Urban violence and humanitarian challenges

Joint Report

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EUISS-ICRC Colloquium
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This report derives from a colloquium on the theme of urban violence and humanitarian challenges organised jointly by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) that took place on 19 January 2012 in Brussels.

The present publication reflects the personal opinions of the experts who participated in the Joint EUISS-ICRC Colloquium. The views expressed in this publication do not reflect the positions of the EUISS and ICRC.
# CONTENTS

Introduction 3

I. Opening 5

   Welcoming remarks 5
   Opening address 7

II. Urban violence: state of play, operational and legal challenges 13

   Definition and trends of urban violence 13
   Causes and actors of urban violence 19
   Applicable legal frameworks pertaining to urban violence 24
   Humanitarian consequences of urban violence and challenges of intervention 27
   Humanitarian response towards urban violence 31
   Conclusion 36
   Towards an EU approach to the issue of urban violence? 37
   Discussion 41

III. Urban violence: case studies 45

   Roundtable I: Humanitarian responses to the needs arising from organised crime and
gang violence: study of pilot projects 45
   Discussion 55
   Roundtable II: Humanitarian challenges arising from urban violence in the context
of uprisings: lessons from the Arab protests 57
   Conclusions 67
   Discussion 68

IV. Closure 71

   Concluding remarks 71
   Panel I 71
   Panel II 72
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annexes</th>
<th>79</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>About the authors</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
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</table>
INTRODUCTION

This second colloquium organised jointly by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) aimed to present the causes and humanitarian consequences of urban violence, as well as related trends and challenges for the European Union and humanitarian actors. Two case studies have been selected, focusing on different types of violence affecting urban environments. The first case study examines pilot projects to address humanitarian needs arising from organised crime and gang violence in megacities; the second is an analysis of the humanitarian challenges emerging from urban violence in the context of uprisings, referring specifically to the lessons learned from the protests in the Arab world.

Urban violence represents numerous challenges for policy makers and humanitarian actors alike. Today, more than half of the world’s population lives in cities and it appears that urban centres will absorb almost all new population growth in the coming decades. It has therefore become increasingly important to understand the dynamics of violence in an urban setting.

By bringing together experts, academics and representatives from various relief organisations, the ICRC and the EUISS hope to have contributed to the debate and spurred further interest in this increasingly important issue.

The present publication includes summaries of both the presentations provided by the speakers and the discussions held during the colloquium.
I. OPENING

Welcoming remarks

Mr. Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Director, EUISS

It is a pleasure for me to welcome you today to our second joint colloquium with the ICRC. This partnership, started in 2010, is a great opportunity for the EUISS to cooperate with the leading organisation in the field of international humanitarian law, which has a remarkable record in humanitarian work in places affected by conflicts and armed violence.

In today’s globalised and interconnected world, the EU cannot address challenges alone; we need to work with EU institutions, with EU Member States, and with other organisations like the ICRC.

The topic of our second joint colloquium with the ICRC is very timely and relevant as today we are witnessing urban violence on a daily basis. But we also need to deal with it in a long-term perspective. This was our rationale when the EUISS got involved in the ESPAS 2030 forecasting project, an inter-institutional European initiative. Our ESPAS report and research show how urbanisation will increase dramatically in the next twenty years, and one of its key conclusions highlights the growing role of cities in tomorrow’s world, with a very likely high degree of potential violence in these urban environments.

We are going to live more and more in a world of ‘diffuse power’. The monopoly of the state will be diminished. Non-state and private actors will play an increased role. Privatisation of security will intensify. Cities’ governance will become a major challenge. By 2030 more than 60 percent of the global population will live in cities, and most of it will be concentrated in megacities. This will particularly be the case in Asia. In India there will be more than 70 cities of more than 1 million inhabitants.

These cities will be new centres of governance and economic well-being, and hence they will constitute new centres of power. Urbanisation, when coupled with rapid demographic growth, may become a recipe for increased violence, and this is why I find today’s discussion particularly valuable for the European Union and its foreign policy.

We will learn from our Brazilian brothers on how to make the struggle against urban violence more effective, as Colombia has done. But let’s look at Syria today for instance. How can we respond to the violence in the cities of Syria, after having acted in Libya? Cities are the places where demonstrations and violence against civilians are taking place. What can be done to overcome the impasse in the United Nations Secu-
rity Council (UNSC) to protect the citizens of Syria? These are urgent questions that we need to address together with our friends from the humanitarian community. Urban violence is also an internal challenge for European states themselves. They are well aware of this fact: they have acquired some experience in dealing with urban violence, and in the light of this experience perhaps they have something to share with the rest of the world.

This is a good basis for potentially fruitful triangular cooperation between Europeans and other global players like Brazil, the US, China and Russia, together with third countries confronted with urban violence but which have not yet designed tailored policies and approaches for dealing with it.

There may also be a legal vacuum in the way we all are addressing urban violence. Between the international humanitarian law framework and the human rights corpus, do we need new international legal instruments? Should we focus on the legal framework to contribute to new rules on how to tackle urban violence? I leave it to you to answer or nuance my open question.

We need to think ‘out of the box’, and learn from other expert communities, to ensure that the existing knowledge and experience at our disposal can be used by us all to tackle potential urban violence, and prevent it.

I am convinced that this colloquium will help EU institutions to develop more in-depth thinking on the issue, and I am proud that the EUISS is helping to put this topic on the agenda of the EU.

Mr. François Bellon, ICRC Head of Delegation to the EU, NATO and the Kingdom of Belgium

Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests,

It is my pleasure to welcome your to this one-day colloquium, jointly organised with the European Union Institute for Security Studies. For the past twelve years, the ICRC delegation in Brussels has been organising seminars and colloquia on different topics related to international humanitarian law. For instance every year as from 2000, the ICRC has organised, in collaboration with the College of Europe, a highly specialised colloquium that discusses a specific legal theme. The 2011 October colloquium examined for instance the legal framework and responsibility of international organisations’ involvement in Peace Operations. Eager however to enlarge the debate beyond strictly legal issues, the ICRC Delegation in Brussels decided two years ago to also organise debates on thematic humanitarian issues. To maintain a link with the European Union, the ICRC approached the Paris-based agency, the European Union Institute for Security Studies.
Both agreed to organise in June 2010 in Paris a first colloquium dedicated to ‘Current challenges to humanitarian action in conflict situations’. You will find the records of the stimulating presentations and discussions in the proceedings of this colloquium, which is in your welcome folder.

For this year, we have chosen a quite complex issue: ‘Urban violence and humanitarian challenges’. As seen in the past decade, new humanitarian needs and responses are emerging. The purpose of today’s presentations and discussions is to explore the nature of this issue and its possible consequences and developments in the coming years. With 50 percent of the world population living today in urban centres, a demographic trend that will continue in the coming decades, the location of future ‘battlefields’ may well be more and more in city centres.

As a leading humanitarian organisation, the ICRC has always been forward-looking and is willing to initiate and lead the humanitarian discussion and not lag behind events. It is therefore important to map and open the discussions on new humanitarian dynamics sufficiently in advance in order to shape the debate towards new horizons. This is the purpose of holding a colloquium on this subject today. I am looking forward to hearing the presentations and discussions and I invite you to actively participate in the debate. I will share with you, at the end of the day, some final concluding remarks.

Opening address

Ms. Angela Gussing, Deputy Director of Operations of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Excellencies,
Mr Director,
Ladies and gentlemen,

It is an honour and pleasure to welcome all of you, on behalf of the ICRC, to this colloquium on ‘Urban violence and humanitarian challenges’.

The aim of today’s colloquium is to open a debate on a complex, yet increasingly important, issue by sharing experiences and bringing together experts from European institutions, the humanitarian sector, practitioners and academics who will discuss the humanitarian challenges in various situations of violence occurring in urban settings. We hope these discussions will spur further interest in the topic and foster more reflection and attention.
Ladies and gentlemen,

Elections or demonstrations turn violent, revolutions take place, riots erupt, urban gangs proliferate and fight each other, authorities resort to massive use of force to crack down on the urban fiefdoms of traffickers, etc. etc. All such situations happen or start almost exclusively in cities. They occur increasingly in urban environments because of the rampant urbanisation of our societies, but also because of the concentration of power and resources (and of their opposites) in such settings.

Situations of violence in urban environments (or urban violence for lack of another term) can generate serious humanitarian consequences and are often synonymous with chronic insecurity with dozens, hundreds or thousands of persons killed, wounded, or displaced from their homes, and with an absence of or reduced access to basic services. The affected population may live in fear and hide in their homes, unable to move freely and thus precluded from access to work and markets. In addition, many may be detained and at risk of ill-treatment or assassination by both governmental agents and non-governmental actors.

The situations that we will be looking at during the course of the day do not meet the legal criteria of an armed conflict and fall outside the scope of international humanitarian law. The theme under discussion is important for the work of our organisation today, with the aim of having more clarity to guide our decisions regarding engagement in such environments and being able to predict these situations of urban violence more effectively.

The ICRC’s concerns about and interest in this topic rest on the hypothesis that various forms of violence in urban settings, generating high levels and various forms of human suffering, may be more prevalent in the near future, notably due to the concentration of increasing problems prevailing in some cities. But you may ask, why the ICRC interest in this topic if it is not a conflict and if international humanitarian law does not apply?

During the last few years, the ICRC has observed a continuous development of situations of violence in urban settings that do not correspond to the criteria of armed conflicts but – as already mentioned – create serious humanitarian problems, which can be acute or chronic. The situation of violence ‘per se’ is not the ICRC’s main focus, but rather its humanitarian consequences and the ICRC’s potential added value in helping to address them.

While situations of conflict remain and always will remain at the heart of the ICRC’s mission due to its mandate enshrined in the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC also acts in situations of internal strife and has been doing so for many decades.
It enjoys a right of initiative, expressly specified in the Statutes of the Movement (art 5.3) in any situation that justifies humanitarian action by a specifically neutral and independent institution and intermediary. It should be noted that these Statutes were adopted in 1986 by the states which are also party to the Geneva Conventions and by the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in their International Conference.

Thus, even when international humanitarian law does not apply, the ICRC may still offer its humanitarian services to governments without that offer constituting an interference in the internal affairs of the state concerned. It is important to underline here that it is neither the actors’ motivations nor the causes of the violence that prompt the ICRC’s involvement, but the humanitarian impact of a given situation.

Such situations do not occur only in so-called ‘developing countries’: we only have to mention Greece, the UK, Tunisia and Syria, but also Thailand, Kyrgyzstan or Zimbabwe, to recall images of violent events occurring in their cities in the recent past. In most of these situations, the ICRC offered its services to the governments concerned and carried out humanitarian activities with their consent.

One point that I still want to make and which is important for this colloquium is that in some parts of the world, such situations are increasingly linked to criminality and criminal networks; and they are spreading. Criminal networks and groups take possession of whole neighbourhoods, with a direct impact on the lives and security of tens or hundreds of thousands of their inhabitants.

Operating in highly politicised environments is very challenging, but so is operating in highly ‘criminalised’ ones (for lack of a better word). However, the dynamics of such situations of violence present many similarities but also many differences. The ICRC is learning to work with both, applying relevant lessons learnt in other contexts and acquiring new experience in the face of new realities. It stays focused on the people and communities affected; it concentrates on work that contributes to alleviating their suffering, to ensuring the protection of their lives and dignity and to promoting the respect of applicable law.

In our ‘line of work’, learning happens in the field. Practice precedes policy and positions that we develop through analysis and reflection, internally but also externally with other partners, as on the occasion we have here today. With regard to some of the types of violence that we will be looking into, we have many decades of experience and we have proved our added value; with regard to other types, the engagement of the ICRC is fairly recent and its approaches and criteria for engagement still in adaptation.
Ladies and gentlemen, now a look at the day ahead of us.

In the framework of this colloquium, we have chosen to begin with the preliminary study of the issue with general questions: what are the definitions of urban violence, the trends, the actors, the legal frameworks, the EU approach and of course the humanitarian consequences and responses? This panel will be presented by well-known specialists on the subject and I am looking forward to their presentations and to a lively debate.

It will be important here to underline the diversity of situations in which urban violence can take place and try to analyse the various forms it can take. It is indeed not possible – and it is not our intention – to boil down such a complex issue to one single definition and unique model. Instead, we hope to have a broad view of the issues at stake.

The afternoon will be dedicated to two specific case studies addressing different types of settings where urban violence can occur: (i) chronic violence linked to organised crime; and (ii) violence stemming from sudden popular uprisings. Though contexts, forms of violence and consequences may vary, the general observation is that they can both generate large-scale humanitarian needs and represent humanitarian challenges, which is the core subject of this colloquium.

For the purpose of the present colloquium, the focus will remain on violence in non-conflict situations, thereby setting aside the complexities linked to armed conflicts in urban areas. The speakers will exchange expertise, knowledge and ideas. The floor will then be open to your questions.

The first roundtable is entitled ‘Humanitarian responses to the needs arising from organised crime and gang violence: study of pilot projects’. Drawing on the interventions of representatives from various backgrounds, this part will present some initiatives undertaken and projects developed as a response to the violence and its consequences by civil society, international organisations and concerned authorities. The purpose of these presentations and debates is to provide more insight into the existing responses and to draw possible lessons for a humanitarian response in other contexts. The panellists in this session are therefore field actors participating in the humanitarian response.

The second roundtable, ‘Humanitarian challenges arising from urban violence in the context of uprisings: lessons from the Arab protests’, has been chosen because of the importance of the crisis that erupted in some major cities of the Arab world in 2011. Though popular movements are not a new phenomenon as such, the latest events and their widespread repercussions are certainly a reminder of all the challenges they generate, namely from a humanitarian operational point of view.
I am convinced that these two subjects will be very inspiring and illustrative. This is an excellent opportunity for discussing and exchanging experiences and ideas with experts and professionals from different organisations and countries, learning from each other and thinking together. I am confident that our discussion today will be fruitful and will bring more clarity to these important issues and help to open new avenues in our thinking and practice.

I thank you for your attention and wish us all a very successful, fruitful and pleasant colloquium.

Thank you.
II. URBAN VIOLENCE: STATE OF PLAY, OPERATIONAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES

Panel chaired by Dr. Ignacio Cano, Professor at the Laboratory of the Study on Violence, State University of Rio de Janeiro

**Definition and trends of urban violence**

**Mr. Kees Koonings, Associate Professor of Development Studies and Latin American Studies, Utrecht University**

Over the past two decades, urban violence has acquired increasing visibility and impact. In a number of violence scenarios this has been the result of the urbanisation of internal or international armed conflict. In many more cases, however, urban violence as an endemic situation has not been driven by explicit political motives. Instead, urban violence is above all socially and economically motivated. Urban armed actors seek to exploit often illicit economic opportunities and seek to control the urban physical and social space. Official security forces employ violence in cities to counter this but more often become involved in extralegal urban violence themselves. As a result, urban residents, especially in poor or peripheral areas, face the daily impact of violence and insecurity as a result of a specific form of state failure, namely the failure to uphold the ‘legitimate monopoly of coercion’ and to provide security as a basic public function. Instead, urban residents have to deal with varying forms of *de facto* power wielded by obscure alliances of extralegal and official armed actors. The conventional division between war-type violence and criminal violence therefore disappears as far as the impact on civilian populations is concerned.

1. **Incidence and magnitude of urban violence**

We can explore the magnitude and proliferation of urban violence with the help of selected statistical indicators (namely, homicide rates per 100,000). The results of this exploration appear in Tables 1 and 2 (see pages 17 and 18). As can be seen, at

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1. These data are used for illustrative purposes only. The original sources used for the compilation presented by the sources cited have used a variety of procedures to arrive at the given homicide rates. Usually, these include data provided by agencies in the domain of law enforcement and institutions (public, non-governmental, international) active in the field of public health. Homicide rate figures are by definition difficult to establish with total precision due to problems regarding accuracy, completeness, and cross-national and diachronic comparisons. In other words, there is the proverbial dark number that probably tends to underestimate victims of lethal violence. In addition, many aspects of violence are not covered by homicide rates: non-lethal violence, potential violence, the physical impact of violence, perceptions of fear and insecurity, etc. For these dimensions, victimisation surveys and qualitative assessments can provide additional in-depth insights for specific cases. These methods make cross-case and diachronic analysis more complicated, though.

2. Please note the methodological *caveats* for the reliability and validity of cross-national and cross-city homicide rate data appended to the tables.
least over the past decade, urban violence is (or has become) the most serious form of lethal violence in the world. It appears to be most present in non-conflict countries and regions that are generally considered ‘at peace’. Many of them, especially in Latin America, but also including South Africa, are (transitional) democracies, seeking or claiming legitimate state monopoly of the rule of law and means of violence.

The ‘red zones’ of urban violence are Latin America and the Caribbean, South Africa, and a number of cities in the US. Here, levels of lethal violence at the national level and in various cities are clearly much higher than the global average and, indeed, than registered lethal violence in war-torn areas. This profile would become even more clear-cut if we were able to zoom in on homicide rates in specific intra-urban areas (such as shanty towns) or vulnerable social groups. Then, homicide rates would rise to 500-plus levels. In short, modern cities in countries at peace are often the theatres of de facto warfare. We do find a limited number of violent urban areas in war-torn regions. These are, however, special cases – and not the most violent ones. Still, the prime focus of counterterrorist and counterinsurgency strategic thinking in conventional military and security circles is on these scenarios of ‘urban low-intensity warfare’.

There is no direct link between lethal violence levels and (urban and national) poverty or the size of cities. In fact, megacities are not per se the most violent on the average; the most lethal urban areas tend to be secondary cities or small towns, or specific parts of large conurbations characterised by the breakdown of state control and the emergence of extralegal armed actors and informal configurations of power and coercion.

2. Characterisation of urban violence

We have already seen that urban violence, in its most extreme manifestations, can have a similar magnitude and intensity to warfare (1,000+ yearly lethal victims). This means that this urban violence cannot be dismissed as simply ‘urban crime that has got out of control’. Crime is essentially a legal concept. From a social, political, and indeed humanitarian point of view, the distinction between legal and illegal depends on the legitimacy, effectiveness and above all reach of states and their legal apparatus and discourse. Where the role of the state is problematic in this regard, the distinction between criminal and other forms of social violence, and between conflict and non-conflict, gets blurred.

