. These issues and the experience gained in the implementation of the Regulation will be taken into account when proposing a revision of the Security of Gas Supply Regulation. [...] Working together with member states, the Commission will establish a range of acceptable risk levels for supply interruptions, and an objective, EU-wide, fact-based security of supply assessment addressing the situation in member states. This will take into account cross-border flows, variable renewable production, demand response and storage possibilities. Capacity mechanisms should only be developed to address security of supply if a regional system adequacy assessment points to such a need, taking into account the potential for energy efficiency and demand-side response.

Stronger European role in global energy markets [...] The European Union has to improve its ability to project its weight on global energy markets. Together with its major partners, the European Union will work towards an improved global governance system for energy, leading to more competitive and transparent global energy markets.
In general, the Commission will pursue an active trade and investment agenda in the energy field, including access to foreign markets for European energy technology and services. As part of a revitalised European energy and climate diplomacy, the EU will use all its foreign policy instruments to establish strategic energy partnerships with increasingly important producing and transit countries or regions.

In our immediate neighbourhood, the Commission will propose to strengthen the Energy Community, ensuring effective implementation of the EU’s energy, environment and competition acquis, energy market reforms and incentivising investments in the energy sector. The goal is closer integration of the EU and Energy Community energy markets. The energy relationships with the European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP) countries will be considered in the ongoing ENP review.

More transparency on gas supply
An important element in ensuring energy (and in particular gas) security is full compliance of agreements related to the buying of energy from third countries with EU law. Such compliance checks for Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) and related commercial agreements based on the relevant Decision are currently carried out after a member state and a third country have concluded an agreement. In practice, we have seen that renegotiating such agreements is very difficult.

The Commission will review the Intergovernmental Agreements Decision and will propose options to ensure that the EU speaks with one voice in negotiations with third countries. In the context of the review of the Security of Gas Supply Regulation, the Commission will also propose to ensure appropriate transparency of commercial gas supply contracts that may have an impact on EU energy security, while safeguarding the confidentiality of sensitive information.

2.2. A fully-integrated internal energy market
Despite progress made in recent years, Europe’s energy system is still underperforming. The current market design does not lead to sufficient investments, market concentration and weak competition remain an issue and the European energy landscape is still too fragmented. We have to give a new political boost to completing the internal energy market.

The internal market’s hardware: connecting markets through interconnections
At this moment, the European electricity and gas transmission systems, notably crossborder connections, are not sufficient to make the internal energy market work properly and to link the remaining energy islands to the main electricity and gas network.

A specific minimum interconnection target has been set for electricity at 10% of installed electricity production capacity of the member states, which should be achieved by 2020. The necessary measures to achieve this 10% target are set out in the Commission Communication presented with this Energy Union Strategic Framework. In 2016, the Commission will report on the necessary measures to reach a 15% target by 2030.

The transition towards a more secure and sustainable energy system will require major investments in generation, networks and energy efficiency, estimated at some €200 billion annually in the next decade. While the private sector will bear the costs of much of these investments, access to financing will be key. Today, the European Investment Bank, the Connecting Europe Facility and financing under the European Structural and Investment Funds already provide the means. Moreover, the proposed European Fund for Strategic Investments will provide additional support, hence, further facilitating
access to finance for projects of European significance such as in energy networks, renewable energy and energy efficiency. The Commission will explore proposals for energy investment regimes that pool resources to finance economically viable investments, avoiding market distortion and fragmentation. […] The Commission will regularly take stock of the implementation of major infrastructure projects which contribute to the Energy Union, in particular in the framework of the PCI follow-up. As part of this stock-taking exercise, it will make an annual report on the progress to reach the 10% electricity interconnection target with a specific focus on the implementation of the regional action plans. Finally, the Commission will also convene a dedicated Energy Infrastructure Forum where progress should be discussed with the member states, relevant regional cooperation groups as well as with EU institutions. It will meet for the first time in late 2015.

Implementing and upgrading the internal energy market’s software
Full implementation and strict enforcement of existing energy and related legislation is the first priority to establish the Energy Union. There is no point in developing new policies and approaches on weak foundations.

The Commission will use all available policy instruments in this regard and will insist that member states fully implement and enforce the third Internal Energy Market Package, in particular as regards unbundling and the independence of regulators. Certain ex-ante conditions must be met so that the European Structural and Investment Funds can be used for co-financing energy investments. This will help to ensure compliance with EU energy legislation. […] A well-functioning internal energy market needs an effective regulatory framework. The third Internal Energy Market Package set up bodies to ensure cooperation among transmission system operators and regulators. In the context of the market design discussion, the functioning of these bodies will be strengthened. Currently decisions in these bodies still reflect national views. […] The Commission will work together with member states to ensure that capacity mechanisms and support for renewable electricity are fully in line with existing rules and do not distort the internal energy market. Environmentally harmful subsidies need to be phased out altogether. A reformed Emission Trading System will also play an important role in setting the right investment signals. Finally, the Commission will ensure greater transparency in the composition of energy costs and prices by developing regular and detailed monitoring and reporting, including on impacts of energy costs and prices on competitiveness. Particular attention will be paid to public interventions such as regulated tariffs, energy taxation policies and the level of public support, as well as their impact on pricing mechanisms, including electricity tariff deficits.

