Peacebuilding in 3D: EU and US approaches

BY
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PEACEBUILDING IN 3D: EU AND US APPROACHES

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The author

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At the end of a year mostly devoted to discussing military capabilities in an age of austerity, it is quite refreshing to have the opportunity to cast our sights on a wider horizon – one encompassing the whole range of civilian capabilities which are proving increasingly necessary to build and maintain peace in the world. And it is all the more stimulating to do so from a comparative transatlantic perspective, exactly ten years after the start of the first EU-led missions and operations, the big debates on the US Mars and the EU Venus, and the release (in December 2003) of the European Security Strategy.

The past decade has taught both Europeans and Americans a number of notable lessons: that contemporary conflicts and crises are intrinsically complex and that their resolution requires time, dedication and multiple resources; that situational awareness, contingency planning and a shared analysis among partners and stakeholders are key to success (however defined); and that in situations of fragility state (or nation)-building is the only real game in town, and cannot be played with military tools alone.

Yet precisely what is the most appropriate mix of capabilities and resources required in each situation remains a question that is difficult to answer for all. Only a balanced (and possibly concerted) development of targeted means and approaches may help secure the level of preparedness and resilience necessary to respond to contemporary international crises.

This is why Eva Gross’ Chaillot Paper – the second in the new series – represents an extremely useful analysis and timely assessment of the road travelled so far by the transatlantic partners: a road marked by a growing degree of convergence and cooperation but also by persistent differences in the appreciation of a number of factors. This is not necessarily a cause of concern, as some differentiation in approach and style may be not only healthy but even mutually stimulating and ultimately beneficial.

Antonio Missiroli

December 2013
Introduction

Giving peace a chance has always been a difficult challenge. Making peace, preserving peace – but now, especially, building peace – represents one of the most important and demanding objectives of any foreign policy aimed at bringing about a safer world. Today, an increasingly complex global security environment requires a flexible and multifaceted approach to address the symptoms as well as the causes of conflict. Peacebuilding is a broad but useful concept that captures the variety but also the spectrum of measures available to international actors in pursuit of sustainable peace.

Engagement in various post-conflict settings over the past decade has led individual countries and organisations to work on enhancing the coherence and effectiveness of their respective instruments. This has involved efforts at improving coordination of capabilities as well as building up civilian tools and capacities so as to strengthen diplomacy and development alongside defence. Depending on the setting, such an alignment of the so-called ‘3Ds’ has been alternatively referred to as a ‘comprehensive’ or ‘whole-of-government’ approach, and its operationalisation has been conditioned by existing organisational structures, available resources, and strategic cultures.

This Chaillot Paper concerns itself with the ‘comprehensiveness’ of peacebuilding and, within that, its civilian dimension. It represents an exercise in mapping and comparing developments across the Atlantic regarding the combination of policy instruments for peacebuilding, and especially the development and association of civilian ones to the more ‘traditional’ tools of power, starting with the military ones. Both Brussels and Washington have made efforts at implementing a comprehensive (in the case of the EU) and whole-of-government (in the case of the US) approach to better align their respective instruments.

As a result of these endeavours, EU-US approaches show increasing signs of complementarity but also of residual divergence. Both sides emphasise the need to work with others to attain their objectives – and the transatlantic relationship is arguably the most valuable of existing partnerships. However, lack of awareness of the differences vis-à-vis the status of diplomacy and development in the broader foreign policy toolbox, the nature and the availability of civilian capabilities for deployment abroad, and broader strategic considerations as to the value of peacebuilding activities at large could negatively impact on future transatlantic cooperation in this policy area.
This Chaillot Paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of such approaches, but also to the continued importance of peacebuilding as a foreign policy objective. The analysis is divided into four sections. The first briefly assesses the concept of peacebuilding and the growing international consensus around the strategic and operational value of the various activities it encompasses. The second section presents the development and state of play with regard to the EU’s ambitions to put in place a comprehensive approach. It restricts the analysis to EU-level institutions and instruments, as including also the contribution of individual member states would well exceed the scope of this paper. The third one analyses the trajectory of US efforts to build up civilian capabilities and more broadly to strengthen diplomacy and development in a context where the military has traditionally received the lion’s share of attention when it comes to foreign policy engagement. The fourth and final section compares EU and US approaches, including their respective strengths and weaknesses. The paper concludes with an overview of existing frameworks of transatlantic cooperation on aspects of peacebuilding as well as some observations on the likely future trajectory of EU-US cooperation in this area.
Conflict management and peacebuilding have received increasing and sustained international attention since the end of the Cold War. The post-9/11 global security environment has further heightened the strategic threats that arise from state failure, underdevelopment and weak governance. Perhaps most importantly, it has highlighted the interconnections between these elements even for actors that had not previously prioritised peacebuilding or paid adequate attention to the civilian aspects of post-conflict reconstruction or ways in which swift response to state fragility or conflict could be accomplished.

Peacebuilding mirrors the simultaneous focus on a comprehensive approach to conflict management that has emerged as a guiding paradigm for the EU, individual countries and other international organisations in their respective attempts to align civil and military instruments. Such an approach combines defence, diplomacy and development – the so-called 3Ds – in pursuit of long-term stability.

Evolving strategic orientations in a climate of austerity in the Western world and increasing public reluctance to support the use of military force have led to a move away from large-scale military interventions and long-term post-conflict reconstruction initiatives undertaken over the past decade in theatres as diverse as Afghanistan, Bosnia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Preventing conflict and achieving sustainable peace has, however, remained a strategic policy goal by necessity. Ongoing engagement in conflicts in Afghanistan or sub-Saharan Africa as well as unfolding engagement with political and societal transitions in a number of countries in the MENA region further highlights the need for a multi-faceted comprehensive approach to establishing and maintaining peace.

Responding to the changing nature of conflict

Peacebuilding is a broad concept that acknowledges not only the intricacies of conflict and post-conflict settings but also the various actors and operational requirements in the implementation of a comprehensive approach. Peacebuilding is firmly anchored in UN-led conceptual and operational engagements. This approach dates back to the early 1990s and the realisation that peacekeeping efforts up until that point (that is, the deployment of peacekeepers to ensure the
observation of peace-agreements) were insufficient to respond to conflict in a post-
Cold War world that was increasingly fraught with ethnic and nationalist conflict. The 1992 Agenda for Peace thus focused on preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping and outlined the range of relevant tasks as well as the need for institutional reform. Subsequently, the 2000 Brahimi Report identified a series of institutional adjustments to maximise internal UN support for more effective peacekeeping – and peacebuilding.

Ongoing work on the coordination of peacebuilding tasks and activities resulted in the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2005. As an advisory body, the Peacebuilding Commission represents an effort on the part of the international community to streamline efforts, focus on post-conflict scenarios and develop a set of best practices.

The recognition of long-term approaches, and the centrality of governance and institutional capacity as well as economic development for stability, is not limited to the UN but reflects lessons learned from a decade-long engagement in Afghanistan – and elsewhere. International financial institutions also subscribe to the growing consensus around the underlying causes of fragility calling for peacebuilding engagement. The 2011 World Bank Development Report entitled Conflict, Security and Development explicitly tackled the linkages between conflict, security and development and suggested that in terms of development, armed conflict can ‘wipe out an entire generation of economic progress’.

The concurrent emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and its focus on human security – a concept that places the individual, rather than the state, as a referent of security – further strengthens and underpins the emerging focus on not just external intervention but also strengthening local capacity in pursuit of stable peace. As a result of the evolving normative framework, peacebuilding has become increasingly central to international efforts in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, but also in furthering economic development.

This broad consensus, together with the conceptual and institutional lead of the UN in peacebuilding and peacekeeping, reinforces the salience but also the legitimacy of international engagement in this area. EU and US activities thus take place in a dense institutional environment and in an international context that is marked by conceptual synergy and that emphasises coordination and cooperation in responding to situations of fragility and complex conflict situations. These require economic and political but also operational engagement on the part of primarily civilian – and in some circumstances also military – actors.
Breaking the conflict cycle

While there has been consistent engagement with the concept and practice of peacebuilding over the past two decades, the intricate nature of contemporary conflict and insecurity as well as the increasing number of actors that engage in different aspects of peacebuilding have made a singular and precise definition difficult.

In the most general terms, peacebuilding encompasses activities aimed at establishing a sustainable peace environment in critical and unstable situations so as to avoid relapse into conflict. The term applies predominantly to post-conflict interventions but can include preventative and early warning elements as well. This is because situations of fragility can require early interventions that go beyond traditional post-conflict interventions – and that can take place concurrently with conflict interventions as well. The subsequent definition offered by the Brahimi Report highlights the complexity of the term, the resulting activities and the range of actors involved. It defines peacebuilding as ‘activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to re-assemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war’. Peacebuilding thus places emphasis on sustainability as well as governance and institutional capacity. It aims at long-term and structural reform but can involve short-term, preventative interventions as well. Unlike peacekeeping, which aims at maintaining a secure environment and deterring renewed outbreaks of violence, peacebuilding aims at making such a post-conflict environment self-sustaining so as to reach, at minimum, a state of limited cooperation in a context of basic stability. The level of ambition – namely, the attainment of ‘positive peace’ characterised by high levels of cooperation but also peaceful and institutionalised settlement mechanisms – is thus higher and calls for a more sustained and multifaceted engagement than peacekeeping alone.

At the same time there is a strong link between immediate, post-conflict interventions that focus on the establishment of a secure environment, the provision of basic services, and the stabilisation of governance structures, and those longer-term interventions that focus on the sustainability of peace. This link requires not only that peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures are properly sequenced and are mutually reinforcing, but also that these measures are supported – and absorbed – by local government and administrative structures. Indeed, local ownership including the involvement of civil society represents a key objective for peacebuilding intervention.

The graph overleaf illustrates various stages of conflict and identifies approaches that could facilitate the identification of appropriate peacebuilding instruments. It also highlights the relevance of all three ‘Ds’ – diplomacy, development and defence – for peacebuilding.
In practice these phases are often blurred or can take place concurrently within specific country contexts, as examples of protracted conflict and instability in Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) illustrate. Peacebuilding activities can thus span the conflict cycle, operate either at the forefront or as indispensable elements in the background, and are often carried out by institutional or national actors that simultaneously engage in other aspects of conflict management as well.