Using relevant definitions of violence, we can progressively broaden the notion to encompass both lethal and non-lethal dimensions of urban violence and insecurity. John Keane defines violence as: ‘[…] any uninvited intentional or half-intentional act of physically violating the body of a person who previously had lived “in peace”’. Roberto Briceño-

Leon and Verónica Zubillaga⁴ include potential physical force: ‘We define violence as the use or credible threat to make use of physical force with the intention of taking or damaging the property of, or of injuring or killing, another person or oneself. That is, we include in the concept both the violent act itself and its possibility [...]’. I propose to follow the still more inclusive definition of Alberto Concha-Eastman: ‘Violence is the intentional use of force or power with a predetermined end by which one or more persons produce physical, mental (psychological) or sexual injury, injure the freedom of movement, or cause the death of another person or persons (including him or herself).’⁵

Urban violence is not random. Most of the time it is deliberate and purposeful, including during episodes of apparently arbitrary violence such as riots and lynching. Urban violence is business, power and control by ‘other means’. Urban violence is also highly visible, sometimes spectacular and thus directly linked to perceptions and frames of insecurity and fear.

3. Urban violence as warfare

To support the contention that urban violence can be seen as ‘undeclared wars’ or quasi-warfare, with far-reaching social, political, cultural and institutional consequences, we can draw a parallel with Mary Kaldor’s⁶ concept of ‘new wars’. Kaldor argues that (intragate) armed conflict has lost most of its politico-ideological motives; instead, factors like (illicit) economic gain (‘greed’) or religious and ethnic identities and cleavages (‘grievance’) have appeared as major drivers of violent conflict. As a result, the main actors in new wars are not formally organised military or rebel fighting forces but irregular groups: militias, gangs, death squads, etc that spread terror among non-combatants (who are the principal targets) and contribute to the disintegration of the social fabric.

From this perspective, urban violence has elements that bring it into the realm of ‘new wars’: economic/criminal and social/cultural motives rather than political; diversity of armed actors, violence entrepreneurs and power brokers; an organised/collective quality beyond anomic disorder/singular crime; relationship to patterns of social exclusion and socio-spatial fragmentation; links with transnational (illicit) flows of commodities and people; new urban ‘warlike’ identities: warlords, soldiers, victims, vigilantes, insurgents and counterinsurgents.

Urban violence has a perverse political and policy impact. It reframes the conventional urban paradigm of progressive modernity and inclusive non-violent politics. It leads to fractured citizenship and the systematic distortion of democratic govern-

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ance and rule of law. Enrique Arias and Daniel Goldstein⁷ speak, referring to Latin America, of ‘violent democracies’. Democratic politics are captured by violent power brokers; violence in turn generates support among the electorate (and the international community) for repressive and militarised law enforcement at the expense of human rights standards. Zero tolerance and militarisation are, however, generally ineffective to achieve its stated objectives.

Conclusion

The implications of this analysis for humanitarian agendas are that present-day urban violence fits into the remit of international humanitarian concerns and interventions in massive and endemic collective violence. However, this requires a new doctrine and legal/institutional framework for an (international) humanitarian agenda addressing urban violence that takes into account the social, institutional and political characteristics of these violence scenarios. This means that humanitarian interventions in contexts of urban violence should focus on supporting social actors and institutions addressing urban violence rather than seeking to replace them. Instead of bringing basic relief in war theatres without any functioning entities, such interventions should try to strengthen the resilience of societies affected by urban violence: enhancing the response capacity of urban actors and institutions in order to protect residents and to defuse and prevent violence.

Table 1 – Homicide rates: countries in selected years

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>↑</td>
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Source:
The Guardian Datablog: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AonYZs4MzlZbdEFKenJZdUd4WE9HYVjSE8yc19QcE#gid=0;
Table 2 – Homicide rates: cities in selected years

<table>
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<th>Cities/Metropolitan Areas</th>
<th>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</th>
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Seguridad, Justicia y Paz (Mexico): http://editor.pbsiar.com/upload/PDF/S0_ciud_mas_violentas.pdf
Causes and actors of urban violence

Dr. Cathy McIlwaine
Professor of Geography, School of Geography, Queen Mary, University of London

This paper examines what has been referred to as the ‘multiple complexity’ of urban violence in relation to the causes of and the actors involved in such conflict. Just as there are many different types of urban violence that can be categorised as political, social, economic and institutional, so the causes of such violence are multiple and need to be understood from a holistic perspective. In turn, different types of urban violence intersect and overlap and a range of actors perpetrate various forms of violence. Such complexity has also contributed to the notion that urban violence has now become ‘ubiquitous’ or ‘endemic’ especially in many parts of the Global South.

It is now acknowledged that the causes of urban violence must be viewed from a multi-disciplinary and multi-scalar perspective. Although different academic disciplines tend to focus on particular aspects of the underlying causes of urban violence, it is widely recognised that no single factor underpins its emergence. Instead, these range from psycho-social theories linked with socialisation processes to much wider macro-economic trends that relate to poverty and inequality. In turn, it is important to view the causes from a combination of structural, institutional, interpersonal, and individual levels, all of which are interrelated. This perspective is incorporated within the ‘ecological model’ or ‘epidemiological’ approach which has since been popularised by violence researchers as well as by international agencies like UN-Habitat and the WHO. The adapted version identifies various contributory factors relating to psychological, social and familial, economic, cultural, political and institutional issues.

At the structural level, the most commonly identified underlying causes of urban violence include deep-seated inequalities in the distribution of economic, political and social resources which themselves are interrelated with poverty and are underpinned by globalisation and neo-liberal macro-economic and political processes.\(^{15}\) Related to these at the institutional level are unemployment and exclusion from labour markets, as well as ineffective judicial and state security systems combined with impunity. These factors facilitate the emergence and proliferation of a wide range of different violence actors, especially when linked with spatial exclusion within cities where the poor reside in marginal settlements where the state plays a limited role and where alternative violent actors thrive. This becomes self-perpetuating as low-income neighbourhoods become ‘no-go’ zones. Research in Colombian and Guatemalan poor communities shows how they would often be branded as ‘red zones’ (zonas rojas) by wider city dwellers making them out-of-bounds and limiting the resources flowing into these areas.\(^{16}\) This can create what Briceño-León and Zubillaga\(^{17}\) call ‘reactive violence’ which can be criminal or political in response to such marginalisation, as well as the ‘democratisation of violence’.\(^{18}\) At interpersonal and individual levels, issues such as experiences of intra-family and gender-based violence can contribute to people turning to other forms of violence. For young people in particular, such socially-constituted violence can lead them to leave home and join gangs (in order to provide an alternative form of social support), or turn to drugs, which are themselves associated with insecurity, as well as types of economic violence, e.g. robbery, attacks, crime and delinquency\(^{19}\) (see Figure 1, p. 21).

Recently, a model of causality that identifies factors underlying urban violence in terms of the interrelationships among structure, identity, and agency has been developed. It is referred to as a ‘causal triangle’\(^{20}\) (see Figure 2, p. 22). At the top corner of the triangle are structural factors such as socio-economic inequalities and political change. At another angle is ‘identity’ which highlights how people experience or perpetrate violence in different ways according to their social positions influenced mainly by gender, age, ethnicity and race. For example, women are more likely to be victims of social violence than men, while hegemonic masculinities are closely linked with the exercise of male power enforced through violence against women. The elderly also experience different types of violence, usually as victims, with the young being more closely associated with gang and drug-related violence. At the final angle is


\(^{19}\) Cathy McIlwaine and Caroline O.N. Moser, ‘Latin American urban violence …’, op. cit. in note 11.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.
‘agency’ which highlights how people react and deal with various types of violence in different ways, positively and negatively.

**Figure 1: Causal flow diagram of interrelationships between different types of violence and insecurity (3 young men from a youth centre, Colombia)**

Among the diverse range of actors of violence in cities are those who perpetrate it informally and usually on an individual basis and those who use force in a more formal and/or collective manner. Violent individuals are invariably those who commit intra-family and gender-based violence. Although these are usually assumed to be perpetrated by male conjugal partners against women as a form of domestic abuse, this is not always the case. For example, it also includes social violence perpetrated by extended family members such as between siblings or co-wives in cases of polygamy or on the part of stepfathers, as well as violence perpetrated by women against partners in a minority of cases.\(^{21}\)

Informal, individually motivated violent actors also operate in the public as well as the private sphere. Some of these actors are motivated by the need to assert social and economic power, especially in the case of those under the influence of alcohol. For example, research in Guatemala and Colombia has highlighted how alcohol was not only linked with people committing gender-based and intra-family violence in the home, but also with sexual violence in the streets, as well as street fights, usually

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occurring close to the local *cantinas*. Other important actors operating informally and individually are drug addicts. While again in Guatemala and Colombia drug addicts perpetrated gender-based and intra-family violence, they were also associated with street rapes, as well as robbery, assault and murder linked with funding drug habits.

**Figure 2: Causal triangle framework for understanding urban violence**


In terms of more organised violent actors, drug consumption and distribution also

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underpins the actions of drug-traffickers in cities as well as fuels the activities of gangs. Although drug-trafficking cartels operate globally and nationally, they also invariably have a local presence in cities with their activities bolstered by violence. While they are usually universally feared, the relationship between drug traffickers and communities is a complex reciprocal and, to a degree, mutually beneficial one (see below). Gangs, which are the most commonly identified type of violent actor in cities, are also hugely diverse. These exist and function for a range of intersecting social, economic and political reasons and they are often extremely important actors in the institutional landscapes of the cities, especially in the Global South.23

The huge number of violent actors that exist in cities is illustrated from research in Cali, Colombia where one group of community members identified a total of 37 groups involved in the perpetration of violence in the *barrio*.24 These can be viewed along a continuum of level of organisation as well as according to the predominant type of violence they perpetrate. For example, at one end are gangs involved in social violence which might include groups of friends who occasionally participate in violent acts to assert territorial control and which are relatively open. Also involved in more organised violence are structured gangs with rules governing entry and exit into the group and who participate in organised crime, robbery and drug consumption and distribution (for example, *pandillas* and *maras* in Latin America).25 While these are primarily social groupings often providing alternative social support structures for young men (and occasionally young women), they are also economic structures. For marginalised, unemployed youth, gangs provide a viable livelihood that would be otherwise impossible; indeed, some gangs operate almost solely for economic purposes. At the other end of the organisational spectrum are politically motivated groups such as militias, paramilitaries or guerrilla organisations who are usually highly organised, well-funded and are involved in the most extreme forms of violence. In many cities of the Global South there also exist what are sometimes referred to as ‘social cleansing’ groups. These are organised killers who target other violent or ‘anti-social’ actors such as drug addicts, delinquents, as well as other ‘undesirables’ such as street children and sex workers.26

Although the pursuit of personal power and control and the need to challenge wider processes of exclusion underlies the creation of many gangs, there is also a more collective and protective dimension to the emergence of gangs in cities. On the one hand, young people in particular join gangs for protection from the violent actions of other gangs or other state-controlled violent actors such as the police or army; in such circumstances, gangs often provide a community protection role. Indeed, in an assessment of trust in social institutions carried out in nine research communities

25. Winton, op. cit. in note 23.
in Colombia almost one fifth of people felt that perverse organisations had a positive function because of their vigilance roles. In addition, community members are also often able to differentiate between perverse organisations that function for the common good and those who work for their own benefit. For example, in Guatemala, the maras tended to be universally reviled yet social cleansing groups were often praised for their extra-judicial killings. Finally, as indicated above, violent actors are also those formally accorded the role of protecting their citizenry by the state – the police and army. Throughout the Global South, these organisations are widely mistrusted and feared, contributing to widespread impunity which provides ever more fertile contexts for more violent actors to emerge. Therefore, violence actors exist across the whole spectrum from neighbourhood gangs, to warlords, to violence entrepreneurs, to soldiers, insurgents and counterinsurgents.

In conclusion, this paper has highlighted the complexity and multidimensionality of the causes and actors of urban violence. This diversity of violent actors can have serious deleterious effects on the social, economic and political fabric of communities and cities as violent individuals and groups vie for power and control while simultaneously generating widespread fear and insecurity (see Figure 1). In addition, the recognition of the multiple causes of violence also highlights the need for holistic policy responses of different scales and in different spheres.

**Applicable legal frameworks pertaining to urban violence**

Mr. Stéphane Kolanowski, Senior Legal Adviser, ICRC Delegation to the EU, NATO and Kingdom of Belgium

The aim of this contribution is to address the issue of what legal framework(s) will be the appropriate one(s) to apply in responding to urban violence, and to discuss the differences between the existing legal frameworks and the consequences of their application.

When assessing situations of violence, two possible legal frameworks could apply: one applicable to armed conflicts and one applicable to law enforcement. In the case of an armed conflict, the applicable legal framework will be mainly international humanitarian law while in other cases, it will be human rights law and national criminal law. While the rule is clear, the implementation of it can be much more delicate.

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What is of particular interest to us here are situations of urban violence other than armed conflicts; but to exclude situations of armed conflicts we need to define what an armed conflict is, and we will concentrate on non-international armed conflicts only as international armed conflicts are not relevant for this topic. Non-international armed conflicts are protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a state. The armed confrontation must reach a certain level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a certain level of organisation.

To distinguish what is an armed conflict from what is not, two criteria emerge beside the obvious fact that there needs to be protracted armed confrontation: the level of intensity and the organisation of the group or groups involved.

It is by applying these criteria to a specific situation that we can distinguish an armed conflict from internal disturbances or tensions to which international humanitarian law does not apply. This involves assessing facts on the ground, on a case-by-case basis using a number of indicators.

For the criterion of the level of organisation of the group, or groups, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has, albeit not exhaustively, identified assessment indicators such as the existence of a command structure and internal disciplinary rules, the existence of headquarters, the ability to procure, transport and distribute arms, the group’s ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics, its ability to negotiate and conclude agreements such as ceasefire or peace accords, etc. This would then exclude a number of violent phenomena like, for instance, large-scale, long-lasting demonstrations, or mass riots lacking this level of organisation. However, some groups around the world can probably fit this criterion of organisation.

The second, cumulative, criterion to reach the threshold of an armed conflict is the intensity of violence. Useful indicators have been established by international jurisprudence to assess what intensity of violence has to be reached in order to pass the threshold of an armed conflict, considering that the other criterion, the level of organisation, is fulfilled. The main indicators are the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations, the type of weapons and other military equipment used, the number and calibre of munitions fired, the number of persons and types of forces taking part in the fighting, the number of casualties, the extent of material destruction, and the number of civilians fleeing combat zones.

It is important to underline that the two cumulative criteria are the only ones to be taken into consideration. International jurisprudence has clearly dismissed the suggestion of other criteria (such as political motivation) on the basis that the applicability of international humanitarian law should not become arbitrary.
Although in theory, one can imagine that urban violence related to organised crime can fulfil these two criteria and consequently be considered as an armed conflict, in actual practice it is difficult to identify any occurrence of urban violence that matches these criteria. At least, I do not have, to date, any example to share with you. But in case of internal disturbances in urban settings, this violence can develop, and at some point the two abovementioned criteria may be met. That is for instance what happened in 2011 in Benghazi. A situation of internal disturbances, concentrated notably in that city, amplified and became a non-international armed conflict.

The legal classification of a situation is something that has to be regularly updated as a situation can evolve from one category to the other. Most non-international armed conflicts start off as internal disturbances, and conversely a non-international armed conflict can also develop into a situation of violence other than an armed conflict. If this is the case, the legal framework will change and the behaviour of the parties should be adapted in consequence.

International humanitarian law and human rights law share the same aims, i.e. to protect the lives, health and dignity of persons, and are accepted to be separate but complementary legal regimes.

Three of the main differences between the two legal regimes have indeed to be highlighted. Human rights apply at all times, in peacetime as well as in armed conflict situations, but human rights law *de jure* binds only states. On the other hand, international humanitarian law will be applicable only in armed conflicts and will in these cases supersede human rights law as the *lex specialis* or the law tailor-made for situations of armed conflict. It will be binding upon all parties to an armed conflict, be they states or non-state actors.

The third major difference between international humanitarian law and human rights law is the issue of derogation. As international humanitarian law is purposely made for specific situations of armed conflict, taking into consideration the military necessity of the parties to the conflict as well as the humanitarian requirements, no derogation at all is possible. This is not the case for most of the human rights treaties. Indeed, as human rights law is intended to be applicable at all times, most of the human rights treaties allow states who declare a state of emergency to derogate from their human rights obligations, except for a limited number of non-derogable rights.

Human rights law and criminal law also have substantive differences with international humanitarian law. In practice, depending if we are in a law enforcement context or if we are in an armed conflict context, different rules related to the use of force, including the choice of weapons, and to detention will be applicable. These differences are very much understandable considering the purpose of human rights law and of international humanitarian law.
It appears, from what is stated above, that urban violence will most often not correspond to the definition of armed conflict, which means that the applicable legal framework will be human rights law and the national criminal law of the state concerned. But sometimes, urban violence can fit the definition of an armed conflict and therefore enter into a legal framework governed by international humanitarian law.

It is of the utmost importance to assess a situation appropriately in order to be able to apply the relevant legal framework as different legal frameworks have been developed to respond to different problems and vulnerabilities. Applying the wrong legal framework or applying a mix of legal frameworks might jeopardise the protection of victims of violence.

**Humanitarian consequences of urban violence and challenges of intervention**

**Mrs. Elena Lucchi, Operational Advisor, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)**

**Urban scenarios in which MSF operates vary:**

1. Urban warfare (international humanitarian law (IHL) conflicts): Mogadishu, Kabul, Baghdad, Tripoli, etc.
2. Non-conflict armed violence (gangs, *maras*, narco-traffickers, etc.): relentless routine daily violence: social cleansing, armed robberies, assaults, beatings, kidnappings, murder, threats, confrontation with law enforcement agents for the control of territory (e.g. Rio de Janeiro, Port-au-Prince, Guatemala City, Tegucigalpa, Bogotá).
3. Neglected and marginalised populations living in slum settings. Such scenarios include influx of IDPs and refugees into urban settings (e.g. Johannesburg, Nairobi, Dhaka, Lagos, etc.).