Enhanced regional cooperation within a common EU framework
In an Energy Union, member states must coordinate and cooperate with their neighbours when developing their energy policies. […] Given its particular vulnerability, there is a need to improve cooperation, solidarity and trust in the Central and South-Eastern part of Europe. Dedicated cooperation arrangements would help to accelerate the better integration of these markets into the wider European energy market which would improve the liquidity and resilience of the energy system and would allow full use of the region’s energy efficiency and renewable energy potential. The Commission will take concrete initiatives in this regard as an urgent priority.
For the Northern and Baltic Seas, the Commission will work with member states and industry on delivering cost-reduction to these offshore energy systems.

A new deal for consumers
In an Energy Union, consumers in one member state should be able to make informed choices and buy their energy freely and simply from a company in another member state. This requires the further adaptation of the current national regulatory frameworks since the vast majority of European households remain passive consumers. In some member states consumers have a limited choice of suppliers and switching between suppliers is relatively cumbersome.
In order to empower consumers, member states and their authorities need to fully implement and enforce existing European rules, including consumer protection rules. Necessary support measures should be undertaken also by regional and local authorities, so that consumers have understandable, readily-accessible information, user-friendly tools, and financial incentives for saving energy.

However, this will only work if market prices send the right signals. In a number of member states, regulated tariffs still limit the development of effective competition, which discourages investments and the emergence of new market players. [...]

The Commission will seek the phasing-out of below cost regulated prices through the competition and economic governance frameworks. It will also encourage member states to establish a road map for the phasing-out of all regulated prices.

Protecting vulnerable consumers
Energy poverty negatively affects living conditions and health. It has many causes, mostly resulting from a combination of low income and general poverty conditions, inefficient homes and a housing tenure system that fails to encourage energy efficiency. Energy poverty can only be tackled by a combination of measures, mainly in the social field and within the competence of authorities on the national, regional or local levels. When phasing out regulated prices, member states need to propose a mechanism to protect vulnerable consumers, which could preferably be provided through the general welfare system. If provided through the energy market, it could be implemented through schemes such as a solidarity tariff or as a discount on energy bills. The cost of such schemes needs to be covered by non-eligible consumers collectively. Hence, it is important that such a system is well targeted to keep overall costs low and to limit the distortions deriving from regulated prices (e.g. not increase further tariff deficits in member states).

2.3. Energy efficiency as a contribution to the moderation of energy demand
The European Council set in October 2014 an indicative target at the EU level of at least 27% for improving energy efficiency in 2030. This will be reviewed by 2020, having in mind an EU level of 30%. It is in this context necessary to fundamentally rethink energy efficiency and treat it as an energy source in its own right, representing the value of energy saved. As part of the market design review, the Commission will ensure that energy efficiency and demand side response can compete on equal terms with generation capacity.
Most of the work has to be done at national, regional and local level, but the Commission can play a strong role creating the appropriate framework for progress. The Commission will, therefore, encourage member states to give energy efficiency primary consideration in their policies.

2.4. Decarbonisation of the economy
An ambitious climate policy is an integral part of our Energy Union. The EU’s climate policy is based on an EU-wide carbon market (the EU Emissions Trading System), ambitious but fair national green-
house gas reduction targets for the sectors outside the Emissions Trading System and an energy policy to make the European Union the number one in renewable energy.

**An ambitious EU Climate policy**
The agreement on the 2030 climate and energy framework has defined the EU commitment of an at least 40% domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990. This makes an ambitious contribution to the international climate negotiations with a view to achieving a binding climate agreement in 2015. This contribution is spelled out in the communication on the Road to Paris, presented at the same time as this Energy Union Strategic Framework. The Commission, together with the member states, will engage with other major economies to convince them to join Europe’s ambition. It will do this through an active European climate diplomacy that makes full use of trade and development instruments.

[...]

**Becoming the number one in renewables**
The European Union is committed to becoming the world leader in renewable energy, the global hub for developing the next generation of technically advanced and competitive renewable energies. The EU has also set an EU target of at least 27% for the share of renewable energy consumed in the EU in 2030. The EU is already on track to meet its 2020 target of 20% renewable energy in its energy mix, costs for new wind and photo-voltaic capacity have reduced significantly due in large part to the EU’s commitment in this area, and reform of support schemes to further drive down costs is well under way. But to achieve the 27% target, new challenges must be faced.