The scope of peacebuilding

Thus, peacebuilding includes – but is not limited to – reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); transitional justice and improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques – as well as engagement in immediate post-conflict security needs. A key goal of peacebuilding concerns the building, reforming and strengthening of local institutional capacity.

The diagram below illustrates the range of individual peacebuilding tasks that focus on diplomatic activities as well as reforming the security sector, building institutions and good governance. These tasks can be undertaken on both sides of the conflict spectrum.

**Figure 2: Peacebuilding activities**

Peacebuilding thus encompasses security, political and economic dimensions. While efforts at sustainable peace rely predominantly on civilian contributions, military instruments can play a crucial and often supportive function by establishing a climate of security in which long-term peacebuilding initiatives can be fostered. This applies in particular to early-stage peacebuilding activities during the transition period from peacekeeping, which is crucial for setting up the structures in which long-term peace-consolidation efforts can take place – although peacebuilding can take place without a concurrent or previous peacekeeping effort having been undertaken. Still, engagement in settings of long-term insecurity and situations of state fragility also requires effective coordination among civilian and military actors engaged in peacebuilding.

**Conclusions**

Cooperation among international actors is important for the successful implementation of peacebuilding, and the EU and the US represent two pieces in the broader institutional puzzle. In light of their respective areas of expertise and their potential combined strength, having these two actors coordinate and improve cooperation in this policy field can bring added political and operational weight to international
Peacebuilding in 3D: EU and US approaches

and transatlantic engagement in conflict management and peacebuilding. When placed in the framework of the broader transatlantic security relationship, formal and concrete EU-US cooperation already extends to the civilian aspects of conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding.

On a strategic level policymakers in both the EU and the US have recognised the threat emanating from failed states and regional instability. This has resulted in increasing engagement with peacebuilding, including institutional reforms for enhancing respective capacity but also with a growing emphasis on cooperation. Doctrinal shifts towards comprehensive approaches to international crises underpin the increasing emphasis on transatlantic coordination and cooperation. Finally, shrinking budgets due to austerity and a diminishing appetite for military interventions and lengthy state-building operations further emphasise the importance of a comprehensive approach towards structural and long-term peacebuilding.

Given its decade-long engagement with conflict prevention and crisis management through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU’s portfolio spans the range of the peacebuilding activities listed above. For its part, the US has increasingly focused on civilian aspects of peacebuilding, including the rule of law and SSR activities in addition to stability operations undertaken by the US military.
Chapter 2

The EU: consolidating capacities

The ongoing recalibration of peacebuilding instruments since the launch of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010 represents the culmination of the incremental development of EU conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding instruments. With the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993 and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 1999 the EU has gained civilian and military capabilities that complement its financial, economic and development instruments in support of long-term institutional and structural reform in fragile states. Over the past decade, the EU’s operational experience has come to encompass a broad range of activities that are undertaken by civilian and military actors, and that contribute in various ways to peacebuilding. The adoption of the comprehensive approach as a guiding paradigm highlights not only the range of instruments at the EU’s disposal in pursuit of peacebuilding but also the priority given to the coordination between specific instruments.

Strategic objectives and geographic blueprints

To date the EU has not adopted an explicit peacebuilding strategy or concept. However conceptualising the EU’s policies and implementation in terms of a comprehensive approach underscores the fact that the EU views conflict and post-conflict interventions from a holistic perspective. The recent adoption of regional sub-strategies – including the 2011 EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel and the 2011 Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa – not only testifies to the interconnectedness of security and development, and the centrality of governance in peacebuilding. The regional sub-strategies also constitute documents that aim to translate the comprehensive approach encompassing the full range of EU instruments into practice in specific geographic areas.

The process of formulating strategic objectives through the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), numerous communications of the European Commission as well as an increasing operational acquis – through CSDP missions but also political and financial engagement in a range of conflict settings – show that over the past decade the institutions within the EU’s foreign policy machinery (Council, Commission and now the EEAS) have engaged conceptually and operationally
Peacebuilding in 3D: EU and US approaches

with the challenge of addressing sources of insecurity at a global level. Individual strategic objectives encompass various peacebuilding tasks and include conflict prevention, breaking the conflict-poverty cycle, the need to work with partners in pursuit of these objectives, and local ownership.

The recent geographic strategies have evolved from and are perhaps the manifestations of the gradual development of the EU’s profile as a peacebuilding actor and the normative and strategic underpinnings of this evolution. Fundamentally, given its often violent history, Europe’s own integration process has long been regarded as the EU’s main contribution to conflict prevention. The process of elaborating a set of explicit foreign policy goals gained traction after the end of the Cold War and the genesis of the EU’s foreign policy instruments as a response to the war in the Balkans and broader geostrategic shifts. Furthermore, in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood exporting a set of values through a process of conditionality enshrined conflict prevention through enlargement – an approach that was later adapted and applied to the wider neighbourhood through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

The 2003 ESS represented the first formal attempt at formulating a set of strategic priorities for the EU. Previously, the adoption in 2001 of the ‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict’, the so-called Gothenburg Programme, framed conflict prevention as an explicit policy objective and set clear political priorities for preventive action: to improve early-warning, action and policy coherence; to enhance its instruments for long- and short-term prevention; and to build effective partnerships for conflict prevention. The ESS identified a number of threats and conceptual links that place peacebuilding at the centre of engagement in pursuit of its objectives. The document explicitly connects security and development, stating that ‘security is a precondition for development’ and highlights the cycle of ‘conflict, insecurity and poverty’ that international and EU efforts must seek to break.

The 2008 Report on the implementation of the ESS, alongside the June 2011 Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, reaffirmed the centrality of conflict prevention and peacebuilding for EU policy, taking into account the EU’s growing operational record and capabilities but also the shifting geopolitical world order in which the EU conducted its policy. On the security-development link the 2008 report stressed that ‘there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace’. It also highlighted the link between conflict and stability, and the need for interlinked measures of development assistance and improving security through SSR and DDR – with a particular focus on partnership with the broader international community and local stakeholders. These priorities and objectives echo and complement communications formulated by the European Commission on security and development and situations of fragility.

More recently, the EU has formalised its conception of a comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises [European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication
The EU: consolidating capacities

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to the European Parliament and the Council: ‘The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises’, Brussels, 11 December 2013. Significantly, ‘comprehensiveness’ refers to joined-up deployment of instruments and resources but also to the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and member states. The Joint Communication highlights specific measures that are to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of external action that apply to all stages of the conflict cycle and indirectly also their relevance to peacebuilding. They include the development of shared conflict analysis as well as the definition of a common strategic vision; a focus on prevention and the mobilisation of the different strengths and capacities of the EU; a commitment to the long term; linking policies and internal and external action; making better use of EU Delegations; and working in partnership with other international actors, including the UN, international and regional organisations, strategic partners and major international NGOs.

Actors and instruments: diplomacy and development

The EEAS structures have brought a more focused and coordinated approach to the EU’s foreign and security policy. They have also improved representation of the EU in the field. Established in late 2010 and progressively operationalised since, the EEAS contributes to the EU’s peacebuilding objectives through the enhancement and integration of available policy instruments but also institutional capacity, policy formulation and implementation on the ground.

The creation of the post of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP), currently held by Catherine Ashton, provides leadership and is designed to ensure a coherent approach to EU policy implementation. The post of HR/VP combines two functions: that of Vice-President of the Commission, the ‘owner’ of long-term structural and financial instruments, and of the High Representative which involves a more political role in terms of negotiation and agenda-setting power, but also a coordination function when it comes to member states. Civilian as well as military CSDP operations further complement these instruments.

The EEAS brings previously separate policy functions and competences under one institutional roof. Through the appointment of permanent chairs of most Committees and Working Groups that include member state representatives the EEAS also provides continuity to EU policymaking and implementation. The combination of staff drawn from the Council Secretariat, Commission and member states and the blending of different organisational cultures is an ongoing process; however, these new structures put the EU in a better position to improve its interactions with local and international partners. While geographical directorates provide country-specific expertise, EU crisis management structures per se in turn occupy a separate position within the EEAS. Moreover, a newly created Division
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for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Instruments – within the Security Policy and Conflict Prevention Directorate that is grouped with the crisis management structures – shows that peacebuilding has come to occupy a more prominent place in the emerging EU structures.

Improvements to the Union’s policymaking capacities through the creation of the EEAS go beyond the Brussels level. They also have an effect in the field through the upgrading of former Commission delegations to EU Delegations/embassies, thereby improving the EU’s representation and visibility in the field, but also the linkages between the field and Brussels – not least through improved reporting and information sharing. EU Delegations fulfil a political as well as an economic and developmental function. They both represent the Commission and its financial instruments but also the EU’s political dimension. This is even more the case in instances (such as Afghanistan) where the Head of Delegation is double-hatted as EU Special Representative (EUSR) – giving the post an even more explicit political mandate.

Equipped with this range of instruments, the EU is in an advantageous position to implement the peacebuilding activities outlined in the previous chapter. In addition to giving peacebuilding a more prominent role within the EEAS structures, specific engagement has taken place around improving early warning and crisis response; the coherence among EU instruments, and the linkages between security and development. All three elements play an important part in preventing the outbreak of conflict – as well as its relapse – and therefore form an integral part of the EU’s peacebuilding capabilities. While some of these developments remain in an early phase and have yet to be put to the test, ongoing institutional efforts point at increasing coordination to bridge gaps and to align conflict analysis and operational planning (and execution).
The EU: consolidating capacities

Improving analysis, early warning and response

The EU has extended efforts at strengthening early-warning action by means of improving and streamlining intelligence but also reporting structures. The EEAS builds on this work by putting in place procedures with a view to creating, over time, an intelligence and early warning culture. This entails the coordination of available intelligence derived from member states with that of EU reporting; and the need to link the provision of intelligence and early warning to effective crisis response that draws in all relevant institutional actors within the EEAS system.

Early warning relies, first, on intelligence provided by the member states that is synthesised and verified by the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN). The EU does not have a stand-alone intelligence capacity and relies on member

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2. This figure is a simplified extract from a more detailed organisational chart showing the EU’s larger peacebuilding and foreign policy capacities in order to illustrate the analysis of structures in this chapter. For an up-to-date organisational chart of the EEAS, see http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf.

3. The history of EU INTCEN dates back to the creation of the CSDP in 1999 and the creation of a Joint Situation Centre that was to serve as a forum for information exchange between a number of members and that until 2005 was referred to as SITCEN.
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states’ assets made available to the EU. Intelligence-sharing generally occurs on a case-by-case basis and on call rather than in a systematic, ongoing and across-the-board fashion. Member states have different intelligence capabilities and only share a fraction of their intelligence with their European partners. Although the information provided has increased in volume, it is often limited and sometimes provided with caveats – and the process is further complicated by in-built language problems.

The EEAS represents an opportunity to provide better intelligence and early warning through increasing coherence of the different sources of intelligence available through its geographic and horizontal directorates and its representation in the field. The EU Delegations play an important role both on account of being able to deliver integrated field-based reports and through their liaison function with local civil society, which will increase the range of information available to the EU. Finally, COREU (CORrespondance EUropeenne), the communication network between the member states and the Commission, further strengthens the speed of decision-making and response in emergencies.

A second aspect of early warning concerns the coordination of instruments in crisis response. A number of institutional innovations have been made since the creation of the EEAS that do point towards a sustained engagement with coordination. The Managing Directorate for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination, a post that was created through the EEAS, holds a key position in the link between early warning and crisis response through its overarching role in coordinating individual instruments during actual crisis response. A Crisis Response System (CRS) was established with a view to additionally facilitate political decision-making and the coordination of the EEAS activities internally and with other actors [Note from the Executive Secretary-General, 2012, cited in Nicoletta Pirozzi, ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management’, EU Crisis Management Paper Series, Brussels, DCAF, 2013].

Further, by creating a permanent mechanism that allows information exchange and coordination among relevant services, the EU is in a better position to bring together geographic and horizontal services, but also CSDP as well as diplomatic and economic measures. To this end the EEAS has established a Crisis Management Board (CMB), a permanent entity mandated to address horizontal aspects of EEAS crisis response through regular meetings and in consultation with relevant EEAS services, and that cooperates closely with Commission and Council General Secretariat Services. The European Commission in particular has strong capacities in emergency aid and disaster response – as well as development policy proper – that contribute to peacebuilding.

These capacities were used, for instance, in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti to provide humanitarian assistance; and are currently deployed in the Central African Republic (CAR) where the Commission through ECHO has extended its humanitarian airlift service to provide assistance to the population.
Aligning short-term and long-term measures

Coordinating the EU’s various instruments in pursuit of greater coherence represents a challenge not just for conflict analysis but also for the alignment of short- and long-term measures in pursuit of peacebuilding. This applies in the first instance to funding instruments, not all of which are tailored to fast crisis response. Given its 7-year budget cycles, the EU is in a good position to administer long-term support for structural peacebuilding measures – but not primarily for short-term interventions. The problem of alignment of financial instruments with political and operational contributions is also a function of the use of CSDP operations in post-conflict scenarios.

The EU responded to this crisis-development intersection by creating in 2006 the Instrument for Stability (IfS), which is a key component of the EU’s foreign policy toolkit, and which serves as a way to bridge crisis intervention and post-conflict or long-term development. The IfS, which is managed by the Commission, is used primarily to react quickly to a crisis situation and to make financial support available on a short-term basis that can later be mainstreamed into other Commission funding. The advantage of the IfS is its rapid employability, and its ability to ‘flank’ other EU measures. Early support for justice reform in Afghanistan serves as one example where IfS funds were used to kick-start reform efforts that were later absorbed by other budget lines.

IfS funding is in high demand precisely because it can be rapidly released. This has increased the strain placed on this particular budget item – and suggests persistent programmatic gaps in EU long-term assistance that need to be addressed so that the IfS can be used in support of what it was originally intended for: as an integral part of crisis response and to ensure short-term availability of necessary funds. These funding instruments complement long-term financial instruments available through the EEAS as well as the Commission that assist transition processes or the building of government institutions.
Table 1: Instrument for Stability (IfS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Instrument for Stability (IfS) – flexible crisis spending</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year adopted: 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successor to the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), which had an annual budget of €30 million with funding restricted to a duration of six months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget: €2 billion for funding period 2007-2013; €2.5 billion for 2014-2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses: Assistance in response to situations of crisis and emerging crisis (Art. 3) and assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation (Art. 4). Complementary to and consistent with measures adopted in the context of CFSP and on police and criminal justice cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration: 'exceptional assistance measures' up to 18 months, deployed in close cooperation with the Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Examples:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan – start-up funding to address EUPOL–justice link</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo – funding for International Civilian Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya – assistance to a needs assessment in integrated border management ahead of exploratory CSDP mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR – support for the demilitarisation of forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger – demining programmes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EEAS

Security-development: linkages and synergies

When it comes to the alignment of short- and long-term measures, the rapid institutional development of CSDP in particular has raised issues over the potential clash between long- and short-term objectives – but also the ownership of instruments and policy initiatives. This applies in particular to the EU’s development instruments, which are long-term by design. The Commission’s financial instruments and capabilities have been increasingly used to meet crisis and conflict prevention objectives: traditional development aid has become increasingly ‘securitised’ and contains a clear conflict prevention rationale, which is noticeable also in the geographic allocation of aid. Only humanitarian aid remains almost exclusively needs-based. These debates also point towards a more targeted use of development funds: there has been a shift in thinking towards a closer alignment of humanitarian and development aid within the EU and a more concerted effort to streamline development spending to support governance.
The first decade of CSDP was also one of ‘turf wars’ between the Commission and the Council over the delineation of competences and activities. The ruling under the 2008 ECOWAS court case, which centred on the classification of support in stemming the flow of weapons in West Africa, held that in cases where aid is provided with a dual objective – in this case, development and security – action must be taken under the Community. Such legal action illustrated Commission resistance to Council claims, which also stems from an imbalance between EU resources devoted to development and those allocated for CFSP activities, as well as reluctance on the part of the Commission to ‘share’ its assets. With the double-hatting of the post of HR/VP with that of Vice-President of the Commission, the EEAS structures have merged security and development instruments under a single ‘hat’ – at least in principle – even if the challenge of balancing resources between security and development needs, particularly in times of increasing austerity, remains.

**Missions and capabilities: the 3rd ‘D’**

CSDP forms an integral part of EU peacebuilding. Together with the upgraded Delegations and their Heads/Ambassadors, the CSDP missions are also the most visible manifestation of the EU’s peacebuilding activities: Commission financial instruments, although they structurally support EU activities (including political and civilian/military dimensions thereof) are normally administered by other bodies, for example, trust funds managed by the UN or the World Bank. During the first decade of CSDP – and the launch of the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia in December 2003 – the EU has launched close to 30 civilian and military missions and operations. Currently (December 2013) the EU conducts 12 civilian missions and 4 military operations in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Afghanistan, Africa and the Middle East.

The member states, supported by EEAS structures, take the lead in decisions to launch CSDP operations – with emphasis on the third ‘D’ – and also assume responsibility for staffing these operations. Whereas the EEAS holds key competences in political and developmental areas of peacebuilding, this particular dimension of peacebuilding includes and relies on member states’ commitments and contributions. The table below illustrates the increasing number, geographic but also operational range of CSDP missions undertaken in pursuit of aspects of peacebuilding over the past decade.
## Table 2: EU Peacebuilding missions and operations, 2003-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monitoring Missions</th>
<th>Monitoring Mission</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMM Aceh</td>
<td>AMM Aceh</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMM</td>
<td>EUMM</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>since 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence operations</td>
<td>EUFOR Concordia</td>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>since 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police missions</td>
<td>EUPM</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>since 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU POL Proxima</td>
<td>EU POL Proxima</td>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>2003-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU POL Kinshasa</td>
<td>EU POL Kinshasa</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>2005-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU POL COPPS</td>
<td>EU POL COPPS</td>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>since 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPAT</td>
<td>EUPAT</td>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU POL RD Congo</td>
<td>EU POL RD Congo</td>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>2005-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU POL Afghanistan</td>
<td>EU POL Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>since 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity-building missions</td>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Niger</td>
<td></td>
<td>since 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law missions</td>
<td>EU JUST Themis</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2004-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU JUST LEX</td>
<td>EU JUST LEX</td>
<td>Brussels/Iraq</td>
<td>2005-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
<td>since 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border management missions</td>
<td>EUBAM Rafah</td>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>since 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Ukraine-Moldova</td>
<td>EUBAM Ukraine-Moldova</td>
<td></td>
<td>since 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Libya</td>
<td>EUBAM Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td>since 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Sector Reform missions</td>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td>since 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU SSR Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>EU SSR Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td></td>
<td>since 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military training missions</td>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td>since 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td>since 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Council of the European Union
The emphasis on the ‘comprehensive approach’ has highlighted the integration of CSDP missions and operations in a broader EU crisis response. With a view to establishing an EU peacebuilding practice, this applies both to their coordination with broader foreign policy instruments outlined in the previous section, but also the coordination of civilian and military instruments. In addition to mission planning and conduct, the alignment of civil-military instruments as well as staffing CSDP missions has thus remained a priority area for EU peacebuilding efforts.

**Mission planning and conduct**

When it comes to the planning and conduct of missions Brussels has faced the task of creating planning and oversight structures as an intermediary function between Council structures and the field. The challenge of coordination and building appropriate structures thus pre-dates the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the launch of the EEAS. In 2009 the two DGs in the Council responsible for military and civilian crisis management, respectively, were merged in an effort to improve coordination and now form the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD).

With the creation of the CMPD, two strands of mission types are combined at the Brussels level in order to improve EU ability to put together and deploy all facets of the CSDP’s toolkit across the civil-military spectrum. As for civilian CSDP, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) is responsible for the operational planning, command and control of civilian missions. Created in 2007, it functions as an important support element for individual civilian crisis missions.

There remain coordination challenges within the EEAS when it comes to launching and staffing missions as well as the procurement of mission equipment. This particular shortfall – the harmonisation of schedules of deployment of staff and procurement of mission equipment – has been widely highlighted and documented in most CSDP missions. Beyond internal policy coordination, including that of CSDP with other EU policies, the EU’s interaction with the host country has represented a further challenge [European External Action Service, ‘Civilian CSDP missions: lessons and best practices’, Report 2010, Brussels, May 2011].

Given the need for civilian planning structures – but also the need for standardisation of missions – the EU has also taken steps towards instituting a lessons learned process. To date, this process consists of the identification of lessons as well as the institutionalisation of changes – but is far from systematic and consistent. The CMPD produces 6-monthly reports on lessons learned, and the annual compilation of best practices. This concerns civilian missions only, even if a civil-military joint annual report is envisaged in the future so as to increase the potential for civil-military synergies.

Improving civil-military coordination is also a matter of intensifying contacts between civilian and military planners and mission personnel in Brussels as well as on the ground, where such contacts have already taken place. This could include,
for instance, the sharing of lessons learned (as foreseen in the CHG 2010) and would enable the EU to harness synergies despite the fact that civilian missions deal with a more diverse spectrum of tasks than military operations, and despite the fact that the financing of operations proceeds along different lines. The EEAS, and its ongoing institutional construction, can provide an added socialisation function.

**Generating capabilities**

The creation of CSDP launched a sustained engagement with developing appropriate capabilities. This applies in particular to the civilian aspect of CSDP. Military staff are drawn from member states’ armed forces that are regularly trained and deployable. Civilian deployment, however, is more intricate: civilian staff are normally drawn from member states’ interior, justice or foreign ministries with different levels of training and, given the increasingly specialised nature of EU peacebuilding missions, there is an increasing need for specialised training and the identification and recruitment of suitably trained staff.

Over the past decade the EU has, in response to these developments, fine-tuned the process of capability generation and the deployment of appropriately trained staff in sufficient numbers. This effort has gradually moved from an initial stock-taking of member states’ capabilities and the formulation of generic civilian capability goals to an emphasis on appropriately trained and rapidly deployable staff. The 1999 ‘Action Plan on non-military crisis management’ was to map existing national and EU resources in order to define targets for generating capabilities. In 2000 member states committed themselves to make available 5,000 police officers by 2003, of which 1,000 should be deployable within 30 days; and at the June 2001 Gothenburg Council member states established targets for the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection and committed to providing 200 rule-of-law officials and civil protection intervention teams of up to 2,000 personnel by 2003.

The formulation of the so-called Civilian Headline Goals (CHG) constituted a qualitative improvement. The CHG 2008, adopted in 2004, converted the priority areas identified earlier as well as national commitments into more specific capabilities and criteria for member states with respect to training and staffing. It focused on the elaboration of planning assumptions and illustrative scenarios, a list of the required capabilities including personnel, equipment, planning, logistics and missions support, the assessment of member states’ contributions with a view to identifying shortfalls and designing a Capability Improvement Plan, and establishing a system for the regular review of national contributions.

Based on operational experience, and perceived shortfalls particularly in the planning of individual missions, CHG 2010 also developed scenarios for the creation of a pool of specifically trained experts. The Civilian Response Teams (CRTs), a pool of up to 100 experts drawn and specifically trained by member states, is used for deployment during the preparatory stage of an intervention. In
addition to the CRTs, and in light of the EU’s increasing engagement with SSR, the CHG 2010 also developed a SSR scenario. Apart from standardised training for civilian missions in general and information release when it comes to the numbers of staff, the EU has, therefore, made some headway in putting together smaller and targeted expert pools. As a follow-on to the CRTs, EU member states decided on the creation of an SSR pool. These experts receive regular training as well as task and geography-specific training – but, given the specialised nature of their tasks, raising the numbers of these pools will be challenging.

Table 3: Targeted staffing for peacebuilding operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian Response Teams (CRTs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tasks: carrying out assessment and fact-finding missions in crisis situations; helping to prepare operation plans; ensuring a rapid operational presence on the ground; supporting the initial phase of civilian missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition: Pool of experts in the fields of justice, administration, logistics, management and policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application: DRC, Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size: about 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawn from experts selected and trained by member states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SSR pool</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drawn from: Member states, European Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use: contributing to carrying out SSR assessments and audits and the planning of SSR actions; temporary deployment in EU missions; contributing to development of the European Union concepts in relation to SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application: Libya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ZIF Glossary of Peace Operations; Council of the European Union

Staffing missions: towards standardisation

Questions over staffing and training have emerged as key coordination challenges for the EU – both internally as well as between Brussels and the member states. While the increasingly specific targets for numbers but also competences for civilian staff show that the EU has conceptually engaged with the intricacies of field-based needs when it comes to the quantity and quality of mission personnel, generating and training staff has presented a significant challenge for the EU. To begin with, civilian staff require fundamentally different training from that provided to military forces. Civilian staff tend not to be on-call, and do not receive training either on a regular basis or in the group constellation in which they will be deployed. Instead, when not on mission, civilian staff work in their respective
national administrations or in other jobs. This makes the challenge of civilian different from military training, where the EU and its member states can rely on a much longer tradition and record of exercises and standards, including and particularly from within NATO.

Staff selection takes place at the national rather than European level – and often involves internal negotiations or the need for restructuring of competences between ministries of the interior or justice in order to make staff available for international missions. This system thus places responsibility for generating sufficient personnel for individual missions in the hands of the member states – and the level and readiness to employ civilian staff varies considerably among capitals. Similarly, training efforts also take place on the national levels and the quality and regularity of training varies among member states – particularly when it comes to providing regular as well as geographically and conflict-appropriate training.

The challenge of training civilian staff has been taken increasingly seriously. Member states engage in training or have taken the lead in providing or streamlining training. This applies in particular to Germany and the Nordic countries – those member states with a larger contingent of deployable civilian forces. The German Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF) has assumed a key role as, in exchange with others, it works on streamlining training curricula to ensure congruence among national training courses. Still, the level of pre-deployment training tends to vary, and not all member states follow the same training schedules and methods.

The EU has made some efforts to address these shortfalls. In addition to moves towards standardised training and the creation of CRTs and the SSR expert pool, the EU has also set up a web-based platform to make the availability of staff more transparent. *Goalkeeper*, as this platform is called, is to contribute to the ongoing work on personnel resources and to assist mission planning and recruitment processes. National variations are likely to continue as member states remain reluctant to ‘upload’ training to the European level. A fully realised EU-level training is unlikely to develop: keeping staff selection at a national rather than a European level gives member states control over personnel available for international deployments; the EU system of personnel recruitment and deployment is different from that of the UN, for example. There, member states pay for UN personnel but without exerting commensurate authority – and, what is perhaps more important in the EU context, without enjoying the same political identification with European peacebuilding.

However, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), a network of civilian and military training institutes, offers EU-level training courses and aims to improve the coordination and standardisation of training. Created in 2005 with the aim of providing strategic-level education in CSDP and promoting a common European security culture, the ESDC has recently been allocated a dedicated budget, an increased secretariat and a legal personality to support the delivery and continual development of training [Council Decision 2013/189/CFSP of 22 April 2013].
Conclusion

The EU possesses a variety of peacebuilding tools, many of which have been honed through various deployments and lessons learned as a result. They encompass diplomatic initiatives, including the deployment of a EUSR to aid the HR/VP through information gathering and through coordinating and advising other EU instruments on the ground; economic support through the release of humanitarian aid but also general development support; military and civilian engagement through CSDP missions. These instruments can be deployed for preventive engagement but also in post-conflict peacebuilding.

The EEAS and its emerging structures have provided an opportunity to rethink and reform development and peacebuilding assistance that goes beyond the alignment of instruments but that builds on experience in peacebuilding to date. This is important because effective peacebuilding requires the availability of a comprehensive and integrated toolbox from which to draw pre-manufactured crisis instruments as needed and as appropriate for a given situation of fragility or conflict. The EU’s operational experience has also shown that the emphasis needs to be placed on institution-building, i.e., reforming and strengthening institutional capacity and governance structures. This also implies that the EU ought to focus on oversight mechanisms rather than merely capacity development at the central state level while concurrently placing emphasis on accountability and democratic legitimacy.

While significant improvements have been made to EU institutions and operational practice, EU peacebuilding is still confronted with a number of challenges. Peacebuilding is a long-term commitment that touches on crisis management but transcends it, and this means that further improving coherence between instruments and bureaucratic structures should be a priority. This also includes conceptual work on institutions and operational practice. Embedding CSDP in broader country or sub-regional strategies is one obvious solution, as is also a closer look at the effect of EU and CSDP intervention in terms of potential side-effects. There remains a need for developing a common approach to peacebuilding, rule-of-law, and security sector reform within the EEAS – but also an alignment of views and means when it comes to the EU’s cooperation with partners.
Across the Atlantic, the decade-long military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated the limits of military contributions to post-conflict and stabilisation operations. A resulting focus on civilian capabilities that started under the second Bush administration has gradually led to a shift away from the near exclusive reliance on military instruments in international security. Beyond questions of civil-military coordination this shift has also generated sustained conceptual and operational engagement with conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Under the first Obama administration in particular the balance of engagement has shifted towards prevention and conflict response in pursuit of US interests and values as a result. The adoption of ‘smart power’ as a guiding principle signals that, in an environment of complex security threats and declining economic resources, diplomacy and development tools are vital when it comes to achieving broader US aims.

This shift in emphasis has resulted in a focus on civilian structures and capabilities as well as mechanisms to facilitate their coordination. Recent institutional changes reflect a broad consensus among (and within) successive US administrations on the need for a focus on civilian capabilities and a ‘whole-of-government’ approach. On a strategic-institutional level, the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the first exercise of this kind, has further emphasised the role but also the contributions of the State Department as well as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to civilian reconstruction. Beyond a greater recognition of the contributions of diplomacy and development to peacebuilding, the QDDR constitutes an attempt to consolidate but also streamline functional capabilities in US foreign policy. In particular, it has led to a recalibration and reconceptualisation of institutional structures within civilian agencies, notably the US Department of State. The recent adjustments have yet to become fully embedded within bureaucratic structures and diplomatic practice. However, together with the emphasis on diplomacy rather than defence espoused by the second Obama administration, they point to an enduring consensus and commitment towards maintaining and improving on functional civilian capacities for peacebuilding.
Strategic objectives and political trajectories

Engagement with the role of civilian instruments in post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction commenced during successive Bush administrations, but the institutional build-up and evolution of such capabilities in pursuit of ‘smart’ power has taken place during the Obama presidencies. This continuity – albeit with a subtle shift from civil-military coordination in complex stability operations (under Bush) towards conflict prevention and peacebuilding (under Obama) – suggests a durable consensus within the US system in favour of the development and strengthening of civilian capabilities outside of military structures. It also signals that engagement with aspects of peacebuilding has come to occupy a more central place in US foreign policy – even if the US has not adopted an explicit peacebuilding concept or strategy.

‘Smart power’, the term adopted by the Obama administration as one of its guiding principles, signals an ideologically less ambitious agenda that is shaped by the toll of two simultaneous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the impact of the economic crisis. A term originally coined by Joseph Nye to denote ‘the ability to combine hard and soft power into a winning strategy’, smart power has been described by former Secretary of State Clinton as ‘the full range of tools at our disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural – picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation’ [Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, 13 January 2009]. This signals not only a coordinated and comprehensive approach towards peacebuilding, but emphasises the importance of diplomacy at the forefront of efforts.

A comprehensive approach that combines civilian and military instruments has also found its way into the key US policy documents and doctrine. The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) places emphasis on a ‘Whole of Government Approach’ that focuses on the integration and alignment of military and civilian institutions. It also highlights improving coordinated planning and policymaking, and the need to build capacity in order to ‘achieve integration of our efforts to implement and monitor operations policy and strategies’ [White House, National Security Strategy 2010]. Echoing ‘smart power’, the NSS also emphasises the need to ‘balance and integrate all elements of American power (…) our diplomacy and development capabilities must be modernised, and our civilian expeditionary strategy strengthened’ [White House, National Security Strategy 2010].

While the impetus for contemporary institutional developments pre-dates the Obama administration, the changing conceptual underpinning of civilian reconstruction signals a noticeable shift between his administration and the previous one. The Bush administration viewed its approach as part of ‘transformational diplomacy’: that is, working with partners of the US to ‘build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system’ [Testimony by Secretary Rice before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, 14 February
2006]. Transformational diplomacy, like smart power, emphasised awareness of the threat arising from weak and failing states and the need for organisational change to properly address these new challenges – but the scope of goals and overall ambitions has been adjusted downwards in the shift towards smart power.

Operationalising these strategic priorities has necessitated conceptual and institutional restructuring and the creation of capabilities. It has also led to an emphasis on engaging partners inside and outside government in pursuit of peacebuilding. In the words of Secretary of State John Kerry, ‘we value security and stability in other parts of the world, knowing that failed states are among our greatest security threats, and new partners are our greatest assets’.

Recalibrating the 3Ds

The stated goal of achieving a ‘whole-of-government’ approach and the modernisation of diplomacy and development implies a readjustment of the balance between agencies tasked with US national security. Individual departments and agencies differ as far as size, resources and the nature and frequency of their international engagement are concerned. This can exacerbate political and operational differences, but also set the stage for turf battles in inter-agency relations. The Pentagon can lay claim to the most sizeable role and budget in US foreign policy, and the most extensive experience with in-conflict engagement over the past decade; USAID has the longest tradition of deploying civilians for the types of reconstruction and peacebuilding tasks envisaged – but is also the agency that has received the least amount of funding and political authority among the three major departments.

The State Department has assumed an increasing role in administering and coordinating peacebuilding activities over the past few years and thus forms a natural partner for the EEAS in its coordination and geographical functions. But, although the State Department has invested in the creation of civilian capabilities and institutional structures for speedy deployment, this work has not yet uniformly entered the mainstream of diplomatic practice. This is also because the specific US system of generating civilian capabilities, which can draw from the federal but not the state level, faces constraints in coordinating, training and deploying civilian capabilities. In the context of declining budgets, bureaucratic politics and existing initiatives continue to have to be proactive in establishing and maintaining their place and demonstrate their added value in the greater structures.

The State Department: taking ownership

The emerging consensus on the threat posed by weak and failing states to international security and the need for the deployment of civilian capabilities as part of a ‘smart power’ approach has moved the State Department to the centre of conceptual debate and institutional reform. The 2010 QDDR represented
an important step forward in the conceptualisation and coordination of US peacebuilding instruments. Co-led by then Deputy Secretary Jack Lew and USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah, together with a leadership team that included senior diplomacy, defence and development advisors, the overall goal was to establish clear and mutually reinforcing State and USAID roles and missions and to implement tangible organisational change: in other words, a blueprint for diplomatic and development efforts through the alignment of policy, strategy and resources.

The QDDR has affected the institutional structure and implementation of peacebuilding in the field in two ways. First, it called for streamlining work on coordination and planning and an upgrading of existing structures tasked with reconstruction. Second, it emphasised policy implementation and coordination on the ground and thus engages with the role and function of US embassies – and the organisational, logistical and planning capacities needed to engage in conflict settings. This reconceptualisation highlights functional, rather than merely geographic, expertise but also implementation structures when it comes to peacebuilding through diplomacy.

The organisational changes resulting from the QDDR have implications for the implementation of the civilian aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. This holds true both for the development of an institutional framework for response and a focus on the availability of civilian experts – from US structures or that of partner organisations – for rapid deployment. It applies in particular to the Bureau of Conflict and Stability Operations (CSO), which the QDDR upgraded from what was previously the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). S/CRS operated under the authority of the Secretary of State, but without being fully embedded and integrated into bureaucratic structures. As a result of the QDDR, activities that had been undertaken by S/CRS since its creation in 2004 – namely to aid in coordinating civilian reconstruction tasks and capabilities – have now become mainstreamed into State Department bureaucracy, with more predictable funding and staffing structures. The creation of a Civilian Response Network (CRN) in turn is to facilitate the identification and deployment of civilian experts inside and outside the US government. Within CSO, particular investment has been made in analysis, early warning and crisis response, as well as the identification and training of civilian experts from other parts of the US Bureaucracy.

Within the State Department, CSO belongs to the so-called ‘J-family’ of bureaus reporting to the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights. Created as a result of the QDDR in late 2012, it consists of five bureaus and three offices and emphasises functional rather than geographical tasks, including peacebuilding. The ‘J-family’ has a budget of $4.5 billion, of which CSO has $60 million – with a staff of 140. CSO works with these and other offices to increase coherence in preventing and responding to conflict and crisis.
The US: a ‘smart power’ approach

Figure 4: The J-family

The Pentagon – towards devolution of influence?

The Pentagon occupies a key position in US foreign policy both in terms of budgetary allocation as well as political influence. It at first resisted but then exhibited a significant change in attitude towards the place of post-conflict reconstruction in US foreign policy and thus acted as a catalyst for the development of relevant civilian capabilities. More recently, and as a result of a decade-long experience in stabilisation missions, the ongoing strategic re-orientation towards the Asia-Pacific, but also the emergence of new and broader security threats in a context of shrinking budgets, the role of the military – under the aegis of President Obama as well as Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel – is moving towards being regarded as an essential but no longer the sole or primary tool for advancing US interests. Rather, the emphasis is now on integrating the available sources of US power – be they economic, diplomatic, civilian or military. In a recent speech, on 5 November 2013, US Secretary of Defense Hagel accordingly stated that ‘the US must use military strength as a supporting component of a comprehensive strategy’. This points to a continuing and growing role for the military but also support for the development and application of civilian capabilities outside the Department of Defence.

It was the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq that brought about a significant change of attitude towards stabilisation missions (and the role of the military vis-à-vis civilian actors) – an activity that, under the first Bush administration at least, was seen as falling outside the scope of US military responsibilities or priorities. By 2005 the Pentagon had defined stability operations as ‘a core military mission that the DoD shall be prepared to conduct and support’ (US Department of Defence, Directive 3000.05, ‘Military Support for Stability, Security Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations’, 28 November 2005). In both theatres of operations it was the US military rather than civilian forces that undertook stabilisation and state-building
efforts. The experience of military personnel undertaking civilian construction tasks for which they were not necessarily suited and certainly not prepared – and the absence of civilian capabilities in other agencies that could have stepped in to take over – resulted in an emphasis on building up civilian capabilities.

This changing set of priorities led to a call for development of civilian expertise that would complement the military in their tasks. Official language reflects this shift. The 2006 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) stated that ‘interagency and international combined operations (...) are the new Joint operations. Supporting and enabling other agencies, working towards common objectives, and building the capacity of partners are indispensable elements of the Department’s new missions. (...) The Department will support substantially increased resources for the Department of State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability and State’s associated proposal to establish a deployable Civilian Response Corps (...).’

The 2010 QDR emphasises counterinsurgency, stability and counterterrorism operations. Highlighting the importance of building states’ security capacity, the document emphasises coordinating ‘those activities with other US government agencies as they work to strengthen civilian capacities’. As a result of its own institutional learning processes, this reinforces the need for working on the coordination of tasks and strengthening the political leadership of other civilian actors.

Public statements by then Secretary of State Clinton and then Secretary of Defense Gates that ‘our civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been underfunded for too long’ in turn illustrate the consensus between the civilian and military leadership in favour of civilian aspects of foreign assistance, particularly conflict prevention and crisis response. This consensus continues to hold under the second Obama administration, although the strategic impetus for such a consensus has shifted beyond civil-military relations to encompass, in the words of Secretary of Defense Hagel, ‘a principled and engaged realism that employs diplomatic, economic and security tools – as well as our values to advance our security and prosperity’.

