

Managing a Post-Crisis World


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The EUISS Annual Conference of 2009 aimed to draw a parallel between two crises that occurred twenty years apart, and the responses that were given to them. In this spirit we focused our attention on the responses, both European and international, to the major changes that Europe experienced after the fall of the Berlin Wall: we also sought to better understand the ways of capitalising on the dynamic created by the reaction – both international and European – to the economic and financial crisis that erupted in summer 2007. The idea was, in both cases, to draw lessons that could be applied to other domains.

The themes of the Paris Conference were explored beforehand in Working Groups that took place in Warsaw, New York, New Delhi and Paris, and whose reports were drafted by Pawel Swieboda, Azzam Mahjoub, Radha Kumar and Maria João Rodrigues respectively. The discussion of these topics at the Annual Conference aimed to indicate what policies the international community should pursue in response to the serious crises that the world is currently experiencing, and ideally, to have the means of being able to anticipate their outbreak. Among the predominant ideas that emerged in this regard, a few main points that commanded consensus stood out: the vital importance of rebuilding the legitimacy of international action, more dependent than ever on the approval of the United Nations; the necessity, faced with the major global issues, of defining clear and concerted strategies; and, finally, the urgency of backing up political initiatives with compatible means and resources, and guaranteeing generally an ongoing coordination between relevant actors dealing with a given problem.

The international community's response to the events of 1989 was primarily led by the European Community and the United States. In the case of the current economic crisis, the response was articulated by a much wider constellation, encompassing other global players like China, Japan, India and Brazil. It is the capacity to build greater convergences that henceforth will constitute the touchstone of international leadership in a multipolar world; forging this capacity is therefore a central priority for America's new foreign policy. It has been pointed out repeatedly that Barack Obama's presidency, which advocates multilateralism and an inclusive concept of global governance, had opened a window of opportunity that must not be missed if we are to construct an effective multilateral system.





Javier Solana

Javier Solana delivered his last keynote speech to the EUISS Annual Conference on 22 October 2009, after a decade in office as High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (CFSP). During that period, he oversaw the development of European policy and the structures and institutions that underpin it. From the beginning he had a close involvement with the Institute. SG/HR Solana, who was also Chairman of the Board of the Institute, officially inaugurated the Institute at the first Annual Conference in July 2002, just over six months after the Institute was founded. His speech on CFSP was to become the highlight of the Institute's Annual Conferences over the years, and his unflinching presence at the Annual Conferences was always appreciated.

In his final address to the EUISS Annual Conference, SG/HR Solana said:

'Building on the improvements of the last ten years, and with the new opportunities of the Lisbon Treaty within reach, we should plan our next steps: alert to new problems and dangers; guided by our common values. In partnership with others. And with the conviction that each on our own is unable to deal effectively with the problems of our globalised world. We know that acting together is the only way to defend our interests. But we have also defined acting together as being a strategic common interest. That is why European integration is both a means but also an end in itself.'

LIGHTHOUSE EUROPE: FROM 1989 UNTIL TODAY

The first panel's discussion focused on democratic inclusion as the key instrument of the Union's foreign policy, both within Europe and in its neighbourhood, and on the question of whether it can function in the same way in the absence of the more or less distant prospect of membership.

Twenty years after the 'fourth wave of enlargement', it is clear that democratic inclusion has constituted the principal instrument of the Union's external action. The EU's progressive expansion has only been made possible by the enormous power of attraction that it exerts for its neighbours. As Pawel Swieboda reminds us in his report by quoting Bronislaw Geremek, the sense of a European

community of purpose was never felt as strongly as when people throughout Western Europe wore the badge of the Solidarity movement, in protest at the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981: 'it was at this moment that Europe was finally able to show what it represented.' This power of attraction has played an essential role in the success of democratic inclusion.

Those who advocated an international response to the collapse of the Soviet empire were fully aware that maintaining, indeed increasing, the power of attraction of the European Union and the democratic world represented a crucial factor; all equally subscribed to the idea of an enlarged community. The events during the years that followed the fall of the Wall showed that they were right; *soft power is real power.*

For the European Union more than for any other international actor, it is the magnetism of its model of democratic integration that constitutes its principal strength. Thus, taking, with Attila Erlep, a point of view from Turkey, the Union should act as 'Lighthouse Europe', a beacon of stability and democratic values in our turbulent international system. But it must nevertheless be recognised that there is a prevailing mood of enlargement fatigue, even though enlargement is the preeminent instrument of European external policy; a feeling associated with the conviction that the Union has neglected to deepen the integration process and that it has not yet 'digested' its last wave of enlargement.

The future of the method of democratic inclusion, as it is currently formulated, seems therefore rather uncertain. Despite everything, it has been clearly affirmed that in order to ensure democratic stability in the Balkans and among its neighbours, the European Union should pursue, in a different manner, the expansion of its arena of peace and democracy to its neighbours in the East and the Southern Mediterranean. A worrying question has also been raised: why does democracy in the East constitute an objective that has been clearly articulated by the Union, while this is not the case for the South? Although the changes that resulted from the 'domino effect' of the 1989 democratic revolution had less of an impact in the Mediterranean than in the East, it is nevertheless true that the countries in this region share the same democratic aspirations, even if the degree of hope or appetite for membership is different. In the Southern Mediterranean, the consistency of the Union's international policy, and the values that the EU professes, are confronted with a decisive test.

To sum up:

- Preserving and capitalising on the *soft power* of the Union constitutes an objective in itself. Political 'conditionality' should feature in all the policies of the Union.
- Building a wall which would separate the EU from the world would be contrary to the fundamental principle of unity in diversity and would constitute a fatal error. In order to avoid this, a coherent immigration policy is vital.
- Maintaining a policy of equilibrium between the

East and South (one of the elements of the European compromise of 1989) is a vital necessity for the internal equilibrium of the Union and for the success of the Neighbourhood Policy.

- The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty presents a dynamic of which we must take full advantage in order to give a new impetus to the expansion of the EU to the Balkans and its relationship with Turkey.
- It is necessary to bolster the Neighbourhood Policy (ideally a mechanism of inclusion) with the means commensurate with its ambition, similar to those which enabled the success of democratic inclusion via enlargement.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT: GETTING OUT OF THE GHETTO

Two issues dominated the debate of the third panel: what attitude should be adopted with regard to the eruption onto the scene of great powers – primarily China – in relation to the development agenda? What relationship should be established between the different measures taken in response to the economic and financial crisis and the promotion of sustainable development?

Multilateral bodies dedicated to development should launch the debate between all relevant actors on different models of development – a debate which should not be confined to the OECD. The fact that China is today a major player in Africa means that this country must be involved in initiatives aiming to combat poverty and foster development. Basically this means that a new approach to development needs to be forged, one that involves multiple actors, such as China or Brazil. As Azzam Mahjoub stated in his report, ‘the aim of doubling Chinese state aid to development has been maintained despite the economic crisis. Chinese ODA in sub-Saharan Africa takes the form of donations in nature, concession agreements or zero interest loans, without any political conditionality’, which Chinese experts associate with the concept of responsible stakeholder. Rather than ask questions about the aims of China’s strategy in Africa, it is more important to ask questions about what the Africans, first and foremost, should expect from it, and about the way in which they can benefit most from China’s desire to play a more important role in the field of development. This also implies a considerable challenge for China: to make its contribution to development an instrument for conflict-prevention and good governance.

Although the discussions highlighted important areas of divergence, they also confirmed a tendency towards convergence with regard to models of internal development, due principally to the importance attached to the ecological question, in turn leading to a certain convergence of aid models. The changes implemented in this sphere by the Obama administration also underscore this tendency. Among the main conclusions of the debate, the following in particular should be noted:

- Traditional forms of development aid, which constitute autonomous policies generally dissociated from other

aspects of international politics, should be replaced by integrated policies. As Azzam Mahjoub emphasises in his report, ‘Aid and business development are quite separate, in the same way that there is little or no conjunction or effort to attain synergy between aid and migrants’ remittances: aid must get out of the ghetto.’

- It is necessary to connect the different issues on the global agenda – whether the response to the economic and financial crisis, the environment, conflict prevention, problems associated with migration and trade – and to link these up with the theme of development.
- Multilateral institutions in the field of development should fully integrate the new situation that prevails in the international arena. In addressing the question of development in the context of the economic crisis, the G-20 has taken a step in the right direction. But modes of global governance must be found that allow countries that are directly targeted by development policies to make their voices heard.
- The questions of good governance, political reform, the rule of law and human rights are an essential component in the success of development policies. They should not be sacrificed on the altar of stability and the over-securitised visions of international issues.



Alvaro de Vasconcelos and Javier Solana as SG/HR Solana takes questions from the floor after his opening speech

THE PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM: PROTECTING CIVILIANS

The discussion of the second panel highlighted the lack of consensus between the relevant actors – whether global or regional, old or new – regarding the principles and norms that should guide the behaviour of the international community in the spheres of war and peace. In some cases, there is broad agreement on these principles, but despite that they are not universally respected. One common conviction nevertheless emerged during the discussion, with equal clarity: there is no real risk of confrontation between the principal great powers. The latter generally consider themselves to be partners rather than strategic competitors. The quest for a common doctrine, at least in broad outline, is therefore in no way a fanciful or rhetorical exercise: this doctrine is necessitated by a convergence of interests that reflects the clear interdependence of the

main global power centres. This must be acknowledged as a matter of urgency, especially in view of the serious regional crises in the Middle East or in Afghanistan which constitute, to cite Radha Kumar in her report, 'increasingly complex conflicts' in which armed forces, rebel militias and humanitarian disasters all collide.

Two distinct schools of thought emerged. On the one hand, advocates of the existing institutional frameworks and existing principles; on the other hand, those who believe that it is necessary to establish new institutions and new principles that could embody a new multilateralism that sets the protection of the individual as its primary objective. The discussion nevertheless made it possible to clarify one point: the conditions for the legitimisation of the use of force to prevent or avoid crimes against humanity are the crux of the problem. The debate on the Responsibility to Protect is essential for the definition of rules and norms that could serve as the basis for the legitimisation, by the international community, of a given operation, as well as for the conduct of military action proper. As Radha Kumar's report indicates, the use of force, essential in exceptional circumstances, 'entails a high risk of human rights violations, so it needs to be stressed that R2P applies to international forces as much as it does to state and non-state forces' – bearing in mind, furthermore, that the international community already disposes of the necessary regulations to supervise military interventions, like the Geneva Convention.

The emerging powers are confronted with the necessity to take on increasing responsibilities in the international security arena, which means that they have to devise a security doctrine compatible with these new tasks and responsibilities. In this context, it is a particularly opportune moment to seek international consensus on questions relating to peacekeeping, including the principles which govern the use of the armed forces. The following recommendations emerged from the panel's discussions:

- The concept of responsible power constitutes the basis of a convergence of views among the main global players with regard to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. In this context, the concept of human security should be reintroduced into the debate, and reworked.
- International mechanisms for monitoring the behaviour of international forces deployed under international mandate in relation to human rights should be set in place, in particular so as to verify whether the Geneva Conventions are respected in the context of these interventions.
- Given that reform of the Security Council is not going to happen anytime soon, another means of including security in the global governance agenda needs to be found. It was in this context that the creation of a G20 for Security was proposed, one that might be inspired by the UN Peacebuilding Commission – without however necessarily having to be a part of the UN system.
- Nuclear disarmament is one of the priorities of effective multilateralism, and the great powers need to be mobilised on this issue.
- While the principles of the United Nations need to be reaffirmed, at the same time, the need to protect the

rights of civilians and to define a doctrine to protect them from mass violence, and notably genocide, needs to be formulated in a clearer and more restrictive manner. In this regard, it is imperative that the debate on the Responsibility to Protect be pursued.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE : CAPITALISING ON THE DYNAMICS OF THE G20

The United States and the European Union have acknowledged that they need the collaboration of other powers to be able to successfully tackle the economic and financial crisis. The G20 has thus been replaced by the G20, in what was unanimously applauded as a progressive development, with the implicit recognition of the fact that we live in a multipolar world, where the West needs the rest to deal with global issues. Does the G20 represent a new mechanism of *ad hoc* global governance, which might be repeated in other 'G's' composed of the same states or others, on other global questions? Is the G20 not blazing a trail for the overall reform of other multilateral organisations, in a way that would better reflect the current distribution of power at the global level? The question is still open. Will the international system evolve from *ad hoc* forms of governance towards effective multilateralism? As Maria João Rodrigues points out in her report: 'The overriding objective is to achieve a grand bargain at the global level centred on sustainable economic, social and environmental development. The question is how to get there while dealing with difficult negotiations on interconnected issues in separate arenas.' The same objective should however be pursued, in other key areas, such as disarmament, crisis management or peacebuilding. It was also argued, during the discussions, that initiatives like the nuclear summit convened by President Obama imply an extension of the dynamic of the *ad hoc* 'G's' to the security domain.



Jacques Delors and Javier Solana at the lunch

It was also stated that regional cooperation remains one of the major components of effective multilateralism; far from being something that can be neglected, it should on the contrary be integrated as a component of global governance in its own right. This is clearly already the case in the European Union with its Neighbourhood

Policy, Brazil with Mercosul and Unasul, or South Africa with the SADC. In the same vein, regarding security matters, regional cooperation, whether in institutionalised form or not, has proved to be essential in order to ensure trust between neighbours and for conflict resolution, especially in the case of Afghanistan. In a multipolar world, regionalism should remain a priority if we want to prevent the emergence of a system founded on the interplay of the great powers alone.

Finally, the radical changes in the United States' foreign policy have been identified as a window of opportunity for the creation of a wide international consensus around the concept of effective multilateralism, sealing the 'grand bargain' which will allow international organisations to adapt to the necessities of global governance.

This will ultimately mean that the question of the reform of the Security Council will have to be raised anew. Establishing whether this question is still on the agenda was one of the central questions in the discussion, during which a consensus emerged on the necessity to guarantee a fair representation of all relevant actors if we are to be able to deal with global issues in a way that involves the contribution of all: in other words, participation cannot take place without representation. From this panel's discussions the following recommendations emerged:

- The G20 represents progress in relation to the G8 ; however, it will be necessary to find ways to enhance its effectiveness, and to ensure that it takes account of topics that relate to global governance like energy, climate change and development, all of which were part of the G8's agenda.
- It is imperative – as the logical result of the dynamic ushered in by the G20 – that multilateral institutions such as the Bretton Woods organisations (the IMF and the World Bank) be reformed, if we want to give global governance its full legitimacy. The reform of the Security Council could take place within this same dynamic.
- The European Union should agree to significantly reduce its Member States' representation in the G20. For the Europeans, to speak with one voice in international organisations – beginning with the IMF and the World Bank – signifies more, and not less, power.
- Regionalism should again feature among the priorities in the initiatives concerning global governance – not only as a necessary dimension for the strengthening of its legitimacy, but also as an essential instrument for the implementation of initiatives in the sphere of development or indeed security. The creation of a group of regional organisations, parallel to the G20, would be a step in this direction.
- The voices of non-state actors should be more audible prior to decision-taking, as sources of both expertise and legitimacy, especially in the areas that concern them directly, such as disarmament, human rights, emigration and refugees, climate change and international justice.

Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Director of the EUISS

PANEL 1. TWENTY YEARS AFTER 1989: ENLARGEMENT AND NEIGHBOURHOOD. THE DYNAMICS OF DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION

Report by Pawel Swieboda

This panel discussed the conclusions of Working Group 1 on 'Implications of the economic crisis for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy' held in Warsaw on 19 June 2009, in collaboration with Collegium Civitas (Centre for Security Studies) and Demos EUROPA.

I. LESSONS OF THE 1989 TRANSITIONS

The revolutionary changes that characterised 1989 brought about one of the most rapid transformation processes in modern times. But those changes would not have been possible without the popular mobilisation across Central and Eastern Europe, with major events challenging the Communist regimes of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and finally East Germany.

As the former Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek recalled, the feeling of a European community of purpose was strong and clear when the whole of Western Europe was wearing the pin of the underground Solidarity movement in the 1980s that eventually undermined communism, and when people protested against the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981. 'This was the moment when Europe demonstrated what it was really about', he said. The spring 1989 Round Table talks in Poland between the communist government and the democratic opposition marked the moment when the moral superiority of the anti-communist dissidents was translated for the first time into a political power-sharing agreement that proved to be crucial for the eventual success of the democratic movement.

The year 1989 was the founding moment of the European Union as we now know it, and the key to its continuing relevance. It was an example of the powerful effects of 'a community of purpose' among the EU member states as well as between them and the United States. The latter was of key importance for the eventual success of the democratic transformation. The understanding that European integration was the best means available to reunify Germany and bring democracy to Central and Eastern Europe was shared on both sides of the Atlantic, and provided the much-needed strategic orientation. Just as it did at the outset of the European process, the United States in this crucial 'hour of Europe' was ready to stand by its values with an impressive strength of conviction.

There are two distinct phases in the history of European integration, according to Álvaro de Vasconcelos. Peace was the main objective during the first phase, notably through the transformation of Franco-German relations. The agenda of the second phase of integration has been

dominated by democratisation and inclusion, beginning with the accession of Portugal, Spain and Greece and continuing with efforts to consolidate democracy in Turkey via the accession process.

If the EU were to lose its power of attraction, along with its salient features such as solidarity, democracy, democratic values, and diversity, it would also forego its ability to transform the neighbouring countries.

The enlargements of the last two decades indicate that four aspects are most important:

- *Conditionality* which defines the necessary steps on the part of candidate countries;
- *Credibility* which ensures that the EU will deliver on its promise of membership once the conditions are met;
- *Coherence* of the European policy regarding enlargement and a common denominator among the member states on the future of the process; and
- *Solidarity* which can be brought about by means of a gradual process of integration, starting with participation in different political cooperation plans.

What also followed from the events of 1989, and which continues today, was an experiment in political engineering whereby space was created for various social groups, some of which suffered enormously as a result of the transformation. In hindsight, establishing links between countries on an economic basis, complicated in itself, proved easier than achieving the same at the level of historical memory. As Aleksander Smolar rightly recalls, many people considered the geopolitical dimension as the most important. For them, 1989 was seen as a result of the 'Great Power play' rather than a quest for freedom. Not surprisingly, it is the fall of the Berlin Wall, the symbol of Europe's division, that is generally remembered better in the world than the Polish Solidarity movement and the Round Table talks, the first compromise between the communist government and the opposition, and a model for many other transformations.

The European Union is the best thing that has happened to Central and Eastern European countries. It has proved to be a unique formula for transforming their politics, economy and way of life. It is also an example of the effectiveness of the EU's policy of democratic inclusion, combining economic integration and political conditionality. Economic integration cannot proceed without the political dimension and complete integration is the only means of democratisation.

The democratisation process has also led to a delegitimation of extreme nationalism. In relation to the Western Balkans, the EU is now trying to demonstrate that there is another way of rethinking identity, namely through Habermas's notion of constitutional patriotism, whereby national identity is constructed without a confrontational identity *vis-à-vis* a neighbour.

The transformation of Central and Eastern Europe was a challenging exercise. There was little wholehearted em-

bracing of the new members by the old; at least, that was the reading among the former. Just as with the enlargement to include Spain and Portugal, democratic conditionality was also at the core of the process of Central European enlargement.

The changes of 1989 unleashed forces which led to both the deepening and widening of the integration process, a process in which the two phenomena were mutually reinforcing. The EU had to be pushed to make decisions, which were always formulated late and under pressure. The fundamental dynamics originated in the powerful impetus generated by the Central and Eastern Europeans' desire to 'rejoin Europe'.



Pawel Swieboda and Joachim Bitterlich during Panel 1

Significantly, there remains an invisible wall between the East and the West. The members of 'old Europe' do not always comprehend the political agenda of the new members from Central and Eastern Europe. Western Europe still has not come to terms with the fact that we now live in a Europe without the wall, as Daniel Hamilton observes. This difficulty in shrugging off the old mentality led to grave errors in the 1990s in the Balkans, a region that at the time was not universally accepted as part of Europe.

The EU has gained from enlargement, but it still must come to terms with how much it has changed as a result. Moreover, it will have to better understand that shutting the doors to new members in the future would defy the logic of openness and inclusion that are its very foundations.

With respect to the possible accession of Turkey, a nation undergoing its second great wave of modernisation after Atatürk, the EU will have to change its attitude towards Islam and adopt the view that Islam and democracy are compatible. The EU has borders with dictatorships such as Belarus already and in the future it may share its borders with Iran, Syria and Iraq. Although the traditional route to EU membership should be followed with respect to the Balkan countries, a new approach may be required for Turkey.

The problem lies deeply rooted in the minds of the European elites. As Jacques Rupnik once remarked, 'everyone

is someone else's barbarian'. Europeans have temporarily lost appetite for transforming countries which do little to transform themselves. They will however come to realise that, especially with regard to their closest neighbours, failing to engage is not an option. But at the same time, Europeans are weary of the constant reform process and must devise a new approach to enlargement in the future.

But there is no doubt that 1989 transformed the European Union, even though it could be said that 1989 ended the dream of a federal Europe, as Aleksander Smolar notes, because the EU became too culturally diverse.

II. FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a trademark of EU engagement with its Eastern and Southern neighbours. However, it carries the DNA code of a different historical period. Born in the context of the EU's most extensive enlargement to absorb 12 countries in Central and Southern Europe, the ENP was designed to avoid new dividing lines between members of the 'club' and the less distant outsiders. It emerged as a function of the EU's internal evolution and had the objective of cushioning the Union against any unwanted turbulence beyond its borders. That is, its purpose was more the protection of the EU and its achievements rather than an expansion of its sphere of influence to new geographical zones. As such, it was a policy for the calmer waters of a simpler world in which the EU would continue to exercise influence in its immediate proximity by virtue of its unique prosperity and model of cooperation. However in the years since its adoption, the world has become a different place, and the ENP policy must now be changed to reflect this new reality.

Since 1995, the EU has engaged in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Oslo Process when peace seemed to be within reach. For the EU, this was a means to enlarge the area of peace and stability through inclusion to the south but without the incentive of membership. The objective of the EMP was to combine economic integration and political cooperation but without strong political conditionality. Since then, the enormous difficulties of the exercise have become apparent. The process has been subject to several revisions, the latest being its transformation into the Union for the Mediterranean. The Gaza War in early 2009 demonstrated that peace remains a key prerequisite to a functioning Euro-Mediterranean community, and confirms that economic incentives are not sufficient on their own if they are not accompanied by a growing sense of security and political stability.

The most recent initiative aimed at enhancing the region's ties with the European Union is the Eastern Partnership. With its promise of further political and economic integration, it opens up a new chapter in the relationship between the EU and six Eastern European neighbours:

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. At the same time, its instruments are destined to create a relatively weak bond with these countries unless they are updated within a reasonable period of time. The creation of thematic platforms will facilitate regional dialogue and the exchange of best practices, but they will need to be re-launched in 2010 and 2011 with the aim of strengthening the relationship between the EU and Eastern Partnership countries.

Russia will continue to play an important role in the region, competing with the EU in exercising influence and leverage by means of both soft and hard power. European attitudes towards Russia are largely shaped by the Union's energy dependence, which moderates its willingness to confront Moscow directly when the situation in the neighbourhood so requires. At the same time, Russia is a fragile actor and this often leads Moscow to put on a show of strength. Open dialogue and clear 'red lines' are therefore indispensable in dealing with Russia.

III. PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER ENLARGEMENT

The EU clearly does not have the same power of attraction over the current candidates and potential candidates that it had with respect to the Central and Southern European members. This is due to the lost historical momentum, aside from the growing 'enlargement fatigue' within the EU and the complexity of the post-civil war situation in the Balkans. The 'big bang' enlargement was about overcoming the historical divisions of the continent. That motivation is no longer there, although the prospect of EU accession remains an impetus for transformation in the candidate countries (Croatia and FYROM) and potential candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia) in the Western Balkans. We are in the post-conditionality stage at the moment, which is more incentive-oriented.

There has been a stalemate in the Turkish accession negotiations for some time now and the negative interaction between the EU and Turkey in recent years has weakened the EU's 'lighthouse Europe' role and its transformative power over Turkish reforms. Foreign policy cooperation could prove to be an effective measure to unblock that stalemate. As Atila Eralp observes, the challenge for Turkey is to bring an active neighbourhood policy together with its European vocation. The use of soft power in Turkey's foreign policy can already be considered a result of the ongoing Europeanisation process.

Further EU enlargement remains firmly in the interests of the EU for reasons related to consolidating democracy and stabilising countries in its direct neighbourhood, as well as the future character of the EU, the role it intends to play in the world and the influence it wishes to yield beyond its borders. The EU's international influence will not grow through closing the door to new members. Having said that, further EU enlargement must be the result of a conscious choice rather than an unwanted necessity.

IV. IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS ON NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

Neighbouring countries are facing enormous difficulties in the context of the current economic crisis, which has exacerbated their poor capital base and resultant high dependence on external financing. These countries are perceived as presenting the highest risk among emerging markets due to their unclear position *vis-a-vis* the EU and/or Russia, meaning that they will be crowded out in the competition for capital. The abundance of red tape and corruption are deterring investment and domestic business growth.

Ukraine, the largest country in the region, remains of principal interest as a destination for capital but requires more political stability and reform drive. Georgia has a reform-minded government and a liberal economic regime but it was destabilised and isolated as a result of the August 2008 conflict with Russia. Belarus may benefit from its low starting point base and the EU's proximity.



Participants in Panel 1

The weak prospects for EU membership are attributable to domestic reasons - for example a lack of reform - as well as external reasons, such as the fact that the EU's appetite for enlargement is even more diminished than it was before the crisis. Many countries' political elites were unprepared when the crisis struck, and they lacked a coherent plan of action. The momentum for reform decreased. Practically no progress was made in carrying out political reforms including constitutional and judicial reform as well as with respect to the fight against corruption.

As a result, popular unrest is likely as the economic crisis filters its way down into the wider echelons of the population. There is growing disenchantment with the governing political elites and a readiness to grant the benefit of the doubt to newcomers. In Ukraine, the pivotal country in Eastern Europe, the 2010 presidential elections are not expected to lead to substantially more political stability and improvements in the quality of governance. Reform of the constitution remains essential for avoiding divisions among the executive branch.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been the key partner for countries in the region, with Ukraine's agreement for a stand-by arrangement to the tune of USD 16.4 billion crucial for stabilising its precarious economic situation. It helped Ukraine to avoid what many feared was a near-default in the spring of 2009, and it contributed to the easing of financial pressures although political uncertainty and a deeper-than-expected contraction of the economy continued to pose challenges.

The European Commission began considering a large macro-financial assistance programme for Ukraine with the objective of covering its external financial needs and supporting the government's reform programme, especially with regard to the social safety net. Ukraine remains heavily dependent on international demand for commodities such as steel, grain and chemical products. The January gas dispute exacerbated the situation and meant that the Ukrainian government had to halt deliveries to industry in order to ensure heating for households. Consumer confidence and exports of raw materials have since shown signs of recovery.

In the Mediterranean neighbourhood, the consequences of the global economic crisis have been less marked than expected. Many countries in the region had suffered more severely from the earlier rises in oil prices which pushed up energy costs in non-oil producing states and compounded a parallel explosion in food prices. This generated popular resentment and found expression in riots in Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. On the other hand, non-oil southern Mediterranean economies benefited from high levels of direct private foreign investment from the Gulf during the second half of this decade, redirected from traditional Western recipients because of anger over Western policies towards the Middle East.

Against the odds, 2009 has not been as difficult as expected, largely because of the immature state of the banking sector which was not exposed to the sophisticated financial products that created huge problems elsewhere. Harvests have been good and oil prices have moderated. Foreign direct investment did not decline as quickly as expected, and is expected to rise in 2010. Some countries such as Libya have themselves become significant foreign investors during 2009. Tourism has been resilient in Tunisia and is on the rise in Morocco. Having said that, the region has been affected by the decline in world trade, especially European demand. It is expected that 2009 economic growth in the Eastern Mediterranean will reach 1.8 percent, with 2.9 percent in North Africa. The region's privileged relationship with the European Union, visible particularly in Morocco's advanced status under the EMP and its normative and regulatory convergence, will be significant in the longer term although domestic resilience will be crucial for the immediate future and economic recovery.

Enlargement is the best thing that has happened to the EU in that it stimulated its internal transformation. The choice for the future however hinges on a frame of mind.

Some think that the future of Europe lies not in a cosmopolitan version of the empire of Charlemagne but in a postmodern version of the feudal fragmentation that succeeded the Frankish empire. Hopefully, we are wiser today.

Turkey is an enormously useful intermediary for dialogue with Muslim countries, and that ability will be decisive in the future. David Miliband described enlargement in his Warsaw speech in June as being about the 'deepening of liberal democracy'. One way or another, the dichotomy between enlargement and deepening will no longer have the same resonance.



Álvaro de Vasconcelos with Jacques Delors



Participants at the luncheon

PANEL 2. PEACE-BUILDING, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES FOR A COMMON EFFORT

Report by Radha Kumar

This panel discussed the conclusions of Working Group 2 held in Paris on 5 May and in New Delhi on 10 October 2009, in collaboration with the Delhi Policy Group.