To integrate renewable production progressively and efficiently into a market that promotes competitive renewables and drives innovation, energy markets and grids have to be fit for renewables. Existing legislation and new market rules need to be fully implemented, enabling the roll-out of new technologies smart grids and demand response for an efficient energy transition.

[...]

### 2.5. An Energy Union for Research, Innovation and Competitiveness

A new strategy for Research and Innovation (R&I) must be at the very heart of the Energy Union. If Europe’s Energy Union is to be the world number one in renewable energies, it must lead on the next generation of renewable technologies as well as storage solutions.

Equally, putting the EU at the forefront of smart grid and smart home technology, clean transport, as well as clean fossil fuel and the world’s safest nuclear generation, is central to the aim of turning the Energy Union into a motor for growth, jobs and competitiveness.

[...]

To achieve this, the new European energy R&I approach should accelerate energy system transformation. This should build on Horizon 2020 and involve all member states, stakeholders and the Commission.

[...]

An innovation-driven transition to a low carbon economy offers great opportunities for growth and jobs. New business sectors, new business models and new job profiles will emerge. Technological leadership must be followed by the development of industrial production capabilities or technology supply chains across Europe. This requires bringing together research, industry, the financing sector and public authorities. An efficient industrial strategy along these lines will enable the EU industry to benefit from the first-mover advantage, both domestically and within international technology markets, with the resulting positive effects on competitiveness and job creation. The Commission will explore how public procurement can exploit its potential to act as a catalyst for industrial and business innovation, and green growth both within the EU and beyond its borders. It
will make full use of EU trade policy to improve access to foreign markets for Energy Union related technologies and services as well as to protect the EU market from unfair trade practices, and support other countries in their efforts to establish modern and sustainable energy systems. The Commission will work with member states and regions to ensure synergies between the different EU funds and to exploit the full potential of Cohesion Policy funding for innovation. Change also means that some sectors, business models or job profiles will have to adjust. Vocational and other training paths for new or adapted job profiles have to be established, corresponding to the new business needs and providing people with solid professional skills. [...]  

3. ENERGY UNION GOVERNANCE  
The Energy Union also needs an integrated governance and monitoring process, to make sure that energy-related actions at European, regional, national and local level all contribute to the Energy Union’s objectives. The governance process should serve the following purposes:

- bring together energy and climate actions as well as actions in other relevant policy areas, leading to more and longer-term policy coherence. This also provides long term certainty and guidance for investors;
- secure implementation of the internal energy market and the delivery of the 2030 energy and climate framework, notably the implementation of the agreed 2030 targets on renewables, energy efficiency, non-Emissions Trading System and interconnections;
- streamline current planning and reporting requirements, avoiding unnecessary administrative burden;
- involve an energy dialogue with stakeholders to inform policy-making and support active engagement in managing the energy transition;
- deepen the cooperation between member states, including at the regional level, and with the Commission;
- improve the data, analysis and intelligence needed to underpin the Energy Union by pooling the relevant knowledge and making it easily accessible to all stakeholders, and
- annual reporting to the European Parliament and the Council on the state of the Energy Union in order to address the key issues and steer the policy debate.
- The Commission will launch a dynamic governance process for the European Energy Union. While there will be clear links between this governance process and the European Semester, the two processes will be managed separately.

4. DELIVERING THE ENERGY UNION  
Achieving the Energy Union means delivering on the actions set out in this Strategy, which are summarised in the fifteen points set out below. The attached roadmap shows the initiatives to be developed as part of the Strategy, with a clear timetable for adoption and implementation as well as respective responsibilities. The Commission regards these as inter-linked and consistent with the scale of ambition the EU needs to transform Europe’s energy system. Successful implementation depends on the political commitment of all actors concerned, including EU institutions, member states, the European Investment Bank and other stakeholders, including at regional and local level, in line with the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and better regulation. The EU must be able to react to unexpected events, seize new opportunities and anticipate and adapt to future trends. Whenever necessary, the Commission will use its right of initiative to set out an appropriate response to events.
The Commission invites the European Parliament and Council to endorse this strategy to deliver the Energy Union and to actively engage in its implementation, in close cooperation with all relevant stakeholders.

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‘COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS ON THE EU HORN OF AFRICA REGIONAL ACTION PLAN 2015-2020’, 26 OCT. 2015
[excerpt – some footnotes have been deleted]

[...]

1. INTRODUCTION

In November 2011, EU Foreign Ministers adopted a Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa to guide the EU’s engagement in the region. The Strategic Framework spelled out the EU’s objectives in the Horn of Africa: peace; stability; security; prosperity; and accountable governments, and identified actions to further these goals. The EU subsequently appointed an EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa and reviewed the Strategic Framework in January 2013. The Strategic Framework has led to an Action Plan on Counter-terrorism for the Horn of Africa and Yemen, an Action Plan on Counter-Piracy, and the Support to the Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE) initiative. While the priorities in the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa remain valid, some particular issues have become more pronounced and critical over the last few years, i.e. the broader geopolitical framework, the flows of mixed migration and violent radicalisation. This Action Plan seeks to implement the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, taking into account the new challenges, and in complementarity with the above mentioned Action Plans and initiative for the region.

Since 2011, the EU has taken substantial steps – through political dialogue and active engagement, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and targeted development cooperation assistance to implement the strategic framework. Through its support for the Somali Compact, the EU has made a decisive contribution to Somalia’s emergence from prolonged conflict. The EU has contributed to a significant reduction in piracy off the coast of Somalia through CSDP missions and Commission cooperation programmes that have bolstered partner countries’ maritime security capacity and their ability to bring pirates to justice. However, threats to maritime security remain a concern.

[...]

Developments since 2011 need to be addressed by the EU, working together with its partners in the region. Furthermore, while the Strategic Framework covered the member states of the regional organisation for the Horn of Africa, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), most if not all of the challenges identified are equally relevant to Tanzania, which is not an IGAD member state. The implementation of the EU Strategic Framework will be pursued through this Action Plan, which is intended to describe a set of areas for priority actions that will enable the EU to step up its engagement on a basis of partnership with, and ownership by, the countries of the region with a view to addressing both new developments and chronic problems in the period from adoption of the plan until 2020. This Action Plan also aims at allowing the EU to incorporate other actors through rethinking its geographical areas of cooperation so as to integrate the Arabian Peninsula as well as Egypt and Libya, to work across borders so as to focus on peripheral regions and transnational challenges, and to better synchronise and coordinate common approaches on political, development, economic, migration and security issues.
The objectives of the EU remain to achieve greater peace, stability, security, sustainable growth, prosperity and accountable governments, with a view to assisting states to meet the Sustainable Development Goals.

The five broad areas for work by the EU in order to pursue these objectives also remain relevant:

1) Assist all countries in the region to build robust and accountable political structures, including civil and civic institutions, allowing the people of the Horn of Africa to express their legitimate political aspirations and ensure that their basic human rights and freedoms are respected;

2) Work with the countries of the region and with international organisations (especially the United Nations and African Union, and IGAD) fully to resolve current conflicts, particularly in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan, and to avoid future potential conflicts between or within countries;

3) Ensure that, until that is achieved, the insecurity in the region does not threaten the security of others beyond its borders, e.g. through maritime criminality (including piracy), terrorism or irregular migration;

4) Support efforts to promote the sustainable and inclusive economic growth of all countries and people in the region, to enable them to reduce poverty, increase prosperity, ensure environmental sustainability, combat climate change and enjoy the benefits globalisation can bring;

5) Support political and economic regional cooperation and bolster the role of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to tap into positive trends and developments across national borders;

The following challenges should receive a higher attention for the implementation of the Strategic Framework in the period 2015-2020.

(i) Many countries in the region are prone to conflict and instability due to inherent structures of underdevelopment and lack of accountable state institutions. Developments in the wider region have become an additional factor of destabilisation. There is a need to encourage frameworks for cooperation and integration in the form of security and development cooperation between the Horn of Africa countries themselves, with IGAD, and between them and the wider region, namely the Arabian Peninsula, including the countries of the Red Sea, Egypt and Libya. Where countries in the region are undergoing conflicts or facing grave political crises, support to mediation efforts at all levels needs to be continued.

(ii) Individuals living in destitution may well turn to migration or fall prey to radicalisation. It is therefore needed to support the legitimacy of states in the Horn of Africa through strengthening their capacity to fulfil all aspects of the social contract between the state and its citizens, so that citizens have access to both physical security and basic social services, such as education and health care, sufficient to enable them to live a life of dignity. Moreover, ever-increasing migratory flows place severe strain on the administrative capacity of states in the region. Building on the more for more principle, it appears necessary to enhance cooperation with partners in the region to address the root causes and provide alternatives to irregular migration and forced displacement, to support states’ capacity to better manage mixed migratory flows, including through integrated border management, and to help combating trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, in line with the four pillars of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).

(iii) Promoting the political and institutional structure that underpins pluralism is essential to counter the increasingly seductive appeal of violent extremism. States and civil society should both be encouraged to implement measures to promote religious tolerance, inclusivity and social co-existence. Factors of marginalisation and desperation, which can give rise to radicalisation, should also be countered.
Youth faced with little or no prospect of finding a job will have little opportunity to develop stable lives in their home communities. Promoting the creation of sustainable jobs with decent working conditions is indispensable to meeting the aspirations of the region’s youth. Special attention must also be paid to empowering women and addressing pervasive discrimination on grounds of gender. In this light, efforts to promote employment in the region are critical.

Violations of human rights, absence of the rule of law and authoritarian governance all give rise to exclusion, grievance and alienation among citizens; despite the EU’s attempts to engage the countries of the region on these issues, they remain an especially difficult area of cooperation and there have been few improvements. States must be encouraged to improve governance, respect human rights, to implement the rule of law, and to respect democratic processes, with a view to ensuring that the state enjoys legitimacy and is accountable and responsive to the views and needs of its citizens. In this context, enlarging the space for civil society and the media and strengthening the capacity of citizens and communities to organise is essential. States must also be pressed to respect international humanitarian law and allow unimpeded humanitarian access.

4. EU ACTIONS

Following the objectives set out in the Strategic Framework, and taking into account the new challenges in the region, the EU should give priority to the following five groups of actions in the period 2015-2020: regional security and stability; migration and forced displacement; countering radicalisation and extreme violence; youth and employment; and human rights, rule of law and democratic governance. This will complement EU support to promote inclusive economic growth in the Horn of Africa. Given that Tanzania is an important actor in the Horn of Africa, and that the challenges of radicalisation and migration set out above affect Tanzania, the scope of this Action Plan should also apply to Tanzania.

Regional Security and Stability

(i) Developing regional political frameworks: Building on facilitation by the EUSR for the Horn of Africa of the Nile Waters Agreement and coordination with Gulf actors on Somalia, more intensive engagement with partners in the Gulf, Egypt and Libya, in addition to the Horn of Africa, should encourage and support political frameworks that can contribute to the stability of the Red Sea region. In this context, the EU should support preparatory work for a high-level regional security conference. The EU should promote that the Horn of Africa is discussed at Ministerial and Senior Officials’ meetings with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and consider the possibility of establishing trilateral meetings, as well as opening structured political dialogues with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states in addition to its existing dialogue with the GCC. The EU should encourage increased participation of the countries in the wider region in appropriate co-ordination mechanisms at country level.

(ii) Supporting IGAD: As provided for in the strategic framework, continued support to IGAD, including conflict prevention, early warning and mediation, would encourage greater political and security integration in the region. Eritrea’s return to IGAD would make it more relevant in this respect. The EU should undertake a dialogue with the IGAD secretariat and IGAD member states about an appropriate security mechanism for the region and IGAD’s role and ambition in this respect. The EEAS and Commission services will assess the role of other relevant regional organisations, and encourage coherence and close cooperation between all regional mechanisms. This should take into consideration EU engagement with the African
Union, especially given its role in Somalia through AMISOM, and with the aim of advancing towards the full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

(iii) Reviewing CSDP missions: The Council, EEAS and Commission services are taking stock, within their respective competences, of the implementation of CSDP operations, security arrangements, instruments and assets in the region, including capacity building in support of security and development, for which Somalia was identified for a pilot project. CSDP has been an important part of the EU ‘toolbox’ for its engagement in the Horn of Africa, especially Somalia. The holistic strategic review of the three CSDP missions in the region later this year will provide an analysis of achievements to date and options for the future.

(iv) Supporting mediation and dialogue: Appropriate mediation, dialogue and transitional justice mechanisms can play an important role in addressing the causes of conflicts across the region, including in border areas. The EU should continue to be involved in conflict prevention and mediation processes at various levels – from the governmental to local communities - and at different stages - from preliminary talks to the implementation phase of peace agreements. The EU will continue to promote the role of women in peacebuilding and conflict resolution in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, including Resolution 2242 (2015).

(v) Fighting illegal activities: Controlling the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, drug trafficking, poaching of and trafficking in wildlife, illegal border crossing, illicit financial flows, and illegal unreported and unregulated fishing remain challenges for many countries of the region. The EU should seek to step up its support to partners to ensure the effective investigation, detection and prosecution of these activities.

(vi) Country by country approach: (1) Somalia - The EU, working jointly with international partners, should continue supporting a peaceful transitional and electoral process in 2016 in Somalia, and the creation of a sustainable public administration and national security architecture, in the context of the formation of federal states. [...] (2) Eritrea - The EU should incrementally intensify its dialogue and cooperation with Eritrea with a view to encouraging the government of Eritrea to grant greater political and economic freedoms to its citizens. The EU should also continue to support a political resolution of both the Eritrea-Ethiopia and Eritrea-Djibouti border disputes, essential for overall stability and development throughout the Horn of Africa. (3) South Sudan - The EU should support regional and international efforts to bring peace to South Sudan while continuing to focus on transparency of oil revenues, accountability and provisions of basic social services. In addition, the EU should continue to be committed to respond to the increased conflict-related humanitarian needs. (4) Sudan - Finally, the EU should also support efforts towards a holistic and inclusive political solution in Sudan.