The Pentagon continues to engage with stability operations in an effort to preserve lessons learned as a result of the decade-long engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. It maintains capabilities to work at the civilian-military interface and hand over issues that remain distinct from the approach taken by the State Department. These efforts focus on stabilisation and reconstruction operations, foreign disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, international peacekeeping efforts and evacuations of non-combatants.

This expertise on civil-military relations connects with but is different from the emphasis of the State Department. Initially it was the Pentagon that funded S/CRS efforts, since Congressional funding was not available. This reflected, at least initially, a conception of civilian efforts – and implicitly also peacebuilding activities more broadly – as supporting the military in pursuit of a comprehensive
approach understood as the alignment of civilian with military instruments. By now the two offices – and institutions – function separately, and operate from related but distinct strategic assumptions and lessons, with the State Department’s engagement conceptualised as distinct and civilian contributions to peacebuilding. Bureaucratic (including budgetary) re-ordering as a result of the QDDR has thus made the State Department and now CSO more autonomous, but has also further separated two of the three Ds – defence and diplomacy.

USAID – the politicisation of development

US development assistance has undergone a significant change over the past two decades. President Obama has made the elevated status of development under his administration explicit in arguing that development assistance ‘should be one of our most powerful foreign policy tools’, which further indicates a shift away from relying on purely military towards emphasising non-military peacebuilding instruments.

Aid had a strong ideological connotation during the Cold War, but US aid policy lost not only its political direction but also financial support after 1990. The Bush administration funded a number of presidential initiatives and thus set up a number of separate, narrowly focused programmes that further diminished a coherent aid policy and approach. At the same time, the growing focus on state failure as a root cause of terror meant that development became more and more politicised – and development explicitly used as a tool in democracy promotion in pursuit of transformational diplomacy. As a result of this trend, USAID moved progressively closer to the US Department of State. Growing concern with post-conflict stabilisation and the kinds of skills needed to perform reconstruction tasks have placed USAID back in the spotlight. The complexity of reforming local and regional governance, a country’s security sector or building institutions, requires significant technical expertise that USAID possesses, along with increased and improved inter-agency coordination and cooperation. Aside from its close coordination with the Department of State USAID also engages with the military through the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) within the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Resistance (DCHA), and conceptually through the publication in 2008 of a civilian-military cooperation policy as well as deploying USAID advisors in military operations.

In 2006 the State Department, which had been given increased oversight over USAID, assumed de facto control through the creation of the post of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) who took over the responsibilities of the USAID Director and has authority over State Department and USAID programmes. These institutional developments reflect the fact that development assistance is regarded as a foreign policy and national security tool – that is, an instrument of diplomacy – rather than a normative goal in itself. As a result of a dwindling budget and personnel, with the majority of its funds subcontracted to NGOs, private companies or consulting firms, USAID has turned into a ‘clearing house’ rather than a functioning operational agency. Furthermore, the multitude of agencies
within the US Government that implement aid has further reduced USAID’s ability to assume the position of leadership in development debates [See Carol Lancaster, ‘USAID in the 21st Century: What do we need for the tasks at hand?’, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sub-committee on International Development, Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs and International Environmental Protection, 1 April 2009].

CSO: civilian structures for conflict response

Within the State Department, the creation of CSO (and previously S/CRS) was designed to fill the gaps identified in inter-agency planning, capabilities and identification of conflict drivers. It represented a novel concept both through its coordinating mandate, but also its emphasis on planning and technical expertise, rather than more traditional diplomatic roles and activities. While innovative, its role and functions were hampered not just by the novelty of the concept and its departure from ‘normal’ diplomatic practice, but also the lack of Congressional funding for the sort of civilian peacebuilding tasks that were to be carried out by these new structures. This highlights the difficulties associated with institutionalising bureaucratic change (and its budgetary implications) and with raising the profile of civilian peacebuilding tasks in a political context that is predisposed towards supporting the military, but that does not value foreign assistance more generally.

NSDP-44, the National Security Presidential Directive ‘Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization’ [The White House. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, ‘Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization’, Washington DC, 7 December 2005] gave the Secretary of State responsibility to coordinate and lead efforts in planning, preparation and execution of stabilisation and reconstruction operations. The legitimacy of the office was progressively strengthened under both the Bush and the Obama administrations in terms of financial and institutional support. Since its creation the scope of activities has slightly changed: this applies in particular to the focus on external civilian capabilities but also planning and coordination. Initially both were emphasised – but while the former is no longer as prominent the latter remains a focus of CSO in particular.

Drawing a blueprint

The authority of the post of S/CRS was strengthened through the Reconstruction and Stabilisation Civilian Management Act of 2008 that formally established S/CRS at the State Department and provided the authority to develop a Response Readiness Corps and the Civilian Reserve Corps. Accordingly, functional tasks expanded to early warning; planning; lessons learned and best practices; and crisis response strategy and integrated resource management. S/CRS also developed
two concepts for the planning and conduct of stabilisation and reconstruction operations: the Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilisation and Conflict Transformation; and the Interagency Management System that consisted of a policy coordination group, a civilian planning cell, and deployable civilian teams.

S/CRS’ original mission was to ‘lead, coordinate and institutionalise US Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilise and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife’. The main aim was conflict prevention and mitigation, rather than operating in active conflict. The then-Acting Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation was supported by three deputy coordinators: one from USAID and two from the State Department. This institutional set-up reflected the close partnership with USAID, although S/CRS and now CSO also includes personnel seconded from the Pentagon and other government agencies.

Despite the internal shift in opinion towards an appreciation of the value of civilian aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding among US government agencies, getting Congressional approval for funding S/CRS was difficult – despite the fact that S/CRS benefited from the support of the President as well as the Secretary of State. As a matter of fact, S/CRS received funds from the DoD on a case-by-case basis for stabilisation and reconstruction projects. The use of DoD supplementary funds to pay for State Department activities underscored the military’s commitment to strengthening civilian capabilities.

It was not until 2009 that S/CRS received directly-appropriated funding, and this negatively impacted on operational engagement. $45 million was allocated in FY09, and $323 million in FY10, most of which was to go to the Civilian Response Corps. Congress also appropriated $75 million for the Civilian Stabilisation Initiative (CSI) that supports S/CRS planning, assessment and outreach activities; the Office of Civilian Response in USAID and the Civilian Deployment Center; the costs of Corps member recruitment, hiring and management by partner agencies; and the training, equipment and force protection for deployment of the Civilian Response Corps (US Department of State, ‘Civilian Response Corps Today: Fact Sheet’, 2010). Overall, support from Congress has become more positive, and the State Department and USAID established a unified plan in 2009 that allowed for joint funding decisions and a collaborative relationship [US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, ‘2009 Year in Review: Smart Power in Action’, 2010]. For FY 2011, the overall budget for State and USAID was $52.8 billion, which included $100 million for a complex crisis fund. Part of the increase in funding in 2011 was also directed towards improving staffing, resources and strengthening partnerships [Hillary Clinton, President’s Proposed Budget Request for FY2011 for the Department of State and Foreign Operations. Testimony Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs. Washington DC, 24 February 2010].
Initial experiences and future trajectories

Initial field experiences demonstrated that S/CRS had upper-level backing – but working level difficulties. Given its small budget, S/CRS had trouble in convincing other parts of the State Department bureaucracy – in particular, the regional bureaus – of an S/CRS lead or even value added in crisis situations. The administrative upgrade to a bureau through the QDDR partially addressed this imbalance.

S/CRS activities in the field were of a consultative rather than operational nature. In Kosovo, it undertook a comprehensive planning effort in support of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to develop a medium-term strategy for the four years following independence. SCR/S also sent a planning team to Afghanistan in support of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the US Embassy in Kabul. For S/CRS Afghanistan represented the largest deployment of about 20 staff who helped with the 2009 presidential elections and work on strategic-military planning. S/CRS also conducted inter-agency planning for operations in Sudan and Haiti. While financial resources gradually increased, S/CRS did not assume the lead in civilian coordination tasks. With civilian elements already in place on the ground, activities had to rely on the buy-in from other State Department bureaus and agencies. Such buy-in increased over time – but its continuation depends on CSO remaining active, and working effectively with others, inside and outside the US government, on a sustainable and repeated basis.

The upgrading from S/CRS into CSO through the QDDR has given CSO a more sustainable and stable footing – in both institutional and budgetary terms – from which to engage in bureaucratic and institutional coordination; although some of the original ambitions have been downshifted and changed. This attests to a shift in emphasis on prevention and coordination but is also a function of lessons learned from the first years of S/CRS and now CSO.

The current mission is to ‘break cycles of violent conflict and mitigate crises in priority countries’ through mobilising ‘partners and leveraging resources for governments and their citizens to address the causes of destabilizing violence (…) through research and analysis, strategic planning, coordinated action and catalytic change’. The idea is that CSO focuses on countries and operations where it can demonstrate results within a year and hand over to other parts of the bureaucracy after 18 months, having kick-started engagement in a particular country. Essentially, CSO has morphed into a conflict analysis think tank as well as early assessment/impact provider to anticipate and intervene – which, given the experience of the past near-decade, represents a more realistic approach.

Still, the work undertaken by CSO fills an important gap in US capabilities. To date, its main tasks have evolved to encompass research and analysis to identify ways to address causes of conflict; to plan and design rapid-response strategies and inter-agency plans; and the coordination of mobilising partners inside and outside government. In its task of coordination CSO is to act as a ‘force multiplier’ rather
The US: a ‘smart power’ approach

than to duplicate efforts undertaken elsewhere – essentially, a coordination agency at the centre of individual reconstruction efforts that can lead planning but also integrate the individual elements and make them work together in Washington and in the field.

To this end, CSO has developed criteria for engagement that include strategic impact and relevance to national security priorities, but also leveraging local ownership and partnerships. It places emphasis also on partnership with non-traditional and non-state actors - that is, civil society groups and NGOs that can liaise and report on conditions on the ground – as well as the provision of conflict analysis.

