European Union Institute for Security Studies

European Union Global Strategy

TOWARDS AN EU GLOBAL STRATEGY

Background, process, references

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Towards an EU global strategy – Background, process, references

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Preface

The world has changed dramatically since Javier Solana, more than a decade ago, released the European Security Strategy. And we, the European Union, have changed as well. In light of this, at the beginning of my mandate I decided to engage in a process of strategic reflection on the EU's way ahead in the world. In the coming months, this process should culminate in an EU global strategy. The purpose of engaging in this process is threefold.

First, in the current configuration of crisis, chaos and competition, there is a temptation to be reactive and events-driven. How often do we see the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council change at the eleventh hour in response to an eleventh-hour crisis? Reacting to crises is essential. But reaction alone is insufficient. Unless our reaction is cast within a more organic framework, unless we foresee forms of engagement even after the eyes of the international media have turned away, we will be forever chasing one crisis after the next. We cannot let sensationalism dictate our agenda. We need a framework that allows us to combine swift action with patient negotiation; we need conflict prevention and post-crisis management. At the same time, in a world (and a Union) of finite resources, we need to prioritise those areas where we can, where we must, and where we want to make a difference. All this requires a *consistent EU global strategy*.

Second, the Treaty of Lisbon entrusted the Union with a powerful set of external action instruments. My task as HR/VP, in collaboration with the EEAS, is to bring these together in a coherent whole. A trademark of CSDP is the 'comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises'. But comprehensiveness should not be limited to crisis contexts. A joined-up approach should be the motto and watchword of our foreign policy across the board. It is in this spirit that we have established the Commissioners' Group of External Action, which I regularly convene. Outlining how the different instruments of our eternal action can be put to the service of a common set of goals is precisely the aim of a *comprehensive EU global strategy*.

Finally, the current context is marked by greater foreign policy engagement by a wide variety of actors. Indeed as the link between internal and external security tightens, and the world becomes more connected, more people are beginning to care about what happens beyond their borders. Greater interest and engagement by a wide array of actors should be viewed by those like us, with a stake and an interest in foreign policy, as a valuable

asset. We have an opportunity to forge a stronger and more effective EU foreign policy bolstered by the full weight of 28 member states engaged at the highest level. We have the opportunity of soliciting greater interest in foreign policy from the European public. But this opportunity can only be realised if this extra dose of energy and interest can be made to work in synergy. That is why I believe that member states and the wider foreign policy community are an essential ingredient of this process of strategic reflection. That is why I am convinced that the process of reflection by a wide range of actors is as important as the end product of the exercise itself. The strategy is not a theoretical paper destined to collect dust on people's desks. It has to be a living document consciously guiding our action. And this can only happen if, at the end of this process, we succeed in elaborating a genuinely *common EU global strategy*. And the key is precisely the word *common*.

It is with this conviction that I have launched a broad consultation on the EU global strategy, one in which we seek to involve EU institutions, member states, the foreign policy community and the wider public. We do not want to simply receive input; we want to shape together our common vision on our common European role in the world.

I look forward to engaging with all of you in the months ahead.

Federica Mogherini
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Brussels, September 2015

Introduction

Now that the EU is back into 'strategic' mode, with a view to producing a 'global strategy on foreign and security policy' by June 2016, it may be worthwhile to take a step back and look at the record so far.

Typically, the most effective 'strategies' devised and implemented by the European Community/Union over the past few decades were rarely labelled as such – be it the drive to the single market and monetary union, the implementation of Schengen or the 'big bang' enlargement of 2004. In fact, the expansion of the EC/EU has been driven by a short and simple article in the Rome Treaty; the single market was spearheaded by a sort of 'Green Paper' (the Cecchini Report) and pushed through by judicial action; and Schengen is a quintessential case of spill-over, both geographic and functional.

The open call for a 'strategy', when it is made, often highlights the need for a review of political objectives in the light of new developments, or just for a clearer sense of direction and a convincing 'narrative' as an antidote to purely reactive policymaking and simply muddling through. Perhaps tellingly, this has happened quite often in the domain of EU foreign and security policy.

The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty even introduced 'common strategies' among the foreign policy instruments at the disposal of the Union. These were mean to have a regional focus and to be public documents agreed upon unanimously — while allowing for qualified majority voting when adopting specific 'joint actions' and 'common positions' stemming from them. As soon as the new treaty entered into force, in May 1999, three 'common strategies' were swiftly released: on Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean – while a fourth one, on the Western Balkans, was implicitly dropped following also the simultaneous launch of the Stability Pact for the Balkans. None of these, incidentally, generated any 'joint action'.

Shortly afterwards, the newly appointed High Representative (HR) for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, delivered a critical evaluation report on the 'common strategies' [published in ISS *Occasional Paper* no. 27/2001][1] in which he argued *inter alia* that:

1. Antonio Missiroli et al, ' Coherence for security policy: debates – cases – assessments', *Occasional Paper* no. 27, ISS, Paris, May 2001.

(a) the three documents brought no added value because they referred to areas where common EU policies were already well established, thus amounting to little more than inventories of existing activities;

(b) lacking any guidelines, procedures were improvised and ended up in lengthy negotiations in Council working groups which led, in turn, to a 'Christmas tree' approach based on the lowest common denominator among the stakeholders, with no clear priorities;

(c) the decision to make the 'strategies' public turned them into classical declaratory texts, well-suited for public diplomacy but less useful as internal working tools balancing pros and cons, evaluating EU interests and goals, and identifying areas of disagreement with partners.

It is against this background that the European Security Strategy (ESS) was first conceived, then drafted, and finally agreed – thus opening a new chapter in the EU book. It is still a moot point whether the 2003 ESS was truly a 'strategy' in its own right or rather a general doctrine, a combination between a fresh appraisal of the new security environment and a broad set of policy guidelines and recommendations. Ever since, however, no comparable equally comprehensive exercise has been carried out at EU level, despite the dramatic changes that both Europe itself and the wider world have gone through in recent years.

This volume starts notably from there and explores both the context and the process leading up to the European Security Strategy (or Strategies, considering the two successive versions of June and December 2003). It then dwells upon the 2008 report on the implementation of the ESS and, finally, briefly illustrates the basis on which the current HR released her report on the 'changing global environment' in June 2015 and is now preparing for the new strategy, due out next year.

Along with the relevant EU documents, this volume also presents the two texts that are most likely to represent a key point of reference for the forthcoming 'global strategy', namely NATO's current Strategic Concept, dating back to 2010, and the latest US National Security Strategy, released earlier this year by the Obama administration.

The expectation is that this Reader will help all those interested and involved in the ongoing 'strategic review' better understand the nature, the scope, the potential benefits as well as the intrinsic limitations of such exercises.

Antonio Missiroli

Paris, September 2015

Documents

ESS 2003

The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) was the first document of its kind ever drafted and agreed by the European Union. The background to its elaboration was notably the political clash – both across the Atlantic (including in NATO) and among the EU member states – over the war in Iraq launched by US President George W. Bush in the spring of 2003. Those divisions were on display in international fora (including the UN Security Council) and media as well as inside virtually every Western country, and raised a number of fundamental issues about the best way(s) to deal with threats that had become dramatically apparent with the terrorist attacks of 9/11, prompting Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan. The US National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the Bush administration in September 2002 highlighted that 'America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach', and then included the possibility for Washington to 'act alone, if necessary', and to do so 'pre-emptively'. The case for military action against Saddam Hussein which was presented through this prism immediately proved divisive and, at any rate, required a conceptual response from the European allies.

The process

The idea of producing a 'European strategy concept' was first put forward by the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer at an informal Council meeting ('Gymnich', in EU jargon) held on the small Greek island of Kastellòrizo right at the end of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, in early May 2003. In a few weeks, a small team around Javier Solana - the first EU High Representative (HR) for the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), who also was Secretary-General (SG) of the Council – put together a first report 'on the Security Strategy of the EU', titled 'A secure Europe in a better world', which was submitted to and welcomed at the ensuing European Council meeting, held in Thessaloniki on 20 June 2003. The report, actually, was welcomed but not formally endorsed: in fact, the summit tasked Solana to 'bring this work forward, to further examine our security challenges [...] with a view to submitting an EU Security Strategy [...] to be adopted by the European Council in December. This strategy should also encapsulate Member States' interests and citizens' priorities and constitute a living document subject to public debate and to review as necessary'.

Consequently, a swift process of consultation and outreach – based on the initial report – was set in motion. While involving all the relevant stakeholders, however, it was never carried out through formal negotiations on the text either in the working groups or in the COREPER, although the Political and Security Committee (PSC) held a couple of dedicated meetings. The 'pen' was kept firmly in the hands of Solana's own cabinet, the Policy Unit led by Christoph Heusgen, and the Director-General for Security and Defence Policy in the Council General Secretariat, Robert Cooper. The 25 member states – the ten acceding members were already fully associated to CFSP matters, although they would formally join the Union only in May 2004 – were also asked to submit short written 'contributions' on the first report which were collected by the Council's General Secretariat. Interestingly, not all countries did so, and the various papers differed markedly in scope and depth. Yet, on the whole, member states showed a considerable degree of self-restraint and allowed Solana to operate without much interference.

In parallel to that, the EUISS organised a series of expert seminars on the three main sections of the document – respectively in Rome (September), Paris and Stockholm (October), in partnership with national institutes – that further nourished the final drafting of the ESS, which was eventually submitted to and indeed 'adopted' by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003. The summit, which also adopted the first EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), went even as far as to ask Solana 'to present, as appropriate, concrete proposals for the implementation of the ESS'. In the end, however, the HR would prefer to keep the ESS as a general 'doctrine' and resist calls to translate it immediately into a series of detailed action plans.

The text(s) and the context

Both reports – the initial text from June and the final version from December – included a general introduction; an analysis of the new security environment, its broad challenges and specific threats; an articulation of common objectives for the EU to pursue; and a set of general recommendations on how to address the former and achieve the latter. Yet a closer comparison of the two texts also highlights how the text evolved during the second semester of 2003, in part as a result of the consultation process itself and in part as a consequence of developments in the wider world. Some member states, for instance, emphasised the importance of not forgetting or neglecting – under the overwhelming impact of the 'new' threats – older sources of conflict at regional level, especially in South-East Europe and the Middle East; and some experts suggested that it might be useful to differentiate more clearly between 'failed states' and 'organised

crime' as sources of insecurity and instability while highlighting the possible disruptive consequences that might result from their combination.

All this led to the identification of five 'key' threats and to a stronger emphasis on 'effective multilateralism' as a response to the US temptation to 'act alone' and unilaterally as well as to the difficulty of working through multilateral bodies. Interestingly, Russia was also more clearly earmarked as a key 'strategic partner' – distinctly from Japan, China, Canada and India – and mentioned right after the United States, while WMD evolved from 'the single most important threat' to 'potentially the greatest threat to our security'. Finally, in what is arguably the most significant linguistic shift between the two texts, the originally called-for '*pre-emptive* engagement' – perhaps too reminiscent of the 2002 NSS at a time when the situation on the ground in Iraq had started deteriorating – eventually became '*preventive* engagement'.

It is worth mentioning, however, that these were also the months when the so-called 'Big Three' (France, Germany and the UK) worked most closely together – after the bitter divisions of the first four months of the year – to mend fences both inside Europe and across the Atlantic, trying to find a balance between American priorities and European approaches and to provide a common EU vision that would be acceptable also to the US. This attitude was reflected *inter alia* in the joint initiative taken by Foreign Ministers Dominique de Villepin, Joschka Fischer and Jack Straw *vis-à-vis* Tehran when the first news of Iran's secret nuclear programme emerged – an initiative that was also welcomed by Washington and later evolved into the EU3+3 (or P5+1) format for negotiations, notably coordinated by the HR. With regard to the ESS, this context came to represent both a driver and an outcome for the entire process.

In the end, the ESS was hailed as an unqualified success in that it helped bridge the political divisions created by Iraq (although Washington did not hide a slight preference for the first draft) and energise the still fledgling European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Its general approach and language – starting with the opening sentence – is now seen, in retrospect, as representative of a particularly dynamic period that included also the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – the term 'neighbourhood' indeed found its way into the ESS – the accession of ten new members and the approval of the draft Constitutional Treaty by the Convention on the Future of Europe.

In the following section the June 2003 and December 2003 versions of the European Security Strategy are presented side-by-side to facilitate comparison of the two texts.

‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’

Report by Javier Solana,
EU High Representative for the CFSP
On the Security Strategy of the EU

Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003

INTRODUCTION

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and cooperating through common institutions. Over this period, authoritarian regimes have changed into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.

The United States has played a critical role in this success through its support for European integration and its security commitment to Europe through NATO.

The end of the Cold War has not brought to an end the security threats and challenges for European countries. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent.

Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states. In this period, European forces have been deployed abroad more often than in any previous decade, including to places as distant as Afghanistan, Congo or East Timor.

‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’

European Security Strategy of the EU

Brussels, 12 December 2003

INTRODUCTION

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.

The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.

The conclusion of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor; no other country or group of countries comes close to its capability. Nevertheless, no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems entirely on its own.

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), the European Union is, like it or not, a global actor; it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security.

I. NEW THREATS IN A NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The new environment

The post-Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders. Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought growing freedom and prosperity to many people. These developments have increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. In spite of these encouraging trends, many problems remain unresolved and some have got worse.

Regional conflicts continue to foster instability, disrupt economic activity and reduce opportunities for the people concerned. Problems such as those in Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East.

Almost 3 billion people, half the world's population, live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 million continue to die every year out of hunger and malnutrition. Sub-Sahara Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, the failure of economic growth has been linked to political problems and violent conflict. In some parts of the world, notably sub-Saharan Africa, a cycle of insecurity has come into being. Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians. Over 18 million people worldwide have left their homes or their countries as a result of conflict.

Three great global infectious diseases – Aids, Tuberculosis, Malaria – killed over 6 million people in 2002, the vast majority of them in Africa.

Bad governance is often at the heart of these problems. Corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability corrode states from within and contribute to regional insecurity. Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not

Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent. Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, and most of the victims have been civilians.

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. In the last decade European forces have been deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC. The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.

I. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND KEY THREATS

Global Challenges

The post- Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.

Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians. Over 18 million people world-wide have left their homes as a result of conflict.

In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion people, half the world's population, live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 million die every year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict.

only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions risk becoming caught in a downward spiral of conflict, insecurity and poverty.

Although not a threat in the normal strategic sense, the rise in temperatures predicted by most scientists for the next decades is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in a number of regions of the world.

Energy dependence is also a concern. Europe is the world's largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will be 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.

New threats

Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable. In particular, Europe faces three key threats.

Terrorism:

International terrorism is a strategic threat. It puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it threatens the openness and tolerance of our societies. The new terrorism is different from the organizations with which we are familiar. Not only is it international, connected by electronic networks, and well resourced, it also lacks the constraints of traditional terrorist organisations. These usually wish to win political support and therefore exercise some self-restraint; ultimately they may be ready to abandon violence for negotiation. The new terrorist movements seem willing to use unlimited violence and cause massive casualties. For this reason, the idea of obtaining weapons of mass destruction is attractive to them as it is not for traditional terrorist organisations.

Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorists. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Al Qaeda has named European countries as potential targets. Major attacks on our territory have been planned but thankfully thwarted.

The most recent wave of terrorism is linked to violent religious fundamentalism. This arises out of complex causes including the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.

Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.

Competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.

Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world's largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.

Key Threats

Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.

Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.

Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is the single most important threat to peace and security among nations. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. The spread of missile technology adds a further element of instability and will put Europe at increasing risk.

The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. The more proliferation continues, the greater this risk will become. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for states and armies. In such cases, deterrence would fail. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the next years; attacks through chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility.

The last use of WMD was by the Aum terrorist sect in the Tokyo underground in 1995, using sarin gas. 12 people were killed and several thousand injured. Two years earlier, Aum had sprayed anthrax spores on a Tokyo street but killed only birds and animals.

Failed States and Organised Crime: In many parts of the world bad governance, civil conflict, and the easy availability of small arms have led to a weakening of state and social structures. In some cases, this has brought about something close to the collapse of state institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan are the best-known recent examples. The weakness of the state is often exploited (and sometimes caused) by criminal elements. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries; in Afghanistan, drug revenues kept the Taliban and several private armies in power. As states fail, organised crime takes over. Criminal activities in such states affect European security. Major illicit flows of drugs and migrants reach Europe through the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction and the failure of state systems – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.

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Regional Conflicts: Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.

State Failure: Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.

Organised Crime: Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism.

Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime can come to dominate the state. 90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan – where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade world wide. A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy.

II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

This new world offers both a brighter prospect than mankind has ever known and at the same time a more terrifying future. Which of these comes about will depend partly on our actions. This paper proposes three strategic objectives for the European Union. First, we can make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in our immediate neighbourhood. Second, more widely, we need to build an international order based on effective multilateralism. Finally, we must tackle the threats, new and old.

Extending the Zone of Security around Europe

Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.

The reunification of Europe and the integration of acceding states will increase our security but they also bring Europe closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.

The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans where the European Union, with NATO and other partners, is committed to achieving stability, good governance, and the closest possible integration of the region into Europe. This effort will have to be sustained for some years to come.

Following the failures of the nineties, the European Union, over the past years, has considerably strengthened its engagement in the still fragile Western Balkans. It has helped to stabilise the situation in Southern Serbia and FYROM and facilitated the constitutional arrangements between Serbia and Montenegro. The European Union took over the police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the United Nations and the military operation in FYROM from NATO. With the Stabilisation and Association process the European Union has created an effective framework for reforms and for progress towards Europe.

It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our future neighbours in the East. Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus – while resolving political problems there. We should take a stronger interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.

Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.

II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

We live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than we have known. The future will depend partly on our actions. We need both to think globally and to act locally. To defend its security and to promote its values, the EU has three strategic objectives:

Addressing the Threats

The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats.

- It has responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S.A. The EU continues to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its defences.

- It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The Union has just agreed a further programme of action which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement. The EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions.

- The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU.

In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe.

Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing successfully with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union has been involved in this question for more than twenty years. It remains an essential interest, which is now being taken forward through the Quartet.

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process.

Strengthening the international order

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order should be our objective.

It is welcome that since the end of the Cold War, key institutions in the international system, e.g. the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions, have extended their membership. China has joined the WTO and Russia has applied. It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of such bodies while maintaining their high standards.

One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship.

Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union are important partners.

The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, must be a European priority. If we want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security we should be ready to act when their rules are broken.

Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world-wide: their activities in central or southeast Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. Meanwhile, global communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world.

Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.

Building Security in our Neighbourhood

Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.

The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.

The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region

It is a condition of a rule-based international order that laws evolve in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest in further developing existing institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the International Criminal Court.

The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.

Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world's largest provider of official assistance, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals. Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures should be an important element in a European Union security strategy. A world which is seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens. Pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future.

A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms of domestic governance or of international behaviour. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.

Countering the Threats

The European Union has been active in tackling the threats presented by terrorism, proliferation and failed states/organised crime.

- It responded to 11 September with a package that included the creation of a European Arrest Warrant, measures to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S.A.
- It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The Union has just agreed a further programme of action which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic and Energy Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement.

is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict. The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there. The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform.

It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.

Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solution - which Europe has long supported - is now widely accepted. Implementing it will require a united and cooperative effort by the European Union, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves.

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.

An international order based on effective multilateralism

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.

We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.

We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.

- The European Union and Member States have intervened to help failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, East Timor and in Africa (most recently in Congo).

It is worth underlining certain common points in these threats and in the way they need to be tackled.

The threats of the new era are often distant. In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe. Terrorists are now able to operate worldwide: their activities in central or Southeast Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. Meanwhile, global communication means that the humanitarian tragedies in failed states anywhere in the world can cause acute concern in European opinion.

Our traditional concept of self-defence. up to and including the Cold War. was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats the first line of defence will often be abroad.

The new threats are dynamic. Left alone, they will become more dangerous. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous (we should have tackled Al Qaeda much earlier). State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected. as we have seen in West Africa.

This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, political, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian to tackle the immediate crisis. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well-equipped to respond to such multi- faceted situations.

Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions, have extended their membership. China has joined the WTO and Russia is negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of such bodies while maintaining their high standards.

One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship.

Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world.

It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest in further developing existing institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the International Criminal Court. Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. Such instruments can also make an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond.

The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.

Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world's largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals.

Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens.

A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.

III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE

The European Union has made progress in developing a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management in the last few years. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans (and now more widely). But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable.

More Active in pursuing all our strategic objectives. In particular, more active policies are needed to counter the new, dynamic threats. As a Union of 25 members, spending a total of 160 billion Euros on defence, we should, if required, be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention. We should think particularly of operations involving both military and civilian capabilities. This is an area where we could add particular value. A European Union, which is more active, will be one which carries greater political weight in all situations, even where military or civilian intervention is not contemplated.

More Coherent. The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale. The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments such as the European Development Fund. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development. Our objective should be to create synergy through a more coherent and comprehensive approach.

Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.

Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states. The Union's external assistance amounts to some 7 billion Euros a year; member states spend about ten times that amount.

More Capable. A more capable Europe is within our grasp**,** though it will take time to realise our full potential. We need to look in particular at the following:

- More resources for defence. If we are serious about new threats and about creating more flexible mobile forces we need to increase defence resources.

III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE

The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.

More active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.

As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.

The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations.

We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight.

More Capable. A more capable Europe is within our grasp**,** though it will take time to realise our full potential. Actions underway – notably the establishment of a defence agency – take us in the right direction.

To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary.

Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities.

In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations.

- There is much duplication of defence assets across the European Union. Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities.

- Greater capacity to bring civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations. In particular we should look at stronger arrangements for civilian planning and mission support. In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos.

- Stronger diplomatic capability. This is as important as civilian and military capacity, if we are to make the best political use of other resources. The threats we have to deal with are more distant and more foreign than during the Cold War. Greater understanding of foreign countries is needed. We have more than 45.000 diplomats. Here also pooling would increase capability. We need to develop a system that combines the resources of Member States with those available in EU institutions.

- Improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and partners: a common threat assessment is the best basis for common action.

- As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. In addition to the Petersberg tasks this might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building.

Working with partners. There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with other key actors or regions.

Among the latter, the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. If we build up capabilities and increase coherence, we will be a more credible actor and a more influential partner.

We should continue to strengthen our ability to work with other key actors. The European Union has relationships throughout the world, but in the next years we should focus particularly on developing strategic partnerships with Russia, Japan, China, Canada and India. These partners play an increasingly important role in their respective regions

Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of Member States with those of EU institutions. Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication.

Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners.

As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building.

The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century.

More Coherent. The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale.

The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development.

Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.

Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime.

Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states.

Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.

and beyond. None of our relations will be exclusive. We stand ready to develop active partnership with any country which shares our goals and values and is prepared to act in their support.

CONCLUSION

This is a world in which there are new dangers but also new opportunities. If it can become a fully effective actor, the European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both to dealing with the threats and to helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer and more secure world.

Working with partners There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.

The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.

We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.

Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on. In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support.

CONCLUSION

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.

ESS Report 2008

In late 2007 the now 27 EU member states invited HR/SG Solana to undertake a first review of the 'implementation' of the 2003 ESS 'in the light of the evolutions which have taken place since, in particular the experience drawn from ESDP missions', as the 14 December 2007 European Council conclusions stated. The main driving forces behind this effort were Sweden, on Foreign Minister Carl Bildt's initiative, and then France, where newly elected President Nicolas Sarkozy had just decisively contributed to the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty. Paris, in particular, had very ambitious plans for the country's forthcoming presidency of the Council in late 2008 and wanted a brand new ESS – an idea that was not fully supported by all EU partners (including Germany and post-Blair Britain) or by Solana himself. The mandate was therefore limited and did not entail a comprehensive review of the strategy – but, of course, it implied some sort of verification of the validity of its analysis and policy prescriptions.

The process

The ensuing procedure displayed only some similarities with 2003. This time round, the main 'pen' holders remained the Policy Unit, now led by Helga Schmid. A number of informal and formal meetings were organised throughout 2008 with the security policy directors of the EU-27 and the PSC, under the aegis of the two rotating presidencies (Slovenia and France); and successive provisional versions of the report were sent to the member states for comments – but, yet again, no substantial 'drafting by Committee' took place. On the other hand, the praesidium of the European Parliament's AFET Committee was briefed on the text and, in particular, the European Commission was much more closely associated to the whole process, with Richard Wright (who represented the EC's DG Relex on the PSC) playing a pivotal role in coordinating its contribution and feedback.

In parallel, once again, the EUISS replicated the exercise carried out in 2003 by organising another series of targeted seminars in Rome, Warsaw/Natolin (June), Helsinki (September) and finally Paris (October) – still in partnership with local research institutes and centres – to flank and feed the discussion unfolding at political level. In the end, Solana's Report was first illustrated to the Council, which expressed its 'broad support' (8 December), then formally presented to the European Council on 11 December 2008.

The text

As compared to the 2003 ESS, the 2008 Report – which included an executive summary – highlighted the successes scored by the EU since then regarding enlargement, ENP, stabilisation in the Western Balkans and ESDP (later renamed CSDP) missions and operations. Yet it also emphasised that not only had the key threats not gone away but they had rather become 'more significant, and all more complex'. In terms of proliferation of WMD, Iraq and Libya had lost salience but Iran and North Korea had gained traction. Terrorism had hit the European homeland (in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005) and showed its domestic roots, calling for comprehensive and coordinated responses. State failure was now framed in terms of 'fragility', with far-reaching policy implications. Organised crime was also linked to piracy and illegal immigration; and new vulnerabilities were becoming ever more visible – from cyber- and energy security to climate change and 'financial turmoil'. Last but not least, the emergence of new powers and players on the international scene – epitomised that year by the summer Olympics in Beijing – was also registered, *inter alia* by stating that 'globalisation is accelerating shifts in power and is exposing differences in values'.

Finally, while the strategic objectives and core recommendations formulated in 2003 were reaffirmed (and seen as vindicated), the emphasis was now put on effectiveness, capability and sustainability of EU action – with an explicit reference to the need for 'public support' that took on board the lessons of a string of unsuccessful referendums on EU treaty matters in some member states. The ESDP/CSDP part of the Report, however, remained relatively general as France channelled all its efforts into a lengthy and detailed Presidency Report on security and defence.

The context

And indeed external events had an impact also on the drafting of the report – starting with the military conflict between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 and, a few weeks later, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in New York. The war in the Caucasus polarised the discussion somewhat, in part echoing the intra-European differences that had already emerged at NATO's Bucharest summit in the spring, and surely complicated building consensus at 27 (in the end, the Report was not formally endorsed by the Council also because Cyprus objected to some wording on NATO). For its part, the outbreak of the financial crisis could not be fully appreciated and factored in as its consequences for Europe would become more apparent only later on.

Still, paradoxically, the 2008 Report provided a more comprehensive analysis of the security environment and more specific policy recommendations than the 2003 ESS – but it lacked both a propitious political context and an adequate commitment by all the member states, including for the follow-up. Since then, at any rate, the EU has produced an increasing number of targeted 'strategies' and 'strategic frameworks' on either specific regions (e.g. Horn of Africa, Sahel, Great Lakes, Gulf of Guinea, Afghanistan) or functional policies (cybersecurity, maritime security) – and indeed a dedicated Internal Security Strategy (February 2010).

Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy

Brussels, 11 December 2008

S407/08

PROVIDING SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD

Executive Summary

Five years on from adoption of the European Security Strategy, the European Union carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history.

The EU remains an anchor of stability. Enlargement has spread democracy and prosperity across our continent. The Balkans are changing for the better. Our neighbourhood policy has created a strong framework for relations with partners to the south and east, now with a new dimension in the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership. Since 2003, the EU has increasingly made a difference in addressing crisis and conflict, in places such as Afghanistan or Georgia.

Yet, twenty years after the Cold War, Europe faces increasingly complex threats and challenges.

Conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world remain unsolved, others have flared up even in our neighbourhood. State failure affects our security through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy. Terrorism and organised crime have evolved with new menace, including within our own societies. The Iranian nuclear programme has significantly advanced, representing a danger for stability in the region and for the whole non-proliferation system.

Globalisation has brought new opportunities. High growth in the developing world, led by China, has lifted millions out of poverty. But globalisation has also made threats more complex and interconnected. The arteries of our society – such as information systems and energy supplies – are more vulnerable. Global warming and environmental degradation is altering the face of our planet. Moreover, globalisation is accelerating shifts in power and is exposing differences in values. Recent financial turmoil has shaken developed and developing economies alike.

Europe will rise to these new challenges, as we have done in the past.

Drawing on a unique range of instruments, the EU already contributes to a more secure world. We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity. The EU remains the biggest donor to countries in need. Long-term engagement is required for lasting stabilisation.

Over the last decade, the European Security and Defence Policy, as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy, has grown in experience and capability, with over 20 missions deployed in response to crises, ranging from post-tsunami peacebuilding in Aceh to protecting refugees in Chad.

These achievements are the results of a distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy. But there is no room for complacency. To ensure our security and meet the expectations of our citizens, we must be ready to shape events. That means becoming more strategic in our thinking, and more effective and visible around the world. We are most successful when we operate in a timely and coherent manner, backed by the right capabilities and sustained public support.

Lasting solutions to conflict must bind together all regional players with a common stake in peace. Sovereign governments must take responsibility for the consequences of their actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

It is important that countries abide by the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and OSCE principles and commitments. We must be clear that respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes are not negotiable. Threat or use of military force cannot be allowed to solve territorial issues – anywhere.

At a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order. The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. We have a unique moment to renew multilateralism, working with the United States and with our partners around the world. For Europe, the transatlantic partnership remains an irreplaceable foundation, based on shared history and responsibilities. The EU and NATO must deepen their strategic partnership for better co-operation in crisis management.

The EU has made substantial progress over the last five years. We are recognised as an important contributor to a better world. But, despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in progress. For our full potential to be realised we need to be still *more capable, more coherent and more active*.

INTRODUCTION

The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. For the first time, it established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU's security interests based on our core values. It is comprehensive in its approach and remains fully relevant.

This report does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it. It gives an opportunity to examine how we have fared in practice, and what can be done to improve implementation.

I. GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND KEY THREATS

The ESS identified a range of threats and challenges to our security interests. Five years on, these have not gone away: some have become more significant, and all more complex.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Proliferation by both states and terrorists was identified in the ESS as 'potentially the greatest threat to EU security'. That risk has increased in the last five years, bringing the multilateral framework under pressure. While Libya has dismantled its WMD programme, Iran, and also North Korea, have yet to gain the trust of the international community. A likely revival of civil nuclear power in coming decades also poses challenges to the non-proliferation system, if not accompanied by the right safeguards.

The EU has been very active in multilateral fora, on the basis of the WMD Strategy, adopted in 2003, and at the forefront of international efforts to address Iran's nuclear programme. The Strategy emphasises prevention, by working through the UN and multilateral agreements, by acting as a key donor and by working with third countries and regional organisations to enhance their capabilities to prevent proliferation.

We should continue this approach, with political and financial action. A successful outcome to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010, with a view in particular to strengthening the non-proliferation regime, is critical. We will endeavour to ensure that, in a balanced, effective, and concrete manner, this conference examines means to step up international efforts against proliferation, pursue disarmament and ensure the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by countries wishing to do so.

More work is also needed on specific issues, including: EU support for a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle; countering financing of proliferation; measures on bio-safety and bio-security; containing proliferation of delivery systems, notably ballistic missiles. Negotiations should begin on a multilateral treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Terrorism and Organised Crime

Terrorism, within Europe and worldwide, remains a major threat to our livelihoods. Attacks have taken place in Madrid and London, while others have been foiled, and home-grown groups play an increasing role within our own continent. Organised crime continues to menace our societies, with trafficking in drugs, human beings, and weapons, alongside international fraud and money-laundering.

Since 2003, the EU has made progress in addressing both, with additional measures inside the Union, under the 2004 Hague Programme, and a new Strategy for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs, adopted in 2005. These have made it easier to pursue investigations across borders, and co-ordinate prosecution. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, also from 2005, is based on respect for human rights and international law. It follows a four-pronged approach: preventing radicalisation and recruitment and the factors behind them; protecting potential targets; pursuing terrorists; and responding to the aftermath of an attack. While national action is central, appointment of a Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator has been an important step forward at the European level.

Within the EU, we have done much to protect our societies against terrorism. We should tighten co-ordination arrangements for handling a major terrorist incident, in particular using chemical, radiological, nuclear and bioterrorism materials, on the basis of such existing provisions as the Crisis Coordination Arrangements and the Civil Protection Mechanism. Further work on terrorist financing is required, along with an effective and comprehensive EU policy on information sharing, taking due account of protection of personal data.

We must also do more to counter radicalisation and recruitment, by addressing extremist ideology and tackling discrimination. Inter-cultural dialogue, through such fora as the Alliance of Civilisations, has an important role.

On organised crime, existing partnerships within our neighbourhood and key partners, and within the UN, should be deepened, in addressing movement of people, police and judicial cooperation. Implementation of existing UN instruments on crime is essential. We should further strengthen our counter-terrorism partnership with the United States, including in the area of data sharing and protection. Also, we should strengthen the

capacity of our partners in South Asia, Africa, and our southern neighbourhood. The EU should support multilateral efforts, principally in the UN.

We need to improve the way in which we bring together internal and external dimensions. Better co-ordination, transparency and flexibility are needed across different agencies, at national and European level. This was already identified in the ESS, five years ago. Progress has been slow and incomplete.

Cyber Security

Modern economies are heavily reliant on critical infrastructure including transport, communication and power supplies, but also the internet. The EU Strategy for a Secure Information Society, adopted in 2006, addresses internet-based crime. However, attacks against private or government IT systems in EU Member States have given this a new dimension, as a potential new economic, political and military weapon.

More work is required in this area, to explore a comprehensive EU approach, raise awareness and enhance international co-operation.

Energy Security

Concerns about energy dependence have increased over the last five years. Declining production inside Europe means that by 2030 up to 75% of our oil and gas will have to be imported. This will come from a limited number of countries, many of which face threats to stability. We are faced therefore with an array of security challenges, which involve the responsibility and solidarity of all Member States.

Our response must be an EU energy policy which combines external and internal dimensions. The joint report from the High Representative and Commission in June 2006 set out the main elements. Inside Europe, we need a more unified energy market, with greater inter-connection, particular attention to the most isolated countries and crisis mechanisms to deal with temporary disruption to supply.

Greater diversification, of fuels, sources of supply, and transit routes, is essential, as are good governance, respect for rule of law and investment in source countries. EU policy supports these objectives through engagement with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Africa, as well as through the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. Energy is a major factor in EU-Russia relations. Our policy should address transit routes, including through Turkey and Ukraine. With our partners, including China, India, Japan and the US, we should promote renewable energy, low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency, alongside transparent and well-regulated global markets.

Climate Change

In 2003, the ESS already identified the security implications of climate change. Five years on, this has taken on a new urgency. In March 2008, the High Representative and Commission presented a report to the European Council which described climate change is a "threat multiplier". Natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration. Climate change can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible.

We have enhanced our conflict prevention and crisis management, but need to improve analysis and early warning capabilities. The EU cannot do this alone. We must step up our work with countries most at risk by strengthening their capacity to cope.

International co-operation, with the UN and regional organisations, will be essential.

II. BUILDING STABILITY IN EUROPE AND BEYOND

Within our continent, enlargement continues to be a powerful driver for stability, peace and reform.

With Turkey, negotiations started in 2005, and a number of chapters have been opened since. Progress in the Western Balkans has been continuous, if slow. Accession negotiations with Croatia are well advanced. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has obtained candidate status. Stabilisation and Association agreements have been signed with the other Western Balkan countries. Serbia is close to fulfilling all conditions for moving towards deeper relations with the EU. The EU continues to play a leading role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but, despite progress, more is required from local political leaders to overcome blockage of reforms.

We are deploying EULEX, our largest civilian ESDP mission to date, in Kosovo and will continue substantial economic support. Throughout the region, co-operation and good neighbourly relations are indispensable.

It is in our interest that the countries on our borders are well-governed. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004, supports this process. In the east, all eligible countries participate except Belarus, with whom we are now taking steps in this direction.

With Ukraine, we have gone further, with a far-reaching association agreement which is close to being finalised. We will soon start negotiations with the Republic of Moldova on a similar agreement. The Black Sea Synergy has been launched to complement EU bilateral policies in this region of particular importance for Europe.

New concerns have arisen over the so-called "frozen conflicts" in our eastern neighbourhood. The situation in Georgia, concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has escalated, leading to an armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. The EU led the international response, through mediation between the parties, humanitarian assistance, a civilian monitoring mission, and substantial financial support. Our engagement will continue, with the EU leading the Geneva Process. A possible settlement to the Transnistrian conflict has gained impetus, through active EU participation in the 5+2 negotiation format, and the EU Border Assistance Mission.

The Mediterranean, an area of major importance and opportunity for Europe, still poses complex challenges, such as insufficient political reform and illegal migration. The EU and several Mediterranean partners, notably Israel and Morocco, are working towards deepening their bilateral relations. The ENP has reinforced reforms originally started under the Barcelona process in 1995, but regional conflict, combined with rising radicalism, continues to sow instability.

The EU has been central to efforts towards a settlement in the Middle East, through its role in the Quartet, co-operation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with the Arab League and other regional partners. The EU is fully engaged in the Annapolis Process towards a two-state solution, and is contributing sustained financial and budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority, and capacity-building, including through the deployment of judicial, police and border management experts on the ground. In Lebanon, Member States provide the backbone of the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission. On Iraq, the EU has supported the political process, reconstruction, and rule of law, including through the EUJUST LEX mission.

Since 2003, Iran has been a growing source of concern. The Iranian nuclear programme has been subject to successive resolutions in the UNSC and IAEA. Development of a nuclear military capability would be a threat to EU security that cannot be accepted. The EU has led a dual-track approach, combining dialogue and increasing pressure, together with the US, China, and Russia. The High Representative has delivered a far-reaching offer for Iran to rebuild confidence and engagement with the international community.

If, instead, the nuclear programme advances, the need for additional measures in support of the UN process grows. At the same time, we need to work with regional countries including the Gulf States to build regional security.

The ESS acknowledged that Europe has security interests beyond its immediate neighbourhood. In this respect, Afghanistan is a particular concern. Europe has a long-term commitment to bring stability. EU Member States make a major contribution to the NATO mission, and the EU is engaged on governance and development at all levels. The EU Police Mission is being expanded. These efforts will not succeed without full Afghan ownership, and support from neighbouring countries: in particular Pakistan, but also India, Central Asia and Iran. Indeed, improved prospects for good relations between India and Pakistan in recent years have been a positive element in the strategic balance sheet.

Security and development nexus

As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace. Threats to public health, particularly pandemics, further undermine development. Human rights are a fundamental part of the equation. In many conflict or post-conflict zones, we have to address the appalling use of sexual violence as a weapon of intimidation and terror.

Effective implementation of UNSCR 1820 on sexual violence in situations of armed conflict is essential.

Conflict is often linked to state fragility. Countries like Somalia are caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict. We have sought to break this, both through development assistance and measures to ensure better security. Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are a key part of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction, and have been a focus of our missions in Guinea-Bissau or DR Congo. This is most successful when done in partnership with the international community and local stakeholders.

Ruthless exploitation of natural resources is often an underlying cause of conflict. There are increasing tensions over water and raw materials which require multilateral solutions. The Kimberley Process and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative offer an innovative model to address this problem.

Piracy

The ESS highlighted piracy as a new dimension of organised crime. It is also a result of state failure. The world economy relies on sea routes for 90% of trade. Piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has made this issue more pressing in recent months, and affected delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia. The EU has responded, including with ATALANTA, our first maritime ESDP mission, to deter piracy off the Somali coast, alongside countries affected and other international actors, including NATO.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Cluster Munitions and Landmines

In 2005, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition. In the context of its implementation, the EU supports the UN Programme of Action in this field. The EU will continue to develop activities to combat threats posed by illicit SALW.

The EU has given strong support to the concept of an international Arms Trade Treaty and has decided to support the process leading towards its adoption. The EU is also a major donor to anti-mine action. It has actively supported and promoted the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines worldwide. The Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions, agreed at Dublin in May 2008, represents an important step forward in responding to the humanitarian problems caused by this type of munitions, which constitute a major concern for all EU Member States. The adoption of a protocol on this type of munitions in the UN framework involving all major military powers would be an important further step.

III. EUROPE IN A CHANGING WORLD

To respond to the changing security environment we need to be more effective – among ourselves, within our neighbourhood and around the world.

A. A more effective and capable Europe

Our capacity to address the challenges has evolved over the past five years, and must continue to do so. We must strengthen our own coherence, through better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making. The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide a framework to achieve this.

Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach. Peace-building and long-term poverty reduction are essential to this. Each situation requires coherent use of our instruments, including political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade co-operation, and civilian and military crisis management. We should also expand our dialogue and mediation capacities. EU Special Representatives bring EU influence to bear in various conflict regions. Civil society and NGOs have a vital role to play as actors and partners. Our election monitoring missions, led by members of the European Parliament, also make an important contribution.

The success of ESDP as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy is reflected by the fact that our assistance is increasingly in demand. Our Georgia mission has demonstrated what can be achieved when we act collectively with the necessary political will. But the more complex the challenges we face, the more flexible we must be. We need to prioritise our commitments, in line with resources. Battlegroups and Civilian Response Teams have enhanced our capacity to react rapidly.

Appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters capability are key. Our ability to combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through the planning phase and into implementation must be reinforced. We are developing this aspect of ESDP by putting the appropriate administrative structures, financial mechanisms, and systems in place. There is also scope to improve training, building on the European Security and Defence College and the new European young officers exchange scheme, modelled on Erasmus.

We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security. The EU has recognised the role of women in building peace. Effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and UNSCR 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict is essential in this context.

For civilian missions, we must be able to assemble trained personnel with a variety of skills and expertise, deploy them at short notice and sustain them in theatre over the long term. We need full interoperability between national contingents. In support of this, Member States have committed to draw up national strategies to make experts available, complemented by more deployable staff for mission support, including budgeting and procurement. The ways in which equipment is made available and procured should be made more effective to enable timely deployment of missions.

For military missions, we must continue to strengthen our efforts on capabilities, as well as mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements. Experience has shown the

need to do more, particularly over key capabilities such as strategic airlift, helicopters, space assets, and maritime surveillance (as set out in more detail in the Declaration on the Reinforcement of Capabilities). These efforts must be supported by a competitive and robust defence industry across Europe, with greater investment in research and development. Since 2004, the European Defence Agency has successfully led this process, and should continue to do so.

B. Greater engagement with our neighbourhood

The ENP has strengthened individual bilateral relationships with the EU. This process now needs to build regional integration.

The Union for the Mediterranean, launched in July 2008, provides a renewed political moment to pursue this with our southern partners, through a wide-ranging agenda, including on maritime safety, energy, water and migration. Addressing security threats like terrorism will be an important part.

The Eastern Partnership foresees a real step change in relations with our Eastern neighbours, with a significant upgrading of political, economic and trade relations. The goal is to strengthen the prosperity and stability of these countries, and thus the security of the EU. The proposals cover a wide range of bilateral and multilateral areas of co-operation including energy security and mobility of people.

Lasting stability in our neighbourhood will require continued effort by the EU, together with UN, OSCE, the US and Russia. Our relations with Russia have deteriorated over the conflict with Georgia. The EU expects Russia to honour its commitments in a way that will restore the necessary confidence. Our partnership should be based on respect for common values, notably human rights, democracy, and rule of law, and market economic principles as well as on common interests and objectives.

We need a sustained effort to address conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, Republic of Moldova and between Israel and the Arab states. Here, as elsewhere, full engagement with the US will be key. In each case, a durable settlement must bring together all the regional players. Countries like Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have played an increasingly important role in the region, whereas this has not been the case with Iran. There is a particular opportunity to work with Turkey, including through the Alliance of Civilisations.

C. Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism

The ESS called for Europe to contribute to a more effective multilateral order around the world. Since 2003, we have strengthened our partnerships in pursuit of that objective. The key partner for Europe in this and other areas is the US. Where we have worked together, the EU and US have been a formidable force for good in the world.

The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. The EU works closely in key theatres, including Kosovo, Afghanistan, DRC, Sudan/Darfur, Chad and Somalia, and has improved institutional links, in line with our joint 2007 EU-UN Declaration. We support all sixteen current UN peacekeeping operations.

The EU and NATO have worked well together on the ground in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, even if formal relations have not advanced. We need to strengthen this strategic partnership in service of our shared security interests, with better operational cooperation, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of each organisation, and continued work on military capabilities. Since 2003, we have deepened our relationship with the OSCE, especially in Georgia and Kosovo.

We have substantially expanded our relationship with China. Ties to Canada and Japan are close and longstanding. Russia remains an important partner on global issues.

There is still room to do more in our relationship with India. Relations with other partners, including Brazil, South Africa and, within Europe, Norway and Switzerland, have grown in significance since 2003.

The EU is working more closely with regional organisations, and in particular the African Union. Through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, we are supporting enhanced African capacities in crisis management, including regional stand-by forces and early warning.

We have deepened links with our Central Asia partners through the Strategy adopted in 2007, with strengthened political dialogue, and work on issues such as water, energy, rule of law and security. Elsewhere, the EU has developed engagement with ASEAN, over regional issues such as Burma, with SAARC, and Latin America. Our experience gives the EU a particular role in fostering regional integration. Where others seek to emulate us, in line with their particular circumstances, we should support them.

The international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on several fronts. Representation in the international institutions has come under question. Legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-making in multilateral fora made more efficient. This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions.

Key priorities are climate change and completion of the Doha Round in the WTO. The EU is leading negotiations for a new international agreement on the former, and must use all its levers to achieve an ambitious outcome at Copenhagen in 2009. We should continue reform of the UN system, begun in 2005, and maintain the crucial role of the Security Council and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The International Criminal Court should grow further in effectiveness, alongside broader EU efforts to strengthen international justice and human rights. We need to mould the IMF and other financial institutions to reflect modern realities. The G8 should be transformed. And we must continue our collective efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals.

These issues cross boundaries, touching as much on domestic as foreign policy. Indeed, they demonstrate how in the twenty-first century, more than ever, sovereignty entails responsibility. With respect to core human rights, the EU should continue to advance the agreement reached at the UN World Summit in 2005, that we hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

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Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home.

Five years ago, the ESS set out a vision of how the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world. We have come a long way towards that. But the world around us is changing fast, with evolving threats and shifting powers. To build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now.

NATO SC 2010

NATO's 'Strategic Concept' is an official document that outlines the Atlantic Alliance's enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks. It also identifies the central features of the wider security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's approach to security and provides guidelines for the adaptation of its military forces.

Reflecting changing strategic environments, NATO has repeatedly reviewed its tasks and objectives. Between its founding in 1949 until the end of the Cold War, NATO presented four *classified* Strategic Concepts (in 1949, 1952, 1957, 1968), accompanied by Strategic Guidance documents for the military. These Cold War Strategic Concepts were centred upon military defence and nuclear deterrence.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has issued three *public* Strategic Concepts (in 1991, 1999, 2010), complemented by *classified* documents for military implementation. In these post-Cold War Strategic Concepts, NATO adopted acharacterized by defence and deterrence broader approach including the notions of cooperation and security, in addition to deterrence and defence. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, NATO has also given greater attention to the fight against terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

It is the North Atlantic Council (NAC) that adopts NATO's strategic documents. Before reaching the NAC, however, there are many stages of discussion, negotiating and drafting that take place. The decision-making process with regard to the Strategic Concept has evolved over time. During the Cold War, strategic concepts were principally drawn up by the military for approval by the political leadership of the Alliance. Since the end of the Cold War, the process has become more political, gradually turning also into an exercise of public diplomacy.

The text and the process

Taking into account its growing membership, the emerging threats (e.g. energy security and cyber-attacks) and its own operational experiences in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, NATO produced its current Strategic Concept in late 2010. Entitled 'Active

Engagement, Modern Defence', it describes NATO as 'a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law' and presents NATO's three essential core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. The concept also emphasises Alliance solidarity, the importance of transatlantic consultation and the need to engage in a continuous process of reform. The 2010 Strategic Concept also emphasised the value and importance of working with partners from across the globe.

A major novelty of the 2010 Strategic Concept was the importance given to the *process* of producing the document. The process of reflection, consultations and drafting of the Strategic Concept was perceived as an opportunity to build understanding and support across numerous constituencies and stakeholders. One important goal was 'to re-engage and re-commit NATO allies to the renewed core principles, roles and policies of the Alliance.' To achieve this goal, NATO broadened the debate to include academics and experts and invited the interested public to contribute.

The 2010 Strategic Concept was also the first Strategic Concept debate that a NATO Secretary-General initiated and steered. The process leading to the new Strategic Concept had three phases: (1) a reflection phase in the form of a series of seminars on various topics inviting stakeholders and experts; (2) a consultation phase with allied capitals; and (3) a drafting and final negotiation phase.

To facilitate the process and lay the groundwork for the development of a new Strategic Concept, in 2009 the Secretary-General appointed a group of 12 high-level experts drawn from across the Alliance and chaired by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, with the former CEO of Royal Dutch Shell Jeroen van der Veer as her deputy (the appointment was made right at the end of the mandate of Jaap de Hoop Scheffer but in agreement with his successor Anders Fogh Rasmussen). The group, a combination of insiders and outsiders (from the private sector, think tanks and the academic community), was tasked with producing a report – entitled 'NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement' – to guide the ensuing drafting. Following the seminars, the expert group discussed their findings and recommendations with allied governments before presenting their report to the Secretary-General on 17 May 2010.

Drawing on the expert group's analysis and recommendations and NATO member states' reactions, Secretary-General Rasmussen submitted his report on a new Strategic Concept to the allied governments. The draft Strategic Concept was then discussed by the NATO Permanent Representatives in Brussels before being submitted for final negotiations and adoption at the NATO Lisbon summit in November 2010.

Later on, at the Chicago summit in May 2012, the Alliance would launch its 'smart defence' blueprint to ensure that the goals of NATO 2020 be met in a context of budgetary austerity requiring more cooperation and coordination to develop, acquire, operate and maintain adequate military capabilities.

Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon

ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT, MODERN DEFENCE

Preface

We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and security. This Strategic Concept will guide the next phase in NATO's evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners:

- It reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our citizens.
- It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.
- It offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute.
- It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.

- It restates our firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement contributes to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.
- It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence.

The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe. While the world is changing, NATO's essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.

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Core Tasks and Principles

1. NATO's fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Today, the Alliance remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world.
2. NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
3. The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been forged in NATO since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. We will continue to defend it together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.
4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO's territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:

a. ***Collective defence***. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.

b. ***Crisis management***. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro- Atlantic security.

c. ***Cooperative security***. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO's standards.

5. NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Any security issue of interest to any Ally can be brought to the NATO table, to share information, exchange views and, where appropriate, forge common approaches.

6. In order to carry out the full range of NATO missions as effectively and efficiently as possible, Allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, modernisation and transformation.

The Security Environment

7. Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a century.

8. However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. Many regions and countries around the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military

capabilities with consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict. This includes the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.

9. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world's most volatile regions.

10. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities.

11. Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.

12. Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organised criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be the source of such attacks.

13. All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption. Some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and, in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption.

14. A number of significant technology-related trends – including the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space – appear poised to have major global effects that will impact on NATO military planning and operations.

15. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

Defence and Deterrence

16. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.

17. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

18. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

19. We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will:

    - maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
    - maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
    - develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance's expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;
    - carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;

- ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;
- develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
- further develop NATO's capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
- develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;
- enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves;
- develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;
- ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;
- sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced;
- continue to review NATO's overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

Security through Crisis Management

20. Crises and conflicts beyond NATO's borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.

21. The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.

22. The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO will continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.

23. Where conflict prevention proves unsuccessful, NATO will be prepared and capable to manage ongoing hostilities. NATO has unique conflict management capacities, including the unparalleled capability to deploy and sustain robust military forces in the field. NATO-led operations have demonstrated the indispensable contribution the Alliance can make to international conflict management efforts.

24. Even when conflict comes to an end, the international community must often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. NATO will be prepared and capable to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction, in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant international actors.

25. To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, we will:

- enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, to better predict when crises might occur, and how they can best be prevented;
- further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations;
- form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors;
- enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum;
- develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance;
- identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions;
- broaden and intensify the political consultations among Allies, and with partners, both on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis – before, during and after.

Promoting International Security through Cooperation

Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

26. NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts:

- We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
- With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.
- In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.
- We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for stability. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity, transparency and host-nation consent.
- We will explore ways for our political means and military capabilities to contribute to international efforts to fight proliferation.
- National decisions regarding arms control and disarmament may have an impact on the security of all Alliance members. We are committed to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.

Open Door

27. NATO's enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies; the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security have advanced stability in Europe more broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing common values, would be best served by the eventual integration of all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures.

- The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.

Partnerships

28. The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO's fundamental tasks.

29. Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhancing international security, to defending the values on which our Alliance is based, to NATO's operations, and to preparing interested nations for membership of NATO. These relationships will be based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.

30. We will enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners together – across and beyond existing frameworks:

    - We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organisations across the globe that share our interest in peaceful international relations.

    - We will be open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of common concern.

    - We will give our operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute.

    - We will further develop our existing partnerships while preserving their specificity.

31. Cooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a substantial contribution to security in operations around the world. The Alliance aims to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN, as set out in the UN-NATO Declaration signed in 2008, including through:

    - enhanced liaison between the two Headquarters;

    - more regular political consultation; and enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are engaged.

32. An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into force

of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU's capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which we will:

- fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations;
- enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
- broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
- cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.

33. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.

34. The NATO-Russia relationship is based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, especially regarding the respect of democratic principles and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area. Notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security. We are determined to:

- enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security;
- use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia.

35. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are central to our vision of Europe whole, free and in peace. We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to:

- enhance consultations and practical military cooperation with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
- continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, based
- on the NATO decision at the Bucharest summit 2008, and taking into account the Euro-Atlantic orientation or aspiration of each of the countries;
- facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with the aim to ensure lasting peace and stability based on democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations;
- deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean
- Dialogue of other countries of the region;
- develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Reform and Transformation

36. Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces able to operate together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere through its integrated military command structure; and that has at its disposal core capabilities that few Allies could afford individually.

37. NATO must have sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to carry out its missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and territory. Those resources must, however, be used in the most efficient and effective way possible. We will:

- maximise the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATO's usability targets;
- ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary duplication, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements;
- develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost- effectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity;
- preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding that bind us together;
- engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency.

An Alliance for the 21st Century

38. We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of our Alliance so that it is fit for purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges. We are firmly committed to preserve its effectiveness as the globe's most successful political-military Alliance. Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve.

US NSS 2015

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the official document in which the US administration outlines and articulates its vision of how to advance core American interests worldwide. It is not a planning document as it relies on other texts, such as the National Military Strategy (NMS). Its primary purpose is rather to communicate to the US Congress the President's national security concerns and strategic vision (and how to manage them) as well as explain his stance to a wider domestic and international audience. As such, it is also an important tool with which the US executive branch seeks to forge an internal consensus on foreign and defence policy. Forcing government bodies which often have different and competing views to reach an agreement is a difficult but invaluable process for any administration. The team drafting the document - normally led by the National Security Advisor - must summarise all of America's security concerns, describe how the US will address them, and then secure support and buy-in from the many government agencies and departments across Washington.

The legal foundation for the NSS lies in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 - meant to reorganise and streamline the whole national security apparatus - which requires the President to submit one annually to Congress. And, until 2001, a NSS was indeed published almost every year: George W.H. Bush submitted three in four years – at the critical juncture of the end of the Cold War – and Bill Clinton seven during his eight years at the White House. George W. Bush, however, submitted only two – in 2002 and 2006 respectively – one per term. The same will probably apply to Barack Obama, whose first NSS was released in 2010, with the second one made public only this February.

The 2015 NSS emphasises that US action will be guided by a long-term perspective and make use of all instruments available including – but not limited to – diplomacy, development, defence, science and technology, and intelligence. The US will lead by example, upholding its values at home and its obligations abroad, and work alongside capable partners which can be mobilised to take collective action in the face of global challenges. The three main threats listed in the new NSS are: a catastrophic attack on the US homeland or critical infrastructure; threats or violence against US citizens abroad and US allies; and a global economic crisis or widespread economic slowdown. Other top strategic risks identified include nuclear proliferation; infectious disease outbreaks; climate change; energy market security; and weak or failing states (interestingly, neither Russia

nor ISIL are explicitly mentioned among these top risks to US interests, although attacks against US citizens and allies are).

The White House also pledges to maintain the world's best trained, equipped and led military force which is to 'remain dominant in every domain'. In order to achieve this, the science and technology base will be safeguarded from sequestration, and new investments made in the fields of space, cyber, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

National Security Strategy of the United States of America

February 2015, The White House, Washington

Today, the United States is stronger and better positioned to seize the opportunities of a still new century and safeguard our interests against the risks of an insecure world.

America's growing economic strength is the foundation of our national security and a critical source of our influence abroad. Since the Great Recession, we have created nearly 11 million new jobs during the longest private sector job growth in our history. Unemployment has fallen to its lowest level in 6 years. We are now the world leader in oil and gas production. We continue to set the pace for science, technology, and innovation in the global economy.

We also benefit from a young and growing workforce, and a resilient and diversified economy. The entrepreneurial spirit of our workers and businesses undergirds our economic edge. Our higher education system is the finest in the world, drawing more of the best students globally every year. We continue to attract immigrants from every corner of the world who renew our country with their energy and entrepreneurial talents.

Globally, we have moved beyond the large ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that defined so much of American foreign policy over the past decade. Compared to the nearly 180,000 troops we had in Iraq and Afghanistan when I took office, we now have fewer than 15,000 deployed in those countries. We possess a military whose might, technology, and geostrategic reach is unrivaled in human history. We have renewed our alliances from Europe to Asia.

Now, at this pivotal moment, we continue to face serious challenges to our national security, even as we are working to shape the opportunities of tomorrow. Violent extremism and an evolving terrorist threat raise a persistent risk of attacks on America and our allies. Escalating challenges to cybersecurity, aggression by Russia, the accelerating impacts of climate change, and the outbreak of infectious diseases all give

rise to anxieties about global security. We must be clear-eyed about these and other challenges and recognize the United States has a unique capability to mobilize and lead the international community to meet them.

Any successful strategy to ensure the safety of the American people and advance our national security interests must begin with an undeniable truth – America must lead. Strong and sustained American leadership is essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security and prosperity as well as the dignity and human rights of all peoples. The question is never whether America should lead, but how we lead.

Abroad, we are demonstrating that while we will act unilaterally against threats to our core interests, we are stronger when we mobilize collective action. That is why we are leading international coalitions to confront the acute challenges posed by aggression, terrorism, and disease. We are leading over 60 partners in a global campaign to degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq and Syria, including by working to disrupt the flow of foreign fighters to those countries, while keeping pressure on al-Qa'ida. We are leading a global effort to stop the deadly spread of the Ebola virus at its source. In lockstep with our European allies, we are enforcing tough sanctions on Russia to impose costs and deter future aggression.

Even as we meet these pressing challenges, we are pursuing historic opportunities. Our rebalance to Asia and the Pacific is yielding deeper ties with a more diverse set of allies and partners. When complete, the Trans-Pacific Partnership will generate trade and investment opportunities – and create high-quality jobs at home – across a region that represents more than 40 percent of global trade. We are primed to unlock the potential of our relationship with India. The scope of our cooperation with China is unprecedented, even as we remain alert to China's military modernization and reject any role for intimidation in resolving territorial disputes. We are deepening our investment in Africa, accelerating access to energy, health, and food security in a rapidly rising region. Our opening to Cuba will enhance our engagement in our own hemisphere, where there are enormous opportunities to consolidate gains in pursuit of peace, prosperity, democracy, and energy security.

Globally, we are committed to advancing the Prague Agenda, including by stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials. We are currently testing whether it is possible to achieve a comprehensive resolution to assure the international community that Iran's nuclear program is peaceful, while the Joint Plan of Action has halted the progress of Iran's program. We are building on our own energy security – and the ground-breaking commitment we made with China to reduce greenhouse gas emissions – to cement an international consensus on arresting climate change. We are shaping global standards for cybersecurity and building international capacity to disrupt and investigate cyber threats.

We are playing a leading role in defining the international community's post-2015 agenda for eliminating extreme poverty and promoting sustainable development while prioritizing women and youth.

Underpinning it all, we are upholding our enduring commitment to the advancement of democracy and human rights and building new coalitions to combat corruption and to support open governments and open societies. In doing so, we are working to support democratic transitions, while also reaching out to the drivers of change in this century: young people and entrepreneurs.

Finally, I believe that America leads best when we draw upon our hopes rather than our fears. To succeed, we must draw upon the power of our example—that means viewing our commitment to our values and the rule of law as a strength, and not an inconvenience. That is why I have worked to ensure that America has the capabilities we need to respond to threats abroad, while acting in line with our values—prohibiting the use of torture; embracing constraints on our use of new technologies like drones; and upholding our commitment to privacy and civil liberties. These actions are a part of our resilience at home and a source of our influence abroad.

On all these fronts, America leads from a position of strength. But, this does not mean we can or should attempt to dictate the trajectory of all unfolding events around the world. As powerful as we are and will remain, our resources and influence are not infinite. And in a complex world, many of the security problems we face do not lend themselves to quick and easy fixes. The United States will always defend our interests and uphold our commitments to allies and partners. But, we have to make hard choices among many competing priorities, and we must always resist the over-reach that comes when we make decisions based upon fear. Moreover, we must recognize that a smart national security strategy does not rely solely on military power. Indeed, in the long-term, our efforts to work with other countries to counter the ideology and root causes of violent extremism will be more important than our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield.

The challenges we face require strategic patience and persistence. They require us to take our responsibilities seriously and make the smart investments in the foundations of our national power. Therefore, I will continue to pursue a comprehensive agenda that draws on all elements of our national strength, that is attuned to the strategic risks and opportunities we face, and that is guided by the principles and priorities set out in this strategy. Moreover, I will continue to insist on budgets that safeguard our strength and work with the Congress to end sequestration, which undercuts our national security.

This is an ambitious agenda, and not everything will be completed during my Presidency. But I believe this is an achievable agenda, especially if we proceed with confidence and if we restore the bipartisan center that has been a pillar of strength for American foreign policy in decades past. As Americans, we will always have our differences, but what unites us is the national consensus that American global leadership remains indispensable. We embrace our exceptional role and responsibilities at a time when our unique contributions and capabilities are needed most, and when the choices we make today can mean greater security and prosperity for our Nation for decades to come.

I. INTRODUCTION

In a young century, opportunities for America abound, but risks to our security remain. This new *National Security Strategy* positions the United States to safeguard our national interests through strong and sustainable leadership. It sets out the principles and priorities to guide the use of American power and influence in the world. It advances a model of American leadership rooted in the foundation of America's economic and technological strength and the values of the American people. It redoubles our commitment to allies and partners and welcomes the constructive contributions of responsible rising powers. It signals our resolve and readiness to deter and, if necessary, defeat potential adversaries. It affirms America's leadership role within a rules-based international order that works best through empowered citizens, responsible states, and effective regional and international organizations. And it serves as a compass for how this Administration, in partnership with the Congress, will lead the world through a shifting security landscape toward a more durable peace and a new prosperity.

This strategy builds on the progress of the last 6 years, in which our active leadership has helped the world recover from a global economic crisis and respond to an array of emerging challenges. Our progress includes strengthening an unrivaled alliance system, underpinned by our enduring partnership with Europe, while investing in nascent multilateral forums like the G-20 and East Asia Summit. We brought most of our troops home after more than a decade of honorable service in two wars while adapting our counterterrorism strategy for an evolving terrorist threat. We led a multinational coalition to support the Afghan government to take responsibility for the security of their country, while supporting Afghanistan's first peaceful, democratic transition of power. The United States led the international response to natural disasters, including the earthquake in Haiti, the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and the typhoon in the Philippines to save lives, prevent greater damage, and support efforts to rebuild. We led international efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including by building an unprecedented international sanctions regime to hold Iran responsible for failing to meet its international obligations, while pursuing a diplomatic effort that has already stopped the progress of Iran's nuclear program and rolled it back in key respects. We are rebalancing toward Asia and the Pacific while seeking new opportunities for partnership and investment in Africa and the Americas, where we have spurred greater agriculture and energy-related investments than ever before. And at home and abroad, we are taking concerted action to confront the dangers posed by climate change and to strengthen our energy security.

Still, there is no shortage of challenges that demand continued American leadership. The potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, poses a grave risk. Even as we have decimated al-Qa'ida's core leadership, more diffuse networks of al-Qa'ida, ISIL, and affiliated groups threaten U.S. citizens, interests, allies, and partners. Violent extremists exploit upheaval across the Middle East and North Africa. Fragile and conflict-affected states incubate and spawn infectious disease, illicit weapons and drug smugglers, and destabilizing refugee flows. Too often, failures in governance and endemic corruption hold back the potential of rising regions. The danger of disruptive and even destructive cyber-attack is growing, and the risk of another global economic slowdown remains. The international community's ability to respond effectively to these and other risks is helped or hindered by the behaviors of major powers. Where progress has been most profound, it is due to the steadfastness of our allies and the cooperation of other emerging powers.

These complex times have made clear the power and centrality of America's indispensable leadership in the world. We mobilized and are leading global efforts to impose costs to counter Russian aggression, to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL, to squelch the Ebola virus at its source, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons materials, and to turn the corner on global carbon emissions. A strong consensus endures across our political spectrum that the question is not *whether* America will lead, but *how* we will lead into the future.

First and foremost, we will **lead with purpose.** American leadership is a global force for good, but it is grounded in our enduring national interests as outlined in the 2010 *National Security Strategy*:

- The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
- A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
- Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
- A rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

Especially in a changing global environment, these national interests will continue to guide all we do in the world. To advance these interests most effectively, we must pursue a comprehensive national security agenda, allocate resources accordingly, and work with the Congress to end sequestration. Even so, our resources will never be limitless. Policy tradeoffs and hard choices will need to be made. In such instances, we will prioritize efforts that address the top strategic risks to our interests:

- Catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland or critical infrastructure;
- Threats or attacks against U.S. citizens abroad and our allies;
- Global economic crisis or widespread economic slowdown;
- Proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass destruction;
- Severe global infectious disease outbreaks;
- Climate change;
- Major energy market disruptions; and
- Significant security consequences associated with weak or failing states (including mass atrocities, regional spillover, and transnational organized crime).

We will seize strategic opportunities to shape the economic order and cultivate new relationships with emerging economic powers and countries newly committed to peaceful democratic change. We will also capitalize on the potential to end extreme poverty and build upon our comparative advantages in innovation, science and technology, entrepreneurship, and greater energy security.

We will **lead with strength.** After a difficult decade, America is growing stronger every day. The U.S. economy remains the most dynamic and resilient on Earth. We have rebounded from a global recession by creating more jobs in the United States than in all other advanced economies combined. Our military might is unrivaled. Yet, American exceptionalism is not rooted solely in the strength of our arms or economy. Above all, it is the product of our founding values, including the rule of law and universal rights, as well as the grit, talent, and diversity of the American people.

In the last 6 years alone, we arrested the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression and catalyzed a new era of economic growth. We increased our competitive edge and leadership in education, energy, science and technology, research and development, and healthcare. We achieved an energy transformation in North America. We are fortifying our critical infrastructure against all hazards, especially cyber espionage and attack. And we are working hard to safeguard our civil liberties while advancing our security.

America's strategic fundamentals are strong but should not be taken for granted. We must be innovative and judicious in how we use our resources to build up our national power. Going forward, we will strengthen our foundation by growing our economy, modernizing our defense, upholding our values, enhancing the resilience of our homeland, and promoting talent and diversity in our national security workforce.

We will **lead by example.** The strength of our institutions and our respect for the rule of law sets an example for democratic governance. When we uphold our values at home, we are better able to promote them in the world. This means safeguarding the civil rights and liberties of our citizens while increasing transparency and accountability. It also means holding ourselves to international norms and standards that we expect other nations to uphold, and admitting when we do not. We must also demonstrate our ability to forge diverse partnerships across our political spectrum. Many achievements of recent years were made possible by Democrats and Republicans; Federal, state and local governments; and the public and private sectors working together. But, we face continued challenges, including political dysfunction in Washington that undermines national unity, stifles bipartisan cooperation, and ultimately erodes the perception and strength of our leadership abroad. American leadership is always most powerful when we are able to forge common ground at home around key national priorities.

We will **lead with capable partners.** In an interconnected world, there are no global problems that can be solved without the United States, and few that can be solved by the United States alone. American leadership remains essential for mobilizing collective action to address global risks and seize strategic opportunities. Our closest partners and allies will remain the cornerstone of our international engagement. Yet, we will continuously expand the scope of cooperation to encompass other state partners, non-state and private actors, and international institutions – particularly the United Nations (U.N.), international financial institutions, and key regional organizations. These partnerships can deliver essential capacity to share the burdens of maintaining global security and prosperity and to uphold the norms that govern responsible international behavior. At the same time, we and our partners must make the reforms and investments needed to make sure we can work more effectively with each other while growing the ranks of responsible, capable states. The United States is safer and stronger when fewer people face destitution, when our trading partners are flourishing, and when societies are freer.

We will **lead with all the instruments of U.S. power.** Our influence is greatest when we combine all our strategic advantages. Our military will remain ready to defend our enduring national interests while providing essential leverage for our diplomacy. The use of force is not, however, the only tool at our disposal, and it is not the principal means of U.S. engagement abroad, nor always the most effective for the challenges we face. Rather, our first line of action is principled and clear-eyed diplomacy, combined with the central role of development in the forward defense and promotion of America's interests. We will continue pursuing measures to enhance the security of our diplomats and development professionals to ensure they can fulfill their responsibilities safely in high-risk environments. We will also leverage a strong and well-regulated economy to

promote trade and investment while protecting the international financial system from abuse. Targeted economic sanctions will remain an effective tool for imposing costs on irresponsible actors and helping to dismantle criminal and terrorist networks. All our tools are made more effective by the skill of our intelligence professionals and the quality of intelligence they collect, analyze, and produce. Finally, we will apply our distinct advantages in law enforcement, science and technology, and people-to-people relationships to maximize the strategic effects of our national power.

We will **lead with a long-term perspective.** Around the world, there are historic transitions underway that will unfold over decades. This strategy positions America to influence their trajectories, seize the opportunities they create, and manage the risks they present. Five recent transitions, in particular, have significantly changed the security landscape, including since our last strategy in 2010.

First, power among states is more dynamic. The increasing use of the G-20 on global economic matters reflects an evolution in economic power, as does the rise of Asia, Latin America, and Africa. As the balance of economic power changes, so do expectations about influence over international affairs. Shifting power dynamics create both opportunities and risks for cooperation, as some states have been more willing than others to assume responsibilities commensurate with their greater economic capacity. In particular, India's potential, China's rise, and Russia's aggression all significantly impact the future of major power relations.

Second, power is shifting below and beyond the nation-state. Governments once able to operate with few checks and balances are increasingly expected to be more accountable to sub-state and non-state actors – from mayors of mega-cities and leaders in private industry to a more empowered civil society. They are also contending with citizens enabled by technology, youth as a majority in many societies, and a growing global middle class with higher expectations for governance and economic opportunity. While largely positive, these trends can foster violent non-state actors and foment instability –especially in fragile states where governance is weak or has broken down –or invite backlash by authoritarian regimes determined to preserve the power of the state.

Third, the increasing interdependence of the global economy and rapid pace of technological change are linking individuals, groups, and governments in unprecedented ways. This enables and incentivizes new forms of cooperation to establish dynamic security networks, expand international trade and investment, and transform global communications. It also creates shared vulnerabilities, as interconnected systems and sectors are susceptible to the threats of climate change, malicious cyber activity, pandemic diseases, and transnational terrorism and crime.

Fourth, a struggle for power is underway among and within many states of the Middle East and North Africa. This is a generational struggle in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war and 2011 Arab uprisings, which will redefine the region as well as relationships among communities and between citizens and their governments. This process will continue to be combustible, especially in societies where religious extremists take root, or rulers reject democratic reforms, exploit their economies, and crush civil society.

Fifth, the global energy market has changed dramatically. The United States is now the world's largest natural gas and oil producer. Our dependence on foreign oil is at a 20-year low – and declining – and we are leading a new clean energy economy. While production in the Middle East and elsewhere remains vitally important for the global market, increased U.S. production is helping keep markets well-supplied and prices conducive to economic growth. On the other hand, energy security concerns have been exacerbated by European dependence on Russian natural gas and the willingness of Russia to use energy for political ends. At the same time, developing countries now consume more energy than developed ones, which is altering energy flows and changing consumer relationships.

Today's strategic environment is fluid. Just as the United States helped shape the course of events in the last century, so must we influence their trajectory today by evolving the way we exercise American leadership. This strategy outlines priorities based on a realistic assessment of the risks to our enduring national interests and the opportunities for advancing them. This strategy eschews orienting our entire foreign policy around a single threat or region. It establishes instead a diversified and balanced set of priorities appropriate for the world's leading global power with interests in every part of an increasingly interconnected world.

II. SECURITY

The United States government has no greater responsibility than protecting the American people. Yet, our obligations do not end at our borders. We embrace our responsibilities for underwriting international security because it serves our interests, upholds our commitments to allies and partners, and addresses threats that are truly global. There is no substitute for American leadership whether in the face of aggression, in the cause of universal values, or in the service of a more secure America. Fulfilling our responsibilities depends on a strong defense and secure homeland. It also requires a global security posture in which our unique capabilities are employed within diverse international coalitions and in support of local partners. Such a shift is possible after a period of

prolonged combat. Six years ago, there were roughly 180,000 U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, there are fewer than 15,000. This transition has dramatically reduced U.S. casualties and allows us to realign our forces and resources to meet an evolving set of threats while securing our strategic objectives.

In so doing, we will prioritize collective action to meet the persistent threat posed by terrorism today, especially from al-Qa'ida, ISIL, and their affiliates. In addition to acting decisively to defeat direct threats, we will focus on building the capacity of others to prevent the causes and consequences of conflict to include countering extreme and dangerous ideologies. Keeping nuclear materials from terrorists and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons remains a high priority, as does mobilizing the international community to meet the urgent challenges posed by climate change and infectious disease. Collective action is needed to assure access to the shared spaces – cyber, space, air, and oceans – where the dangerous behaviors of some threaten us all.

Our allies will remain central to all these efforts. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the world's preeminent multilateral alliance, reinforced by the historic close ties we have with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Canada. NATO is stronger and more cohesive than at any point in its history, especially due to contributions of the Nordic countries and newer members like Poland and the Baltic countries. Our alliances in Asia underwrite security and enable prosperity throughout Asia and the Pacific. We will continue to modernize these essential bilateral alliances while enhancing the security ties among our allies. Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as well as our close partner in New Zealand, remain the model for interoperability while we reinvigorate our ties to the Philippines and preserve our ties to Thailand. And our allies and partners in other regions, including our security partnership and people-to-people ties with Israel, are essential to advancing our interests.

Strengthen Our National Defense

A strong military is the bedrock of our national security. During over a decade of war, the All Volunteer Force has answered our Nation's call. To maintain our military edge and readiness, we will continue to insist on reforms and necessary investment in our military forces and their families. Our military will remain ready to deter and defeat threats to the homeland, including against missile, cyber, and terrorist attacks, while mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters. Our military is postured globally to protect our citizens and interests, preserve regional stability, render humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and build the capacity of our partners to join with us in meeting security challenges.

U.S. forces will continue to defend the homeland, conduct global counterterrorism operations, assure allies, and deter aggression through forward presence and engagement. If deterrence fails, U.S. forces will be ready to project power globally to defeat and deny aggression in multiple theaters.

As we modernize, we will apply the lessons of past drawdowns. Although our military will be smaller, it must remain dominant in every domain. With the Congress, we must end sequestration and enact critical reforms to build a versatile and responsive force prepared for a more diverse set of contingencies. We will protect our investment in foundational capabilities like the nuclear deterrent, and we will grow our investment in crucial capabilities like cyber; space; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. We will safeguard our science and technology base to keep our edge in the capabilities needed to prevail against any adversary. Above all, we will take care of our people. We will recruit and retain the best talent while developing leaders committed to an ethical and expert profession of arms. We will honor our sacred trust with Veterans and the families and communities that support them, making sure those who have served have the benefits, education, and opportunities they have earned.

We will be principled and selective in the use of force. The use of force should not be our first choice, but it will sometimes be the necessary choice. The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our enduring interests demand it: when our people are threatened; when our livelihoods are at stake; and when the security of our allies is in danger. In these circumstances, we prefer to act with allies and partners. The threshold for military action is higher when our interests are not directly threatened. In such cases, we will seek to mobilize allies and partners to share the burden and achieve lasting outcomes. In all cases, the decision to use force must reflect a clear mandate and feasible objectives, and we must ensure our actions are effective, just, and consistent with the rule of law. It should be based on a serious appreciation for the risk to our mission, our global responsibilities, and the opportunity costs at home and abroad. Whenever and wherever we use force, we will do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy.

Reinforce Homeland Security

Our homeland is more secure. But, we must continue to learn and adapt to evolving threats and hazards. We are better able to guard against terrorism –the core responsibility of homeland security – as well as illicit networks and other threats and hazards due to improved information sharing, aviation and border security, and international cooperation. We have emphasized community-based efforts and local law enforce-

ment programs to counter homegrown violent extremism and protect vulnerable individuals from extremist ideologies that could lead them to join conflicts overseas or carry out attacks here at home. Through risk-based approaches, we have countered terrorism and transnational organized crime in ways that enhance commerce, travel, and tourism and, most fundamentally, preserve our civil liberties. We are more responsive and resilient when prevention fails or disaster strikes as witnessed with the Boston Marathon bombings and Hurricane Sandy.

The essential services that underpin American society must remain secure and functioning in the face of diverse threats and hazards. Therefore, we take a Whole of Community approach, bringing together all elements of our society – individuals, local communities, the private and non-profit sectors, faith-based organizations, and all levels of government – to make sure America is resilient in the face of adversity.

We are working with the owners and operators of our Nation's critical cyber and physical infrastructure across every sector – financial, energy, transportation, health, information technology, and more – to decrease vulnerabilities and increase resilience. We are partnering with states and local communities to better plan for, absorb, recover from, and adapt to adverse events brought about by the compound-ing effects of climate change. We will also continue to enhance pandemic preparedness at home and address the threat arising from new drug-resistant microbes and biological agents.

Combat the Persistent Threat of Terrorism

The threat of catastrophic attacks against our homeland by terrorists has diminished but still persists. An array of terrorist threats has gained traction in areas of instability, limited opportunity, and broken governance. Our adversaries are not confined to a distinct country or region. Instead, they range from South Asia through the Middle East and into Africa. They include globally oriented groups like al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, as well as a growing number of regionally focused and globally connected groups – many with an al-Qa'ida pedigree like ISIL, which could pose a threat to the homeland.

We have drawn from the experience of the last decade and put in place substantial changes to our efforts to combat terrorism, while preserving and strengthening important tools that have been developed since 9/11. Specifi , we shifted away from a model of fighting costly, large-scale ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in which the United States – particularly our military – bore an enormous burden. Instead, we are now pursuing a more sustainable approach that prioritizes targeted counterterrorism operations, collective action with responsible partners, and increased efforts to prevent the

growth of violent extremism and radicalization that drives increased threats. Our leadership will remain essential to disrupting the unprecedented flow of foreign terrorist fighters to and from conflict zones. We will work to address the underlying conditions that can help foster violent extremism such as poverty, inequality, and repression. This means supporting alternatives to extremist messaging and greater economic opportunities for women and disaffected youth. We will help build the capacity of the most vulnerable states and communities to defeat terrorists locally. Working with the Congress, we will train and equip local partners and provide operational support to gain ground against terrorist groups. This will include efforts to better fuse and share information and technology as well as to support more inclusive and accountable governance.

In all our efforts, we aim to draw a stark contrast between what we stand for and the heinous deeds of terrorists. We reject the lie that America and its allies are at war with Islam. We will continue to act lawfully. Outside of areas of active hostilities, we endeavor to detain, interrogate, and prosecute terrorists through law enforcement. However, when there is a continuing, imminent threat, and when capture or other actions to disrupt the threat are not feasible, we will not hesitate to take decisive action. We will always do so legally, discriminately, proportionally, and bound by strict accountability and strong oversight. The United States – not our adversaries – will define the nature and scope of this struggle, lest it define us.

Our counterterrorism approach is at work with several states, including Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, we have ended our combat mission and transitioned to a dramatically smaller force focused on the goal of a sovereign and stable partner in Afghanistan that is not a safe haven for international terrorists. This has been made possible by the extraordinary sacrifices of our U.S. military, civilians throughout the interagency, and our international partners. They delivered justice to Osama bin Laden and significantly degraded al-Qa'ida's core leadership. They helped increase life expectancy, access to education, and opportunities for women and girls. Going forward, we will work with partners to carry out a limited counterterrorism mission against the remnants of core al-Qa'ida and maintain our support to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). We are working with NATO and our other partners to train, advise, and assist the ANSF as a new government takes responsibility for the security and well-being of Afghanistan's citizens. We will continue to help improve governance that expands opportunity for all Afghans, including women and girls. We will also work with the countries of the region, including Pakistan, to mitigate the threat from terrorism and to support a viable peace and reconciliation process to end the violence in Afghanistan and improve regional stability.

We have undertaken a comprehensive effort to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. We will continue to support Iraq as it seeks to free itself from sectarian conflict and the scourge of extremists. Our support is tied to the government's willingness to govern effectively and inclusively and to ensure ISIL cannot sustain a safe haven on Iraqi territory. This requires professional and accountable Iraqi Security Forces that can overcome sectarian divides and protect all Iraqi citizens. It also requires international support, which is why we are leading an unprecedented international coalition to work with the Iraqi government and strengthen its military to regain sovereignty. Joined by our allies and partners, including multiple countries in the region, we employed our unique military capabilities to arrest ISIL's advance and to degrade their capabilities in both Iraq and Syria. At the same time, we are working with our partners to train and equip a moderate Syrian opposition to provide a counterweight to the terrorists and the brutality of the Assad regime. Yet, the only lasting solution to Syria's civil war remains political – an inclusive political transition that responds to the legitimate aspirations of all Syrian citizens.

Build Capacity to Prevent Conflict

We will strengthen U.S. and international capacity to prevent conflict among and within states. In the realm of inter-state conflict, Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity – as well as its belligerent stance toward other neighboring countries – endangers international norms that have largely been taken for granted since the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, North Korean provocation and tensions in the East and South China Seas are reminders of the risks of escalation. American diplomacy and leadership, backed by a strong military, remain essential to deterring future acts of inter-state aggression and provocation by reaffirming our security commitments to allies and partners, investing in their capabilities to withstand coercion, imposing costs on those who threaten their neighbors or violate fundamental international norms, and embedding our actions within wider regional strategies.

Within states, the nexus of weak governance and widespread grievance allows extremism to take root, violent non-state actors to rise up, and conflict to overtake state structures. To meet these challenges, we will continue to work with partners and through multilateral organizations to address the root causes of conflict before they erupt and to contain and resolve them when they do. We prefer to partner with those fragile states that have a genuine political commitment to establishing legitimate governance and providing for their people. The focus of our efforts will be on proven areas of need and impact, such as inclusive politics, enabling effective and equitable service delivery, reforming security and rule of law sectors, combating corruption and organized crime, and promoting eco-

nomic opportunity, particularly among youth and women. We will continue to lead the effort to ensure women serve as mediators of conflict and in peacebuilding efforts, and they are protected from gender-based violence.

We will continue to bolster the capacity of the U.N. and regional organizations to help resolve disputes, build resilience to crises and shocks, strengthen governance, end extreme poverty, and increase prosperity, so that fragile states can provide for the basic needs of their citizens and can avoid being vulnerable hosts for extremism and terrorism. We will meet our financial commitments to the U.N., press for reforms to strengthen peacekeeping, and encourage more contributions from advanced militaries. We will strengthen the operational capacity of regional organizations like the African Union (AU) and broaden the ranks of capable troop-contributing countries, including through the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership, which will help African countries rapidly deploy to emerging crises.

Prevent the Spread and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

No threat poses as grave a danger to our security and well-being as the potential use of nuclear weapons and materials by irresponsible states or terrorists. We therefore seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States must invest the resources necessary to maintain – without testing – a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that preserves strategic stability. However, reducing the threat requires us to constantly reinforce the basic bargain of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which commits nuclear weapons states to reduce their stockpiles while non-nuclear weapons states remain committed to using nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. For our part, we are reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons through New START and our own strategy. We will continue to push for the entry into force of important multilateral agreements like the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the various regional nuclear weapons-free zone protocols, as well as the creation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

Vigilance is required to stop countries and non-state actors from developing or acquiring nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or the materials to build them. The Nuclear Security Summit process has catalyzed a global effort to lock down vulnerable nuclear materials and institutionalize nuclear security best practices. Our commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is rooted in the profound risks posed by North Korean weapons development and proliferation. Our efforts to remove and destroy chemical weapons in Libya and Syria reflect our leadership in implementation and progress toward universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We have made clear Iran must meet its international obligations and demonstrate its nuclear program is entirely peaceful. Our sanctions regime has demonstrated that the international community can – and will – hold accountable those nations that do not meet their obligations, while also opening up a space for a diplomatic resolution. Having reached a first step arrangement that stops the progress of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for limited relief, our preference is to achieve a comprehensive and verifiable deal that assures Iran's nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes. This is the best way to advance our interests, strengthen the global nonproliferation regime, and enable Iran to access peaceful nuclear energy. However, we retain all options to achieve the objective of preventing Iran from producing a nuclear weapon.

Confront Climate Change

Climate change is an urgent and growing threat to our national security, contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources like food and water. The present day effects of climate change are being felt from the Arctic to the Midwest. Increased sea levels and storm surges threaten coastal regions, infrastructure, and property. In turn, the global economy suffers, compounding the growing costs of preparing and restoring infrastructure.

America is leading efforts at home and with the international community to confront this challenge. Over the last 6 years, U.S. emissions have declined by a larger total magnitude than those of any other country. Through our Climate Action Plan and related executive actions, we will go further with a goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 26 to 28 percent of 2005 levels by 2025. Working with U.S. states and private utilities, we will set the first-ever standards to cut the amount of carbon pollution our power plants emit into the air. We are also working to strengthen resilience and address vulnerabilities to climate impacts.

These domestic efforts contribute to our international leadership. Building on the progress made in Copenhagen and in ensuing negotiations, we are working toward an ambitious new global climate change agreement to shape standards for prevention, preparedness, and response over the next decade. As the world's two largest emitters, the United States and China reached a landmark agreement to take significant action to reduce carbon pollution. The substantial contribution we have pledged to the Green Climate Fund will help the most vulnerable developing nations deal with climate change, reduce their carbon pollution, and invest in clean energy. More than 100 countries have also joined with us to reduce greenhouse gases under the Montreal Protocol – the same agreement the world used successfully to phase out ozone-depleting chemicals. We

are partnering with African entrepreneurs to launch clean energy projects and helping farmers practice climate-smart agriculture and plant more durable crops. We are also driving collective action to reduce methane emissions from pipelines and to launch a free trade agreement for environmental goods.

Assure Access to Shared Spaces

The world is connected by shared spaces – cyber, space, air, and oceans – that enable the free flow of people, goods, services, and ideas. They are the arteries of the global economy and civil society, and access is at risk due to increased competition and provocative behaviors. Therefore, we will continue to promote rules for responsible behavior while making sure we have the capabilities to assure access to these shared spaces.

Cybersecurity

As the birthplace of the Internet, the United States has a special responsibility to lead a networked world. Prosperity and security increasingly depend on an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet. Our economy, safety, and health are linked through a networked infrastructure that is targeted by malicious government, criminal, and individual actors who try to avoid attribution. Drawing on the voluntary cybersecurity framework, we are securing Federal networks and working with the private sector, civil society, and other stakeholders to strengthen the security and resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure. We will continue to work with the Congress to pursue a legislative framework that ensures high standards. We will defend ourselves, consistent with U.S. and international law, against cyber attacks and impose costs on malicious cyber actors, including through prosecution of illegal cyber activity. We will assist other countries to develop laws that enable strong action against threats that originate from their infrastructure. Globally, cybersecurity requires that long-standing norms of international behaviour – to include protection of intellectual property, online freedom, and respect for civilian infrastructure – be upheld, and the Internet be managed as a shared responsibility between states and the private sector with civil society and Internet users as key stakeholders.

Space Security

Space systems allow the world to navigate and communicate with confidence to save lives, conduct commerce, and better understand the human race, our planet, and the depths of the universe. As countries increasingly derive benefits from space, we must join together to deal with threats posed by those who may wish to deny the peaceful

use of outer space. We are expanding our international space cooperation activities in all sectors, promoting transparency and confidence-building measures such as an International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities, and expanding partnerships with the private sector in support of missions and capabilities previously claimed by governments alone. We will also develop technologies and tactics to deter and defeat efforts to attack our space systems; enable indications, warning, and attributions of such attacks; and enhance the resiliency of critical U.S. space capabilities.

Air and Maritime Security

The United States has an enduring interest in freedom of navigation and overflight as well as the safety and sustainability of the air and maritime environments. We will therefore maintain the capability to ensure the free flow of commerce, to respond quickly to those in need, and to deter those who might contemplate aggression. We insist on safe and responsible behaviors in the sky and at sea. We reject illegal and aggressive claims to airspace and in the maritime domain and condemn deliberate attacks on commercial passenger traffic. On territorial disputes, particularly in Asia, we denounce coercion and assertive behaviors that threaten escalation. We encourage open channels of dialogue to resolve disputes peacefully in accordance with international law. We also support the early conclusion of an effective code of conduct for the South China Sea between China and the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN). America's ability to press for the observance of established customary international law reflected in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea will be enhanced if the Senate provides its advice and consent – the ongoing failure to ratify this Treaty undermines our national interest in a rules-based international order. Finally, we seek to build on the unprecedented international cooperation of the last few years, especially in the Arctic as well as in combatting piracy off the Horn of Africa and drug-smuggling in the Caribbean Sea and across Southeast Asia.

Increase Global Health Security

The spread of infectious diseases constitute a growing risk. The Ebola epidemic in West Africa highlights the danger of a raging virus. The spread of new microbes or viruses, the rise and spread of drug resistance, and the deliberate release of pathogens all represent threats that are exacerbated by the globalization of travel, food production and supply, and medical products. Despite important scientific, technological, and organizational accomplishments, most countries have not yet achieved international core competencies for health security, and many lack sufficient capacity to prevent, detect, or respond to disease outbreaks.

America is the world leader in fi ting pandemics, including HIV/AIDS, and in improving global health security. At home, we are strengthening our ability to prevent outbreaks and ensure sufficient capacity to respond rapidly and manage biological incidents. As an exemplar of a modern and responsive public health system, we will accelerate our work with partners through the Global Health Security Agenda in pursuit of a world that is safer and more secure from infectious disease. We will save lives by strengthening regulatory frameworks for food safety and developing a global system to prevent avoidable epidemics, detect and report disease outbreaks in real time, and respond more rapidly and effectively. Finally, we will continue to lead efforts to combat the rise of antibiotic resistant bacteria.

III. PROSPERITY

Our economy is the largest, most open, and innovative in the world. Our leadership has also helped usher in a new era of unparalleled global prosperity. Sustaining our leadership depends on shaping an emerging global economic order that continues to reflect our interests and values. Despite its success, our rules-based system is now competing against alternative, less-open models. Moreover, the American consumer cannot sustain global demand – growth must be more balanced. To meet this challenge, we must be strategic in the use of our economic strength to set new rules of the road, strengthen our partnerships, and promote inclusive development.

Through our trade and investment policies, we will shape globalization so that it is working for American workers. By leveraging our improved economic and energy position, we will strengthen the global financial system and advance high-standard trade deals. We will ensure tomorrow's global trading system is consistent with our interests and values by seeking to establish and enforce rules through international institutions and regional initiatives and by addressing emerging challenges like state-owned enterprises and digital protectionism. U.S. markets and educational opportunities will help the next generation of global entrepreneurs sustain momentum in growing a global middle class. To prevent conflict and promote human dignity, we will also pursue policies that eradicate extreme poverty and reduce inequality.

Put Our Economy to Work

The American economy is an engine for global economic growth and a source of stability for the international system. In addition to being a key measure of power and influence in its own right, it underwrites our military strength and diplomatic influence. A strong economy, combined with a prominent U.S. presence in the global financial system, creates opportunities to advance our security.

To ensure our economic competitiveness, we are investing in a new foundation for sustained economic growth that creates good jobs and rising incomes. Because knowledge is the currency of today's global economy, we must keep expanding access to early childhood and affordable higher education. The further acceleration of our manufacturing revolution will create the next generation of high technology manufacturing jobs. Immigration reform that combines smart and effective enforcement of the law with a pathway to citizenship for those who earn it remains an imperative. We will deliver quality, affordable healthcare to more and more Americans. We will also support job creation, strengthen the middle class, and spur economic growth by opening markets and leveling the playing field for American workers and businesses abroad. Jobs will also grow as we expand our work with trading partners to eliminate barriers to the full deployment of U.S. innovation in the digital space. These efforts are complemented by more modern and reliable infrastructure that ensures safety and enables growth.

In addition to the positive benefits of trade and commerce, a strong and well-regulated economy positions the United States to lead international efforts to promote financial transparency and prevent the global financial system from being abused by transnational criminal and terrorist organizations to engage in, or launder the proceeds of illegal activity. We will continue to work within the Financial Action Task Force, the G-20, and other fora to enlist all nations in the fight to protect the integrity of the global financial system.

Advance Our Energy Security

The United States is now the world leader in oil and gas production. America's energy revival is not only good for growth, it offers new buffers against the coercive use of energy by some and new opportunities for helping others transition to low-carbon economies. American oil production has increased dramatically, impacting global markets. Imports have decreased substantially, reducing the funds we send overseas. Consumption has declined, reducing our vulnerability to global supply disruption and price shocks. However, we still have a significant stake in the energy security of our allies in Europe and elsewhere. Seismic shifts in supply and demand are underway across the

globe. Increasing global access to reliable and affordable energy is one of the most powerful ways to support social and economic development and to help build new markets for U.S. technology and investment.

The challenges faced by Ukrainian and European dependence on Russian energy supplies puts a spotlight on the need for an expanded view of energy security that recognizes the collective needs of the United States, our allies, and trading partners as well as the importance of competitive energy markets. Therefore, we must promote diversification of energy fuels, sources, and routes, as well as encourage indigenous sources of energy supply. Greater energy security and independence within the Americas is central to these efforts. We will also stay engaged with global suppliers and our partners to reduce the potential for energy-related conflict in places like the Arctic and Asia. Our energy security will be further enhanced by living up to commitments made in the Rome Declaration and through our all-of- the-above energy strategy for a low-carbon world. We will continue to develop American fossil resources while becoming a more efficient country that develops cleaner, alternative fuels and vehicles. We are demonstrating that America can and will lead the global economy while reducing our emissions.

Lead in Science, Technology, and Innovation

Scientific discovery and technological innovation empower American leadership with a competitive edge that secures our military advantage, propels our economy, and improves the human condition. Sustaining that edge requires robust Federal investments in basic and applied research. We must also strengthen science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education to produce tomorrow's discoverers, inventors, entrepreneurs, and high-skills workforce. Our commitment remains strong to preparation and compensation for STEM teachers, broadband connectivity and high-tech educational tools for schools, programs that inspire and provide opportunities for girls and underrepresented minorities, and support for innovation in STEM teaching and inclusion in higher education. We will also keep our edge by opening our national labs to more commercial partnerships while tapping research and development in the private sector, including a wide range of start-ups and firms at the leading edge of America's innovation economy.

Shape the Global Economic Order

We have recovered from the global economic crisis, but much remains to be done to shape the emerging economic order to avoid future crises. We have responsibilities at home to continue to improve our banking practices and forge ahead with regulatory reform, even as we press others to align with our robust standards. In addition to securing our immediate economic interests, we must drive the inclusive economic growth that creates demand for American exports. We will protect the free movement of information and work to prevent the risky behavior that led to the recent crisis, while addressing resurgent economic forces, from state capitalism to market-distorting free-riding.

American leadership is central to strengthening global finance rules and making sure they are consistent and transparent. We will work through the G-20 to reinforce the core architecture of the international financial and economic system, including the World Trade Organization, to ensure it is positioned to foster both stability and growth. We remain committed to governance reforms for these same institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to make them more effective and representative. In so doing, we seek to ensure institutions reinforce, rather than undermine, an effective global financial system.

We believe trade agreements have economic and strategic benefits for the United States. We will therefore work with the Congress to achieve bipartisan renewal of Trade Promotion Authority and to advance a trade agenda that brings jobs to our shores, increases standards of living, strengthens our partners and allies, and promotes stability in critical regions. The United States has one of the most open economies in the world. Our tariffs are low, and we do not use regulation to discriminate against foreign goods. The same is not true throughout the world, which is why our trade agenda is focused on lowering tariffs on American products, breaking down barriers to our goods and services, and setting higher standards to level the playing field for American workers and firms.

Through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), we are setting the world's highest standards for labor rights and environmental protection, while removing barriers to U.S. exports and putting the United States at the center of a free trade zone covering two-thirds of the global economy. Our goal is to use this position, along with our highly skilled workforce, strong rule of law, and abundant supply of affordable energy, to make America the production platform of choice and the premier investment destination. In addition to these major regional agreements, we will work to achieve groundbreaking agreements to liberalize trade in services, information technology, and environmental goods – areas where the United States is a global leader in innovation. And we will make it easier for businesses of all sizes to expand their reach by improving supply chains and regulatory cooperation.

All countries will benefit when we open markets further, extend and enhance tools such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and reduce inefficiencies in the global trading system through trade facilitation improvements. And through our development initiatives – such as Power Africa, Trade Africa, Feed the Future, and the Open Government Partnership – we will continue to work closely with governments, the private sector, and civil society to foster inclusive economic growth, reduce corruption, and build capacity at the local level. Investment in critical infrastructure and security will facilitate trade among countries, especially for developing and emerging economies.

End Extreme Poverty

We have an historic opportunity to end extreme poverty within a generation and put our societies on a path of shared and sustained prosperity. In so doing, we will foster export markets for U.S. businesses, improve investment opportunities, and decrease the need for costly military interventions. Growth in the global economy has lifted hundreds of millions out of extreme poverty. We have already made significant progress guided in part through global consensus and mobilization around the Millennium Development Goals. The world cut the percentage of people living in extreme poverty in half between 1990 and 2010. In that period, nearly 800 million people rose above the international poverty line. By 2012, child deaths were down almost 50 percent since 1990. Twenty-nine countries registered as low- income in 2000 have today achieved middle-income status, and private capital and domestic resources far outstrip donor assistance as the primary means for financing development. Trends in economic growth also signal what is possible; sub-Saharan Africa has averaged an aggregate annual growth rate of over 5 percent for the last decade despite the disruptions of the world financial crisis.

We are now working with many partners to put ending extreme poverty at the center of a new global sustainable development agenda that will mobilize action for the next 15 years. We will press for transformative investments in areas like women's equality and empowerment, education, sustainable energy, and governance. We will use trade and investment to harness job-rich economic growth. We will concentrate on the clear need for country ownership and political commitment and reinforce the linkage between social and economic development. We will lead the effort to marshal diverse resources and broad coalitions to advance the imperative of accountable, democratic governance.

We will use our leadership to promote a model of financing that leverages billions in investment from the private sector and draws on America's scientific, technological, and entrepreneurial strengths to take to scale proven solutions in partnership with governments, business, and civil society. And we will leverage our leadership in promoting food

security, enhancing resilience, modernizing rural agriculture, reducing the vulnerability of the poor, and eliminating preventable child and maternal deaths as we drive progress toward an AIDS-free generation.

IV. VALUES

To lead effectively in a world experiencing significant political change, the United States must live our values at home while promoting universal values abroad. From the Middle East to Ukraine to Southeast Asia to the Americas, citizens are more empowered in seeking greater freedoms and accountable institutions. But these demands have often produced an equal and opposite reaction from backers of discredited authoritarian orders, resulting in crackdowns and conflict. Many of the threats to our security in recent years arose from efforts by authoritarian states to oppose democratic forces – from the crisis caused by Russian aggression in Ukraine to the rise of ISIL within the Syrian civil war. By the same token, many of our greatest opportunities stem from advances for liberty and rule of law – from sub-Saharan Africa to Eastern Europe to Burma.

Defending democracy and human rights is related to every enduring national interest. It aligns us with the aspirations of ordinary people throughout the world. We know from our own history people must lead their own struggles for freedom if those struggles are to succeed. But America is also uniquely situated – and routinely expected – to support peaceful democratic change. We will continue mobilizing international support to strengthen and expand global norms of human rights. We will support women, youth, civil society, journalists, and entrepreneurs as drivers of change. We will continue to insist that governments uphold their human rights obligations, speak out against repression wherever it occurs, and work to prevent, and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities.

Our closest allies in these efforts will be, as they always have, other democratic states. But, even where our strategic interests require us to engage governments that do not share all our values, we will continue to speak out clearly for human rights and human dignity in our public and private diplomacy. Any support we might provide will be balanced with an awareness of the costs of repressive policies for our own security interests and the democratic values by which we live. Because our human rights advocacy will be most effective when we work in concert with a wide range of partners, we are building coalitions with civil society, religious leaders, businesses, other governments, and inter-

national organizations. We will also work to ensure people enjoy the same rights – and security – online as they are entitled to enjoy offline by opposing efforts to restrict information and punish speech.

Live Our Values

Our values are a source of strength and security, and our ability to promote our values abroad is directly tied to our willingness to abide by them at home. In recent years, questions about America's post-9/11 security policies have often been exploited by our adversaries, while testing our commitment to civil liberties and the rule of law at home. For the sake of our security and our leadership in the world, it is essential we hold ourselves to the highest possible standard, even as we do what is necessary to secure our people.

To that end, we strengthened our commitment against torture and have prohibited so-called enhanced interrogation techniques that were contrary to American values, while implementing stronger safeguards for the humane treatment of detainees. We have transferred many detainees from Guantanamo Bay, and we are working with the Congress to remove the remaining restrictions on detainee transfers so that we can finally close it. Where prosecution is an option, we will bring terrorists to justice through both civilian and, when appropriate, reformed military commission proceedings that incorporate fundamental due process and other protections essential to the effective administration of justice.

Our vital intelligence activities are also being reformed to preserve the capabilities needed to secure our interests while continuing to respect privacy and curb the potential for abuse. We are increasing transparency so the public can be confident our surveillance activities are consistent with the rule of law and governed by effective oversight. We have not and will not collect signals intelligence to suppress criticism or dissent or to afford a competitive advantage to U.S. companies. Safeguards currently in place governing how we retain and share intelligence are being extended to protect personal information regardless of nationality.

Advance Equality

American values are reflective of the universal values we champion all around the world – including the freedoms of speech, worship, and peaceful assembly; the ability to choose leaders democratically; and the right to due process and equal administration of justice.

We will be a champion for communities that are too frequently vulnerable to violence, abuse, and neglect – such as ethnic and religious minorities; people with disabilities; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) individuals; displaced persons; and migrant workers.

Recognizing that no society will succeed if it does not draw on the potential of all its people, we are pressing for the political and economic participation of women and girls – who are too often denied their inalienable rights and face substantial barriers to opportunity in too many places. Our efforts include helping girls everywhere get the education they need to participate fully in the economy and realize their potential. We are focused on reducing the scourge of violence against women around the globe by providing support for affected populations and enhancing efforts to improve judicial systems so perpetrators are held accountable.

Support Emerging Democracies

The United States will concentrate attention and resources to help countries consolidate their gains and move toward more democratic and representative systems of governance. Our focus is on supporting countries that are moving in the right direction – whether it is the peaceful transitions of power we see in sub-Saharan Africa; the movement toward constitutional democracy in Tunisia; or the opening taking place in Burma. In each instance, we are creating incentives for positive reform and disincentives for backsliding.

The road from demanding rights in the square to building institutions that guarantee them is long and hard. In the last quarter century, parts of Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, and East Asia have consolidated transitions to democracy, but not without setbacks. The popular uprisings that began in the Arab world took place in a region with weaker democratic traditions, powerful authoritarian elites, sectarian tensions, and active violent extremist elements, so it is not surprising setbacks have thus far outnumbered triumphs. Yet, change is inevitable in the Middle East and North Africa, as it is in all places where the illusion of stability is artificially maintained by silencing dissent.

But the direction of that change is not predetermined. We will therefore continue to look for ways to support the success and ease the difficulties of democratic transitions through responsible assistance, investment and trade, and by supporting political, economic, and security reforms. We will continue to push for reforms in authoritarian countries not currently undergoing wholesale transitions. Good governance is also predicated on strengthening the state-society relationship. When citizens have a voice in

the decisionmaking that affects them, governments make better decisions and citizens are better able to participate, innovate, and contribute.

The corrosive effects of corruption must be overcome. While information sharing allows us to identify corrupt officials more easily, globalization has also made it easier for corrupt officials to hide the proceeds of corruption abroad, increasing the need for strong and consistent implementation of the international standards on combating illicit finance. The United States is leading the way in promoting adherence to standards of accountable and transparent governance, including through initiatives like the Open Government Partnership. We will utilize a broad range of tools to recover assets stolen by corrupt officials and make it harder for criminals to hide, launder, and benefit from illegal proceeds. Our leadership toward governance that is more open, responsible, and accountable makes clear that democracy can deliver better government and development for ordinary people.

Empower Civil Society and Young Leaders

Democracy depends on more than elections, or even government institutions. Through civil society, citizens come together to hold their leaders accountable and address challenges. Civil society organizations often drive innovations and develop new ideas and approaches to solve social, economic, and political problems that governments can apply on a larger scale. Moreover, by giving people peaceful avenues to advance their interests and express their convictions, a free and flourishing civil society contributes to stability and helps to counter violent extremism.

Still, civil society and individual activists face challenges in many parts of the world. As technology empowers individuals and nongovernmental groups to mobilize around a wide array of issues – from countering corruption and advancing the rule of law to environmental activism –political elites in authoritarian states, and even in some with more democratic traditions, are acting to restrict space for civil society. Restrictions are often seen through new laws and regulations that deny groups the foreign funding they depend on to operate, that criminalize groups of people like the LGBT community, or deny political opposition groups the freedom to assemble in peaceful protest. The United States is countering this trend by providing direct support for civil society and by advocating rollback of laws and regulations that undermine citizens' rights. We are also supporting technologies that expand access to information, enable freedom of expression, and connect civil society groups in this fight around the world.

More than 50 percent of the world's people are under 30 years old. Many struggle to make a life in countries with broken governance. We are taking the initiative to build relationships with the world's young people, identifying future leaders in government, business, and civil society and connecting them to one another and to the skills they need to thrive. We have established new programs of exchange among young Americans and young people from Africa to Southeast Asia, building off the successes of the International Visitor and Young African Leaders initiatives. We are fostering increased education exchanges in our hemisphere. And we are catalyzing economic growth and innovation within societies by lifting up and promoting entrepreneurship.

Prevent Mass Atrocities

The mass killing of civilians is an affront to our common humanity and a threat to our common security. It destabilizes countries and regions, pushes refugees across borders, and creates grievances that extremists exploit. We have a strong interest in leading an international response to genocide and mass atrocities when they arise, recognizing options are more extensive and less costly when we act preventively before situations reach crisis proportions. We know the risk of mass atrocities escalates when citizens are denied basic rights and freedoms, are unable to hold accountable the institutions of government, or face unrelenting poverty and conflict. We affirm our support for the international consensus that governments have the responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities and that this responsibility passes to the broader international community when those governments manifestly fail to protect their populations. We will work with the international community to prevent and call to account those responsible for the worst human rights abuses, including through support to the International Criminal Court, consistent with U.S. law and our commitment to protecting our personnel. Moreover, we will continue to mobilize allies and partners to strengthen our collective efforts to prevent and respond to mass atrocities using all our instruments of national power.

V. INTERNATIONAL ORDER

We have an opportunity – and obligation – to lead the way in reinforcing, shaping, and where appropriate, creating the rules, norms, and institutions that are the foundation for peace, security, prosperity, and the protection of human rights in the 21st century. The modern-day international system currently relies heavily on an international legal architecture, economic and political institutions, as well as alliances and partnerships the United States and other like-minded nations established after World War II. Sustained by robust American leadership, this system has served us well for 70 years, facilitating international cooperation, burden sharing, and accountability. It carried us through the Cold War and ushered in a wave of democratization. It reduced barriers to trade, expanded free markets, and enabled advances in human dignity and prosperity.

But, the system has never been perfect, and aspects of it are increasingly challenged. We have seen too many cases where a failure to marshal the will and resources for collective action has led to inaction. The U.N. and other multilateral institutions are stressed by, among other things, resource demands, competing imperatives among member states, and the need for reform across a range of policy and administrative areas. Despite these undeniable strains, the vast majority of states do not want to replace the system we have. Rather, they look to America for the leadership needed to both fortify it and help it evolve to meet the wide range of challenges described throughout this strategy.

The United States will continue to make the development of sustainable solutions in all of these areas a foreign policy priority and devote diplomatic and other resources accordingly. We will continue to embrace the post-World War II legal architecture – from the U.N. Charter to the multilateral treaties that govern the conduct of war, respect for human rights, nonproliferation, and many other topics of global concern – as essential to the ordering of a just and peaceful world, where nations live peacefully within their borders, and all men and women have the opportunity to reach their potential. We will lead by example in fulfilling our responsibilities within this architecture, demonstrating to the world it is possible to protect security consistent with robust values. We will work vigorously both within the U.N. and other multilateral institutions, and with member states, to strengthen and modernize capacities – from peacekeeping to humanitarian relief – so they endure to provide protection, stability, and support for future generations.

At the same time, we will exact an appropriate cost on transgressors. Targeted economic sanctions remain an effective tool for imposing costs on those irresponsible actors whose military aggression, illicit proliferation, or unprovoked violence threaten both international rules and norms and the peace they were designed to preserve. We will

pursue multilateral sanctions, including through the U.N., whenever possible, but will act alone, if necessary. Our sanctions will continue to be carefully designed and tailored to achieve clear aims while minimizing any unintended consequences for other economic actors, the global economy, and civilian populations.

In many cases, our use of targeted sanctions and other coercive measures are meant not only to uphold international norms, but to deter severe threats to stability and order at the regional level. We are not allowing the transgressors to define our regional strategies on the basis of the immediate threats they present. Rather, we are advancing a longer-term affirmative agenda in each of the regions, which prioritizes reinvigorating alliances with long-standing friends, making investments in new partnerships with emerging democratic powers with whom our interests are increasingly aligned, and continuing to support the development of capable, inclusive regional institutions to help enforce common international rules.

Advance Our Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific

The United States has been and will remain a Pacific power. Over the next 5 years, nearly half of all growth outside the United States is expected to come from Asia. That said, the security dynamics of the region – including contested maritime territorial claims and a provocative North Korea – risk escalation and conflict. American leadership will remain essential to shaping the region's long-term trajectory to enhance stability and security, facilitate trade and commerce through an open and transparent system, and ensure respect for universal rights and freedoms.

To realize this vision, we are diversifying our security relationships in Asia as well as our defense posture and presence. We are modernizing our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines and enhancing the interactions among them to ensure they are fully capable of responding to regional and global challenges. We are committed to strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation to reinforce shared rules and norms, forge collective responses to shared challenges, and help ensure peaceful resolution of disputes. We are also working with our Asian partners to promote more open and transparent economies and regional support for international economic norms that are vital to maintaining it as an engine for global economic growth. The TPP is central to this effort.

As we have done since World War II, the United States will continue to support the advance of security, development, and democracy in Asia and the Pacific. This is an important focus of the deepening partnerships we are building in Southeast Asia includ-

ing with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. We will uphold our treaty obligations to South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand, while encouraging the latter to return quickly to democracy. We will support the people of Burma to deepen and sustain reforms, including democratic consolidation and national reconciliation.

The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China. We seek to develop a constructive relationship with China that delivers benefits for our two peoples and promotes security and prosperity in Asia and around the world. We seek cooperation on shared regional and global challenges such as climate change, public health, economic growth, and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. While there will be competition, we reject the inevitability of confrontation. At the same time, we will manage competition from a position of strength while insisting that China uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights. We will closely monitor China's military modernization and expanding presence in Asia, while seeking ways to reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation. On cybersecurity, we will take necessary actions to protect our businesses and defend our networks against cyber-theft of trade secrets for commercial gain whether by private actors or the Chinese government.

In South Asia, we continue to strengthen our strategic and economic partnership with India. As the world's largest democracies, we share inherent values and mutual interests that form the cornerstone of our cooperation, particularly in the areas of security, energy, and the environment. We support India's role as a regional provider of security and its expanded participation in critical regional institutions. We see a strategic convergence with India's Act East policy and our continued implementation of the rebal- ance to Asia and the Pacific. At the same time, we will continue to work with both India and Pakistan to promote strategic stability, combat terrorism, and advance regional economic integration in South and Central Asia.

Strengthen Our Enduring Alliance with Europe

The United States maintains a profound commitment to a Europe that is free, whole, and at peace. A strong Europe is our indispensable partner, including for tackling global security challenges, promoting prosperity, and upholding international norms. Our work with Europe leverages our strong and historic bilateral relationships throughout the continent. We will steadfastly support the aspirations of countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration, continue to transform our relationship with Turkey, and enhance ties with countries in the Caucasus while encouraging resolution of regional conflict.

NATO is the strongest alliance the world has ever known and is the hub of an expanding global security network. Our Article 5 commitment to the collective defense of all NATO Members is ironclad, as is our commitment to ensuring the Alliance remains ready and capable for crisis response and cooperative security. We will continue to deepen our relationship with the European Union (EU), which has helped to promote peace and prosperity across the region, and deepen NATO-EU ties to enhance transatlantic security. To build on the millions of jobs supported by transatlantic trade, we support a pro-growth agenda in Europe to strengthen and broaden the region's recovery, and we seek an ambitious T-TIP to boost exports, support jobs, and raise global standards for trade.

Russia's aggression in Ukraine makes clear that European security and the international rules and norms against territorial aggression cannot be taken for granted. In response, we have led an international effort to support the Ukrainian people as they choose their own future and develop their democracy and economy. We are reassuring our allies by backing our security commitments and increasing responsiveness through training and exercises, as well as a dynamic presence in Central and Eastern Europe to deter further Russian aggression. This will include working with Europe to improve its energy security in both the short and long term. We will support partners such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine so they can better work alongside the United States and NATO, as well as provide for their own defense.

And we will continue to impose significant costs on Russia through sanctions and other means while countering Moscow's deceptive propaganda with the unvarnished truth. We will deter Russian aggression, remain alert to its strategic capabilities, and help our allies and partners resist Russian coercion over the long term, if necessary. At the same time, we will keep the door open to greater collaboration with Russia in areas of common interests, should it choose a different path – a path of peaceful cooperation that respects the sovereignty and democratic development of neighboring states.

Seek Stability and Peace in the Middle East and North Africa

In the Middle East, we will dismantle terrorist networks that threaten our people, confront external aggression against our allies and partners, ensure the free flow of energy from the region to the world, and prevent the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we remain committed to a vision of the Middle East that is peaceful and prosperous, where democracy takes root and human rights are upheld.

Resolving these connected conflicts, and enabling long-term stability in the region, requires more than the use and presence of American military forces. For one, it requires partners who can defend themselves. We are therefore investing in the ability of Israel, Jordan, and our Gulf partners to deter aggression while maintaining our unwavering commitment to Israel's security, including its Qualitative Military Edge. We are working with the Iraqi government to resolve Sunni grievances through more inclusive and responsive governance. With our partners in the region and around the world, we are leading a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. At the same time, we will continue to pursue a lasting political solution to the devastating conflict in Syria.

Stability and peace in the Middle East and North Africa also requires reducing the underlying causes of conflict. America will therefore continue to work with allies and partners toward a comprehensive agreement with Iran that resolves the world's concerns with the Iranian nuclear program. We remain committed to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a two-state solution that ensures Israel's security and Palestine's viability. We will support efforts to deescalate sectarian tensions and violence between Shi'a and Sunni communities throughout the region. We will help countries in transition make political and economic reforms and build state capacity to maintain security, law and order, and respect for universal rights. In this respect, we seek a stable Yemen that undertakes difficult structural reforms and confronts an active threat from al-Qa'ida and other rebels. We will work with Tunisia to further progress on building democratic institutions and strengthening its economy. We will work with the U.N. and our Arab and European partners in an effort to help stabilize Libya and reduce the threat posed by lawless militias and extremists. And we will maintain strategic cooperation with Egypt to enable it to respond to shared security threats, while broadening our partnership and encouraging progress toward restoration of democratic institutions.

Invest in Africa's Future

Africa is rising. Many countries in Africa are making steady progress in growing their economies, improving democratic governance and rule of law, and supporting human rights and basic freedoms. Urbanization and a burgeoning youth population are changing the region's demographics, and young people are increasingly making their voices heard. But there are still many countries where the transition to democracy is uneven and slow with some leaders clinging to power. Corruption is endemic and public health systems are broken in too many places. And too many governments are responding to

the expansion of civil society and free press by passing laws and adopting policies that erode that progress. Ongoing conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic, as well as violent extremists fighting governments in Somalia, Nigeria, and across the Sahel all pose threats to innocent civilians, regional stability, and our national security.

For decades, American engagement with Africa was defined by aid to help Africans reduce insecurity, famine, and disease. In contrast, the partnerships we are forging today, and will expand in the coming years, aim to build upon the aspirations of Africans. Through our Power Africa Initiative, we aim to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa. We will increase trade and business ties, generating export-driven growth through initiatives like Trade Africa and AGOA. We will continue to support U.S. companies to deepen investment in what can be the world's next major center of global growth, including through the Doing Business in Africa campaign. Moreover, we are investing in tomorrow's leaders – the young entrepreneurs, innovators, civic leaders, and public servants who will shape the continent's future. We are strengthening civilian and military institutions through our Security Governance Initiative, and working to advance human rights and eliminate corruption. We are deepening our security partnerships with African countries and institutions, exemplified by our partnerships with the U.N. and AU in Mali and Somalia. Such efforts will help to resolve conflicts, strengthen African peacekeeping capacity, and counter transnational security threats while respecting human rights and the rule of law.

Our investment in nutrition and agricultural capacity will continue, reducing hunger through initiatives such as Feed the Future. We will keep working with partners to reduce deaths from Ebola, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis across Africa through such initiatives as the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Global Health Security Agenda. The Ebola epidemic in 2014 serves as a stark reminder of the threat posed by infectious disease and the imperative of global collective action to meet it. American leadership has proven essential to bringing to bear the international community to contain recent crises while building public health capacity to prevent future ones.

Deepen Economic and Security Cooperation in the Americas

We will continue to advance a Western Hemisphere that is prosperous, secure, democratic, and plays a greater global role. In the region as a whole, the number of people in the middle class has surpassed the number of people living in poverty for the first time in history, and the hemisphere is increasingly important to global energy supplies.

These gains, however, are put at risk by weak institutions, high crime rates, powerful organized crime groups, an illicit drug trade, lingering economic disparity, and inadequate education and health systems.

To meet these challenges, we are working with Canada and Mexico to enhance our collective economic competitiveness while advancing prosperity in our hemisphere. With Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Canada, we are setting new global trade standards as we grow a strong contingent of countries in the Americas that favor open trading systems to include TPP. We seek to advance our economic partnership with Brazil, as it works to preserve gains in reducing poverty and deliver the higher standards of public services expected by the middle class.

We are also championing a strong and effective inter-American human rights and rule of law system. We are expanding our collaboration across the Americas to support democratic consolidation and increase public-private partnerships in education, sustainable development, access to electricity, climate resilience, and countering transnational organized crime.

Such collaboration is especially important in vulnerable countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, where government institutions are threatened by criminal syndicates. Migration surges involving unaccompanied children across our southern border is one major consequence of weak institutions and violence. American leadership, in partnership with these countries and with the support of their neighbors, remains essential to arresting the slide backwards and to creating steady improvements in economic growth and democratic governance. Likewise, we remain committed to helping rebuild Haiti and to put it and our other Caribbean neighbors on a path to sustainable development.

We will support the resolution of longstanding regional conflicts, particularly Colombia's conclusion of a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Overall, we have deepened our strategic partnership with Colombia, which is a key contributor to international peace and security. Equally, we stand by the citizens of countries where the full exercise of democracy is at risk, such as Venezuela. Though a few countries in the region remain trapped in old ideological debates, we will keep working with all governments that are interested in cooperating with us in practical ways to reinforce the principles enumerated in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. As part of our effort to promote a fully democratic hemisphere, we will advance our new opening to Cuba in a way that most effectively promotes the ability of the Cuban people to determine their future freely.

VI. CONCLUSION

This *National Security Strategy* provides a vision for strengthening and sustaining American leadership in this still young century. It clarifies the purpose and promise of American power. It aims to advance our interests and values with initiative and from a position of strength. We will deter and defeat any adversary that threatens our national security and that of our allies. We confidently welcome the peaceful rise of other countries as partners to share the burdens for maintaining a more peaceful and prosperous world. We will continue to collaborate with established and emerging powers to promote our shared security and defend our common humanity, even as we compete with them in economic and other realms. We will uphold and refresh the international rules and norms that set the parameters for such collaboration and competition. We will do all of this and more with confidence that the international system whose creation we led in the aftermath of World War II will continue to serve America and the world well. This is an ambitious, but achievable agenda, especially if we continue to restore the bipartisan center that has been a pillar of strength for American foreign policy in decades past. America has greater capacity to adapt and recover from setbacks than any other country. A core element of our strength is our unity and our certainty that American leadership in this century, like the last, remains indispensable.

Towards an EU global strategy

Nathalie Tocci [1]

The prelude

I recall the first conversation that I had with Federica Mogherini on an EU global strategy in September 2014. At the time, she was still the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, but had recently been designated by the European Council as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission. When asked about her views on formulating a coherent EU foreign policy strategy her response was unambiguously positive. The idea of engaging in a process that could help the European Union, with its many voices, sing 'from the same hymn sheet' and in greater harmony, instinctively appealed to her. Unlike her predecessor, Catherine Ashton, who made no secret of her scepticism towards strategy, Federica was immediately drawn to the idea. A few weeks later, when asked for her views on the subject during her hearing at the European Parliament, she gave the first clear indication of what she had in mind, calling for a 'strategic rethink' in EU foreign policy.[2] She did not go into details on that occasion, but the first seeds of what was to become the 'EU strategic reflection process' were sown.

We resumed the conversation early in 2015 in light of the looming deadline stemming from the mandate entrusted to the HR/VP by the European Council in December 2013. In those Council conclusions, the HR/VP was asked 'in close cooperation with the Commission, to assess the impact of changes in the global environment, and to report to the Council in the course of 2015 on the challenges and opportunities arising for the Union, following consultations with the Member States'.

By her 100th day in office, on the occasion of the 51st Munich Security Conference, Federica Mogherini expressed her clear intention to produce a new strategy: 'We need a sense of direction. We need an ability to make choices and to prioritise. We need a sense of how we can best mobilise our instruments to serve our goals and in partnership with

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2. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings-2014/en/schedule/06-10-2014/federica-mogherini.

whom.... We need a new strategy'. Her rationale was clear: 'In these times of crisis it is not easy to go beyond the immediacy of today. But taking the time to look ahead is not a luxury. It is an essential prerequisite to transition from the current global chaos to a new peaceful global order.'[3]

The purpose

But what is the underlying 'political' purpose of an EU global strategy in 2015? The 2003 EU Security Strategy (ESS) was born out of a specific geopolitical context. Through the ESS, High Representative Javier Solana sought to heal the internal European wounds opened by the 2003 US-led war in Iraq and the acrimonious divisions, notably between the United Kingdom on the one hand and France and Germany on the other. The political intent behind the 2003 ESS transpired in the text: 'effective multilateralism' epitomised the Franco-German attempt to assert a European preference for multilateralism, while qualifying such multilateralism as effective, thus allowing the UK and other 'Atlantic' member states to give Washington a nod and a wink.

In a conversation in early 2015 Robert Cooper, one of the key contributors to the 2003 ESS, asked me what the underlying purpose of a new EU strategy would be. In this case too, the primary purpose of an 'external' strategy is actually internal. Russia notwithstanding, the divisions between member states in 2015 are nowhere as deep or impassioned as they were in 2002-2003. Member states do have different priorities and different readings of the 'ring of fire' surrounding the Union. But there is no major schism that threatens to bring EU foreign policy to a standstill. So far at least, and no doubt to Moscow's surprise and chagrin, EU unity, while fragile, has been maintained.

Today we live in far more turbulent times than we did back then however. We are also witnessing a period of relative European decline, be it because of the EU's financial and economic crisis, be it because of the rise of new (and old) powers across the globe, be it because of the diffusion of power beyond institutional boundaries. When resources are in short supply but problems increase, making the best of what one has becomes an imperative necessity. The Lisbon Treaty is one of the assets we have today that we lacked in 2003. The Treaty on European Union was a disappointment to those who had hoped for a truly common EU foreign policy that would tower over if not replace member states' individual foreign policies. But the Treaty does allow the EU to bring the various strands of its external action together under a single 'hat'. The creation of a double-hatted HRVP and of the European External Action Service symbolised this intent. Six years on we are still far from a genuine and comprehensive implementation of

3. http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_16063_en.htm.

the letter and spirit of the Treaty. EU foreign policy too often still looks like a mishmash of non-communicating vessels driven by distinct, at times contrasting, objectives and processes, bereft of an overall sense of direction. Institutional turf wars have been the *leitmotif* of the Brussels bubble over the last five years.

The first piece of good news is that the EU foreign policy community concurred on the diagnosis of the problem, and frustration mounted within the institutions too. The next piece of good news was that the new EU political leadership that emerged after the 2014 European Parliament elections appreciated the challenge ahead. President Juncker's move towards a 'clustered' Commission opened the way for the establishment of a Commissioners' Group on External Action, chaired by the HRVP: an important institutional step towards the realisation of a joined-up EU foreign policy.

Enter the global strategy. A strategy can contribute to a joined-up EU external action in line with the letter and spirit of the Lisbon Treaty. By identifying and agreeing on a set of interests and goals as well as on the means to achieve them, a strategy can become a tool that encourages different actors, instruments and policies to work in greater synergy. If the 2016 EU Global Strategy were to achieve this aim, even partially, that accomplishment would be no mean feat. This is the ultimate reason why the intention, since the outset of the strategic reflection process, was not that of revising the 2003 European Security Strategy, but rather that of developing a broader Global Strategy that would bring together into a coherent whole all the dimensions of EU external action, security and non-security related. Javier Solana in 2003 did not have that opportunity. Catherine Ashton chose not to seize it. Federica Mogherini wants to give it her best shot. As Churchill famously put it: 'Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we must think'. Developing an EU Global Strategy seeks to do exactly that.

The process

In the early days of 2015 we began the work in earnest. The decision was taken to divide the process into two phases. In a first phase, running from January to June 2015, the work would concentrate on producing a strategic assessment. If the European Council granted the HR/VP a mandate to pursue the work after June, a second phase would then concentrate on an EU Global Strategy in the months that followed. There were five key reasons for this approach.

First, the mandate. The December 2013 Council Conclusions did give the HR/VP a mandate, but it was not a mandate to produce a new strategy. That mandate reflected what at the time was an ambiguous position within the European Council on the issue. Some member states, notably Finland, Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden, had been

pushing for a new ESS since 2009. The 'Big Three' – France, Germany and the UK – were against. Those member states that had pushed for a new ESS ultimately proceeded through a track-two exercise led by four think tanks (Elcano, IAI, PISM and UI). The eurozone crisis raged on and precious little attention was paid to EU strategy-making in the turbulent years that followed. Yet by 2013, the European Council, amidst a rapidly deteriorating security environment, agreed on a fudge: it mandated the HR/VP not to deliver a new ESS, but to 'do something' about strategy by producing a report on the changes in the global environment and the challenges and opportunities arising for the Union. The HR/VP had to fulfil the letter of that mandate. And this she set out to do. Beyond this, however, Federica's intent was to obtain a mandate for a new strategy. The strategic assessment presented to the European Council in June 2015 also served that purpose. The goal was accomplished, with the European Council stating that: 'the High Representative will continue the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with member states, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016'.

Second, the timing. Some had suggested that the December 2013 European Council conclusions could have been read as a mandate for a new strategy. While this was dubious at best, the truth is that the new HR/VP was in no rush. Had the December 2013 conclusions been interpreted as a mandate to produce a new strategy, then by December 2015, little over a year into the new job, Federica Mogherini should have delivered a new strategy. It is certainly possible to write a document, even a good one, in one year. But can a new HR/VP settle into a new job, manage day-to-day urgent matters, while also defining her priorities, making the necessary institutional adjustments to reflect these, and building trust, momentum and convergence among 28 member states, EU institutions and the wider foreign policy community on a major strategic document in such a short timeframe? Probably not. Here it is important to stress that for this HR/VP, the value in the exercise lies in the process as much as in the product. In Munich, she called for a strategy 'that is not drawn up in a closet by a select few, but a broad process that involves the member states and EU institutions, as well as the foreign policy community spanning across academic and think tanks, the media and civil society.'[4] And she meant what she said. Not out of political correctness, but because if a strategy – regardless of its quality – is to provide a reference point for foreign policy-makers and shapers across the Union, it must be the product of a collective rethink. And this takes time. Hence, the rationale of dividing the exercise into two phases. By June we aimed to produce a 'strategic assessment' following the letter of the December 2013 conclusions, hoping that this would provide the springboard to move forward for the strategy proper.

4. http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_16063_en.htm.

Third, the need to clear the ground and set precise parameters in the strategic reflection. The 2003 ESS, according to its own authors, was only partially a strategy. It provided an overall vision, a sound analysis and a well-crafted set of overarching goals. But it said little about the means to achieve these, apart from a general observation that in the defence field more was needed. By dividing this new exercise into two phases – and documents – the intention was to clear the ground through the systematic sifting and assessment of aspects of mapping and analysis that would have otherwise made their way into the strategy itself. The snapshot of what the world looks like and what this means for the EU is an important part of the strategic reflection. But it should be viewed as the groundwork upon which a strategy is built. It does not belong to the strategy itself. It is the description that precedes the prescription. The strategic assessment also served to set some guidelines and objectives for the ensuing strategy. It flagged up the HR/VP's intention to use to the full her two hats, moving beyond a narrower 'security' strategy and towards a broader 'global' strategy that mobilised all the EU's external action instruments. This is the rationale underpinning the third section of the report, which reviews the state of play of the major external action instruments at the EU's disposal, highlighting the challenges facing these instruments and policies. By engaging in this exercise in the first phase, the expectation is that in the second the discussion about policy instruments will be tailored to specific goals. In other words, in the strategy there should not be a general plea for more defence spending, but perhaps a more specific recommendation as to which capabilities are needed in pursuit of specific goals.

Fourth, the need to test a working method. Given the value attached to this project and to the process itself, dividing it up in two phases allowed the HRVP to test a working method, and build trust, consensus and momentum for the second phase of the strategic reflection. In the six months during which we worked on the strategic assessment, we established and explored a working method: a trial- and-error run to see what worked and what did not, allowing the HR/VP to recalibrate the process for the second phase. We established an informal working group including representatives from the European External Action Service, the European Commission, the Council Secretariat and the European Council. We held regular meetings with the EEAS Secretary General and Senior Management. We reached out to representatives of the Commission, notably those engaged in sectoral strategic projects such as the ENP review, the trade strategy, the Agenda on Migration, and the Energy Union. It was essential that the strategic assessment, that talked the talk of a more joined-up approach, also walked the walk by 'joining-up' with other strategic exercises underway in the Brussels beltway. As regards the member states, we engaged at various levels with policy planners, with the PSC and COREPER, and in two Foreign Affairs Council meetings. In so doing, what emerged clearly was the broad consensus to move forward with the exercise among the member

states. While from 2008 to 2013 there were divisions between member states regarding an EU global strategy, by 2015 all agreed that the security environment had so radically changed – and not for the better – that a strategic rethink had become imperative. In these short six months there was little time to go much beyond this. The wider foreign policy community was not deeply engaged. But the EUISS did organise one conference in April 2015 in which the draft outline of the strategic assessment was presented and the HRVP engaged in a long Q&A session with an expert audience.

The prospect

At the time of writing, in the summer of 2015, we are gearing up for the second phase of the strategic reflection process. The EU Global Strategy will have a dedicated website (www.euglobalstrategy.europa.eu), a logo and a coordinating and supporting team. It will be launched at the 2015 Heads of Delegation conference in Brussels on 1 September and will pursue regular contacts with the EEAS, the Commission and the Council at various levels throughout the year. It will include intermittent exchanges with the European Parliament and when possible with national parliaments. It will feature a 'consultation semester', which will see a roadshow in different EU capitals aimed at garnering input and ideas from the wider European foreign policy community. It will include meetings beyond the EU, both to gauge what the rest of the world thinks and expects from us and to connect with similar exercises of strategic reflection within major countries, regional and international organisations. Consultations and outreach will seek to extend beyond the expert community too, engaging civil society, students and the wider public through student conferences, town hall meetings, opinion polls, as well as virtually through social media, and an interactive website featuring written opinions, videos and infographics.

As this publication goes to print, we will be on the cusp of pressing the start button of this new phase.

It promises to be an interesting year ahead.

The European Union in a changing global environment

A more connected, contested and complex world

Executive Summary

Since the 2003 Security Strategy, the EU's strategic environment has changed radically. While much has been achieved over the last decade, today an arc of instability surrounds the Union. Further afield, we see conflicts in Africa and security tensions in Asia, while climate change and scarce natural resources harbour the risk of more conflict. At the same time, global growth, interdependence and technological progress enable ever more people to escape poverty and live longer, healthier and freer lives. The EU must confront both the challenges and the opportunities that come with its changed environment. We have a responsibility to protect our citizens while promoting our interests and universal values. The very nature of our Union – a construct of intertwined polities – gives us a unique advantage to steer the way in a more complex, more connected, but also more contested world.

1. A CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

A more connected world: Globalisation has been the dominant force shaping our world for the best part of the last century. Today it is giving rise to an unprecedented degree of global connectivity, with a surge in human mobility, compelling us to rethink migration, citizenship, development and health. The exponential spread of webs not only opens opportunities for political participation, it also favours economic and financial crime, terrorism and trafficking. Markets too are increasingly connected, as shown by China's efforts to develop infrastructural ties with Central and Southeast Asia (as well as Europe) or the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. Greater connectivity is a European phenomenon too: the Eurozone crisis has highlighted both the density of interconnections within the Union and the need to tackle the resulting economic problems through deeper integration.

A more contested world: Fragile states and ungoverned spaces are spreading. To the east, the EU's neighbours suffer from economic, political and energy supply fragilities. Across the Mediterranean, the spread of ungoverned spaces has enabled criminals and terrorists to thrive. Further south, instability and violence are the product of poverty, lawlessness, corruption and conflict-ridden electoral politics. More than 50 million people are now displaced. Ideology and identity drive tensions on different continents. In Europe and beyond, new narratives challenge the open society model. In the Middle East, identity politics fuels old and new cleavages. Demographic trends and growing inequalities also threaten more conflict, despite the emergence of a global middle class. Climate change and resource scarcity drive conflicts across Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Finally, technological progress is changing the nature of conflict, revolutionising the defence industry while generating new threats. The EU too is more contested, as internal forces increasingly challenge the European project. Yet a more contested Union can also spur decision-makers to better connect foreign policy with citizens' expectations and inject fresh momentum in the European debate.

A more complex world: We live in an age of global power shifts and power diffusion. In the years to come, the United States will still enjoy a comprehensive global reach, and the EU is set to retain one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. Still, the age of dominance by any single country is over. Prime amongst the 'new' powers is China. Across all continents, emerging powers are rising in global rankings, but they are unlikely to form a single and cohesive bloc. Moreover, different regions display different configurations of power, while globally power is diffusing beyond the nation state towards a network of state, non-state, inter-state and transnational actors. Traditional multilateralism is losing steam as emerging countries want to reform the post-World War II architecture – yet opposing existing global governance mechanisms has been easier than creating new ones.

2. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EU

In the emerging global environment, the EU faces five broad sets of challenges and opportunities.

European Neighbours: The EU needs to continue to support reform in the Western Balkans, Turkey and the Eastern partners through integration and association policies, respectively. We also need to develop foreign policies that engage Turkey on issues of

common interest; that strengthen the statehood of our Eastern partners; that respond firmly to destabilising actions on our borders, while also engaging Russia to restore a sustainable European security architecture and address global challenges.

North Africa and the Middle East: The EU needs to tackle the immediate challenges in its South by sharpening its tools in the internal-external security nexus and addressing immediate humanitarian crises. We also need to respond to old and new conflicts and help address the root causes of resentment through tailor-made responses.

Africa: The EU can help unlock Africa's potential by developing the right mix of migration and mobility policies; by bolstering security cooperation with the United Nations, the African Union and other African partners; and by bridging fair trade and economic integration objectives.

Atlantic Partnerships: The EU needs to continue investing in a strong and sound privileged relationship across the Atlantic through closer cooperation between the EU and NATO and through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. At the same time, we need to deepen relations with Latin America and the Caribbean through bilateral partnerships and inter-regional arrangements.

Asia: The EU can offer consistent but also customised support to regional cooperation efforts in Asia. We also need to foster a rules-based approach to conflict management and respond to the opportunity presented by various developments in Asian connectivity.

3. IMPLICATIONS

The EU needs to tackle the challenges and seize the opportunities which the global environment presents. An effective response depends on the Union's ability to make choices and prioritise areas where it is willing and able to make a difference. It also depends on whether the EU's external action instruments are fit for purpose. Five key issues need to be addressed in this context:

Direction: In recent years the EU has started updating the direction of its external engagement: in several areas, however, adaptations are necessary. In the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU has lost salience and momentum in a few areas – for instance, the 'strategic partnerships'. In disarmament and arms control, the EU's approach, conceived in a post-Cold War environment, needs to respond to 21st century realities. Similarly, in the Common Security and Defence Policy, although the December 2013 European Council underlined that 'defence matters', the current level of ambition

and capability targets are not tailored to the degraded strategic environment. Humanitarian assistance also needs to adapt to humanitarian crises becoming the 'new normal', with ever growing needs. Enlargement is a policy whose sense of direction is openly contested. At the same time, there is no credible alternative to EU enlargement in the Balkans, and a fair accession process remains the most promising channel to support reforms in all candidate countries. In trade policy, the EU still needs to find effective ways to manage tensions that may arise between trade and non-trade objectives. And cyber and counter-terrorism policies need to find a sustainable balance between freedom and security, while remaining committed to both.

Flexibility: As the largest global combined donor, the EU is a leader in development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. But insufficient flexibility reduces the effectiveness of aid on the ground. Likewise, in counter-terrorism, implementation is hampered by heavy procedural requirements.

Leverage: In trade and development policy, the EU potentially wields significant power. Yet, the EU's declining economic dynamism, the high demands it makes on its trading partners, and what it is willing to offer may be hampering its leverage. Likewise, sanctions hinge on economic strength and the extent to which the EU can embed its efforts within a wider multilateral framework. Leverage is a challenge also within the European Neighbourhood Policy, particularly when it comes to neighbours that have little interest in endorsing EU standards.

Coordination: In diplomacy, a number of initiatives by various groups of Member States have complemented efforts made within CFSP: if well-coordinated, these can make our collective action more effective. In development policy, greater coordination with Member States' own policies will increase impact, but in this as well as other policy areas better implementation requires overcoming the fragmentation of financial instruments both across Commission services and between the EU and the Member States. In the cyber domain, Member State buy-into a common EU approach is still limited, and coordination both among EU institutions and across the public-private divide is insufficient. Unlike in climate policy, in external energy policy the EU is too often unable to speak and act with one voice, thus facilitating divide-and- rule efforts by some supplier countries.

Capabilities: In the field of migration, mobility partnerships and visa facilitation remain underexploited. In light of mounting migration challenges, the EU's capabilities need to be strengthened by assigning additional resources to its Agencies and by integrating the external and internal dimensions of migration management, as well as by tackling the root causes of the phenomenon in the long-term. In security and defence, CSDP has developed from scratch since 2000 and its modus oper-

andi in partnership with international and regional organisations works well. Yet it still faces difficulties in force generation and access to early and common financing, enablers, intelligence and logistics. The Battle Groups have never been deployed and the Lisbon Treaty's Article 44 has never been implemented. Defence budgets have been slashed in an uncoordinated and uneven manner, with spending on R&T taking the greatest toll. While the EU is not a military alliance, it cannot ignore the 'D' in its CSDP.

The case for joined up EU external action

CSDP pioneered the "comprehensive approach", more relevant today than a decade ago. A joined-up approach is now needed not only in external conflicts and crises, but in all aspects of the EU's role in the world. This puts a premium on various actors and instruments of EU external action coming together to work in synergy. Vertical and horizontal silos hamper the EU's potential global role. And in a world of mounting challenges and opportunities this is a luxury we cannot afford.

In a more connected, contested and complex world, we need a clear sense of direction. We need to agree on our priorities, our goals and the means required to achieve them.

We need a common, comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy.

THE EUROPEAN UNION IN A CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

A MORE CONNECTED, CONTESTED AND COMPLEX WORLD

We used to think that Europe had 'never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free'. With much of the previous century having been marred by turmoil on the continent and in the wider world, the turn of the millennium was indeed a high-water mark. Much has been achieved since 2003: the EU has integrated 13 new members, fostered stability in the Western Balkans, and contributed to peacebuilding in Africa and elsewhere. Yet the overriding perception now is that Europe's prosperity has been hit by economic crises, and that its security and freedoms are openly under threat.

Today the EU is surrounded by an arc of instability. To the east, basic tenets of international law, such as the inviolability of borders, are no longer respected. In the Middle East, the unravelling of a century-old regional order has unleashed war and human suffering. As states collapse and regional powers collide, terrorists spread fear and destruction throughout the region, connecting to networks in Africa and on European soil. Further afield, we see global and regional players jostling for influence in Asia, while climate change and an increased competition for scarce natural resources risk generating further conflict in many parts of the world.

At the same time, global growth, interdependence, connectivity and technological progress are enabling ever more people to escape poverty and live longer, healthier and freer lives. Growing numbers of citizens around the world aspire to a way of life based on democratic institutions, human rights and the rule of law. Indeed, while there has been a remarkable diffusion of international human rights norms and mechanisms in recent decades, the protection of human rights has not been implemented across the board. A more connected world brings such paradoxes to the fore.

When faced with this world of disorder and of opportunity, two things are clear. First, global trends are neither linear nor preordained, but often the product of shocks and human choices. This highlights the uncertainty that lies ahead, but also the role of agency – including that of the EU – in moving forward. We may not fully know our future, but we can shape it. Second, the European Union does not have the luxury of turning inwards. We have a responsibility to protect our citizens, while promoting our interests and universal values.

It is a responsibility dictated by history and an interest dictated by geography. The very nature of the EU as a construct of intertwined polities gives us a unique advantage to help steer the way in a more complex, more connected but also more contested world.

1. A CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

1.1. A more connected world

Globalisation has been the dominant force shaping our world for the best part of the last century. Today, it is giving rise to an unprecedented degree of connectivity. Global connectivity is changing the meaning of borders. A surge in human mobility – from tourists to terrorists, from students to refugees – compels us to change how we think

FIGURE 1: Global migration flows



Source: EUISS (from Eurostat data: IOM World Migration Report 2013)

about migration, citizenship, health and development. Global tourism is expected to approach 2 billion by 2030. Migration along south-south – and to a lesser extent south-north – routes is accelerating as a result of conflict, repression, economic disparity, demographic imbalances and climate change. Extremists, too, exploit the opportunities arising from porous borders: the numbers of 'foreign terrorist fighters' estimated to have travelled to Syria and Iraq far exceed those that had waged jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq or Somalia in the past. With greater mobility also comes the risk of greater spread of pandemics. The Ebola outbreak is the latest, but surely not the last, manifestation.

A more connected world also comes as a result of the exponential surge and spread of webs. By 2030, Internet users are expected to near 5 billion. By then, 80% of the world's population will have mobile connectivity and 60% will enjoy broadband access. Big data, data mining, cloud computing and the Internet of Things will shape the pace and contours of how we live, work and consume. The digital age offers tremendous benefits to billions of people in terms of wealth, knowledge and freedom. As such, the security and stability of the net, as well as the integrity of data flows, is of growing importance to our economies and our societies. Communication technologies have already had profound political impact, mobilising millions in Tahrir and Maidan. The fight to protect the freedom of and on the net is thus becoming increasingly critical for the protection and promotion of human rights throughout the world. However, technology also creates new vulnerabilities, including opportunities for jihadists and traffickers of arms, drugs and human beings, as well as for public and private actors to engage in counterfeiting and financial and economic crime. Globalisation empowers individuals – for good or ill.

Markets too are increasingly connected. Geo-economics – the global competition for access to markets and resources – has become a key driver of international relations. Examples include China's efforts to develop infrastructural ties with Central and South-east Asia as well as Europe, the growth of regional and sub-regional groupings in East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, or the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. A rising Asia is now the most dynamic element of the global economy. At the same time, we face an 'Asian paradox': while the region's economy is buoyed by integration and sense of optimism, strategic competition among regional powers is feeding concern about a fragmented security environment. Similar paradoxes also exist in other parts of the world.

If the world is more connected than at any point in the past, the same is true for the European Union. The EU has expanded from 15 to 28 Member States, and the Lisbon Treaty has generated opportunities to better integrate EU security and defence policies with external relations policies. The Eurozone crisis has highlighted the interconnections and asymmetries within the Union, and demonstrated that the crisis could only be addressed through greater integration. The last five years have seen steps for-

FIGURE 2: Percentage of individuals using the internet



Source: International Telecommunication Union data, 2013

ward in economic governance which were previously unthinkable. At the same time, the EU is moving towards building an Energy Union to tackle fragmented energy markets through more effective coordination of energy policies and new investments in critical infrastructure. Likewise, the EU is making progress in creating a digital single market, and deepening integration and investment in R&D.

These developments have profound implications for the Union's foreign policy. The Eurozone crisis temporarily tarnished the EU's international reputation, and took a toll on its self-confidence and openness to the outside world. Europeans have since been concerned with jobs and growth, while developing less of an appetite for expensive endeavours abroad. At the same time, steps forward in economic governance are putting the crisis behind us, and the European way of life continues to attract tourists, businesses, students and migrants. Efforts to build an Energy Union will help rebalance relations with Russia, the Caucasus and the Middle East. The political economy of defence, coupled with security crises beyond the EU's borders, could lead to deeper cooperation between Member States, and thereby boost the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This, in turn, would help bolster partnerships with the UN, NATO and regional organisations.

1.2. A more contested world

We used to think that greater interdependence would automatically bring about peace and prevent war. Now we know that while a more connected world is full of opportunities, it is also putting the nation state under unprecedented strain. By generating vulnerabilities and fragmented identities, this is giving rise to tensions and, at times, leading to more conflict. It is becoming a more dangerous world.

Fragile states and ungoverned spaces are becoming more widespread. Nowhere is this clearer than closest to home. To the east, our neighbours suffer from economic, political and energy-related vulnerabilities. Russia has actively destabilised some of them by undermining their freedom, sovereignty and security. Beyond the imperative of fostering democracy, human rights (including the rights of minorities) and good governance, the conflict over Ukraine underlines the need to bolster the statehood prerogatives of our neighbours. These include recognised and protected borders, a sustainable fiscal capacity, as well as functioning customs services and police and military forces. What is at stake is peace on our continent.

Across the Mediterranean, the spread of ungoverned spaces from Libya to Syria and Iraq has enabled criminals, extremists and terrorists to thrive. Yet a repressive state is no recipe for long-term stability. The value of the few fragile democracies in the region, with Tunisia in the lead, should not be underestimated. It is crucial to recall that political change does not happen overnight, and that progress is often accompanied by setbacks. Further south – from the Sahel to the Horn, from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Guinea – instability and violence are the products of poverty, corruption, human rights abuses and conflict-ridden electoral politics.

Although casualties on the battlefield have decreased significantly over time, we have seen a dramatic rise in civilian victims and refugees: more than 50 million people are displaced worldwide. The consequences of this human tragedy will reverberate across regions and generations – including within the EU.

Identity and ideology fuel tensions on different continents. Both in Europe and in the wider world, the model of an open society is being questioned and other concepts put forward. In the Middle East, identity politics makes for an explosive mix – from the deeply entrenched Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which is aggravating sectarianism across the region. Moreover, a crisis of unprecedented magnitude has broken out inside the Sunni world, revolving around different interpretations of political Islam. And violent extremism – in various incarnations and franchises – feeds on grievances, repression and despair across the Middle East, North Africa, and large swathes of sub-Saharan Africa and

Asia. There is also a growing danger of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons across the Middle East and Asia.

Demographic trends threaten to increase the risk of conflict in years to come. The global population, standing at 7.2 billion today, is expected to grow to 9.6 billion by 2050. More than half of the world's demographic growth will come from Africa. At the same time, Africa's GDP is expected to remain five times lower than China's and half that of India, which will exacerbate poverty and could raise the risk of mass displacement and radicalisation. While Africa's natural resources and growing workforce create ample opportunities, the continent's potential will only be realised if efforts related to job creation, good governance, human rights protection and conflict resolution become more effective.

By 2030, the global middle class is expected to rise to 5 billion. But inequalities are set to rise too, in both the developed and the developing worlds, potentially triggering social discontent. The new global middle class is likely to be less homogenous and more volatile than the Western middle classes of the past. Disparities in wealth, education, digital connectivity and employment opportunities (notably for the young) harbour the potential for greater social mobility, as well as conflict.

Climate change and resource scarcity, coupled with demographic growth, contribute to international conflicts and are expected to do so even more in the future. Climate-induced floods, droughts, desertification and farmland destruction have triggered migration and conflict from Darfur to Mali. Food price hikes in the 2000s triggered riots from Cameroon to Bangladesh and were a factor behind the 2011 Arab uprisings. Meanwhile, water management has become more contentious, with projects such as the Grand Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia and the Rogun Dam in Tajikistan causing regional tensions. By 2025, climate change is expected to slash harvests and water supplies, affecting some 1.4 billion people. Climate change, coupled with demographic growth, will therefore require innovative agricultural solutions: agricultural output will have to increase by 70% in order to feed the planet in 2050. Rising temperatures are also accelerating the melting of glaciers. This could have devastating consequences for coastal regions which are inhabited by 60% of the global population. At the same time, the thawing of the glaciers will bring access to new energy, mineral and fishing resources, calling for collective responses to manage access to shipping routes and prevent irreversible environmental damage.

New energy discoveries and technologies can both help address scarcities and bolster efforts to mitigate climate change. Today, we live in times of significant oil over-supply. While the current drop in oil prices is a boon for consumers and energy importers, it threatens the sustainability of many energy producing countries. By 2035, however,

energy consumption is expected to rise by over 40% compared to 2012, with 95% coming from emerging economies. Energy security and climate change will thus remain a global challenge for years to come.

Technological progress is also changing the nature of conflict. Big data and cloud technology are revolutionising the defence industry and may open new avenues for crisis management. Dual-use technology has been critical in advancing scientific research and industrial development. But it could also favour the proliferation of WMDs and the development of sophisticated conventional arms such as lethal autonomous weapons systems. The surge in Internet users has made cybercrime and terrorist use of the Internet a new frontier of 21st century warfare. Terrorists use information and communication technologies to recruit, finance, intimidate and disseminate their message. The conflict over Ukraine has exposed the hybrid nature of destabilisation, which combines 20th century conventional warfare with 21st century tactics. These include the jamming of command, control and strategic communications systems, cyber espionage and disinformation campaigns, covert operations, foreign asset acquisitions, the disruption of critical infrastructure, encouraging corruption, and trade and energy-related coercion. We are certainly more connected, but not always and not necessarily more secure.

The European Union, too, is more contested. The financial and economic crisis has posed a serious challenge to European unity. Many Europeans have been hit by the crisis, and have come to view themselves as losers of globalisation. This is feeding certain constituencies within Member States which express criticism of, if not outright opposition to, the European project. This trend, which often blends legitimate grievances with a dangerous mix of nationalism, populism, protectionism and even racism, is exposing a new rift within the EU and bringing new anti-establishment forces to the fore. It is a divide between elites and citizens manifested in voter disaffection, and a lack of trust in public institutions and policies. It is a divide amongst citizens driven by unemployment, strained welfare systems, unsuccessful migration and integration policies, as well as by terrorism and radicalisation. And it is a generational divide driven by youth unemployment and exclusion. All this is adding to the pressure for greater differentiation within the EU. While differentiation has long been a fact of EU life, it has become a more prominent and possibly more permanent feature of the Union.

A more contested EU is bringing about broader external challenges. The rise of nationalism, protectionism and illiberalism could expose European nations to the lure of anti-democratic models promoted from outside. Populism and racism could feed fortress Europe mentalities, undermining credible enlargement and neighbourhood policies, forthcoming migration and mobility policies, and even trade liberalisation. Radicalisation requires the EU to put a premium not only on enhanced border man-

agement, data protection, Internet governance and intelligence cooperation, but also on efforts to improve education and community dialogue.

And yet, a more contested EU also represents an opportunity for change. The Union is committed to regaining lost confidence, supporting those that have suffered most during the crisis, and rekindling trust in disenfranchised Europeans. Plans aimed at promoting investment, economic growth and job creation are part of this determined effort. If well managed, internal differentiation could help accommodate differences within the EU and revamp enlargement and neighbourhood policies. It could help transform the divisive 'all-or-nothing' membership question into a more constructive 'integration' question – based on successive functional building blocks – to the benefit of all. A self-questioning EU can also spur decision-makers to connect foreign policy with citizens' expectations. And it can inject new energy in the European debate through a generational change in politics. We need to forge a new social contract with European citizens also through foreign policy.

1.3. A more complex world

We live in an age of power shifts at a global level and power diffusion at all levels – away from governments and towards markets, media, civil (and less civil) societies and individuals.

A dose of nuanced realism is required. Despite much talk of America's decline, in 2030 the United States will probably still enjoy its global economic, military, technological and financial reach. With a global currency and an unrivalled set of alliances, this places the US in a pivotal position to shape world affairs into the 21st century. Likewise, while no single EU country is likely to have an economy justifying G7 membership by 2050, the Union is set to retain one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. The European Union has all the means to be an influential global player in future – if it acts together.Still, the age of dominance by any single country or group of countries, experienced first by European colonial powers and then the US, is over. The combined effect of rising literacy, jobs and disposable incomes, along with the accelerating rate of technological progress, is expanding the number of stakeholders in world affairs.

Prime amongst the 'new' powers is China, whose rise is reversing a two-century long historical anomaly. With an average growth of 10% over the last two decades (now settling at more moderate levels), China has already lifted 600 million people out of poverty. By 2030, China's GDP is expected to represent 20% of the world's total, overtaking that of both the EU and the US. China's military spending is growing fast and its economic, security and social reach is rising, notably in Asia and Africa. However, even if it con-

tinued on current trends and surpassed the US in absolute terms within a couple of decades, China would struggle to reach US-level military capabilities. Next comes India, set to account for 16% of the world's GDP by 2030. By 2045, India will probably spend as much on defence as all EU Member States combined, and by 2050, China and India's combined GDP may overtake that of the entire OECD. Among the 'BRICS', Russia belongs in a different category, mostly due to a bleaker economic and demographic future. Nevertheless, its defence spending has increased by 30% since 2008. Other powers like Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Nigeria, South Africa and Turkey are all likely to rise in global power rankings.

The rise of other powers is undeniable. Less certain is whether they will form a single cohesive alternative bloc. The creation of the BRICS Development Bank and China's Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, the current Sino-Russian rapprochement, and the sensitivities of some large democracies at the UN regarding atrocity prevention and the international promotion of human rights seem to corroborate this prospect. But the reality is messier. Rising powers argue that the post-World War II order needs to be reformed, but they are divided or uncertain about the precise changes they would like to see. They share a pragmatic approach to foreign policy, but each rising power is following its own path to modernity. Profound divergences between their political systems remain, and in many respects they are strategic competitors. In short, emerging powers lack a key ingredient of lasting cooperation: a common system of values or interests to bind them into a cohesive force.

Moreover, different regions display different configurations of powers that do not add up to a single coherent whole. In the Middle East, Russia and China are increasingly active, but the real game changer is the central role played by the Gulf States, Iran and Turkey. The competition between regional actors stretches into the Horn of Africa in what has become an interdependent Red Sea sub-region. In Asia, a China-only focus does not fully capture regional dynamics: the strategic landscape is more complicated. In Africa, growth has reduced the continent's willingness to import rules, norms and practices passively from outside. While global powers – notably the US, the EU and China – play prominent roles, Africans increasingly steer the continent's affairs. In Latin America, Brazil and Mexico are the major economic players, but Argentina, Colombia and others could form a 'middle class' of powers, albeit not united in purpose yet. Across regional theatres, there is no single set of powers with roughly equal influence everywhere – nor are regional hegemons determining dynamics on their own. Power configurations change across time and place, making regions themselves dynamic concepts. The world system is no longer bipolar, unipolar or even multipolar: the very notion of 'polarity' is in question.

FIGURE 3: GDP share of world total (%)



Source: IMF, WEO (Oct. 2014) | Note: GDP is adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) | *IMF forecast based on current trends

FIGURE 4: Shifting centre of gravity of the world economy



Source: McKinsey Global Institute using data from Angus Maddison, University of Groningen

Adding to such complexity is the shift from a world of nation states to a networked globe of state, non-state, inter-state and transnational actors – from civil society, media and business to regional, sub-regional and mini-lateral groupings. While nation states will remain the basic building blocks of the international system, their national sovereignty is increasingly contested and constrained by the connectivity and complexity within and across different world regions. We live in a world of multiple players and layers bound by complex interdependence. We live in a world of overlapping webs, in which power no longer resides within actors but circulates among them.

We know that variable geometries of state and non-state actors will shape the world in new ways. What we do not know are the rules of global interaction and who will set them. The global power shift and power diffusion are challenging traditional multilateralism. While the UN remains the principal guarantor of the sovereign equality among states, the composition of its Security Council and the distribution of voting rights in the International Financial Institutions no longer reflect current realities. The World Trade Organisation has grown in membership (and thus legitimacy) but not in ability to achieve consensus or advance multilateral trade liberalisation.

The G20 has emerged as a major informal forum, reflecting global power realignments. But while it played a key role in short-term crisis management during the 2008 financial crisis, it has failed so far to tackle structural global challenges in economic growth, financial markets and development. No effective global institutions are in place to confront other pressing challenges such as migration, cyber security, arms control or natural resource management. Opposing existing global governance mechanisms has been easier than creating new ones.

Historically, major power transitions have been accompanied by military conflict. The current challenge is to facilitate a peaceful transition towards a new global order which reflects universal values and in which the interests of all stakeholders are respected within the confines of agreed rules. This new system needs to take into account the global power shift and power diffusion. It will need to tackle a world which is at once more integrated and connected, but also more fragmented and contested. While remaining anchored in the UN, the new system is likely to be more flexible and multifaceted than envisaged by the aspirations which underpinned the post-World War II architecture. In a world of incalculable risk and opportunity, crafting effective responses will hinge on the Union's ability to adjust, react and innovate in partnership with others.

2. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EU

A more connected, contested and complex global environment has different regional manifestations. In the emerging global environment, the EU is faced with five broad sets of challenges and opportunities.

2.1. Redoubling commitment to our European neighbours

In eastern and south-eastern Europe, the EU retains substantial influence and is able to generate positive change. Enlargement produced remarkable transformations in acceding Member States. The EU has been instrumental in bringing about the stabilisation and demilitarisation of the Western Balkans and the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue. It was also critical in fostering reforms in Turkey. Beyond enlargement, the EU's power of attraction persists in parts of the eastern neighbourhood.

But the EU's 'soft power' is waning as the memory of the 'big bang' enlargement recedes and other actors strive for influence in its neighbourhood. Today's challenge is to revive the reform momentum through credible policies of integration and association. In the Western Balkans, promoting economic integration and development are essential to counter de- industrialisation, unemployment and low investment. In Turkey, the task is to rekindle a positive political reform dynamic and move forward on structural economic reforms. In those eastern neighbours seeking closer ties with the EU, the Union has a unique role to play to support political, economic, governance and broader societal reform.

At the same time, the conflict over Ukraine, Russia's hybrid destabilisation tactics, Europe's energy security challenges, and Turkey's rise as a regional power all highlight – in different ways and to different degrees – the imperative of forging a genuine common foreign policy that includes but is not limited to an accession or association policy.

The EU must indeed 'develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries'. But this does not necessarily mean that enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy are the only ways of doing so. Our approach to Turkey cannot neglect issues of common interest, including trade, migration, energy and security in the region. Our approach towards our eastern partners needs to include robust policies to prevent and resolve conflict, bolster statehood along with economic development, and foster energy and transport connectivity. And our policy towards Russia needs to prevent new dividing lines by combining a firm response to destabilising actions at and within our borders with engagement to rebuild a sustainable European security order with which all are at ease, while seeking common approaches to global issues.

2.2. Rethinking the EU's approach towards North Africa and the Middle East (MENA)

The positive human energy unleashed by the 2011 Arab uprisings has given way to a wave of upheavals in the region, featuring collapsing states, thriving terrorist networks, burgeoning transnational crime, millions of refugees, and intolerable violence. All this, too, is happening at our doorstep, just a few kilometres from our shores.

The most immediate task is that of stemming the tide of terrorists and criminal networks by enhancing the coherence between internal and external security policies. We also have to address the humanitarian crises in war-torn and refugee-hosting countries through humanitarian assistance, asylum policies and development cooperation. In doing so, we must insist on the full application of international humanitarian law, the protection of civilians and the respect of human rights in conflict situations. Our diplomatic, economic, migration, asylum and security policies need to account for the deep connections between Europe's southern neighbours and their neighbours in the Gulf and sub-Saharan Africa in order to help put out the fires ravaging the region, from Libya to Syria, and Iraq to Yemen.

But the biggest challenge is reminding ourselves that stability is no substitute for sustainability and that the root causes of resentment – from repression and deprivation to the 'old' Israeli-Palestinian conflict – have deepened across the region. We need to devise policies that, without preaching, support human dignity, social inclusiveness, political responsiveness, educational modernisation and the rule of law across the region. In this respect, devising tailor-made policies in the fields of economic development, social protection and youth inclusion, as well as political accountability, justice and security is key. Equally important is to encourage inclusive and rules-bound reconciliation in old and new conflicts embedded within a new regional security architecture in the wider Middle Eastern space.

2.3. Redefining our relationship with Africa

As in large parts of the MENA region, poverty, food insecurity, ill-governance and conflict continue to plague parts of Africa today. But Africa is also a continent of opportunity and growth, rich in natural resources and agricultural potential. Representative and accountable government is becoming more the norm, and the call for strong institutions, not strong men, is reflected in increasingly credible, albeit in some cases contested, elections. In a world in which key universal values are being questioned, Africa's potential is significant. The secret of success in Africa lies in triggering a virtuous circle

in the development-security-migration nexus, bearing in mind the tight interconnections between North and sub-Saharan Africa, as well as between the Horn and the Persian Gulf.

For the EU, Africa has a huge potential for trade, energy and investment, which at the same time is what the continent needs. Likewise, while Europe is facing a daunting demographic predicament, Africa is living through a youth bulge which is expected to persist for most of this century. The resulting equilibrium between demand and supply of migratory forces could either benefit both continents or generate economic strain and political unrest. The EU can help unlock Africa's potential by developing the right mix of migration, mobility and integration policies; by bolstering security cooperation with the UN, the African Union and other African partners; by supporting education and sustainable development; by bridging fair trade and economic integration objectives; and by favouring sustainable agriculture and green growth. This can drive Africa's entrepreneurial spirit, and unleash faster, more balanced and sustainable growth while offering more attractive prospects than those provided by other external players. The post-2015 agenda and the 2015 global climate deal could help the EU establish a fairer partnership with Africa, together with a revised post-2020 EU-ACP Partnership.

2.4. Reviving Atlantic partnerships

The global power shift highlights the risk of a structural transatlantic drift. Yet there is an unprecedented presence and demand for more European engagement across world regions, most of all in the Americas. As an overall middle-income region, the successful efforts to overcome entrenched conflicts, the march to democracy, socio-economic progress, and the fundamental values we share make the countries of the Americas partners of choice for Europe when tackling global challenges. The complexity and connectivity of our times are enhancing interactions in the wider Atlantic space, and the EU has only to tap this potential.

The transatlantic bond with the United States and Canada is unique, and rests on solid political, cultural, economic, and security foundations. The opportunity before us is to develop an even stronger and sounder relationship, in which the assets of all are developed and put at the service of common interests. With regard to the US, security and the economy are two pillars which merit further deepening. In security terms, this means that the EU and its Member States are called to shoulder more responsibility for their neighbourhood, and further develop European defence capabilities. At the same time, as NATO refocuses on territorial defence, CSDP can work with NATO to sharpen its focus on crisis

management and hybrid threats. In economic terms, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a potentially win-win project that can create jobs and business opportunities, eliminate red tape, and thus stimulate growth. An ambitious and open TTIP would not just be a free trade and investment agreement. It would be a strategic endeavour that, by establishing the largest free-trade area in the world, may inject momentum into the development of global rules in areas where multilateral negotiations have stalled.

Expanding Atlantic cooperation also means deepening relations with Latin America and the Caribbean through bilateral partnerships, inter-regional relations and in multilateral fora. There is more EU investment in Latin America than in Russia, India and China combined, while cultural ties and migratory flows are strong in both directions. Steps to strengthen ties with individual countries and with organisations such as CELAC, SICA, CARICOM, MERCOSUR and UNASUR reflect these trends.

2.5. A rounded approach to Asia

The EU has a strategic interest in playing a fully-fledged role in and with Asia. The EU has a huge stake in the continued success of Asian economies, including China's reform efforts. But the EU is also vulnerable to the ramifications of underlying political and security tensions. Disputes and conflicts in the region would affect trade routes, financial flows and a regional order in a part of the world which is of paramount importance to the EU.

The challenge ahead is to maximise economic opportunities and access to growth in the region, while positioning the EU as a committed and constructive political and security actor. The EU can tap into the growth of Asia's middle class, while supporting the region in dealing with the environmental and social challenges this brings about. On the back of its own experience, the EU is well placed to offer customised support to regional cooperation efforts in Asia, without preaching a single model. The relationship with ASEAN, as a fellow partner in integration, holds special promise in a region affected by growing geopolitical tensions. The EU can also step up its engagement with regional security structures, fostering a rules-based approach to conflict management. Lastly, the EU should seize the opportunity presented by Asia's multifaceted connectivity drive – from ASEAN's plans to China's 'Silk Road Economic Belt and New Maritime Silk Road' – through a multipronged approach which brings together various sectoral instruments. It also needs to ensure that these initiatives comply with WTO rules, open public procurement practices, and stringent environmental and social standards.

3. IMPLICATIONS

To be secure, prosperous and free, the EU needs to respond to the challenges and opportunities the global environment presents. An effective response hinges on the European Union's ability to make choices and prioritise areas where it can and wants to make a difference. This also requires that the EU can agree and commit to a set of goals to be pursued through collective action. Lastly, it depends on whether the EU's external action instruments, woven together with the fine thread of diplomacy, are fit for purpose. Taken together, are the EU tools and policies equipped for the task?

An overview of the EU's major external action instruments and policies

- The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a tested framework for the EU's collective external action, including support for human rights and democracy, arms control and disarmament, mass atrocity and conflict prevention, mediation, regional strategies and strategic partnerships.
- Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), with its civilian and military crisis management missions, and its contribution to the development of Member States' capabilities, notably through the European Defence Agency, is a key instrument for external action. It has provided value added to institutional reform and capacity-building initiatives through specialisation in training and mentoring. Several action tracks are programmed to enhance the security-development nexus in capacity building missions, in line with the 'comprehensive approach'.
- In counter-terrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE), the EU is crystallising a two-pronged approach: countering radicalisation internally and externally through a narrative based on respect for human rights, diversity and respect for religion; and a criminal justice approach embedded in a security and defence policy framework based on strengthening the judicial, policing and intelligence capacities of partners, in full respect of human rights.
- On cyber issues the EU the aims to address threats to the free and open internet, allow EU citizens and businesses to benefit from the digital economy, and put ICT at the service of development, all in respect of the EU's values. Globally, the EU strives for an open and secure cyber realm, in which cyber issues are firmly anchored within the framework of human rights, rule of law and international law.
- In development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, while traditional goals – the eradication of poverty, the preservation of life and the alleviation of suffering, respectively – remain in place, the approach towards achieving them is evolving. The EU's Agenda for Change emphasised human rights, democracy and good govern-

ance along with sustainability and inclusive growth. It also shifted attention from funding inputs to development outputs. Today, attention is focused on adopting a post-2015 agenda and sustainable development goals (SDGs) in order to eradicate extreme poverty and address all dimensions of sustainable development by using realistic and measurable targets.

- Trade, pursued through bilateral and multilateral agreements, has long been recognised as an engine for growth and jobs, as well as helping to promote other goals including human rights, development, energy security and environmental protection.

- In migration policy, the EU has a border cooperation agency (FRONTEX), an agency supporting Member States in the field of Asylum (EASO), a new Europol-run intelligence centre aimed at countering migrant smuggling, as well as an Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund. The EU can offer market access, assistance and mobility to neighbouring countries, and has been rolling out regional protection programmes to help nearby states absorb refugee flows. The EU is also strengthening cooperation with origin countries through dialogues in the context of the Rabat, Khartoum, Budapest and Prague processes. Collective action is being taken to save lives and cope with mounting pressures through increased solidarity, intelligence sharing and partnerships with transit and origin countries, as well as with the international community.

- In climate policy, the EU emissions trading scheme has become a cornerstone in the effort to combat climate change and reduce industrial greenhouse gasses, and the EU is committed to achieving a binding agreement at COP21 and bilateral cooperation on resource-efficient and green growth. The Energy Security Strategy and the Energy Union Communication chart the way ahead in energy policy. To enhance energy security, much of the answer lies within the EU. But the internal-external nexus in the energy security puzzle is critical, too. Hence the imperative to diversify energy sources and routes through partnerships with suppliers and transit states.

- A review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is underway in light of the developments to the EU's east and south. Two major questions stand out. Geographically, the ENP is confronted with the differences between and within each region, as well as the tight interlinkages – for good or ill – between the EU's neighbours and the neighbours' own neighbouring countries and regions. Conceptually, the ENP was premised on the notion of 'enlargement lite', the relevance and effectiveness of which are now being called into question.

- Enlargement has been one of the EU's most successful endeavours. In the early 1990s, the predicament of many eastern neighbours was no different from that of most

central and eastern European Member States: within a generation, the gap between them has widened dramatically. Today, enlargement remains central in EU policy towards the Western Balkans and Turkey.

3.1. Challenges in the EU's External Action Instruments

The EU's external action instruments are faced with five major challenges: direction, flexibility, leverage, coordination and capability. Meeting these is essential if the EU is to punch its weight in the wider world.

First is *policy direction*. In recent years the EU has started updating the direction of its external engagement, and efforts are underway to bring its status within international organisations in line with the Lisbon Treaty. But much more remains to be done.

In CSFP, while in some areas the direction of policy is clear, in others the EU has lost salience and momentum. The 'strategic partnerships' require a sharper definition of how to maximise EU influence. In disarmament and arms control, the EU remains anchored to treaty-based commitments and to renewing efforts aimed at revitalising multilateral negotiating bodies. However, the 2005 EU strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition was conceived in a post-Cold War environment. It is yet to adapt in order to respond to 21st century realities, including the use of conventional weapons by terrorists and criminals, as well as by rebel forces, militias and other non-state actors.

Similarly, in CSDP, although the December 2013 European Council underlined that 'defence matters', the current level of ambition and capability targets are not tailored to the changing strategic environment, featuring hybrid threats, intertwined internal and external security challenges, and the growing need for Europeans to take responsibility for their own security. Greater clarity and conviction among Member States is needed on what a vigorous and responsive CSDP can and should look like in a more connected, contested and complex global environment.

Humanitarian assistance is also a policy that is yet to adapt to changing global circumstances. While the main objective remains to provide an immediate response in order to save lives and reduce suffering, humanitarian actors are faced with humanitarian crises becoming the 'new normal', with ever-increasing needs. New policy action therefore aims at enhancing resilience, disaster risk reduction, and bridging more effectively the transition towards development cooperation.

Enlargement is a policy whose sense of direction is openly contested. Faith in enlargement policy is declining in the EU and candidate countries alike. At the same time, there is no credible alternative to enlargement policy in the Balkans today, and a fair accession process remains the most promising channel to support reforms in Turkey and the Western Balkans alike. The challenge is to make pre-accession policy more credible, and restore the belief within the EU and the candidate countries that enlargement can be a win-win for all. Elites and publics in the region risk otherwise turning away from the EU, and looking for inspiration and support elsewhere.

In trade policy, the EU still needs to find effective ways to manage tensions that may arise between trade and non-trade objectives. And within non-trade objectives, a distinction needs to be made between the general pursuit of fundamental freedoms and specific human rights issues which are tied to trade as such, including labour and health standards and property rights. Furthermore, the balance between multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreements is changing. While in some cases – notably Asia – bilateralism can pave the way to inter-regionalism, in other cases, there may be trade-offs warranting more careful reflection.

The need to manage tensions prevails also in cyber and counter-terrorism policies, which are evolving against the backdrop of the need to balance freedom and security. The EU is committed to achieving both. The discussion on how to go about implementing human rights, international law and the rule of law in the cyber domain warrants increased attention, however, not least through diplomatic action. Likewise, in counter-terrorism, the debate on security versus freedom remains work in progress.

Second comes *flexibility*. As the largest global donor equipped with a wide range of geographically and thematically tailored instruments, the EU and its Member States are collectively a world leader in development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. The EU is also the only actor committed to reaching a 0.7% ODA/GNI target despite difficult budgetary and economic circumstances. But insufficient flexibility hampers effectiveness, notably in light of global shocks. In development cooperation, insufficient versatility, emphasis on results reporting, and a lack of responsiveness to local circumstances all reduce the EU's impact. The effectiveness of EU development cooperation also hinges on greater awareness of, and responsiveness to, new state and non-state donors, whose funds may or may not have strings attached.

Likewise, in counter-terrorism, despite growing attention, implementation is hampered by heavy procedural requirements, insufficient expertise and mainstreaming in programming, and, at times, difficulty in working in concert with Member States and finding suitable implementing partners.

Third, *leverage*. In trade and development policy, the EU potentially wields significant power. In trade policy, the EU represents the largest trading partner for 80 countries and the second largest for a further 40. Yet, the EU's declining economic dynamism, the high demands it makes of its trading partners, and what it is willing to offer may be hampering its leverage. Proof is the difficulty the EU is facing to conclude negotiations on investment or free trade agreements with several major partners. In addition, new challenges are emerging as the EU seeks to move beyond the elimination of tariffs to cover non-tariff barriers as well – as in the case of TTIP. Negotiations over non-tariff barriers often entail regulatory convergence, which require a thorough understanding of the needs, interests and procedures of sectorial regulators and social actors. Likewise, sanctions policy hinges on the EU's economic strength and the extent to which the EU can embed its efforts within a wider multilateral framework, as well as on the ability of target countries to circumvent EU measures.

Leverage is a challenge also within the European Neighbourhood Policy. The ENP helped cultivate a domestic constituency for reform in several neighbours. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement negotiations and the Visa Liberalisation Action Plans with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia spurred progressive reforms in many areas. The ENP facilitated the emergence of a pro-democratic civil society, even in contexts of great repression. At the same time, particularly when it comes to neighbours that have little interest in moving closer to the EU, the ENP has revealed its limits. More tailor-made and reflexive approaches towards each neighbour are required. The ENP alone is also ill-equipped to deal with the hard state-building challenges across the region.

Fourth is *coordination*, both across institutions and with Member States. In EU diplomacy, a number of initiatives by various groups of Member States have accompanied and complemented CFSP efforts. Rather than focusing only on speaking with one voice, there is a need for a multitude of voices speaking in unison. Variable actions and formats can only strengthen the EU's global role, and reflect the complexity of our times. Provided the EU remains united and well-coordinated, varied diplomatic constellations can also give greater visibility to our common priorities and make our collective efforts more effective.

Ranging from development to defence, effectiveness requires coordination amongst Member States. In defence, Member States' budgets have been cut in an uncoordinated manner. More recent investment plans by some Member States' are equally uncoordinated. In development policy, Joint Programming is a promising step forward in this regard. In development policy – as in the field of non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and export control – effective implementation requires overcoming the fragmentation of financial instruments both across Commission services and between the EU and its Member States.

In the cyber domain, the EU is ratcheting up its efforts, with several funding instruments focusing in part on building capacity in the areas of cybercrime and cyber security. However, uncertainty still remains over Member State buy-in for a common EU approach. There is also insufficient coordination among EU institutions and inadequate efforts being made to effectively bridge the public-private divide.

Coordination and cohesion challenges are perhaps most pressing in the energy domain. Unlike in climate policy, where the EU stands united and plays a global role, the EU is too often unable to speak and act with one voice when it comes to its external energy policy. Internal fragmentation makes the Union a target of divide-and-rule efforts by some supplier countries. Insufficient EU representation in international energy bodies, insufficient Member State coordination of their external energy policies, and insufficient Member State buy-in to the EU's external energy partnerships hamper efforts to achieve energy security. The effects can be seen in the difficulties encountered in building an integrated energy market in the neighbourhood and in completing the Southern Gas Corridor.

Finally, come *capability* challenges. In the field of migration, mobility partnerships and visa facilitation with our partners remain underexploited. In light of mounting migration challenges, the Commission's Agenda on Migration aims at strengthening Europe's capabilities by assigning additional resources to its Agencies and by integrating the external and internal dimensions of migration management, as well as by tackling the root causes of the phenomenon in the long-term. Rising to the migration challenge and doing so in full respect of human rights and international law is a vital interest at the very core of our values.

In security and defence, CSDP has been developed from scratch since 2000. The policy is now equipped with planning capabilities, structures, procedures and a wealth of operational experience built up in some thirty missions to date. CSDP's modus operandi of partnering with international and regional organisations – notably the UN, the AU and NATO – is ever more relevant in an age of complexity. However, launching CSDP operations is getting no easier over time. CSDP still faces difficulties in force generation, and access to early and common financing, enablers, intelligence and logistics. This has often limited the scope, size, strategic depth and escalation management ability of missions. The Battle Groups, although on stand- by, have never been deployed. The Lisbon Treaty's permanent structured cooperation and Article 44 TEU (on the implementation of a task by a group of Member States) have never been activated. More broadly in the defence field, budgets have been slashed in an uneven manner, with R&T taking the greatest hit. The EU's capability development process remains mostly bottom-up, relying on voluntary contributions by Member States. The EU is not a military alliance. The Union cannot afford, however, to ignore the 'D' in its CSDP.

3.2. A joined-up approach to Europe's external action

The Common Security and Defence Policy pioneered the 'comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises'. Today the comprehensive approach is even more relevant than a decade ago. With conflicts proliferating and escalating, a proactive rather than reactive EU policy must combine early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding in a coherent whole. This, in turn, is to be connected to long-term statebuilding and development efforts. How to transition from CSDP to other EU instruments or external partners needs to inform long-term planning. Likewise, in counter-terrorism, effectiveness depends on coherence and coordination between internal and external EU security policies, including cyber policies, as well as on the establishment of a more comprehensive information-sharing system between Member States.

A joined-up approach is needed today, not only in external conflicts and crises, but in virtually every aspect of the EU's presence in the world. This puts a premium on the various actors and instruments of EU external action working in synergy. For this to happen, diplomacy is key. Far from being a luxury, diplomacy can be a powerful multiplier of influence, thus realising the full potential of the EU's external action. Today, on top of the diplomatic instruments and regional strategies within the remit of CSFP, specific EU policy areas and departments (environment, trade, development, energy, justice and home affairs, transport, culture, science and research) are all developing their own strands of diplomacy. While welcome, this enhances the need for coordination among Member States, between EU actors, and within the CFSP framework proper.

FIGURE 5: Defence expenditure 1994-2014



Source for data: SIPRI

Closest to home, developing a joined-up external action means establishing closer links between enlargement, neighbourhood, migration, energy, CT and security and defence policies. Concerted external action is necessary to make our immediate neighbours more democratic, prosperous and well-governed, as well as more resilient and secure.

In both the neighbourhood and the wider world, when trade policy is used as a foreign policy means, it requires a coherent pursuit of trade and non-trade objectives, which in turn calls for deeper cooperation between different stakeholders in the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements. When trade agreements are pursued to achieve economic goals, successful negotiations often hinge on trade being part of a wider relationship, which includes access to research funding, visa liberalisation, development cooperation and much more. At the same time, introducing energy and climate components in trade and investment agreements can promote the transfer of low-carbon technologies, and exchange best practices in terms of governance and regulatory regimes. In the same vein, while sanctions are one of the most powerful tools at the EU's disposal, their effectiveness depends on them being integrated into a joined-up foreign policy involving political dialogue and complementary efforts, which is coordinated with other major players.

As development cooperation widens its horizons post-2015 to address global challenges and develop new forms of cooperation with emerging economies, it becomes all the more necessary to devise a joined-up approach. Such an approach needs to build partnerships beyond the EU and across the public-private divide, and account for the inter-linkages between development, on the one hand, and governance, security, trade, migration, energy, climate and cyber on the other. A step forward in this respect is the Policy Coherence for Development. Further efforts in this direction can help ensure that the Union can bring its full weight to bear on driving an ambitious and deliverable post-2015 agenda.

Synergy between migration, trade and development policies is insufficient, as are the linkages between internal and external policies in this regard. When it comes to transit countries, the EU insufficiently factors in the ties between migration control, labour mobility and trade to enhance incentives for cooperation on border management and readmission. Development cooperation could make an important contribution when addressing migration challenges and countering radicalisation in North and sub-Saharan Africa and in the Middle East. For the migrants' countries of origin, the effective implementation of regional migration strategies hinges on better coordination with development policy and greater insight from diplomatic resources and local partners, including civil society. A joined-up approach to migration prevents the emergence of policy silos. But this also requires the end of geographical silos. Instruments to fight smuggling and trafficking conceived for Syria ought to be relevant for the Horn of Africa, the Balkans and Ukraine, too.

Perhaps clearest of all, a more horizontal, joined-up approach to cyber policies is almost tautological if the EU is to rise to the challenge of a more connected world. Given the use of computer networks and Internet-based applications in all areas of human activity, cyber policies cannot be dealt with in splendid isolation. The effective implementation of external cyber policies depends on cooperation across the public-private divide and on effective coordination between policy areas. While several policy areas deal with the evolution of the cyber domain as such, broader cyber policy needs to be mainstreamed into policies dealing with energy, transport, defence, security, CT, health, the economy and more.

4. CONCLUSION

At the time of the 2003 European Security Strategy, the EU was still enjoying its best moment in recent history. The Union was completing the 'big bang' enlargement, had just approved an ambitious draft Constitutional Treaty, and was launching a no less ambitious neighbourhood policy, as well as the first CSDP missions. The widespread perception at the time was that the EU was equipping itself to safeguard the interests of its citizens globally and promote its values in the world.

Since then, the world – and our perception of it – has become more dangerous, divided and disorienting. The EU has suffered from a major financial and economic crisis, with profound socio-political ramifications that still reverberate across the Union. The security environment has deteriorated significantly, with both the eastern and southern neighbourhoods unravelling. The growing number of fragile states, coupled with the spread of new technologies, the pressures of climate change and the scarcity of natural resources could unleash new conflicts in Africa and Asia. Multiple narratives and currencies of power question traditional multilateralism without providing new answers to global governance. At the same time, a more complex and connected world holds the potential of being more prosperous, more equitable and more representative. It can generate forms of growth that are environmentally sustainable and respectful of rights and freedoms.

The world is more connected but also more contested; more integrated but also more fragmented: it is much more complex. Alone, Member States would struggle to meet these challenges. As a microcosm of complexity and connectivity and the most successful experiment of conflict transformation on a continental scale, the EU has experience in dealing with challenges and opportunities that now present themselves on a global

scale. How can we rebuild confidence in the EU's ability to keep its citizens safe and to promote their interests globally? How can we revive the values and political foundations of Europe through foreign policy?

The EU can rely on a broad set of instruments to confront the challenges and seize the opportunities ahead. Much has been achieved, but challenges revolving around policy direction, flexibility, coordination, leverage and capability must be met if the EU is to punch its weight in global affairs. In a degraded security environment, a commitment to strengthening CSDP is crucial, as is the need to develop synergies between internal and external security policies. More broadly, a joined-up approach should guide EU policy not only in conflicts and crises, but across all fields of EU external action. Vertical and horizontal silos hamper the EU's potential global role. And in a world of mounting challenges and opportunities, it is a luxury we cannot afford.

In a more connected, contested and complex world, we need a clear sense of direction. We need to agree on our priorities, our goals and the means required to achieve them. We need to become more realistic and adaptive, more innovative and more proactive. We must refine the art of orchestration of the polyphony of voices around the table and the panoply of instruments at our disposal.

We need a common, comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy.

Annex

For further reading

Part of the Council General Secretariat's administrative record relevant to the launch and preparation of the ESS, previously stored at the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), is now deposited at the EUISS – although it does not amount to a proper 'archive'.

The 2003 ESS triggered massive academic interest, including an entire 'generation' of PhD dissertations in political science, international relations and European studies. The first in-depth inquiry into the 'making' of the ESS, including comparisons between the first and the final versions as well as with the 2002 NSS, was provided by Alyson J.K. Bailes, *The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History* (SIPRI Policy Paper no.10, 2005). Among the scholarly publications, Sven Biscop's *The European Security Strategy: A Global Agenda for a Positive Power* (Ashgate, 2006) came first, along with the comprehensive collection of views in *The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe*, edited by Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (Routledge, 2008).

A useful publication related to the 2008 Report is *The European Security Strategy 2003-2008: Building on Common Interests*, edited by Alvaro de Vasconcelos (EUISS Report no.5, February 2009).

Another foray into 'strategic' territory was made by four think tanks (Swedish Institute of International Affairs/UI, Istituto Affari Internazionali/IAI, Real Instituto Elcano, Polish Institute of International Affairs/PISM) between 2012 and 2013 and led to a joint report – *Towards a European Global Strategy: Securing European Influence in a Changing World*, by Bjoern Faegersten, Alessandro Marrone, Martin Ortega and Roderick Parkes (UI, May 2013) – which can be downloaded from their websites.

A background analysis for the 2015 Report can be found in *A Changing Global Environment*, by the EUISS team (*Chaillot Paper* no.133, December 2014), while a selection and a list of EU 'strategies' since 2003 are printed in *Strategy Matters*, available at www.iss. europa.eu.

Abbreviations

AFET	Committee on Foreign Affairs
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CT	Counterterrorism
DG	Directorate General
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	European Commission
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
FYROM	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ODA	Official Development Assistance
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSS	National Security Strategy
PSC	Political and Security Committee
R&D	Research and Development
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SG/HR	Secretary General/High Representative
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Against the background of the ongoing consultation exercise on developing an EU global strategy, this book presents and contextualises the landmark documents that have successively codified the Union's external action objectives.

The volume explores the evolution of the European Security Strategy (or Strategies, considering the two successive versions of June and December 2003). It then dwells upon the 2008 report on the implementation of the strategy and, finally, briefly illustrates the basis on which the current HR/VP released her report on the 'The European Union in a changing global environment' in June 2015 and is now preparing for the new strategy, due out next year.

Along with the relevant EU documents, the book also presents the two texts that are most likely to represent a key point of reference for the forthcoming 'global' strategy, namely NATO's current Strategic Concept, dating back to 2010, and the latest US National Security Strategy, released earlier this year by the Obama administration.

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