The recent conduct of international peace and security has thrown up a number of challenges which are proving to be critical to the success or failure of ongoing missions, for example in Afghanistan. How should the international community respond to 'increasingly complex conflicts' (defined as those in which armies, rogue militias and human disasters collide)?¹ Under which conditions is military intervention for humanitarian purposes warranted? For sustainable peace, what should be the relation between civil and military operations, and what are the limits within which counter-insurgency should be circumscribed? How can it be guaranteed that all relevant actors, whether regional or global, function under commonly agreed principles and norms?

Equally important, these challenges have often been met with *ad hoc* and/or unilateral responses, which have in their turn led to a slew of new debates. Should the UN reassert itself as *the* multilateral forum in which global decisions on peace and security are taken? If so, should the Security Council be reformed to reflect the changing geopolitics of a rising Asia, active Africa and prospering South America? Given the rapidity with which financial governance is reforming, and the speed with which economic power has shifted to a wider multilateral forum, the G20, why has the same dynamism not emerged in the field of governing peace and security? Is the time ripe for a peace and security G20 to organise itself?

Based on these questions, we have prepared the following draft set of *Principles for a Common Effort*, to be presented at the EUISS annual conference. The principles have been drawn from discussions at the EUISS (2008), the Indian Council of World Affairs (2009) and the Delhi Policy Group (2009).

1. PEACE-BUILDING AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ARE CORE GOALS

Peacekeeping and peace-building constitute the core of international response to mass crises. In recent times, a set of key policy reviews have expanded the scope of each, based on the twin-pole principles: (i) Responsibility to Protect (R2P); and (ii) Peace-building.

1. See article: 'Increasingly complex conflicts put aid efforts at risk, warns UN refugee chief', UN News Centre, 28 September 2009. Available online at: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=32304&Cr=unhcr&Cr1>.

Failures and/or inconsistencies in the international community's response to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity over the past two decades led the 2005 UN World Summit to adopt the principle of R2P and to define peace-building as a core goal of UN missions. The UN Peace-Building Commission was set up soon after, but it took longer to implement the Summit's agreements on R2P. In the UN Secretary-General's report A/63/677, dated 12 January 2009, three pillars were identified for follow-up on the recommendations of the 2005 World Summit, which meshed R2P and peace-building: (a) responsibilities of the State; (b) international assistance and capacity building; and (c) timely and decisive response. The report was quick to stress that R2P 'is an ally of sovereignty, not an adversary ... it seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it'.²



Nicole Gnesotto, Radha Kumar and Timofei Bordachev in Panel 2

The EU, too, endorsed R2P in the recent *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World*, which includes a formal commitment to help build international consensus to make R2P an *effective* principle, i.e. a core basis for effective multilateralism. Pillars 1 and 2 of the UN Secretary-General's report provide incentives for sceptical countries to come on board, because they emphasise aid and support for countries facing a potential humanitarian crisis to develop their own capacities to handle the problem. These provisions should reassure those who fear that powerful States might misuse R2P, but are unlikely to do so until R2P in practice is measured on the ground.

Emerging mechanisms for the R2P appear to be:

- Early warning facility for data collection and intelligence at the UN, under the Special Advisors on Prevention of Genocide and R2P;
- Prevention through capacity development of the concerned State, to create peace-building institutions;
- Peer review mechanisms (global and/or regional);
- Deterrence of unresponsive leaders/actors through the International Criminal Court (ICC); and
- Military intervention, if all else fails.

2. UN Secretary-General's report A/63/677, 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect', 12 January 2009, pp. 7-8. Available online at: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/SGRtoPEng.pdf>.

While there is as yet little consensus on the ICC, the conditions under which military intervention can be sanctioned are still interpreted differently, with countries such as India and China agreeing to it with the caveat that it will apply to the gravest of mass crimes, such as genocide. Both India and China, along with a host of other countries, would accept military intervention only under a UN mandate. Among regional organisations, the African Union is the most advanced on R2P, with clauses defending R2P incorporated in both security and development forums.

2. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS SHOULD BE FRAMED WITHIN GUIDELINES

It is now accepted that dealing with most complex conflicts requires a combination of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-building, as the given situation may require. These measures can rarely be neatly phased to follow one after the other, most often the requirement is for them to overlap. This entails a high risk of human rights violations, so it needs to be stressed that R2P applies to international forces as much as it does to state and non-state forces. Even, or especially, in peace enforcement operations, adherence to the principle can win or lose hearts and minds and determine success or failure.

A key recommendation in the UN Secretary-General's report is that military force can be used against non-state actors where the R2P is threatened. Criteria for such use will presumably take into account their capabilities and the scope for negotiations, and plan for the impact of military force, while enforcing the Geneva Convention's binding humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict.

It is also now accepted that military actions will benefit from having peace-building operations built in, but it is not clear what the balance between military and civil components should be.

Emerging mechanisms:

- Creation of a code of conduct for peace enforcement operations;
- Periodic assessment of performance in the field;
- Human rights and transitional justice components in military missions;
- Capacity-building of national security forces, including civilian police; and
- Development and reconstruction activity alongside military operations.

Other points that are under discussion and deserve follow-up include:

- Major existing and potential UN troop-contributing countries assign/dedicate troops and civilian, including police, units for a UN Standby force; and
- Troop-contributing countries and organisations conduct regular exercises to prepare for interoperability in the field.

3. MORE INCLUSIVE DECISION-MAKING AND PLANNING PROCEDURES

Received wisdom from past experience indicates, as the UN Secretary-General's Report recommends, that local and regional knowledge can provide the key to success or failure in a mission. National and regional consensus legitimises and enables peace-building or R2P missions; it also contributes to national and regional capacity-building and 'ownership' of the peace-building process.

Moreover, as the constitution of the Peace-Building Commission (PBC) suggests, involvement of troops' contributors in the strategic decisions and planning of a mission is also likely to contribute to its success. We have seen some policy planning coordination between donors and mission chiefs, but little of it between troop contributing countries before deployment. Interoperability exercises will help develop coordinated policy planning, as will the creation of a UN Standby Force.

Most important of all, there is now a developing set of pools of experience. More and more countries are getting involved in peacekeeping and peace-building missions – notably in Africa, with South Africa and Kenya leading the way, and Asia, where Japan, India and South-East Asian countries have re-engaged, and China is the newest entrant. More and more regional organisations are also getting involved in peacekeeping and peace-building missions, from security to economic organisations – e.g. the EU, NATO, the African Union (AU), ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the World Bank and the African Development Bank (ABD).

In other words, a wider group than the UNSC already exists on issues of global peace and security. The PBC taps into that group, but its mandate is limited.

Emerging mechanisms:

- The PBC to engage in policy planning and decision-making on military missions;
- Mission troops' contributors to also engage in policy planning and decision-making;
- Inter-Agency coordination; and
- Collaboration between global and regional organisations to ensure widest possible legitimacy.

For the PBC to assume this role, its mandate and resources would have to be far wider and stronger than they are. But a larger policymaking and public role for the PBC members would improve the legitimacy of current and ongoing missions.

4. CONCLUSION: A G20 FOR GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY?

Most observers agree that the stage is set for the old and new peace-builders to engage in more than *ad hoc* discussions and planning for dealing with humanitarian crises. Many are also asking whether such a body should be formed under the auspices of the UN (the PBC, Human Rights Council and Special Advisors already constitute new policy planning inputs), or whether it should, like the G20, be an outside mechanism to spearhead institutional reform.



Participants in Panel 2

At the mission-specific level such groupings already exist. Bosnia's Peace Implementation Council had 59 member countries, international organisations and UN agencies. Coordination efforts for Afghanistan and Pakistan again involve a large number of countries and institutions. But the reforms engendered through such initiatives tend to be slow and compartmentalised.

The discussion on a G20 for global peace and security was triggered by the emergence of the G20 as a mechanism for change to deal with the financial crisis. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and the Israel-Palestine conflict are similarly in a peace and security crisis, but as the jockeying for influence and regional tensions surrounding each indicate, a G20 for their peace and security would be extremely difficult to achieve.

On the other hand, efforts to engage countries and institutions that are already involved in these conflicts in policy formulation for collective security could put brakes on their relatively unfettered ability to pursue their national interests irrespective of the potentially destabilising impact.

The time may not be ripe for a G20 for global peace and security. But the idea is in the air.

PANEL 3. THE DEVELOPMENT GOALS UNDER PRESSURE: DEFINING MEANS AND PRIORITIES

Report by Azzam Mahjoub

Ce panel a discuté les conclusions principales du Groupe de Travail 3 intitulé « L'impact de la crise économique mondiale sur les pays en développement : quelles politiques globales ? », tenu à New York le 18 septembre 2009, en coopération avec le Secrétariat d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères et à la Coopération du Portugal.

L'IMPACT DE LA CRISE ÉCONOMIQUE MONDIALE SUR LES PAYS EN DÉVELOPPEMENT : QUELLES POLITIQUES GLOBALES ?

Le Groupe de travail s'est assigné pour objectif de répondre aux trois problématiques suivantes :

- (1) Quels sont les impacts de la crise globale sur les Pays en développement (PED) et en particulier sur les pays d'Afrique subsaharienne (ASS) ?
- (2) Quelles en sont les conséquences sur le développement (modèle et politiques – y compris dans le domaine de la coopération) ?
- (3) Quels en sont les effets sur la gouvernance globale (politique, économique, financière, etc.) et les multilatéralismes à l'œuvre ?

LES IMPACTS DE LA CRISE MONDIALE

Remarques préalables

La crise est multiple : Pour nombre de PED (en ASS en particulier), il y a de fait une confluence de crises : alimentaire³, énergétique, financière et économique. Cette simultanéité/succession de crises au cours des deux dernières années s'inscrit dans un contexte de fragilisation environnementale planétaire marquée par le changement climatique.

Une analyse exhaustive doit nécessairement prendre en compte l'aspect pluridimensionnel de la crise mondiale du point de vue de ses impacts cumulatifs et combinés, en particulier dans les PED fragiles sur le plan structurel.

Les impacts sont multiples : Au-delà de la confluence des crises, les impacts sont aussi bien financiers, commerciaux, économiques, sociaux et politiques qu'environnementaux.

Rares sont les analyses englobant toutes ces dimensions, notamment celles liées à la fragilisation écologique et

3. Les prix des denrées alimentaires ont certes baissé progressivement depuis juillet 2008, mais ils restent élevés par rapport aux niveaux d'avant la crise alimentaire. Selon la FAO, la situation alimentaire est critique : un individu sur trois souffre de la faim de manière chronique.

au changement climatique. L'aspect politique en termes de nouvelles turbulences et d'instabilité politique accrue, sur fond de fragilité politico-institutionnelle de type structurel dans de nombreux pays d'ASS en particulier, mérite d'être analysé de manière plus globale et complète.

L'hétérogénéité des situations : S'il existe des impacts à caractère commun pour tous les pays y compris les PED (accroissement du chômage, de la pauvreté, de la précarité, etc.), leur intensité peut être variable, et les effets négatifs vont concerner plutôt certains pays que d'autres.

Une typologie par groupe de pays ayant des caractéristiques plus ou moins similaires en termes de fragilité structurelle et de degré de confluence de crises s'impose.

Quoi qu'il en soit, une différenciation est nécessaire afin d'éviter les réponses standards appliquées de manière uniforme à toutes les situations.



Stefano Silvestri, Victor Borges and João Gomes Cravinho in Panel 3

Les impacts à l'échelle mondiale

La pauvreté : Selon l'ONU⁴, près de 200 millions d'individus, la plupart vivant dans les PED, basculeront dans la pauvreté si aucune action rapide n'est menée.

Le chômage : Selon l'OIT, par rapport à 2007, le chômage a touché 30 millions d'individus supplémentaires et il pourrait atteindre 50 millions si la situation continue de se détériorer.

Selon la FAO, pour la 1^{ère} fois, le nombre de personnes souffrant de faim de manière chronique dépassera le milliard, soit une augmentation de 11% (+85 000) par rapport à l'année dernière.

Les Objectif du Millénaire pour le Développement (OMD) : alors que des progrès ont été enregistrés en matière d'OMD, notamment en ce qui concerne la mortalité infantile et la scolarisation, la crise va provoquer une détérioration de la situation, ce qui va accroître encore la fragilité de nombreux pays et conduire à des crises humanitaires⁵.

4. The commission of experts on reform of the international monetary and financial system (Recommendations March 1, 2009).

5. On estime à plus de 400 000 le nombre de nouveaux décès pour les enfants de moins de 5 ans.

Les impacts en Afrique sub-saharienne (ASS)⁶

Impacts financiers directs (faibles et limités comparative-ment) : seuls les pays dotés de bourses de valeurs significatives sont touchés en raison de leurs connections avec les marchés financiers mondiaux et le système bancaire international (Afrique du Sud, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya).

Du fait du voisinage et de la migration, les pays situés à proximité subissent indirectement les effets de la crise financière ayant affecté leurs voisins.

Impacts économiques : Il y a quatre voies de transmission de la crise :

- Les **IDE** (Investissements directs étrangers) – qui représentaient 3,2% du PIB en ASS et progressaient ces dernières années – subissent un reflux (arrêt, gel ou report).



Azzam Mahjoub

- Les **transferts des émigrés** : (2,5% du PIB en ASS) venant à 80% des pays développés frappés par la récession entraînant l'augmentation du chômage y compris pour les immigrés. On estime qu'une baisse de 1% de la croissance dans les pays d'accueil entraîne une chute de 4% de transfert des immigrés⁷.
- Le **commerce** : en ASS, les exportations représentent 34% du PIB. La demande extérieure (émanant en particulier des pays riches) en baisse (40%) entraînera en 2009 un manque à gagner de 250 milliards de dollars. De ce fait, les revenus fiscaux publics liés au commerce extérieur accuseront des pertes équivalant à 1% du PIB et à 4,6% des revenus publics.
- **L'Aide publique au développement** : L'APD représente 4,5% du Revenu national brut de l'ASS. Les prévisions sont plutôt à la baisse : 119 751 milliards de dollars en 2008 et 97 544 milliards de dollars en 2009, soit une baisse de 22 287 de dollars (15 à 20% au moins en moyenne). Sachant que les engagements des pays donateurs sont exprimés en pourcentage du PIB, la baisse de ce dernier provoquée par la récession

6. Ces remarques concernant l'Afrique subsaharienne s'appuient sur les conclusions préliminaires du Rapport européen sur le Développement (European Development Report, ERD) de 2009, soutenu par la DG DEV, sous la direction de Giorgia Giovannetti (EUI, Florence).

7. Dans quelle mesure une substitution du travail au capital pourrait-elle résulter de la crise et contrebalancer les licenciements des migrants ?

cumule son effet négatif à la dépréciation des taux de chômage réel en ASS.

L'APD pour l'Afrique connaît de fait une croissance deux fois moindre par rapport au nécessaire requis pour réaliser les objectifs de Gleneagles (à la différence d'autres pays bénéficiaires). Selon l'OCDE, il manquera entre 20 et 25 milliards de dollars US pour atteindre les dits objectifs en 2010.

- La Chine prend la relève et comble l'écart ?
L'objectif de doubler l'APD chinoise entre 2000 et 2009 est maintenu malgré la crise.
L'APD chinoise à l'ASS prend la forme de dons en nature ou de prêts aux conditions très libérales, dont les taux d'intérêts sont quasi nuls, et sans conditionnalité politique⁸.
- La vente de terres agricoles : une réponse à la crise financière, ou plutôt à la crise alimentaire ? Depuis 2005/2006, les ventes se multiplient (par exemple au Congo, où la Chine s'est portée acquéreur de terres de plantation d'huile de palme), en réponse à ou en anticipation des pénuries alimentaires. Les effets à moyen et long terme sont problématiques si la destination de la production est l'extérieur et ne réduit pas l'insécurité alimentaire au plan local.

Les impacts de la crise sur l'ASS sont d'autant plus forts que la vulnérabilité ou la fragilité structurelles qui préexistaient à la confluence des crises est grande et que le degré de résilience est faible⁹. Une typologie des pays est de nature à permettre un ciblage approprié.

Il est indéniable que les effets économiques et sociaux pour les pays très fragilisés sur les plans politique et institutionnel conduiront à des situations conflictuelles exacerbées sur fonds de crise humanitaire aiguë.

LES IMPACTS DE LA CRISE MONDIALE SUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT (MODÈLE ET POLITIQUES)

Le modèle théorique ou paradigme du développement n'est pas seul à être remis en question ; il en va de même pour la coopération pour le développement, et en particulier pour l'Aide Publique au Développement (APD).

La crise pousse par ailleurs à un nouveau positionnement du social, et au recentrage sur les politiques sociales actives en matière de développement.

L'intégration de la dimension environnementale, du changement climatique en particulier, dans les politiques de développement et de coopération reste encore insuffisante et reflète la fragmentation dans les modèles dominants de développement.

8. Souvent très prisée par les bénéficiaires africains, l'APD chinoise est cependant décriée dans certains milieux occidentaux, où l'on parle de pratique néocoloniale, parce que l'aide est liée à l'accès aux matières premières.

9. La vulnérabilité reflète le degré de « résilience » face aux chocs extérieurs plus ou moins inattendus (la confluence des crises) et la probabilité que ces chocs conduisent à une détérioration du niveau de vie des individus (basculement dans la pauvreté). Bien qu'il soit difficile de mesurer la vulnérabilité et la résilience, les tentatives faites au niveau de l'ASS ont permis de dresser une typologie des pays : six pays sont dans une situation critique (forte vulnérabilité structurelle, faible résilience) : République démocratique du Congo, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Angola et Soudan.

L'aide et le développement de l'activité économique restent des domaines séparés, de même qu'il y a peu ou pas de conjonction, ni de recherche de synergie, entre l'aide et les transferts des migrants. **L'aide doit impérativement sortir de son ghetto.**

Certes, la Déclaration de Paris sur l'efficacité de l'aide (2005)¹⁰ constitue un progrès ; la mise en œuvre effective des principes et des engagements s'avère d'autant plus à l'ordre du jour dans le contexte de la crise globale. La co-appropriation et la responsabilité mutuelle continuent à se heurter à l'asymétrie structurelle entre donneurs et bénéficiaires. Le principe de conditionnalité est de plus en plus controversé (cf. le rapport de mars 2009 de la Commission d'experts de l'ONU sur la réforme du système monétaire et financier international présidée par Joseph Stiglitz).

Les politiques économiques :

Les politiques économiques sont à leur tour revisitées. En effet :

- La crise globale actuelle a montré qu'il était risqué de faire des présupposés sur les politiques économiques, concernant l'infailibilité et l'autorégulation des marchés. Un nouvel arbitrage (*trade off*) entre l'Etat et le marché est à l'ordre du jour.
- Les politiques fiscales pour stimuler la demande s'imposent désormais.
- De même, l'accent excessif mis sur l'ouverture commerciale au détriment du marché intérieur et de la demande intérieure est remis en question. Un meilleur équilibre est préconisé par nombre d'économistes¹¹.
- Les politiques anticycliques sont souvent absentes dans les PED. Il importe, comme le recommande la Commission Stiglitz, que les PED puissent élargir le champ de leurs interventions pour concevoir des politiques et créer des institutions leur permettant de mettre en œuvre des politiques anticycliques appropriées.

La coopération pour le développement : pour de nouvelles approches

Certes, la question de l'aide reste centrale et l'engagement de la communauté internationale doit être réitéré ; il convient toutefois de mettre en exergue les effets des législations et politiques internes aux pays donateurs (migration, énergie, agriculture, etc.), dont l'impact sur le développement des PED est immense.