Currently CSO operates in conflict countries ranging from Afghanistan, El Salvador, Libya and South Sudan. Priority areas in 2013 were Syria, Central America and Burma, but also support for government and civil society in Kenya during the preparation and conduct of the March 2013 elections. Specific activities have included support for and training of Syrian activists or the deployment of rule-of-law experts and mediation trainers in Honduras to tackle growing violence and instability due to transnational criminal organisations.

The Civilian Response Network

An investment in civilian capabilities represented a second area of emphasis when it came to upgrading civilian structures and resources under the ownership of the US State Department. In the US it is state and local authorities rather than the federal government that oversee justice and law enforcement functions and that ‘own’ relevant personnel. This means that US federal agencies do not have at their disposal a reservoir of trained and experienced experts for specific civilian peacebuilding tasks that involve policing and aspects of the rule of law, or expertise that is exclusively found at the state level. The US does second federal staff (of which there are limited numbers), which creates gaps in capabilities in Washington – and engenders the challenge of timely secondment and career re-entry. And, although various US agencies have staff with international experience, not all of this is appropriate to a post-conflict setting or reflects organisational needs for individual peacebuilding tasks. To make up for this gap the US also relies on private contractors to carry out various civilian peacebuilding tasks. The drawback of this approach is that US government agencies do not acquire or retain institutional knowledge, and this reinforces the lack of institutional capacity to undertake fully-fledged civilian operations.

Despite the commitment to invest in civilian capabilities that began under the second Bush administration, the US has faced challenges when it came to building and coordinating capabilities. This applied in particular to the creation of a roster of adequately trained and readily deployable experts that could complement the customary reliance on contractors for large-scale civilian deployments. While such engagement remains ongoing it has suffered both from organisational hurdles
and limited funding available for this particular aspect of peacebuilding. As with CSO, original ambitions have been adjusted over the past decade and now centre on the Civilian Response Network (CRN) of federal capabilities as well as those of partner organisations.

Like S/CRS, the idea of a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) – the predecessor of what has now become CRN – originated under the Bush administration and enjoyed considerable backing from the Pentagon. The idea of a CRC was initially proposed within the DoD in the run-up to NSPD-44, and in the 2007 State of the Union Address then President Bush called for a Civilian Response Corps that ‘would shoulder the responsibility to work with states recovering from conflict and instability’.

Congressional funding was first requested in FY07 but it was not until 2008 that the hiring of 100 personnel for an active and 500 for a standby component was made possible. The 2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act allocated $65 million to the State Department and USAID for the Civilian Response Corps to begin building a 250-member active component and a 2,000 member standby component. A third, reserve component was to include personnel from ‘the private sector and state and local government who have unique skills not found in the federal government’. The Corps was designed to deploy at 48-hour notice, to foster coordination across all relevant agencies in the earliest phases of deployment, to promote coordination with existing efforts and to provide support to US Embassies and State Department Bureaus to assess, plan and carry out operations. By the end of 2010 the active and the standby component had been funded and established; and the overall ranks of the CRC numbered around 1,200. The majority of Corps members came from the Department of State, Department of Justice and USAID.

The QDDR called for replacing the reserve component with an ‘Expert Corps’ that would consist of an active roster of technical experts, willing but not obligated to deploy to critical conflict zones and ‘well-suited to smaller-scale complex crises as well as large-scale US operations’. This recommendation reflected the negative effects of financial restrictions on the creation of US capacity to identify, train and deploy civilian personnel.

Current efforts to develop civilian expertise do not rely on stand-by forces but rather on the CRN that connects and draws on existing expertise within federal structures and beyond. USAID is the biggest partner in CRN, although other departments (from the J-family and elsewhere) participate as well. CSO has also expanded the existing model of response from government experts to include networks of experts from outside the government, international partners but also local partners. This reflects the increasing emphasis on fostering locally-driven initiatives that rely on civil society, the media, community leaders as well as government. The focus as well as allocation of financial resources has thus shifted from relying on a roster of stand-by experts to the ability to jump-start projects with local partners when needed.
Where next? The State Department under Obama II

Civilian peacebuilding capabilities and an investment in State Department structures have come a long way; and the US has drawn institutional lessons from the operational and institutional experience of the past near-decade so as to improve upon existing structures. Despite the continued emphasis on the value of conflict prevention and some bureaucratic restructuring, CSO has not yet fully bedded in State Department structures, nor has there been a corresponding recognition of its added value.

The consensus in favour of civilian capabilities, and the emphasis within the State Department on functional tasks rather than merely geographic focus, has carried over from the Bush to the Obama administration – and the institutional changes initiated during the first to the second Obama administration. But within the State Department, current structures face two hurdles: that of gathering bureaucratic support, including personnel appointments; and that of a continued emphasis on moving existing capabilities further in light of other, pressing priorities. By necessity – given that the current strategic and financial environment is likely to remain volatile – doing more with less and relying on civilian rather than military instruments will remain a paramount concern.

The protracted economic downturn, overall strategic US repositioning towards Asia and political attention that focuses on the crises of the day – including Syria, Egypt and Iran – has cast doubt on the future trajectory of civilian capabilities. Secretary of State Kerry’s priorities to date have focused on traditional conflicts – particularly the Middle East – and diplomatic engagement in pursuit of conflict settlements. An overall lengthy appointment process across the US government has meant that, at the end of the first year of the second Obama administration, several positions in the State Department have not yet been filled.

For CSO and civilian efforts more generally, the current period has been one of bureaucratic entrepreneurship where commitment to civilian capacity can be deepened. When it comes to the J-family more broadly, its functions are likely to remain a fixture on the political menu. Still, by December 2013 the appointment process for the position of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights had not yet been fully completed, although a Senate confirmation hearing of Sarah Sewall, the nominee for this position, was held in November 2013. This means that there remains space for individual bureaus – and bureaucratic actors – to consolidate and prove their worth, but equally that their standing could be downshifted over the course of the current administration. There is no indication of a shift in preferences when it comes to strengthening diplomatic and development tools. But continuing to set priorities elsewhere – and not actively championing fledgling conflict prevention and peacebuilding instruments – could result in an overall loss of standing of these capabilities in the long term.
Conclusion

The past decade has seen a significant engagement on the part of the US with the creation of civilian capabilities and bureaucratic structures that can facilitate the coordination of tasks when it comes to peacebuilding. In its focus on conflict prevention and the identification of conflict drivers, but also efforts at strengthening functional rather than geographic structures such as CSO, the US has demonstrated an ongoing commitment to its peacebuilding capacities.

The increasing focus on conflict prevention and institutional changes within the State Department signals a move away from the emphasis on military contributions to post-conflict reconstruction. Both resonate with the EU’s approach, and suggest that there could be increasing scope for EU-US cooperation on conflict prevention and dealing with complex crises in the future, given that these represent areas of engagement where EU and US approaches overlap and can complement one another.
Chapter 4

EU-US trajectories: increasing cooperation

The EU and the US have both drawn similar strategic, institutional and operational lessons from complex crisis and reconstruction challenges over the past decade. This has led to an increasing emphasis on peacebuilding tasks and institutional reform to facilitate policy implementation. Both partners increasingly focus on conflict prevention and long-term institutional reform in pursuit of sustainable peace. Each side has conducted internal reviews on how to align security and development instruments, has made institutional changes to facilitate coordination and has strengthened functional capacities. Both Brussels and Washington also highlight the need to work with a multitude of stakeholders through their respective emphasis on building international partnerships.

This growing alignment of views allows for operational synergies in functional and geographic areas where both engage that include and go beyond existing arrangements for institutionalised cooperation. Progress on coordinated EU-US peacebuilding has taken place through the institutionalisation of cooperation on aspects of conflict prevention and crisis management. Framework agreements have been concluded between Brussels and Washington that permit the sharing of information, frequent exchanges between officials and, more recently, the US contributing personnel to civilian CSDP missions. Beyond existing institutional frameworks the EU and US increasingly also work alongside one another in conflict areas such as the Horn of Africa where both engage through military and civilian means. Finally, the nascent security-development dialogue is designed to bring together relevant actors and expertise from the two spheres. Such deepening cooperation and coordination means that EU-US cooperation increasingly transcends traditional institutional frameworks.

EU-US assets compared

At the same time, the trajectories of EU-US peacebuilding policies do not fully converge: whereas the EU continues to invest in civilian capabilities through member state commitments to CSDP but also in coordination of instruments within the EEAS, the US is focusing on early warning and conflict prevention but has moved away from civil-military coordination and building up civilian capabilities. Finally,
the locus of functional expertise related to peacebuilding remains spread among different agencies, even within bureaucracies; and, in the case of the US, without a concurrent push for overall coordination – as increasing interest and political investment in the UN as a platform for international engagement suggests.

A comparison of respective EU-US approaches and capabilities reveals significant scope for cooperation and synergies.

Table 4: EU-US approaches

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>US</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Guiding principle</strong></td>
<td>Comprehensive approach</td>
<td>Whole-of-government approach</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Smart power</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian capabilities</strong></td>
<td>Personnel drawn from member states (and participating 3rd countries)</td>
<td>Personnel drawn from federal structures, contractors or local and international partners</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SSR/CRT pools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functional structures</strong></td>
<td>EEAS Crisis Management Structures and Functional Directorates</td>
<td>US State Department, in particular CSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pentagon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional emphasis</strong></td>
<td>Early warning, conflict analysis, coordination, security-development nexus, CSDP missions and operations</td>
<td>Early warning, conflict analysis and prevention, rapid response and interagency coordination (US State Department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil-military partnerships (DOD)</td>
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## Financial resources (2013 figures)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CFSP budget: €9.6 billion</th>
<th>State Department Foreign Operations budget: $54.7 billion</th>
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<td>Of which:</td>
<td>Of which:</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP budget: €400 million</td>
<td>Conflict Stabilisation Operations: $56.5 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Instrument for Stability: €300 million</td>
<td>USAID: $1.53 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid: €900 million</td>
<td>International Organisations: $3.7 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument: €2.6 billion</td>
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Between the two sides there is considerable synergy that can be exploited: civilian capabilities, although they do not fully overlap, are complementary. Both sides have also begun to focus their attention and invest in similar areas: that is, early warning and prevention, as well as coordination of functional and geographic elements.