This presentation will focus on scenarios where violence in urban settings is pervasive and mainly (but not exclusively) on non-conflict armed violence.

**Medical humanitarian needs resulting from violence**

When cities become theatres of violence, the violence can result in serious medical humanitarian needs.

Direct consequences of violence include loss of life, injuries, wounds, physical and
mental trauma. The following indirect medical effects of violence can result from aggravating factors: epidemics, malnutrition, respiratory tract infections, malaria, intestinal infections, diarrhoea, sexually-transmitted infections (STIs) and nutritional problems. Mental trauma, stress and frustration can also lead to alcohol and drug abuse. Due to healthcare structures being non-accessible, or simply not available, chronic illnesses can also become acute and emergencies can go unattended.

Violence can also undermine the provision of healthcare: health structures are not always able to cope with the various medical emergencies produced by violence. The entire health system may collapse due to violent events. Health facilities are barely functional due to lack of medical staff, equipment and supplies. Healthcare professionals may choose to stay away from certain areas of the city for fear of violence.

In sum, in violent urban contexts, there are important humanitarian needs which justify the presence of humanitarian actors, particularly when violent trends have an impact on the health and well-being of poor urban communities, when populations and communities are extremely vulnerable to violence, and when access to healthcare is limited and critical gaps need to be addressed.

**Common challenges in understanding and responding to crisis in urban settings**

There seem to be some common challenges when operating in urban settings. Most are context-related, but there are additional internal organisational challenges.

**Context-related challenges:**

- *Violence is difficult to predict* (volatility, multiplicity of armed actors, criminality, blurring of civilians and combatants).

- *Understanding context and ‘power dynamics’* as well as mapping different actors: understanding who is who – armed actors, groups, security forces, political powers, traditional powers, and other actors with influence.

- *Defining and identifying vulnerable populations* (and their needs): conducting assessments in urban settings is extremely complex. Recurrent questions before and during an intervention include the following: who are the most vulnerable? How to find them? What sort of medical interventions should be designed for them? Different vulnerabilities coexist in the same setting. How should beneficiaries be defined? Who is sys-

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30. Examples of such aggravating factors include: displacement, breakdown of the social fabric, separation of families and breakdown of social and health services and law and order. The deleterious impact on living conditions can also be the cause of suffering and disease. Forcibly displaced populations are often exposed to poor living conditions and hygiene, overcrowding, poor quality of food, sexual exploitation, forced labour, and violence by new informal actors, criminal gangs, and security forces. As such, these populations are particularly vulnerable to many serious medical consequences. This new influx of people also puts additional strain on existing urban resources and available services.

31. Populations in such communities are extremely vulnerable to violence. In situations of urban violence homicides, violent trauma and abuse occur on a daily basis. People live in a state of fear and are subjected to high levels of stress.
tematically excluded from healthcare and why?

- **Identifying victims of violence** (often afraid or reluctant to access health services, living in the same community as the perpetrator). Despite the potentially easy access to certain locations, the challenge is often how to reach specific vulnerable groups and to identify victims of violence. The key often lies in focusing on activities that complement or facilitate the medical response (e.g. outreach, community health workers, social workers, etc).

- **Defining the limits of medical action** (inclusion and exclusion criteria). It is not easy to identify the target population (people affected by violence) in the middle of a vulnerable population affected by poverty and exclusion. How big a ‘health package’ is the organisation willing to provide and for how long? Focusing only on emergency response to violent trauma might be the most obvious strategy to reduce morbidity and mortality, but potentially many more people might be facing the indirect consequences of violence and require more primary healthcare assistance, including in terms of mental health or treatment of chronic diseases. Choices need to be made.

- **Managing the scale and volume of potential beneficiaries?** Once people know that services are available, accessible and relatively near at hand in urban settings, the demand rises. One challenge is therefore to be able to manage an increasing demand for free humanitarian services.

- **Fine-tuning humanitarian intervention strategies** is about combining emergency action and long-term structural priorities, response to the needs of individuals and support of the health system as a whole. The challenge is to focus projects on core humanitarian action knowing that it takes place in an environment characterised by larger developmental and structural shortcomings.

- **Defining modalities of work with the Ministry of Health (MoH) and other health providers** (partnership, referral system, support, etc). Some levels of healthcare provision are usually available in urban settings. There are opportunities to refer patients to other structures, to work in partnership rather than in isolation, all the while acting against barriers to access to health that might be affecting certain groups.

- **Networking, partnership and negotiation with different actors** (including armed ones). What does a humanitarian organisation have to offer in order to negotiate with armed actors with criminal objectives? How to ensure a humanitarian space in violent settings where some armed actors often do not hesitate to kill people in hospitals? It is important to re-affirm impartiality and neutrality of action. This can also have implications for security management.

- **How to define the exit criteria in chronic settings?** In settings with chronic needs, the situation (or rather the system) is not going to change in the short term: what kind of indicators can be used to define success of response or achievement? What sort of monitoring and evaluation tools should be used?
• **Labels and funding:** The way in which humanitarian needs are typically defined fails to address the problems of these contexts, the suffering they produce and the populations affected. Distinctions between formal armed conflicts, regulated by international humanitarian law, and other violent settings, as well as those between emergency and developmental assistance, can lead to the neglect of populations in distress. Many cities in a number of countries that are technically at peace are also in need of attention. In a number of Latin American cities, the levels of violence — and the attendant medical humanitarian needs — are often extremely high. Despite the horrendous impacts of violence in these ‘unofficial’ theatres of conflict, the resulting humanitarian needs often remain underserved and the humanitarian response is limited. The various players in the humanitarian system (governments, donors and organisations) need to remedy this situation. Funding should be made available for responding to crises and related humanitarian needs in non-traditional conflict settings, and organisations should not shy away from operating in such contexts.

**Internal challenges (debated issues within the organisation)**

• One debated issue is related to the kind of violence to which the humanitarian organisation wants to respond. Different typologies of violence often coexist in one same context (e.g. conflict violence, criminal violence, structural violence, social violence, economic violence). On the other hand, MSF strategic plans usually prioritise operations in areas of active and chronic conflict (the battlefield). Yet, some of the response situations in urban settings cannot be easily categorised. As Philippe Bourgois notes: ‘[…] violence operates along multiple, overlapping planes along a continuum that ranges from the interpersonal and delinquent to the self-consciously political and purposeful.’

From an organisational point of view, it seems important to respond to the consequences of violence on people’s health, regardless of its nature: the humanitarian consequences of many criminally violent urban settings are comparable to those of more traditional wars, yet despite the intensity of the needs, humanitarian aid in such settings is limited.

• Another interesting debate often revolves around the **internal allocation of resources.** For an organisation that is striving to work in an impartial (i.e. needs-based) way, are projects responding to violence in urban settings the best allocation of limited resources? Such programmes, usually in middle-income countries, are particularly expensive in terms of cost per patient. The typical question is often: are such programmes really life-saving? How many IDPs in Darfur or Somalia could be treated

32. We might feel more comfortable when the state is involved (and international law applies, including human rights law and IHL) rather than when criminal, individual or domestic violence takes place.

with the same budget?

• **Is MSF the right organisation to work in such settings?** The question is often whether, within the capacity of the organisation, skills and tools are available to properly understand the nature of social exclusion and discrimination in these settings (e.g. if the MoH/others are there, ‘What is the issue?’ Why are people not able to access health services?’). On the other hand, does the organisation have emergency/security management experience that can be applied to these settings?

• Does this correspond to core MSF activities? Such settings pose an identity challenge. Victims of conflict-related violence (the battlefield) are still MSF’s main priority. However, the world theatre of conflict is changing and humanitarian organisations such as MSF need to adapt.

**Opportunities**

Despite their challenges, urban settings also present opportunities for humanitarian actors: greater opportunities exist for creating referral possibilities to MoH and other specialised structures. The possibility of working in a network, and coordinating with local authorities and other actors (rather than in isolation as often happens in remote settings) also constitutes a great added value. Social workers can be used to ensure patients’ access to health services, as well as access to legal or physical protection. It is also easier to develop communication strategies and conduct lobbying and advocacy work in urban settings where violence affects everyone at different levels: the territory of action is pretty well-defined and the various target audiences are all located in the same city.

**Conclusions**

To sum up, urban settings are justified contexts of interventions for humanitarian organisations like MSF. Relevant and necessary programmes can be developed in urban contexts with a focus on direct and indirect consequences of violence. In order to strengthen and improve our response in such settings, there is a need to rethink the classic MSF operational response and to fine-tune it, without necessarily creating a completely new approach.

Urban settings are the future location for many humanitarian interventions; it is therefore important to share experiences and foster reflection, innovation, and flexibility in order to achieve effective operational responses.\(^\text{34}\)

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Humanitarian response towards urban violence

Mrs. Marion Harroff-Tavel, Consultant in Humanitarian Affairs, former ICRC Political Advisor

Violence in urban environments is a recent topic of debate in many think tanks and humanitarian organisations. Yet, armed confrontations in cities are part of the history of mankind. To address the topic of ‘humanitarian response towards urban violence’, I shall tackle the three following questions: why have humanitarian agencies been generally more involved in providing aid in rural environments than in urban environments?; why is there now such a growing interest in humanitarian response in urban environments?; what issues need to be explored to tailor the humanitarian response to violence in cities?

Allow me first to clarify two concepts: in this presentation, ‘humanitarian response’ refers to impartial aid, designed to save lives and protect human dignity during and after outbreaks of armed violence. The focus is on aid channelled through NGOs, the ICRC and the UN. Moreover, ‘urban violence’ refers to the use of force in urban or peri-urban settings, involving physical and psychological damage as well as material deprivation. I consider here ‘urban violence’ as a phenomenon, irrespective of the legal designation of the situation – that is whether it is classified as an armed conflict or another form of urban violence, such as riots or sporadic outbreaks of violence. Legal definitions and classifications are important to identify the rules that must be invoked to protect civilians or regulate the conduct of hostilities, but they are of less importance when identifying the humanitarian response to suffering. Last but not least, if I have cities of developing countries in mind, violence is also a source of concern in London, Paris, Lyon, Palermo and New York.

1. Why have humanitarian agencies been generally more involved in providing aid in rural environments than in urban environments?

Six possible explanations come to mind, formulated as questions since some are more convincing than others:

Were the needs stemming from violence greater in rural areas than in cities? According to Caroline Moser and Dennis Rodgers, from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), ‘the general assumption that rural areas are more peaceful than urban areas is far from true (...). Rural areas are often the arenas of long-running and brutal civil wars, (...) and can experience significantly higher levels of violence than urban areas in certain post-conflict situations.’ 35 The intensity of the conflicts in rural areas of Angola, Darfur, Colombia, Peru, Tajikistan or DRC corroborates this viewpoint.

Were humanitarian organisations, until recently, oblivious of the high level of violence in cities due to a lack of data? Such an assumption takes into consideration the fact that many crimes in cities, such as rapes or sexual assault, go unreported, in particular when the victims live in an irregular situation and trust neither the police, nor the justice system.

Did humanitarian organisations and governments consider that the priority was to protect and assist victims of full-blown armed conflicts? They viewed violence in cities of otherwise peaceful countries (e.g. Cape Town or Caracas) as a security concern, a law enforcement challenge, and a field of action for human rights activists and development agencies.

Were the local solidarity networks in rural areas unable to cope with the effects of armed violence in the community, while cities had a stronger and better-organised civil society helping those in need? Some would argue, on the contrary, that in rural areas people know and help each other, while people affected by violence in urban settings, in particular migrants, are helpless without the support of a network. From my experience in Grozny or Sukhumi, it is often young and middle-aged people who flee the city. Those who remain are the elderly who have nowhere to go or who want to protect the family belongings. Their support system therefore often collapses.

Did humanitarian organisations have more leeway in rural areas than in urban areas to develop humanitarian activities? That may well be. The power relationship with the authorities is more complex in urban settings. Authorities in the capital are involved in politics and pressure humanitarian agencies to work within the framework of strong governmental policies. In rural areas, humanitarian organisations deal with local authorities, which often give them more freedom of manoeuvre.

Were donors somewhat reluctant to allocate funds for a humanitarian response to what they viewed as criminal violence in urban settings? In such case, NGOs, which are often driven by demand and funding, quite naturally paid more attention to the plight of rural populations affected by violence.

2. Why is there now such a growing interest in humanitarian response in urban environments?

Two explanations that are sometimes given do not convince me entirely:

Humanitarians are now paying more attention to cities because ongoing conflicts are more urban than before. Mogadishu, Grozny, Baghdad are recent examples of urban warfare. Do they exemplify a new trend? Attacks against cities and armed violence in cities are not a new phenomenon. Remember the bombing of Guernica, in Spain, that inspired one of the most famous paintings of Picasso, the heavy fighting in Beirut.

during the Lebanese civil war or the bombing of Sarajevo in the 1990s. However, it is true that in peaceful countries, the level of violence in some cities has grown tremendously for reasons explained by other speakers. It has also manifested itself in new forms.

Others argue that cities are the new ‘market place’ for aid agencies, whose number has recently exploded. During the last two decades, the humanitarian environment has become very crowded and agencies compete for funds, when resources are scarce. In some areas of the world, South America, for instance, the number of armed conflicts has gone down. Therefore, providing aid in cities that are being torn apart by acts of violence would amount to opening a new ‘market’ for humanitarian organisations. It would be a gimmick to maintain a presence in countries where they would otherwise have no reason to stay. This explanation is debatable.

The growing interest in a humanitarian response in urban settings stems, in my opinion, from the four following facts:

Since the end of World War II, and above all since the end of the 1960s, there has been a gigantic movement of population from the countryside towards the cities, that has led to new forms of violence that it is no longer possible to ignore. Earlier, the agricultural sector was not sufficiently developed and mechanised to generate agricultural surpluses that would feed the city. In the last few decades, in many cases, this population movement was so important that governments were incapable of offering a minimum of public services to the newcomers in cities, in the fields of education, health, water, sanitation and above all employment and security. This has led to the collapse of law and order in entire urban areas. The favelas of Rio de Janeiro are a case in point, but what about Lagos, Johannesburg, Karachi, Calcutta or Mexico? This rapid and uncontrolled development of big cities has led to new forms of violence, for instance fighting between well-organised gangs (which was reflected in an early artistic form in the movie West Side Story) and conflicts linked to drug trafficking.

Humanitarian organisations are increasingly aware that the world is confronted with major challenges such as globalisation, climate change, demographic transformations and migration. They have their share of responsibility in helping mankind prepare a better future for the next generations. Urbanisation is a global challenge not only by virtue of its sheer scale, but also by virtue of the number of stakeholders that need to be involved to make sure cities are safer and places of opportunity rather than desolation.

In urban environments, long-term, structural, chronic needs, such as education or job opportunities, coexist with short-term humanitarian needs. A child from a slum needs to go to school and have access to education rather than hang around in the street, but he or she may also need to be evacuated to a hospital after having been hit by a bullet in a gang fight. There is room in the city for both humanitarian and developmental projects.
Humanitarian organisations realise that their experience and their principles of impartiality and neutrality could be a valuable asset to address violence in cities. When violence in cities increasingly resembles a classic armed conflict situation, because of the weaponry used, the organisation of the contending parties, the tactics adopted, and the gravity of the suffering inflicted, humanitarian actors are in a familiar – yet different – terrain. Some organisations, like the ICRC, know how to cross front lines, negotiate access to bring humanitarian aid, and evacuate the wounded. The ICRC can also offer its good offices to facilitate agreements enabling humanitarian action.

3. What issues need to be explored to tailor the humanitarian response to violence in urban environments?

The first issue is giving fresh thought to the relationship between a humanitarian response and a development agenda. In urban settings there is a mix of chronic problems – such as poverty, discrimination and unemployment – and of acute problems when violence strikes – such as access to health facilities for wounded people. The time and mind frames necessary to address those problems are not the same. Humanitarian organisations want a quick response and exit strategies. Development agencies analyse the underlying causes of the challenges they observe and want their work to be sustainable in the long term. Their personnel have different cultures. Yet, they must work together.

Another issue is deciding whether or not the origin of the violence matters to provide a humanitarian response. The policy of humanitarian organisations could be to abstain from getting involved when criminal violence is at the origin of human suffering. Is it possible to do so? In some contexts, lines are blurred between different types of violence. Then, the effects of armed violence on people are the same, whether they are kidnapped by bandits or armed groups and killed by drug lords or police forces. Last but not least, in armed conflicts humanitarian organisations already have to deal with people involved in all sorts of reprehensible trafficking activities. In a globalised world, criminal networks operate in all types of situations.

How to ensure security for humanitarian workers in cities with high levels of gang violence in otherwise peaceful countries is the third challenge. Armed factions are generally highly organised and capable of sustaining military-type operations. Hence a lot of questions that require an answer in specific contexts: How can an outsider identify the right interlocutors and gain their trust? What intermediaries could help in approaching gang leaders or drug lords without security risks? Does neutrality inspire any confidence? Could it be useful to broker truce agreements between armed factions? Could codes of honour be envisaged, in which letting humanitarian workers care for the sick and wounded would be recognised as a protected activity?

A fourth point deserves further analysis: how to promote community-based support for humanitarian action, in other words, how to build the capacity of local communities that are
the first ones to provide food, shelter, access to healthcare, money and emotional assistance to those in need.

The fifth issue is the appropriateness of humanitarian organisations’ operational modes and toolboxes vis-à-vis the needs generated by extreme violence in cities of otherwise peaceful countries. Are the tools devised for armed conflicts suitable for use in violent urban settings of peaceful countries – the tools to assess vulnerability, identify those in need, provide assistance, restore livelihoods or protect the people in search of security? Is there a need for new tools and operational modes? Or should humanitarian agencies offer what they are good at and nothing else?

Let me give you three examples of different operational modes. To provide water, it may be necessary in a city to fix a highly complex water system and identify the technical experts that will be able to maintain it. In isolated villages, trucking water will be the only solution until wells are repaired. To feed people, cash and vouchers can be useful in cities, where inhabitants need to buy their food, sometimes at a very high price. In the countryside, it may be better to distribute food parcels, seeds or tools, to vaccinate the cattle or to build an irrigation canal. To ensure the economic security of a household in a city, an approach based on a single economic sector is not sufficient because of the diversity of employments people have. Income-generating projects (technical assistance, provision of training or tools), limited in time, enable the beneficiary to take up a commercial activity again. Rural households produce their own food: an agronomic project will improve their lot.

Last but not least, there is also a need for fresh thinking about operational modes to protect persons affected by violence in urban areas. On the one hand, it is easier to collect valid information in urban areas where people affected live in close proximity to one another. Local associations can corroborate information. The use of portable phones enables instant transmission of pictures and information. On the other hand, it can be more difficult to identify and monitor the situation of persons to be protected, as often they are lost in the anonymity of the crowd. They move from one area of the city to another. They die, without their deaths being recorded.

Conclusion

For a long time, humanitarian organisations devoted more attention to rural areas than to urban settings. In the last few decades, humanitarian practitioners have felt increasing concern regarding the extreme violence prevailing in cities, in particular in slum areas, of otherwise peaceful countries. They must gain knowledge of this complex phenomenon before deciding whether or not to get involved. It is not yet clear whether experience gained in armed conflicts is relevant when dealing with territorial gangs or criminal groups of big cities. It is dangerous to send young humanitarian professionals to operate in ungoverned urban spaces where the crime rate is high.
That said, security measures and law enforcement strategies are not sufficient. Letting down the people who suffer in ungoverned urban spaces at the hands of armed factions without trying to imagine how to contribute to the alleviation of their suffering and provide hope and a sense of pride to young people would be wrong. May humanitarian organisations preserve their pioneering spirit and governments welcome their contribution towards building a better future!

Towards an EU approach to the issue of urban violence?

Mr. Damien Helly, Senior Research Fellow, EUISS

The concept of urban violence: nowhere or everywhere in EU competences?

So far, urban violence does not feature in the EU’s glossary or vocabulary. Although European Member States are exposed to some forms of urban violence, the topic has not been dealt with explicitly at the EU level. As far as external action is concerned, there does not seem to be a specific strategic or programmatic document focusing on urban violence as such.

When requested to participate in a debate on the topic, it seems EU officials felt rather embarrassed since there is no clear EU legal or policy framework encompassing the notion of urban violence that they could use as a basis for their external communication and public diplomacy. This being said, the EU has been addressing urban violence in many ways in the framework of its external action but without highlighting it in a very explicit manner. Similarly, Member States have addressed urban violence at home with their own policy mix and a more detailed focus on their experience in that realm and how it could be used in external action could be worthwhile.

My contribution focuses on the external action dimension of the EU’s approach (or the non-existence thereof) to urban violence, looking at the existing terminology and strategic framework, opportunities and challenges for agenda setting, and instruments and tools that could be mobilised in situations of urban violence.

Existing terminology used by the EU and compatibility with some dimensions of urban violence

Within Europe, urban violence attracted renewed attention with the riots in France in 2005, leading to a range of initiatives being undertaken in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon. Since then, as the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS) has remarked, ‘England may well have monopolised atten-
tion on this subject recently, but we can cite examples of riots in many other places: Brussels at the beginning of the 1990s, Rostock in Germany (1992), Brixton in England (1995), France (2005), Slotervaart in the Netherlands (2006), Hungary (2006), Madrid (2007), Copenhagen (2007 and 2008) and Athens (2008).\(^3^7\)

The European Economic and Social Committee has worked on the concept of ‘youth violence in urban areas’\(^3^8\) and police departments of the Member States have also addressed the issue of urban violence through various programmes. There are also a number of civil society and network initiatives on ‘urban security’ and ‘crime prevention’ like the European Forum on Urban Security (funded by the European Commission Daphne III programme) or the French Forum on Urban Security.\(^3^9\)

The topic of urban violence is certainly not new for European police forces, and increased cooperation among countries is being discussed. For instance, a seminar was organised in November 2011 in Lyons by the European Police College (CEPOL), inviting experts from Portugal and the Netherlands.

An interesting cross-cutting dimension that has been studied and discussed among Europeans is the role of the media and how it is handled by those professionals working on urban violence in Europe and outside Europe.

The fact that some types of urban violence are perceived as a challenge in Europe itself places the EU in a very delicate position vis-à-vis international interlocutors when it comes to exchanging and cooperating on urban violence settings in third countries.

Within the EU, the balance between internal challenges and the need to engage worldwide in urban violence issues will require a proper debate between internal and external security and humanitarian communities.

**Urban violence in the field of the EU’s external action**

Urban violence is actually dealt with indirectly via a variety of policy labels and categories, covered in a piecemeal and cross-cutting manner by diverse policies and programmes. It is not rare to find urban-specific projects or programmes with some components focusing on violence, but these are not part of a systematic, overarching EU policy.

The EU has a *European Security Strategy*, in which organised crime is depicted as one of the key threats to European and international security.

The EU has a conflict prevention (including peacebuilding) approach which, in a way, encompasses urban violence, without necessarily explicitly alluding to this concept. In this field, the EU follows its programme on conflict prevention and produces a regular report on progress achieved.

The EU also has an arms transfer policy (in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy), to be used to limit opportunities of delivery of weapons (legal or illegal, due to diversion of legal transfers) to non-state actors involved in urban violence.

The EU has a human rights policy with a dedicated instrument (the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights – EIDHR), but key human rights documents do not seem to include the term ‘urban violence’.

Thirdly, the EU has a development cooperation policy, which includes a variety of chapters and thematic dimensions, each having something to do, directly or indirectly, with urban violence: capacity building, support to the public sector/administration, technical assistance, urban planning, decentralised cooperation between cities, city twinning, youth, culture, employment policies, and support to civil society. It should be mentioned though that public aid is being increasingly called into question as the main tool to achieve poverty alleviation and prosperity. Investment policies, micro credit, the role of diasporas (often engaged at the local level) and remittances are all now considered as key drivers for urban development.

The EU has an external trade policy and investment promotion policies, which have tremendous impact on partners’ growth and poverty alleviation. This is also relevant for the macro level impacting on levels of violence.

Finally, the EU has a crisis management policy, ranging from crisis prevention to post-conflict stabilisation interventions. In this framework, urban violence may also be at the very heart of the EU’s action, but so far, there is no such thing as an EU concept on crisis management in urban settings.

As for EU military and civilian crisis management operations, the urban dimensions of interventions are usually to be found in operational documents such as crisis management concepts (CMC), concepts of operations (CONOPS), operations plan (OPLAN) and rules of engagement.

Specific activities have however been conceptualised in a more formal way, like in the case of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) as the result of a political consensus. However, it seems urban violence is not addressed per se in these existing documents. Do we need a specific EU CSDP concept on urban crises covering urban violence?
In the sphere of *humanitarian action*, the EU has a policy which is not part *stricto sensu* of the EU’s external action, and the way it addresses urban violence follows its basic standards of humanitarian action based on humanitarian needs and access to victims.

**Rationale and challenges for new agenda setting in the current environment of the EU’s external action**

In the current context of the EU’s external action, marked by institutional transformation and bureaucratic uncertainty, conceptual innovation is not necessarily welcomed by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Member States. However, if sufficient lobbying is brought to bear on EU institutions, through for instance the European Parliament, international organisations and civil society organisations, it may lead to increased attention being paid to the issue within the institutions. Forecasting analysis on increased and challenging urbanisation around the world, as was done by the EUISS-led ESPAS project, has already made the case for a more tailored and mainstreamed approach to urban violence by the EU. Advocacy efforts now need to elaborate on existing knowledge with a view to engaging policy makers more concretely.

**Opportunities to address urban violence through EU policies**

The revamping of the EEAS may present opportunities to inject urban-violence focused approaches within the working methods of the EU. Budget discussions may be the opportunity to ensure that urban violence is included in strategic documents for 2013-2020.

**EU Instruments, mechanisms and methods for agenda setting on urban violence**

It could be envisaged that some components of the EU’s external action and humanitarian action embark on a strategic thinking process in Brussels to address urban violence as a challenge *per se*. Nevertheless, because of the local nature of urban violence, there is also a need to engage EU delegations in third countries.

In the case of ECHO, it could be the commissioning of studies on challenges posed by urban violence to its work and to its partnerships, and to its coordination with other components of the EU’s external action and other international humanitarian and non-humanitarian bodies.

In the case of the EEAS, several levels need to be considered. At strategic level, conceptual work could be envisaged by cross-cutting analytical bodies (forecasting units or directorates), legal services (in the Council, the Commission and the EEAS) or by specific bodies: conflict prevention, peacebuilding (Instrument for Stability + EEAS geographic desks), development cooperation (geographic directorates) and crisis
management communities (EU Military Staff, CMPD, European Security and Defence College, Instrument for Stability). A task force or informal coordination study group could be set up to work specifically on challenges posed to the EU by urban violence, including humanitarian ones, but also beyond them.

The relevance of drafting a European Commission communication, non-paper or a proposal for an EU action plan on urban violence or the inclusion of urban violence as one of the threats mentioned in a to-be-reviewed European Security Strategy (or reviews of its implementation as was the case in 2008 for climate change and cyber threats for instance) should be discussed in the framework of such a study group.

The European Parliament’s general secretariat could also commission an external study on the appropriateness of the EU conceptualising urban violence or addressing it through its existing instruments.

Some Member States could also be encouraged to produce non-papers on urban violence in the framework of the Political and Security Committee, and/or task the EEAS forecasting department and/or the EUISS to work more on the topic.

At operational level, further work could be done on lessons learned exercises to take stock of experiences from urban violence theatres in the shape of seminars, including ESDP/CSDP operations but also European Commission programmes.

As for implementation, the topic of urban violence could be included in existing experts’ rosters for SSR, DDR, Crisis Response Teams, human rights and humanitarian experts but also staff in EU delegations located in places where urban violence is very acute. Specific courses on urban violence in the framework of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and the CEPOL could also be envisaged, in cooperation with leading training agencies. Finally, the idea of an international knowledge network on urban violence could be considered.

**Discussion**

Some consider the term ‘urban violence’ as inappropriate or devoid of meaning, its counterpart ‘rural violence’ being non-existent. The speakers were therefore invited to exchange their points of view on this terminology and to discuss the existing alternatives. One suggestion was, for the sake of more accuracy, to make a distinction between three circumstances: violence in the city, violence of the city (division of the city, segmentation of the population, etc.) and violence against the city (siege, looting, etc.). Others suggest terminologies like ‘violence in urban and peri-urban environments’ or, in order to make a clear distinction with armed conflict violence: ‘everyday violence in cities’.

It emerged however that it remains important to categorise the types of violence
(socio-economic-institutional-political) so as to better consider how to deal with them and, as long as there is a recognition that all these types of violence are interlinked, to help those working in the field.

One argument in favour of the use of the term ‘urban’ is that it is easy to understand for all kinds of audiences, making any narrative related to it more resonant. The ‘urban idea’ is indeed strong, in the sense that everybody knows about cities and slums, and that it is quite clear that the city will be the main theatre of human experience in the twenty-first century.

Overall, it was agreed that the sometimes-suggested term of ‘criminal violence’ was not always relevant as a generic concept because not all violence finds its source in criminal behaviour. To refer to urban violence as only ‘criminal’ can furthermore be misleading or reductive as in some circumstances the situation is far more nuanced. One good example of this is the Jamaican dons in Kingston who are not exclusively gang leaders or criminals but also political brokers and entrepreneurs.

Aside from the measures that aim to deal with the consequences of urban violence, there are programmes focused on preventing violence in these settings. The speakers were therefore invited to share their expertise on the prevention programmes that have proven to be efficient. It was underlined that there was also a need for a holistic approach when looking at prevention measures. While one method focuses on the criminal justice system (e.g. training police officers, including women) starting from the urban planning point of view, another method deals with city plans (street lighting, rehabilitation of spaces where gangs can meet, etc.). However, the measures that have been proven most efficient are those which, for the past 15 years, have been concentrating on rebuilding social capital and fabric, rebuilding trust and restoring a sense of community. People themselves have identified these as efficient solutions at local level to prevent violent actors from taking over. The combination of these methods, coupled with initiatives at state level dealing with macro-economic and development issues, is key to successfully preventing violence in urban settings.

Illustrative of the social approach was the example given of Cape Flats, near Cape Town, where the South African Red Cross is supporting children who, as part of a project encouraging them to abstain from violence, are taking part in various programmes ranging from vocational training to recreational and sports activities. According to the police, the initiative has contributed to reducing the level of violence in the concerned neighbourhoods. Once children have joined a gang, it is then very hard for them to desist and dissociate themselves from the gang. The fact that at school gang members put a lot of pressure on those children who do not want to join underlines the importance of prevention. The community-house built by a person
who followed the programme in his youth, where kids just come and go, is crucial in this regard. Again, it shows how essential in a violent neighbourhood the sense of community belonging is as well as the sense of being respected.

It was added that, according to the Geneva-based network ‘Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence’, it is useful to make a typological distinction between mitigating impact in a rather immediate way and addressing the causes. In terms of prevention, it is also necessary to work on the transformation of these contexts of direct, structural and cultural violence. This can be done by both setting a public security agenda that would focus on human rights and citizen security, and addressing social and everyday concerns of communities (making use of their experience and knowledge, involving them politically, empowering them in reorganising their own community and reorienting it towards a less violent situation). It could be particularly instructive to further look at the tools existing in many Latin American countries that have significant experience in participatory politics.

Another question which was raised concerned the arguments used by humanitarian actors to convince those non-state actors who are not familiar with their work to accept its validity and usefulness. As one of the speakers explained, one persuasive argument for the respect and protection of health structures and facilities is that, as they belong to the supported communities, one day they might need these services too. Explaining to a community that it is their mothers, girlfriends and daughters that the organisation is trying to help is also an appeal to their sense of humanity and community. Even though the arguments will vary according to the context, this is one of the most convincing ones.

Operating in urban environments can be challenging for humanitarian actors. As the speakers were asked to exchange views and experiences on their approaches with a view to optimising their effectiveness, one humanitarian expert described the results of a three-day workshop of an NGO on operational strategies in urban settings, which notably concluded that there was no need to change the entire way of working, but to introduce adaptations such as developing a package for needs assessment in urban settings that would differ from the mindset applied in refugee camps or rural settings, where the indicators and thresholds are completely different. As many actors are available and able to provide services in the settings concerned, it is also important to support those and to be part of networks in such a way that an external organisation becomes a facilitator rather than a direct assistance provider. Also, considering this wide array of available actors it is also necessary to increase the capacity to identify reliable referral partners. Finally, seeing that, particularly in chronic situations, it is difficult to define what is successful or not, it is necessary to redefine the monitoring and evaluation tools and approaches.

40. See: http://www.urbanresilience.org/.
III. URBAN VIOLENCE: CASE STUDIES

Roundtable I: Humanitarian responses to the needs arising from organised crime and gang violence: study of pilot projects

Chaired by Mr. Angel Carro Castrillo, Head of the Mercosur Division, European External Action Service (EEAS)

Dr. Ignacio Cano, Professor at the Laboratory of the Study on Violence, State University of Rio de Janeiro

Evidence points to the fact that even given that historically there was a high level of violence in Rio de Janeiro, homicide rates increased dramatically during the 1980s and into the mid-1990s. Analysts tend to explain this as the result of the consolidation of the cocaine trade through criminal networks operating in the slums.

Indeed, territorial control is the central element that needs to be taken into account to understand the local scenario and to explore the options for possible interventions. Unlike other organised crime groups, criminal gangs based in Rio slums dominate small territories, where they carry out illegal drug processing and, most importantly, where they establish drug selling points (‘bocas de fumo’). The control of these small areas is fiercely disputed by armed groups and networks, which leads to the use of heavy weapons to defend the territory and to high levels of lethal violence. Populations who live in these slums have to abide by the rules imposed by these groups that coercively dictate what is and is not allowed even in the most mundane spheres of daily life (ranging from curfews, to designating areas that may or may not be visited, the colour of clothes that may be worn, music that can be listened to, etc.). Disobedience is punishable by expulsion, aggression or death. As a result, legal rights granted to any citizen are notoriously absent in these contexts and so is the rule of law.

On the other hand, these groups enforce a clear and predictable social order and, as a result, they acquire a certain degree of local legitimacy. Residents even resort to the local leader of the armed group to mediate and rule over internal conflicts, including domestic and neighbour disputes. Furthermore, sexual crimes or crimes involving theft or destruction of property are rare, for savage punishment is meted out to those who dare commit such crimes. Also, these groups engage in community assistance activities (such as for example funding funerals, or medical treatment for those who cannot afford it) as a way to reinforce their popularity.

This violent domination takes place against a background of of economic ‘micro-segregation’, where very rich people live very close to very poor people in the hills above. Indeed, this is a sharp contrast to the typical geographical landscape of centre versus periphery that can be found in many cities.
The traditional state response has been part of the problem. Police have pursued a militarised strategy, i.e. the war on crime or the war on drugs, periodically invading slums with heavy gunfire regardless of the humanitarian consequences. Police officers in the state of Rio have acknowledged they have killed around one thousand people a year, on average, for the last few years, which implies a higher human toll than is apparent in some wars. Between 1995 and 1998, the state government paid a bonus to police officers who engaged in lethal shootouts against suspects. Human rights violations, such as torture and summary executions, have been often reported and the degree of trust in police among poor communities is very low. Corruption has frequently plagued the ranks of the police force and is also widespread in other branches of the state apparatus. Indeed, the police have acted in practice as one more actor disputing territorial control: their strategy was conceived not to protect those who lived in the slums, and suffered in the hands of criminal groups, but to fight ‘the enemy’ at all costs. As a result, state intervention has only served to fuel the vicious cycle of violence.

In short, those who live in the slums are subjected to authoritarian coercion, the degree of which can vary, from community to community, from a reign of terror to control exercised with a reasonable degree of local legitimacy. In fact, some of this legitimacy arises from the fact that, having always been exposed to and socialised in one or other kind of violent social control, people have come to believe that this is the only possible reality.

Armed groups, for their part, have tended to erode communal trust and social capital, leaving no room for independent political leaderships that can stand up for the interest of the community. This, in turn, feeds into economic deprivation.

The scenario in Rio the Janeiro includes many of the tragic features often observed in wars: high degrees of victimisation and lethal violence, use of heavy weaponry, displacement of populations and even some obstacles to providing medical assistance to victims. Yet this type of urban violence does not constitute a war for many reasons. A war is a temporary condition of armed struggle among two or more clearly defined parties, which are fighting for specific objectives. A war has to end with the victory of either side or with a peace agreement. Urban violence does not fulfil any of these criteria: there are no clear sides to the conflict since the ‘enemy’ is always recruiting from the population, the conflict is permanent and cannot be solved by any agreement or by military victory since the only objective is individual economic benefit.

In fact, the utilisation of a militaristic approach to deal with urban violence has only made matters worse. War has not only been a metaphor, accepted by many (the media, governments, broad sectors of society), but an inspiration for existing doctrines and strategies. For instance, the idea of a war is used to justify human rights violations, as if anything is permissible in an armed conflict, irrespective of the Geneva Conventions. Hence, victims of stray bullets have often been treated by government officials as collateral damage.
Alternative approaches started to emerge from the 1990s onwards. These included projects to try to socially integrate young people from deprived social backgrounds, undertaken both by the government and by non-governmental actors. Yet, likely though it is that achieving such integration would have prevented the present-day crisis situations from arising, once armed control is established, social projects of this nature will not be enough to undo it. Two decades of experience have confirmed this diagnosis.

Efforts to disarm the population and to control access to guns have been another strategy commonly employed to deal with urban violence in Rio, with positive though limited results.

In late 2008, the government started a new policing project called ‘Police Pacification Units’ (PPUs) whereby police officers are permanently stationed in the slums to try to stop gunfights and territorial control by criminal groups. The aim this time is to pacify the territories instead of winning the war. Police officers are newly recruited and receive one to two weeks of special training. This new paradigm, strengthened by the international visibility granted by the future celebration in Rio of the Football World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016, means that the police have been quite successful in their attempts to eliminate shootouts and territorial control by criminal groups, although many problems still plague the relationship between police and poor communities. Drug dealing goes on in the slums but with much lower degrees of violence, as is the case elsewhere.

Yet there are approximately 19 of these PPUs covering 40-50 slums, while Rio has hundreds of slums occupied by irregular armed groups. Areas benefiting from the deployment of these PPUs are typically middle- or upper-class, tourist neighbourhoods and those districts directly linked to the above-mentioned mega sporting events. Areas with the highest homicide rates, such as the suburbs (Baixada Fluminense) and the west of town have been left behind. The high cost of this initiative, basically because it involves a ratio of around 11.4 police officers per 1,000 inhabitants compared to the average of 2.3 for the state of Rio, makes it very unlikely that it will be expanded to the whole territory under the present model.

Although the local effect of the model is geographically limited, hopes lie in the chance of deriving a long-term systemic effect from it. Such transformation would be based on cultural and attitudinal changes, which are however slow by definition. Basically, the PPUs and the international visibility of Rio offer a unique opportunity to alter the landscape, reforming the police and inducing criminals to adopt less violent approaches. However, if all of this fails, there exists the risk of a dramatic return to past levels of violence after resources begin to dry up in 2017 after the Olympic Games.

The arrival in Rio of international humanitarian organisations used to protecting populations in war situations is undoubtedly a positive development, even if it might
have the detrimental side-effect of reinforcing people’s belief that urban violence is, after all, equivalent to war.

The space for humanitarian work will depend significantly on local conditions, identified on a case-by-case basis. As far as accidental victims of the shootouts between armed gangs or the police are concerned, humanitarian actors may be open to engage in this kind of intervention. However, when violence against the civil population is a deliberate and specific strategy to achieve territorial control, such as in the case of summary executions by all sides involved, the opportunities for humanitarian interventions will be much reduced.

Ms. Angela Gussing, Deputy Director of Operations, ICRC

ICRC perspectives based on experiences in various contexts

Responding to needs in urban environments affected by violence requires a careful analysis of the situation as well as of the specific problems that affect the population and communities, understanding their vulnerabilities and resilience capacities as well as the existing public and social services.

One of the important challenges is the choice and prioritisation of interventions, due to the wide range of needs and vulnerabilities present in urban environments. A positive feature of such environments is the existence of a wide range of service providers which can reach the communities affected, or can be easily accessible due to proximity.

Vulnerabilities found in such environments are a mix of the following factors:

- There are direct and indirect effects of violence
- There are both acute and chronic needs
- Physical and mental effects of the violence are both very present
- Different effects based on age and gender
- Interconnected and overlapping pressures on populations.

For the purpose of a concrete illustration in this roundtable, we decided to focus on the specific ICRC working experience in Rio de Janeiro, even though it is also involved in similar activities in other towns and cities affected by the same phenomena, for instance in Guatemala City, Jamaica, Johannesburg, Mexico or Honduras.

With the consent and support of the Brazilian authorities, in 2009 the ICRC launched a 5-year pilot project in Rio de Janeiro to work in some of its favelas. A number of target communities were identified, assessments were carried out and activities were defined for each of the intervention communities.
The overall approach of the ICRC pilot project is geared towards ‘protection and empowerment’ of the population and communities affected. It was decided that the main focus should be on: (i) safety and access to basic services; (ii) making schools safer; (iii) improving conditions of detention in prisons and improving the behaviour of weapons bearers.

The following activities were put in place in Rio de Janeiro:

- Community First Aid
- Health awareness
- Health activities for particular groups, including mental health
- Strengthening resilience (focus: teenage mothers)
- Improving detention conditions
- Dialogue with the military and civil police
- Dialogue with armed factions.

The main challenges are not very different from other operational environments:

- Access to and dialogue with all actors
- Security pressures and acceptance
- Relevance of response.

The ICRC approach to the Rio Pilot project (5 years)

- Sustained, regular and visible field presence in the areas of intervention
- The priority is facilitating access to services which exist or can be mobilised
- A communication strategy crafted to enable acceptance of activities and access to the people and communities affected
- Well-integrated and complementary assistance and protection activities
- Importance of ‘self-protection components’ for population and service providers
- Enhanced networking/dialogue – with all actors, at all levels
- ICRC seen to be active both in the favelas and in places of detention
- Work in partnership, and using a participatory approach, with the population and the local authorities, but also with the various health, social and education service providers (mainly state services, but also NGOs).

Main lessons learnt in various contexts, including Rio de Janeiro pilot project

- Entry strategy needs extensive preparation and sufficient time
- Support and willingness of authorities is key
- Activities have to be adapted to context and specific conditions
- All response activities need to be geared towards supporting the resilience of urban communities
  - Support rather than substitution
  - Approach – resilience rather than aid
Partnership is a prerequisite (states, NGOs, National Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement) in such environments. Dialogue with armed actors (police, groups) on main humanitarian concerns, based on concrete and contextualised realities. Ability to access all levels, from field actors to Ministries in the capitals. Working both in the communities and in places of detention often and enhances results.

**Reviewing what is the ‘ICRC added value’ in such environments**

- Ability (experience, competence and acceptance) to work both in the affected communities and in places of detention.
- Flexibility in approach due to the possibility to choose activities from a wide range of services and ‘compose’ relevant response – not only health, not only social, etc.
- Ability to access all strata of authorities and actors from ground to ministerial level (local level to global level).
- Credibility and trust towards the ICRC, composed of various elements, which may be slightly different depending on the country of operation. In some countries, ICRC activities and credibility are very well known, in others the ICRC’s services are very much in demand but in very specific areas (such as in relation to missing persons or detention).
- Capacity to partner with other organisations and service providers.
- Existence of a local Red Cross or Red Crescent Society, to partner with.
- It is interesting to note that armed groups and gangs have so far accepted that the ICRC has a sustained working dialogue with armed and security forces on various issues (training, protection). This is not always the case regarding other organisations, which seem to have more problems in this regard.
- The ICRC’s experience of working in ‘unsafe environments’ is very useful for various stakeholders (health, social and education service providers) and in high demand, because relevant for their everyday duties.

Ms. Myriam Merchán, Advisor for urban safety and governance issues, United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) office in Bogotá

Urbanisation and urban violence have proven to be intimately related: while crime and violence affect citizens’ quality of life, the resources of the city and its capacity to provide public goods and services, rapid urbanisation, and lower or stagnant levels of urban development, favour the development of crime and violence, informality and illegality. Urban disorder, exclusion and weak institutional responses promote local conflicts, different forms of violent behaviour and delinquency, and these also result in fewer urban development opportunities, hence creating a vicious cycle difficult to overcome.

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When urban violence occurs, this has important repercussions for the city’s functionality. It affects how people relate and adapt to their environment, forcing them to modify their behaviour. It also alters social dynamics in public spaces and defines how citizens relate to their institutions. An aggravating issue relates to weak institutional capacity. Local institutions find themselves constrained by limited capacities and instruments when endeavouring to respond to the complex needs posed by urban violence affecting democratic spaces and governability.

However, although urban inequalities and the urban divide can sometimes explain general criminal and violent tendencies, each particular urban settlement will present different trends and patterns of illegality, informality, violence and delinquency, depending on the pace of and response to urbanisation but also on specific institutional, cultural and social conditions. These types of conditions also determine the presence of organised crime and gangs or youth violence.

More precisely, the existence of informality and illegality creates ‘dysfunctional territories and communities that do not integrate to the legal and formal infrastructure of urban dynamics’. When territories do not count on legal or formal institutions to respond to their needs, illegal actors capture them and use them instrumentally: parallel orders, norms and institutions are introduced by illegal groups, bands and/or gangs. The control they exercise may ultimately contribute to consolidate their political standing within these communities, instead of empowering local leaders and grassroots organisations, thus undermining even more the local capacity to build social capital and maintain social cohesion.

This by no means implies that all territories are captured by gangs and organised crime or that they are always violent: armed violence and intimidation may or may not take place; illegal actors may or may not use violence; and illegal activities may or may not be supported by informal and/or illegal channels. Instead, other types of dynamics may take place. Criminal organisations may prefer to capture public institutions and urban spaces, and use legal and formal channels to achieve their goals; theft, muggings, harassment and violence against women, including domestic battering, rape, sexual abuse and exploitation, among other crimes common to captured territories may even be attributable to the normalisation of violence within the community rather than to the presence of organised crime or gangs; the highest levels of violence may even occur not when criminal organisations are established but mainly when territories are contested.

When this is understood and acknowledged, assertive and comprehensive measures can be designed and implemented. Medellin, a city in Colombia of approximately

43. Ibid.
2,220,000 inhabitants (2005 census), is a good example of this. After suffering from soaring levels of violence and delinquency, the city was able to reduce its rate of violent crime and redefine itself as a modern and dynamic city.

The homicide rate in the city of Medellin reached the incredible figure of 381 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1991, with many different forms of violence expressed simultaneously in the city (vigilante justice groups, gangs up to 600 in number, drug lords, contract killers, urban militias, violence against property, interpersonal violence, and interpersonal partner violence among others), yet by 2007, the homicide rate had dropped to 26 per 100,000 inhabitants.45

The implementation of preventive and control-oriented activities, but also the institution of urban policies addressing the social causes of violence led to a reduction in the levels of crime and violence. This eventually evolved into a comprehensive model of urban intervention (social urbanism) that involved areas such as urban renewal, socio-cultural programmes, the strengthening of security and justice agencies, and capacity-building initiatives. This, together with strategic interventions from the national government on urban safety, positively impacted on the results obtained. It was effectively shown that urban interventions, together with community empowerment, promoted social inclusion and peaceful coexistence and helped reduce the capacity of illegal actors to control and capture local communities.

This approach links safety concerns with the sustainable urban development agenda, to promote social cohesion and community resilience to crime and violence. The United Nations Programme for Human Settlements, UN-HABITAT, through its Safer Cities Programme has promoted this approach by strengthening the capacity of local authorities to address urban safety issues and promote crime prevention initiatives, building partnerships, supporting the development of clear frameworks for action, and working with local actors to plan and address community safety, violence against women and access to justice through a culture of prevention.

To address organised crime and gang violence, UN-HABITAT provides technical assistance to develop responses according to specific demands regarding urban safety that seek to reduce urban vulnerabilities. UN-HABITAT promotes a culture of prevention, empowerment and the governance of urban safety by encouraging adequate urban planning, the provision of secure environments, and coordination with the provincial and national responses to urban hazards. All of the above is developed within the framework of an articulate, comprehensive and multi-sectorial approach.

Within this framework for action, parameters for humanitarian response are proposed to clearly determine when and how this response should be put in place. The main issues are: (i) to understand the conditions described above when developing

responses and, (ii) to reinforce and support inclusive governance models that alter local power structures controlled by gang lords or criminal organisations which ultimately contribute to consolidate their political standing within these communities and aggravate their already precarious situation.

**Captain PM Leonardo Nogueira, Battalion Commander, Pacification Police Unit (UPP), Military Police of Rio de Janeiro**

First, I would like to express my gratitude to the organisers for having been invited to speak at such an important event. I believe it is essential to be aware of prevention and violence control initiatives and to exchange experiences in order to improve people’s welfare around the world.

Rio de Janeiro was Brazil’s capital until 1960 and went through many political, social and demographic changes. From 1964 to 1985 we had a military dictatorship – a political regime who directly influenced the Military Police. After the 1980s, figures showed a substantial increase in violence in the State of Rio de Janeiro. In order to fight against this wave of violence, the police had to intensify its efforts and improve its ways of working. The *favelas*, which already existed, were further expanding every year, bringing even more violence with their growth. In addition, due to large quantities of cocaine produced mainly in Andean America, the price of cocaine dropped, thereby increasing its market. This led to a higher demand and made the biggest dealers richer, providing them with the means to buy heavy weapons in order to defend their territories against other gangs and police operations. Those dominated territories faced a new reality as they were subjected to the power of the drug dealers as a result of poverty and abandonment. This parallel power, with its violent, arbitrary and tyrannical measures, led to ‘laws’ made by the drug dealers who imposed them on the *favelas* population. The disputes and feuds inside the drug market led to the establishment of three main gangs who divided the slums between themselves into areas where they could conduct their illegal activities. This process led to extremely violent conflicts, resulting in high losses for the local community and for society as a whole, and generating an environment of fear due to shootings and numerous deaths. Drug dealers began to use semi-automatic rifles and other types of large weapons to defend their territory. The main weapons used were rifles (AR-15; AK-47; FAL; HK –G3; M-16), submachine guns (HK MP 5; INA; MT-12, 9mm pistols, .40, .45), defensive grenades and even anti-aircraft machine guns.

This created a scenario of urban guerrilla warfare, most commonly described as urban conflicts between the police force and drug dealers. This dynamic created a war logic leading the police force to develop new tactics and improve their training due to these events, which usually occurred in contexts of acute violence. The number of deaths among the drug dealers in clashes with the police was considerably high.

46. Perez, op.cit. in note 42.
because of the constant conflict dynamics. This confrontation policy, as we call it, created a gap between the police and the population, especially the residents of the favelas. The public’s perception of the police was not positive. They were regarded for many years as corrupt and violent and were perceived as an enemy. This was caused by what we call a ‘facção’ subculture: a culture of violence triggered by pressure from the drug dealers, who defined themselves as the ‘owners’ of the slums where they lived.

The Police Pacification Unit (PPU) was created in order to bring the drug dealers’ territories back into legality. There had been previous attempts to introduce a permanent police presence in the favelas, but they did not prove to be effective. The PPU model has proved successful thanks to the community activities included in the police actions. In our view, the police needs to establish close links with the population and we should decide together about public security policies, in accordance with article 144 of the Brazilian Constitution: ‘Public security, the duty of the State and the right and responsibility of all is exercised to preserve public order and the safety of persons and property [...]’. Based on our Federal Constitution, therefore, we have the duty and the responsibility to talk about security. Respecting the local culture and its expressions are fundamental to a good relationship with the population. The first approach between the parties involved is usually awkward. The PPU, as a quite recent development, is still in an ongoing improvement phase. On the other hand, we see that the favelas population (who have now lived under the drug dealers’ command and influence for a long time) have lost the habit of obeying laws and observing rules, which is extremely important for community coexistence. The PPU’s objective is to preserve citizens’ rights without imposing restrictions. As an example, we can mention neighbours’ quarrels concerning high levels of noise requiring the PPU’s intervention to guarantee both people’s right to sleep and the right to listen to music in a way that will not bother the neighbourhood. Another common area where the PPU intervenes is domestic violence. The drug dealers used to decide upon the verdict in these situations but today the state, represented by the military police, attends to the allegations, usually made by women abused by their husbands. Helping sick and injured people are other common activities. For instance, due to the lack of ambulances, these persons are brought to the hospital in military police vehicles.

Drug dealing activities still take place but not in the same way as before. Nowadays drug dealers trade in small quantities, are unarmed and no longer dominate the territories. Usually, when they are arrested they are classified as drug users, which makes it difficult for the police to take action because those dealers will not be sent to prison. With the neighbourhoods being freed from armed groups, people can go inside favelas where the PPU is present without the fear they used to experience in the past. Nowadays, other state projects are being initiated, something that for many years did not happen because of the lack of security in these favelas.
In order to prevent violence and crime, the PPU’s implement strategic and proactive projects. Policemen are working on projects related to sports, music and community mobilisation, which are helping to create a positive image and restoring credibility to the police. Furthermore, these projects are increasing the flow of information to the police force, leading to an increased police presence at crime scenes and allowing for the increased identification of criminals. These projects are also providing the right conditions for more efficient police work with the direct apprehension of criminals who could threaten the physical integrity of the favelas’ populations or their belongings.

We are aware that the PPU’s are not the solution to all Rio de Janeiro’s public security problems, but they have been successful in freeing citizens in these communities who used to live under the power of the drug dealers and who now have their rights guaranteed by the state through the PPU’s work. Today the favelas’ population are free and able to stand up for their rights. Thanks to the PPU’s we have ended the war logic and become engaged in the promotion of peace.

Discussion

As the new model of the Pacification Police Unit (PPU) is evolving slowly (9 out of 10 policemen in Rio still belong to the old model) discussants were asked to debate on how the PPU policemen are perceived and how they themselves perceive this new model of the police force. As explained, the activities covered by the old and new model are quite different. While the first model includes the use of force (grenades, rifles, direct fights etc.), the second focuses on activities striving to promote peace and guarantee the rights of people.

One expert emphasised that according to academic research, 70 percent of policemen working in this new model would rather work in the old one; in his view this shows the prevailing low level of legitimacy of PPU work in the police force. Lack of financial incentives and tough working conditions feature among the various reasons that could explain that perception; the most important being that – as in most places in the world where there is community policing – it is looked upon as second-rate policing, with police performing tasks similar to those of social workers. From a police point of view, however, policemen who live and work in the favelas seem glad to work with the PPU’s. The discussants agreed that perceptions evolve slowly and that it will take time before this new model is overall seen as positive. Ultimately, a shift to this community policing model would evidently be in the best interest of the population.

Considering the assets of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the question of how the ICRC cooperates with the National Societies was raised. Most of the ICRC’s projects are carried out together with the National Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. The extent to which the ICRC works with them mainly
depends on their capacities, but although the degree of cooperation varies according to the countries/location, in any setting it is important for the ICRC to work with the National Society. Especially in acute situations, National Societies are the first ones to respond. However, being local and part of their environment can represent a handicap, and sometimes they may be afraid to intervene. The ICRC will always try to capitalise on its advantages of being a stranger to the context on the one hand, and of benefiting from the local knowledge of the National Societies on the other hand. This being said, partnerships are not exclusive to National Societies and it is very important to also partner with other existing forces serving the community, like health or education services.

In response to a question about what was the PPU’s perception of international humanitarian organisations providing aid and assistance in the favelas, it was underlined that in general their presence and work is very much recognised and appreciated. Indeed, organisations like the ICRC and Brazilian Red Cross are generally well integrated in the communities and have a good understanding of the situations on the ground and are thereby effective in bringing help to the population. Furthermore, as was explained in response to a question regarding the security of ICRC staff in these kinds of settings, the ICRC works in dangerous environments all around the world. It is hard to say if these kinds of settings are more or less dangerous, but in any case they are different as in cities events evolve very rapidly. These situations involve a different psychology, but they are not necessarily more difficult.

The PPUs and UN-HABITAT were asked to reflect on the work they are carrying out specifically targeting children. UN-HABITAT answered that it works with two types of population groups: youth at risk and gangs. Caution is called for when selecting projects as they can have counter-productive impacts. Some projects have proven ineffective, when for example financial support has been given to young people to steer them away from the clutches of gangs, but gang leaders eventually took control over and used the project to their advantage. It appears more effective to include young people in decision processes, for instance in determining the allocation of funds to specific activities. Not only do they feel empowered by such initiatives, giving them a sense of usefulness, but they prove to adults that young people can be leaders and not just actors of violence. From the PPUs’ perspective, it was said that it is important to work with children and to become a positive reference so that when they grow up they have a positive perception of the police.

Asked about the influence of politicians and political changes on these processes, the case of Colombia was cited as an example. It was noted that one aspect of success in Colombia was that local mayors have made commitments and showed political will in allocating resources and personnel to work on urban safety issues. As explained, in parts of the country where authorities are more reluctant to assume this role, the crime level appears to be higher. Another factor explaining the success encountered in Medellin and Bogotá is that national authorities have put in place both national
Roundtable II: Humanitarian challenges arising from urban violence in the context of uprisings: lessons from the Arab protests

Chaired by: Professor Amine Ait-Chaalal, Director of the Centre for the Study of International Crises and Conflicts (CECRI), Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL)

Mr. Alain Délétroz, Vice President, International Crisis Group Europe (ICG)

The issue of urban violence raises two fundamental questions: the legitimacy of the use of force and the state’s challenged monopoly of the legitimate user of force. In Latin America, historical armed groups and some gang leaders justify their recourse to force as a response to the inequity that societies in which the distribution of wealth is so unjust impose on the poor in a form of ‘structural violence’. In the wave of protests and uprisings that have swept the Arab world, the question of the legitimacy of the use of force has gone from the streets to the UN Security Council. What is the threshold beyond which a government largely seen as ‘legitimate’ suddenly turns into a pariah and is asked by the international community to step down? This threshold, as we have seen in Libya and now in Syria, can vary very much according to the analysis of the situation, and the interests prevailing and the behind-the-scenes horse trading going on in the Security Council. And for humanitarians it can have a direct impact on their access to the victims and the ability to carry out their duties.

The International Crisis Group sees the Arab revolutions through three different analytical prisms: (i) people against regimes, (ii) people against people, and (iii) regimes against regimes.

We first saw people rising up against political regimes. Most spectators could understand the key elements and dynamics of those movements, which played out in part on our television screens, and saw large parts of these societies demanding deep political reforms and the ousting of the ruling dictators.

What was less apparent, was the ‘people against people’ elements. Different more or less organised groups are fighting for their visibility and political power. On one side you can find the political party members of the old regime, and the security apparatus, but there is also a fight going on between liberals, the secular opposi-
tion in exile, the opposition in the country and the Islamists. This can also include clan violence as we have seen in southern Tunisia over jobs, or communitarian violence between perceived ethnicities, as we saw between Misrata and Tawergha in Libya. Tawergha is still largely a ghost town, whose population fled as the Misratans sought revenge after Gaddafi used the Tawerghans to try to crush the city of Misrata in a long urban battle that was in many ways the linchpin of the eight-month conflict in that country.

Finally, the Arab revolutions have also been a fight between regimes in a context of deep uncertainties on the region’s new strategic balance. Qatar, for instance, has taken up a prominent position in the Libyan conflict in favour of the insurgents while embracing the opposite position on the Bahrain conflict. Turkey is pushing strongly for Bashar al-Assad in Syria to step down while Iran has put all its weight into supporting Assad and his regime.

This situation as it is developing at present is quite challenging for all those involved in population protection and for humanitarian actors. The Arab revolutions throughout the region have presented a number of political similarities:

(a) more or less corrupt dictatorial regimes that siphon off the bulk of the wealth of their nation for the exclusive use of a rather small circle of people, often the ruler’s family and their club of cronies;
(b) the clan in power often tries to ensure that political succession does not jeopardise the ruling family’s assets by imposing one of the outgoing president’s sons as a successor (Syria, Egypt);
(c) the regime can rely on a state security apparatus that enforces respect for the ruling circle, through intimidation, arbitrary roundups and detentions;
(d) the secular opposition has been destroyed and pushed either underground or into exile;
(e) the strongest organised opposition forces have often been able to resist thanks to the protection of the mosque and have an important religious agenda in their programme.

For humanitarian workers involved in civil population protection, four questions can help guide their action before and during an urban uprising:

1. Is the ruler willing or reluctant to shoot at his own people? When the latter rather than the former scenario applies, then a political process can be opened up and the road to a peaceful transition becomes possible;
2. Are the different security agencies willing to resist and capable of resisting the order to shoot on demonstrators when asked to do so by the ruler? If they are, then the prospect for a peaceful transition remains again much more open, but the security apparatus of the state is quickly pushed to a position where it has to bring down the ruler (Tunisia, Egypt).
3. How long does it take for ‘peaceful demonstrators’, or at least part of them, to organise themselves into armed groups that will fight back? (There was violence and threats of violence in all 18 Arab revolutions)

4. How far and in what manner is the international community ready to respond?

When there is clear resistance to opening a political dialogue immediately, an extremely dangerous and violent situation with acute humanitarian repercussions ensues. The international community is then faced with several alternative responses: (i) conveying a clear message that those who fire at crowds of demonstrators will one day have to face justice, and then implement it (but this may not be very effective); (ii) taking sides with the revolutionaries (Libya) with the risk here being clearly of doing more harm than good; (iii) doing nothing and seeing how events unfold (Syria) but then running the risk of seeing the situations evolving quickly into an ugly civil war with the potential to draw in part of its neighbourhood.

For humanitarians, this is when the question of protection and access becomes key. It is for them essential to have already established a good network with the body of mid-level officers in the military of the country concerned. This is when it is crucial to engage in what the ICRC calls ‘humanitarian diplomacy’ by making extensive use of these channels to pass as many clear ‘quiet messages’ as possible, on their responsibilities as officers with regard to upholding international humanitarian law and the very constitution of their states and to remind them of the responsibilities they will have to face, once the dust settles and national or international courts start looking into their actions. Keeping the channels of communication open with them will be essential to maintain direct access to victims and to ensure full respect of the Red Cross/Red Crescent emblems in all situations of violence.

On the side of the demonstrators, the challenge has been much greater than for humanitarian actors for the very reasons mentioned above: the movements were, particularly at the beginning, not centralised, not very organised, relied a lot on the new social media etc, and had no real leaders with whom humanitarians could talk.

Humanitarian interventions in Libya and Tunisia and Egypt seem to have managed to fulfil their mission mandates rather well. The basic needs for displaced people, the wounded and prisoners were relatively well covered. But the international community has only begun to scratch the surface of the long-term needs like treating Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder or helping devastated communities rebuild themselves and renegotiate reconciliation and new modus operandi with their neighbours.

What are the lessons learnt from all these tragedies? Maybe only one: once a dictatorship is allowed to take root in a country, the costs of uprooting it are usually extremely high. Therefore the emergence of such dictatorships should be prevented as much as possible in the first place. Once a dictatorship is entrenched, the influence of the outside world can play a role, but it will always remain marginal. Fully-fledged military interventions like in Iraq or Libya can bring regimes down but leave behind...
deep scars that will make reconstruction extremely difficult. In the age of the internet, can a man or clan stay in power for over 40 years and still claim to be the best possible ruler(s) for their country?

Mr Johannes Luchner, Head of Unit, European Commission Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection (DG ECHO), European Neighbourhood, Middle East, Central and South-Western Asia Unit

One aspect that all the crisis situations of the Arab Spring have in common is that they started in urban centres. Fortunately, not all of them brought with them the violence we have witnessed in Libya, Syria and Yemen. Not all the crisis situations during the Arab uprisings can easily be classified as internal conflicts or as international conflicts although some of the countries which have been affected evolved rapidly from a state of civil disobedience and protest actions into a civil war or internal conflict, with often even a significant international component. In many countries, we were faced with situations which are categorised as what we call here today ‘violence in non-conflict situations’.

To claim that the international humanitarian community, including the European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) responded to these different cases following a pre-set rationale would be overstating the reality. We rather followed our intuition and our traditional assessment methods and line of thinking. However, after a year of turmoil in several Arab countries, with serious disturbances and acts of violence in several countries, we can probably better determine on which basis we decided to launch a humanitarian action or not. I will come back to this rationale later.

The first test in Tunisia

Our first test was in Tunisia, where a campaign of civil resistance, with a series of street demonstrations, took place in December 2010 and led to the ousting of longtime President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011. The protests constituted the most dramatic wave of social and political unrest in Tunisia in three decades and resulted in scores of deaths and injuries, most of which were the result of action by police and security forces against demonstrators. Clearly there was violence and there were humanitarian needs, albeit on a rather limited scale. However, the government and its security forces remained still in charge. Most of all, the government was still able to provide the necessary public services to the population and this included e.g. medical services and some degree of law and order. Of course, there was a thin line between this capacity of the government to maintain law and order and its resorting to disproportionate measures. Had the President postponed his departure, this situation could have evolved into a civil war. ECHO was present and closely followed the course of events; it conducted assessments but decided not to fund any humanitarian action.
Then we had Egypt

The Egyptian popular uprising began on 25 January 2011. The uprising was mainly a campaign of non-violent civil resistance, which featured a series of demonstrations, marches, acts of civil disobedience and labour strikes. Thousands of protesters from a variety of socio-economic and religious backgrounds demanded the overthrow of the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. Despite attempts to preserve the initial peaceful nature of the uprising, the revolution witnessed violent clashes between security forces and protesters, with hundreds of people killed and thousands injured. On 11 February, following weeks of determined popular protest and pressure, President Mubarak resigned from office. The situation calmed down and power was turned over to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Undeniably, there were humanitarian needs but again law and order was restored quite rapidly and throughout there remained a government in charge which genuinely tried to provide services to the population and was able to do so to a large extent. ECHO observed the situation sur place but did not launch any humanitarian funding.

Next was Libya

While the Libya crisis started off as acts of disobedience and peaceful demonstrations in Benghazi beginning on 15 February 2011, this very quickly led to a violent confrontation with security forces firing on the protesting crowd. The protests escalated rapidly into a rebellion that spread across the country, with the forces opposing Gaddafi establishing an interim governing body, the National Transitional Council. We entered therefore into another category of armed conflict, namely an ‘internal conflict’, which quickly developed international ramifications. There were many humanitarian needs, many of them in areas which were not accessible for the humanitarian community. The government of Libya was no longer in a position to provide services, including protection, and ECHO together with many other organisations started funding humanitarian action in the areas that were accessible.

As you know, except in very specific cases, ECHO only finances operations that its staff can actually monitor. In other words, access is a general precondition for humanitarian financing. The Libyan case illustrates that humanitarian aid for besieged cities is potentially far more difficult than in open country: Misrata, for instance, could be reached only by sea – and at intermittent intervals by road. While there was a sustained humanitarian response, there were short periods during which we could not be sure that we were reaching those in need. The risks involved in needs assessments were very high. In particular at the beginning of the siege, needs assessments was reduced to the general knowledge that a besieged population and trapped migrant workers would need basic humanitarian aid. We acted on that basis until access slowly but surely became more feasible.

The situation in Sirte at the end of the conflict was similar and it is thanks to the ICRC that intermittent access and evacuation of the wounded became possible.
As for areas held by regime forces, we tried to gain access whenever possible – for instance, we were able to dispatch experts to the Nafusa mountains on an intermittent basis, which provided us with valuable information about the humanitarian needs there and the best response. As for Tripoli, we tried but failed to gain access to the city before it fell to the rebel movement. Again, we did not hesitate to finance the activities of key partners there – in particular the ICRC, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Organisation for Migration (IOM). However, we would have preferred to have an ECHO presence established, but never received sufficient assurances to make that possible.

One corollary of war or conflict situations where populations are trapped in high-density urban environments is that they will often be accompanied by calls for ‘humanitarian corridors’. This is intuitively logical as a humanitarian corridor makes it possible to reach a large number of people in need concentrated in one place. The question in Libya was the same as in similar situations: while in theory a sensible idea, in practice ‘humanitarian corridors’ for an area the size of northern Libya, extending from the Tunisian border in the West to Brega in the East, pose a number of practical problems: where to prioritise?; how to secure them?; how to ensure that humanitarian action is not confused with a more politico-military agenda, etc.? If fighting in a city like Misrata continues inside the town and if shelling continues from outside, it becomes clear that a corridor cannot fully resolve the existing access problem.

Another lesson learnt from Libya is that humanitarian bases in neighbouring countries or inside the country can constitute a significant logistical precondition for the provision of meaningful humanitarian aid. Some aid reached Misrata initially directly from Europe, later from Benghazi.

Yemen

A second case study is Yemen: in this country the situation is extremely fragmented and evidently had already entered into a civil war phase in many parts of the country (e.g. in the North) prior to the Arab Spring. We have here a more classical situation of internal conflict with many dimensions where humanitarian aid is required not only for the conflict areas but for the whole population as most are directly or indirectly affected by the crisis.

The problems with humanitarian aid and humanitarian access in Yemen are so complex that it is impossible to summarise them comprehensively. One dilemma, for instance, is the concentration of IDPs in public buildings in cities, which are themselves potential targets of insurgents. A clear necessity, however, is a security information network that serves all partners at the same time and which is fed by all of them. Security analysis is hampered by the fact that the source of aggression is not always clearly attributable. The situation in Sana’a is different from that in Taiz or Saada, but it is clear that the logistics of any humanitarian operation will have to be able to
cope with the need for constant movement inside cities as well as with the possibility of being – at least temporarily – cut off.

**Syria**

Finally, the most difficult case could become the Syria uprising characterised by a concentration of violence in urban centres.

The Syrian uprising started with some public demonstrations first held on 26 January 2011, but which quickly expanded to mass protests in Daraa on 17 March. The situation rapidly developed into a full-scale nationwide revolt, with protesters demanding the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad and the overthrow of the regime. With the successful revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt in mind, Syrian protesters embarked on a sustained campaign of civil resistance aimed at ending nearly five decades of Ba’athist rule. Over the many months during which the crisis has been ongoing, the Syrian revolution has passed through many stages, has experienced ebbs and flows, and spread among new layers of the Syrian population. New political dimensions – (e.g. the creation of the Syrian National Council and the involvement of the League of Arab States) and new military dimensions (e.g. the defection of some Syrian military and the creation of the Free Syrian Army) further transformed the revolution into a complex, multi-faceted power struggle. The scenario that everyone fears and would like to avoid is looming now; namely that the civil protests will turn into a civil war. Some claim we are already at that stage today. Moreover, an international or regional dimension cannot be ruled out. While, in my opinion, we have not yet reached the phase of a full-scale civil war the questions that must be asked are clear: is the government still able to maintain law and order or ensure basic protection for its population? Is the government still capable or even willing to provide basic services such as medical assistance or food security? These questions are becoming critical in deciding whether or not a humanitarian intervention is needed.

Clearly the general level of vulnerability and the humanitarian needs of the population in and around the most affected areas are growing fast and require preventive action by building up the resilience and coping capacities of the population. Insecurity, denial of humanitarian access and lack of reliable and comprehensive information makes it hard to understand the conditions the Syrians are currently experiencing and even harder to assess the short- and mid-term impact on the socio-economic situation. Whatever the future holds, it is clear that a humanitarian intervention will be needed in urban centres with all the complications this entails.

*What can we deduct post factum from these cases on what the rationale was for ECHO to decide whether or not to launch a humanitarian action? What was the basis of our decision in each case?*

- First there is the evaluation of the humanitarian needs. The requirement of clearly identifiable needs is not new or typical for these types of situations
but always a decisive condition for ECHO to launch any humanitarian pro-
gramme. However, in besieged cities, this might not be possible except at the
most general level. In all cases, humanitarian needs were identified: although
in some countries these were rather minor, in others they are growing rapidly.

- Second, what is our response to the concept of humanitarian corridors? This is
  very likely to be a continuous demand in situations where large concentrations
  of population are concerned.

- Third, for us there is the assessment of whether or not ECHO has a compara-
tive advantage in getting involved in supporting essential services compared
to other service providers. Obviously, when the assessment of the situation
shows that the government is still able and willing to carry out its public serv-
ice function (even if not covering all the needs to a full extent), it is preferable
that ECHO limits itself to the observer role. However, if the government seems
to have lost control over the situation, if the government fails to provide ba-
sic services such as security and law and order for its population, or medical
services or social safety nets, and no other non-governmental entities such as
NGOs or CBOs or CSOs are able to step in, then ECHO will consider contrib-
uting to try to cover the gap. While the Commission/ECHO is often the first
donor on the ground and can temporarily fill coordination gaps, it is unlikely
to be able to do so in cities that are accessible only at tremendous risk to life
and limb of our staff.

- Fourth, when violence turns into a civil war or an internal conflict situation
  and the government becomes a party to the conflict, ECHO will probably de-
cide to launch a full humanitarian action where feasible and in the areas that
remain accessible. In such cases, the EU in general and the Commission in
particular will intensively advocate for humanitarian access.

**Questions arising from this post factum evaluation:**

- Which implementing partners are best placed to provide the essential services
  that the government can no longer provide (UN agencies, ICRC, CBOs, NGOs,
  CSOs)? Are the national authorities still a potential partner (e.g. should we still
  support a hospital run by the Ministry of Health)? This raises another ques-
tion: how to decide when national authorities are no longer capable of taking
  or willing to take their public service provider responsibility?

- Are there any specific groups of the population which would require special
  attention as they are particularly vulnerable in the setting of urban violence
  (e.g. in the Arab world, the millions of migrants or economic refugees will be
  among the first ones to face hardship when a socio-economic deterioration
  sets in)?

I hope that the discussion today will help us to find some answers to these questions.
Mr. Pascal Daudin, Head of Policy Unit, Division of Multilateral Organisations, Policy and Humanitarian Action, ICRC

As Timur Kuran wrote in an article published in 1995 in the American Journal of Sociology, there is an intrinsic incapacity to predict revolutions. Organisations and experts with privileged access to information often seem to fail in detecting strong undercurrents and are unable to foresee imminent political changes. This lesson holds also for humanitarian organisations who have probably invested in preparedness and in the ability to cope with future crises.

We can dispute the uniqueness of the Arab protests in terms of epitomising a radically new humanitarian working environment. Violence and warfare in urban settings have a long history but the particular features of the upheavals that shook the region in 2011 have nevertheless created numerous unusual humanitarian challenges.

Although the city did not play a central role as a specific violence generator or a specific combat environment in these contexts, its sociology brought new players onto the scene. Indeed, the specific forms of political struggle that emerged (at least at the beginning), largely led by urban elites, challenged classic modus operandi and known political rules. More precisely these events illustrated the paramount importance of humanitarian actors like the ICRC being accepted, known and deemed relevant, especially in those contexts where the organisation had no substantial operational experience.

The following document will seek to explore some of the humanitarian consequences of the Arab Spring uprisings, the actions undertaken by the ICRC to respond to these, as well as challenges and lessons learnt from this experience. Although specific to these contexts, they will serve to illustrate challenges appearing in future working environments in urban settings, as well as difficulties in responding to them.

Humanitarian impact

It would be fastidious to give a detailed account of the overall humanitarian impact engendered by the various occurrences of the Arab protests. The main issues the ICRC had to deal with may be summed up as follows: a significant number of casualties; mass arrests and violence against demonstrators; problems related to access to healthcare and first aid (shortage of medical supplies; intimidation and reprisals against patients and relatives; attacks against medical personnel); displacements and migration; difficulty in having access to basic services (disruption of water and electricity supply, the education system, mobility); food security.

During these various crises, the ICRC focused on four areas of action: (i) promoting international humanitarian law (IHL); (ii) assistance (health programmes, water and
habitats); (iii) protection (restoration of family links, detention-related activities); (iv) coordination and close collaboration with National Societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Operational lessons identified

It is far too premature to draw definitive lessons from the events that shook the Arab world in 2011. The patterns of violence and political struggle were not totally new but they represented significant difficulties for our organisation. Let me describe here some of the main aspects.

Pre-positioning, local anchoring and knowledge of dynamics

The ICRC’s efficiency is usually based on long-term presence in a given country or region, good knowledge of the social and political fabric, and on cultivating relationships of trust with all kinds of audiences from religious circles to informal groupings as long as they have an influence on the fate of the people the ICRC is committed to protect. This networking is less accepted by interlocutors in situations of peace, as having interactions with highly politicised entities may create confusion regarding the ICRC’s mandate and purposes. In other words, statutory activities with regard to promotion of IHL, and other relevant norms, are usually aimed at armed forces and police, and much less towards civil society. Access to civil society forces may prove difficult and politically very sensitive, but it will be crucial to encourage various parties and their leaders to respect the most basic humanitarian rules.

In some of the concerned countries, the ICRC had a long-time presence but its connections with the local civil society and emerging factions proved insufficient. Over the past few years, the ICRC has deployed considerable efforts to link up with academics, police and Islamic circles but local anchoring and knowledge of certain political dynamics remained nevertheless insufficient. The difficulty in accessing some groups and reaching new audiences (i.e. youth movements) that are usually below the radar represented a significant operational challenge. From a regional perspective, extensive dialogue with regional bodies such as the OIC and the Arab League demonstrated the importance of such strategic anchoring and shall be pursued with similar organisations in the future.

This issue of local anchoring will be even more complicated in the future because ‘networking and connectivity’ will determine the success of humanitarian endeavours and the security of the organisation’s staff. Indeed, we already know that working in complex and violent environments such as cities will depend on understanding and acceptance from a multitude of different groups, from state security agencies to criminal gangs, from improvised militia to private contractors.
Importance of local partnerships

While deploying humanitarian activities in complex political situations prevailing in various Arab countries, the ICRC has recognised the value of having efficient partners, especially within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, for extending its operational outreach. In contexts where the national society was unable to deliver or impeded from delivering humanitarian services, it proved difficult for the ICRC to reach out to the victims or relevant authorities or to set up appropriate programmes.

Challenged model

New technologies used during the Arab Spring challenged the ICRC’s information management model in different ways. First and foremost, the abundance of information made situational analysis difficult. The ICRC usually acts upon carefully cross-checked information gathered by its own staff. Secondly, the blurred boundaries between physical conflict and confrontation in the communication sphere rendered information extremely difficult to filter and thus made it difficult to provide the right tailored response. The ICRC delegations and Geneva headquarters were submerged by rumours, false information and unverifiable news reports spread by ‘networked and home-grown journalists’, as well as by counter-information operations, presumably organised by state agencies. Thirdly, social media which in many instances greatly influenced mainstream information outlets gradually imposed new communications rules. As a result, intervening in social media networks with balanced and non-partisan messages aimed at raising awareness of humanitarian issues was sometimes perceived as being less credible and relevant than available unverified statements or partisan views.

Conclusions

There is no indication that the uprisings in Arab cities we witnessed last year (which in some cases evolved to more classic confrontations) will replicate elsewhere but the laws of demography, statistics and geography are all converging towards cities as the arenas of political, economic, religious and ethnic rivalries. The dynamics of population growth, settlement patterns and uncontrolled migration may increase stress on conurbations subject to territorial disputes, communal confrontations, sectarian disputes or environmental scarcity. Our experience also tells us that urban environments are prone to trigger excessive use of force, various forms of abuses, and significant destruction of essential infrastructures.

Humanitarian actors will have the obligation to work in situations where multiple sources of violence and other forms of political struggle coexist and sometimes overlap. The good news is that cities appear to be remarkably resilient regardless of decaying infrastructure, social and environmental degradation, corruption, crime and
Joint Report

armed conflicts. Various forms of humanitarian interventions and strategies will be necessary to cope with these different situations and to respond efficiently to the needs of the affected communities, for instance by supporting the resilience of the social fabric. They will need a renewed capacity to get a concrete understanding of conflict dynamics, designing appropriate response, developing good community/actors outreach, as well as maintaining a systemic approach to the problems.

The humanitarian challenges experienced probably did not constitute a generic testing ground for future actions in urban settings, but illustrated some of the difficulties to come and provided a glimpse into future working environments. The perspective of working in urban environments will probably force aid organisations to significantly adapt the content of their programmes. The diverse and changing nature of the needs of urban populations and the challenges in delivering meaningful and relevant assistance in these contexts will represent a challenging task. Aid organisations will need to have a very good understanding of the factors and dynamics of violence in order to design meaningful responses. Organisations will have to be prepared to switch from emergency relief to more sophisticated service restoration depending on the nature of the needs. The complexity of urban environments with multiple factors generating a vast array of humanitarian problems will deserve a more systemic approach, better community outreach as well as a tailor-made response.

Discussion

Knowing that every crisis comes with opportunities, the speakers were invited to reflect on what in their opinion are the new prospects created by the Arab Spring. The uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East occurred at a historical moment when the EU was facing unprecedented institutional and financial challenges. Some argued that ‘Europe had shown its irrelevance in that part of the world situated at its direct borders.’ It was clear for some respondents that budgetary constraints would preclude Europeans and Americans from playing a central role even though they certainly tried to push, or help push, for the democratisation of these countries. What will be interesting, one speaker added, is to observe whether the new players, the democratic emerging countries, will prove that they are not only global players but democratic global players. Besides, such crises serve as reminders of the importance of preventive actions, notably through further proactive development measures.

The popular uprisings throughout the Arab world unfolded very differently from one place to another. In some instances the protesters were met with limited levels of repression and violence and governments were ousted relatively quickly, but in other places the uprisings led to other results. This was evidently the case in Libya where the situation grew from a context of rebellion into an open armed conflict.
In this regard, the UN Resolution 1973 on Libya was justified as a ‘humanitarian intervention’ to protect civilians, but many people and countries around the world think it was used to facilitate a regime change. This raised two main questions: how was the resolution based on humanitarian grounds going to affect the perception of humanitarian action? Would this experience lead to future attempts at the UN Security Council to obtain a similar resolution on other crises? It was argued that when committing one’s country to war, one should be very clear about the vocabulary and the risk of mixing and confusing humanitarian action with military interventions. It was further argued that from the moment great powers deploy their armies, it is not for humanitarian reasons. State interests are clearly at stake. The way some countries invoked humanitarian reasons to go to war may be criticised, without disputing the validity of the decision itself. It might therefore take a long time, and Syria is a good example, before some mutual ‘trust’ is re-established in the UNSC. Whether there will be replications of this type of resolution is difficult to say.

While not many would dispute that Resolution 1973 saved lives in the beginning, it is also certain that it created confusion on many levels, not least with regard to the perception of humanitarian action. Have humanitarian actors in recent years failed to protect the term ‘humanitarian’ and its definition? Looking at the crisis in Libya, from the UNSC resolution to the EU sanctions regime, it seems that at one point nearly everything became ‘humanitarian’. Even the suggestion of dropping weapons in certain areas was described as providing ‘humanitarian’ supplies, because they were serving to comply with the responsibility to protect the civilian population. This example illustrated the risk of a situation coming about where ‘humanitarian’ as a term becomes totally meaningless. Therefore, humanitarians probably need to claw back a lot of terrain from legal international experts and politicians.

Within the classical idea of urban violence, violence is protracted and creates long-term humanitarian needs and thus requires sustained interventions. With regard to the very specific nature of popular uprisings, the question was raised as to what would be the duration of humanitarian interventions in such settings. The duration of both popular uprisings and of the needs they possibly create will vary according to contexts. In some cases, violence will be protracted and generate long-lasting humanitarian needs. For instance, a regime change imposed against the wishes of the majority of the population can lead to subsequent renewed uprisings to destabilise the new power in place. In some countries this scenario has happened several times in a row. There is also a risk that the appropriation of a revolution by an alternative power is followed by frustrations and a new cycle of violence. Globally, there is a risk that popular uprisings may deteriorate into full-scale internal conflicts with long-term humanitarian needs.
IV. CLOSURE

Concluding remarks

Mr. François Bellon, ICRC Head of Delegation to the EU, NATO and the Kingdom of Belgium

Ladies and gentlemen,
Distinguished guests,

I am delighted to close what has been a very fruitful colloquium. I have been impressed by the quality of the presentations and by the qualitative participation of the public, and I thank all of you for having contributed to this event.

The aim of today’s colloquium has been to launch a reflection and open the debate on a complex, yet increasingly important, issue by bringing together experts from the European institutions and the humanitarian sector, as well as academics to discuss the humanitarian challenges in situations of violence occurring in urban settings.

Panel I

The morning session was devoted to setting the scene and addressing essential issues such as the definitions and current trends of urban violence, the actors involved and the legal frameworks in which they operate. The humanitarian consequences of urban violence and possible responses were discussed, as well as the EU approach towards urban violence.

As Kees Koonings underlined, urban violence is not just ‘urban crime that went out of control’. It has developed significantly over the past decade and is now widely present in non-conflict countries or regions that are considered at peace. Dr. Koonings shared disturbing figures illustrating how widespread and lethal this form of violence can be around the world.

From the start, we have been faced with the complexity of the subject. Cathy McIlwaine even spoke about ‘multiple complexity’ and underlined that just as there are many different types of urban violence – political, social, economic and institutional – the causes of such violence are multiple and interrelated, meaning that the subject needs to be understood from a holistic perspective. The huge diversity of actors was clearly underlined. The widespread fear and insecurity created by violence in urban settings was compared in scale to warfare.
We continued with **Stéphane Kolanowski**, who outlined the two possible legal frameworks in which urban violence can fit. As we have seen, general rules exist for peacetime and specific ones for situations of armed conflict. When responding to urban violence, the accurate classification/definition of a situation is therefore extremely important in order to apply the appropriate rules.

We have also tackled the many challenges urban violence represents for those humanitarian actors striving to understand and respond to crisis in urban settings. Using the example of MSF, **Elena Lucchi** explained the reasons why an organisation, usually working in armed conflict situations, is now engaging in responding to the consequences of urban violence. She highlighted both the operational and identity challenges raised, numerous issues related to this kind of operation being strongly debated within the organisation itself.

**Marion Haroff-Tavel** analysed the shift made by humanitarian organisations from their previous focus on rural areas to the current growing interest for humanitarian response in urban settings. Based on her experience and sound research, she suggested a number of issues to be explored, such as the appropriateness and efficacy of the *modus operandi* of humanitarian organisations, the difficult security challenges or the need to promote community-based support for humanitarian actions. She particularly highlighted the importance of giving fresh thought to the relationship between a humanitarian response and a development agenda.

While the EU is not addressing this pressing issue of urban violence in a strategic or coordinated way, neither within the EU nor globally, some dimensions of urban violence are covered in a piecemeal way by different EU programmes and policies. **Damien Helly** listed for instance conflict prevention, human rights and development cooperation as well as crisis management policies as indirectly addressing urban violence. He also referred to the European Security Strategy which mentions organised crime as a security threat. Dr. Helly went on to underline the rationale and opportunities for engaging the EU in that field, suggesting some ways to move ahead.

During the debate, many different questions were raised and discussed. Notably, it was highlighted that some important concepts still need to be clarified; and that the issue of prevention, such as finding ways to convince actors in contexts of urban violence to accept humanitarian action, is a major challenge.

### Panel II

Over the past number of years, there has been a continuous development of situations of violence in urban settings, which do not correspond to the criteria of armed conflicts but which create serious humanitarian problems.
Some of these situations were discussed this afternoon, which was dedicated to two specific case studies addressing different types of settings where urban violence can occur, namely (i) chronic violence linked to organised crime and (ii) violence stemming from popular uprisings.

Though their contexts, forms and consequences may vary, the general observation was that these types of violence can both generate large-scale humanitarian needs and represent humanitarian challenges.

**Roundtable I**

Vulnerabilities that result from organised crime and gang violence, and subsequent challenges for the ICRC’s operations (and those of other humanitarian actors) are numerous. Angela Gussing – through the pilot project in Rio – underlined the ICRC’s added value in such situations. The organisation has the ability to work in unsafe environments, to access all stratas of authorities and actors from ground to ministerial level, to partner with other organisations and to develop context-specific approaches. This ability is a precious asset to the ICRC.

Tackling the challenges related to urban crime prevention, Myriam Merchán insisted that ‘not all violence comes from organised crime and not all youth violence comes from gangs’. She presented the UN-HABITAT approach through its safer Cities Programme. The Medellin case was eloquent. In particular, in terms of humanitarian response, Mrs. Merchán insisted on the importance of: (i) defining clear parameters to determine when and how technical assistance is provided; (ii) accompanying local actors in their efforts to remove the structural causes related to crime and violence; (iii) progressively implementing norms for coexistence; and (iv) empowering. Finally, she underlined the importance of resources to implement effective solutions.

Through the example of Brazil, Dr. Ignacio Cano explained how the domination of certain small territories is disputed. While people expect order and social control, rule of law and state control can be absent. In Dr. Cano’s view, the arrival of humanitarian organisations has positive effects, but there is a danger that it might legitimate the situation as war. As for the state response, it can become part of the problem with human rights violations, corruption, etc. Alternative approaches exist, such as social approaches, disarmament and pacification projects.

In this precise context, Leonardo Nogueira, Captain at the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro, presented the objectives of the Police Pacification Unit, which notably strives to maintain a presence in the territory, reduce violence, prevent crimes and dismantle the subculture of gangs. In addition, integrated actions appear as positive references, helping – *inter alia* – to improve the police/community relationship.
**Roundtable II**

First, **Alain Délétroz** pointed out that the Arab uprisings all occurred as a response to a rather similar pattern of violent authoritarian regimes across the region. People first rose up against the regimes in the big cities. But then violence of people against people could also be observed and, finally, violence by regimes against regimes. The challenge for humanitarian workers is first of all to ensure, as far as possible, that police or military commanders refuse to shoot at unarmed demonstrators. Once this threshold is passed, the stage is set for a very dangerous and violent situation with serious humanitarian consequences.

**Johannes Luchner** recalled that during the Arab uprisings, DG ECHO followed its traditional assessment methods and line of thinking and that, after now a year of turmoil, it could probably better determine on which basis to launch or not launch a humanitarian action. While the requirement of clearly identifiable humanitarian needs remains a decisive condition, another crucial criterion is the assessment as to whether ECHO has a comparative advantage or not in getting involved in supporting essential services. Overall, when violence turns into a civil war or an internal conflict situation and the government becomes a party to the conflict, ECHO will probably decide to launch a full humanitarian action where feasible and in the areas that remain accessible. In such cases, the EU in general and the Commission in particular will intensively advocate for humanitarian access.

As **Pascal Daudin** explained, violence and warfare in urban settings have a long history but the particular features of the upheavals that shook the Maghreb and the Mashreq in 2011 have created numerous unusual humanitarian challenges. The specific forms of political struggle that emerged (at least at the beginning), largely led by urban elites, challenged classic *modus operandi*. They also illustrated how crucially important it is for humanitarian actors such as the ICRC to be accepted.

There are no indications that the uprisings in Arab cities we have witnessed last year (which in some cases are still continuing) will replicate elsewhere, but the laws of demography, statistics and geography are all converging towards cities as the places where political, economic, religious and ethnic rivalries are played out. Experience also shows that urban environments are prone to trigger excessive use of force, different forms of abuse and significant levels of destruction. Various forms of humanitarian intervention and strategies will be necessary to cope with these situations and respond efficiently and smartly to the needs of the affected communities.
**Conclusion**

One of the strategic objectives of the ICRC is to ‘shape the debate’ on matters related to the human costs of armed conflicts and other situations of violence, the future of humanitarian action, and other emerging issues.

I believe this colloquium has been an excellent forum to shape the debate and to launch a discussion on a topic that will undoubtedly become more and more important.

I am convinced we have all learned from each other’s experiences and that we can now draw on the discussions to better prepare future projects and thereby hopefully lay some foundations for effective assistance to the people made vulnerable by urban violence.

This has been an excellent opportunity for discussing and exchanging both experiences and ideas, with experts and professionals from different organisations and countries.

I would also like to take this opportunity to again pay tribute to the remarkable work carried out in the field by the Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies and all other local actors striving to alleviate human suffering.

Thank you.

**Closure**

**Mr. Damien Helly, Senior Research Fellow, EUISS**

At the end of this seminar, I think we can all agree that our debates have helped us to clarify the questions we have about the challenges posed by urban violence in various contexts, even if we have not yet managed to answer all pending questions. There are phases in addressing urban violence: crowd control, war on crime, pacification, socio-economic policies, and emergency humanitarian interventions. This requires the use of a constantly changing policy mix of humanitarian, security and socio-economic tools and approaches.

The choice of this topic was relevant in many respects for the ICRC and the EU. My understanding is that urban violence is a challenge for the ICRC because it is located in a grey area not covered by its mandate related to armed conflicts, but actually having strong humanitarian consequences. This, therefore, represents a challenge for the organisation, where it is called upon to tackle an acute phenomenon without its usual legal framework and its usual mandate. For the EU, urban violence is both an internal and external challenge, and will need to be addressed more explicitly in the future.
As has been acknowledged, urban violence is not a new phenomenon, but what has changed in the debate? We have learned that the forms of violence in cities have changed and require some kinds of adaptation by humanitarian actors and all professionals involved in urban settings. What is also new is what one speaker called ‘time space contraction’ when new media and ICT are now being used by the actors of urban violence, as demonstrated for example by the phenomenon of ‘digital uprisings’ or mobile phone usage.

Should our approach differ when in some cases government authorities exist formally but are not able to assume their responsibilities and in other cases there is a government able but not willing or not managing to address urban violence?

The definition of the phenomena we have discussed today still needs to be fine-tuned. Nonetheless there seems to be a broad consensus regarding the meaning of the terms ‘urban’ and ‘violence’ and they have not been radically challenged by alternative conceptual proposals to define what is at stake. This being said, we need to recognise that the dynamics analysed in Central, Latin and North America as well as in South Africa probably represent one type of urban violence that has to be distinguished from ‘governance-induced’ or ‘political crises-induced’ urban violence as lately witnessed in the Arab world. Another consensus that seemed to emerge among participants today is the awareness that there is a danger attached to the usage of ‘war narratives’ when actually the problem is about urban violence in its complexity.

Both case studies (to generalise in a simplistic way) raise the same methodological and practical challenges. What scale of analysis do we need to choose to understand these trends? Should we use countries’ statistics, or data collected at city or even micro-local level? The choice in methodology makes a huge difference in the narrative we construct about urban violence.

As for our practice in violent urban settings, there is some awareness that each of us relies on partners and on other stakeholders. This should be a starting point when considering the possibility of an intervention in violent urban contexts. The military need humanitarians, humanitarians need other humanitarians, community and civil society need international contacts, the media need all actors involved to report their experiences, the security apparatus needs international diplomacy, etc. We also recognised that urban settings will remain a serious challenge for access to humanitarian victims and all those intervening in these contexts are constantly reviewing the modalities of their action.

Old and new forms of urban violence will remain a challenge for existing legal frameworks. If violent urban events cannot be categorised as armed conflicts, they need to be addressed effectively, but there is a risk of a legal vacuum. What can be done to bind armed actors that are not parties to an armed conflict beyond human rights law obligations for states? Do we need some sort of legal framework which would
not permit derogation, which would apply to non-state actors, and which would be applicable at all times? Perhaps some more legal work should be done on national criminal laws in partnership with concerned states and local governments.

As for the EU, its policy makers need to examine where it can act along the continuum of urban violence, from prevention to post-crisis reconstruction and development aid. Is the EU well-equipped to deal with all kinds of urban non-state actors involved in violent contexts? To what extent could the EU’s experience and policies towards non-state actors be useful to address urban violence? More assessment and lesson learning are probably needed on that front. The judicial dimension, and in particular its detention component, has been addressed only briefly today and would perhaps deserve further research and policy work.

Urban violence is also an internal challenge for European states themselves. They are well aware of this fact. They also have acquired some experience in dealing with it, and perhaps they have something to share with the rest of the world. This is a good basis for potentially fruitful triangular cooperation between Europeans and other global players like Brazil, the US, China and Russia, together with third countries facing urban violence but which have not yet designed tailored policies and approaches.

The EU (at all levels, including at the level of cities) has a role to play in prevention of violence in urban settings. After all, combating organised crime (which is one aspect of urban violence among others) is acknowledged as one of the EU’s main security challenges as described in the European Security Strategy. But how can the EU address these challenges and be effective at community level knowing that its current procedures are often criticised for being too cumbersome? It seems there is a challenge there.

Urban violence will remain a ‘grey area’ and should be looked at in a dynamic perspective to focus on violent urban contexts potentially evolving towards an armed conflict and on violent urban environments in the aftermath of armed conflicts in cities. At the political level, several questions were raised by one of the speakers on the role of state leaders, security apparatuses and demonstrators and they should be kept in mind as a blueprint for future analysis of urban violence situations.

Finally, how can we take stock of experiences and use them in other contexts? This publication is a first step, but will certainly not be sufficient. More sustainable tools for knowledge sharing should be envisaged at European and global levels, perhaps on the model of existing European civil society networks.
ANNEXES

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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**François Bellon** is the Head of the ICRC Delegation to the European Union, NATO and the Kingdom of Belgium since August 2010. He joined the ICRC in 1984, and has occupied numerous positions within the ICRC. Prior to Brussels, he was the Head of ICRC Regional Delegation for the Russian Federation, the Head of Delegation in Israel, in Georgia, in Budapest and in the Federal Republic of Yougoslavia. He conducted several ICRC field missions in Azerbaijan, Moldova, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Iraq and Lebanon. He also served at the ICRC Headquarters at the Middle East and North Africa Desk as well as in the Legal Division. He holds a Master in Law from Lausanne University in Switzerland and completed a postgraduate course in conflict management and emergency response at the Complutense University in Madrid.

**Ignacio Cano** obtained his joint Ph.D in sociology and social psychology at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain) in 1991 with a thesis on social stereotyping that received a national award from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas of Spain. Since 1996 he has been based in Rio de Janeiro, carrying out research for NGOs and at several universities on topics related to violence, human rights, public security and education. He is currently a senior lecturer in research methodology at the Department of Social Sciences of the State University of Rio de Janeiro. Over the last 15 years he has published on different issues related to public security and human rights in Brazil and been a consultant and evaluator for various projects related to these areas in several countries in the region.

**Angel Carro Castrillo** is Head of the Mercosur Division at the European External Action Service (EEAS), in charge of relations with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela and the Mercosur regional organisation. He has been economic adviser at the EU Delegation in Tanzania and responsible for the Press Office at the
EU Representation in London. At DG Agriculture he first became Head of Unit for Enlargement and International Organisations and then Head of Unit for Rural Development and Structural Funds. In 2003, he was appointed Deputy Head of the EU Delegation in New York where he worked until 2007, dealing with EU-UN matters. He obtained his Ph.D in Economics at the Swiss Institute of Technology in Zurich in 1985 and a Master’s Degree in Public Management in 1990 at the Université Libre de Bruxelles.

**Pascal Daudin** is currently the Head of Policy Unit of ICRC. After a short career as a freelance journalist he joined the ICRC in 1986. During his sixteen-year term with the organisation he was deployed in major conflict situations such as Afghanistan, the Middle East region, Iraq, Iran, Central Asia, Caucasus and the Balkans. After leaving the ICRC in 2003, he worked as senior analyst and deputy head of a counter-terrorism division attached to the Swiss Ministry of Defence. He then served as global safety and security director for CARE International and senior corporate risk manager. Since 2011, he has again joined the ICRC and is now attached to the Division of Multilateral Organisations, Policy and Humanitarian Action. He holds a Master in International Relations and has obtained various diplomas in Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as well as Public Administration.

**Alain Délétroz** joined International Crisis Group in 2002 and launched Crisis Group’s advocacy activities in Brussels, Moscow and Brasilia. Since 2005 he has held the position of Vice-President (Europe) and concentrates on European policy and advocacy issues, closely focused on the EU, its member states and Russia. Before joining International Crisis Group, he worked for 12 years with NGOs in Latin America and the former Soviet Union: he was Director of the Open Society Institute in Tashkent, Delegate of the ICRC in Moscow, and worked on adult literacy and capacity-building projects in the Southern Andes of Peru. He holds a Master’s degree in the sociology of organisations from the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris, as well as degrees in cultural anthropology and Russian studies from Paris IV and V-Sorbonne and in the Quecha language from the Institut National des Langues Orientales.

**Álvaro de Vasconcelos** has been Director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies since May 2007. Prior to this, he headed the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (IEEI) in Lisbon, of which he is a co-founder, from 1981 to 2007 where he launched several networks including the Euro-Latin American Forum and EuroMeSCo. As well as being a regular columnist in the Portuguese and international press, he is author and co-editor of many books, articles and reports, notably in the areas of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Euro-Mediterranean relations and on the theme of world order, such as *Portugal: A European Story*, *La PESC: Ouvrir l’Europe au Monde*, *The European Union, Mercosul and the New World Order*, and *A European Strategy for the Mediterranean*. 
Angela Gussing joined the ICRC in November 1990. She was appointed to her current position of Deputy Director of Operations in charge of Global Affairs and Policy in 2008, after serving the institution in several positions both in the field (Somalia and Mozambique) and at its Headquarters in Geneva. In her current assignment, Ms. Gussing oversees the ICRC global networking efforts and leads projects concerning operational issues of a global nature. From 2006 to 2008, Ms. Gussing was the Head of Operations for Latin America and the Caribbean. Before that, she was the Head of Division for Cooperation and Coordination within the Movement. Between 1993 and 1997, Ms. Gussing worked as an independent organisational development consultant and conducted missions in various parts of the world. Ms. Gussing obtained her university degree as a Bachelor of Arts in 1983 from the Instituto Superior de Administração in Lisbon, Portugal.

Marion Harroff-Tavel has more than thirty years of humanitarian experience at the ICRC where she has held various positions: Deputy Head of the Division in charge of Policy and Relations with the Movement; Deputy Delegate General for Eastern Europe and Central Asia Operations; Head of the Division for the Promotion of International Humanitarian Law; Policy advisor to the Directorate and Deputy Director for the Department of International Law and Cooperation within the Movement. The results of her research and experience have been published in academic journals and books throughout her career. She completed her formal training at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva and at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Boston. Marion Harroff-Tavel is now a Consultant in Humanitarian Affairs.

Damien Helly is Senior Research Fellow at the EUISS where he deals with Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe-Africa relations, and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). He was previously Caucasus project director (2003-2004) and Haiti senior analyst (2006-2007) for the International Crisis Group. In 2005-2006, he opened and ran Saferworld’s EU and advocacy office in Brussels. He holds a Ph.D in political science from Sciences Po, Paris. Damien carries out field research in Sub-Saharan Africa on a regular basis and has written on EU policies in several countries and on European Union-African Union relations. He has also developed, as its deputy director, the Observatoire de l’Afrique, a network of European and African think tanks working on peace and security in Africa.

Stéphane Kolanowski holds a Law Degree and a Master in Laws (LL.M.) in Public International Law. He joined the ICRC Legal Division in Geneva in 1997. In 1999, he participated in the build-up of the ICRC Delegation to the EU and NATO, a Delegation in which he is still working today as the Senior Legal Adviser. He is responsible for following relevant legal developments in EU and NATO policies and operations and for promoting and disseminating international humanitarian law for several audiences. He has published articles on international humanitarian law and participated in several conferences and seminars. In 1999 he also initiated the cooperation with the College of Europe, leading to the organisation of the yearly Bruges Colloquium, a highly specialised event on international humanitarian law.
Kees Koonings is Professor of Brazilian Studies at CEDLA/University of Amsterdam and Associate professor of Latin American and Development Studies at Utrecht University. He teaches on the social and political development of Latin America and Brazil, urban exclusion and violence in Latin America, and conflict and conflict transformation. His research interests include poverty, exclusion and violence in Latin American cities, local urban governance, participation and citizenship, armed conflict and the politics of peace in Colombia, and the political economy of development in Brazil. His recent book publications include Armed Actors: Organized Violence and State Failure in Latin America (2004), Fractured Cities: Social Exclusion, Urban Violence & Contested Spaces in Latin America (2007) and Megacities: The Politics of Urban Exclusion and Violence in the Global South (2010). He has also done consultancy and advisory work for Dutch development co-operation organisations (government and NGOs) and international organisations such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) and UNESCO.

Elena Lucchi is Operational Advisor for Urban Settings for Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). She has worked for several years with the ICRC as a protection delegate and then as head of sub-delegation in Colombia, Rwanda and South Sudan. She has also worked as a Humanitarian Affairs Specialist with MSF designing and implementing advocacy strategies. She conducts research and develops policies on issues such as violence in urban settings; challenges to the principles of humanitarian action; children and violence; forced migration; and minimum protection standards. She recently completed an evaluation of MSF projects on displacement in open (urban and rural) settings. Additionally, Elena works as an independent consultant, undertaking a number of programmatic reviews and evaluations for networks for global health.

Johannes Luchner has been Head of Unit at the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) for the ‘European Neighbourhood, Middle East, Central and South-Western Asia’ unit since March 2010. He previously worked for the Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry, for the Cabinet of Neil Kinnock and for the Directorate General for Development. Prior to the European Commission Mr. Luchner worked as desk officer at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Austria in the UN Department. He has also been a teaching assistant and lecturer in international relations, political economy, and European integration at the Penn State University in the US. He holds a Ph.D in international relations with specialisation in international political economy and an MA in Political Science and History from the Universität Wien, Austria.

Cathy McIlwaine is Professor of Geography at Queen Mary, University of London. She has a background in research on development issues in the Global South in relation to gender, poverty, civil society and urban violence and insecurity and civil society. More recently she has been working on international migration in the UK in relation to low-paid migrant workers and Latin American migrants in London, which has also included some research on gender-based violence. She has published

**Myriam Merchán** is an Advisor to the UN on urban safety and governance issues. She is specialised in geography and urban safety. Over the past eight years, she has worked with the public sector as well in the field of international cooperation on citizen security issues. She also collaborated with the National Planning Office, the National Police and the Ministry of Interior of Colombia, as well as with the National Planning Office of Guatemala, developing guidelines on crime prevention, community policing and information management. During the last three years she has supported UN-HABITAT developing methodologies on citizen security, urban planning and urban safety in Colombia, Guatemala and Nairobi, and provided technical assistance to local and provincial authorities on urban safety, planning and the use of information, and gender and youth mainstreaming in public policing.

**Leonardo Nogueira** is Captain at the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro where he is the Commander of the Police Pacification Unit (PPU) in Morro da Mangueira. He is also professor at the Police Training Centre in Rio de Janeiro and has developed community outreach programmes through music, sport and community mobilisation. Captain Nogueira has worked in the Military Police for the past 11 years where he has also been Chief of Intelligence of the 35th Military Police Battalion. He participated in meetings on Public Safety, among them the Colombia-Brazil Police Congress in Bogota in 2010 and was a speaker at the 22nd International Conference on Harm Reduction in Beirut in 2011. Captain Nogueira graduated from the Academy of Military Police Dom João VI and has a degree in Geography from the State University of Rio de Janeiro.
### Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-Based Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPOL</td>
<td>European Police College</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management and Planning Directorate</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid &amp; Civil Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>ESPAS</td>
<td>European Strategy and Policy Analysis System</td>
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<td>EUISS</td>
<td>European Union Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>MoH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of Islamic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPU</td>
<td>Police Pacification Unit</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>STI</td>
<td>Sexually Transmitted Infection</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UN-HABITAT</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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This report derives from a colloquium on the theme of urban violence and humanitarian challenges organised jointly by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) that took place on 19 January 2012 in Brussels.

The present publication reflects the personal opinions of the experts who participated in the Joint EUISS-ICRC Colloquium. The views expressed in this publication do not reflect the positions of the EUISS and ICRC.