Migration and forced displacement

(i) Implementing the Khartoum Process: The EU should aim to establish broad partnerships with countries in the region to address migration in an integrated and coordinated manner. In this regard, the EU should step up implementation of actions under the Khartoum Process, launched in November 2014, which brings together EU member states, countries of the Horn of Africa, and Egypt and Tunisia as transit countries and will focus increasingly on delivery. In particular, the Khartoum Process will provide an important forum for political dialogue with partners at Senior Officials’ level, with a focus on a rights-based approach. The EU should in particular work with the African Union, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan to improve migration management in the region.
(ii) Improving facilitation of legal migration and mobility: The EU should explore ways to support opportunities for legal migration to Europe, in line with the European Agenda on Migration. Moreover, the EU should look at ways to support South-South migration, such as the development and implementation of regional agreements on legal migration within the Horn of Africa and beyond, including through regional organisations such as IGAD, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC).

(iii) Preventing irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings: Faced with increasingly professional trafficking and smuggling networks, the EU should support the development of legislation on trafficking and smuggling, and capacity building of police and judicial authorities as well as strengthening of national coordination mechanisms. The EU should also support regional and international mechanisms, possibly through IGAD and the UN, for intelligence sharing and joint operations against traffickers and smugglers in the region. The EU should also consider supporting the implementation of integrated border management projects in the Horn of Africa, in full consistency with the EU’s comprehensive approach.

(iv) Supporting sustainable returns and promoting cooperation on readmission: EU actions should be used to create both incentives and pressure for improved cooperation on readmission. The EU should, in parallel, contribute to improving the capacities of countries in the Horn of Africa to reintegrate returnees and support creating conditions conducive to their sustainable return. In particular, the EU should upgrade cooperation with international partners to (i) ensure that Somalis returning from Yemen and Kenya are properly re-integrated into Somalia and (ii) ensure conditions are met for the safe and sustainable repatriation of Somalis into Somalia.

(v) Providing protection to those in need: The EU should develop the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) for the Horn of Africa and support states in the region to reinforce the protection of refugees and IDPs, support integration of long-term refugees and displaced persons in host communities and strengthen resilience and livelihoods of these communities. The EU should explore possibilities to assist Ethiopia to improve integration of increased numbers of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia and will look into the readiness of Sudan to undertake similar actions.

(vi) Investing in development: The EU should intensify its efforts to ensure that the factors that lead individuals to move, such as conflicts, instability, natural disasters, the effects of climate change, environmental degradation, desertification, poverty or lack of basic social services, are comprehensively addressed in development cooperation programmes with countries of origin, notably Eritrea and Somalia. The impact of displacement including migration on all development programmes, financed under National or Regional Indicative Programmes should be assessed during their design. The EU should also support initiatives to enhance the role of diasporas in development and political processes. The EU should also work intensively with transit states to strengthen their ability to accommodate migrants or refugees from their neighbourhood by creating economic opportunities both for host communities and migrants or refugees. The EU Delegations’ capacities in the field of migration and displacement should also be reinforced.

(vii) Exploring emerging issues: The EU should conduct analyses of the local drivers of mixed migration flows and of the migration – security nexus in the Horn of Africa, including issues of radicalisation and migration and the potential impact on diaspora communities in Europe of developments in the Horn itself, and of the link between trafficking of people, goods (e.g. drugs, wildlife products) and weapons in the context of the Horn of Africa with a view to identifying further actions.
Counter-radicalisation and violent extremism

(i) Supporting global and regional initiatives on counter-terrorism: The EU should continue to support global and regional initiatives on counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism such as the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum Working Group on the Horn of Africa, which the EU co-chairs with Turkey. The EU should promote enhanced measures to strengthen capacity among the countries of the region on counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, together with international partners such as the United Nations. The EU should also promote cooperation between the countries of the region on intelligence-sharing, including assisting the AU-led Djibouti process, as well as assisting individual states that wish to improve legal and intelligence cooperation.

(ii) Targeting development cooperation towards mitigating the underlying factors and root causes that drive radicalisation. The structural dysfunction of states, such as their inability to provide access to basic social services, in particular health and education among the poorest and the most marginalised, and corruption, have been identified as among the drivers to radicalisation. On the basis of additional analysis of the local causes of violent extremist threats, the EU should better target and define its development cooperation in a way that encourages the state to assume its responsibilities in the provision of public services and to protect the human rights of its citizens.

(iii) Strengthening capacity building in justice, security and law enforcement: Indiscriminate heavy-handed responses to violent extremism by countries in the region coupled with inadequate capacity and capabilities in the follow-up and investigation of terrorist cases run the risk of exacerbating the problems they are designed to address and alienating citizens. The EU should support reforms in the security sector, aiming at building capacity of law enforcement authorities adequately to respond to violent extremism, while respecting human rights, and to properly investigate and prosecute alleged terrorist cases.

(iv) Promoting tolerance and strengthening the voice of moderating influences: Governments, through state education establishments, as well as local and faith-based communities bear an important responsibility in promoting tolerance and critical thinking skills which are essential in the long term to tackle radicalisation. Free and full access to all public education is a fundamental tool to prevent marginalisation and radicalism; the EU support in this sector should be based on a careful assessment of agencies directly implementing projects in the field. The EU should support governments’ reforms aiming at promoting tolerance. The EU should also support efforts by civil society organisations and local communities to facilitate local conflict mediation and resolution as well as inter-faith dialogue and counter-terrorism narratives. The EU should consider developing support for individuals who have defected from extremist movements, with a view to encouraging them publicly to challenge the attraction of such movements. Strategies and actions leading to the empowerment of women will also be essential to prevent radicalisation and counter terrorism.

(v) Responding adroitly to violent extremism: The EU should offer assistance to governments both in framing and communicating policies to counter violent extremism that are holistic and led by an understanding of the forces driving radicalisation in the first place. The EU should also consider providing support to civil society organisations, including religious bodies, active in the field of preventing violent extremism. Consideration should be given to provide support for implementation of the IGAD Security Sector Programme.

(vi) Exploring emerging issues: The EU should support academic analyses of national and international factors contributing to radicalisation, including financing.
Youth and Employment

(v) Reintegrating former combatants: In post-conflict situations, large groups of disarmed and displaced young persons – principally men but also women - or children, many of whom have been entirely deprived of education and training, require reintegration. The EU should support projects, taking full account of a gender perspective, to enable them to reintegrate into society and to develop livelihoods.

Human rights, rule of law and democratic governance

(i) Tackling human rights country by country: The EU has identified priorities tailored to the situation in each country of the region in its human rights country strategies adopted since 2012, and should continue to address these priorities with a view to encouraging partners to pursue policies that allow citizens to play a role in governance. In particular, the EU should, in accordance with the human rights country strategies, underline through political dialogue with partners the importance of ensuring freedom of expression and opinion, ensuring the human rights of women and of encouraging a vibrant and critical civil society, by respecting inter alia freedom of association and assembly. Specific attention should be devoted to the prevention, at all levels, of sexual violence and abuse. Overall, the importance of respecting international human rights obligations should be stressed in political dialogues.

(ii) Supporting democratic principles: The EU should provide support for the establishment and development of democratic processes and institutions. The EU should continue to support the holding of democratic elections through Election Observation Missions to appropriate countries, as well as providing support for implementation of their recommendations.

(iii) Eliminating torture: Ill-treatment of citizens by the security forces, whether in the form of torture, arbitrary arrest or prolonged pre-trial detention, is especially likely to exacerbate resentment among those affected; the EU should step up its efforts to address these issues, including through funding projects where appropriate.

(iv) Promoting economic, social and cultural rights: Partner countries continue to face difficulties in ensuring all citizens can enjoy economic, social and cultural rights; the EU should continue to address issues such as access to water and food security through development projects, but also intensify its work on emerging issues, such as land-grabbing, that have a particular impact on livelihoods of the poorest and the most marginalised.

(v) Supporting human rights defenders: Human rights defenders play a vital role in identifying problems in the implementation of human rights and democratic governance, yet often find themselves in difficult situations; in line with the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, the EU should step up its advocacy on behalf of human rights defenders to reinforce their legitimacy, as well as continue providing practical support, including through strengthening regional links between defenders.

(vi) Strengthening the rule of law: Violations of the rule of law – whether through unfair trials, inability of individuals to enjoy access to legal remedies at all, or heavy-handed behaviour by partisan, unaccountable or corrupt police forces – also undermine citizens’ faith in state institutions. The EU should encourage actions to improve the capacity and efficiency of the legal system, as well as to strengthen the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, the impartiality and professionalism of police forces and to widen access to justice, including transitional justice in post-conflict countries. Funding Security Sector Reform programmes should be considered.

(viii) Supporting respect of International Humanitarian Law: Violations of international humanitarian law, whether by states or non-state actors, continue unabated in several countries of
the region. The EU should strengthen its efforts to support effective implementation of international humanitarian law, in accordance with the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with International Humanitarian Law.

(ix) Protecting women in conflict situations: The EU should strengthen its efforts towards the protection of women and girls in conflict situations from all forms of violence, including sexual and gender based violence, with reference to implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 and 1820 and the Guide to Practical Actions at EU level for Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict. These efforts should include measures aimed at preventing as well as to ensure accountability for such violence.

(x) Protecting children in conflict situations: The EU should pursue and further strengthen its efforts towards the protection of children in conflict situations from all violations and abuses, including inter alia the recruitment and use of children and their killing and maiming with reference to the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1612 and subsequent resolutions as well as the EU guidelines on children and armed conflict. These efforts should include measures aimed at ending and preventing violations and abuses committed against children as well as to ensure accountability for them.

5. EU INSTRUMENTS AND INITIATIVES

The implementation of the Action Plan will involve a range of instruments and mechanisms aiming at strengthening the comprehensive approach. This will include efforts spanning the diplomatic, security, military, trade and development cooperation fields.

Cooperation with the partner countries of the Horn of Africa takes place in the framework of the EU-ACP partnership under the Cotonou Agreement. The 11th European Development Fund’s (EDF, 2014-2020) National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) for seven Horn of Africa countries and Tanzania could contribute an important part of funding to the implementation of this Action Plan. Moreover, funds from the 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) for East Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean region (EA-SA-IO) and the Pan-African Programme (PANAF) under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) could target projects and activities under this Action Plan. While the main focus of the EDF and the DCI is on long-term development, other instruments have different mandates with different time horizons and concentrating on security, stability and peace. The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is intended to respond to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts (Article 3, non-programmable actions), and to support conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building (Article 4, programmable actions). Under Article 5, the IcSP focuses on global and trans-regional and emerging threats (programmable actions).

Moreover, on 9 September 2015 the European Commission endorsed the establishment of a European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF) as a crisis Trust Fund. The overall objective of the Trust Fund is to address the crisis in the Sahel and Lake Chad basin, Horn of Africa including Tanzania, and North Africa regions. It will support all aspects of stability and contribute to better migration management as well as addressing the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration, in particular by promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development. The European Commission proposed to mobilise EUR 1.8 billion of EU funds including EUR 1 billion from the EDF Reserve. The European Commission has called on member states and other donors to contribute. The EUTF would complement existing programmes and contribute to the implementation of the Regional Action Plan.

[...]

The EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (‘Khartoum Process’) was launched by a Ministerial Conference in Rome in November 2014. It gathers the countries of origin, transit and destination
along the migratory routes from the Horn of Africa to Europe. During a first phase, activities under the initiative should concentrate on addressing trafficking in human beings, as well as smuggling of migrants, with the perspective of expanding the process at a later stage. A series of concrete actions have already been identified by the Steering Committee of the Khartoum Process. The EU is also preparing a Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) in the Horn of Africa, with the aim of addressing the protection and developmental needs of people suffering long-term displacement, in particular by creating education and livelihood opportunities for IDPs, refugees and host communities.

The EU-Somalia ‘New Deal Conference’ held in Brussels on 16 September 2013 brought significant progress with the endorsement of a Compact between Somalia and the international community (the Somali Compact). It spells out the immediate priorities and actions for 2014-2016 for peace and state-building goals, including a political vision for an inclusive political process to achieve a stable and federal Somalia through the adoption of a Federal Constitution and elections by 2016. The Compact enshrines the principle of Somali ownership, including commitments against benchmarks, and direct engagement. It also includes principles for donor coordination and financial mechanisms to channel international support to the Compact priorities.

6. COORDINATION AND MONITORING

EU and member state’s [sic] activities will have to be closely coordinated in line with the comprehensive approach. Reinforced coordination, in particular in countries of the region is required and will be envisaged. This includes a better overview of ongoing and planned initiatives. These efforts should be undertaken in coordination with other key regional and international actors. Appropriate monitoring should be established to oversee the implementation of the proposed actions, in close cooperation with the member states. As concerns risk management, regional and country conflict and risk assessments will have to be regularly updated.

With regard to the EU Trust Fund, a Trust Fund Board will ensure the oversight of the overall strategy. The Board will be chaired by the European Commission with representatives of EU member states and other donors contributing to the Fund in line with the EU Financial Regulation.
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>BGs</td>
<td>Battlegroups</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CEPOL</td>
<td>European Police College</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CIR</td>
<td>Common Implementing Regulations</td>
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<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<td>Standing Committee on Internal Security</td>
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<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<td>International Development and Cooperation</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
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<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>European Asylum Support Office</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (formerly known as the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office)</td>
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<td>European Defence Technological and Industrial Base</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<td>European Institute for Gender Equality</td>
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<td>ENI</td>
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<td>Emergency Response Coordination Centre (formerly MIC)</td>
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<td>Early Response Mechanism</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EU Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>eu-LISA</td>
<td>European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice</td>
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<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<td>EUROJUST</td>
<td>EU’s Judicial Cooperation Unit</td>
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<td>EU Agency for Fundamental Rights</td>
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<td>FRONTEX</td>
<td>European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission</td>
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<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>IPA (II)</td>
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<td>MEP</td>
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<td>Multiannual Financial Framework</td>
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<td>Monitoring and Information Centre</td>
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<td>International Support Mission to the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>Partnership Instrument (formerly ICI)</td>
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<td>Research and Technology</td>
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<td>RCA</td>
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<td>Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems</td>
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<td>EU Satellite Centre</td>
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<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small and medium-sized enterprises</td>
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<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
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<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>US dollars</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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The EUISS Yearbook of European Security (YES) 2016 is the Institute’s annual publication compiling key documents and data related to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) for the year 2015. Updated factsheets, maps, graphs and charts provide added clarity on some of the key issues facing the European Union and its external action today.

YES is an indispensable publication that aims to inform experts, academics, practitioners and, more generally, all those wishing to know more about the EU and security-related matters through innovative, evidence-based analysis and the showcasing of crucial facts and figures.