### Respective strengths – and gaps

A comparison of EU and US approaches – along the lines of capabilities, money spent and internal coordination efforts – further highlights respective strengths. When it comes to the type of capabilities, the EU is in the lead, particularly when it comes to policing but also with regard to the rule of law more broadly. Due to its federal structure the State Department cannot call upon police staff the way the EU can, which means the EU has a unique transatlantic advantage. The Pentagon can draw on civilian expertise through the National Guard, but the civilian training tasks required are generally of a different nature than those of the EU or what the US civilian side aims to accomplish. The US has largely abandoned efforts to create a roster, or build up the civilian response corps and this indicates a structural advantage for the EU when it comes to ‘in-house’ capabilities.

In financial terms, the US has the advantage when seen in the overall context of the 3Ds and security-defence spending – given that the budget request for defence in 2013 stood at $613.9 billion. However, when comparing the CFSP budget to that of the US State Department in terms of money allocated for civilian peacebuilding activities and development, Brussels does measure up. The EU spends more on its CFSP proper than the US does on CSO – and this is not counting individual
member state commitments to peacebuilding that could reinforce EU efforts. Similarly, the EU’s Development budget far outstrips that of USAID. That said, the US’s commitment of $3.7 billion to international organisations indicates that Washington pursues peacebuilding also through other channels – although, given the EU’s focus on its partnership with the UN, this does not have to run counter to EU-US cooperation and conceptual synergies.

There are, then, significant overlaps and similarities between EU and US approaches and both Brussels and Washington face challenges when it comes to hiring and training, but also rapidly deploying, civilian personnel. The US has made great strides in developing coordination mechanisms particularly within the State Department, but there remains the need for greater institutional buy-in but also inter-agency coordination that can sometimes be difficult. As a result, relevant expertise remains located in various agencies and parts of the bureaucracy. The EU, by contrast, has most instruments within its own structures and has invested heavily in coordination within and among EU instruments – but faces challenges of duplication of structures and mechanisms.

**Formal EU-US institutional cooperation**

These assets are increasingly put to use through institutionalised EU-US coordination frameworks and parameters. Formalised cooperation between Brussels and Washington has steadily expanded and includes exchange of information and of best practices, as well as US contribution to EU crisis missions. As the table opposite shows, with the exception of the nascent Security-Development Dialogue, these agreements and mechanisms pre-date the set-up of the EEAS – but all reflect the increasing convergence of strategic aims and institutional/organisational change.

The expanding scope of cooperation is embedded in the broader framework of transatlantic – understood as EU-US – cooperation that was gradually established following the end of the Cold War and that was further strengthened in the aftermath of 9/11 and shifting security priorities that came to focus on homeland security and post-conflict reconstruction. A growing EU profile in international but also internal security and corresponding shifts in US perception as to the value of EU-US cooperation in the light of shifting priorities resulted in an increasing diplomatic and operational investment on the part of the US.
Table 5: EU-US institutional cooperation mechanisms

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Year of Adoption</th>
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<tr>
<td>Security agreement</td>
<td>Facilitates exchange of classified information</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework agreement</td>
<td>US participation in EU CSDP missions</td>
<td>2011</td>
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Direct EU-US security cooperation was hampered by tensions in the EU-NATO relationship and the reluctance to acknowledge the EU as not merely a civilian but also a civil-military and eventually also military-security actor. For the US, a growing interest in civilian reconstruction also came to influence Washington's relationship with international institutions, including the EU. Rather than viewing CSDP as competition to NATO, US officials came to regard it as potential value added – and as a result, cooperation between the US and the EU in security policy moved into focus.

In December 2007 the two sides agreed on the Work Plan for US-EU Technical Dialogue and Increased Cooperation in Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention. Intended to create a relationship to develop and improve respective EU and US approaches, the Work Plan identified several areas for cooperation that have since been put into practice. Following the 2008 signature of a security agreement on the exchange of classified information, the two sides exchange country watch lists and can jointly consider a range of options, including the coordination of responses. A second area of cooperation concerns an exchange of best practices, lessons learned and planning exercises as a means to progress towards further cooperation.

The 2007 Work Plan represented a solid basis for cooperation, but there was a clear sense that more can be done to improve coordination and cooperation. The Belgian EU Presidency during the second half of 2010 – when the EEAS was not yet in place – subsequently witnessed progress towards a Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Crisis Management that would take coordination and cooperation further, and that was designed to add impetus to the debates taking place at the EU
level. A review of achievements also highlighted several areas of further exploration in US-EU cooperation in crisis management. The ongoing EU-US dialogue was generally judged productive, and crisis management missions were to continue to provide real-world opportunities for operational coordination. At the same time, there was a clearly perceived need for more strategic dialogue in the pre-conflict state – specifically collaboration on conflict prevention and mission planning.

Further suggestions for cooperation included an exchange of civilian crisis management planners; exploring the interoperability of planning and assessment tools; initiating a dialogue on crisis prevention; and observing and participating in pre-deployment training programmes. Finally, building the capacity of third parties, including the African Union and the United Nations itself, constitutes an additional focal area for transatlantic cooperation. Several other areas of potential intensified cooperation were identified, including the exchange of staff, and the US contributing to current and future EU missions.

**Increasing the scope of cooperation**

The 2011 Framework Agreement on the participation of the US in EU CSDP operations provides a legal framework for US civilians to participate in EU crisis management missions. It represents the culmination of a process of arriving at the exact parameters of EU-US cooperation in (civilian) crisis management and eliminates the need to negotiate separate agreements for future US participation in individual EU missions – such as earlier US participation in EULEX Kosovo and EUSEC RD Congo, which relied on ad hoc arrangements.

Secondment is not reciprocal but solely concerns US participation in CSDP missions: the 2011 agreement subsequently focuses on ‘contributions of civilian personnel, units, and assets by the United States to EU crisis management operations’. The agreement signals the willingness on the part of the US to generally support and participate in individual EU missions where there is an overlap of goals and where the US possesses relevant expertise. The future scope of US participation in CSDP missions depends to a large extent on the EU and its capacity and willingness to launch future civilian missions – and on a fit between US and EU mission objectives as well as available and suitable personnel.

These developments point towards an increasing willingness and ability to cooperate – as attested by diminishing political reservations as well as enhanced operational capacities and experiences. Since the creation of the EEAS and the increased importance placed on connections between security and development – including cooperation between respective bureaucratic structures – EU-US cooperation has further expanded to include the Security-Development Dialogue. Mandated at the 2010 EU-US summit, it was launched in January 2012 and brings together relevant actors from EU structures (namely the EEAS, DEVCO, and ECHO) and the US (CSO, USAID and DoD) to explore mutual approaches and discuss crisis areas of mutual concern. This initiative is supplemented by case-by-case interaction among officials on both sides of the Atlantic.
While the scope of EU-US cooperation has significantly broadened as a result of institutional changes and shifting security challenges, there remain some potential limitations to formal EU-US cooperation in peacebuilding as a result of the institutional constraints inherent in the EU-NATO relationship. NATO’s intention, voiced at the 2010 Lisbon summit, to develop its own civilian capabilities presents added potential for transatlantic cooperation but also for friction between and within NATO and the EU. Beyond overlapping capabilities, existing restrictions in the EU-NATO relationship can impact on EU-US cooperation in peacebuilding. While regular exchanges between the EU and NATO take place, cooperation at present is reduced to cooperation on the ground and at the tactical level. While the growing focus on working with partners specifically in the context of a more pragmatic stance on the EU-NATO relationship technically bodes well for increasing cooperation, the formal restrictions inherent in the relationship could continue to limit EU-US cooperation in practice.

Conclusion

The growing international consensus around peacebuilding generally strengthens the legitimacy of bilateral efforts, and provides a conceptual framework under which to structure strategic considerations. This consensus also requires an increasing focus on ‘whole-of-government’ or ‘comprehensive’ approaches as well as debates over the calibration of development and security aims and instruments. Both Brussels and Washington have engaged with these issues, and reached similar conclusions, although bureaucratic and operational innovations have been filtered through respective national strategic and institutional cultures.

Given the increasing engagement not just with the changing security environment but also instruments and capabilities needed to conduct peacebuilding, the present strategic juncture represents an opportunity – as well as a necessity – to further explore respective approaches and modes of cooperation.

EU-US cooperation can be further institutionalised by continued commitment to cooperation at the strategic level, complemented by an increase in cooperation and coordination at the working level so as to engage all relevant stakeholders in the two political systems. This ensures that both sides continue to align their instruments; and ensure sufficient awareness of respective approaches but also institutional capacity that facilitates cooperation. In addition, case-by-case and situation-dependent encounters and coordination serve to ensure that EU and US officials increase their level of familiarity with the institutional structures of their counterparts but also modes of crisis response and peacebuilding structures.

These general recommendations presuppose that both sides continue to pursue peacebuilding and the civilian dimension of post-conflict reconstruction and aim to strengthen their existing capabilities. The current economic and political
Peacebuilding in 3D: EU and US approaches

climate, which may result in further financial cutbacks on the part of the US and a further contraction of EU capabilities, presents a risk that the gains made over the past decade may not be preserved. Sustained political leadership, but also continued engagement on the part of the various stakeholders in the EU and the US, remains an indispensable element for the future institutionalisation of peacebuilding capabilities as well as EU-US cooperation in pursuit of common goals.
Annex

Abbreviations

AMM  Aceh Monitoring Mission
CAR  Central African Republic
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHG  Civilian Headline Goal
CMB  Crisis Management Board
CMPD  Crisis Management Planning Directorate
CPCC  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CRC  Civilian Response Corps
CRN  Civilian Response Network
CRS  Crisis Response System
CRT  Civilian Response Team
CSDP  Common Security and Defence Policy
CSI  Civilian Stabilisation Initiative
CSO  Bureau of Conflict and Stability Operations
DCHA  Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
DDR  Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DG  Directorate General
DoD  Department of Defense
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid &amp; Civil Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<tr>
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<td>High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission</td>
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