Managing a Post-Crisis World

CONCLUSIONS
by Álvaro de Vasconcelos
The international community’s response to the events of 1989 was primarily led by the European Community and the United States. In the case of the current economic crisis, this response was articulated by a much wider constellation, encompassing other global players like China, Japan, India and Brazil. It is the capacity to build greater convergences that henceforth will constitute the touchstone of international leadership in a multipolar world; forging this capacity is therefore a central priority for America’s new foreign policy. It has been pointed out repeatedly that Barack Obama’s presidency, which advocates multilateralism and an inclusive concept of global governance, had opened a window of opportunity that must not be missed if we are to construct an effective multilateral system.

The EU’s progressive expansion has only been made possible by the enormous power of attraction that it exerts for its neighbours. As Pawel Swieboda reminds us in his report by quoting Bronislaw Geremek, the sense of a European community of purpose was never felt as strongly as when people throughout Western Europe wore the badge of the Solidarity movement, in protest at the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981: ‘it was at this moment that Europe was finally able to show what it represented.’

Twenty years after the ‘fourth wave of enlargement’, it is clear that democratic inclusion has constituted the principal instrument of the Union’s external action. The EU’s progressive expansion has only been made possible by the enormous power of attraction that it exerts for its neighbours. As Pawel Swieboda reminds us in his report by quoting Bronislaw Geremek, the sense of a European community of purpose was never felt as strongly as when people throughout Western Europe wore the badge of the Solidarity movement, in protest at the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981: ‘It was at this moment that Europe was finally able to show what it represented.’

The first panel’s discussion focused on democratic inclusion as the key instrument of the Union’s foreign policy, both within Europe and in its neighbourhood, and on the question of whether it can function in the same way in the absence of the more or less distant prospect of membership.

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This power of attraction has played an essential role in the success of democratic inclusion.

To sum up:

- Preserving and capitalising on the soft power of the Union constitutes an objective in itself. Political ‘conditionality’ should feature in all the policies of the Union.
- Building a wall which would separate it from the world would be contrary to the fundamental principle of unity in diversity and would constitute a fatal error. In order to avoid this, a coherent immigration policy is vital.
- Maintaining a policy of equilibrium between the East and South (one of the elements of the European compromise of 1989) is a vital necessity for the internal equilibrium of the Union and for the success of the Neighbourhood Policy.
- The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty presents a dynamic of which we must take full advantage in order to give a new impetus to the expansion of the EU to the Balkans and its relationship with Turkey.
- It is necessary to bolster the Neighbourhood Policy (ideally a mechanism of inclusion) with the means commensurate with its ambition, similar to those which enabled the success of democratic inclusion via enlargement.

The principles of effective multilateralism: protecting civilians

The future of the method of democratic inclusion, as it is currently formulated, seems therefore rather uncertain. Despite everything, it has been clearly affirmed that in order to ensure democratic stability in the Balkans and among its neighbours, the European Union should pursue, in a different manner, the expansion of its arena of peace and democracy to its neighbours in the East and the Southern Mediterranean. A worrying question has also been raised: why does democracy in the East constitute an objective that has been clearly articulated by the Union, while this is not the case for the South? Although the changes that resulted from the ‘domino effect’ of the 1989 democratic revolution had less of an impact in the Mediterranean than in the East, it is nevertheless true that the countries in this region share the same democratic aspirations, even if the degree of hope or appetite for membership is different. In the Southern Mediterranean, the consistency of the Union’s international policy, and the values that the EU professes, are confronted with a decisive test.
International mechanisms for monitoring the behaviour of international forces deployed under international mandate in relation to human rights should be set in place, in particular so as to verify whether the Geneva Conventions are respected in the context of these interventions.

Given that reform of the Security Council is not going to happen anytime soon, another means of including security in the global governance agenda needs to be found. It was in this context that the creation of a G20 for Security was proposed, one that might be inspired by the UN Peacebuilding Commission – without however necessarily having to be a part of the UN system.

Nuclear disarmament is one of the priorities of effective multilateralism, and the great powers need to be mobilised on this issue.

While the principles of the United Nations need to be reaffirmed, at the same time, the need to protect the rights of civilians and to define a doctrine to protect them from mass violence, and notably genocide, needs to be formulated in a clearer and more restrictive manner. In this regard, it is imperative that the debate on the Responsibility to Protect be pursued.

Global governance and development: getting out of the ghetto

Two issues dominated the debate of the third panel: what attitude to adopt with regard to the eruption onto the scene of great powers – primarily China – in relation to the development agenda? What relationship should be established between the different measures taken in response to the economic and financial crisis and the promotion of sustainable development?

Multilateral organs dedicated to development should launch the debate between all relevant actors on different models of development – a debate which should not be confined to the OECD. The fact that China is today a major player in Africa means that this country must be involved in initiatives aiming to combat poverty and foster development. Basically this means that a new approach to development needs to be forged, one that involves multiple actors, such as China or Brazil. As Azzam Mahjoub stated in his report, ‘the aim
of doubling Chinese state aid to development has been maintained despite the economic crisis. Chinese ODA in sub-Saharan Africa takes the form of donations in nature, concession agreements or zero interest loans, without any political conditionality’, which Chinese experts associate with the concept of responsible stakeholder. Rather than ask questions about the aims of China’s strategy in Africa, it is more important to ask questions about what the Africans, first and foremost, should expect from it, and about the way in which they can benefit most from China’s desire to play a more important role in the field of development. This also implies a considerable challenge for China: to make its contribution to development an instrument for conflict-prevention and good governance.

Although the discussions highlighted important areas of divergence, they also confirmed a tendency towards convergence with regard to models of internal development, due principally to the importance attached to the ecological question, in turn leading to a certain convergence of aid models. The changes implemented in this sphere by the Obama administration also deepen this tendency. Among the main conclusions of the debate, the following in particular should be noted:

- Traditional forms of development aid, which constitute autonomous policies generally dissociated from other aspects of international politics, should be replaced by integrated policies. As Azzam Mahjoub emphasises in his report, ‘Aid and business development are quite separate, in the same way that there is little or no conjunction or effort to attain synergy between aid and migrants’ remittances: aid must get out of the ghetto.’

- It is necessary to connect the different issues on the global agenda – whether the response to the economic and financial crisis, the environment, conflict prevention, problems associated with migration and trade – and to link these up with the theme of development.

- Multilateral institutions in the field of development should fully integrate the new situation that prevails in the international arena. In addressing the question of development in the context of the economic crisis, the G-20 has taken a step in the right direction. But modes of global governance must be found that allow countries that are directly targeted by development policies to make their voices heard.

- The questions of good governance, political reform, the rule of law and human rights are an essential component in the success of development policies. They should not be sacrificed on the altar of stability and the over-securitised visions of international issues.

Global governance : capitalising on the dynamics of the G20

The United States and the European Union have acknowledged that they need the collaboration of other powers to be able to successfully tackle the economic and financial crisis. The G20 has thus been replaced by the G20, in what was unanimously applauded as a progressive development, with the implicit recognition of the fact that we live in a multipolar world, where the West needs the rest to deal with global issues. Does the G20 represent a new mechanism of ad hoc global governance, which might be repeated in other ‘G’s composed of the same states or others, on other global questions? Is the G20 not blazing a trail for the overall reform of other multilateral organisations, in a way that would better reflect the current distribution of power at the global level? The question is still open. Will the international system evolve from ad hoc forms of governance towards effective multilateralism? As Maria João Rodrigues points out in her report, ‘The overriding objective is to achieve a grand bargain at the global level centred on sustainable economic, social and environmental development. The question is how to get there while dealing with difficult negotiations on interconnected issues in separate arenas.’ The same objective should however be pursued, in other key areas, such as disarmament, crisis management or peacebuilding. It was also argued, during the discussions, that ini-
The G20 represents progress in relation to the G8; however, it will be necessary to find ways to enhance its effectiveness, and to ensure that it takes account of topics that relate to global governance like energy, climate change and development, all of which were part of the G8’s agenda.

It is imperative – as the logical result of the dynamic ushered in by the G20 – that multilateral institutions such as the Bretton Woods organisations (the IMF and the World Bank) be reformed, if we want to give global governance its full legitimacy. The reform of the Security Council could take place within this same dynamic.

The European Union should agree to significantly reduce its Member States’ representation in the G20. For the Europeans, to speak with one voice in international organisations – beginning with the IMF and the World Bank – signifies more, and not less, power.

Regionalism should again feature among the priorities in the initiatives concerning global governance – not only as a necessary dimension for the strengthening of its legitimacy, but also as an essential instrument for the implementation of initiatives in the sphere of development or indeed security. The creation of a group of regional organisations, parallel to the G20, would be a step in this direction.

The voices of non-state actors should be more audible prior to decision-taking, as sources of both expertise and legitimacy, especially in the areas that concern them directly, such as disarmament, human rights, emigration and refugees, climate change and international justice.

Panel 4

It was also stated that regional cooperation remains one of the major components of effective multilateralism; far from being something that can be neglected, it should on the contrary be integrated as a component of global governance in its own right. This is clearly already the case in the European Union with its Neighbourhood Policy, Brazil with Mercosul and Unasul, or South Africa with the SADC. In the same vein, regarding security matters, regional cooperation, whether in institutionalised form or not, has proved to be essential in order to ensure trust between neighbours and for conflict resolution, especially in the case of Afghanistan. In a multipolar world, regionalism should remain a priority if we want to prevent the emergence of a system founded on the interplay of the great powers alone.

Finally, the radical changes in the United States’ foreign policy have been identified as a window of opportunity for the creation of a wide international consensus around the concept of effective multilateralism, sealing the ‘grand bargain’ which will allow international organisations to adapt to the necessities of global governance.

This will ultimately mean that the question of the reform of the Security Council will have to be raised anew. Establishing whether this question is still on the agenda was one of the central questions in the discussion, during which a consensus emerged on the necessity to guarantee a fair representation of all relevant actors if we are to be able to deal with global issues in a way that involves the contribution of all: in other words, participation cannot take place without representation. From this panel’s discussions the following recommendations emerged: