The security-development nexus: how to bridge the gap between foreign/security policies and development policies, Introductory notes

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The framework: a renewed focus on the security/development nexus

- The security/development nexus is not a new concept, has been a fundamental component of development policies since their inception in late 40’s (ERD2009).
  - Europe itself is a product of it: the Marshall Plan also aimed at using ODA to foster stability and security in a post-conflict Europe.
  - During the Cold War, ODA was used to combat communism by offering a ‘carrot’ to Third World countries, thus ensuring that they become/remain allies.
  - In the 70’s, the European Community start giving ODA to its Mediterranean neighbour, on the ground of security.

- After September 11 it has been explicitly integrated in the international development agenda.
- UN Security Council debate on peace building, April 2010: “just as development can’t occur in the absence of peace, peace without development is peace that might not last”.

- The security development nexus has shaped part of ODA flows
Plenty of quotes in EU emphasising the nexus...

- “Security is the first condition for development. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda” (European Security Strategy, 2003).

- “Without peace and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur” (European Consensus, 2005)

- “The Parties acknowledge that without development and poverty reduction there will be no sustainable peace and security, and that without peace and security there can be no sustainable development” (Revised Cotonou Agreement, 2010, Article 11)

- “No one questions anymore the importance of security for development and the role that development plays for preventing conflicts, ensuring durable exits from conflicts and for accompanying crisis management through protective, confidence-building and crisis-alleviating measures. The security development nexus has been firmly established in the EU’s political priorities” (EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development, 2009).
The nexus is double-edged: a security-oriented development policy and a development oriented security policy...

- Few examples showing that ODA has often been used as a means to a security-oriented end.

- This “securitization” of development policy has intensified since 9/11, as many donors allocate the bulk of their ODA to countries perceived as a threat to their security interests.

- The 5 first beneficiaries of US ODA in 2008 (32% of the total) were Iraq (3246 million$), Afghanistan (1816 million$), Sudan (779 million$), Egypt (684 million$) and Ethiopia (592 million$).

- The share of USA ODA managed by USAID has declined from 64.3% in 1998 to 38.8% in 2005; conversely the share of the Department of Defence has grown from 3.5% to 21.7% during the same period.

- Though the phenomenon more obvious in the US, also EU donors allocate a substantial share of their ODA to ‘strategic’ countries and/or to alleviate security concerns (terrorism, migrations…).

- NGO’s regularly denounce this securitization trend and warn that « support for global security and the war on terror should not tap the already limited resources allocated to development » (CONCORD, 2007).
... and a development-oriented security policy

- The definition of security itself has been broadened and ‘developmentalized’.

- “Human security (UNDP, HDR 1994) include 7 categories: economic security; political security; health security; food security; environmental security; personal security; community security.

- Human security is a global notion that ties several agendas together (peace, development, security). Its implementation should ensure “freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom to live in dignity” (Kofi Annan).
A development-oriented security policy

• EU has adopted “a wide definition of security referring to all initiatives that promote human as well as state security ranging from conflict prevention to post-conflict activities which are financed under development instruments” (EU PCD, 2009)

• And has published a series of Communications on the links between security and development:
  • SEC(1996)332. The EU and the issue of conflicts in Africa: peacebuilding, conflict prevention and beyond;
  • COM(1999)240. Cooperation with ACP countries involved in armed conflicts;

• The development-oriented security perspective is characterized by a particular focus on “fragile states”, often “aid orphans”
The question: “is there any substance behind the rhetoric and the commitments?”

- Or is focusing on security and development “just another Euro-platitude” (Youngs, 2008)?

- Youngs claims: “would anyone contend that insecurity and raging conflict were good for development, or conversely poverty good for poverty conflict mitigation?”

- While it does seem quite obvious that security and development go hand in hand, the complex causal connections are still difficult to establish (Tschirgi, 2009), and often country-specific.

- This means that implementation has to be properly tailored, as ‘one size fits all’ policies can’t work, especially in fragile states (ERD 2009).
The implementation challenge: a security development competition?

- The first step is to bridge the gap between two policy communities with different perspectives and agendas, that can be in competition.

- Lack of mutual comprehension: “security experts can still be shockingly dismissive of the relevance of getting development and governance policies rights, while many in the development community still paint anything done in the field of security in unremittingly negative light, as only prejudicial to their work” (Youngs, 2009).

- This is evidenced by the fact that many in the development community see the dispositions of the new Treaty – on coherence, the High Representative, EEAS... as a possible threat to a ‘pure’ development policy which needs to be “safeguarded” (CONCORD 2010).
The implementation challenge

- At the institutional level, cooperation has intensified. In 2007, the first joint Council of the development and defence Ministers took place under Portuguese presidency.

- A few Member States (NL, FI, DE...) have created structures which deal specifically with the security development nexus.

- But “some Member states report major coordination problems between ministries. Defence and development ministries do not always share the same objectives and priorities, and they have different structures and time frames for action. Even the Member states that take a Whole of Government Approach face difficulties implementing it as mandates, practices and institutional policies differ” (EU PCD Report 2009).
The implementation challenge

• One must not shy away from the fact that behind these problems lies a competition for funds and competences.

• At the EU level for example, a development-oriented security policy can extend the sphere of action of the Commission to the competences of the Council, for example “by framing EU Africa policy as a development issue, and security as a dimension of EU development policy” (Sicurelli, 2008).

• The difficulties in coming up with a compromise on the EEAS is closely related to the funding issue: in deciding who supervises development activities between the EEAS and the Commission, the real issue is who gets to control and allocate a development budget which represents almost 80% of the EU’s external action budget.
The African Peace Facility shows the ambivalence of the security/development

- On the one hand, is presented as a means to promote peace, security and stability, and to foster the necessary conditions for sustainable development (EuropeAid website).

- On the other hand, the APF’s budget (440 million euros under the 9th EDF; 300 million euros for 2008-2010) is functioned on the European Development Fund (EDF), notwithstanding that most of it cannot be considered ODA under the DAC criteria (Kaldor and Glassius, 2005).

- This goes back to the debate in the DAC as to which security-related expenses can be counted as ODA, some Member states advocating for broader guidelines (IT, SE).
Does the security-development nexus matter?

- ERD 2009 explored the issue of fragility, at the core of the development security nexus.
- Fragility is an internal issue, as it is linked to the inability of the state to deliver public goods, provide basic and defend its citizens.
- This inability may stem from lack of capacity and means, but also from a lack of political will, often combined with bad governance and poor legitimacy.
- These inefficient state-building processes are also an external issue, as they are a source of regional and global threats. Fragile countries are “bad neighbours” as their fragility spreads through borders, for example through refugee movements, organized crime, or illicit flows and trafficking.
- The threat is also perceived by the donor themselves, whether it takes the form of migration flows or Somali pirates.
Adding a new issue: security, development, and social protection

- ERD 2010 deals with the issues of poverty, inequality and social protection, with a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa.

- In many ways, it expands and deepens the reflection on fragility initiated in the ERD 2009.

- In fragile states, governments are unable or unwilling to foster a resilient socioeconomic system, in which a degree of redistribution ensures the protection of the most vulnerable.

- In turn, resource gaps can increase fragility, as “inequality, exclusion and marginalisation create the preconditions for violence and criminality” (SIDA 2008).
The issue of social protection

• In this framework, “the political function of social protection is to provide social balance” (BMZ 2009)

• Experience, for example in Mozambique, shows that also social transfers can be effectively implemented in fragile states (DFID 2005). In these challenging situations, social protection systems can help restore or strengthen the social contract by fostering cohesion thanks to more social justice.

• In post-conflict situations, providing non-warfare related means of subsistence (employment and/or transfers) is also a crucial issue to ensure sustainable peace.
What role for donors?

• Hence, for donors, “the establishment and extension of social protection systems is not only a contribution to social and economic development, but also a contribution to efforts to foster peace and prevent conflicts” (BMZ 2009).

• However, building these systems is at the very core of state sovereignty. It is thus a deeply political process, in which it is difficult for donors to intervene.

• Promoting social protection, just like promoting state-building in situations of fragility, can’t be seen as an (exclusively) donor-driven agenda. For example, advocating a “European model” of social protection through a ‘one size fits all’ approach is more than likely to fail.
What role for donors? The EU

• Unlike most aid agencies, the array of potential EU policies extends much beyond financial assistance. The breadth of its policy mix gives the EU a comparative advantage as a donor.

• Furthermore, in the field of social protection, the EU’s member states provide a diversity of experiences and expertise in combining economic growth and (a measure of) social justice.

• Some EU donors (DFID, GTZ/BMZ, SIDA, AFD, EC…) are already active in the field of social protection, providing budget support and research to partner government, and financing pilot schemes in many developing countries.
The crux of the matter: political dialogue

• The success or failure of EU donors in promoting social protections relies on the quality of political dialogue.

• On the one hand, how to best approach the social protection issue with partner countries, simultaneously influencing and fostering ownership? On the other hand, how to do so at the EU level, through better division of labour, without being perceived as an external force imposing an agenda?

• ERD 2010 explores these issues. A collective EU approach, politically savy and tailored to the specificities of the partner country, could effectively help foster the extension of SP systems in SSA. In doing so, the EU would help bridge the gap between security and development, social protection being one of the foundations of the social contract and the way to enhance resilience.