Le nouvel instrument créé en 2005 au sein de l'UE (politique de cohérence pour le développement), combiné à une nouvelle approche de partenariat (Accord de

Cotonou), ouvre des perspectives nouvelles (dont la portée doit être évaluée) permettant d'élargir le champ de la coopération, en cherchant à montrer comment les politiques et législations internes des pays donateurs doivent être à leur tour revisitées en matière de coopération pour le développement.

IMPACT SUR LA GOUVERNANCE GLOBALE ET LES MULTILATÉRALISMES

L'OMC/cycle de Doha : un multilatéralisme difficile. Le gel du processus de négociation depuis la réunion des ministres de Hong Kong montre comment dans un cadre large (tous les pays adhérant à l'OMC), les difficultés en matière de multilatéralisme commercial (les divisions Nord-Sud et Sud-Sud) pèsent de leur poids (traitement spécial et différencié : quotas en libre accès sans droits de douane ; mode 4 pour les services : libre circulation des personnes ; accès aux marchés des produits non agricoles).

Les difficultés à conclure le cycle Doha ont poussé les grands pays comme les Etats-Unis à privilégier le bilatéralisme commercial pour arracher des concessions des PED non obtenues au sein de l'OMC.

Le G20 : un multilatéralisme à l'œuvre face à la crise financière ?

Pour les 172 pays qui n'en font pas partie, le G20 est perçu comme une coalition d'intérêts où le principe de solidarité n'est pas nécessairement mis en œuvre (prise en compte des intérêts des absents). L'ouverture vers les pays émergents est certes positive mais ne peut oblitérer l'absence de 172 pays de ce forum.

Le G20 montre à la fois la possibilité de construction de coalitions plus larges en vue de faire face à l'absence de gouvernance économique et financière. Le FMI n'est pas en effet considéré comme un cadre idoine pour une meilleure gouvernance financière globale (en dépit des réformes annoncées) en raison d'un déficit de légitimité.

Au sein du G20, s'il est limité, le multilatéralisme n'en reste pas moins constructif et réaliste pour la préservation des intérêts des uns et des autres – ce qui n'est pas le cas au sein des Nations unies en matière de droits humains, par exemple, et il y a fort à parier que le renforcement du G20 contribuera de fait à approfondir la césure (avancées sur le terrain de la finance et de l'économie, mais peu ou pas de progrès sur le terrain politique). Force est de constater la césure entre les Nations Unies et le G20.

Plutôt que de césure, entre ces multilatéralismes, on peut parler de **multilatéralismes à vitesses et configurations variables**. En effet, si des avancées sont enregistrées sur le plan financier et économique, rien n'indique que ce sera le cas pour l'environnement à Copenhague, par exemple.

En fait, il semble que l'on soit en train d'assister à un dysfonctionnement relationnel entre la gouvernance mondiale

10. Voir annexe sur les principaux engagements contenus dans la Déclaration.

11. Cependant, certains économistes contestent la pertinence de cette recommandation et soutiennent que les logiques « vertueuses » de la mondialisation et notamment commerciales continuent à prévaloir. La libéralisation des échanges (l'ouverture aux marchés extérieurs) accélérée par les NTIC accélère les processus de transnationalisation des chaînes de production, offrant ainsi des opportunités aux PED de trouver une place dans l'économie mondiale. De ce point de vue, le risque d'un retour au protectionnisme dans un contexte de crise globale serait de nature de contrarier cette tendance « vertueuse » de la mondialisation. L'APD devrait entre autre faciliter l'insertion des PED (de faible taille en particulier) dans cette logique d'ouverture.

(systèmes des Nations unies et de Bretton Woods) et les différentes formes de multilatéralisme comme le G20.

Aussi, une gouvernance à géométrie variable et flexible en fonction de thématiques majeures pourrait faire l'objet de coalitions constructives. L'idée de forums ad hoc rassemblant l'ensemble des Etats avec une légitimité plus forte, pourrait contribuer à une nouvelle architecture de la gouvernance globale.

Le régionalisme est-il toujours à l'ordre du jour ?

Face aux défaillances de la gouvernance globale, face à une crise à caractère global, le régionalisme peut-il être une réponse appropriée ? Dans les années 1990, l'intégration régionale était perçue comme une solution à la plupart des problèmes. Face, aujourd'hui, aux puissances-régions comme la Chine et l'Inde, quid de l'UE et des autres processus et formes d'intégration régionale (Nord-Sud, Sud-Sud) ?

La recherche d'alternatives aux Etats-nations en perte de vitesse invite au recentrage sur l'intégration régionale. La difficulté essentielle en ce domaine résidant toujours dans les concessions en matière de souveraineté nationale – de manière à avoir un processus rationnel de prise de décision commune et de pouvoir parler d'une seule voix –, le Traité de Lisbonne représente un pas dans ce sens.

CONCLUSION : LES PRINCIPAUX ENSEIGNEMENTS

- Pour beaucoup de PED, il y a une confluence de crises dans un contexte de fragilisation environnementale globale marquée par le changement climatique en particulier.
- Les impacts sont multiples et les situations sont hétérogènes dans les PED. Les impacts se traduisent et se traduiront par l'accroissement de la pauvreté, de la faim chronique, du chômage, de la précarité, ainsi que par un revers dans la réalisation des OMD.

Pour l'ASS, les impacts négatifs au travers de quatre canaux de transmission (IDE, transferts des migrants, APD et commerce) sont d'une intensité variable et fonction de la vulnérabilité structurelle, de la résilience des pays et du degré de confluence et d'acuité des crises.

- La crise met à mal le développement du fait de la fragmentation des approches, de par la faible intégration de la dimension environnementale et du changement climatique en particulier. L'APD doit sortir de son ghetto, et la pertinence de la Déclaration de Paris sur l'efficacité de l'acte doit être évaluée à l'aune des progrès effectifs en particulier en matière de co-appropriation et de responsabilité mutuelle. De plus, le rééquilibrage du marché intérieur en faveur de l'Etat (par rapport au marché défaillant) et la nécessité de politiques anticycliques sont désormais inscrits à l'agenda du développement dans les PED.
- Les multilatéralismes à l'œuvre sur fond de crise de gouvernance globale sont de formes et de vitesses

variables. Il existe entre les structures des Nations Unies et des organisations multilatérales comme le G20 une sorte de césure ou de dysfonctionnement relationnel. Ce qui est suggéré est un multilatéralisme à géométrie variable, sur une base thématique, impliquant le plus grand nombre (plus de légitimité pour plus d'équité).

- Enfin, le débat reste ouvert sur le rôle du régionalisme aujourd'hui.

ANNEXE : LES 5 PRINCIPES DE LA DÉCLARATION DE PARIS SUR L'EFFICACITÉ DE L'AIDE AU DÉVELOPPEMENT (2005)

Appropriation : Les pays partenaires exercent une réelle maîtrise sur leurs politiques et stratégies de développement et assurent la coordination de l'action à l'appui du développement.

Alignement : Les donateurs font reposer l'ensemble de leur soutien sur les stratégies nationales de développement, les institutions et les procédures des pays partenaires.

- Les donateurs s'alignent sur les stratégies des pays partenaires ;
- Les donateurs utilisent des systèmes nationaux consolidés.

Les pays partenaires renforcent leurs propres capacités de développement avec le concours des donateurs. Ils s'engagent à :

- Consolider les capacités de gestion des finances publiques ;
- Renforcer les systèmes nationaux de passation des marchés ;
- Délivrer l'aide pour une meilleure utilisation des ressources.

Harmonisation : Les actions des donateurs sont mieux harmonisées et plus transparentes et permettent une plus grande efficacité collective. Les donateurs :

- Mettent en place des dispositifs communs et simplifient leurs procédures ;
- Renforcent la complémentarité, pour une division du travail plus efficace ;
- Multiplient les incitations à l'action en coopération ;
- Œuvrent à renforcer l'efficacité de l'aide dans les Etats fragiles ;
- Encouragent une approche harmonisée des évaluations environnementales.

Gestion axée sur les résultats (gérer les ressources et améliorer le processus de décision en vue d'obtenir des résultats).

Responsabilité mutuelle : Les donateurs et les pays partenaires sont responsables des résultats obtenus en matière de développement (contrôle parlementaire, approche participative, transparence et coévaluation).

PANEL 4. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AFTER THE G-20 SUMMITS: REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION

Report by Maria João Rodrigues

This panel discussed the conclusions of Working Group 4 held in Paris on 12 October 2009.

The ongoing redistribution of power at the international level and the advent of the first global financial and economic crisis have triggered significant innovation in global governance structures. A window of opportunity for the reform of global governance has opened and new formats of dialogue have taken centre-stage in addressing the global crisis. The G20, chiefly focusing on the impact of the economic crisis, stands out as the central innovation and paves the way for further cooperation in other policy domains. While, however, the key interests of major powers seem increasingly aligned, the challenge lies in translating this broad convergence into concrete policies and stronger governance frameworks. The overriding objective is to achieve a grand bargain at the global level centred on sustainable economic, social and environmental development. The question is how to get there while dealing with difficult negotiations on interconnected issues in separate arenas.

THE NEW PATTERNS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The global economic crisis and the emergence of new power centres in the international system have shifted the debate on the reform of global governance. The international system is in transition. While many of the features of a multipolar system can be detected, the unprecedented degree of interdependence linking all countries suggests that a new scenario may lie ahead – an inter-polar world. In an inter-polar world, major powers have a vital interest in cooperation to preserve a functioning international system and address together some of the challenges with which they are all confronted.

These include, among others, the economic crisis, the environmental crisis, and threats like weapons proliferation and regional conflicts. An inter-polar system is (i) interest-based, as it builds on the progressive alignment of large powers' interests; (ii) problem-driven, as it focuses on major common challenges ahead; and (iii) process-oriented, because it points to the imperative need for stronger multilateral cooperation. At present, potential for cooperation is paralleled by an equally significant potential for competition and perhaps confrontation. The problem is that challenges are global, but their impact is differentiated in time and space, and the way in which they are perceived varies between different groups of countries. The basic political challenge is to make a strong case for win-win cooperation and counter the advocates of zero-sum competition.

The international agenda is daunting but also rich with opportunities. To grasp them, innovation is of the essence both in policy debates and in shaping adequate global governance structures. As to the latter dimension, it is important to highlight some new patterns or features of global governance cutting across different policy debates and leading to a new generation of multilateral formats. In this context, the G20 stands out as the most visible answer to the growing demand for cooperation.

Informal groupings

First, traditional multilateral institutions like the UN are flanked by new, informal bodies. The G20 has replaced the G8 as the central forum for cooperation and coordination in managing the economic crisis and shaping a new financial system. Informal summits present a number of advantages. They provide the opportunity for top political leaders to come together, build mutual confidence and back strategic decisions with their political weight. The summits' agenda is flexible and can adjust to evolving political priorities. Different formats can be envisaged to gather around the table the representatives of the countries that matter the most in addressing distinctive common problems, from the economic downturn to climate change or regional conflicts. Informal groupings can help provide political drive and set the agenda for larger multilateral institutions.



Marco Aurélio Garcia, keynote speaker at lunch on Friday 23 October

Informal governance structures and processes play an important role in the security domain as well. The G8 has become an important forum to launch new measures to prevent and counter weapons proliferation. Other multilateral efforts to counter proliferation include the US-promoted Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Terrorism and various arrangements to strengthen safeguard systems and export controls. From a global governance perspective, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva offers a particularly interesting model for future debate and negotiations on non-proliferation, arms-reduction and disarmament. While not a formal UN body, the Conference is recognised by the UN. With a view to the ongoing debate on nuclear proliferation, the CD is the only forum including all nuclear weapon states and most of the states with

nuclear weapon capability. Politically marginalised after the Cold War, there may be potential for the CD to play a much bigger role if renewed political input is provided at summit level.

Inclusive representation

Second, formal and informal governance frameworks need to further involve both emerging powers and representatives of different sets of countries, so as to mirror the diversity of the international system. The difficult balance between inclusiveness, or legitimacy, and effectiveness is at the heart of this evolution. On the one hand, participation in common endeavours requires representation in relevant forums, where decisions are taken. On the other, the expansion or reform of governance frameworks also requires a commonality of intent or, given that decision-making is based on consensus, it can lead to more vetoes and gridlock. The question is how to make of institutional processes a vehicle, among others, for building trust and fostering political convergence. Informal bodies like the G20 have the advantage of bringing together all major players without granting them formal individual blocking powers.



Maria João Rodrigues intervenes in Panel 4

At the same time, some regard the G20 as too large and detect the emergence of sub-groupings pursuing different agendas. In particular, there is a debate on whether the G20 needs a hard core of major players to drive its proceedings. Various formulas are envisaged, from a G2 (US and China) to a G3 (G2+EU) and a G4 (G3+Japan). While these can be useful groupings for stronger dialogue, it is important that they do not appear as self-appointed directorates or the still contested, balance between legitimacy and effectiveness achieved by the G20 may be offset. That said, it is understood that the membership of the G20 is not fixed yet and more fine-tuning will be required.

Comprehensive approach

Third, governance frameworks are beginning to shape a more comprehensive approach to deal with complex challenges. Multilateral structures need to integrate the interconnected nature of pressing issues in their proceedings.

The gaps between fragmented institutions and connected problems are to be tackled. A comprehensive approach is essential to address intertwined issues such as economic recovery, environmental sustainability and energy security, among others. Links between environmental degradation and migration flows, trade and green recovery, development and security, climate change and conflict, energy and weapons proliferation, resource exploitation and state fragility, among other questions, are the subject of increasing attention, although as yet limited action.

In a significant shift, the agenda of the G20 has expanded over just one year from regulating financial markets and coordinating measures for economic recovery to include issues such as the reform of Bretton Woods institutions, finance for development, climate change negotiations and trade and labour matters, although mainly by way of reference to substantive negotiations held elsewhere. Besides, the members of the G20 have agreed in Pittsburgh to identify common objectives for their financial, economic and structural policies. This process will be supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This evolution signals the potential for the G20 to take a comprehensive overview of the sustainable development agenda.

Convergence of development strategies

Fourth, in many ways, the domestic agendas of major economies are converging around common priorities, such as more inclusive welfare systems, better labour standards and an environmentally sustainable economic growth. The decision of the G20 summit in Pittsburgh mentioned above reinforces this trend. This sets the stage for much more intensive dialogues and further cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral level, identifying the common ground and building on it. For example, the G20 leaders have planned a range of follow-up meetings at the ministerial level, such as that of labour ministers in early 2010. Such exchanges do and should increasingly involve trans-national civil society and business networks.

Involvement of non-governmental actors

Fifth, multilateral cooperation at large requires the more structural involvement of non-governmental actors. In particular, many of the challenges and of the opportunities emerging at the international level are generated by technological innovation, which takes place predominantly in the private sector and academia. This impacts not only on the energy and climate change debates, but also on key security concerns. Knowledge can be transferred easily and exploited for hostile purposes. This alters the definition of what can be considered as 'weapons' and affects the viability of existing and future international arms-control and non-proliferation tools. In different fields of cooperation, relevant stakeholders from business, civil society and academia have to be engaged in networks of peers where political differences can be put in perspective. In such networks, experts and practitioners can focus on improving regulation, increasing transparency, building trust and exchanging best practices.

Implementation mechanisms

Sixth, renewed focus is put on the implementation of decisions achieved in international forums. Whether considering measures to mitigate climate change or to strengthen non-proliferation regimes, monitoring national measures and verifying their application is crucial not only to deliver results but also to build trust between partners. More effective enforcement mechanisms need to be envisaged too. Independent, multilateral authorities performing these functions will have to be set up or strengthened and the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency can provide some guidance. This is another area where the involvement of non-governmental actors will be increasingly important. A debate is to be held on how to reconcile effective verification mechanisms with concerns over national sovereignty. A mix of adequate incentives, peer-review mechanisms and intrusive measures will have to be devised.

Multi-level governance

Seventh, while action at the multilateral level is essential, this has to go hand-in-hand with dealings at the mini-lateral, trilateral or bilateral level. Cooperation between two or in small groupings remains important to help shape the agenda of larger forums and to implement shared decisions. This is notably the case when addressing issues that may prove difficult to tackle in global bodies, such as questions of market access that are relevant both to economic relations and to the climate change agenda. It is at this level that strategic confidence-building measures, such as common funding of technological innovation, seem most promising. In the field of arms-control and disarmament as well, cooperation between the US and Russia is a basic condition to shape the global agenda and progressively involve other recognised and non-recognised nuclear weapon states. Beyond specific policy areas, bilateral strategic partnerships, such as that between the US and China or those that the EU pursues with major emerging powers, should be instrumental in paving the way for agreement in larger frameworks.

Given these seven major patterns of global governance, it is clear that effective interaction between formal and informal governance frameworks is key to deliver tangible progress. The political drive towards a grand bargain on sustainable development can only be provided by the synergy of three sets of actors, namely UN bodies, international financial institutions and informal forums like the G20. In this context, three main levels of interaction can be developed:

- The Chief Executives Board of the UN, including among others the President of the World Bank, the Managing Director of the IMF and the Director General of the WTO, should perform a stronger coordinating role and promote a comprehensive approach at UN level.
- The top executives of relevant international institutions and agencies should actively participate in the meetings of the G20. This is increasingly the case. For example, they could be requested to submit joint

policy proposals and to report on the implementation of summit decisions.

- The members of the G20 should act in the broader context of the UN, and in particular in the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), in ways that are consistent with engagements achieved at summit level. This would improve both the effectiveness of the decisions and their legitimacy, as different members can reach out to different constituencies of countries.

TOWARDS A GRAND BARGAIN

In the presence of fundamental shifts in world politics and economics, it is important to think of a grand bargain that would address interconnected challenges with a comprehensive approach. Clearly, such a grand bargain is currently not at hand. It will have to be pursued through a mix of instruments and be built on concrete results in specific areas of cooperation. However, framing the solution to the challenge of sustainable economic, social and environmental development in these terms has many advantages.



Participants in Panel 4

Under a grand bargain, linkages between issues can be highlighted and help uncover potential for cooperation across different policy areas. Taking an overarching perspective makes it possible to identify governance gaps, such as those concerning the management of natural resources aside from fossil fuels. The idea of a grand bargain can also help achieve a common understanding and definition of the challenges facing the international community, which in turn would strengthen mutual confidence among the main parties. Working for a grand bargain can provide a new narrative and political momentum for international cooperation, stressing the advantages that all partners would reap from a stronger multilateral system, and the dangers of failing to build one. Political convergence around the issues central to a grand bargain on sustainable development can also spill over to other areas, such as hard security concerns. Geopolitical stability will hardly be assured if major powers feel that the conditions for their future prosperity are not fulfilled.

In other words, the grand bargain is a medium-term goal and has the merit of providing a sense of direction to negotiations pursued in different arenas. The G20 is well suited to express and carry forward the idea of a grand bargain. While performing as a political engine, however, the G20 cannot deal with all relevant issues. The agenda of this summit should not be overburdened with a plethora of issues. Besides, some variable geometry has to be envisaged. Different sets of countries need to join forces to address different challenges, although the latter are interconnected. The G20 can therefore be seen as a proactive hub of a broader range of informal global governance structures, providing input to them and receiving their feedback.

The grand bargain has to be pragmatically pursued at two levels – policies and institutions. Political convergence around common policy objectives and instruments is essential. That said, the path towards a grand bargain is paved with major political hurdles and scope for policy failure. Providing global public goods without an hegemonic power, like the US, and outside a tight framework of rules, as established by the EU, is a very difficult endeavour. Institutions need to be set up to enable progress, or at least to avoid regression, when the political atmosphere deteriorates.

From this standpoint, there is a debate on whether the G20 and similar informal groupings should be considered as a culmination point or as an interim solution, leading to more institutionalised forms of cooperation. In other words, the question is the degree of institutionalisation that is best suited under different regimes to combining flexible agenda setting and resilience to political crises. In designing these regimes, opportunities for cross-fertilisation between different policy areas are to be exploited and best practices transferred. This concerns for example how to channel scientific expertise into policy-making and how to involve networks of non-governmental actors.

As to the content of a grand bargain, the latter should entail steps from the most advanced countries, emerging ones and developing countries alike. Taken together, these steps should amount to and be presented as a 'win-win plan' for all parties.

- Developed countries should open their markets to developing countries' exports, redeploy to other economic sectors, strengthen financial and technology transfers to developing countries under a clear legal framework, and move to sustainable consumption and production patterns, as conditions to pave the way towards a new path of prosperity.
- Developing countries should integrate further in the global economy, while receiving support to build their national capacities in economic, technological and educational terms. Sustainable environmental policies, the fight against poverty and the improvement of working conditions are key priorities, which can be regarded as prerequisites for democratic governance and the respect for human rights.

- Emerging countries should deepen their integration in the global economy and enhance the convergence of their standards in the environmental, social and intellectual property areas, among others, with those of advanced countries. This process needs to be accompanied and sustained by larger financial and technological transfers from richer countries.

An equitable division of labour and responsibilities in addressing common challenges will be central to moving closer to a grand bargain. It is clear that different countries or regions have different perceptions of what is equitable and just. In many respects, this debate sees advanced countries and the developing world aligned on different sides, with emerging powers like China hedging their position. Controversy on the links between the climate change agenda, priorities for economic growth, trade liberalisation and the agricultural policies of the EU and the US prove this point.

Increasingly, public opinion is involved in the debate on development models and their interplay at the global level. This is a positive evolution, as it makes international negotiations more accountable. Conversely, however, public pressures can constrain the room for manoeuvre of diplomats and politicians. The latter can be exposed to the pressure of nationalist or protectionist movements. For multilateral cooperation to work, deals will need not only to be perceived as equitable on all sides but also to deliver tangible benefits as fast as possible. That would help fill the gap between short-term domestic political debates and long-term challenges such as climate change or resource depletion.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The EU has the right 'software' to help shape and support more advanced forms of multilateral cooperation, along the seven patterns sketched out above. Different governance regimes co-exist within the Union, including the Community method based on the initiative of a strong central institution (the European Commission), summit diplomacy with the European Council, intensive inter-governmental cooperation supported by the permanent Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, and various models of open coordination and peer-review processes in those policy areas where the EU has the least competences.

The EU is also a major normative actor on the international scene, at two levels. For one, it has developed a consistent narrative in support of effective multilateralism and contributes concretely with money, political support and expertise to international institutions, regimes and negotiations. For another, it plays an influential role in shaping specific rules and standards, particularly in those areas where the powers of the Union are strongest such as trade and competition policy.

The European Union has an ambitious agenda for sustainable development combining its economic, social and environmental dimensions, but it cannot achieve it in isola-

tion. The implementation of this internal agenda needs to be supported by an international movement of convergence in the same direction, able to create a 'win-win game', to avoid the risks of a race to the bottom and to strengthen collaboration to face common global challenges.

Clearly, the global economic crisis and the power shift towards emerging actors have put the EU's profile and influence on the international stage in perspective. This is due to a combination of factors. At a basic but important level, the EU is simply losing portions of its power to others, and sheer power still matters in the eyes of many. At another level, the EU is perceived as a risk-averse, increasingly introverted actor, uncomfortable with change. The normative discourse of the EU is furthermore challenged in two ways. For one, because emerging actors are vocally expressing their own narratives, which may or may not coincide with those of the EU. For another, because of the sometimes visible gap between discourse and practice. Where the EU has the power to behave like a unitary actor, such as on trade matters, it engages in power politics at the global level pretty much like others. This is legitimate from a European standpoint, but weakens the image of the Union as a distinctive actor. In areas where the EU has taken the lead at the global level, such as measures to mitigate climate change, it has to implement ambitious programmes at a time of acute economic crisis.

Three additional factors hamper the contribution of the EU to stronger global governance structures. First, its institutional structures are not conducive to shaping a strategic, comprehensive approach cutting across different policy areas, as competences change across different fields and cooperation between the Council and the Com-

mission has been uneven. The Treaty of Lisbon, however, would introduce significant reforms designed to improve the coherence of the EU's policy-making procedures and output. Second, Member States are often reluctant to coordinate at EU level and pursue bilateral dialogues with major partners with little mutual information. This weakens the EU's aspiration to speak with one voice and send out one message on the global stage. Third, this is mirrored in the fragmented representation of the EU and its Member States in international organisations and informal forums. This is not only a problem of effectiveness but also of legitimacy, as the EU and its Member States are regarded as over-represented in governance frameworks such as the international financial institutions, the UN Security Council and the G20.

And yet, the EU remains an essential actor in improving the shape and quality of global governance. It is the only major global actor that sets the strengthening of an effective multilateral system as a top strategic priority. It has very large resources to back its words with deeds, and in many ways it does so already. When a common position is achieved within the Union, the multi-level representation of the EU and its Member States in multilateral forums can become a major source of influence. Likewise, when based on a common approach, the variety of dialogues involving the Union and EU countries provides them with multiple entry points enabling a more effective linkage between various governance structures and bilateral partnerships. This can be done building on the significant, incremental convergence of the strategic priorities of major powers. Establishing a structural link between the internal and external policies of the Union will prove essential to pursue sustainable development and enhance geopolitical stability.

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CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

Managing a Post-Crisis World

Venue:
Hôtel Lutetia
45 Bd Raspail
75006 Paris

THURSDAY, 22 OCTOBER

09h30 **Registration and welcoming coffee**

10h00 **Opening: Annual speech by JAVIER SOLANA**

High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union

12h30 **Lunch**

Keynote speaker: JACQUES DELORS, former President of the European Commission, Paris

14h30 **Panel 1. 20 Years after 1989: enlargement and neighbourhood - the dynamics of democratic inclusion**

Chairperson: ÁLVARO DE VASCONCELOS, Director, EUISS, Paris

Report: PAWEL SWIEBODA, Director, DemosEUROPA, Centre for European Strategy, Warsaw

Discussants:

JOACHIM BITTERLICH, former Foreign and Security Policy Advisor to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Executive Vice-President, International Affairs, Veolia Environment, Paris

ATIL A ERALP, Director, Center for European Studies, Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara

TAIB FASSI-FIHRI, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Kingdom of Morocco, Rabat

DANIEL HAMILTON, Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC

HRYPHORY NEMYRIA, Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine, Kiev

ALEKSANDER SMOLAR, Chairman, Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw

SALOMÉ ZOURABICHVILI, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Chairwoman of The Way of Georgia, Tbilisi

16h45 **Coffee break**

17h00 **Panel 2. Peace-building, international justice and human rights: principles for a common effort**

Chairperson: NICOLE GNESOTTO, former Director of the EUISS, Chair of European Union Studies, Conservatoire National des Arts & Métiers (CNAM), Paris

Report: RADHA KUMAR, Director, Delhi Policy Group, Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace & Conflict Resolution, New Delhi

Discussants:

TIMOFEI BORDACHEV, Research Programs Director, Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow

JEAN-MARIE GUÉHENNO, former UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Senior Fellow, Managing Global Insecurity Project, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC

CELSO LAFER, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Member, Academia Brasileira de Letras, Emeritus Professor, University of São Paulo (USP)

F. STEPHEN LARRABEE, Corporate Chair in European Security, RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA

BERTRAND RAMCHARAN, Chancellor of the University of Guyana, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva

EBRAHIM RASOOL, Member of the South African Parliament, Cape Town

20h30 **Dinner**

Debate:

How to respond to America's new Middle East policy?

AHMED MAHER EL-SAYED, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Member of the Shura Council, Cairo

BASSMA KODMANI, Executive Director of the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)

FRIDAY 23 OCTOBER

09h00 **Welcoming coffee**

09h30 **Panel 3. The Development Goals under pressure: defining means and priorities**

Chairperson: **STEFANO SILVESTRI**, President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

Report: **AZZAM MAHJOUN**, Professor of Economics, Tunis El Manar University

Discussants:

VICTOR BORGES, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and Communities of Cape Verde, Praia

JOÃO GOMES CRAVINHO, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Portugal, Lisbon

STEPHEN GROFF, Deputy Director, Development Co-operation Directorate, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris

ABDALLAH SAAF, former Minister of Education of Morocco, Professor, Centre des Etudes et Recherches en Sciences Sociales, Rabat

ALFREDO VALLADÃO, Professor, Mercosul Chair, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris

13h00 **Lunch**

Keynote Speaker: **MARCO AURÉLIO GARCIA**, Special Advisor on Foreign Policy to the President of Brazil, Brasília

Moderator: **PIERRE LÉVY**, Director, Forecasting Department, French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Paris

14h30 **Panel 4. Global Governance after the G-20 Summits: representation and participation**

Chairperson: **HELGA SCHMID**, Director, Policy Unit, EU Council General Secretariat, Brussels

Report: **MARIA JOÃO RODRIGUES**, Special Advisor to EU Presidencies, Institute for Strategic & International Studies, Lisbon

Discussants:

MARCO AURÉLIO GARCIA, Special Advisor on Foreign Policy to the President of Brazil, Brasília

CHARLES GRANT, Director, Centre for European Reform (CER), London

ALEJANDRO JARA, Deputy Director-General, World Trade Organisation (WTO), Geneva

SIMON SERFATY, Brzezinski Chair in Geostrategy, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC

TAO WENZHAO, Deputy Director, Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing

TEIJA TIILIKAINEN, former Finnish Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Director, Network for European Studies, University of Helsinki

LOUKAS TSOUKALIS, President, ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy), Athens

16h30 **Closing session**

Álvaro DE VASCONCELOS, Director, EUISS, Paris (conclusions)

Carl BILDT, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm

