



THE CSDP IN 2020

The EU's legacy and
ambition in security
and defence

Edited by
Daniel Fiott

With contributions from

Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Giovanni Faleg, Ana E. Juncos,
Gustav Lindstrom, Claudia Major, Jean-Pierre Maulny,
Christian Mölling, Roderick Parkes, Pedro Serrano and Dick Zandee

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Executive Summary

‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free’. The opening line of the 2003 European Security Strategy rings rather hollow today. Following a financial crisis in 2008, Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 and concerns about the political integrity of the EU, Europeans are having to accept the reality of a vastly deteriorating security landscape. Not only is Europe beset by security challenges near its borders, but structural – geopolitical – shifts are forcing the Union to question and reassess long-standing partnerships. Since the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU and the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States in 2016, European leaders have had to grapple with the challenge of maintaining European political unity, ensuring that the transatlantic relationship remains on an even keel and building up European security and defence. The EU Global Strategy of 2016 is therefore much nearer the mark when it states that ‘we live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union’.

In response to the challenges it faces, the EU and its member states have invested in a range of policy mechanisms that are designed to pull governments closer together on defence. While it is certainly true that there is nothing comparable in the history of EU security and defence to the hyperactivity that has been observed in this domain since 2016, the reality today is that the ‘alphabet soup’ of EU security and defence – CSDP, PESCO, EDF, CARD, CDP, MPCC, NIPs, EPF, etc. – has not yet led to any tangible shift in the Union’s capability base or readiness for deployment. The expectations for EU security and defence have perhaps never been higher, but neither has the risk that the EU fails to deliver. Expectations certainly have to be put into perspective and there is a danger that developments under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since 1999 may be overshadowed by the steps taken in the past few years. Without an appreciation of the historical evolution of EU security and defence since 1999, it is hard to put recent initiatives into perspective.

Indeed, after 20 years of the CSDP it is possible to draw a range of conclusions, including the fact that with 34 current and past missions and operations (and another two likely in 2020) the EU has clearly proven its ability to deploy civilian and military instruments. What is more, since 1999 the Union’s

institutions have displayed their ability to plan for and conduct civilian and military CSDP missions and operations. In some cases, such as the ongoing naval operation off the Horn of Africa or the military operation sent to Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008, the EU has chalked up some notable operational successes. In other cases, it has been difficult to pinpoint the EU's contribution to security even though the EU continues to fine-tune its comprehensive and integrated approaches to crisis management.

Yet, the past 20 years of CSDP have also surely taught us more about the EU as a security and defence actor. First, the sometimes agonising lack of political unity or will that exists to deploy missions and operations continues to frustrate, despite the very clear need to bolster the EU's footprint in regions such as the Sahel and the Mediterranean. What is more, even when EU member states have politically agreed to deploy a CSDP mission or operation, this is not always supported with a credible pool of experts or force package. Second, the CSDP today has not entirely lived up to the ambitions set down by European ministers at Helsinki in December 1999. In fact, over the past 20 years we could arguably show how European governments have collectively invested in non-EU frameworks such as NATO or more bilateral and mini-lateral endeavours, rather than engage in defence cooperation with other EU member states through CSDP. Conversely, the CSDP may have been overtaken by the geopolitical realities that have developed over the past two decades. Therefore, it is perhaps worth asking whether CSDP has outgrown the 'crisis management' paradigm and evolved into something altogether broader. There are other significant questions, such as how EU security and defence has become an important part of the EU integration process and why it might be used by certain governments to hedge against a challenging transatlantic relationship and uncertain future for NATO.

In this book, we tackle such questions and more besides, but through a wider definition of the CSDP. Instead of merely analysing the EU's civilian and military missions and operations, this volume is additionally interested in looking at how the security environment facing the EU has evolved and how this might effect CSDP; whether the Policy has led to any discernible improvement in European military and civilian capabilities; and what effect CSDP might have had on Europe's defence industry. Each of the EUISS analysts, leading think tank and academic representatives and senior policymakers that have contributed to this book have been driven by a desire to assess the first 20 years of civilian and military CSDP and to probe the extent to which the Policy can be re-framed in the coming years. To this end, part one of the book contains five chapters that look back at the military, civilian and industrial

legacy of the CSDP since 1999. In part two, five further chapters look forward and weigh up the costs of inaction for EU security and defence, while detailing some of the security and political challenges that CSDP will face in the coming years and decades.

Introduction

DANIEL FIOTT

20 years ago, on 10–11 December 1999, European leaders met in Helsinki to sketch out the capabilities and institutions they thought were needed for the CSDP that they had launched six months earlier at the Cologne European Council. The 1999 Helsinki meeting underlined European leaders’ ‘determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises’.¹ More specifically, the European Council decided that the EU’s level of ambition on defence should be set at an ability to deploy up to 50,000–60,000 personnel within 60 days, and to sustain this deployment for up to a year, by 2003. By the time the Nice European Council convened in December 2000, key CSDP institutions² were formally established and in 2003 the EU started to undertake missions and operations, as well as operationalising the EU Battlegroups by 2004. To this day, however, the ambition set at Helsinki (the ‘Headline Goal’) has never been fulfilled – even though it remains a target that has not been altered or lowered by European leaders.

Of course, in 2020, similar questions about the EU’s level of ambition for security and defence dominate deliberations about the CSDP. Under the Croatian Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2020, leaders and ministers are still debating how to ensure that the Union can deploy military and civilian assets as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and how the CSDP can facilitate greater EU strategic autonomy in security and defence. Since the publication of the EU Global Strategy, a raft of new structures and capacities

1 European Council, “Presidency Conclusions: Helsinki European Council”, December 10–11, 1999, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/europeanCouncil/pdf/hel_en.pdf.

2 The Nice European Council formally established the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) but leaders had already called for their creation at the Cologne European Council in June 1999.

has been put in place. On the one hand, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) are designed to enhance capability development and the coordination of national defence planning. On the other, the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) provides for more streamlined command and control for CSDP military missions and operations, whereas the Civilian CSDP Compact binds member states to a set of commitments that are designed to improve the responsiveness of the EU's civilian capacities. Despite the introduction of these ambitious initiatives since 2016, however, there have been recurrent debates since then about whether the EU is an autonomous security and defence actor or not. In fact, even a cursory look back over the past 20 years can lead us to question whether the EU has in fact become more capable and more responsible in this domain. Answering this question depends on how we benchmark 'success' in relation to CSDP – whether it is evaluated as a tool for crisis management or as an instrument for power.

For some, the Union has already emerged as a credible and effective crisis manager.³ Since its first deployment to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003,⁴ the Union has gone on to launch 34 missions and operations⁵ to 21 different countries and regions. Accordingly, the Union has deployed force and civilian expertise using its own autonomous decision-making bodies and its own resources. As a result, CSDP has led to tangible differences in the countries and regions where missions and operations have been deployed. While we must recognise that there is no exact science to measuring the tangible effects of the CSDP, we can point to instances where the EU's fusion of civilian and military tools have positively contributed to security. Take, for example, the Union's efforts in the Horn of Africa, where the combination of an anti-piracy naval operation and civilian capacity-building and military training missions have led to the re-opening of commercial shipping lines and food aid deliveries in the Indian Ocean. In this regard, since 2009, EU naval action has led to the protection of some 485 World Food Programme (WFP) and 140 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) vessels, in turn resulting in the safe delivery of

3 See, for example, Thierry Tardy, "CSDP in Action: What Contribution to International Security?", *EUISS Chaillot Paper* no. 134, May 2015.

4 EU Police Mission Bosnia and Herzegovina was deployed on 1 January 2003 and it was the first mission conducted under the European Security and Defence Policy.

5 This number excludes the EU's Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, as this mission is not managed by CSDP structures.

1,890,612 metric tonnes of food by the WFP to Somalia.⁶ This comprehensive approach to security and defence – fusing civil and military tools – is a hallmark of the Union's strategy against instability.

There are far fewer military CSDP missions and operations today than at the inception of the CSDP.

This ability has only been possible because of successive evolutions in the EU's institutional architecture since 1999 and the pooling of member state capabilities, personnel and resources. Having already established the post of High Representative for the CFSP under the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, the Cologne European Council in the same year developed the 'Berlin

Plus arrangements', which were designed to give the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities under specific conditions. What is more, in Cologne leaders recognised the need for the creation of politico-military bodies like the Political and Security Committee (PSC), EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS), as well as underlining the importance of pre-existing agencies, such as the EU Satellite Centre (SatCen) and the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). The first EU military Headline Goal was set at Helsinki in 1999, and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was declared operational in 2001 during the Laeken European Council. However, the Headline Goal was quickly revised at the Brussels European Council in 2004, which included further work on the creation of EU Battlegroups⁷ and a call to ensure their full operational readiness by 2007. This aspiration was bolstered by the positive experiences of having deployed the EU's largest military operation in December 2004 – EUFOR *Althea* saw some 7,000 troops deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure compliance with the Dayton/Paris Agreement.

Developments in civilian CSDP have also contributed to the Union's autonomy in security and defence. In 2000, the Union set its first Civilian Headline Goal at the Feira European Council in Portugal: the goal stipulated that the EU should be able to deploy 5,000 police officers within 30 days – 1,000 of these officers would need to be on high readiness. The Gothenburg European Council in 2001 built on Feira by stating that by 2003 the Union should also be able to deploy 200 judges and prosecutors and up to 2,000 civil protection personnel

6 EUNAVFOR Atalanta, "Key Facts and Figures", <https://eunavfor.eu/>.

7 EU Battlegroups are rapidly deployable forces of approximately 1,500 troops that are placed on a six-month rotational standby.

at very short notice. Having largely met these targets by 2004, new Civilian Headline Goals were respectively set for 2008 and 2010 that called for additional experts on dialogue, conflict analysis, civil response and transnational dialogue. The EU's readiness in civilian terms was underlined in February 2008 with the deployment of EULEX Kosovo, the Union's largest civilian mission to date, which has overseen capability building for the rule of law and the training of police, judges, customs officials and civil administrators.

Despite these developments, however, it is important to recognise that there are far fewer military CSDP missions and operations today than at the inception of the CSDP – today there are 6 ongoing military CSDP deployments and 10 civilian missions (although another civilian mission is planned for 2020). This fact illustrates both the relative efficiency with which the Union can deploy civilian missions and EU member states' continued reservations about deploying military force in a CSDP framework. Even with the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003, the creation of a common financing mechanism in 2004 (the 'Athena Mechanism') and the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, this situation has not changed.

For others, however, and regardless of its record in crisis management, the CSDP has become a tool that does not entirely fit the geopolitical pressures Europe faces today.⁸ This much higher benchmark argues that the so-called Petersberg Tasks defined by European leaders in June 1992 under the then Western European Union (WEU), and later incorporated into and expanded by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009,⁹ are a product of a bygone era that saw unrivalled American power after 1991 give rise to an overwhelming desire to correct the ills of globalisation.¹⁰ Perhaps this viewpoint unfairly glosses over the continued instability in places such as the Sahel – areas of Europe's wider neighbourhood that can be intensely violent and not as easy to remedy as the label 'crisis management'

The impetus behind the CSDP followed Europe's helplessness in dealing resolutely with the Balkan crisis during the 1990s.

⁸ See, for example, Margriet Drent and Dick Zandee, "After the EUGS: Mainstreaming a New CSDP", *EUISS Alert*, no. 34, July 2016; Adrian Hyde-Price, "The Common Security and Defence Policy", in Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss (eds.), *The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 392–406.

⁹ The Petersberg Tasks initially included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, but, once incorporated under Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks and post-conflict stabilisation tasks were added.

¹⁰ Luis Simón, "CSDP, Strategy and Crisis Management: Out of Area or Out of Business?", *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 47, no. 3 (2012), pp. 100–115.


may sometimes imply. Nevertheless, this view holds that the real security dilemma facing Europe is not instability near the EU's borders but rather the tectonic shifts underway in international politics – indeed, regional instability can be directly attributed to these shifts in certain instances (e.g. Russia's seizure of Crimea).

More concretely, when CSDP is weighed against the Trump presidency, the rise of China and a crumbling multilateral order, it cannot help but disappoint. Although this is an unfair metric of CSDP's importance, given the specific treaty provisions governing the policy and the fact that it has not been set up to deal with global geopolitical competition, the argument invariably comes from an understandable perspective: one that wants to see the EU secure its values and interests in a world where old partners and new powers cannot be relied upon. To paraphrase Lord Palmerston, while the EU may be starting to realise it has no eternal allies or perpetual enemies, the difficulty the EU faces in defining eternal and perpetual interests – and in unison too – all too often undercuts CFSP and, by extension, CSDP. Numerous past and recent examples highlight the occasionally flimsy common interests the CSDP is supposed to help secure (e.g. Libya and Syria in 2011). Under this view, any claim to EU strategic autonomy rings hollow because the Union remains politically divided and not militarily capable of deploying force.¹¹

Yet we are perhaps prone to forgetting the similarities with the past. The impetus behind the CSDP followed Europe's helplessness in dealing resolutely with the Balkan crisis during the 1990s. The United States had to step in while Europe was grandstanding about its 'hour' in history. Again, in 2003, American action in Iraq split Europe, but there was no realistic way at that point in time that the CSDP could replace the US as the key guarantor of security in Europe. Admittedly, however, there is something very different about the political landscape today when compared to the 1990s. Today, arms control is fading in Europe due to the tearing up of the INF Treaty, US President Trump has rhetorically undermined some of NATO's core precepts such as Article 5, Russia is again an antagonist in Eastern Europe and in places like Syria, China's rise is testing Europe's position in the world and Brexit means that one half of the duo that signed the St Malo Declaration in 1998 is leaving the Union behind – and taking its capabilities with it.

11 For in-depth analysis on the concept of 'strategic autonomy' in defence see Daniel Fiott, "Strategic Autonomy: Towards 'European Sovereignty' in Defence?", *EUISS Brief*, no. 12, November 2018; Sven Biscop, "Fighting for Europe: European Strategic Autonomy and the Use of Force", *Egmont Paper*, no. 103, January 2019.

Share of missions/operations



Data: European External Action Service, 2019

Within this challenging context, discussions about the EU’s level of ambition on security and defence re-emerged in 2016 with the EU Global Strategy. Not only did this strategy take stock of a rapidly deteriorating security environment for Europe, it was also keen to lay the foundations for a further step forward in the story of the CSDP. Accordingly, the strategy broadened the EU’s level of ambition beyond crisis management and capacity building to also include a thought-provoking concept called ‘Protecting Europe’, which was designed to address issues such as hybrid threats, cybersecurity, border management and other challenges that sit along the internal-external security nexus.

What is more, the EU Global Strategy and its specific follow-on implementation plan on security and defence introduced new initiatives designed to enhance defence planning and military command and control at the EU level. It also dusted off provisions buried in the treaties to ensure that willing and able member states embark on PESCO in defence based on binding commitments related to operations and capabilities. Additionally, looking at the rather woeful increase in defence capabilities in the EU since 1999, the European Commission entered the fray with the creation of a European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2017. With a view to providing financial incentives for cooperative defence capability development, the Commission’s defence action plan in 2016 sought to inject a dose of communitarianism into a hitherto intergovernmental domain. With the rapid development of new military technologies and questions about the industrial competitiveness of Europe’s defence producers, the Fund has raised further questions about the nature of the CSDP.

In this regard, it can be observed that new developments such as the EDF have broadened discussions about EU security and defence beyond the strict confines of the CSDP. Although the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) calls for EU member states to progressively improve their military capabilities and strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) through the European Defence Agency (EDA), the presence of the European Commission in defence matters raises questions about CSDP.¹² Overall, while CSDP still remains an intergovernmental governance arena where member state governments dictate the pace of defence integration through consensus and compromise, the Commission now offers a more communitarian path for defence capability development which potentially offers a way through the deadlock that can arise as a result of intergovernmentalism. Thus, through the Fund the Commission is able to invest in defence technologies and capabilities and this could have a bearing on how we view CSDP – not least because the Union could invest in defence capabilities that are applicable beyond the strict confines of crisis management.

With one eye on the past 20 years and the other on the future, this book seeks to answer two questions. First, how should we assess the first 20 years of civilian and military CSDP? Taking a broader look to include military capability development and defence-industrial matters in addition to CSDP missions and operations, the volume offers readers an in-depth historical account that puts the policy in context and charts the major successes and failures of EU action in security and defence. Second, this book looks to the future to ascertain how experts and analysts discern a possible evolution in the way the CSDP is framed and deployed. In this respect, the book outlines major political, technological and security trends that could affect how Europe sees the CSDP.

To this end, the book is divided into two main parts: five chapters look backwards, the other five look forward. In part one, we begin with a reflection by Pedro Serrano who, as a senior official intimately engaged in the development of CSDP over many years, shares a personal reflection on what has been achieved and what the future possibly holds for CSDP. Claudia Major and Christian Mölling look at the military legacy of the CSDP and draw the conclusion that, with the exception of relatively small-scale deployments, the EU has not lived up to its stated military level of ambition. This is complemented by a chapter by Dick Zandee who looks at the legacy of capability development


12 See Article 42.3 TEU.

under the CSDP and notes how there have been only a few success stories of EU capability development. Building on this analysis is a chapter by Lucie Béraud-Sudreau who focuses on the defence-industrial legacy and how EU policy has affected the development of a vital part of the CSDP: the EDTIB. Finally, Ana Juncos rounds off part one by focusing on the civilian CSDP legacy. She shows how, despite lagging behind on civilian capabilities, and serious questions about the changing international security landscape, the EU has used civilian CSDP to promote itself as a normative foreign policy actor.

Part two of the book begins with a chapter by Gustav Lindstrom which frames the emerging security challenges that may affect the CSDP in the future. The author shows how, driven by emerging security challenges, there are potentially four ways in which the CSDP may evolve in the future. Roderick Parkes then uses his chapter to delve into the relationship between the CSDP and tools and bodies that fall under the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). He concludes that there is competition and overlap between the CSDP and AFSJ. This is followed by a chapter on how we should (re)think the environments in which CSDP operations and missions are deployed, and how these shifts could inform the way the Union sets its military level of ambition in the future. Jean-Pierre Maulny then takes a look at the future of the European defence industry and how this relates to the CSDP. Finally, Giovanni Faleg analyses the civilian level of ambition and argues that the recently agreed civilian CSDP compact is a make-or-break moment for the EU as a civilian actor.



Image: CSDP EEAS



**TWENTY YEARS
ON, WHAT KIND
OF LEGACY?**

CHAPTER 1

Truth and dare

A personal reflection on 20 years of CSDP

PEDRO SERRANO

Introduction

Looking back over 20 years of the CSDP, and allowing for some over-simplification, there have been two main development stages: (i) the birth and initial steps of the ESDP, as it was called prior to the Lisbon Treaty from 1999 to 2003; and (ii) its adolescence and adulthood, as CSDP from 2016 to date. The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) crowns the first phase, and the 2016 Global Strategy marks the beginning of the second phase. The two growth periods are characterised by the development of structures and processes, as well as an accompanying strategic reflection. Between 2003 and 2016, there is a period of prolonged childhood where new missions and operations were launched and there was some redefinition of the EU's level of ambition too. However, this intermediary period was also characterised by tectonic movements that led to the second phase of CSDP. I am,

of course, referring to the geostrategic changes following the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 and the Ukrainian crisis of 2014. In addition to these external shocks, I am also referring to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010, which offered an opportunity to streamline CSDP processes and enhance the Union’s capacities.

In this chapter I will seek to offer a perspective on the political and strategic meaning of the CSDP as it has developed over the past 20 years. Here, I ask some basic questions: what have been the main reasons behind the development of the CSDP and how has it evolved over the 20-year period since its creation? I will therefore refer to its main developments in terms of structures and tools, deployments, defence capability development cooperation and partnerships. I have given this chapter the title of ‘Truth and dare’. Unlike in the game, we should not choose because we need both elements. The present time requires that we be truthful in our analysis of the challenges, interests, achievements and failures that have emerged over the past 20 years. However, we must also be daring when addressing the challenges, defending interests, building on past achievements and redressing the failures. Determination in security and defence policy will be key to the success of the EU in international affairs. In this sense, we have reached a watershed moment.

Before we assess the 20-year record of the CSDP, let me first make a disclaimer. I have had the honour to contribute very directly to the development of the CSDP in different capacities since 2000. This places me in a privileged position to provide some insights into what happened, its significance, achievements and limitations, as well as to share some thoughts on the paths that lie ahead. It is therefore with gratitude and a sense of duty that I provide my reflections on the CSDP. This chapter contribution sits alongside those of many highly qualified experts who will dissect different aspects of the evolution of the EU’s security and defence policy, and, hopefully, shed some light on the way forward. At the same time, I am, to a certain extent, acting as both judge and party in this ‘trial’. I am emotionally engaged in the development of CSDP. I have fought many battles, lost and won. I have discovered limits, including my own. Therefore, I beg you in advance to read my words with empathy and understanding. This is not a scientific study. This is a distillation of my direct experience. The salience I give to some issues in comparison to others will often reflect my direct involvement in the area.

Building a Fiat 500: phase one of the CSDP (2002–2010)

Efforts in the 1990s to revive the Western European Union (WEU), and the valiant developments enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty, contained the seeds of what would become CSDP. It is worth recalling the circumstances that led to these developments. Europeans felt powerless in those years, confronted with war at the very centre of their continent, with harrowing images and events they believed were no longer possible in Europe. The UN's peacekeeping limitations became painfully obvious, with Srebrenica (July 1995) and Rwanda in 1994 being tragic reminders of this. For Europe and the Western Balkans, NATO and the US ultimately saved the day. This painful period in European history led to a reflection about whether structures and mechanisms could be put in place within Europe itself that would prevent such terrible things from happening in the future. Many asked whether Europe should have the instruments needed to facilitate quick interventions before a situation got out of control.

Paradoxically, the Balkans crisis erupted during a period of international and multilateral optimism. The Soviet Union had collapsed. A different kind of cooperative relationship could be developed with the new Russian Federation. The UN Security Council was actively intervening in crises around the world after decades of paralysis. Europe was being rebuilt on a democratic basis. The EU emerged at the time as one of the most promising new pillars of European stability, and for this to become a reality, the Union needed to enhance its security role. Bearing in mind that the US was the winner of the Cold War, and therefore the predominant global power, any European security apparatus would also require a transatlantic and NATO dimension. This led to a process called 'Euro-Atlantic enlargement'. Nevertheless, the process did have some limitations, notably as regards the role of the Russian Federation in the new scheme and the handling of Russia's own security perceptions. Russia's relationship with NATO was debated, including the possibility of Russia joining NATO in some shape or form. Suggestions were made to discuss new security arrangements for Europe, notably within the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Unfortunately, less daring and visionary paths were followed. This created a margin of uncertainty that ultimately led to increased mistrust and the development of conflicting agendas.

The main parameters of European security and defence in the post-Cold War period were thus drawn: (i) Europeans needed to assume greater responsibility for their own security; (ii) the transatlantic relationship would remain a key pillar of European defence; and (iii) no clear understanding was reached with the Russian Federation on European security arrangements. These parameters contain inherent tensions, notably as regards the development of a European security architecture and the potential role of the EU. Such tensions were present at the birth of CSDP (then ESDP) at the European Council of Helsinki in 1999. What was clear was that ESDP could not have been built at the successive meetings in Helsinki, Feira and Stockholm without the full commitment of Heads of State and Government. We needed willingness from the highest political level before we could even think of deploying military and civilian missions and operations, or have the structures in place to effectively deploy such EU instruments.

Institution and strategy building

The birth of the ESDP in the early 2000s required the development of brand new security and defence structures. Owing to the intergovernmental nature of the policy, these structures were initially located within the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU. It is fair to say that the ESDP brought about a small revolution in institution building with the creation of the PSC and its support family of the EUMC, the Politico-Military Group (PMG) and the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management Committee (CIVCOM). It should be noted that the role of these bodies in preparing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP work within the Council was from the outset viewed with some reservations by the most senior Council group: the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). Then as now, the argument has been that only COREPER has a truly comprehensive approach to foreign policy because it brings together all aspects of external action. This is true, of course, because only COREPER has the authority to examine all areas of internal and external security and issues such as defence, terrorism, hybrid threats and cyber security. Yet, it should be recognised that the HR/VP and EEAS have important political roles now, and, given the broad competencies of

The birth of the ESDP in the early 2000s required the development of brand new security and defence structures.

COREPER, it still needs support from the range of preparatory bodies we created at the inception of ESDP.

Two main challenges were present from the outset when creating the new structures: first, to reassure NATO that ESDP was not about collective defence but crisis management; and second, that a civilian dimension needed to be developed alongside military ESDP. We recognised early on that a civilian ESDP dimension was a precondition for a number of member states to accept military ESDP. There was a need to carefully navigate issues such as neutrality and transatlantic concerns (imagined or real).

The first steps of civilian ESDP were particularly challenging. I remember initial meetings of CIVCOM, where none of the delegates there (including myself) really knew what we wanted to achieve, nor what a civilian ESDP mission might look like. The initial concept development was very much inspired by military crisis management. On command and control, I asked a brilliant officer from the *Guardia Civil* who worked with me at the time to take the military concept and replace throughout the document the word 'military' with 'civilian'. It worked! We were implementing the conclusions of the Feira European Council in 2000, which had identified four main areas for its development: civilian administration, civil protection, rule of law and police. Progressively, we started to develop our first operational concepts, notably in the field of police. Even before military concepts were ready, we had planned our first civilian mission (EUPOL BiH).

Despite this early success story, however, we should also recognise initiatives that did not do so well. Mimicking the military 'Headline Goal', a civilian version was proposed in the early 2000s with quantitative targets in mind (for example, 5,000 police officers by the end of 2003). In reality, these objectives were set with no realistic reference or specific operational goals in mind and it thus proved quite a fruitless exercise. The only positive outcome was that it provided an excuse to convene authorities responsible for the deployment of civilian personnel and enhance their engagement with CSDP, or, more broadly, with an external security agenda. Unfortunately, this did not fully materialise. Ministries of foreign affairs became the main interlocutors and other interest groups such as ministries of interior or police departments were crowded out. Clear proof of this were the 'civilian response teams' that were developed under the Swedish EU Presidency in 2001 and which were never actually deployed. Inexplicably, member states would not make relevant personnel available for missions, despite allowing them to undergo training and be put on a roster for rapid mobilisation.

Of course, our concepts and plans for civilian CSDP would not have materialised without relevant institutional structures. We initially began by creating Directorates General for politico-military affairs (DGE VIII) and civilian crisis management planning (DGE IX), but the limits of the structures were soon very apparent. We therefore created a fully-fledged civilian ‘operational headquarters’ in 2007 and we named it the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). The CPCC was essential in allowing us to ensure a proper duty of care for deployed personnel and to allow the PSC to perform its politico-strategic functions more completely. Its baptism symbolises well some of the challenges of CSDP. I recall a lunch with the then British PSC Ambassador at the Le Stirwen restaurant near Place Jourdan in Brussels. He explained the UK’s problems with the use of the word ‘headquarters’ in an EU context, even when applied to the civilian field. When I proposed the title, he replied: ‘Yes, CPCC, it slides off your tongue’. And so it was born. A year later in 2008, it opened space for the creation of a more integrated civilian-military strategic planning structure called the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD).

Our concepts and plans for civilian CSDP would not have materialised without relevant institutional structures.

At the early stages of civilian ESDP, the European Commission started to fear that our efforts might impinge on Commission responsibilities. One friend in the Commission stated that we were replaying the ‘hare and hedgehog’ fable: civilian ESDP would rush to a given theatre only to find the Commission in place already with a financial instrument or project. Were we duplicating the Commission? I remember a scary night-drive from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem with another bright Commission colleague who expressed profound scepticism regarding the launch of an ESDP mission in Rafah (Gaza). While he was speeding down the highway, I explained to him the added value of the border management mission we were planning because it would, for the first time, facilitate Palestinian control over an external border crossing point with Israel’s understanding and cooperation. I explained that the Commission could not generate the political engagement of member states nor their assets (police and customs officials) in the way civilian ESDP could do. We made a bet that if a civilian mission could be deployed successfully within a month, then we would have proved the value of civilian ESDP. EUBAM Rafah was effectively launched within those very demanding timelines in October 2005. We were successful because of our determination and the political authority bestowed on us by the member states.

Along with our Commission colleagues, we have since deconflicted our relationship to some extent, including through giving up the area of civil protection. Nevertheless, I am still convinced that the added value that civilian CSDP missions bring in terms of political commitment and weight, in addition to expertise that resides exclusively within state-owned capabilities, cannot in most cases be replaced by Commission-financed projects. Take, for example, the experience of EUBAM Moldova which is a civilian CSDP-type mission run by the Commission. The name of the mission itself (EU Border Assistance Mission) is taken from the CSDP world, but it was developed as a Commission project and financed through the Neighbourhood Instrument. It incorporates extraordinary arrangements that allow the PSC to provide guidance. Nevertheless, it does not respond formally to a Council chain of command nor is it placed under the responsibility of the CPCC. In reality, it was developed as a Commission project because at the time in 2007 there were no more funds within the CFSP budget and the Commission was reluctant to find alternatives. It seemed to me then that it represented a push by some Commission colleagues to conquer space within the CSDP realm. No further such EUBAM-type initiatives followed. In reality, while the action is still ongoing it has enjoyed less visibility than equivalent CSDP missions.

I have kicked off with civilian CSDP because it is there that I started. But the hard-core of CSDP has always been military. In fact I started in the civilian realm because I was then younger than other fellow Spanish diplomats serving at the Spanish Permanent Representation. The more senior colleagues were

It is the role of the EU in defence that has always been the most contested, essentially due to the transatlantic relationship.

eager to occupy the military space. And it is the role of the EU in defence that has always been the most contested, essentially due to the transatlantic relationship. While the Anglo-French agreement in St Malo launched the ESDP adventure, it became soon clear that France and Britain did not see eye-to-eye on the idea of a military headquarters. France wished to create a truly military HQ capability, whereas Britain, arguing

that this would create unnecessary duplications with NATO, was clear in wanting to limit the scope of the EU's ambitions. At a think tank event at the time, I remember a NATO colleague asking me publicly: 'why does the EU wish to build a Fiat 500 when NATO offers a Rolls Royce?' My NATO colleague did not seem to understand that you cannot drive a Rolls Royce everywhere and sometimes a Fiat 500 may be more effective. He also failed to understand that in driving your own car you can pick your own destination. The compromise

between France and the UK was found in the creation of the EUMS, which not only had responsibilities for concepts, capabilities and secretariat-related tasks but where France also managed to squeeze in some limited operational and strategic planning tasks. A few years later, in 2005, after the Hampton Court Summit, where France returned to the idea of developing an EU Operational Headquarters (OHQ) capability, compromise was found on the establishment of 'facilities' for an operations centre within the EU structures subject to a decision by the Council for its use.

In the meantime, we had to rely on national HQs for CSDP military operations and the Berlin Plus arrangements with NATO. Indeed, developing a strong relationship with NATO was, and still is, an inevitable condition for the development of CSDP. Through the Berlin Plus arrangements, NATO accepted, if requested, to place assets at the disposal of EU operations. This of course referred mainly to its OHQ capability, notably the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Liaison officers were exchanged and consultation mechanisms established between the two organisations. At the start, the EU's Operation *Althea* followed on from a prior NATO operation and it therefore used SHAPE as its OHQ and NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) served as the Operation Commander. Nevertheless, following the 2004 EU enlargement and Cyprus' accession, Turkey's lack of recognition of Cyprus practically paralysed possibilities for sharing information between member states in both organisations and blocked scope for other Berlin Plus operations.

Finally, capability development was also held up as an important aspect of ESDP in this first stage of development. The European Defence Agency (EDA) was created in 2004 as a mechanism through which member states could develop defence capabilities jointly. This role has been anchored in the EU treaties and Article 45 of the TEU specifically acknowledges the Agency and its role of contributing to the identification of capability objectives, harmonisation of operational needs and procurement, proposing multilateral projects, supporting defence technology research, and strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector. However, one of the weakest points of the EDA has probably been the lack of a financial capacity. The defence industry has important specificities and cooperation among states in this sector is not always a given. This is why in 2009 EU internal market rules foresaw

If member states continue their present practices ... the European defence industry and its technological innovation capacity is doomed to decline.

explicit exceptions linked to the defence industry, while trying to enhance transparency in defence procurement and facilitate defence transfers in the EU. If member states continue their present practices, whereby on average less than 20% of defence procurement results in collaborative projects, the European defence industry and its technological innovation capacity is doomed to decline. The EDA continues to play a key role in EU defence by helping overcome the obstacles to greater European cooperation.

Getting into operational gear

In the first period of the CSDP, the Western Balkans and Africa were clearly established as core areas of deployment. The first ESDP missions and operations were launched in 2002, scarcely three years after the Helsinki declaration of 1999. Planning for the first civilian ESDP mission gained ground during the Spanish Presidency of the Council in the first semester of 2002. Member states understood that replacing the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and Herzegovina would facilitate the 'normalisation' of the country and begin a process of 'Europeanisation', as confirmed by the Thessaloniki pledge of 2004. The IPTF in Bosnia and Herzegovina was soon replaced by EUPOL. The then High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, quickly proposed a military deployment to be followed up by a police operation to facilitate the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement in what was then called the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (today North Macedonia). Finally, the NATO operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was replaced by the EU's *Althea* – the first and only time a 'Berlin Plus' operation was launched.

Africa was the second central theatre for ESDP deployments. Particularly so in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Military and civilian missions were deployed there to assist in capacity building, and, for the first time, a military operation (Operation *Artemis*) was deployed to the DRC in 2003 in order to provide security and humanitarian assistance to people in Bunia, in the province of Ituri. A second military deployment to the DRC (EUFOR RD Congo) occurred in 2006 to provide additional support to the UN MONUC mission during elections, with the EU based in Kinshasa. These military deployments sat alongside civilian missions EUSEC DR Congo and EUPOL Kinshasa, in what can only be seen as an early incarnation of the EU's comprehensive approach to crisis management.

These deployments served both to support the UN peacekeeping operation there and a UN request for assistance. This was to become a key characteristic

of ESDP/CSDP and in 2007–2008 the EU deployed a bridging force to Chad (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) at the request of the UN. CSDP deployments have therefore both bridged or followed-up UN missions. We should also recognise that all ongoing CSDP executive operations are based on a UN Security Council mandate. Although the EU decided not to impose generic external preconditions for CSDP deployments, we must also recognise that a number of EU member states are either neutral or non-aligned and have sensitivities about military engagement. I must acknowledge here the efforts of the Swedish Presidency of the Council in the first semester of 2001, which helped us reach an agreement with the UN on cooperation in the field of security and defence. Beyond the recognised political sensitivities, however, the reality has shown the importance of strong cooperation with the UN in CSDP crisis management. Since 2003, senior EU and UN officials have chaired a Steering Committee that has – through its biannual meetings – progressively developed the relationship on security and defence, plus deepening cooperation on conflict prevention and counter-terrorism. It is fair to say that the relationship with the UN represents one of the strongest external pillars of CSDP.

Another important partnership is the one the EU has nurtured with the African Union (AU). From day one we backed AU efforts in crisis management. The African Peace Facility (APF) was established in 2004 to finance AU or AU-endorsed operations and technical support was offered for the establishment of command and control structures in Addis Ababa. In addition to financial support, the EU even deployed a small complementary police advisory team to one of the first AU operations in Darfur. At the time, I was Director of ‘DGE9’, and after my visit to this small support team in El Fasher, Sudan, I understood that we had to develop within the EU more robust structures for the command and control of civilian operations in order, *inter alia*, to ensure properly our duty of care obligations *vis-à-vis* deployed staff. This was one of the steps that lead me to propose the creation of the CPCC a few months later. To further strengthen its engagement with the AU, in 2007 – so even before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force – the EU established a ‘hybrid’ delegation in Addis Ababa in order to bring together the work of the European Commission and the High Representative Javier Solana (an EU delegation *avant la lettre*). Following the experiences of Darfur, the AU deployed another operation to fight al-Shabab in Somalia (called AMISOM). We continue to invest in the EU–AU relationship today and in 2019 we signed a Memorandum of Understanding

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on cooperation on peace and security matters between the crisis management structures of the two organisations.

This initial phase of ESDP was quite bold. Before having all the pieces in place, the EU became active in theatres across the world with civilian and military action. Interestingly, High Representative Solana partially constructed his role on the back of CSDP. He clearly saw CSDP as a 'product' he could offer to international leaders to help promote international peace and security, and thereby gain a seat at the main tables for the EU. Very quickly two missions were deployed in support of the Middle East Peace Process: in Rafah we helped implement the Agreement on Movement and Access in 2005 and in Ramallah we supported Palestinian State building in the field of security. The EU even went as far as Aceh, Indonesia, in 2005, in support of the peace process mediated by Martti Ahtisaari to provide a verification capability for the disarmament and demobilisation of the GAM guerrilla group. This offered an exceptional opportunity for partnership with ASEAN. A police mission was also deployed in Afghanistan in 2007 to support capacity-building there as a complement to NATO and UN efforts. Justice, monitoring and advisory capacity-building missions were deployed to Georgia and Iraq too. The EU also focused on the Horn of Africa and counter-piracy with a naval operation – the first of its kind – and a civilian capacity for Somalia.

CSDP proved a powerful instrument in the EU toolbox.

It is impressive to note that in less than five years the EU launched 19 missions and operations covering practically all continents except the Americas. While the effectiveness of some of these operations and missions could be discussed, most of them did make a differ-

ence. Many achieved their end state and were closed. Others continue to deliver and contribute to stability in their countries and regions of deployment. CSDP proved a powerful instrument in the EU toolbox and it is a very flexible and versatile tool that very few international actors possess. Accustomed in the past to see EU diplomacy as fundamentally based on common statements and diplomatic manoeuvres, whose impact was often difficult to measure, my first visit in 2003 to the first civilian EU operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPOL BiH) produced a lasting impression. The streets of Sarajevo were full of dark blue Volkswagens carrying the EU flag – this conveyed a very visible signal of presence, engagement and transformative action.

Shifting into the next gear of CSDP: phase two (2011–present)

The geostrategic environment at the end of the second decade of this century has added new elements of complexity for the EU. First, the geographical scope of strategic competition has broadened and, today, is inevitably global. Second, there has been a serious deterioration of the relationship with the Russian Federation following the annexation of Crimea and the Donbas crisis in 2014. Third, we are witnessing a widening of the security and defence challenges both through technological change and through the blurring of borders between security and defence and internal and external security. So-called hybrid challenges are good examples of these changes.

The EU Global Strategy presented by former HR/VP Federica Mogherini in 2016 sought to address this new geostrategic environment. Among other things, it led to a review of EU structures and it helped us rethink the operational dimension of crisis management. Whereas former High Representative Solana's 2003 European Security Strategy was drafted *after* the surge in the development of ESDP (1999–2002), the Global

Strategy has preceded and provided a background for the most substantial changes in CSDP since its inception. It is also noteworthy that, linking up with the beginnings of ESDP, which was pushed by Heads of State and Government in Helsinki, Feira and Stockholm, the Global Strategy was preceded in 2013 by a specific European Council on defence and the European Council in December 2016 provided extensive guidance for the next stage of CSDP. Efforts since then to accompany and support further CSDP development at European Council debates have only been partially successful.

The Global Strategy has preceded and provided a background for the most substantial changes in CSDP since its inception.

The unfinished business of institutional reform

Yet before the publication of the Global Strategy, the second phase of CSDP was also influenced by the creation of new institutions such as the EEAS. The new Service subsumed structures that had been found in both the Council and Commission before the Lisbon Treaty. It was rather striking that the structures that were developed for CSDP in 2000s were transferred to the EEAS without any real reflection on what could be adapted or re-organised. The CSDP-related structures appeared in a corner on the left-hand side of the EEAS organisation chart, disconnected from the rest of the EEAS 'machine'. Unfortunately, this pictorial characterisation reflected a reality during the first years of CSDP under the EEAS. In fact, it was necessary to wait until the presentation of the Global Strategy in 2016 before we could achieve a more harmonious integration of CSDP structures within the Service. Although there were limitations imposed by the 2010 Council Decision on the EEAS, CSDP structures were nevertheless progressively integrated into the Service under the Deputy Secretary General for CSDP and Crisis Response – a post I held from 2015 until 2019.

Working with the momentum of the Global Strategy, I recognised an opportunity to further reform CSDP structures. A first step was to create a fully-fledged security and defence policy directorate (SECDEFPOL) by merging the “policy elements” of CMPD with the existing Security Policy Directorate. Eliminating overlaps, SECDEFPOL was established as a true ‘strategic affairs’ department bringing together the policy side of CSDP. What is more, I worked to combine the strategic planning functions of the CMPD with issues such as conflict prevention and the integrated approach to crises, which were initially (and briefly) under the control of the ‘PRISM’ directorate. These CMPD elements and PRISM were combined to create the Integrated Approach for Security and Peace (ISP) directorate. I believe that ISP helps to provide coherence and continuity between conflict prevention and crisis response. It also facilitates the development of a pluri-dimensional and integrated approach when planning for CSDP missions and operations.

A second major development in the second phase was the consolidation of military CSDP through the creation – for the first time ever – of a real military OHQ capability within the EU. The MPCC, mimicking the name of its civilian counterpart the CPCC, was created in 2017 within the EEAS and it built on, and

replaced, the famous ‘facilities for an operations centre’ (OpCen). The MPCC was initially set up to support and provide command and control for military operations of a non-executive nature – essentially training or observation missions. These missions, currently located in challenging theatres, are now receiving proper strategic guidance. So far, the results have been excellent despite the insufficient resources provided by member states. Moreover, in 2018 it was agreed that the MPCC should also command, if so decided by the Council, executive operations of an ‘EU Battlegroup-sized’ force of up to 2,500 troops.

The foreseen departure of the UK following the Brexit referendum in 2016 rendered the negotiations for the MPCC easier. We were faced with a number of pressing realities. On the one hand, the experiences of over 15 years of planning and running CSDP military operations made it evident that such a command and control capacity within the EU itself was necessary to enhance the effectiveness of missions and operations. On the other, the Berlin Plus arrangements had long been *de facto* neutralised following the Cyprus–Turkey blockage. Finally, after more than 15 years, it was clear that CSDP military missions and operations did not in any way threaten NATO’s own role and responsibilities but rather complemented it. Coupled with advances in the EU–NATO relationship, and empirical reassurances that CSDP was not a threat to NATO, Brexit helped turn old ideas into new realities for CSDP.

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In this second period of CSDP the EU also developed specific defence initiatives such as PESCO and the EDF. PESCO is a Treaty-based instrument. It is built on political commitments to invest more in defence, to do so in cooperation with other member states and to be ready to deploy more forces in support of the EU’s security goals. It represents a public acknowledgement of current deficiencies, coupled with the ambition to contribute to an enhanced European defence industry and operational capacity. These political commitments are complemented (even implemented) through specific PESCO projects. The first projects were identified at the end of 2017 as PESCO itself was being established in order to send a clear and immediate signal that PESCO would not be a bureaucratic fiction but a practical and results-oriented endeavour. While the Council was working on PESCO, the European Commission – which was working towards President Jean-Claude Juncker’s vision of a ‘Defence Union’ – launched the EDF. The Commission used a preparatory phase of the Fund to work with the EDA on joint pilot projects that would demonstrate the worth

of the Fund. This initiative signifies a substantial change of attitude towards defence by the Commission.

Additionally, it is interesting to note that the most recent development of CSDP since 2016 has been accompanied by a resurgence in EU-NATO relations. Shortly after being appointed Deputy Secretary General for CSDP and Crisis Response at the EEAS, I attended my first EU 'defence Council' and the NATO Secretary General was invited to participate. He intervened in rather acrimonious terms, complaining about the lack of cooperation between EU and NATO. I have to admit I was shocked and puzzled: why should such feelings of misunderstanding exist between organisations that have largely common memberships and strategic interests? I promised myself that it would be the last time that this sense of frustration would be expressed. I shared my views with NATO counterparts and we strove immediately, and with equal enthusiasm, to strengthen cooperation and clarify misunderstandings. I want to pay tribute here to my colleagues at NATO's International Staff for the work accomplished during these last 4 years.

What did we achieve? Whereas in the early 2000s cooperation was based on engagement between the political organs of both organisations, due to the Turkish-Cypriot conflict, today it is essentially based on staff-to-staff cooperation. I believe it is fair to say that we would not have managed to accom-

Hybrid challenges and cyber-warfare have replaced crisis management as an engine for the EU-NATO relationship.

plish as much in EU defence had we not pursued simultaneously, and successfully, renewed engagement with NATO. Indeed, the parallel strengthened relationship with NATO has put to rest any fears of transatlantic disengagement, and shown that efforts conducted within the EU actually strengthen NATO as well and complement it effectively. However, instead of opera-

tions, this time the relationship was strengthened on the basis of the new strategic landscape. Hybrid challenges and cyber-warfare have replaced crisis management as an engine for the EU-NATO relationship. Our cooperation on military mobility is one good example of this shift. Joint declarations under-signed by the NATO Secretary General, the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission in July 2016 and June 2018 respectively, have opened up a space for 74 'joint actions' in areas such as hybrid threats and cyber, but also for cooperation with third states, exercises and new efforts to align crisis management efforts.

Fewer deployments, but deeper and more comprehensive engagement

I mentioned earlier that there were some initial tensions with the Commission on the deployment of CSDP civilian missions, but I have to admit that concerns have mostly disappeared over the years. In this second phase of CSDP, however, there has nevertheless been a persistent need to show that civilian CSDP provides real added value in comparison to potential parallel projects financed through Commission instruments. What is paramount today is to ensure that CSDP and Commission projects contribute to complementary support in crisis situations. Since 2011, these efforts have been facilitated by the focus on a 'comprehensive approach' to crisis management. Although this need was already prefigured in the 2003 Security Strategy, the creation of the EEAS under HR/VP Catherine Ashton underlined the necessity of this approach to crises. The Global Strategy took yet another stride forward by referring to an 'integrated approach'. The Sahel is, at present, one of the theatres where this approach is pursued more actively. In essence, the integrated approach means more than just civil-military cooperation and includes a truly regional approach comprising CSDP deployments, as well as the mobilisation of development, humanitarian and diplomatic efforts. This is no doubt the right way forward and I pay tribute to all colleagues who are engaged in this approach, despite the challenge of complex institutional boundaries.

The integrated approach has been indispensable for the second phase of the development of CSDP. From an operational point of view, the EU has sought to respond to the dynamics of the so-called Arab Spring and subsequently to the changed relationship with the Russian Federation after 2014. Compared with the initial years of CSDP, and keeping in mind the different geostrategic context after 2011, the second phase has been less rich in terms of deployments. Instead, there has been a deepening and consolidation of action. The Libyan crisis of 2011, for example, opened up new possibilities for the deployment of missions and operations, yet the initial European response through CSDP was relatively modest: we deployed a border assistance mission (EUBAM Libya) to secure the southern borders of the country. The diagnosis of the situation was correct, although the gravity of the crisis that engulfed Libya after the fall of Gaddafi was underestimated. EUBAM Libya has been on survival mode ever since, although it maintains a ready status that will give the EU a head-start in supporting state structures for security when circumstances permit.

Yet, EUBAM Libya was not our only action in the region as the EU deployed Operation *Sophia* in 2015. This maritime operation has shown great flexibility: its mandate has progressively expanded to include the enforcement of the arms embargo and the fight against oil smuggling, as well as training of the Libyan Navy and Coast Guard. Of course, it is to be hoped that a solution to the handling of persons rescued at sea can be found so that maritime assets can be redeployed under the operation. The present aggravation of tensions in Libya renders this redeployment even more urgent. Recent discussions in the Council seem to indicate that the EU is finally moving in the right direction. A real EU maritime presence will contribute to de-escalation in Libya.

Aside from Libya, the EU has also been engaged in Mali and the broader Sahel region. After the 2012 crisis in Mali, the EU reacted quickly to re-establish stability through the deployment of military and civilian missions (EUTM Mali and EUCAP Mali). Following a deterioration in the security situation in the region, the EU then deployed EUCAP Niger to provide regional stability. We know that instability has crossed borders in this region, and we subsequently had to coordinate our efforts including in the follow-up to the creation of the G5 Sahel group. At this stage, the EU had to ask itself whether it wanted to deploy even more civilian and military operations and missions in the region or if it should simply build on the deployments that were already present on the ground in Mali and Niger. We opted for the latter and I bear some personal responsibility for this decision. I wish to clarify that in the absence of enough 'political energy' for a full review of our actions, I instead promoted an incremental approach for a 'regionalisation' of CSDP Sahel missions with the aim of creating a dynamic that would allow the EU to engage with the necessary level of ambition and resources. This is discreetly leading the EU into one of the most ambitious enterprises ever undertaken under CSDP, with efforts to combine the security response under CSDP with development and humanitarian programmes, as well as strong political engagement.

At present, and on the basis of established CSDP coordination arrangements, EU member states need to agree on a full extension of the mandates of our three CSDP missions in the Sahel (EUTM Mali and EUCAPs Mali and Niger) to all G5 countries in order to support their security and defence forces bilaterally, as well as within the framework of the G5 joint force. We are also suggesting that the mandate foresees the accompaniment of security and defence forces in order to enhance our advisory capacity and its effectiveness, while maintaining the non-executive nature of the mandate. If agreed, this will be a first and will lend greater credibility to CSDP action in addressing today's insurgency-type challenges. The success of this ambitious endeavour is still

not ensured. It will certainly depend on the commitment of member states. However, we also need to rely on the willingness of the countries of the region to continue facing together the considerable challenges with which they are confronted. From this perspective, the joint force of the G5 Sahel is a catalyst whose relevance should not be underestimated. Finally, we are also deploying efforts in the Central African Republic, where we currently have two CSDP missions for military training and security advice.

This should not give the impression that we are only concerned with the Sahel region. In fact, together with deployments in Somalia the EU is contributing to security in the Sahelian belt and therefore across the African continent. Even in Eastern Europe, the EU has deployed an Advisory Mission in Ukraine (EUAM) in support of security forces following the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the Donbas conflict. The mission aims to support much needed reforms in the security sector, while presenting a clear signal of political commitment to Ukraine in what, similarly to EUMM Georgia, could be described as a contribution to deterrence. I could also refer to the EU's activities in Iraq as further evidence of CSDP action. What is certain is that even though we have witnessed fewer deployments, the EU has done much to deepen the effectiveness of its CSDP missions and operations. Interestingly, this second phase has also seen the development of the EU's maritime security capacities. I am not just referring to Operations *Sophia* and *Atalanta* either, as we have supported the establishment of maritime coordination centres and mechanisms (e.g. MSCHOA and SHADE) which see us work closer with the maritime industry and international partners. This maritime focus has given rise to a new initiative called the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) to improve the coordination of member state naval assets and maritime situational awareness capacities – the CMP will soon be put to the test in the Gulf of Guinea.

Even though we have witnessed fewer deployments, the EU has done much to deepen the effectiveness of its CSDP missions and operations.

During this second phase of CSDP, we have also recognised that there has been a need to further develop our capacities in the field. There was certainly an identified need to further balance the military CSDP developments enjoyed since 2016 with a stronger civilian dimension. In 2018, the Council agreed to a 'Civilian Compact' and an Action Plan to implement it was established in 2019. This has been developed in a pragmatic manner. Instead of seeking to determine new artificial numerical objectives, the Compact identifies bottlenecks for the deployment of civilian personnel in CSDP missions. It then establishes

commitments such as developing legislation/arrangements on the deployment of civilian personnel in international missions, in order to overcome hurdles and limitations and even create incentives. The Action Plan comes with a follow-up mechanism that will, hopefully, lead to a process allowing member states to measure their progress and refine objectives in view of experiences in the field. The Compact also incorporates lessons learned in civilian planning and it seeks to increase the flexibility of civilian CSDP missions.

Furthermore, in order to ensure complementarity between financial instruments and CSDP efforts a key initiative is currently under discussion within the broader negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). I am referring to the European Peace Facility (EPF). In the early days of CSDP we already observed the importance of supporting international partners such as the AU in the field of peacekeeping. We have been working with the APF since 2004 but financial assistance has been conditional on approval by the AU. At the same time, we have become increasingly aware that the very limited definition of 'common costs' for CSDP military missions and operations (through the Athena mechanism) does not respond to the principle of solidarity that governs EU action. Accordingly, with a view to supporting *inter alia* Sahelian countries in their fight against jihadism and organised crime, the proposed EPF would allow the EU to provide military assistance to partners individually, in addition to regional or sub-regional operations, in a more flexible and comprehensive manner, including lethal equipment. We have indeed learned that the best way to fight jihadism is by empowering local military and police forces. Finally, the EPF also represents the strongest attempt to date to enhance solidarity among member states for the financing of military missions and operations through a more substantial increase in common costs. This could facilitate the deployment of hitherto unused assets such as the EU Battlegroups.

Thoughts on the future: where to next?

Progress over the past two decades has been substantial. Whereas in the early days of ESDP I often had the feeling of being an explorer, opening a path in the jungle with a machete without a clear idea of where I was heading, today we have built roads. The Union has put in place mechanisms for defence

capability cooperation that we thought were not possible just a few years ago. The EU also looks at security and defence beyond military terms and we are developing tools to respond effectively to hybrid challenges. We have understood the importance of mobilising all of our tools in a coordinated manner. We have expanded our partnerships with key international organisations and with nations with whom we share common interests. The EU has also proven its capacity to deploy military and civilian missions and operations in areas of key strategic interest for the EU. We work closely with partners and strive to ensure local security and political buy-in from crisis-hit countries. Such developments mean that the EU and its member states are better placed today to take on rapidly evolving geostrategic threats. Yet, we should also acknowledge the challenges and opportunities that the EU will face in the coming years.

One such challenge is maintaining coherence in EU defence policy because we run the risk of ending up with separate priority-setting processes, leading to a considerable waste of resources and efforts, and ultimately confusion. While the EDF brings to the table the money that has been the missing element of defence cooperation all these years, it is crucial to ensure that it works in full harmony with PESCO. Ideally, industrial projects under PESCO should receive EDF financing but both of these instruments have different decision-making processes. It is therefore of the utmost importance that we agree on a priority identification process that will guide our decisions on capabilities within both PESCO and the EDF. The Capability Development Plan (CDP) is for the time being the sole defence priority-setting mechanism within the EU. The institutional oddities of the EU, with its counterbalancing games, which can lead sometimes to an artificial division of responsibilities, will need to be overcome through rational approaches and the goodwill of all parties. Battles over competencies may prove extremely damaging and provide a pretext to those who are less enthusiastic about advancing a true EU defence policy. Ultimately, it is key to ensure that there is only one EU defence policy. To be credible and effective, the EU institutional 'branches' should not develop independent sectoral, or even worse, instrument-based, defence policies/priorities.

Another key challenge will be maintaining an operational engagement through CSDP in defence of EU security interests. The present 'lay-out' of CSDP missions and operations is a solid basis. Some of the current actions to reinforce EU support to the Sahel as well as EU maritime operations or presences will add further robustness and effectiveness. Member states' continued support to these efforts through the provision of adequate resources and agreement on appropriate mandates will remain essential for their success. It will also enhance the EU's credibility as a truly international security actor.

The inherent tensions and contradictions present at the birth of the CSDP that I referred to earlier on in this chapter have not disappeared. They continue to hamper the development of the policy. There are still differences among EU

The ‘strategic compass’ could open doors to an enhanced common understanding of defence efforts within the EU.

member states as regards the level of ambition for a common defence policy. Addressing these differences will require the further development of what we are now calling a ‘common strategic culture’. At present, under the title ‘strategic compass’ a reflection is being launched within the Council to gain a better understanding of defence needs at the EU level. This is a complex exercise that comprises but goes beyond CSDP crisis

management, or what we have in the past defined as a ‘level of ambition’ for CSDP. The ‘strategic compass’ will cover national defence needs too and defence efforts pursued through other avenues such as NATO. The ‘strategic compass’ could open doors to an enhanced common understanding of defence efforts within the EU. This could help guide priority-setting for defence capability development because we cannot have various parallel processes.

Ultimately, we should recognise that defence policy is no longer ‘just about defence’. For example, the present period has shown that cyber has a crucial security and defence impact too. To a large extent, we are still grappling with new realities that are sometimes described under the generic title ‘hybrid challenges’. We are also witnessing a blurring of external and internal security at the EU’s borders. This requires horizontal approaches by national, supranational and international administrations, based on a strengthened awareness of the challenges. The EU offers from this perspective an unparalleled platform for cooperation for its member states.

Due to the nature of this chapter, I have addressed principally internal EU mechanisms and developments. But it is of key importance that all those of us who work for the EU understand that the world extends well beyond the Schuman roundabout. We are so often consumed in our complex institutional set-up and decision making that we forget this. Actually, we often arrive so exhausted from internal efforts that we have less energy to project action beyond our borders. In addition, recent years have encouraged politically inward-looking attitudes in many of our member states. This is particularly worrying at a time when the EU is surrounded by considerable external challenges directly at its borders, and when geostrategic competition has reached news peaks.

It is my conviction that the EU can still actively contribute to shaping the twenty-first century, and ensure that our most important contributions to humankind – democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights – remain at the centre of tomorrow's international order. There is a strong risk that if we do not recognise the threats and/or respond too meekly, European security will suffer and the achievements so far could even come under threat within our own European societies. Our common efforts in the field of security and defence constitute an important part of the response the EU must provide. We cannot allow ourselves to fail.

CHAPTER 2

The EU's military legacy

Over-institutionalised,
under-equipped and
strategically divided

CLAUDIA MAJOR AND CHRISTIAN MÖLLING

The EU member states created the ESDP in 1999 in order to develop the capacity to act autonomously in military crisis management.¹ Back then, autonomy was conceived of in terms of independence from the United States, in order to ensure that if faced with a military threat the Europeans could act even if the US chose not to become engaged. The EU was anxious to prevent another European failure like the one experienced during the wars that blighted the Balkans in the early 1990s, when – after proclaiming that this was the ‘hour of Europe’ – the Europeans eventually had to rely on US military and political assistance. Beyond this, however, the then ESDP was also an answer to three structural questions about European security that have existed since the end of World War II and which resurfaced with a new

1 As stated in the Petersberg Tasks in 1994, which limited the scope to crisis management tasks.

urgency in 1989: (i) the *strategic question*: who or what to defend and against what?; (ii) the *institutional question*: how and where to organise defence?; and (iii) the *capability question*: what capabilities to develop, in what quantity and how to ensure an acceptable level of burden sharing?²

Two crucial factors have influenced the answers to each of these three questions. First, the role of the US in European security and how any steps to enhance the Union's strategic autonomy in defence have given rise to criticism and questions about Europe's relations with the US, both within NATO and bilaterally. Second, by insisting on their national sovereignty EU member states have constrained how far the Union has ventured down the path of defence cooperation and integration. The ESDP aimed to create the capabilities for autonomous action by fostering more cooperation among EU member states. However, despite having already become interdependent for their collective defence as well as for even medium crisis management operations, national governments still pretend that they are sovereign, i.e. that they can effectively decide and act independently to address defence problems. When ESDP confronted the member states with the choice of being more capable but having less individual say in defence decision-making, member states often preferred a limited national option. In other words, governments preferred to manage their ever-shrinking national capability inventory rather than engage in strategic cooperation – let alone integration – with a view to enhancing their collective security and defence capacities and ability to act.

It would appear, therefore, after two decades of efforts under the ESDP and now the CSDP, the EU has not found any 'magic formula' to reconcile the tense triangular relationship between the desire for more collective autonomy from the US, the wish for more capabilities in defence and the insistence on national sovereignty. If this observation holds true today, then the Union faces a watershed moment in its defence because the security environment on a regional and global basis has significantly deteriorated over the past two decades. Added to this are questions about the internal health of the EU, with the spectre of disintegration (as the worst-case scenario) and fragmentation (the present case in many policy areas). With a view to arriving at some conclusions on the future of the EU's military level of ambition, this chapter deals with a single question: if the CSDP has only made limited progress over the past

2 Claudia Major, "The Role of Capabilities in the Transatlantic Defense Relationship", *Carnegie Europe*, October 2019, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/10/30/role-of-capabilities-in-transatlantic-defense-relationship-pub-80221>.

20 years, why has the EU failed to meet the initial intentions and objectives it laid out during the Franco-British St Malo Summit of December 1998 and the European Cologne Council of June 1999? To this end, this chapter is divided into three main parts: the first focuses on the historical development of CSDP since 1999; the second concentrates on what can be deduced after this 20-year period in terms of the ingredients needed for defence cooperation and maintaining a credible EU military level of ambition; finally, the chapter concludes with some observations about the future of CSDP.

20 years of CSDP: odyssey or otiosity?

The EU's defence efforts only became possible because the two key European powers changed their minds about defence cooperation. For France and the UK, the Balkan wars served as a wake-up call because the episode displayed – rather shamefully – Europe's lack of capacity to act in its own backyard. As a result, in 1998 they launched a bilateral defence initiative known as the St Malo Declaration. London and Paris had different motives for such an initiative, with France appearing to genuinely cherish an EU defence policy as a way to balance NATO and Britain calling for a stronger EU defence as a way of exhorting Europeans to take on more burden sharing within NATO. Yet both wanted EU states to finally improve their capabilities and capacity to act. Not long after St Malo, EU member states decided to Europeanise the initiative and the ESDP was subsequently born.³ As one of the first steps, the EU member states set a military level of ambition called the Helsinki Headline Goal, which focused on crisis management tasks and largely reflected the military needs experienced during the Balkan wars: up to 60,000 soldiers, ready for deployment in 60 days, sustainable for one year. Additionally, new political and military institutions were established in 2000, most notably in the form of the PSC, the EUMC and the EUMS.

³ Giovanni Grevi and Daniel Keohane, "ESDP Military Resources", in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds.), *ESDP: The First 10 Years (1999–2009)*, EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2009, pp. 71–89.

Of course, the EU's foray into defence roused the attention of the US who warned the Europeans not to duplicate efforts in NATO, despite having called for European partners to increase their contributions to European security. In particular, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright issued a now infamous warning to Europe: 'any [EU] initiative must avoid pre-empting Alliance decision-making by de-linking [the European Security and Defence Identity] from NATO, avoid duplicating existing efforts and avoid discriminating against non-EU members'.⁴ Even though this message still rings in the ears of European governments today, the second half of the 1990s saw the ESDP become operational in order to meet security needs and to test the military structures put in place by the EU. Hence, the EU deployed EUFOR *Artemis* to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 (with approximately 2,000 troops) and EUFOR *Althea* to the Balkans alongside NATO in 2005 – this was and remains the largest and longest EU military operation with some 7,000 troops at the outset.

Although the EU has shown that it is capable of deploying force as a crisis manager, the progress made as a military actor was arguably possible because of three factors: (i) a cautious but benign US hegemon; (ii) coordinated inter-governmental action by France, Germany and the UK (which were all led by likeminded social democratic governments at the time); and (iii)

Despite the EU's increased capacity for military action there was no tangible increase in military capabilities.

external crises such as the Balkan wars, which created the pressure and a window of opportunity for EU action. Furthermore, the EU's military activities did not seem to threaten the predominant role of the US in European security or encroach upon the national sovereignty of member states. However, despite the EU's increased capacity for military action there was no tangible increase in military capabilities – another key objective set at St Malo and the European Councils that followed thereafter.

By 2009, a second phase in EU defence started following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the financial crisis that struck Europe in 2008. The Treaty not only changed the name of the ESDP to CSDP, but it set in motion a qualitative institutional change, offering the option for more EU defence integration. As an example, the Treaty set down (under Article 42.6 and Protocol

4 Madeleine K. Albright, "Statement to the North Atlantic Council", Brussels, December 8, 1998, <https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/1998/981208.html>.

10) the terms for closer defence cooperation through a mechanism called PESCO, which called for willing and able member states to be more capable for operations and to enhance capabilities. Widening the potential strategic scope of the EU and its defence, the Treaty also introduced two new clauses for mutual assistance (Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union) and solidarity (Article 222 TFEU). As chapter 8 in this volume shows, the introduction of these two articles potentially expanded the scope of EU military action and the responsibilities that the Union could have for both external and internal security. Despite these innovations, however, EU member state governments were still reluctant to enhance the Union's role in defence mainly because they believed it could call into question the long-established division of labour between the EU and NATO and the US commitment to European defence.

Despite the innovations agreed to under the Treaty of Lisbon, however, from 2009 the member states started to diversify their cooperation outside of the formal framework of the EU. Indeed, formats like the 'Weimar Triangle' (between France, Germany and Poland) and the 'Visegrad 4' (of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) expanded in the period after Lisbon.

Again, EU member states allowed their domestic considerations to trump collective European security.


In addition, new ones appeared, like the Franco-British Lancaster House Treaties. Instead of focusing on PESCO, member states tried to mitigate the negative effects of the economic and fiscal crisis by taking the route of bilateral or minilateral defence groupings. However, these groupings could not stop a new wave of capability cuts – in this respect, even these non-EU in-

itiatives suffered from too many ambitious political statements and not enough willingness to pool and share capabilities. Already plagued by chronic under-investment in capabilities and the hollowing out of forces after the Cold War, the late 2000s saw a further reduction in capabilities and the Europeans' military credibility was hit as a consequence. Even when European governments did invest in capabilities, there was little to no coordination, which led to duplication, superfluous equipment and growing capability gaps and shortfalls. Again, EU member states allowed their domestic considerations to trump collective European security.

From 2014 onwards, Russia's annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine led to a substantial change. As a result of a growing threat perception mainly with regard to Russia, European states re-established NATO as the primary defence framework in Europe; also the US's position was reinforced. This recent turning point was crucial from the perspective of capabilities and

Change in military capabilities

Change, 1999–2018, %



Data: International Institute for Strategic Studies, various years

the EU's military level of ambition. First, the focus on crisis management that had prevailed during the 1990s/2000s was reversed and greater attention was given to deterrence and collective defence. Within the EU context, member states had no intention of transforming the Union into a territorial protector and instead placed greater focus on hybrid threats following Russian interference and intimidation. Although France's invocation of the Mutual Assistance Clause in 2015 following the Paris terrorist attacks shone a light on hitherto forgotten treaty provisions, and the peak of the migration crisis in 2015 once again forced the EU to think about its security, there was no new overarching dynamism that would fundamentally increase the commitment of the EU states. In addition, the UK's decision to leave the Union following the referendum in 2016 was a shock to the EU and it became a symbol of fraying political and societal coherence in Europe. 'Brexit' also raised serious questions about the military capabilities that would be lost to the EU after the UK's departure.

In this context, the EU sought to push ahead with European defence co-operation by launching another series of defence-related initiatives. Under

the former HR/VP Mogherini, an EU Global Strategy was published as a way to foster closer defence cooperation in the wake of Brexit and the Ukraine crisis, but also as a way to show that in a moment of deep crisis the Union could still continue to integrate. Thus, new initiatives that were born out of the Global Strategy, such as PESCO, CARD and the MPCC, were not only about defence but also (if not mainly) about the overall political cohesion of the Union. In particular, many signatories of PESCO and those that may benefit from other innovations such as the EDF hoped that such new initiatives may give rise to increased capabilities. However, according to existing national plans and in view of the paucity of EU plans today and for the next decade, most capabilities will still be developed on a national or multinational basis rather than in an EU framework. It is also not so clear today whether PESCO and the EDF will radically alter member states' reluctance to pool sovereignty in the area of defence.

In sum, a great deal of institutionalisation has taken place under CSDP and a range of military missions and operations have been deployed by the Union. However, we should ask whether the EU has met the stated military level of ambition it set back in 1999. Bluntly speaking, the Union has managed to institutionalise defence but without any real tangible improvement for military capabilities. Arguably, bureaucratic processes and institution building could be seen as a substitute for a lack of capabilities. The simple lesson learned over the past two decades is that member states' governments are still reluctant to define national defence priorities and capabilities within an EU framework. Instead, these governments have focused most of their efforts on multinational projects outside the formal structures of the EU or NATO (e.g. the Framework Nation Concept). If anything, the presence of the CSDP has not altered the capability picture in Europe – with a reduction of about 30–80% of relevant capabilities lost since the inception of the policy. Of course, the EU is not the cause of this reduction but it – along with other international frameworks such as NATO – has not contributed to reversing the downward trend. In fact, overall the trend does not look good for Europe because the EU is unable to deliver on its own military level of ambition (not now, or at least until 2030) and, as one influential study recently showed, it only possesses about 30% of the capacities required to fulfil its level of ambition.⁵ Yet, this is

5 Douglas Barrie et al, "Protecting Europe: Meeting the EU's Military Level of Ambition in the Context of Brexit", a joint International Institute for Strategic Studies and German Council of Foreign Relations report, November 28, 2018, <https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/protecting-europe>.

not a problem confined to the EU only, as even European NATO states would be equally unable to defend Europe without the US commitment to collective defence or protecting the global commons.⁶

What has been learned since 1999?

One of the key underlying problems that afflicts CSDP and European defence more broadly is the gap between rhetorical ambitions and the reality of military capabilities. In short, even after 20 years of CSDP the Union is unable to meet the stated military level of ambition set in 1999. Beyond discussions about whether the EU should deal with deterrence, a number of current crises fit the crisis management model that is so dear to the Union. Take, for example, the need to counter the seizure of vessels in the Strait of Hormuz or the need to separate forces in Syria and provide humanitarian assistance in the country. These are precisely the types of operations that the CSDP was set up to deal with, but the stark reality today is that member state governments are reluctant to engage. What is more, even if the EU did decide to intervene in Syria or the Strait of Hormuz it would simply lack the capacities to do so. Rather paradoxically, had the required European capabilities been in place, the actors behind both the Syria and the Strait of Hormuz crises might have thought twice about acting because the risk of potential EU action would have been too high – and, subsequently, this could actually lower the need for the Union to militarily engage in these regions because of the deterrence effect.

The CSDP was created in the first place to ensure that the EU had the military capacity to act. The lesson from the Balkan wars was that Europeans had to get their military act together, but the experiences over the past 20 years put into question the commitment to this original goal. Of course, today's geopolitical climate is very different to the one prevailing in the 1990s and there is certainly growing external pressure on European states to take decisive measures to address the security threats they face. Most European states today

6 Douglas Barrie et al, "Defending Europe: Scenario-based Capability Requirements for NATO's European Members", International Institute for Strategic Studies Research Papers, May 10, 2019, <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2019/05/defending-europe>.

worry about the health of the transatlantic relationship, even if they disagree on the scope of the problem or possible responses. Indeed, the current US administration has given rise to concerns about Washington's commitment to defending Europe through NATO. If this fear is realised, it may place an additional emphasis on further cooperation through CSDP while at the same time further exposing EU military capability shortfalls (see chapter 3). Yet, this could also incite EU countries to further invest in cooperation outside EU and NATO structures. Any US force reduction in Europe would mean that EU member states would have to develop the capabilities needed to address the objectives of the EU Global Strategy while also having to go beyond crisis management capabilities to cover the full spectrum of collective defence, including deterrence.

The current US administration has given rise to concerns about Washington's commitment to defending Europe through NATO.

Of course, in the wake of any possible US withdrawal from European security, Europeans would have to deal with difficult questions related to conventional and nuclear capabilities. Yet, in this context, it is not just the capabilities that matter but rather who or what should fill the leadership role potentially left by Washington. In this sense, European capability development should not be defined solely in reaction to what the US is doing (or potentially no longer doing).

Europeans have to develop a military level of ambition of their own in terms of what they want to achieve (e.g. treaty provisions such as the solidarity and mutual assistance clauses). In this regard, Europe may even pay greater attention to how it defines 'Europe' when speaking about defence. Should 'Europe' mean NATO, the EU or something different? Here, another lesson to be learned from the past 20 years is to resist the temptation to talk only about EU defence when in fact the topic is more broadly 'European defence'. We need to rethink what we believe institutions such as the EU or NATO are capable of doing. In fact, over the past 20 years, European governments have preferred cooperation in smaller bilateral or minilateral groupings to EU cooperation.

Although these smaller groupings may not have led to an increase in capabilities, they allow for greater flexibility – this is something that should be kept in mind given that Brexit points to a drastic reduction in the military capacity of the EU. European defence thus requires us to think beyond the confines of institutional boxes. This is especially true when we think about how Europeans have undertaken military operations over the past 20 years – in smaller coalitions of the willing. In fact, a number of EU or NATO military operations

and missions actually started life as smaller operations with only a handful of European states. For example, NATO's Unified Protector of March 2011 in Libya began as a Franco-British operation⁷ and EUNAVFOR *Atalanta* was preceded by a maritime escort operation by France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada in November 2007.⁸ This pattern of evolution is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future and, now that 'Brexit' has taken place, such operations/formats may become even more attractive.

What do the next 10 years hold in store?

There are many reasons to explain the limited progress in military CSDP since 1999, and why the Union has failed to meet the military level of ambition it set for itself in 1999. The easy answer is that a reduction in military capabilities has not helped, but then neither has an insistence by member state governments on retaining their national sovereignty. As a consequence, buzzwords such as 'strategic autonomy' ring hollow in an EU context. In fact, since 2016 the EU has essentially been in discursive mode where concepts and ideas are developed but accompanied by little in the way of tangible military capabilities. Accordingly, member states interpret concepts such as 'strategic autonomy' differently and they appear to continue to be unwilling to embrace an EU level of autonomy in defence. Many EU member states believe that rhetoric

Yet while the Europeans debate concepts, the number and intensity of conflicts around the EU persist.

about the EU becoming a serious defence actor can be harmful to their relations with the US, but those supportive of greater autonomy face the herculean task of developing capabilities that can be used beyond crisis management missions and operations. Yet while the Europeans debate concepts, the number and intensity of conflicts around the EU persist. It is clear that no government can manage these challenges alone and, hence, defence cooperation is still needed.

⁷ For more on Unified Protector see: NATO, "Operation Unified Protector: Final Mission Stats", November 2, 2011, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107-factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf.

⁸ For more on 'Operation Alcyon' see: French Ministry of Armed Forces, "L'action de la France dans la lutte contre la piraterie", July 12, 2010, <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/ue/atalante/dossier-de-presentations-des-operations/l-action-de-la-france-dans-la-lutte-contre-la-piraterie>.

We have to wait and see whether the EDF and PESCO deliver the capabilities so badly needed by Europe, but neither the EU nor NATO have the luxury of time.

After two decades worth of efforts, the EU finds itself at a watershed moment in defence. Hence, this chapter ends by outlining three potential scenarios that could transpire in Europe over the next 10 years.⁹ Scenario 1 can be called the 'status quo plus' where the member states remain politically committed to EU defence and calls for a European Defence Union grow stronger. Despite the rhetoric, however, the gap between public praise and capabilities persists. This scenario sees only a marginal increase in defence spending, attention to low ambition projects within PESCO, a reluctance to share information through the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and suspicion about the new Directorate General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS). Overall, there are gradual improvements in capability shortfalls like tactical transport or air-to-air refuelling but the limitations on Europe's ability to act militarily remain intact.

Scenario 2 would see the emergence of European strategic autonomy because the US effectively reduces its political and military role in Europe and NATO. As a result, some countries from Central and Eastern Europe invest in bilateral relations with Washington as a 'life insurance policy' and a kind of 'defence coalition of the willing' is formed under US leadership outside of NATO. As a result, other European states finally get serious about the EU's military capacity to act and they concentrate their efforts under the *leitmotif* of 'strategic autonomy'. Led by France and Germany, they heavily invest in capa-

Even after 20 years of the CSDP, there is still no systematic independent knowledge about the state of capabilities in Europe.

bilities and transfer more authority and resources to DG DEFIS – which now has its own Commissioner for Defence. They also decide to strengthen and enlarge the military and political structures of the EU and they transfer NATO functions such as defence planning to the EU. France and the UK provide nuclear deterrence through a separate format outside of the EU

framework because there is too much disagreement between governments within the EU. As a consequence, Europe now relies on a core of politically and military engaged states that over time increase their operational readiness and advance political integration. NATO starts to lose importance because political

⁹ See Claudia Major, "Die Rolle der NATO in Europas Verteidigung", *SWP Studie*, no. 25 (2019), Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2019S25_mjr_Web.pdf.

decisions are taken in other formats, but the security situation in Europe is at risk of deterioration because the EU is not yet ready to act and NATO is no longer able to. This situation results in a weakness that Europe's adversaries seek to exploit.

Scenario 3 sees EU defence fail but NATO undergo a process of Europeanisation. Here, the US decides to reduce its political and military role in Europe and NATO and European states decide to Europeanise NATO rather than develop CSDP or EU defence. An increasingly Europeanised NATO undermines the appetite for EU military operations and missions, and so the Union instead focuses only on industrial issues and regulations. The Europeanisation of NATO is led by France, Germany and the UK and while central and eastern European states are reluctant to accept this, they recognise that focusing exclusively on bilateral relations with the US would be risky if it comes at the expense of cooperation with their European neighbours. In military terms, European states define a new – significantly lower – level of ambition based on European contributions and an opt-in principle for Washington for planning and decision-making. France and the UK have adopted nuclear deterrence but grant less participation for other states.

Each of these scenarios means that there is clearly a need to do things differently over the next decade or so. First, new labels and instruments – while good for public opinion over the short term – will not reverse the capability shortfalls anytime soon: therefore, a more sober approach to defence discussions in Europe is needed, with more expectation management and less spin. Second, there is a real need for an independent assessment of Europe's capability dilemma, its key drivers and the success and failure of defence cooperation. Even after 20 years of the CSDP, there is still no systematic independent knowledge about the state of capabilities in Europe. Finally, the EU is in need of a 'strategy of conflict' to better assess the dramatic changes taking place in European security and the capabilities being used by other actors in Europe's vicinity. This would include a more thought-through description of the link between policy goals and the role of military instruments.

CHAPTER 3

No more shortfalls?

European military capabilities 20 years on

DICK ZANDEE

The question ‘what does European defence need first and foremost?’ elicits a straightforward answer: ‘three things: capabilities, capabilities, capabilities!’ Yet, 20 years after launching the CSDP,¹ the EU continues to lack the key capabilities to conduct military operations autonomously across the whole spectrum of the use of force. Based on this assessment, our analysis of the CSDP’s ‘capability legacy’ might conclude that this fundamental objective has not been realised over the past two decades.

In reality, in 2019 the record with regard to the development of European military capabilities is more nuanced: there are areas of improvement – such as strategic airlift – while larger shortfalls have not been addressed satisfactorily. Furthermore, the deterioration of the security environment in the last five years – after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the increasing instability in the Middle East and Africa – as well as the growing complexity of the

¹ Originally called the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty ESDP was replaced by CSDP. The latter term is used throughout this article.

threats and challenges that Europe is facing today have resulted in new or additional capability requirements. For example, few people had heard of the terms ‘cyberattacks’ or ‘hybrid threats’ 20 years ago. Deployability, mobility and more lightly armed forces – that was the focus at the end of the 1990s. Today, heavy weaponry, firepower and armoured vehicles have regained their prominence on the list of capability requirements. Territorial defence is back on the agenda and for many countries has become the main priority, in light of the threats posed by Russia and its provocative military actions. To Europe’s south, turmoil and conflict in countries such as Syria and in the wider Sahel region have direct repercussions for the EU, including terrorism and other forms of extremism, refugee flows and migration and transnational crime. Border security has thus become a major political concern for the EU. The lines between external and internal security – thus between the CSDP and the Union’s internal security policies and measures – are increasingly blurred (see chapter 7). These changes in the security environment have an impact on capability needs. This makes an assessment of ‘what has been achieved’ even more complicated.

Nevertheless, an attempt can be made to assess the capability legacy. It took the EU until 2004 – the year when the EDA was launched – to begin establishing its own capability development process, and this chapter asks whether the Union has been successful and what are the results so far. Member states ‘own’ the military capabilities, as they themselves continue to underline. To this end, this chapter also asks what governments have done in terms of developing their capabilities, in particular together with European partners. This contribution also assesses whether member states have used the instruments made available by the EU institutions over the past 20 years. More recent initiatives such as PESCO and the EDF will also be addressed. Here, expectations have certainly been raised. In the words of former HR/VP Federica Mogherini: ‘these are not just names or acronyms. This is real change for our common security. We are helping Member States to make their defence spending more efficient, and develop all the military capabilities that we need – from the skies to the sea, to the cyberspace.’² In this respect, the

The lines between external and internal security are increasingly blurred.

2 Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini on the implementation of the EU Global Strategy at the plenary session of the European Parliament, Strasbourg, July 17, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/65571/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-implementation-eu-global-strategy_en.

chapter will also assess if member states have seized on new initiatives since the launching of the EU Global Strategy in June 2016. To conclude, the chapter sums up the past 20 years of capability development in the EU and examines what remains to be done.

The theory of capability development

At the start in 1999, the focus of CSDP was on creating the institutional framework. The EUMC, supported by the EUMS, was one of the new bodies. In the early years of its existence, the EUMC concentrated its work on the key question of whether or not the Helsinki Headline Goals had been met.³ In other words, would the EU be able to carry out its military level of ambition? Council Conclusions and other documents referred to capability goals and to making use of the NATO defence planning procedures. This gave the impression that the EUMC was conducting capability development. In reality, the EUMS conducted a force planning process for the EUMC and the Council of the EU, which aimed at ascertaining what the EU member states could deliver collectively for crisis management operations and what the shortfalls were.

However, beyond EU institutions, it was the member states that maintained responsibility for addressing European military shortfalls through capability programmes and projects. A first attempt to address capability development at the EU level was the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), launched at the European Council meeting in Laeken in December 2001. Nineteen panels were established, composed of military experts from the member states, to discuss solutions for filling the identified shortfalls.⁴ Although under subsequent EU presidencies the process was further refined, the ECAP produced no concrete results. One of the reasons for its failure was its one-dimensional approach – it brought together only the military to define the requirements and


3 The Helsinki Headline Goal, agreed at the EU Council Meeting at Helsinki in December 1999, stipulated that by 2003 the EU member states should be able to deploy within 60 days a force of up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000–60,000 troops) and to sustain such a force for at least one year.

4 Burkard Schmitt, *European Capabilities Action Plan*, EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2003, <https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/06-bscap.pdf>.

did not involve those in charge of technology investment and procurement programmes.

Military capabilities can only be delivered if all the relevant elements are brought together. In the world of NATO acronyms, this is called ‘DOTMLPF-I’: doctrine, organisation, training, material, leadership, personnel, facilities plus interoperability. Developing military equipment is a key element of capability development. It can be depicted as a chain connecting demand to supply. In other words, military requirements have to be connected to Research and Technology (R&T) and to the development and procurement of equipment through industrial production. This four-phased approach to capability development (see diagram below) was embedded in the EDA.

Capability development process



This more comprehensive capability development approach was not immediately understood by existing institutions. It took a couple of years to convince the EUMC that the Agency was not taking over its responsibilities – of force planning and identifying related shortfalls – but, on the contrary, that it was providing the EU with the instruments needed to solve European capability gaps. After its initial phase, the Agency launched the Capability Development Plan (CDP) as the basis for capability development, which combined short, medium and long-term needs. In 2008, the first CDP was produced. It has been reviewed several times, but in essence the CDP methodology has stood the test of time. The current 2018 version has resulted in eleven capability priorities reflecting the changing security environment (e.g. by putting more emphasis on high-end spectrum capabilities). These eleven capability priorities are supported by the same number of Strategic Context Cases (SCCs) presenting the main characteristics, opportunities and challenges in the short (up to 2024), medium (2025–2034) and long term (2034 and beyond).

Over time, various strategies, policies and methodologies have been elaborated to channel R&T investment, industrial development and production based on a capability-driven approach – there have been too many of them to list here. The current strategy for connecting capability priorities to R&T

programmes is the Overarching Strategic Research Agendas (OSRAs), while the Key Strategic Activities (KSAs) will provide the context for the technologies, skills and industrial manufacturing capacities that are all needed for the implementation of capability development. Furthermore, with PESCO the EU member states have crossed the line from 'voluntarism' to 'commitment', although it remains to be seen how the rather generally formulated PESCO commitments will be interpreted by the participating countries. Certainly, the EDF can be considered as a real breakthrough because, for the first time in history, a part of the EU budget will be allocated for defence investment. Notwithstanding these new initiatives and acronyms, however, it is worth assessing the results so far and what we can expect in the near future.

The practice of capability development

Often, reality is more complex than theory. As a consequence, the delivery of results takes more time. Defence is no exception to this rule: the same can be witnessed in other areas of government. International cooperation further increases the challenge of turning design into concrete products. Thus, it may come as no surprise that the practice of European capability development deviates considerably from the theoretical goals defined in the diplomatically negotiated and politically agreed wording of Council Conclusions and Capability Declarations. Certainly, considerable progress has been made in addressing certain shortfalls. Air transport is a good example. The acquisition of the A400M transport aircraft by Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and Spain (plus non-EU members Turkey and the UK) as from 2003 has improved Europe's capability to deploy forces over long distances. The pooled acquisition of A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft⁵ since 2016 and the establishment of a multinational unit to share their use is an important step forward in increasing and standardising the European air-to-air refuelling capacity. EDA training programmes for helicopter and transport

5 By Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Norway.

aircraft crews since 2009 and 2011 respectively have contributed to improving Europe's performance in the air too.

However, the EDA has been less successful in turning R&T programmes into industrial development of equipment. Despite the launching of a considerable number of R&T projects, member states have showed reluctance in confronting the famous 'valley of death' when larger sums of money have to be invested to develop demonstrators and serial production. The EDF can help cross this valley of death. It will open a new avenue for channelling more money into the European defence sector, assuming that the negotiations on the MFF result in a sizeable budget (estimated at €13 billion) as proposed by the European Commission.

Launched in 2018, the PESCO project for the development of the next-generation Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (MALE RPAS, also known as the EuroMALE or Eurodrone) has the potential to become a success story, helping to fill a gap already recognised by the Helsinki European Council in 1999. This project brings together not only the governments of Germany, France, Italy and Spain – defining common requirements – but also the defence industries located in those countries as a consolidated supply side.

Nevertheless, despite positive results in the last two decades, today Europe is still far from 'standing on its own feet' in terms of military capabilities. While the EU is a world power in trade and wider economic terms, it is a dwarf when it comes to deploying military power. For example, in 2018, a group of experts conducted a scenario-based analysis on the ability of EU member states to carry out CSDP full-spectrum operations. The outcome: with the UK's contribution European capabilities are sufficient for humanitarian-assistance operations, but all other scenarios create significant capability shortfalls. Without the UK, however, the shortfalls become even greater – in particular because its strategic enablers and high-end capabilities are missing. Furthermore, the study concluded that current procurement plans up to 2030 would lead to some improvement, but not to closing the identified capability shortfalls in a context where ageing equipment would increasingly become a problem.⁶

European failure to solve the capability shortfalls is equally detrimental for the EU and NATO.

6 Douglas Barrie et al., "Protecting Europe: Meeting the EU's Military Level of Ambition in the Context of Brexit", a joint International Institute for Strategic studies and German Council of Foreign relations report, November 28, 2018, pp. 2-3, <https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/protecting-europe>.

Alternatively, if we take the US's security guarantee to Europe out of the equation then investment is needed in the range of \$94 billion to \$357 billion, depending on the scenario. Nevertheless, even if the money were to be made available, it would take up to 20 years to make up the capability shortfalls. The study presents itself 'as a reality check for the ongoing debate on European strategic autonomy'.⁷ Indeed, it is. 20 years of European capability development have not enabled Europe to act autonomously in all crisis management operations, let alone in the context of territorial defence. The latter is also very worrying for NATO. If the US were tied up in armed conflict elsewhere in the world and was unable to deploy significant forces to Europe, NATO would not be able to defend its own territory with European forces and capabilities alone. Clearly, European failure to solve the capability shortfalls is equally detrimental for the EU and NATO.

Breaking through or breaking apart

The changes in the security environment of the past five years have opened the eyes of political leaders across Europe. They all more or less subscribe to the conclusion that Europe has to take more responsibility for its own security, which has to include better military capabilities. As a result, defence budgets are on the rise and an impressive range of new initiatives has been agreed to. 'Trumpism' has further pressed European countries to assume responsibility for their own defence efforts in a serious manner. Ambitious programmes – such as the French-German-Spanish plans for the common development of a Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS) by 2040 and next generation armoured vehicles – are good examples of new investments in defence through cooperation and common programmes. The further Europeanisation of development and procurement of military equipment will certainly contribute to the rationalisation and consolidation of industrial capacities and to improving military interoperability and standardisation. Thus, ultimately, such

⁷ Douglas Barrie et al, "Defending Europe: Scenario-based Capability Requirements for NATO's European Members", International Institute for Strategic Studies Research Papers, May 10, 2019, p.3, <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2019/05/defending-europe>.

programmes can contribute to avoiding duplication and to wasting taxpayers' money.

However, if Europe opts for a business-as-usual approach – long bureaucratic processes for the harmonisation of requirements; carving up technological research, industrial development and production shares based on the principle of *juste retour*; adding national 'nice to haves' to multinationally agreed 'needs to have' – then we can expect a repetition of the very expensive and slowly progressing collaborative armament projects of the past. The examples are well-known, from the 1992-initiated NH-90 helicopter with its 24 variants to the A400M, which produced a bill of at least €10 billion extra on top of the original contract worth over €19 billion in 2009.⁸ The EDF, with its conditions of at least three EU member states and three different companies participating in a project in order to receive money from the EU budget, may help to overcome the errors of the past. On the other hand, the ultimate selection of EDF programmes is in the hands of the European Commission. So far, the Commission in its communications about the EDF is mainly underlining the purpose of the EDF in strengthening the EDTIB rather than selecting programmes based on the capability priorities stemming from the CDP and the SCCs. Although comitology is at the heart of EDF governance, there is a clear risk of a potential tension between capability priorities collectively defined by the Agency and governments and allocating money under the Fund to industry-driven projects.⁹

As the past 20 years prove, a fundamental change in European military capability development means more than simply launching new initiatives. There has been no lack of paperwork on assessing capability shortfalls and defining capability priorities. The practice of capability development has only partially followed its theory. Defence bureaucracies did not follow up on what their political masters had decided in the past. In 2005, the first EU High Representative and Head of the EDA, Javier Solana, launched a campaign for a serious increase in collaborative defence R&T spending with the motto 'to spend more, to spend better and to

The practice of capability development has only partially followed its theory.

8 "Factbox: The big money behind Airbus A400M talks", *Reuters*, January 21, 2010, <https://www.reuters.com/article/eads-airbus-figures/factbox-the-big-money-behind-airbus-a400m-talks-idUSLDE60K19R20100121?type=marketsNews>.

9 For the EDA's position and the future of the Agency see: Dick Zandee, "Quo Vadis EDA?", *European Defence Matters*, no. 17, June, 2019, pp. 44–46.

spend more together'. He got the support of the European Council, but a few months later – at an EDA meeting preparing the Steering Board in Defence R&T Directors – one of the national representatives dismissed the role of the European Council on the grounds that 'they don't understand R&T.' He used this statement as an argument to reject proposals for stepping up European collaborative defence R&T spending. Solana's initiative received no serious follow-up from the R&T experts in capitals. The financial austerity imposed after the 2008 economic crisis did the rest. Collaborative European Defence R&T spending dropped from its peak of 16.6% (in 2008) to 8% (in 2017) – well below the benchmark of 20% agreed by ministers of defence in 2007. In the PESCO commitments agreed in 2017, this collaborative benchmark is not even mentioned – and the same applies to the 35% benchmark for collaborative equipment procurement. In other words, member states remain reluctant to live by binding commitments with regard to collaborative programmes. It is a missed opportunity in PESCO, which should be corrected in the future in order to set more ambitious goals.

Another example of an initiative taken at the political level, but which lacked proper follow-up by the experts in the ministries of defence, was the 'Pooling & Sharing' approach launched under the Belgian EU Presidency in 2010. A few years later, the results could be counted on the fingers of one hand, with the already mentioned MRTT air-to-air refuelling project as the most outstanding result. As we are in the early days of PESCO implementation and agreement on the EDF, it can only be hoped that these new initiatives taken at the political level will not share the fate of their predecessors. Time will tell if they are the real breakthrough initiatives referred to by the former HR/VP. This may well be Europe's last chance to live up to its ambition to be more responsible for its own security and defence.

CHAPTER 4

Integrated markets?

Europe's defence industry after 20 years

LUCIE BÉRAUD-SUDREAU

Since the mid-1990s, EU institutions have set out to create an integrated defence market. In doing so, EU-level institutional actors face a certain amount of reluctance from member states for whom the defence industry relates to key sovereignty and economic concerns. Yet, the long-term ambition is to overcome a fragmented landscape of 27 national markets and regulatory frameworks, and to replace it with a more unified approach, which, in turn should support a more globally competitive EDTIB. Although CSDP is usually associated with intergovernmental actors such as the EDA and Council of the EU, the policy's industrial dimension has been strongly influenced by the European Commission. Following a Communication on the challenges facing the European defence industry in 1996,¹ from December 1997 onwards a raft of policy documents was published by the Commission. The 1997 report already recommended a simplification of intra-community transfers, the

¹ European Commission, "The challenges facing the European defence-related industry, a contribution for action at European level", *COM(96) 10 final*, Brussels, January 24, 1996.

creation of a European company statute, common rules for public procurement in the defence sector, more coordination and use of EU funds for research and development.² The Commission's interest in defence has persisted over the years, and a number of concrete policy actions have been developed, but '20 years later, it is difficult not to reflect on the paucity of progress' in the defence industrial sphere.³

Having just passed the twenty-year anniversary of the CSDP, however, gives us an opportunity to take stock of the results of the political and legislative attempts by the European Commission and bodies like the EDA to create a more integrated European defence market and support a competitive EDTIB at the service of the CSDP. To this end, this chapter asks a single question: how have EU institutions influenced the European defence industry over the past 20 years? First recalling the original ambitions in setting up various EU defence industrial policy instruments, it then looks at the results in terms of market integration and industry consolidation. The chapter will show that there have been concrete improvements in some areas, but that not all can be directly attributable to EU actions. Overall, the EU's main influence in the defence industrial domain over the past 20 years has been restricted to its role as a facilitator for government and industry to cooperate more, but it still has little direct intervention capacity.

Competitiveness and market integration: EU instruments

To overcome the fragmentation of supply and demand and shape the defence industrial landscape, the EU has developed institutional, regulatory and financial instruments over the past two decades. While other policy initiatives were developed in intergovernmental frameworks, such as the Letter of Intent (LoI) or the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), we will here focus only on the actions and policies implemented by EU actors.

2 European Commission, "Implementing European Union strategy on defence-related industries", COM(97) 583 final, Brussels, December 4, 1997.

3 Sarah Raine, *Europe's Strategic Future: From Crisis to Coherence?* (London: Routledge, 2019), p.141.

Institutional frameworks were progressively set up to promote joint capability development and lower the costs of cooperation. These institutional frameworks are tied to the Council of the EU rather than the Commission, reflecting their intergovernmental nature. Established in July 2004, the EDA's main task is to support the development of defence capabilities and military cooperation among the EU participating member states. The EDA is expected to promote the harmonisation of operational needs and of compatible procurement methods, and to propose multilateral projects and support the EDTIB (see chapter 3). This has implications for the defence industry, for whom long-term pan-European programmes allow for the development of products for larger markets and help sustain production lines in a more cost-effective manner. Essentially, the Agency's role is as a facilitator for member states to procure weapon systems jointly, thereby participating in consolidating the demand side of the market. Over the past two decades, the EDA has supported joint defence R&D and R&T projects.⁴

Taking the intergovernmental logic further, since November 2017 25 EU member states have engaged in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Originally included in Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union which was signed in 2007,⁵ PESCO aims to foster defence cooperation and joint capabilities. So far, 47 projects, each gathering two or more member states, have been launched by PESCO members – 17 in March 2018, 17 in November 2018 and 13 in November 2019. The overall objective is for participating member states to increasingly develop capabilities jointly, so as to consolidate demand, and reduce duplication in capability requirements. This in turn should support the defence industry in offering a more unified front for demand and possibly larger market access. However, for the time being only certain – not all – PESCO projects entail cross-border industry collaboration.⁶

Over the past 20 years the European Commission has also developed a range of more communitarian, regulatory instruments to help shape the market and improve the efficiency of the CSDP. Two Directives were adopted in

4 European Defence Agency, "Mission", <https://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/Missionandfunctions>; Council of the European Union, "Decision defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency", (CFSP) 2015/1835, Brussels, October 12, 2015.

5 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, "Title V: General provisions on the Union's external action and specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Chapter 2: Specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy, Section 2: Provisions on the common security and defence policy – Article 42 (ex Article 17 TEU)", *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 115, vol. 51, May 9, 2008.

6 European Defence Agency, "PESCO Projects", <https://pesco.europa.eu/>.

2009, one on intra-community transfers (Directive 2009/43/EC), and one on defence procurement (2009/81/EC). These had a clear defence industrial policy goal. The European Commission's 2007 Communication, which formally launched the process towards the adoption of the Directives, stated that the fragmentation of the market, and the different national systems of export controls, undermined the competitiveness of the European defence industry.⁷ The Directives were also a response to the habitual invocation of Article 346 TFEU, which allows member states to exclude defence-related acquisitions from the general rules on public procurement on 'national security' grounds. In particular, Directive 2009/81/EC limited the use of this provision and thereby allowed greater transparency and competition in the defence sector. For its part, Directive 2009/43/EC aimed at harmonising and simplifying the rules for transferring defence equipment within the Union. The logic here was that in-

The EDF is the latest string added to the EU's defence bow in recent years.

stead of being confronted with 28 domestic export control systems, defence firms should instead follow a similar procedure when selling their products to entities located in another member state. Therefore, together these Directives aimed at creating a more unified de-

fence market, while also supporting the consolidation of European-wide defence industry.

The EDF is the latest string added to the EU's defence bow in recent years. Announced in 2016, it will directly use the EU budget to intensify defence cooperation among member states. Should the Commission succeed in securing its request for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the period 2021–2027, the EDF will include €500 million per year on collaborative defence research activities and €1 billion per year for the joint development of defence technologies. Some activities have already begun, with €90 million already allocated to research between 2017 and 2019, and €500 million in 2019–2020 for a defence and industrial development programme.⁸ The objective with regard to the European defence market and industry is to generate cost-efficiencies, reduce duplications and, again, to unify market demand. Arguably, the money

⁷ European Commission, "A Strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry", COM(2007) 764 final, Brussels, December 5, 2007.

⁸ European Commission, "A European Defence Fund: €5.5 billion per year to boost Europe's defence capabilities", Press release IP/17/1508, Brussels, June 7, 2017, https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1508_en.htm; See also the European Defence Industrial Development Programme 2019 call for proposals, conditions for the calls and annex based on Regulation (EU) 2018/1092 and on Commission implementing Decision C(2019) 2205, April 4, 2019.

put on the table – which after 2020 could account for the 4th largest R&D budget in Europe⁹ – will attract defence companies who will jointly bid for defence projects. Larger-scale production runs are also expected to be beneficial in terms of cost-effectiveness. Furthermore, with increased cooperation, the Commission aims to encourage the Europeanisation of supply chains. The EDF is further expected to attract governments and foster cooperation, as it will also indirectly save them some money from their defence budgets.¹⁰

We need to ask whether these various instruments have had any effect on the European defence market and the defence industrial base. Although it is not yet possible to judge the results of the EDF or PESCO, which will take full effect from 2021 onwards, we should expect the institutional and regulatory instruments to have had some impact over the years. Have we seen the emergence of a more unified European market and a more consolidated industry that can better serve CSDP and European defence more broadly?

Measuring the success of EU defence industrial initiatives

So how do the EU's policies that have been developed over the past 20 years fare when measured against the realities of the European defence market? Based on research carried out by the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique,¹¹ it is possible to analyse to what extent European member states are using the defence procurement rules established under Directive 2009/81/EC and whether they refrain from making exemptions to the general EU procurement procedures under Article 346. According to the data, after the full transposition of the Directive in 2013, we can observe a significant uptick in the number of publicised contract notices and awards (see graph on page 67). It should be


9 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Selected European defence research and development (R&D) budgets in 2017 and planned EU defence R&D spending”, *The Military Balance 2018* (London: Routledge, 2018), p. 20.

10 European Commission, “Commission staff working document, Impact assessment accompanying the Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Fund”, *SWD(2018) 345 final*, Brussels, June 13, 2018.

11 Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, “Observatoire des marchés publics de défense et de sécurité européens”, <https://www.frstrategie.org/programmes/observatoire-des-marches-publics-de-defense-et-de-securite-europeens>.

Intra-EU arms transfers

2004–2017



Data: European Commission, 2019;
French Ministry of Defence, 2019

noted that when the Directive was first adopted, a majority of member states were unable to transpose it within the legal deadline of 21 August 2011.¹² During 2012 and 2013, the European Commission had to intervene to ensure that member states were indeed applying the Directive. It was only by the end of 2013 that all member states had transposed it.¹³

Although these numbers show progress in terms of transparency, another statistic reveals that open competition may only exist on paper. Indeed, when it comes to defence markets 76% of contracts are awarded to domestic suppliers and only 9% to another EU-based supplier.¹⁴ Furthermore, according to a 2016 assessment study by the Commission, the value of defence procurement contracts awarded remains marginal compared to overall defence procurement spending in the EU. The suggested explanation was that ‘the Directive was used to a very limited extent for the

¹² European Commission, “Report on the Transposition of directive 2009/81/EC on Defence and Security Procurement”, COM(2012) 565 final, Brussels, October 2, 2012.

¹³ Kévin Martin, “Directive Marchés de défense et de sécurité: bilan et tendances”, *Défense et Industries*, N°1, June, 2014.

¹⁴ Kévin Martin, “Bilan n°1/2019”, Observatoire directive MDPs, December 31, 2018, p. 17, <https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/programmes/observatoire-des-marches-publics-de-defense-et-de-securite-europeens/bulletins/2019/1.pdf>.

procurement of strategic equipment'.¹⁵ In addition, the Commission opened an infringement procedure against five member states in January 2018, which were considered not to have applied the Directive adequately. Italy, Poland and Portugal awarded defence contracts to national suppliers without using public tenders, while Denmark and the Netherlands were suspected of imposing unjustified offset requirements on non-national suppliers.¹⁶ Hence, while the Directive did have an impact on the transparency of procurement procedures, it has not yet reached its objective of stimulating open EU competition in the defence sector.

With regard to Directive 2009/43/EC, full transposition here again appears to have been difficult as, by 2016, not all member states had published the different types of licences required by the Directive.¹⁷ Overall, this instrument appears to have failed to achieve its intended effect because its implementation has become too complex – with effectively 27 different national licensing systems still in place. The Defence Transfer Directive has led to the creation of new tools, in particular the certification of companies and the creation of 'general transfer licenses', but neither appear to have met with much success. These general licences were meant to facilitate the transfer of large amounts of defence products within the single market over a long period of time. However, given that the Directive is soft law, member states have limited the scope of equipment categories applicable under the Directive and excluded products deemed too sensitive.¹⁸ As a result, general transfer licences can differ widely from one country to another¹⁹ and member states and companies

15 European Commission, Commission staff working document, "Evaluation of Directive 2009/81/EC on public procurement in the fields of defence and security Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC on public procurement in the fields of defence and security, to comply with Article 73(2) of that Directive", SWD(2016) 407, Brussels, November 30, 2016, p. 54.

16 European Commission, "Defence procurement: Commission opens infringement procedures against 5 Member States", Press release IP/18/357, Brussels, 25 January 2018, https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-357_en.htm.

17 European Commission, "Evaluation of Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community", COM/2016/0760 final, Brussels, November 30, 2016.

18 European Commission, "Evaluation of the Transfers Directive Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the evaluation of Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community", SWD/2016/0398 final, Brussels, December 7, 2016.

19 European Commission, "Report on transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC simplifying terms and conditions for transfer of defence-related products within the EU", COM(2012) 359 final, Brussels, June 29, 2012.

continue to use individual licences in the same way that they did before the Directive.²⁰

In addition, there is evidence to suggest that companies see the Defence Transfers Directive as a cumbersome process entailing too much cost and little reward.²¹ This is reflected in the low number of certified enterprises under the Directive. Actually, some companies who were certified in the past have apparently not bothered to renew their credentials and the number of certified companies has actually declined (see graph on page 71).²² We can further look at the volume of trade within the EU to measure the effect of the Transfers Directive. The EEAS publishes annual reports on EU member states' arms exports²³ and using the value of licences reported we can track whether there has been an increase in intra-community transfers after the implementation of the directive in 2011.²⁴ The graph on page 64 shows that since 2011 there has been a decline both in the value and proportion of total sales. The uptick in 2015 was due to both Italy and Spain, which were responsible for €2.8 billion and €4.8 billion increases respectively. The more spectacular rise in 2017 was due to Spain, which issued large amounts in licences to France (€7 billion) and Germany (€5 billion).²⁵ Hence, the Defence Transfer Directive seems to have had limited impact on the European defence market for the time being.

Beyond the Commission's legislative tools, it is also necessary to consider the role of intergovernmental bodies such as the EDA. Fifteen years on, the Agency has limited autonomous capacity to consolidate demand through

20 Technopolis Group, "Evaluation of Directive 2009/43/EC on the transfers of defence-related products within the Community", June 2016, <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/538beabd-92af-11e7-b92d-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>.

21 Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe, "ASD Considerations on the Review of the Directive on Intra-EU Transfers of defence-related products 2009/43/EC", *Technical Paper*, March 25, 2016, <https://www.asd-europe.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ASD%20Technical%20Paper%20on%20Intra-Community%20Transfers%2025%2003%202016.pdf>.

22 Sources for Table 2: Luc Mampaey et al., "Study on the implementation of Directive 2009/43/EC on transfers of defence-related products", *Final Report*, GRIP, Ref. Ares(2014)2758238, August 22, 2014, pp. 12-13; Op. Cit., "Evaluation of Directive 2009/43/EC", pp. 22-23; European Commission, "Certified Enterprises Register", <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/certider/index.cfm?fuseaction=undertakings.countries>.

23 European External Action Service, "Arms Export Control - Arms Trade Treaty", https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/security-defence-crisis-response/8472/arms-export-control-arms-trade-treaty_en.

24 To do so, we substituted the data series for France with the value of orders, due to a break in the series for the value of licences after 2014. The data comes from the French national reports on arms exports.


25 Spanish Government, "Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Secretaría de Estado de Comercio, Estadísticas Españolas de Exportación de Material de Defensa, de Otro Material y de Productos y Tecnologías de Doble Uso, Año 2017", p. 64, http://www.mineco.gob.es/stfls/mineco/prensa/ficheros/noticias/2018/180511_informe_MDDU_2017.pdf.

joint projects. Owing to its inter-governmental nature, and thus being dependent on the decisions of its member governments, the EDA has achieved some results but it has little direct authority.²⁶ It has supervised the pooled acquisition of the Multi-Role Tank Transport (MRTT) aircraft and the Agency was involved in the support work for the European MALE RPAS for air traffic integration. However, recently announced large-scale defence procurement projects such as the Future Combat Air System and the Main Ground Combat System are – for the time being at least – being carried forward outside of the EU frameworks. A real test of the EU's new defence initiatives will be whether they can add value to such programmes.

With the newly created CARD, the Agency now has a key role to play in identifying areas for cooperation on capability development and defence innovation. However, after its first trial run the CARD showed that 'three quarters of Member States allocated less than 50% of their defence investment to priority actions stemming from the Agency's Capability Development Plan'.²⁷ As the first full cycle of the CARD gets underway in 2020, it will be necessary to measure how far greater transparency between member states on defence planning has led to industrial opportunities. In this regard, the Agency has set to work on the CDP and while the Plan – revised in 2018 – has long been criticised for being too broad in nature,

Contract notices and contract awards

Number and volume, 2011–2018



Data: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2018

²⁶ Kaija Schilde, *The Political Economy of European Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

²⁷ European Defence Agency, "15 years supporting European Defence", *European Defence Matters*, no. 17, 2019, p. 45, <https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-magazine/edm17singleweb>.

recently agreed initiatives such as the SCCs and the OSRA are supposed to lead to greater detail when prioritising capabilities at the EU level. What is more, in September 2019 the EDA established a new Cooperative Financial Mechanism (CFM) to support cross-border defence projects by offering loans via the European Investment Bank (EIB) and state-to-state budgetary support.²⁸ Again, notwithstanding the necessity of such efforts they will only be successful if member states stay committed to them.

A real test of the EU's new defence initiatives will be whether they can add value to such programmes.

Additionally, the activation of the PESCO framework in December 2017, for which the EDA acts as Secretariat alongside the EEAS/EU Military Staff, should arguably drive forward more joint procurement activities. The first two rounds of PESCO projects did not all try to answer Europe's capability shortfalls and the projects which were most advanced and most

significant from an industrial perspective actually pre-existed PESCO.²⁹ For example, the *Tiger Mark III* overhaul programme has been managed by OCCAR since 2001³⁰ and the upgrade programme was placed under the PESCO umbrella in 2015.³¹ The same can be said of the Eurodrone programme where OCCAR already awarded contracts for design studies in August 2016 – thus, before the project was placed under the aegis of PESCO.³² Indeed, such practices raise questions 'about PESCO's added value and whether it risks duplicating functional institutional frameworks'.³³ The third round of PESCO projects, announced in November 2019, was not as ambitious as promised, retaining only four industrial projects out of a list of thirteen. It does include however

28 European Defence Agency, "Cooperative Financial Mechanism (CFM) ready for signing", Brussels, September 26, 2019, [https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2019/09/26/cooperative-financial-mechanism-\(cfm\)-ready-for-signing](https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2019/09/26/cooperative-financial-mechanism-(cfm)-ready-for-signing).

29 Yvonne-Stefania Efstathiou and Alice Billon-Galland, "Are PESCO projects fit for purpose?", *IISS Blog*, February 21, 2019, <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/02/pesco-projects-fit-for-purpose>.

30 OCCAR, "Tiger – A new generation of helicopters", <http://www.occar.int/programmes/tiger>.

31 OCCAR, "Tiger – Launch of the de-risking phase for mid-life upgrade (MKIII)", September 26, 2018, <http://www.occar.int/tiger-launch-de-risking-phase-mid-life-upgrade-mkiii?redirect=/programmes/tiger%23news>.

32 Gareth Jennings, "Czech Republic joins European MALE RPAS project", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, November 21, 2018; Gareth Jennings, "European MALE RPAS completes design definition phase", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, December 13, 2018.

33 Yvonne-Stefania Efstathiou, Conor Hannigan and Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, "Keeping the momentum in European defence collaboration: An early assessment of PESCO implementation", *IISS Blog*, May 14, 2019, p. 7, <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2019/05/pesco>.

a new Franco-Italian corvette,³⁴ and a missile-interceptor programme led by MBDA.³⁵ Finally, PESCO's binding commitments invite scrutiny as member states are still falling well below the existing benchmarks for collaborative procurement spending (set at 35% of total European spending) and 20% for R&T spending.

European defence market consolidation and the EU

Alongside market integration, the other area where EU actors have tried to influence the European defence market is by supporting the consolidation and competitiveness of the EDTIB. This underwent a radical phase of consolidation at the turn of the 2000s, but this was not attributable to EU actions as key policy and legislative instruments had not yet been created. Indeed, faced with a contraction of demand in Europe during the 1990s and the simultaneous rise in technology costs many European defence firms were either forced to privatise, restructure (through mergers and acquisitions in both the US and in Europe) and/or internationalise business through a greater reliance on exports and foreign acquisitions. Although market restructuring first began in the US, European governments and companies followed suit in order to remain competitive in an increasingly globalised arms market. Across Europe, transnational champions emerged. This movement of consolidation however has occurred mainly in the aerospace sector, and less so in the naval and land domains.

Consolidation generally continued after the early 2000s, but it has not been a linear movement. In the aerospace sector, after the well-known mega-mergers which led to the creation of EADS (2000), Thales (2000), BAE Systems (2000) and MBDA (2001), re-nationalisation occurred at the prime level in the following years. For example, Finmeccanica bought back its shares in Agusta Westland from GKN in 2004, BAE Systems sold its stakes in Saab

34 PESCO Secretariat, "European Patrol Corvette (EPC)", <https://pesco.europa.eu/project/european-patrol-corvette-epc/>.

35 MBDA, "MBDA ready to meet the challenge of Europe's missile defence", November 13, 2019, <https://www.mbda-systems.com/press-releases/mbda-ready-to-meet-the-challenge-of-europes-missile-defence/>.

in 2011 and Airbus sold its shares in Alestis Aerospace to Acturri in 2019. At the sub-systems level, however, and in particular in the propulsion domain, there has been further Europeanisation (e.g. Rolls Royce bought stakes in ITP in 2016 and eAircraft division in Siemens in 2019). Re-nationalisation occurred also in the naval domain, when Airbus bought Atlas Elektronik from BAE Systems in 2007 and, most spectacularly, when Saab bought Kockums from ThyssenKrupp in 2014.

Nonetheless, Europeanisation did continue in other areas. In the land domain, in the early 2000s, the consolidation had a transatlantic dimension. General Dynamics has acquired European land manufacturing assets in Spain (July 2001), Germany (October 2002), Switzerland (March 2003) and Austria (October 2003). This conquest was stopped only in 2004 when General

This episode plainly showed that governments remained in the driving seat of defence industrial dynamics.

Dynamics failed to purchase Alvis-Vickers, which BAE Systems took.³⁶ Europeanisation continued thereafter. In 2005, British and Swedish manufacturers linked up when BAE Systems acquired the American United Defense Industries (UDI), which owned Sweden's Bofors. The Europeanisation of the land defence industry then accelerated in recent years. French

state-owned Nexter bought Mecar Belgium and Simmel Difesa (Italy) in 2014. Then, in 2015, Germany's Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Nexter created a joint holding company called KNDS. Although integration between the two firms remains limited for the time being, this could lay the foundations for a genuine merger further down the line. Early in 2019, Germany's Rheinmetall signalled its interest in acquiring at least 50% of this new holding, a move which would further consolidate the sector.³⁷ Furthermore, in 2019 Rheinmetall bought 55% of BAE System's combat vehicle unit leading to a joint venture

³⁶ Adrien Caralp, "The Restructuring of the European Land Armaments Industry: Between political incentives and economic pressures", *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal*, vol. 12, no. 1 (2017).

³⁷ "Expand to survive: how Rheinmetall is working to secure its future", *Army-Technology*, February 27, 2019, <https://www.army-technology.com/comment/rheinmetall-european-land-defence/>; Sebastian Sprenger, "Tank maker takeover: Germany's Rheinmetall eyes acquisition of rival KMW", *Defense News*, November 27, 2018, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/11/27/tank-maker-takeover-germanys-rheinmetall-eyes-acquisition-of-rival-kmw/>.


between the two groups – Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land.³⁸

In the naval domain, France's Naval Group and Italy's Fincantieri signed in June 2019 a joint venture agreement, which was named Navaris later in the year.³⁹ Additionally, there has been an acceleration of Europeanisation at the sub-regional level in the north of Europe. In addition to the aforementioned purchase of Kockums by Saab, Finland bought back stakes in Patria from Airbus in 2014; then, in 2016, Kongsberg bought 49.9% of Patria. The two jointly then purchased AIM Norway in 2018. In 2016, Saab had bought Nordic Defence Industries Denmark. Noting that Nammo is already a trans-Nordic company, these movements have strengthened the Nordic part of the EDTIB.

However, none of the merger and acquisition activities that have taken place in the 2000s would match the failed attempt at an EADS (now Airbus)-BAE Systems 'mega merger' in 2012. Had the planned *rapprochement* succeeded, the new entity would have been the world's second-largest in terms of defence revenue, just behind Lockheed Martin.⁴⁰ This episode plainly showed that governments remained in the driving seat of defence industrial dynamics, even though the two Chief Executive Officers of each company advocated for

Certified companies

Number, 2014, 2016, and 2019



* as of 26 September 2019

Data: Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité, 2014; European Commission, 2016 and 2019

38 BAE Systems, "Rheinmetall and BAE Systems Launch UK Based Military Vehicle Joint Venture – Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land", July 1, 2019, <https://www.baesystems.com/en/article/rheinmetall-and-bae-systems-launch-uk-based-military-vehicle-joint-venture-rheinmetall-bae-systems-land>.

39 Fincantieri, "Fincantieri and Naval Group sign a joint venture agreement", June 14, 2019, <https://www.fincantieri.com/en/media/press-releases/2019/fincantieri-and-naval-group-sign-a-joint-venture-agreement/>; Naval Group, "Navaris is the name of the joint venture between Naval Group and Fincantieri", October 30, 2019, <https://www.naval-group.com/en/news/navaris-is-the-name-of-the-joint-venture-between-naval-group-and-fincantieri/>.

40 Based on the companies' 2012 defence revenue. BAE-EADS would have reached US\$41.7bn, when Lockheed Martin was at US\$44.9bn. *Defense News* Top 100, 2013, <https://people.defensenews.com/top-100/>.

the deal.⁴¹ In this sense, EU institutions played no part in this planned merger – either to initiate the merger or to stall it. Overall, therefore, despite some tendencies towards re-nationalisation, the restructuring of the defence industry at the European level continued without much involvement by bodies like the EDA or Commission. This highlights the fact that the CSDP in itself has not been a relevant incentive to stimulate the consolidation of the European defence market – firms have taken this matter into their own hands in response to systemic market changes. Again, it will be interesting to see how consolidation evolves in Europe on the back of the EDF and PESCO.

Conclusion

Taking stock of the EU's defence industrial legacy over the past 20 years, this chapter has shown that so far policy outcomes have been mixed in terms of market integration and industry consolidation. Regarding the creation of a single EU defence market, the implementation of the Defence Procurement Directive has led to more transparent competition for European defence manufacturers and it is true that countries tend to invoke Article 346 less frequently than before the Directive. They also less frequently request offsets when

So far policy outcomes have been mixed in terms of market integration and industry consolidation.

buying from other European manufacturers. However, the Defence Procurement Directive has not necessarily led to more cross-border procurement, as around three-quarters of the contracts are still awarded to domestic suppliers. The Defence Transfers Directive has not had the same success so far and it has not led to a harmonisation of licensing requirements. As

for joint procurement, there has been an uptick in recent years but these cases occur mainly outside of the EU framework. It thus remains to be seen whether the newly activated PESCO framework or the EDF will encourage participating governments to launch and manage joint capability development projects under the EU umbrella.

⁴¹ Pierre Barbaroux and Blandine Laperche, "The Failed Birth of a Giant: Lessons Learned from the Collapse of the EADS/BAE Systems Merger", *Journal of Innovation Economics & Management*, vol. 12, no. 2 (2013), pp. 103–125.

On the consolidation and competitiveness of the EDTIB, there has been further Europeanisation since the post-Cold War era but consolidation has largely been driven by defence companies or governments themselves rather than by the EU. For example, EU policy had no effect on the EADS/BAE merger talks back in 2012 or the more recent tie-up between Nexter and Krauss-Maffei Wegman in 2015 – these were decisions strongly influenced by national governments and the companies' leadership. In this regard, the EU's defence industrial legacy over the past two decades has been to create the conditions for such merger and acquisition activities and to regulate the European defence market, even if the Union has had a limited role in each objective. This underscores the reality that institutions such as the European Commission 'still have an indirect and partial link with the defence industry'.⁴² Of course, the introduction of new initiatives such as PESCO and the EDF may change this situation over the next 20 years and it should not be overlooked that the creation of a new DG for Defence Industry and Space – announced in September 2019 – could focus efforts under the new European Commission.⁴³ It is too soon to say how far PESCO and EDF will contribute to a more competitive European defence market and effective CSDP, but the analysis above has shown that much rests on the shoulders of the EU member states. Quite how EU defence industrial policy will be written about two decades from now is the focus of chapter 9 in this volume.

⁴² Daniel Fiott, *Defence Industrial Cooperation in the European Union: The State, the Firm and Europe* (London: Routledge, 2019), p. 25.

⁴³ European Commission, "Mission Letter for Thierry Breton, Commissioner-designate for Internal Market, Brussels", November 7, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/president-elect_von_der_leyens_mission_letter_to_thierry_breton.pdf.

CHAPTER 5

Beyond civilian power?

Civilian CSDP two decades on

ANA E. JUNCOS

For the past 20 years, the civilian dimension of the CSDP has arguably developed in the shadow of its military counterpart, so it is no surprise that this policy has been referred to as the ‘Cinderella’ or the ‘ugly duckling’ of the CSDP.¹ Yet, civilian CSDP comes closer than its military sibling to capturing the EU’s role as an international security actor, the way the international security context has shaped that role over time and the kind of power that the EU has been able to exercise at the international level. Civilian CSDP can be seen as a microcosm of the EU’s security ambitions to develop an integrated, multilateral and flexible approach to international conflicts and crises, in particular in its neighbourhood.

Looking back, the development of the civilian CSDP was certainly stymied by the debate over a military dimension at the EU level. The momentous Franco-British declaration at St Malo (1998) focused exclusively on the need to develop ‘credible military forces’ to ensure the EU had the ‘capacity

¹ See Nicoletta Pirozzi, “The Civilian CSDP Compact: A Success Story for the EU’s Crisis Management Cinderella?”, *EUISS Policy Brief*, no. 9, October 2018 and chapter 10 in this volume.

for autonomous action'.² However, those that were concerned about a potential militarisation of the EU were quick to respond. The neutral countries, led by Sweden and Finland,³ and supported by those that wanted to limit the pace of developments on the military side, were able to push for the establishment of a non-military crisis management mechanism at the Helsinki European Council (December 1999).

Despite its erratic start, progress in this area during its first years was rapid. Of the institutional structures put in place at Helsinki, the Committee on the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) was the first body to become operational. At the Feira Council, the EU member states identified four priority areas in civilian crisis management (policing, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection) and made a commitment to provide 5,000 police personnel by 2003. As with the military Headline Goals, a civilian capability catalogue was to be assembled to allow civilian personnel to be deployed rapidly. Moreover, the first civilian, and first ever ESDP mission,⁴ the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia, was deployed in January 2003, just as the EU was getting ready to launch its first EU military operation (EUFOR *Concordia*). Since then, almost two-thirds of the EU missions and operations launched have been civilian in nature or have had a civilian component. As of December 2019, out of the sixteen ongoing CSDP missions and operations, ten are civilian missions.⁵

In what follows, this chapter reviews the EU's efforts in this area over the past 20 years, including its key successes and main shortcomings, and reflects on what the civilian CSDP tells us about the role of the EU as an international security actor. The chapter first examines the way in which the international security context has shaped the CSDP, before exploring its record so far. This assessment reveals a picture of a limited (even symbolic) and regional engagement, but one that promotes a particular security identity: of a normative, multilateral actor, committed to developing an integrated approach to conflicts and crises. There remain, however, two important gaps in terms of

2 Maartje Rutten, "From St-Malo to Nice – European Defence: Core Documents", *EUISS Chaillot Paper*, no. 47, May 2001, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp047e.pdf>.

3 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Small States, Big Influence: The Overlooked Nordic Influence on the Civilian ESDP", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 47, no. 1 (2009), pp. 81–102.

4 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this policy area has been renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

5 European External Action Service, "Military and Civilian Missions and Operations", 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en.

capabilities and intergovernmental politics that threaten the EU's distinctive identity as a security actor. How the EU addresses these key issues in the future will determine the continued relevance of civilian CSDP.

Responding to a changing security environment

The emergence and development of the civilian dimension of the CSDP has been led as much by internal politics as by the evolution of the external security context – e.g. types of threats, international responses and the degree of competition and cooperation. The overall trend, however, has been one of increasing external demand for civilian capacities to deal with conflicts and crises. Developments at the end of the 1990s took place against the backdrop of the post-Cold War security context, with the increase in intra-state conflicts, such as those witnessed during the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation. The main form of response during that period took place in the form of multilateral interventions, particularly UN peacekeeping missions, driven by the principles of the liberal peace paradigm – i.e. the promotion of free markets and liberal democracies. Regional organisations such as the EU and NATO also stepped up to this challenge, becoming more involved in crisis management and peacebuilding. The establishment of the civilian CSDP and the Feira priorities thus reflected this liberal consensus.

However, the nature of the threats and the level of international competition has changed since then. One of the first lessons of post-Cold War peacekeeping interventions was that it is not possible to resolve crises by relying on military assets alone and that most of these interventions require a long-term effort to build sustainable peace. Hence, while peacekeeping forces are still considered crucial in the first stages of a conflict, civilian crisis management has become increasingly relevant as an instrument to support transition and long-term stabilisation and development. Civil-military coordination has thus become a priority in CSDP. Moreover, traditional peacebuilding tasks such as focusing on monitoring a ceasefire, electoral observation missions, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) have been complemented by a focus on new security tasks. These include counter-terrorism after the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, migration in the wake of the Syria crisis or countering hybrid

threats after the Crimea crisis. The more benign security context of the 1990s has been replaced by one characterised by increasing geopolitical competition in Europe and beyond.⁶

Changes to the external security context have profoundly shaped the development of civilian CSDP. The expansion of the Petersberg Tasks with the Lisbon Treaty – including new tasks such as ‘the fight against terrorism’ – already reflected some of these changes. The trend towards more holistic mandates, from very narrow ‘police’ missions to rule of law missions (e.g. EULEX Kosovo), and, more recently, wider SSR missions (e.g. the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine), stems from a renewed awareness of the changing security context, as well as from lessons learned during the implementation of the first civilian CSDP missions.⁷ The failure of previous international interventions and, by extension, the liberal peace paradigm, has also led to a refocusing of civilian CSDP towards ‘localisation’ and away from top-down institution-building, ensuring local ownership of the reform processes and building local capacities to foster the resilience of external partners.⁸ Thus, recent civilian CSDP operations (e.g. EUCAP Mali, EUCAP Niger, EUCAP Nestor/Somalia) have adopted new roles in terms of supporting local capacity building.

In a more competitive geopolitical environment, however, the EU needs to combine these tasks with the protection of the EU’s interests, and in particular, the protection of the Union and its citizens.⁹ Civilian CSDP missions have also sought to pursue those interests by strengthening the capacities of external partners to confront security threats, and by pursuing more security-focused tasks such as fighting organised crime and border management (EULEX Kosovo and EUBAM Rafah), illegal immigration (EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali), counter-terrorism (EUPOL Afghanistan

The push for a securitisation of migration responses ... has also driven some of these developments.

6 European External Action Service, “The European Union in a Global Changing Environment. A More Connected, Contested and Complex world – Executive Summary”, 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/docs/strategic_review/eu-strategic-review_executive_summary_en.pdf.

7 Ana E. Juncos, *EU Foreign and Security Policy in Bosnia: The Politics of Coherence and Effectiveness* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013).

8 Council of the European Union, “Implementation Plan on Security and Defence”, 14392/16, Brussels, November 14, 2016; and Ana E. Juncos, “Resilience as the New EU Foreign Policy Paradigm: a Pragmatist Turn?”, *European Security*, vol. 26, no. 1 (2017), pp. 1–18.

9 EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, June 2016, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf.

and EUCAP Sahel Niger) and anti-piracy (EUCAP Nestor/Somalia). Such tasks also reflect an increasing consensus at the EU level about the need to improve the internal-external security nexus and the coordination and synergies between CSDP instruments and justice and home affairs (JHA) at the EU and national level (see chapter 7). The push for a securitisation of migration responses, particularly in some EU member states, has also driven some of these developments.

The previous discussion thus shows how the external security environment has shaped policy objectives and mandates over the past two decades, but also the degree of adaptability and flexibility of civilian CSDP when it comes to responding to a changing security environment and increasing demands. But how have these missions fared when it comes to delivering on their mandates?


Civilian CSDP: from aspirations to reality

While the adaptation of its mandates provides evidence of the EU's aspirations as a relevant security player, the operational reality of civilian CSDP over the past two decades points towards more modest achievements, in particular: the relatively low numbers of missions and personnel deployed, its preference for non-executive mandates, and its regional (rather than global) scope.

After an initial period of relentless activity (nine missions deployed between 2003–2005), the number of civilian missions has stabilised with around ten ongoing missions, bringing the total to over twenty missions since 2003. The Union's most recent mission, a new civilian CSDP Advisory Mission to the Central African Republic (EUAM RCA), was established by the Council on 9 December 2019 and it will be operational no later than spring 2020. Regarding personnel deployed, the total figures are rather small, however, with around 1,878 deployed in civilian missions at the end of 2017, of which almost 50% of those were deployed with the EULEX mission in Kosovo.¹⁰ To put this into perspective, the UN deploys over 11 times more mission personnel than the EU,

10 Daniel Fiott and Jakob Bund, *Yearbook of European Security 2018* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2018).

Civilian CSDP Priority Areas



Data: Council of the European Union, 2019

although the total number of missions is only twice that of the EU.¹¹ The budgets are also modest, with around €281 million per year from the CFSP budget allocated to civilian CSDP.¹² Hence, EU missions are relatively smaller in size than those of the UN, a reflection of both the EU’s capabilities and ambition.

Many missions have also been too short-lived to have had any meaningful impact on local security sectors, such as the one-year mandate EUJUST THEMIS. Given the complex tasks and the security challenges faced by some of the recipient states (from Ukraine to Afghanistan to Somalia), the question of whether these deployments just amount to symbolism remains. Such

11 Hylke Dijkstra, Petar Petrov and Ewa Mahr, “Reacting to Conflict: Civilian Capabilities in the EU, UN and OSCE”, *EU-CIVCAP Report*, DL4.1, 2016, <https://eu-civcap.net/portfolio/deliverables/>.

12 European External Action Service, “Working to improve human security: civilian CSDP”, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/64326/working-improve-human-security-civilian-csdp_en.

limited engagements have meant that the ability of these missions to impact conditions on the ground has been marginal (e.g. EUPOL Afghanistan).¹³ The EU has used many of its civilian (and military) missions to show the world that it is willing to engage in security matters and that CSDP is not simply a talking shop. Its earlier missions to the Balkans (EUPM, *Proxima*), the Caucasus (EUJUST THEMIS) and Asia (EUPOL Afghanistan) were intended to demonstrate such commitment, in particular, to key partners such as the US. Yet, symbolism also comes with risks (e.g. in Afghanistan, Ukraine, Niger or Mali). One way in which the EU has sought to engage within these challenging environments, while minimising risks (and responsibility), has been through the implementation of non-executive mandates focusing on monitoring, mentoring and advising (MMA) – instead of so-called ‘executive’ mandates where EU personnel take over tasks from their local counterparts. This is also in line with increasing calls to promote ‘local ownership’ in SSR initiatives. The failure of EULEX Kosovo to implement its executive mandate has only reinforced arguments in favour of MMA mandates.

Finally, the geographical scope of the missions is also congruent with this modest operational implementation of civilian CSDP. While the reach of civilian CSDP has extended to places such as Afghanistan or Aceh, the bulk of the missions have continued to be deployed in the EU’s immediate and wider neighbourhood: the Western Balkans, South Caucasus, Middle East and on the African continent. Hence, the EU’s role in civilian crisis management resembles more that of a regional power, as it falls short of a truly global reach.

Civilian missions as a trademark of the CSDP

The EU Global Strategy refers to civilian missions as ‘a trademark of the CSDP’,¹⁴ but what brand are these missions promoting? Despite the limitations mentioned above, civilian CSDP has allowed the EU to pursue some of its

¹³ Claudia Major and Martina Bail, “Waiting for Soft Power: Why the EU Struggles with Civilian Crisis Management” in Eva Gross et al. (eds.), *Preventing Conflict, Managing Crises: European and American Perspectives*, (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2012), pp. 15–36.

¹⁴ Op. Cit., “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy”, p. 47.

goals as an international security actor, and in so doing, it has contributed to the emergence of a distinct security identity. Among these goals, one can identify the promotion of EU values (consistent with its self-identification as a ‘soft’ or ‘normative’ power), effective multilateralism and the integrated approach, all of which are reflected in the EU’s key strategic documents (mainly, the European Security Strategy of 2003 and the EU Global Strategy of 2016).

Regarding the first objective, the mandates of civilian CSDP missions are in line with the CFSP objectives as established in the Treaties – to promote democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the UN Charter of 1945 and international law (Article 21 TEU). The main focus

The geographical scope of the missions is also congruent with this modest operational implementation of civilian CSDP.

of civilian missions has been to strengthen the rule of law through the implementation of MMA mandates. Their preference for a ‘bottom-up’ approach and its long-term approach to building peace (even if not always reflected in sufficiently long mandates) also fits well with the idea of soft power. Ensuring local buy-in over the past two decades, however, has not always been possible. Despite their relatively hands-off approach, some of their mandates have clashed with the entrenched interests of local elites, especially where EU-sponsored reforms undermine their control over local security forces or limit access to lucrative resources. In other cases, the objectives of EU missions might be perceived as promoting EU interests, rather than values: for instance, where their mandates cover border management, the fight against counter-terrorism, illegal migration or organised crime. In those cases, the EU’s soft power might be undermined by the pursuit of interests. The increasing focus of the EU’s external action on migration also risks turning some of the EU’s current civilian missions into an instrument to control external migratory flows, arguably undermining both the effectiveness *and* the legitimacy of those missions.¹⁵

The pursuit of effective multilateralism is also evident in many of the civilian CSDP missions. Just like military operations, civilian missions have been

¹⁵ Op.Cit., “The Civilian CSDP Compact”, p. 4.

opened up to the participation of third countries. For both the EU and third countries, this remains a pragmatic and, to a certain extent, symbolic exercise – even more so on the civilian side.¹⁶ Recent examples include the US's contribution to EULEX (11 personnel, including 1 based at the Specialist Chambers in The Hague); Canada's contribution to EUPOL COPPS (1 officer); Norway's contribution to EUAM Ukraine (3 officers) or Switzerland's contribution to both EULEX Kosovo (with 2 officers) and EUAM Ukraine (with 1 officer). Effective multilateralism also takes place at the level of inter-organisational cooperation, for example, with the UN (e.g. in Mali), the OSCE (in Ukraine) or NATO (in Afghanistan or Kosovo). A case in point is EULEX Kosovo's participation in several joint exercises with KFOR in 2018. The missions also rely on extensive cooperation both at the local level, with host governments, and at the regional level, with neighbouring countries (e.g. in the cases of EUAM Iraq or EUCAP Somalia).

The EU's ability to implement an integrated approach to conflicts and crises also heavily relies on civilian CSDP and the synergies between these missions and other EU actors and instruments on the ground. Despite the teething problems that affected civilian CSDP in its first years of existence (lack of coherence between civilian and military CSDP on the ground and problems of coordination between Council and Commission instruments), progress has been made over time to ensure better complementarity and coordination between what goes on in Brussels and on the ground. The establishment of the double-hatted HR/VP, supported by the EEAS, did go some way to improving inter-institutional cooperation between the Council and the Commission, including in the area of civilian CSDP. The implementation of the EU Global Strategy and the Joint Communication on the Integrated Approach of 2014 should also help bring more coherence into the system – currently under the responsibility of the Integrated Approach for Security and Peace (ISP) division. One of the crucial questions remains whether a more joined-up approach can also be achieved between CSDP and JHA instruments.

16 With the exception of a few contributors (e.g. Turkey to EUFOR *Althea* and Georgia to EUTM *RCA*), most third country contributions are in the single figures.

Closing the expectation–capability gap?

Civilian CSDP has long suffered from the so-called ‘capability–expectation gap’, which refers to the EU’s ‘relatively limited ability to deliver’ on its foreign policy despite high expectations.¹⁷ While the CSDP machinery has been improved over the past two decades, including the establishment of CIVCOM, a CPCC,¹⁸ headed by the Civilian Operations Commander, and the Security and Defence Policy directorate (formerly known as CMPD), issues remain regarding the capabilities and resources available to civilian CSDP. One of the key problems that has bedevilled civilian missions over the past two decades relates to the recruitment and deployment of qualified personnel from the member states. While problems of capabilities also affect the military dimension, in the case of civilian CSDP the fact that competences over civilian personnel (e.g. police, judges, prosecutors) might be dispersed across different ministries at the national level, and that civilian personnel do not remain on standby to be deployed like their military counterparts, creates additional difficulties. Significant steps have been taken over the past decade with the adoption of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, the Headline Goal 2010, a list of generic civilian CSDP tasks, the creation of a permanent warehouse, the establishment of the Goalkeeper system and a Mission Support Platform. Yet the obstacles are still considerable.

Regarding recruitment over the past 20 years, national systems to select and deploy civilian personnel have been heterogeneous and many of them present some gaps, which undermines the operational effectiveness of the missions. In terms of training, the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and ENTRi (Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management) have improved the training system for peace operations, particularly in terms of

Since the inception of CSDP, member states have been reluctant to commit particular categories of personnel to EU missions.

¹⁷ Christopher Hill, “Closing the Capability–Expectations Gap”, in John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (eds.), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 23.

¹⁸ The CPCC was to replace the original Police Unit within the Directorate General (DG) IX in the Council Secretariat.

standardisation and the provision of specific civilian expertise. But there is still some scope for the harmonisation of training standards provided at the national level. Previous attempts to encourage pooling and sharing of personnel in this area to establish some standing capacities, such as the Civilian Response Teams (CRTs), have also proven unsuccessful, affecting the ability of the EU to deploy the required personnel. Since the inception of CSDP, member states have been reluctant to commit particular categories of personnel to EU missions (judges, rule of law experts), especially as these are already scarce resources at the national level. The Civilian CSDP Compact adopted in late 2018 seeks to address some of these issues (see chapter 10 in this volume).

To the 'capability-expectation gap', one must also add a 'consensus-expectations gap', which encapsulates the difficulties surrounding the formulation of a common European foreign policy. From this perspective, Europe's foreign policy problems stem from a 'lack of cohesiveness, the capacity to make assertive collective decisions and stick to them'.¹⁹ This stems from the existence of divergent national interests, strategic cultures, prioritisation of civilian vs military instruments, etc. The end result for the past 20 years has been the inability of member states to agree on particular courses of action, especially in sensitive areas (e.g. in the Eastern neighbourhood) or in ambiguous/vague mandates impacting the implementation stages. The proposal put forward by former Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in 2018 to extend Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to civilian CSDP might be seen as an attempt to bridge that consensus-expectation gap.²⁰ Yet, this proposal has been rejected by the member states (in particular, smaller member states) because it risks sidelining some countries, while doing little to ensure everyone is on board before a decision is taken.

19 Asle Toje, "The Consensus-Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe's Ineffective Foreign Policy", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 39, no. 1 (2008), p. 122.

20 Jean-Claude Juncker, "State of the Union 2018: The Hour of European Sovereignty," Strasbourg, September 12, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/state-union-2018-hour-european-sovereignty-2018-sep-12_en.

The challenge ahead: maintaining strategic relevance


20 years since the establishment of the civilian dimension of the CSDP there are still reasons to believe that this will continue to be a key instrument in the EU's toolbox and might even achieve a more equal status to that of the military dimension over time. Civilian CSDP chimes well with the EU's goals of developing an integrated approach to conflict and crises. It also strengthens the comparative value of the EU *vis-à-vis* other competing international organisations (e.g. the EU's ability to combine civilian and military instruments unlike NATO or the OSCE). Civilian CSDP constitutes a key means to implement EU values (in accordance with its normative power identity), but also the more interest-based approaches of resilience and capacity building. Thus, the EU Global Strategy and subsequent initiatives such as the Civilian CSDP Compact do not seek a return to the 'civilian power' paradigm; on the contrary, civilian CSDP is seen as an essential instrument for the exercise of both soft and hard power.²¹ The risk of irrelevance, however, remains, especially as some EU actors might prioritise migration and other internal-security concerns as drivers of crisis management missions. In order to remain a meaningful tool, civilian CSDP will need to rise to the challenge and become a more capable, effective, flexible and joined-up instrument, contributing to sustainable peace in the EU's neighbourhood and beyond.

**Civilian CSDP
chimes well
with the EU's goals
of developing an
integrated approach
to conflict and crises.**

21 Op.Cit., "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy", p. 4.



Image: European Defence Agency

A blue-tinted photograph of a forest floor. On the left, a portion of a backpack is visible. The ground is covered in dry grass and small plants. A large white rectangular box is centered on the right side of the image, containing the text 'AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE: WHAT LEVEL OF AMBITION?' in bold, dark blue, sans-serif capital letters.

**AN UNCERTAIN
FUTURE: WHAT
LEVEL OF
AMBITION?**

CHAPTER 6

Emerging security challenges

Four futures for CSDP

GUSTAV LINDSTROM

Looking ahead, a host of emerging security challenges are likely to affect future CSDP operations and missions. Besides influencing the geographic location of CSDP operations and missions, these challenges are also likely to highlight the need to consider new mission profiles and corresponding capabilities. As the introduction to this book states, there is also a need to think about the evolution of the CSDP against the context of broader strategic shifts and tensions. This chapter outlines some of these emerging security challenges, and seeks to answer two inter-related questions: what are the possible implications of emerging security challenges for the CSDP and how could the policy evolve in response to them? In particular, this chapter proposes at least four different ways in which to think about the CSDP and the future: (i) a more in-demand yet 'limited' CSDP; (ii) a more urban-centric CSDP; (iii) a CSDP that is comfortable operating alongside EU borders; and (iv) a CSDP that is adaptable to the unexpected. Before this, however, the chapter considers how security challenges that can potentially flow from climate change, urbanisation and emerging technologies may influence what we expect from the CSDP in the future.

Evolving trends and emerging challenges

At least three trends are likely to shape the future evolution of CSDP missions and operations in the decade ahead. The first one concerns the compounding effects of *climate change* – even if some of these will take additional time to materialise. As is already known, the effects of climate change are distributed unevenly across geographic regions. Areas that are particularly vulnerable, especially in the short- and medium-term, include the Arctic, as well as parts of Africa and Asia. With respect to Africa, seven out of the ten countries considered most vulnerable to climate change are on the continent. These include Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic and Eritrea.¹

For CSDP operations and missions, the growing number of climate risks across Africa (e.g. food insecurity and a higher incidence of malnutrition) are of particular concern, considering 75% of military operations were conducted – or are ongoing – on the continent since 2003. With respect to civilian missions, the corresponding number is 41%. The secondary effects of rising temperatures across these areas may translate into a number of risks that, in turn, can exacerbate tensions or conflicts in the region. These risks might include food security challenges stemming from weaker carbon fertilisation – affecting farming yields – and increased water stress in specific regions, for example due to longer-lasting droughts.² As access levels to food and water within a region change, this may also produce greater numbers of ‘climate migrants’. Such population movements may unintentionally lead to tensions and conflict as migrants literally seek new pastures and opportunities.

A second trend likely to affect CSDP in the future is *rapid urbanisation*. It is a global phenomenon but particularly visible in Africa and Asia, the latter being already home to most megacities or cities with a population size of 10 million or more. Recognising that most of the world’s fastest growing cities are also located in Asia and Africa, it comes as no surprise that the United Nations 2018 World

1 African Development Bank, “Climate change challenges facing Africa”, 2018, <https://www.cop24afdb.org/en/page/implications-africa>.

2 For more on food and water insecurity, as well as the longer-term effects of climate change, see Florence Gaub, *Global Trends to 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe*, European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), April 2019.

Cities report projects that 28 cities will cross the five million mark at some point between the present and 2030. Of these, thirteen are located in Asia and ten in Africa.³ While growing urbanisation is a global phenomenon and does not directly pose security challenges, it can exacerbate certain risks such as:

- > *Human health risks*: such risks may arise, for example, from poor sanitation management that is not adequately adapted to urbanisation growth. Likewise, some urban concentrations may facilitate the spread of zoonotic disease given high population densities in close proximity to animal populations;
- > *Governance risks*: inadequately governed urban population centres may serve as incubators for illicit activities, such as people, drugs and arms trafficking. These practices may in turn serve as a magnet for international criminal networks or fund-raising ventures to finance other illicit activities;
- > *Conflict-associated risks*: as the number of urban centres grow, so does the possibility that future conflicts or skirmishes take place around urban areas. This could arise due to accentuated socio-economic inequality or social-political friction. Recent civil wars in countries such as Syria, Libya and Yemen illustrate the particularly damaging effects of warfare in urban areas.

To date, most CSDP missions and operations have operated within a confined geographic space, typically outside of urban areas. While civilian CSDP

A key question for the EU is how to adapt CSDP missions and operations to better deal with the specific intensity and nature of urban conflicts.

missions have had greater exposure to urban areas, these mission objectives have principally focused on capacity building, training, or mentoring and advising. In this regard, a key question for the EU is how to adapt CSDP missions and operations to better deal with the specific intensity and nature of urban conflicts. If we assume many future conflicts will be based in or around urban settings, there is a need to reflect upon the ways in which such conflicts may affect

³ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *The World's Cities in 2018—Data Booklet* (ST/ESA/SER.A/417), 2018, https://www.un.org/en/events/citiesday/assets/pdf/the_worlds_cities_in_2018_data_booklet.pdf.

the permissibility of EU deployments (see chapter 8) and capability development.

A third trend is the continued *evolution of disruptive technologies*. Among these, the Internet of Things (IoT) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) represent two developments likely to impact CSDP operations and missions.⁴ With respect to the former, there is now a greater number of devices connected to the internet than our global population. Several estimates predict a continued rapid rise in connectivity. Statista, an online portal for statistics, projects around 75 billion devices connected to the internet by 2025, representing a fivefold increase in ten years.⁵


This trend, which is supported by developments in computing power, big data and faster connectivity (e.g. the gradual uptake of 5G), is progressively opening the door to smart cities, smart transportation systems, smart grids, etc. For future CSDP operations, this may require greater attention to protect such systems in areas of operations, especially as they may become attractive targets to those seeking to maximise disruption on the ground. Although the roll-out of IoT will progress at different rates globally, it is likely that laggards will eventually leapfrog to such systems. While interconnected devices can provide multiple benefits to societies, they can also introduce certain vulnerabilities. An example is the potential for ‘cascading’ effects across critical infrastructures, most of which will be connected to the internet in the future. While these infrastructures will be more cost-effective, many will also be more vulnerable, due to inadequate security measures.⁶ Under such conditions, a breakdown in one system (e.g. the electricity grid), could rapidly reverberate across other infrastructures, resulting in a wide-scale slowdown of services and supply chains.

4 Daniel Fiott and Gustav Lindstrom, “Artificial Intelligence: What Implications for EU Security and Defence?”, *EUISS Brief*, no. 10, November 8, 2018.

5 Statista, ‘Internet of Things (IoT) connected devices installed base worldwide from 2015 to 2025 (in billions)’, 2019, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/471264/iot-number-of-connected-devices-worldwide/>.

6 For more, see Aamir Lakhani, “Securing critical infrastructure against modern vulnerabilities and cyberthreats”, *GCN*, October 19, 2018, <https://gcn.com/articles/2018/10/19/critical-infrastructure-security.aspx>.

CSDP and emerging security challenges



Concerning AI, there are ongoing advances in related fields ranging from machine learning to neural networks. The common denominator across them is gradual support towards the emergence of increasingly autonomous systems. As is the case with the IoTs, AI advances will yield many societal benefits, but there are also potential issues of concern. A frequently cited challenge is the possible rise of lethal autonomous (person-out-of-the-loop) weapons systems that operate on sea, land or air. However, even before we get to fully autonomous systems, those with basic levels of autonomy can create disruption. A good illustration is the use of drones in proximity to civilian airports. Recent cases in countries such as the UK have shown their effectiveness in disrupting take-off and landings. It is not hard to imagine that a similar application of this technique could adversely impact the delivery of humanitarian aid (or CSDP personnel) in a conflict zone.

Possible implications for CSDP

The three trends and associated emerging security challenges outlined above can have both direct and indirect implications for CSDP. For example, tensions fuelled by any combination of food, water, or migratory pressures may increase the demand for CSDP operations and missions, especially in countries around Central Africa or Southeast Asia. Addressing such challenges places a premium on using multiple tools in the context of an integrated approach, including possible EU action at all stages of the conflict cycle, as noted in the EU's Global Strategy.

The trend towards urbanisation places a particular set of demands on future CSDP missions and operations – especially for those of a military nature

where tasks such as the separation of parties by force may be required. Thus, any such operations in close proximity to a city with a population of 5 million or megacity would be a tall order. As a result, military planners may need to consider further doctrine development for CSDP operations in urban terrain. Given the possibility of health or conflict risks in urban areas, there may likewise be a need to examine new mission profiles such as quarantine operations in volatile urban zones, a task traditionally carried out by police or gendarmerie forces. From a different vantage point, the steady increase in European tourism abroad, including to urban areas, may call for greater non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) capabilities.

The potential employment of disruptive technologies in conflict or tension zones can also affect the character of CSDP missions and operations. Looking ahead, military CSDP operations may face hostile drones (whose level of autonomy and range will vary) rudimentarily armed with grenades, explosive devices, or low-grade chemical agents in basic containers. This is already observable in some conflict zones, so it could very well apply to zones where CSDP contingents will operate in the future. In a more distant future, it is also possible that increasingly autonomous systems are employed in coordinated swarm formations – with implications for CSDP force protection capabilities, counter-swarming techniques and perimeter security capabilities.

With respect to both military and civilian operations, advances in disruptive technologies may also require the capacity to protect civilian critical infrastructures in pre- or post-conflict situations. To illustrate, a CSDP mission in support of an electoral process may need to address the effects of cyber- or hybrid attacks on specific critical infrastructures or services (such as an electoral commission or its equivalent). To mitigate such risks, future CSDP missions might need to be able to have a ‘plug and play’ capability that enables the temporary attachment of specialised personnel in case of need.

These and related emerging security challenges may also have more general implications for CSDP. Among the more salient are:

- > *A more in-demand yet ‘limited’ CSDP* – A counterintuitive implication stemming from emerging security challenges relating to climate, food and water accessibility is the potentially limiting effect these may have for CSDP, even if this results in more

Tensions fuelled by any combination of food, water, or migratory pressures may increase the demand for CSDP operations and missions.

frequent demands for CSDP operations and missions to mitigate the effects of conflict or tension – especially across geographic spaces disproportionately affected by climate change.

Addressing these types of challenges requires a wide combination of tools, for example financial support mechanisms, many of which the European Commission administers. Overall, these types of challenges may require greater coordination across instruments, overarching strategies and envoys who have the ability to oversee the combination of such resources. Limiting the scope of such challenges also places a premium on sophisticated early warning capabilities, to gauge how several factors coming together in space and time can result in conflict or tension. In addition, it may require a greater reliance on existing tools, such as earth observation capabilities to identify possible solution spaces. To illustrate, remote sensing might be used more routinely to identify water located underground to support humanitarian action.

- > *A more urban-centric CSDP* – Given sustained urbanisation trends, CSDP is increasingly likely to operate in or near urban areas. For military CSDP operations that have limited experience in this domain, there may be a need to update the illustrative scenarios identified in the requirements catalogue to include the capacity to conduct short-term operations in urban terrain. From a different vantage point, there may be a need to review the extent to which EU Battlegroups have capacities to operate in urban areas or access the appropriate strategic enablers, such as special operations units. With respect to capabilities, operating around urban areas may call for greater intelligence gathering via air- or space-based assets. Again, for CSDP missions and operations, this could mean greater reliance on drones or increasingly automated systems that can support surveillance requirements, search and rescue and explosive ordinance disposal.
- > *A CSDP comfortable operating alongside EU borders* – Given the internal-external security nexus, there may be greater impetus for CSDP operations and missions near or inside the EU's borders (see chapter 7). While the EU 'solidarity clause' already provides flexibility with respect to such a scenario, CSDP operations and missions to date are typically far from the EU's borders. Looking ahead, as hybrid threat techniques are increasingly employed, CSDP and Area of Freedom, Justice, and Security (AFSJ) mixed

operations may be needed in close proximity – for example to contain trafficking flows or through maritime operations. Such coordination, which can take different forms, could also support stabilisation or crisis management operations.⁷

- > *A CSDP adaptable to the unexpected* – As noted earlier, climate change will affect geographic zones unevenly. One such zone is the Arctic where there are many national interests at play: for example, concerning the use of sea lanes of communication/transport and access to potential energy sources. While the Arctic zone is foreseen to remain conflict-free, there is no guarantee that this will be the case – especially if tensions or misunderstandings were to escalate. While EU member states may address such situations in a national, bilateral or multilateral manner, there may be some space for potential CSDP contributions, such as escorting or possibly freedom of navigation exercises to minimise tension. Preparing for such developments would translate into maintaining a certain degree of naval capabilities across EU member states.

It should be noted that disruptive technologies may also affect the execution of CSDP missions and operations in unexpected ways. For example, advances in quantum computing could at some point in the future negatively impact the confidentiality of EU communications undertaken within the framework of CSDP missions and operations, as encryption standards are impacted. Likewise, the availability of communications might be affected as new jamming techniques are employed in an area of operations, for example through electromagnetic pulses.

Conclusion

Since the operationalisation of CSDP in 2003, missions and operations conducted under the EU flag have continually adapted to changing demands. Initial activities focusing on traditional peacekeeping and police missions

⁷ For an overview of four formulas, see Roderick Parkes, “Healthy Boundaries – Remedies for Europe’s Cross-Border Disorder”, *EUISS Chaillot Paper*, no. 152, May 2019.

were eventually complemented by new mission profiles focusing on SSR, rule of law, mentoring, monitoring and advising. At the same time, CSDP operations and missions have been strengthened through new structures, such as the respective civilian and military planning and conduct capabilities (the CPCC and MPCC).

Looking ahead, new developments, including the advent of new emerging security challenges, will require further adaptation. This may go beyond the geographic scope of CSDP deployments and the types of missions and operations undertaken. Emerging security challenges are likely to require rethinking the combination of civilian and military tools, the tactics used on the ground and more adaptive CSDP packages. Successful adaptation may also require greater reliance on early warning, strategic foresight, cyber security capabilities and space infrastructures. Lastly, recognising that CSDP is a tool rather than an end in itself, there is the continual need to calibrate it to contribute effectively towards the EU's integrated approach and the CFSP.

CHAPTER 7

Reading the runes

The future of CSDP and AFSJ

RODERICK PARKES

Twenty years of economic globalisation have exhausted even the most robust countries when it comes to building political institutions, creating jobs and managing natural resources. Many African and Asian states struggle to fill the borders carved out for them at the time of independence. What is required is a global investment in state-building on a scale not seen since the 1950s. The recent Schengen crisis offered a taster for Europe: act now, or face a generation of disorderly migration, crime and terrorism. This chapter argues that, despite the scale of the challenge, the EU is well-placed to contribute to international efforts. The EU has a treasury of state-building expertise gleaned from creating its Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ); it has developed the means to inject this expertise into other countries in the form of CSDP deployments; it is currently displaying a quite clear strategic vision regarding the future; and it can look back on past CSDP deployments which successfully involved the three main AFSJ agencies, namely Frontex, Europol and Eurojust.

The trouble is this: the AFSJ and CSDP are still caught up in the *zeitgeist* of 1999. That was a time when the EU embraced globalisation, dismantled borders, and believed it could intervene freely as a force for good in the world. Admittedly, had the EU not lifted borders between its member states, it would

never have built up its treasury of expertise; and, had it not had the ambition to intervene freely abroad, it might still be dependent on the US or the UN. But there is no escaping the fact: the AFSJ and CSDP remain stuck in a different era. Updating AFSJ and CSDP capabilities; combining them in ways that harness their respective strengths; submitting them to a single strategic vision; and drawing the right lessons from past deployments – this is an extremely tall order. Too tall, it seems. This chapter reads the runes. It predicts that AFSJ agencies will simply displace CSDP deployments and become the EU's prime instrument in this field of governance support at home and abroad. It also wonders if this is such a bad thing.


AFSJ+CSDP: the genesis

Looking back 20 years, Europe's then leaders might be credited with remarkable foresight. In the 1990s globalisation was just beginning to show its 'dark side' – something that has become the defining problem of our times. In 1995, two events rattled the capitals of Europe. At home, the deepening of the internal market, and specifically the launch of the Schengen border-free travel zone, magnified Europe's problems with crime and terrorism; abroad, in the nearby Balkans, an outbreak of ethnic violence was quelled only thanks to the intervention of the US. 1995 was a wake-up call. University professors may still have been celebrating the 'end of history', but it was clear that old ethnic conflicts were re-emerging, hand in hand with new problems like a transnational 'McMafia'. EU interior ministers duly began to work on flanking measures to protect the Schengen Area, safeguarding Europe's *freedom* (border guards encircled the free-movement area), *security* (police teamed up to break criminal networks) and *justice* (investigators and prosecutors worked together to punish criminals). EU defence ministers began work on a common capability to intervene in foreign conflicts independently of the US.

Four years later, in 1999, EU governments were ready to launch the AFSJ and the ESDP – later to become the CSDP. Today, these twin projects have delivered us with useful capabilities for today's world. The historic decision to develop a CSDP – and in particular to create formats for deploying European and international personnel abroad – leaves the EU well-positioned to conduct foreign interventions. The decision to found an AFSJ – and more particularly to entrust its running to three home affairs agencies – has endowed the EU with relevant governance expertise. The trio of AFSJ agencies are:

AFSJ milestones

1985-2013



Frontex (tasked to build the border around Schengen); Europol (to link up police forces across Schengen); and Eurojust (to improve judicial cooperation). Today, these agencies pride themselves on setting the gold standard in the exercise of core state functions like border control, and they can rely on CSDP deployments to advance and sustain their work abroad. Or so one might think. But CSDP and AFSJ have more complex roots, and the legacy of the 1990s is more nuanced. Put bluntly: the EU's twin capabilities are still stuck in the past.

European cooperation on internal security in fact dates back at least four decades. In the 1970s, interior ministries set up working groups to combat problems like smuggling, 'asylum-shopping' and Islamist terrorism. So when EU leaders decided to launch Schengen and the AFSJ, this actually *disrupted* their work. This new project was motivated not by some prescient assessment of the dangers of globalisation, but rather by a readiness to embrace them. Schengen and the AFSJ were primarily about lightening borders. Now, admittedly, interior ministries would never have produced today's deep treasury of rules and norms if left to their own devices. But these norms are quite specific to a decision to lighten border controls in Europe two decades ago. Moreover, they are resented by the very interior ministries which authored them. At certain political junctures, foreign ministers have exerted disproportionate influence on EU integration, and they have used

these junctures for grandiose projects. Foreign ministries took advantage of just such windows in the 1990s – an intergovernmental initiative (Schengen), a round of EU treaty change (Amsterdam) and a political summit (Tampere)

– to drive through the AFSJ.¹ Interior ministers have never quite reconciled themselves to the AFSJ.

Schengen and the AFSJ were primarily about lightening borders.

The genesis of CSDP is not so different: this EU project was also championed by foreign ministers and was launched in a flurry of summitry. Just as they had been seduced by the idea of giving the EU a role in internal security, so too were foreign ministers attracted to the symbolism of an EU defence capability.² What the EU ended up launching, though, was again something slightly different – a tool for intervening abroad and bolstering weak states in Africa and Asia. This happens to be extremely useful today. But it was not the original ambition, which was scotched by defence ministers. European defence ministers had, like interior ministers, been co-operating for decades. In 1999, their priority was to prevent any CSDP capabilities encroaching on NATO's defence role. Negotiators duly restricted CSDP deployments to areas outside the EU (as opposed to territorial defence); they carved out a range of 'civilian' jobs for the CSDP (distinct from NATO's military activities); and they confined CSDP to reactive 'crisis management' missions (rather than proactive deterrence). The trouble today is that CSDP deployments struggle to link back to the EU's internal sphere, let alone to behave proactively or link the EU's civilian assets with the military.

PSC×COSI: CSDP and AFSJ aim for a division of labour

Despite these difficult beginnings, the EU does at least appear to have developed its AFSJ and CSDP capabilities according to an efficient division of labour. This ought to leave it well placed to combine them today to maximum effect. The AFSJ agencies are focused on the EU itself, where they have built up a treasury of expertise about the exercise of core state functions. They have

1 Virginie Guiraudon, "European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue Shopping," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 38, no. 2 (2000), p. 265.

2 Anand Menon, "Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten," *International Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 2 (2009), p. 241.

developed ways to clamp down on football hooligans and white supremacist networks; they trace criminals across borders and stop asylum-seekers ‘shopping’ for the state offering the best conditions. Their experiences could readily be adapted to governance problems faced by African, Asian and Latin American states. CSDP focuses on precisely these parts of the world, intervening in weak states. CSDP deployments do international peacekeeping, stabilisation and governance support. In the context of today’s global state-building crisis, AFSJ and CSDP thus seem to provide complementary capabilities: CSDP provides a vehicle, AFSJ provides the passengers. But here too appearances deceive. In practice, there is no neat division between AFSJ and CSDP. They are currently doing similar things in the same places.

AFSJ agencies have gone global. Frontex is deploying its own liaison officers to regions from the Western Balkans to Western Africa, and has gained the power to operate in any foreign country which signs a status agreement with the EU; Europol has sent police experts to Libya; and Eurojust has concluded multiple arrangements to share evidence with foreign prosecutors. Contrast that with CSDP deployments, the EU’s original international format. They are now focusing on the EU’s most pressing domestic interests – terrorists, smugglers, migrants. CSDP deployments hold back criminals and migrants in North Africa, and operate at the very borders of the EU in the Central Mediterranean, a zone which Frontex had come to regard as its own. While Frontex talks grandly of gathering ‘human intelligence’ in far-off conflict zones, CSDP planners nervously discuss an eventual deployment on the territory of the EU itself.³ AFSJ agencies are disregarding CSDP distinctions between ‘crisis management’ and ‘deterrence’, ‘civilian’ and ‘military’, ‘internal’ and ‘external’. CSDP staff struggle to understand AFSJ norms which are attuned to the Schengen Area, not the Sahel.

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If AFSJ agencies and CSDP deployments do still operate separately from each other, it is only because each acts in its own administrative silo. In practice their tasks and zones of action heavily overlap. And this overlap is another

³ According to Article 4.2.1 TEU, CSDP deployments can only be deployed outside the EU. But there is speculation that Treaty Article 222, the ‘solidarity clause’, might override this. A member state overwhelmed by a disaster such as a large-scale terrorist attack can trigger this, and the EU and member states are obliged to make available all tools at their disposal. That might include a deployment of personnel under a CSDP umbrella.

legacy of the 1990s, a time when the EU was actively pursuing a strategy to *blur* the two fields of security, internal and external. Foreign ministers had become caught up in the optimistic spirit of the times. They came to believe that, if the EU lightened its borders, and embraced global interdependence, it could 'domesticate' international geopolitics. The EU spread its internal standards abroad, in a bid to pacify external regions. The AFSJ agencies were duly encouraged to apply EU standards to the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. For their part, CSDP deployments began to specialise in states' internal governance, shying away from hot crisis management tasks. They deployed border, policing and judicial experts to war-hit Northern Macedonia, Georgia and Ukraine. It is only today, when the EU has reversed the strategy of the 2000s and is actively trying to *sever* the nexus between its internal and external spheres, that it has finally begun to address the overlap between its AFSJ agencies and CSDP deployments.

The job of sorting out this messy overlap has been handed to two Brussels committees – CSDP's PSC and AFSJ's Committee on Internal Security (COSI). Unfortunately, historic tensions between interior and foreign ministries play out in their talks. It would be an exaggeration to say that the interior ministry officials in COSI still bear a grudge against the foreign ministry representatives in the PSC for the disruption caused by Schengen. But old differences of style do complicate things. And COSI officials point to a bitter irony: CSDP, the field which foreign ministries themselves took control of in 1999, remains strictly intergovernmental; by contrast the AFSJ, their own field, truly has become a grand European project. Interior ministries are thus subject to the whims of the European Commission whereas foreign ministries are not. Furthermore, interior ministries appear increasingly ready to exploit that advantage even if it makes cooperation with CSDP harder: COSI encourages the AFSJ agencies to cooperate with the Commission services and access the EU budget in ways that CSDP deployments cannot.

HOME+NEAR: the Commission's new strategic consciousness

Despite these problems, at a strategic level there is growing clarity in Brussels. Commission officials recognise the importance of state-building. They trace the global pandemic of crime, migration and terrorism to a sudden dip in

international commitment in this sphere. Back in the 1950s the US led a wave of state-building. Washington correctly perceived that, when states fail to provide territorial security, people will migrate; when economic inequality grows, people resort to the 'crooked social ladder' of crime; and if people feel trapped both physically *and* socioeconomically, they turn to political violence. America advocated strong borders, a degree of economic protectionism and well-stocked public sectors. And yet, its commitment to state-building turned out to be superficial: America's goal was not nation-building *per se*; it was to dismantle European and Soviet empires by means of decolonisation. And sure enough, from the late 1970s, as the US established its hegemony in Asia and Africa, it began to U-turn: Washington started to criticise burdensome customs controls, national economic champions, and large administrations. US interests were now to be served by the free flow of trade and capital.

We are being rocked by the aftershock. Back in the 1950s, migration was still largely domestic; criminal mafias, national; terrorists, separatist. Since the 1990s, all three phenomena have become primarily transnational. The reason is that global economic flows overwhelmed weak states. When the Soviet empire finally collapsed in 1991, and globalisation began in earnest, many African and Asian states were still only half-formed. They proved unequal to the strains. Faith in the liberal model of global integration evaporated – and, with it, faith in the state itself. As migration, crime and terrorism have risen, states like China and Russia have promoted their more authoritarian alternatives. These two countries have weathered the storm by sticking to the statist spirit of the 1950s. They are now challenging the cornerstones of the liberal order – the World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Bank, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and UN – which tried to square the circle of global economic deregulation and political state-building. These liberal bodies had promised that a mix of free capital flows and migration restrictions would induce global economic catch-up and nation-building.⁴ China and Russia are now pushing them aside and making a conquest of law-and-order bodies like Interpol and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

The EU is surrounded by dangers. Its neighbourhood comprises states at risk of collapse, notably Libya. Turkey and Russia are challenging borders allotted during decolonisation. African states are resigned to seeing their young

⁴ The idea was that free flows of capital and goods would spawn middle-classes across the developing world, and migration restrictions would keep them captive until they had completed the process of state-building.

citizens leave, since these youths are causing instability at home rather than patiently building political institutions. China is stepping in to fill the security vacuum in the neighbourhood, deploying police to Europe itself. Furthermore, international migration, crime and terrorism are no longer just survival strategies for desperate people. They are generating their own forms of order – and

The Commission now envisions using these AFSJ agencies to expand its role in EU foreign policy.

in the case of the terrorist ‘Islamic State’, this is happening right on the EU’s doorstep. It is a far cry from the 1990s, when Europe envisioned itself surrounded by friendly countries waiting patiently to apply its own recipe of state-building and economic regulation (‘Managed Globalisation’). Back then, member states out-sourced their security provision, privatised crit-

ical infrastructure and placed military technologies in the commercial domain.

If the Commission is becoming aware of the full strategic picture, it is because it is finally bringing together its home affairs and international experts. Links between its DGs HOME, NEAR and DEVCO are being reinforced. And yet: these institutional reforms appear motivated more by political games in Brussels than by any desire to combine AFSJ and CSDP in the field. Since the 1990s, the Commission has coveted a role in European foreign and security policy, and it is ready to exploit PSC-COSI tensions to achieve this. The Commission has gradually drawn the three AFSJ agencies into its ambit, exploiting its role in regulating the internal market, allotting funds from the EU budget and in the appointment of the agencies’ executive directors. The Commission now envisions using these AFSJ agencies to expand its role in EU foreign policy. It would like to use the agencies as implementers of EU development aid, thus establishing them as a Commission-led alternative to CSDP deployments.⁵ Its idea, in other words, would be to *replace* CSDP, allowing AFSJ agencies to operate at home and abroad. And interior ministries appear (cautiously) open to this move: after all, the internationalisation of AFSJ agencies would come at the expense of their old rivals, the foreign ministries.⁶

⁵ At present, Frontex draws development aid for just one project – its long-standing Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community (AFIC). From an EU standpoint, it may appear an attractive project implementer because it allows the EU directly to recoup development spending. On AFIC: “Frontex opens Risk Analysis Cell in Senegal,” Frontex press release, June 13, 2019, shorturl.at/gsu2z.

⁶ Interior ministries generally dislike seeing Frontex deployed anywhere further than the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. But they dislike even more the attempts by foreign ministries to recruit their personnel to CSDP deployments.

IBM vs. IBM: learning from past experiments

Operational cooperation usually works best in the field, far from Brussels. Cooperation between CSDP and AFSJ assets is no exception. In 2005, the EU deployed a border assistance mission to Moldova. This border assistance mission, EUBAM MD/UA, mixed AFSJ and CSDP formats, as well as including additional components (notably involving OLAF, the EU body for cracking down on customs fraud). And it has been a success. The aim was to prevent smugglers turning the breakaway region of Transnistria into a criminal paradise and to bring Moldova and neighbouring Ukraine into line with EU trade and customs rules. The mission has transformed this Russian sphere of influence into a European 'sphere of expertise', and in Moldova border officials talk warmly of an EU mission which is attuned to both their technical needs and geopolitical circumstances. And yet the experiment is unlikely ever to be repeated. The reason is that, in Brussels, nobody can claim sole credit for it – not the European Commission, not member state interior ministries, not foreign ministries. Indeed, all these parties view the mission with a degree of mistrust. It falls outside proper lines of authority.

So it was no surprise when, in 2019, the European Parliament signed off a document which appeared to limit the scope for such mixed deployments. If this document is anything to go by, the legislature's focus will henceforth be on building up the AFSJ agencies, and on relegating CSDP deployments to a mere service role. The document in question is the new Frontex Regulation. The AFSJ agency is transformed by this Regulation, which deals with Frontex's relations to CSDP only as an afterthought. It is only when we reach Article 69 that we discover CSDP missions are now obliged to service Frontex activities. According to the Regulation, the main job of CSDP deployments, when it comes to border assistance, will be to supplement Frontex's situational picture. Thus CSDP naval operations will meekly provide Frontex with surveillance products and CSDP deployments in countries like Niger will deliver to Frontex timely information about migration trends. Should CSDP deployments carry out border assistance tasks of their own, they would be expected to behave as mere substitutes for Frontex. This means applying the textbook Frontex version of border control, Integrated Border Management (IBM).

This may all sound reasonable. And yet the Moldova mission of 2005 succeeded precisely because it was permitted to improvise its own IBM model.

It deviated from the Frontex textbook in a way now precluded by Article 69. Some background detail about border management is required here. Borders across Eastern Europe and North Africa all face the same basic dilemma: their customs services account for up to 15% of government revenue; their military uses the border as the first line of defence; and, under difficult geopolitical conditions, the two struggle to work out who should be in the lead. A hybrid EU mission like EUBAM MD/UA can adapt to the geopolitics of each particular border to defuse this tension. By contrast, a mission which applied the Frontex textbook would struggle. Frontex wrote its textbook specifically for the Schengen border where immigration authorities, and not the military or customs, rule. If the EU applies this model to Eastern Europe or North Africa, then it risks fundamentally altering the border ecosystem there. We have already seen this in Libya and Niger where the EU transformed customs posts into immigration controls, and we have seen it in Ukraine and Georgia where the EU pushed for the wholesale demilitarisation of borders.

There is, nevertheless, a good reason for avoiding mix-and-match missions like EUBAM MD/UA. This has to do with accountability. The European Parliament is known to be suspicious of CSDP deployments, which it does not oversee, and it fears that joint CSDP-AFSJ deployments could prove undemocratic. But, again, inter-institutional games may be afoot in Brussels. Article 69 can be read as a manoeuvre by the Commission to exploit Parliament's mistrust, and to assert the primacy of the AFSJ agencies in the international sphere. If so, then this manoeuvre is unlikely to succeed, at least not at once. Foreign ministries are matching the Commission's effort to build up the AFSJ agencies, and they are reinforcing CSDP capabilities to manage borders. It is all a far cry from 2005 when a shortfall in capabilities forced the EU to improvise. Neither CSDP nor AFSJ was in a position to supply a full border deployment to Eastern Europe. Frontex was still a mere start-up being run from a Warsaw hotel; and CSDP planners had just launched a series of ambitious missions, which overstretched their resources and garnered mistrust in Moscow. The EU was thus obliged to create a hybrid mission, with genuinely positive results. The risk today is of duplication.

P.S. FRONTEX: the big winner

Readers will likely have reached a realisation by now, even if it has not yet dawned on policymakers in Brussels: the great winner of the past 20 years of inter-institutional games is not the Parliament or the Commission; it is not interior ministries or foreign ministries. It is the pawns which all these players believe they control: the CSDP deployments and AFSJ agencies. For 20 years, the AFSJ agencies in particular have been the silent beneficiary of every major institutional battle in this field. The agencies were created thanks to the manoeuvres of foreign ministries to give the EU a role in internal security; they have benefited from the willingness of interior ministries to access the Commission services and EU budget in ways CSDP deployments cannot; they have benefited from the ambitions of the Commission to develop its own own capability to intervene abroad and replace CSDP; and they benefited, in 2019, when the European Parliament signed off on Article 69 of the Frontex Regulation. Moreover, it is one AFSJ agency in particular that has benefited from these battles: *Frontex*.

The adoption of the new Frontex Regulation provided a neat point of symmetry in the development of Europe's security order. Almost exactly 20 years after the AFSJ was launched at a summit in Tampere, southern Finland, the far-reaching Frontex Regulation was adopted in Brussels under the presidency of the Finnish government. This document will in turn define the coming 20 years of European security activity. It is hard to exaggerate how far the Regulation has raised the level of activity in Frontex HQ, let alone of ambition. Frontex now enjoys a projected budget of €2 billion over the next five years; it has asserted its right to become the reference point for all EU-funded border research projects, including on drones and AI; it is building a new HQ, which will have space to test and bring to market new technologies; it is recruiting a staff of thousands; and it has an EU 'policy-cycle' at its disposal, one which involves Frontex writing a multi-annual risk assessment, drawing up a technical strategy, monitoring the diligence of member states and making operational and capability-development decisions. No wonder Frontex is undertaking tasks usually covered by CSDP and the other AFSJ agencies. And no wonder this is causing tensions.

Under Article 5 of the new Regulation, for instance, Frontex is developing a standing border corps, the EU's first uniformed service, numbering 10,000 personnel. This sounds like a sound strategic goal for strengthening the AFSJ – create a federal border and coastguard force to end the duplication entailed

by maintaining multiple national border agencies in Europe. But Frontex cannot help but tread on toes. The trouble is that Frontex will draw many of the projected 10,000 border guards from existing national stocks, which number only around 100,000. This risks depleting forces from frontline member states in particular: it is the staff of low-wage eastern and southern member states which will find the international career path most attractive. Border defences inside the EU may thus be weakened. Furthermore, these frontline member states will likely refuse to accept back deployments of these new 'euro-border guards' under a Frontex badge, preferring to see them deployed to third countries. CSDP deployments are likely to become a vehicle for these deployments, with Frontex seconding surplus staff to resource-strapped CSDP deployments and in turn defining their work.⁷

Europol too is being squeezed by Frontex, which wants to supplant its status as lead EU body for cross-border law enforcement.

Not all AFSJ agencies are as strong as Frontex of course, and it might be hoped that Europol or Eurojust would take a more even-handed approach to CSDP. Europol is certainly not in a position to replace CSDP policing deployments. But Europol poses its own kind of challenge to CSDP. This is because Europol too is being squeezed by Frontex, which wants to supplant its status as lead EU body for cross-border law enforcement.

Europol may try to use CSDP deployments to compete. This might see Europol using CSDP deployments in the Sahel to gather criminal intelligence in a bid to keep up with Frontex which deploys its own fact-finding liaison officers abroad. For their part, CSDP planners appear open to working with Europol in this way: they are desperate to prove their usefulness to EU citizens when it comes to combating smuggling and terrorism. The trouble is: if CSDP deployments do start feeding Europol with sensitive information, they risk undermining their relationship to their host states in Africa. And if Europol acts on this information, it risks undermining the careful judicial evidence chains created by Eurojust – and perhaps by Frontex operations themselves.

⁷ Frontex can only deploy abroad if the host government has signed an agreement with the EU. That means it is unable to deploy an operation to a place like Libya, where there is no government. In such cases, Frontex would use CSDP deployments as a vehicle.

EU-CSDP: the founding of fortress Europe?

Observers have read the runes and they calculate that the EU minus CSDP equals fortress Europe. There is indeed a real danger that, by giving the AFSJ agencies – and in particular Frontex – a lead role at home and abroad, we will see the construction of a defensive ring around the EU. Frontex is a migration and law-enforcement body, and it will logically focus on the mere symptoms of international shifts – on migration, crime and political violence – without linking to the underlying drivers. Without the guiding hand of CSDP planners, AFSJ agencies operating abroad will likely focus on the EU's most pressing internal security vulnerabilities. This would be a poor response to what is a global crisis of state-building. And yet, the creation of fortress Europe is not pre-ordained. Frontex is increasingly capable of providing an all-round approach to state-building.

One study has elaborated blueprints for joint CSDP-AFSJ deployments.⁸ These consisted of four generic formats which would preserve the relative strengths of both capabilities, AFSJ and CSDP. On the CSDP side, these strengths included geographic range, speed of deployment, sound diplo-strategic acumen and scope to provide 'comprehensive' security. But since the entry into force of their new Regulation, Frontex staff point out that they cover these just as well. Frontex is now permitted to operate worldwide and is training its staff to access 'hot crises'; it is building its own stockpile of assets for speedy deployment; it has liaison officers to provide it with strategic information; and it is building its links to the Commission services across a comprehensive range of state-building functions.

As the EU limbers up for a wave of state-building, perhaps Frontex is the creature it needs.

⁸ Roderick Parkes, "Healthy Boundaries: Remedies for Europe's Cross-border Disorder," *EUISS Chaillot Paper* no. 152, May 2019, p.12.

CHAPTER 8

As you were?

The EU as an evolving military actor

DANIEL FIOTT

In addition to development aid, humanitarian assistance, diplomacy, restrictive measures and election observation missions, the EU's CSDP missions and operations are a recognisable feature of the Union's external action. Such missions and operations are usually held up as an example of the Union's ability to be an effective crisis responder and they are designed to undertake humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping activities; peacemaking; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; post-conflict stabilisation tasks, and more. In recent years, the importance of CSDP missions and operations has been underlined by both the 2016 EU Global Strategy and Council Conclusions of 14 November 2016.¹ Yet, while CSDP missions and operations retain their value, they are also being deployed in increasingly contested environments. Indeed, it is perhaps an obvious observation that the strategic landscape in and around the EU

¹ Council of the EU, "Conclusions on Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the Area of Security and Defence", 14149/16, Brussels, November 14, 2016.

has changed dramatically over the past few years (e.g. Russia's increasingly assertive posture, the demise of the INF Treaty, the crisis in the Sahel, etc.). To name but a few challenges facing Europe: the rise of terrorist and criminal groups; widely available, yet cheap, technologies such as drones; the growing presence of third powers; and the shifting nature of conflict and warfare (see chapter 6). On top of this, there are also questions about the future of NATO, the transatlantic relationship and European strategic autonomy.

Today, therefore, military CSDP is dealing with a core challenge. On the one hand, the EU is still trying to meet the objectives of the Headline Goals, which were agreed to in the 1990s and point towards the need for the Union to enhance its military capabilities and its capacities for deployability in line with the 'Petersberg Tasks' (see chapters 2 and 3). On the other hand, the world has changed dramatically since the 1990s and there are questions over whether the EU's current military level of ambition – as inherited from the 1990s – is fit for purpose. Here, it should be noted that the EU Global Strategy and the Council Conclusions on security and defence from 14 November 2016 have already partially redefined the military level of ambition: in 2016, these documents reconfirmed the EU's focus on crisis management and capacity building but also raised the prospect of using CSDP tools for the protection of Europe and Europeans. This evolution was largely a response to the hybrid threats facing Europe since Russia's seizure of the Crimea in 2014, but also to internal security challenges such as terrorist attacks (e.g. Paris in 2015) and border management (see chapter 7). In particular, more attention is now being given to provisions in the treaties that may have military implications such as the Mutual Assistance (Article 42.7 TEU) and Solidarity (Article 222 TFEU) Clauses.

This chapter tackles the seeming contradiction between the historical military level of ambition set by the EU, and the present and future demands on the Union as a military actor. It seeks to answer two interrelated questions: what options exist to enhance the EU's military level of ambition and why is this necessary? To

this end, the chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part explores the shifting nature of the strategic and operational landscape facing military CSDP. Here, the focus is on the challenges of permissibility and the factors that are contributing to making it more difficult to deploy EU military CSDP missions and operations. The second part specifically tackles the evolving concept of the EU as a military actor. Drawing on existing EU treaty provisions

There are questions over whether the EU's current military level of ambition is fit for purpose.

and looking at the implications of the EU Global Strategy, this section looks at the ways in which the EU's military level of ambition may evolve in the future.

Deteriorating drop zones


To date, EU military operations under the CSDP have been deployed in largely 'permissive' environments. In the language of the EUMC, a 'permissive environment' is defined as 'an area where there is no opposition to the EU-led force, be it when there is an explicit authorisation by the Host State or where there is *de facto* consent of all the parties.'² In contrast, a non-permissive environment would signal that there is opposition to an EU-led force being deployed – this is where we would generally move from a non-executive to executive operation or mission. Yet, this definition is generally centred on the strategic level of permissibility where what matters is whether the EU has permission to deploy or not. Actually, the concept of 'permissibility' is wider than this definition because one must factor in tactical sources of friction during deployments such as *technologies* (e.g. improvised weaponry and ordinance), *hostile actors* (e.g. terrorist groups) and *geography* (e.g. meteorological conditions). In this sense, forces can still face hostile factors even in a 'permissive' environment.

Through its military operations and missions, the EU has engaged in numerous hostile environments. Executive operations such as EUNAVFOR *Atalanta* have been operating in hostile waters as part of a successful fight against piracy – albeit asymmetrically (i.e. EU naval vessels facing off against makeshift boats, dinghies and skiffs). Likewise, EUFOR *Althea*'s executive mandate means that the EU has deployed military force to provide deterrence and to hold the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in line with international agreements. Whenever non-executive CSDP missions or operations are deployed, there are risks too. Many of the countries or regions to which the EU deploys are marked by fragile political and security institutions, and EU civilian and military personnel are susceptible to armed terrorist attacks and hostile environments. Recall, for instance, that EU personnel were lost following

2 Council of the EU, "EU Military Committee Glossary of Acronyms and Definitions Revision 2018", 6763/19, February 22, 2019, Brussels, p. 92, <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6763-2019-INIT/en/pdf>.

CSDP military missions/operations

Past and present



Data: European External Action Service, 2019; European University Institute, 2017

the terrorist attack on the *Le Campement* leisure centre, Bamako, Mali on 20 June 2017.³ On 19 September 2013, a Lithuanian EULEX Kosovo customs officer also lost his life when he was shot dead in the line of duty while driving in northern Kosovo.⁴

Furthermore, such conflict environments are often awash with instability due to the proliferation of weapons and weak political institutions. For example, in Libya in 2016 it was estimated that 20 million weapons were in

³ EU Training Mission Mali, “HQ EUTM in Mourning”, June 20, 2017, <http://eutmmali.eu/en/hq-eutm-in-mourning/>.

⁴ European External Action Service, “EULEX Honours Audrius Senavicius”, September 19, 2018, <https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,10,859>.

circulation in the country and recent UN reports have highlighted how heavy and light weapons are being shipped out of the country and fuelling conflict in neighbouring states and regions.⁵ Moreover, beyond the issue of weapons proliferation, political stability in parts of the world that the EU is likely to deploy to has deteriorated. For example, one study shows that while attempted and successful coup events have declined considerably over the past two decades globally, around 70% of all coup events since 2000 have taken place in sub-Saharan Africa – what is more Burkina Faso, Burundi, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania and Somalia are estimated to be the top 5 countries most at risk from coups in this part of the world.⁶ Furthermore, in its November 2019 ‘CrisisWatch’ analysis International Crisis Group estimated that 15 countries globally are experiencing a deteriorating situation, including countries of concern for the EU such as Mali, Iraq and Somalia (where the EU has already deployed CSDP missions and operations).⁷

In addition to these experiences, however, the EU has to increasingly contend with a shifting geopolitical environment where third powers such as Russia are adopting a ‘get in first’ strategy to conflict zones. In other words, they deploy troops or special forces to a country to tip the balance in favour of the regime they support and/or to change the diplomatic and military calculus for Western governments. Russia’s presence in Syria and Venezuela are prime examples of this strategy. Additionally, third powers (and terrorist groups) can use a mixture of investments, arms exports, diplomacy, cyber hacks, cybercrime and disinformation – under the threshold of conventional military force – to make it harder for external actors to deploy and sustain military operations in places such as Africa. For example, disinformation operations, fake news and propaganda can be used to ‘influence a target audience’s values, belief systems, perceptions, emotions, motivation, reasoning and behaviour’.⁸

5 Michelle Nichols, “U.N. approves high seas crackdown on Libya arms smuggling”, *Reuters*, June 14, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security/u-n-approves-high-seas-crackdown-on-libya-arms-smuggling-idUSKCN0Z02Jo>. See also, UN Security Council, “Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011)”, *S/2015/128*, February 23, 2015 and UN Security Council, “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011)”, *S/2019/914*, December 9, 2019.

6 Clayton Besaw et al., “Annual Risk of Coup Report”, *OEI Research/One Earth Future*, April, 2019, https://oefresearch.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/Risk_of_Coup_Report_2019.pdf.

7 International Crisis Group, “CrisisWatch: Global Overview”, November, 2019, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch>.

8 Collins Devon Cockrell, “Russian Actions and Methods against the United States and NATO”, *Military Review*, no. 1, 2017, p. 17, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2017-Online-Exclusive-Articles/Russian-Actions-and-Methods/>.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has already observed how al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and Daesh have deployed social media campaigns to discredit the programme's work in Africa,⁹ but Russian media networks are penetrating French-speaking parts of Africa¹⁰ and implying that the EU is deploying military force to the Central Mediterranean as a form of neo-colonialism – although, quite what territory the EU has seized during the operation remains unclear.¹¹ China has also entered the information space in European neighbourhoods.¹²

A final way in which the strategic environment of the neighbourhood is in transition relates to technology. A growing number of countries in the Union's neighbourhood are fielding ballistic missiles, air defence systems, submarines, automated air and naval vehicles and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to inflate so-called Anti-Access/Aerial Denial (A2/AD) 'bubbles'. A2/AD capabilities are used to cordon off geographical areas and raise the costs of military encroachment into these areas.¹³ Of more immediate concern for CSDP perhaps is the increasing availability of low-cost technologies that can be used to close the gap with European forces. While sophisticated weaponised drones are still beyond the reach of most terrorist organisations, some groups could modify commercial drones for 'a terrorist attack against civilians or in an IED-like capacity against patrolling military personnel' (e.g. as Daesh did in Iraq and Hamas in Israel).¹⁴ What is more, the growing reach of third powers in and around key sea lanes of communication also calls into question the relative freedom European navies enjoy on the seas and oceans (as demonstrated for example by recent tensions in the Strait of Hormuz).

9 Kate Cox et al., "Social Media in Africa: A Double-Edged Sword for Security and Development", UN Development Programme Research Report, 2018, http://www.africa.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/UNDP-RAND-Social-Media-Africa-Research-Report_final_3%20Oct.pdf.

10 Kevin Limonier, "The Dissemination of Russian-Sourced News in Africa: A Preliminary General Map", *Research Paper*, no. 66, Institut de recherche stratégique de l'École militaire, January 29, 2019, https://www.irsem.fr/data/files/irsem/documents/document/file/2965/RP_IRSEM_No66_2019.pdf.

11 See for example "EU Military Plan for Migrant Crisis – 'Return to Colonial Mentality'", *Sputnik*, May 29, 2015, <https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201505291022708660/>.

12 Although more nuanced than Kremlin-backed media, China Global Television Network (CGTN) in its reporting on Africa occasionally implies that the EU is trying to damage relations between Africa and China. See: "Uganda accuses EU of overstepping bounds", *CGTN Africa*, September 17, 2018, <https://africa.cgtn.com/2018/09/17/uganda-accuses-eu-of-overstepping-bounds/>.

13 See, for example, Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, "NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, vol. 58, no. 2 (2016), pp. 95–116.

14 Kelley Saylor, "A World of Proliferated Drones: A Technology Primer", Center for a New American Security, June 2015, p. 29.

The left-handed monkey wrench?

If we are therefore to accept the idea that the meaning of ‘permissibility’ is evolving in the context of multiple security challenges, then this invites us to ask whether or not we think the EU’s current military of level of ambition is fit for purpose. As chapter 2 in this book made clear, at Helsinki in 1999 the EU decided that its military objective as a crisis manager should be to be able to deploy up to 60,000 land personnel within 60 days for up to a year by 2003. As this objective failed, however, a new headline goal was set in 2004 with 2010 as the new deadline – by 2010, the goal was still not met but the Helsinki Headline Goals still remain in place to this day. Of course, in many ways the Headline Goal process has become emblematic of the lack of member state commitment to the military CSDP – after all, no CSDP military operation or mission can be deployed without the member states’ capabilities. However, perhaps this is an unfair criticism when we consider that even NATO has suffered difficulties with the Response Force (NRF) that it established in 2002 – the Alliance’s aim was to establish a predominantly European, rapidly deployable joint force of about 25,000 troops to deal with a range of tasks such as preserving territorial integrity, undertaking peace operations and delivering disaster relief. The NRF target was never really met and NATO even decided to expand the NRF to 40,000 personnel in June 2015.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the Headline Goal was set dur-

ing a period where permissibility was taken for granted by the EU without any of the challenges mentioned above.

As of today, the Headline Goal still stands and it continues to be a benchmark with which to measure member states’ commitment to CSDP. This is not to say that governments have failed to recognise the problem. Even at the Helsinki meeting in 1999, alongside the discussions

about the Headline Goal, member states were also keen to establish a rapidly deployable force package of approximately 1,500 troops called the EU Battle Groups. Yet, even the Battle Groups have underperformed – the EU is able to generate the six-month rotational forces, but it is unable to decide when and

In many ways the Headline Goal process has become emblematic of the lack of member state commitment to the military CSDP.

¹⁵ Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning, “The NATO Response Force: A Qualified Failure No More?”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 38, no. 3 (2017), p. 444.

Length and strength

Beginning, end/current mandate length, maximum and current strength of CSDP missions and operations

Status


- A Ongoing
- A Past

Type

- Civilian mission
- Civilian/military mission
- Military mission
- Military operation

Peak number of personnel

- 100
- 500
- 2,000
- 7,000



Data: European External Action Service, 2019; European University Institute, 2017

how the Battle Groups should be used. What is more, when member states met to discuss a new Headline Goal at the Brussels European Council in December 2008, they further refined the military level of ambition. While endorsing the need to meet the '60,000 target' by 2010, they also called for the Union to be able to undertake: (i) two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations with the support of 10,000 land personnel for at least two years; (ii) two rapid response operations using the EU Battle Groups; (iii) an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals in less than 10 days; (iv) a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission; (v) one rapid response civil-military humanitarian assistance and/or disaster relief operation lasting up to 90 days; and (vi) a range of civilian missions (see chapter 5).¹⁶ Thus, the overall goal stands but so too do these additional military tasks.

Military planners were challenged to think beyond the traditional crisis management paradigm.

In 2016, the EU Global Strategy and the Council Conclusions on security and defence from 14 November 2016 only reaffirmed the Union's commitment to the goals set in 1999¹⁷ – even though the member states had failed to live up to these commitments. Yet, the Global Strategy and its follow-on work on security and defence did raise some new issues and challeng-

es for the EU's military level of ambition. First, the political level of ambition set by former HR/VP Federica Mogherini through the Global Strategy and the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD) focused on strengthening the EU's capacity to: (i) respond to external conflicts and crises; (ii) build partners' capacities; and (iii) protect the EU and its citizens. Translating this political level of ambition into a military one has confronted military planners with questions. With regard to the first two objectives, the Council called for a review of the EU's military requirements through a revision of the so-called 'Requirements Catalogue'¹⁸ in 2017, and this led to the updating of the

¹⁶ Council of the EU, "Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 11 and 12 December 2008 on the European Security and Defence Policy", *Press Release*, December 12, 2008, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/104699.pdf.

¹⁷ See Op.Cit., "Council Conclusions", 14149/16, 'Annex to the Annex'.

¹⁸ The Requirements Catalogue identifies the agreed military capabilities required to pursue the EU's military level of ambition set in the Headline Goal. See: Council of the EU, "EUMC Glossary of Acronyms and Definitions Revision 2018", 6763/19, February 22, 2019, Brussels.

‘Progress Catalogue’¹⁹ in 2018 as a way to measure the gap between the EU’s stated military objectives and its capabilities – or rather between rhetoric and reality. Following the conclusions of the 2018 Progress Catalogue and the areas of concern it raised, the EU’s military planners and relevant political bodies (PSC, PMG and CIVCOM) agreed in March 2019 to a phased approach to meet the Union’s shortfalls. Again, the overall Headline Goal was not questioned but a new method of achieving it was put in place.

What the Progress Catalogue meant by a ‘phased approach’ included two target years for the EU to up its military game: for the short term (within 6 years) and the medium term (within 12 years). Within these temporal windows, the Progress Catalogue first called for a new approach to priority setting through the so-called High Impact Capability Goals (HICGs). Unlike the EDA’s CDP, which focuses on Europe’s broader capability gaps and needs, the HICGs are designed to address only the most pressing capability shortfalls over the short and medium term as they specifically relate to the EU’s military level of ambition (thus, to CSDP and not NATO or Europe). With regard to the phased approach, the Requirements Catalogue also developed the five most likely illustrative scenarios including peace enforcement, support to stabilisation and capacity building, conflict prevention, rescue/evacuation and support to humanitarian assistance. Each of these scenarios responds to the Headline Goals, but, unlike past iterations of the illustrative scenarios, further military tasks have been included to take note of the challenges mentioned in the previous section (e.g. countering hybrid threats during peace enforcement missions and/or protection of critical infrastructure).

While the Headline Goals have therefore remained fixed, the EU’s military planners have flexibly used existing policy tools – like the catalogues – to identify the current challenges of military engagement and permissibility and call for the prioritisation of capabilities needed over the next 12 years. It should also be recognised that other parallel initiatives may give some degree of hope that the EU can meet its military objectives, sooner rather than later. First, binding commitments 12 and 13 under PESCO make clear that participating states need to make available formations that are strategically deployable and interoperable to meet the EU’s military level of ambition. While the PESCO notification in its own right will not lead to deployable forces, the top-down

19 The Progress Catalogue presents the prioritised capability shortfalls and the related operational risks. It is the qualitative and quantitative ‘delta’ between the Force Catalogue and the Requirements Catalogue. See: *Ibid.*

steering of the initiative could ensure meaningful changes over time. For example, one of the more specific commitments calls on member states to aim for ‘fast-tracked political commitment at national level, including possible reviewing their national decision-making procedures [sic]’.²⁰ While such a commitment is unlikely to lead to the removal of constitutional locks on the use of force, looking at ways to enhance political decisions authorising the use of force is essential. Second, in November 2018 the Council of the EU called for the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) to be able to take responsibility for one executive CSDP military operation by 2020.²¹ Although limited to an EU Battle Group-sized force of about 1,500, the revised responsibilities for the MPCC shows that the Union continues to prepare itself for the possible need to deploy force in hostile environments.

The new military level of ambition set by former HR/VP Mogherini and member states served to broaden the scope of security and defence beyond a mere focus on CSDP military capabilities. In fact, the third pillar of the EU's ambitions on security and defence – ‘to protect the EU and its citizens’ – challenged military planners to think beyond the traditional crisis management paradigm underpinning CSDP. The Council of the EU agreed that CSDP and EU could also potentially play a role, among other tasks, in protecting networks and critical infrastructure, ensuring border security, maintaining access to the global commons (including on the high seas and space), countering hybrid threats, preventing and countering terrorism and radicalisation and upholding the Mutual Assistance and Solidarity Clauses of the Treaties.²² Of course, such duties do not always necessarily involve the need for a military response but the addition of these tasks implied that EU military officials had to include them in their planning assumptions and in the capability shortfalls identified as part of the Requirements Catalogue process. Although the Headline Goal remains untouched, therefore, the potential military taskings have increased in line with the new threats and geopolitical uncertainties facing Europe. While this shows the EU's ability to politically take stock of some fundamental strategic changes in terms of threats and conflicts, it also gives rise to the

20 Council of the EU, “Council Decision establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation and Determining the List of Participating Member States”, (CFSP) 2017/2315, December 14, 2017.

21 Council of the EU, “Council Conclusions on Security and Defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy”, 10048/19, Luxembourg, June 17, 2019, p. 4.

22 Op.Cit., “Council Conclusions”, 14149/16, p. 5.

observation that the Union's political level of ambition is perhaps somehow disconnected from the present realities of the EU's military capability package.

Additionally, the specific reference to the ways that CSDP could support the Union's response in case of the invocation of the Mutual Assistance and Solidarity Clauses pushes the Policy and the level of ambition beyond the language used in the Treaties. Indeed, the treaty provisions on the CSDP state that missions and operations should be used 'outside the Union' (see Article 42.1 TEU), but both the Mutual Assistance and Solidarity Clauses refer to the need to respond to crises 'on the territory' of the Union. Even though France's invocation of the Mutual Assistance Clause in 2015 did not lead to the deployment of EU forces on its or any other EU state's territory, this ambiguity in the treaties theoretically opens the door to the EU and CSDP playing a role inside the Union should member states be the victim of an act of armed aggression or a 'man-made' disaster. Clearly, if the EU's member states are still unable to meet the Headline Goals they set back in 1999, they would equally find it difficult to live up to the type of military tasks implied by the Mutual Assistance and Solidarity Clauses (e.g. deterrence or continental force deployments). Of course, most EU-NATO members would still likely favour the Alliance in such cases, but this is not true for EU member states that are not part of NATO.

On this basis, and given the present difficulties facing the transatlantic relationship and NATO – with mixed messages on whether the US would uphold NATO's Article 5 Mutual Defence Clause –, it is surely prudent to plan for what the EU would (could even) do if either Article 42.7 or Article 222 were invoked: even if it means reconfiguring how the EU plans for capabilities and military operations and missions over the longer

term. Widening the scope of CSDP to potentially include continental security when the Union is still unable to meet its crisis management goals exposes the Union to a huge military credibility deficit. As chapter 2 states in its three scenarios, European countries are more likely to prefer to Europeanise NATO to deal with the potential withdrawal of the US from European security rather than rely on the EU. In any case, any CSDP that evolves in the future to undertake both crisis management tasks and continental security would have to deal with uncomfortable conversations about nuclear deterrence. This is a notion that the EU is currently ill-prepared for and unwilling to entertain. Again, what credibility would the Union have if it rhetorically invests in this

Continental security in Europe has always required military mass, but, increasingly, crisis management operations do too.

expansion of EU military tasks without having yet proved that it can meet its original mandate on defence?

A weapon of mass reduction?

So, how are we to answer the two questions posed at the outset of this chapter: what options exist to enhance the EU's military level of ambition and why is this necessary? The first obvious response is that the Union still needs to meet its own stated objectives on crisis management. Although the EU has deployed military CSDP operations and missions, none of these deployments has really proven that the EU can meet the original objectives found under the Headline Goals. As European governments only have a single set of forces, and these forces are dedicated to the EU, NATO, UN and coalitions of the willing, there is perhaps a need to rethink the Headline Goals that have been inherited. This is a challenging task. For example, if the Union revises the 60,000 target downwards then this may symbolise a tacit admission of failure and indicate that the EU has decreased its level of ambition as a consequence. Yet perhaps force strength is the wrong angle from which to approach this discussion and it may be better to focus on the military threats facing the EU in terms of both crisis management and deterrence, and then let the military requirements be calculated in consequence. After all, the 60,000 figure derived from the war in the Balkans in the 1990s, but today force requirements in terms of personnel numbers and capability/technology packages would need to be revised. What is different today when compared to the 1990s, however, is that member states might find it difficult to agree on an assessment of where they will likely deploy force in the future.

Refocusing discussions about the EU's military level of ambition in this manner will be equally challenging, however. The drive towards force specialisation and smaller numbers of troops (so-called 'Bonsai armies') is in many ways at odds with the security challenges facing Europe today. Continental security in Europe has always required military mass, but, increasingly, crisis management operations do too. In this regard, long-standing discussions about whether the EU should or should not deploy an EU Battle Group in times of crisis misses the mark in terms of the gravity of the European security situation today – it is almost like a discussion happening in a parallel universe. As stated earlier, geopolitics has led to a broadening of the EU's political level of ambition for defence, but this has only created fundamentally onerous

questions about the Union's military level of ambition – will member states make ready the forces and capabilities needed to fill the gap between rhetoric and reality? The EU's military planners give the member states 12 years to see if they are serious about filling the most critical needs.

Without operational effectiveness, the Union will lack political credibility at a time when Europe is faced with a deteriorating security environment and the multilateral order is under threat. It is right, as the Council demanded in June 2019,²³ that the Union draw the lessons learned from the first invocation of Article 42.7 and study the possible implications of Article 222. This way, the EU can have a credible and

serious discussion about what role the EU and CSDP might play in defending Europe at some point in the future. However, this chapter has also outlined how the evolving contours of crisis management are marked by sophisticated technology, hybrid threats, A2/AD capabilities and more. The reality is that the EU has a long way to go before it can safely call itself a credible crisis manager in this new strategic context – the permissive crisis management era of the 1990s and early 2000s is over, and an altogether more sinister version is gradually taking its place. Fortunately, there are policy mechanisms that allow the EU's military planners to factor in technological and strategic changes that may affect CSDP, but this does not amount to much without the commitment of EU member states. If Europe is still *talking* about fulfilling the Headline Goals it set in 1999 in 10 or 20 years' time, then the Union will have clearly taken leave of its (strategic) senses.

The reality is that the EU has a long way to go before it can safely call itself a credible crisis manager in this new strategic context.

23 Op.Cit., “Council Conclusions”, 10048/19, p. 13.

CHAPTER 9

No time like the present

Towards a genuine defence industrial base for the CSDP?

JEAN-PIERRE MAULNY

To determine the potential level of ambition in the field of industrial defence policy over the next 20 years or so, it is first necessary to understand what drives European integration in the area of armaments cooperation. There is, as yet, no single vision of what a European armaments policy should be, just as there is no single vision within the EU of how the EDTIB relates to the CSDP and what it should look like. The EDTIB is fundamental to defence because it represents the aggregation of Europe's defence industrial expertise, technologies and production capacity. For example, EU member states disagree over the military capabilities that should be developed in an EU framework (see chapter 2) and different industrial interests conspire to ensure that EU initiatives generally cater to national interests (see chapter 3). What is more, EU member states do not have similar visions of how the CSDP should function. Some want the CSDP to focus on crisis management operations and missions, whereas others argue for a more expanded CSDP that takes into account European territorial protection too. These divergences directly affect discussions about military capability development, and, in parallel, a number of EU member states have historically pushed for different

visions of the EDTIB: some have promoted a ‘buy European’ mentality that is backed by large strategic armaments projects, whereas others are more interested in maintaining open defence markets and ensuring that non-EU member states are not discriminated against.

To try to determine what the EDTIB will look like in 20 years’ time, this chapter asks two interrelated questions: (i) what are the different perceptions of the role that the defence industry should play in the CSDP and the EU? Here, we look at France and Germany specifically to highlight some differences in order to underline the challenge of fostering a coherent EDTIB; and (ii) what role should the European Commission play in the coming years in EU security and defence policy? More specifically, the second part of the chapter concentrates on the EDF and outlines some of the challenges facing the Commission with regard to competing defence technology and development bids and the possibility of continued national protectionism in defence markets. Finally, the chapter ends with a call to ‘re-rationalise’ the EU’s capability and defence investment strategy in order to provide a solid basis for future EU defence spending.

Different ways of thinking about the EDTIB and CSDP

Among the member states of the EU, there are a wide range of models of thinking about and managing the defence industry and what role the sector should play in the CSDP. Some member states such as Italy,¹ Poland,² and Sweden³ maintain a close transatlantic link, meaning that any commitment to a European defence industrial policy should not come at the expense of collaboration with the United States. A number of other member states specialise

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- 1 Alessandro Marrone, “National Expectations Regarding the European Defence Fund: The Italian Perspective”, *ARES Group Comment*, no. 42, October 11, 2019, <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ARES-42-EDF-Italy.pdf>.
 - 2 Marcin Terlikowski, “National Expectations Regarding the European Defence Fund: The Polish Perspective”, *ARES Group Comment*, no. 46, October 30, 2019, <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ARES-46.pdf>.
 - 3 Per Olsson, “National Expectations Regarding the European Defence Fund: The Swedish Perspective”, *ARES Group Comment*, no. 41, October 2019, <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ARES-41-EDF-Sweden.pdf>.

in key niche technology areas, and while they do not have sizeable defence technological and industrial bases (DTIBs), they still play a role in European defence supply chains and innovation/research clusters.⁴ While the production of defence systems in Europe is highly concentrated geographically, it is France and Germany that have the largest DTIBs in the EU – this will be even more pronounced now that Brexit has taken place. These two countries will therefore play a leading role in defining the role of the EDTIB in European defence, especially within the context of the development of potentially large-scale future European programmes such as the Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS) and the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS).

In this first part, we take a look at France and Germany's policy towards the EDTIB and CSDP. As far as France is concerned, the DTIB is an integral part of defence and security policy.⁵ Over more than 50 years, France has developed a policy of independence and national sovereignty in defence matters and the industrial dimension has always been part of this. The defence 'White Papers' published in 1994, 2008 and 2013 and the 2017 Strategic Review of Defence and National Security all include a chapter dedicated to the challenge of maintaining and the strategic necessity of the DTIB. The political significance of the DTIB for France explains why there is a link between senior public officials in France and senior executives in the French defence industry, many of whom started their careers in the Direction générale de l'armement (DGA) – France's chief governmental body for armaments. This explains France's high level of spending on defence research and technology and the fact that the term 'strategic autonomy' appears no less than 28 times in the 2017 Strategic Review of Defence and National Security.⁶

For France, competition in the field of armaments is vital, although it should nonetheless be borne in mind that the defence market is not fully open and that states alone are responsible for defining their requirements in terms of defence equipment and purchases thereof. In this sense, competition can be harmful if it means the disappearance of defence companies and the

4 Margarita Šešelgytė, "Armament and Transatlantic Relationships: the Baltic States' Perspective", *ARES Group Comment*, no. 47, November 12, 2019, <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Ares-47.pdf>.

5 Sylvie Matelly, "Armament and Transatlantic Relationships: The French Perspective", *ARES Group Comment*, no. 44, October 16, 2019, <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Ares-Group-44.pdf>.

6 French Ministry of the Armed Forces, "Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale", December 4, 2017, <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/presentation/evenements-archives/revue-strategique-de-defense-et-de-securite-nationale-2017>.

consequent loss of technological capacity, which invariably undermines security. It is for this reason that France takes the view that the EU has a duty to become an international player and why it is making the case for Europe as a power – this presupposes an ambitious common security and defence policy. In the 2017 Strategic Review of Defence and National Security, the term ‘European strategic autonomy’ is cited 7 times and the speech by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, at the conference of ambassadors in August 2019 emphasised the need to work on ‘building European sovereignty’.⁷

Germany broadly shares France’s vision concerning European integration and the political role of the EU. Since 2015, Germany has had a defence industrial strategy that acknowledges the role of the armaments industry with regard to defence and security policy within a European framework. The strategy states that ‘if we are to take our collective responsibility for security policy seriously, Europe needs its own efficient defence industry’.⁸ Additionally, this document called for and encouraged the June 2016 publication of the EU Global Strategy in order to help clarify the strategic direction of the CSDP and the Union’s military level of ambition. The defence industrial strategy stated that ‘we need a better understanding of what a common European security and defence policy could look like’. Finally, the German document argued for the need for ‘clear rules for European cooperation’ and stressed that the coalition agreement between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD) of 2013 ‘underlined the importance of an intensified European and Transatlantic cooperation on military equipment’. Therefore, for Germany the defence industrial sector is certainly identified as a component of European security, but more from an economic point of view and one that maintains a transatlantic link for defence equipment.⁹

Germany broadly shares France’s vision concerning European integration and the political role of the EU.

7 Élysée, “Discours du Président de la République à la conférence des ambassadeurs”, August 27, 2019, <https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/08/27/discours-du-president-de-la-republique-a-la-conference-des-ambassadeurs-1>.

8 The German Federal Government, “Strategy Paper of the Federal Government on Strengthening the Defence Industry in Germany”, Berlin, June 8, 2015, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/strategy-paper-of-federal-government-on-strengthening-the-defence-industry-in-germany.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3.

9 Bastian Giegerich, “Armament and Transatlantic Relationships: The German Perspective”, *ARES Group Comment*, no. 45, October 22, 2019, <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Ares-Group-45-1.pdf>.

CSDP milestones

Frameworks and instruments,
2004-2018



Due to the range of national positions on defence industrial issues, it is not always easy to devise EU policy and there is no overarching consensus between governments on what the EDTIB should ideally look like. Interestingly, in this context the European Commission's view of the role of the defence industry has evolved over time. Initially, it had a legalistic vision of the sector fundamentally based on the need to create a competitive defence industry as spelled out in two Directives (see chapter 4).¹⁰ However, this vision has undergone a subtle change in recent years. Although economic considerations are still important for the Commission, with an expressed need for a strong and competitive industrial defence base, a more strategic reflection was developed in the European Commission's Communication of July 2013, which stressed that the EU needs a 'certain degree of strategic autonomy' and that the Union should ensure 'security of supply, access to critical technologies and operational sovereignty'.¹¹ Looking towards the next 20 years, it is certainly true that the Commission will continue to play a role in European defence based on its creation of the EDF.

The Commission's new role in defence is vital given that the CSDP is traditionally an intergovernmental domain of EU policy. Yet, despite the differences between member states on defence industrial policy, national capitals agreed to the Commission's proposal for an EDF for at least two main reasons. Firstly, the prospect of additional funding

¹⁰ This was the gist of the first Communication of the European Commission on the defence industry in 1996, with the potential savings from the creation of the European defence equipment market estimated to be between €5 and €11 billion. See European Commission, "The Challenges Facing the European Defence-Related Industry, a Contribution for Action at European Level", COM(96) 10 final, Brussels, January 24, 1996.

¹¹ European Commission, "Towards a More Competitive and Efficient Defence and Security Sector", COM(2013) 542 final, Brussels, July 24, 2013.

to pay for military capabilities is attractive for member states. Although defence spending is necessary as a means of protecting citizens, the economy and finance ministries continuously look for ways to limit defence spending in member states. Defence spending is generally seen as unproductive by these ministries, and therefore many governments have welcomed the prospect of EU financing for defence, especially if it can facilitate a reduction in national spending. For their part, defence ministries want extra funding, especially in relation to R&T investments, because since the 1990s national budgets for future defence innovation have frequently been sacrificed in favour of defence equipment acquisition.

A second reason is the need to promote cooperation in defence. EU member states realise that the most expensive defence equipment cannot be paid for at the national level alone, as this would require a level of funding that exceeds their economic capacity. In this respect, it is recognised that R&D costs must be shared and that EU funding should be a major incentive in favour of defence industrial cooperation in Europe. Although EU governments generally accept cooperation in this field, some countries have expressed concerns regarding the form that this cooperation should take. Firstly, some governments stress the need to avoid irrational and, ultimately, expensive cooperation due to the lack of sufficient overlap between operational military requirements between countries for equipment and systems; and secondly, they insist that any co-operation should somehow cater to the competing interests of rival defence companies and not lead to harmful market conditions (e.g. job or industrial capacity losses). Of course, these two constraints point towards smaller cooperative groupings of like-minded states rather than the philosophy and rules of the EDF, which require the involvement of at least three legal entities located in three different member states.

Ensuring the EDF makes a genuine difference

Despite general agreement on the need for defence industrial cooperation, however, EU member states are wary about European consolidation. Although the EDF could lead to consolidation, and while this may lead to less duplication of efforts and unnecessary industrial over-capacity, no member state has expressed any desire to see mergers of defence companies into trans-national

groups. This breaks with the past when, in the 1990s, British, French and German leaders called for the creation of a European defence and aerospace company, which led to the consolidation of the European aeronautical sector and the creation of EADS (for more on this, see chapter 4).¹² The question of industrial consolidation was rarely raised by member states or national parliaments when taking their respective positions on the EDF.¹³ In fact, the impression today is that EU member states are reluctant to enter into future defence industrial consolidation due to the potential negative impact it may have on employment. It should be noted that employment in the defence sector has fallen to 15.3% in 2016 compared to 20.7% in 1996.¹⁴ Disputes over industrial consolidation are presently best characterised by the prevarications over the Franco-German MGCS programme and the disagreement over how to define the work-share programme between KNDS (comprised of Nexter and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann) and Rheinmetall. However, the 16 October 2019 Franco-German Council meeting seems to have resulted in some positive results in this regard. For example, there is now a binding agreement between France and Germany on a common approach to arms export.¹⁵ For the MGCS project, there also appears to have been some progress but the precise details are yet to be seen, with President Emmanuel Macron referring only to the fact that France and Germany 'have removed several obstacles'.¹⁶

As a consequence of the disagreement over whether Europe's defence industry should consolidate further, it is not so easy to say how Europe's defence industrial landscape will look 20 years from now. The EDF certainly provides a very strong incentive for defence industry cooperation in the EU. This is beyond dispute, since in order to have access to the Fund, defence companies

12 European Commission, "Mr. Bangemann welcomes the call of British, French and German leaders for a restructuring of the European defence and aerospace industries", December 9, 1997, https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-97-1101_en.htm.

13 Daniel Fiott, "The Scrutiny of the European Defence Fund by the European Parliament and National Parliaments", Study for the Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department, European Parliament, April 2019, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/603478/EXPO_STU\(2019\)603478_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/603478/EXPO_STU(2019)603478_EN.pdf).

14 "Which sector is the main employer in the EU member states?", Eurostat, October 24, 2017, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20171024-1>.

15 Élysée, "Déclaration franco-allemande de Toulouse", October 16, 2019, <https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/10/16/declaration-franco-allemande-de-toulouse>.

16 See the letter sent by the defence and budget spokespersons of the parties of the German government coalition to their defence minister calling for German industrial consolidation or for a German systems provider to be clearly identified as the leader in the MGCS prior to any further commitment to the FCAS air combat system. See "Weitere Vereinbarungen für FCAS unterzeichnet", *Augen Geradeaus*, June 17, 2019, <https://augengeradeaus.net/2019/06/weitere-vereinbarungen-fuer-fcas-unterzeichnet/>.

must come together to propose projects in line with the rule that such projects involve at least three EU member states and three legal entities (or firms). Nonetheless, the EDF may not be immune from the sort of governmental and industrial tactics that have led to over-capacity and duplication in the European defence market thus far. For example, it is unclear at this stage whether there will be a direct link between the development of technologies and the development of projects in the Fund. This is important because it means the efforts of the three or more states and entities engaged in a technology project may not lead to capability projects. This, in turn, could prompt firms and governments to apply for EDF funding to catch up with rival companies that are further ahead in a given technology domain rather than to promote European cooperation or capability development. Such a situation would not meet important criteria under the Fund: namely, ‘avoiding unnecessary duplication’.¹⁷

Another challenge relates to the European Commission’s ability or willingness to adjudicate between major rival projects that make it to the development stage. It is hard to see the European Commission paying for two competing projects at this stage, especially if the two major projects have received the approval of the largest member states. Of course, the European Commission could refrain from financing such rival programmes but in doing so it risks only financing minor

CSDP milestones

Structures and bodies, 2000-2019



¹⁷ See Article 13 of the “Proposal for a Regulation Establishing the European Defence Fund”, COM(2018) 476 final, Brussels, June 13, 2018.

projects or ones that do not meet the priorities set out in the CDP. Indeed, until such time as the European Commission is the institution responsible for the acquisition of defence equipment on behalf of the member states – as is the case with Galileo in the space sector – the concern is that states will pursue strategies that are incompatible with the objectives of the EDF. There indeed remains a risk that member states will invest in technologies they consider indispensable for national strategic autonomy on a national basis. This strategy could maintain the competitiveness of their national defence companies, but national equipment projects could end up competing with projects financed by the EDF.

Putting the European house in order

If these potential problems are to be avoided, it is vital for all of the relevant stakeholders (Commission, industry, member states, European Parliament and European Defence Agency) to have a shared vision of how the EDTIB should look in 20 years' time and to ensure that support for armament programmes is fully in line with how the EDTIB may have evolved by 2040. While respecting that a degree of competition is necessary, industrial consolidation over the next 20 years is therefore vital if Europe is to avoid competing strategies on the part of EU member states and their defence companies. Nevertheless, if the contradictory strategies of governments and firms are to be avoided, new instruments in addition to the EDF and PESCO may have to be developed.

Industrial consolidation over the next 20 years is vital.

In the wake of the 2016 EU Global Strategy, PESCO and the EDF, EU defence currently suffers from a lack of direction and a new European strategic document could help identify capacity projects that can be carried forward by PESCO and the EDF. Currently, the logic of the CARD is

to move towards greater transparency in national capability planning, coordinate the various national plans and identify capability priorities by way of the CDP. However, there is currently no top-down document that precisely determines the EU's level of ambition in capability development or links these capabilities with precise crisis management and conflict scenarios that would require these military capabilities. Such a document would make it possible

to draft a European ‘military programming law’, which member states would be required to take into account in their own national defence budgets. Therefore, it would reinforce the current CDP in two ways: first, by identifying more precisely capabilities that correspond to shortfalls that impede the Union from conducting military operations autonomously;¹⁸ and second, by establishing at the level of the ministries of defence a European military programming law. It would also set out guidelines in terms of the technological development required in the future, while bearing in mind that a certain amount of leeway should be retained in this area to avoid hampering technological innovation and ensure that the OSRA and SCC initiatives are supported by a bottom-up, high-level, EU defence research agenda.

Such an innovative approach would, at the same time, fill a gap in the institutional toolbox that defines the CSDP – namely, it would help bring national capability planning processes closer together and develop the notion of European sovereignty in the field of defence. It would also assist with the convergence of national defence industrial strategies, focus minds and investments on major common capability programmes and speed up European defence industrial consolidation. Such an approach would also make it possible to develop a European defence industrial policy that would rationalise the

CSDP milestones

Documents, 1999-2018



¹⁸ Douglas Barrie et al., “Protecting Europe: Meeting the EU’s Military Level of Ambition in the Context of Brexit”, a joint International Institute for Strategic Studies and German Council of Foreign Relations report, November 28, 2018, <https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/protecting-europe>.

fragmented national defence industrial policies that currently exist. Speeding up the defence integration process in the EU is of particular significance for the defence industry, because it will ensure that decisions are taken for security or strategic reasons rather than just commercial ones. Increasingly, it is major private investment funds that make up the shareholders of European defence companies but, while private investment funds can still contribute to industrial consolidation, firms seek market integration on the basis of an economic logic rather than one that takes into consideration the security interests of the EU member states.

In other words, only a major political impetus from the EU that defines the main capabilities required for the CSDP, with the support of the EDF, can provide an incentive to encourage industrial consolidation within a European framework. Although the EDF and PESCO have laid the foundation for a competitive EDTIB, it is now time for the EU to define a military level of ambition with a view to drafting a European 'military programming law' sooner rather than later. Such an initiative is a vital prerequisite in the medium- and long-term if the EU wants to have a coherent and competitive EDTIB which avoids industrial overcapacity, damaging industrial and technological rivalries, and which supports the notion of European sovereignty.

CHAPTER 10

The ‘Civilian Compact’

Three scenarios for the future

GIOVANNI FALEG

Civilian crisis management is seldom prioritised in political debates: it is constantly overshadowed by developments in the defence sector and chronically affected by a gap between strategic ambitions and capability limitations. Yet it nonetheless constitutes the bulk of the EU’s crisis management policies. It is difficult to imagine the CSDP without its soft power component, given that the military part of the EU’s security footprint over the past 20 years has been minimal, if not marginal. Seen from this perspective, civilian CSDP has therefore punched above its weight, delivering missions despite a lack of resources, low politico-strategic visibility and insufficient professionalisation and training. In 2019, the EU deployed 10 civilian missions (out of 16 in total), and approximately 40% of the total personnel deployed in CSDP missions and operations today are civilians.

While capability shortfalls have not affected civilian CSDP in terms of output, this has not been the case with regard to outcomes. In simple terms, the EU has indeed delivered missions (*output*), but the value and impact of these deployments (*outcome*), and their overall contribution to the strategic objective of building resilience in state and societies, has been questionable. This appears to contradict the assumption that ‘the civilian dimension of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) provides unique added value to

the EU's global role in international peace and security'.¹ Changes in the security environment around the EU, growing instability and threats have also contributed to affect the outcome of civilian CSDP over time. However, the demand for civilian CSDP has been constantly growing, even if responses have struggled to adjust to the new context and the EU has found it difficult to deploy its full crisis management potential. At the same time, FSJ agencies such as Europol and Frontex have gradually expanded their areas of operation, overlapping with CSDP and providing at times more effective tools for interventions in the management of borders and migration flows, or countering transnational crime and illicit trafficking (see chapter 7).²

The Compact raises the level of ambition in civilian CSDP, as well as the capabilities available to carry out civilian missions.

Against this backdrop, the adoption of the 'Civilian CSDP Compact' in November 2018, in line with the guidelines of the EU Global Strategy, could be a turning point. In fact, the rationale of the Compact is to shift attention – and investments – in civilian CSDP from the capacity to produce *output* to the ability to deliver *outcomes*. Accordingly, the Compact raises the level of ambition in civilian CSDP, as well as the capabilities

available to carry out civilian missions. Looking at the next 5–10 years, the full implementation of the Compact will be a major driver for civilian CSDP as it tries to adjust to a growing and more diversified demand for soft security tasks and related capabilities, ranging from conflict prevention to stabilisation.

Accordingly, the questions driving this chapter are: what are the future security challenges facing the EU in the civilian domain, how can the EU deliver on the Civilian CSDP Compact to meet these challenges and what are the consequences for the EU's civilian level of ambition?

To this end, the first section describes the objectives and provisions of the Compact, and the proposed adjustments to civilian CSDP. The second section analyses the demands for new capabilities and tasks arising from changes in the security environment that could affect CSDP missions. The third section discusses what are the possible operational challenges that could hamper the implementation of the Compact, and how to overcome them. The chapter ends

1 European External Action Service, "Factsheet: A Stronger Civilian Side of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy", June 2019, p. 1, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/a_stronger_civilian_side_of_eu_csdp.pdf.

2 Tobias Pietz, "The Civilian CSDP Compact: Strengthening or Repurposing EU Civilian Crisis Management?", *IAI Commentaries*, no. 18/57, October 2018, pp. 3–4.

with some thoughts on what the new level of ambition for civilian CSDP could be if the Compact is fully implemented by 2023, and what the implications are if the EU fails to deliver on the Compact.

The Civilian CSDP Compact

The Civilian CSDP Compact was formally established by the Council of the EU and member states on 19 November 2018, at the end of a negotiation process that lasted one year.³ In the framework of the implementation of the EU Global Strategy,⁴ the Foreign Affairs Council in November 2017 and the European Council in December 2017 called for the reinvigoration of the civilian dimension of the CSDP. A concept paper on 'Strengthening Civilian CSDP' was developed by the EEAS and presented to the PSC in April 2018, laying out the ambition for a quantitative and qualitative leap towards strengthening the role of the EU as a civilian power. It was followed by a non-paper entitled a 'Vision for a strengthened Civilian CSDP', co-sponsored by nine EU member states and distributed to other capitals in May 2018. These two documents provided the strategic and political basis for the Civilian Capabilities Development Plan, released in August 2018, which sought to build a long-term process to enable member states and EU services to interact more closely in the development of the capabilities and capacities required for CSDP missions. The conceptual work and the identified capability needs finally converged and culminated in the Civilian CSDP Compact, through which EU member states and the relevant EU institutions agreed to bolster civilian CSDP, enabling the Union to fulfil the five strategic priorities of the EU Global Strategy.⁵

The Compact outlines three main commitments, to be delivered at the latest by summer 2023. First, it aims at developing a more capable civilian CSDP, including increased contributions (towards, for instance, staff, training and


3 Council of the EU, "Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact", 14305/18, Brussels, November 19, 2018.

4 EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy", June 2016, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.

5 The five priorities are (1) the security of the Union; (2) the resilience of states and societies in surrounding regions; (3) an integrated approach to conflicts and crises; (4) cooperative regional orders; and (5) global governance fit for the twenty-first century. See Op.Cit., "A Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy".

CSDP civilian missions/operations

Past and present



Data: European External Action Service, 2019; European University Institute, 2017

equipment) by member states based on National Implementation Plans (NIPs), and revised decision-making procedures at the national and EU levels. A flag-ship provision is the commitment to a higher percentage of seconded national experts (at least 70% of total personnel) in operations. Secondly, the Compact aims at developing a more effective, flexible and responsive civilian CSDP, by allowing: (i) modular and scalable mandates and tasks; (ii) streamlined and faster planning and decision-making steps; and (iii) a reinforcement of the budget for missions. Explicit targets are the ability to launch a new mission of

up to 200 personnel in any area of operation within 30 days after a Council decision, and also the operationalisation of specialised teams to address short-term mission needs. Finally, the third commitment aims at developing a more joined-up civilian CSDP. This has two main dimensions: one relates to the role of civilian CSDP within the integrated approach to external conflicts and crises, one of the EU Global Strategy's priorities. The other dimension concerns the internal-external security nexus (see chapter 7), by reinforcing synergies and complementarity between the civilian CSDP, the Commission and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) actors, reducing the risk of duplication and establishing a coherent division of labour between JHA agencies and CSDP missions.

It is important to analyse what the Compact's innovations mean in practice, and how exactly it is supposed to rejuvenate civilian CSDP in the years to come. Bearing in mind the goal of a qualitative and quantitative leap in civilian CSDP, the implementation of the Compact is likely to be confronted with a broadened and diversified demand for security tasks in operational theatres, as well as with internal challenges related to the supply of CSDP instruments. The next two sections, therefore, analyse the gap between supply and demand, and how it can affect the implementation of the Compact by 2023.

Future security challenges for the EU

The strategic guidelines of the Compact explicitly mention a number of security challenges that civilian CSDP should be prepared to tackle, in addition to the 'Feira priorities' and the Civilian Headline Goal.⁶ These are irregular migration, hybrid threats, cybersecurity, terrorism and radicalisation, organised crime, border management and maritime security, preventing and countering violent extremism, and preserving and protecting cultural heritage.⁷ The list could become longer as the demand for civilian expertise across the world is on the rise. Two factors are responsible for this rise: (i) a deteriorating security

6 The June 2000 European Council at Santa Maria da Feira, Portugal, identified four 'priority areas' for civilian crisis management: (i) police; (ii) rule of law; (iii) civilian administration; and (iv) civil protection. These areas were subsequently expanded with the Civilian Headline Goal 2008.

7 Op.Cit., "The Civilian CSDP Compact: Strengthening or Repurposing EU Civilian Crisis Management?", p. 4.

situation in and beyond the EU's neighbourhood, with more intense and frequent conflicts and crises spilling over across state boundaries; and (ii) geo-political transformations that are redefining the way great powers collaborate or compete in the global arena.

In 2018 the Gulf of Guinea had the highest number of reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the world.

With regard to the security trends in the EU's neighbourhood, two practical examples can help explain where the demand for civilian CSDP engagement may come from. The first one is West Africa, where inter-communal violence and the terrorist threat is rapidly spreading across (and even beyond) the G5 Sahel countries, affecting the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea – particularly Benin, Ghana and Togo. The expansion of violent extremism overlaps with illicit trafficking and organised crime, which exploit the porosity of borders. In 2018 the Gulf of Guinea had the highest number of reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the world.⁸ At the same time, climate risks are intensifying, particularly in the Sahel, where roughly 80% of the farmland is degraded; temperatures there are rising 1.5 times faster than the global average. 2019 projections anticipate a state of persistent regional food insecurity for the foreseeable future, and by August 2020, 14 million people in West Africa are expected to reach phase 3 level (crisis) of the integrated food security phase classification (IPC) scale, and 1.2 million will be in phase 4 (humanitarian emergency).⁹ The evolution of the security situation on the ground generally outpaces the capacity of strategies and policies to adjust, prevent and respond, as shown by the surge in attacks in Burkina Faso's eastern and northern regions.¹⁰

Moving closer to the EU's borders, challenges related to migration flows will also remain a defining issue in the years to come, especially as these flows will be driven by a varied set of factors ranging from climate change to conflict. The number of internally displaced people as a result of conflict and

⁸ International Chamber of Commerce, "Maritime piracy and armed robbery reaches 22-year low, says IMB report", 2018: <https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1240-maritime-piracy-and-armed-robbery-reaches-22-year-low-says-imb-report>

⁹ See: World Economic Forum, 2019: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/all-the-warning-signs-are-showing-in-the-sahel-we-must-act-now/>. On the integrated food security, nutrition and livelihood analysis and perspectives for West Africa, see: The Food Crisis Prevention Network, "Food and Nutrition Situation 2019–2020": <http://www.food-security.net/en/topic/situation-alimentaire-et-nutritionnelle-2019-20/>

¹⁰ International Crisis Group, "Crisis Watch – Burkina Faso", August 2019, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/sept-august-2019#burkina-faso>.

persecution increased from 28.8 million in 2012 to 40.3 million in 2016 – 6.9 million people were displaced internally due to conflicts in 2016 alone.¹¹ While most of the burden of conflict-induced displacements does not affect Europe directly, the implications of displacement in terms of destabilisation, ethnic tensions and humanitarian repercussions do pose a direct security challenge for Europe.¹²

Geopolitical considerations also come into play when thinking about the future of the EU as a soft power. A new order based on multipolar competition is pushing actors to exploit economic, political and military tools to project their influence or defend their interests. While the ability of the EU to compete with Russia, China or even the United States' approaches through hard power or financial means is constrained,¹³ a highly specialised civilian CSDP that leverages the Union's integrated approach can satisfy a growing demand for assistance in 'niche' areas that could be critical for stabilisation or conflict prevention. In fact, as the demand for resilience in third states is expected to grow in parallel to a deterioration in security, the current reluctance of governments to engage in robust military interventions increases the usefulness of civilian security tools, which can support the capacities of host nations and boost their own security services.¹⁴

Challenges related to migration flows will also remain a defining issue in the years to come.

11 European Political Strategy Centre, "10 Trends Shaping Migration", December 7, 2017, p. 4, https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/other-publications/10-trends-shaping-migration_en.

12 Roderick Parkes, "No More Cherry-Picking: The EU's Internal and External Security Arms Should Streamline Operations", *PeaceLab blog*, June 27, 2019, <https://peacelab.blog/2019/06/the-eus-internal-and-external-security-arms-should-streamline-operations>.

13 Carl Bildt and Mark Leonard, "From Plaything to Player: How Europe can Stand up for Itself in the Next Five Years", *Policy Brief*, European Council on Foreign Relations, July 17, 2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/how_europe_can_stand_up_for_itself_in_the_next_five_years_eu_foreign_policy.

14 European External Action Service, "Shared view: the demand for civilian CSDP will remain high", July 22, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/security-defence-crisis-response/65729/shared-view-demand-civilian-csdp-will-remain-high_en.

Finding a niche: Civilian CSDP in 2023

Any successful implementation of the Compact by 2023 and beyond, will be a function of its capacity to effectively respond to growing security demands and to find a niche in relation to both the EU's external action and the resources and tools of other international players.¹⁵ In addition to the internal-external security nexus (covered in chapter 7), three strategic and operational enablers will affect the implementation process, and can serve as a 'checklist' for policymakers to fully deliver on the Compact.

Enabler #1: adaptability and training. The Compact broadens the tasks of civilian CSDP in response to the demand for security, committing it to a quantitative and qualitative leap. As a consequence, adaptability and training should be a core component of future civilian CSDP missions, both as a way to meet expectations and avoid undermining the credibility of the EU as an external actor. The broadening of tasks under the Compact calls for more specialisation by increasing the expertise and quantity

of personnel available. At the same time, the responsiveness, modularity and the scalability of mandates should be calibrated to make missions adaptable to various changes on the ground and emerging threats. This requires advanced training and the capacity to learn *in itinere* based on mission needs. Combining the imperative of

Geopolitical considerations also come into play when thinking about the future of the EU as a soft power.

specialisation with the need for flexibility and rapid reaction constitutes an important condition for the Compact to make the declared quantitative leap and live up to expectations.¹⁶

Enabler #2: a new narrative for an integrated approach. Civilian CSDP can work best if it contributes to a joined-up approach. Although the internal-external security nexus is a primary concern, it will be important for civilian

¹⁵ Teemu Tammikko and Jyrki Ruohomäki, "The Future of EU Civilian Crisis Management: Finding a Niche", *Briefing Paper*, no. 262, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, May 2019.

¹⁶ Matching the scope and ambition of the Compact requires significant investments in capabilities by the EU and its member states. See: Hylke Dijkstra, "Beyond the Civilian Compact: Why We Need to Talk about Civilian Capabilities", *EU Global Strategy Watch*, no. 2, Istituto Affari Internazionali, December, 2018.

CSDP to engage in areas where value added can be provided, such as stabilisation and conflict prevention or addressing climate change-related issues. This would benefit the implementation of the EU's integrated approach to conflicts and crises, while at the same time help civilian CSDP develop a new narrative. Such a development would, in turn, increase the visibility and attractiveness of the Union's policy instruments to member states and national experts. It will be important that the pilot project and the 'mini-concepts' reflect this objective.

Enabler #3: politics and decision-making. The Compact needs a decision-making framework to encourage coordination among institutions and simplify and streamline budgetary, procedural and political processes, especially when it comes to the preparation for and planning of civilian CSDP missions. This will be a core aspect to be harmonised at the level of the NIPs and the Annual Review Conferences,¹⁷ through which individual member state commitments will be regularly reviewed. In addition to providing an increased contribution to civilian CSDP, reviewing national procedures and decision-making can in fact enhance the availability of experts and their participation in missions, thereby translating political commitments into targeted and concrete plans.¹⁸

Redefining the EU's civilian level of ambition

The redefinition of the EU's civilian level of ambition rests on the full delivery of the Compact. Depending on how many of the enablers identified by the checklist will be 'ticked' by 2023,¹⁹ three scenarios can be foreseen, corresponding

17 The first ARC was co-convened by the EEAS and the Finnish Presidency on November 14, 2019. See: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/70461/eu-civilian-crisis-management-member-states-review-progress-strengthening-civilian-csdp_en

18 Member state commitments will be crucial to adequately support the Compact. On the possible scenarios and challenges, see: Nicoletta Pirozzi, "The Civilian CSDP Compact: A success story for the EU's crisis management Cinderella?", *EUSS Brief*, October 2018, pp. 6–7.

19 For an analysis of the Compact's opportunities and risks until 2023, and policy recommendations, see: Carina Böttcher, "The Compact Roadmap: Towards a New Level of Professionalization in Civilian CSDP", *DGAPkompakt*, no. 11, June 2019, pp. 5–6.

to different levels of ambition: (i) full implementation – CSDP takes it all; (ii) partial implementation – CSDP muddles through; (iii) no implementation.

In the first scenario, the full implementation of the Compact provides for a revamped CSDP with a high level of ambition, which results in the EU being able to carry out all – or nearly all – the new tasks that have been mentioned in the Council conclusions. This would also imply that the civilian CSDP reaches a level of professionalisation and training that allows for a higher quality of deployed personnel, and that member states commit to increasing the number of seconded personnel so as to meet the quantitative targets of the Compact. The quantitative and qualitative leap would also need to translate into the capacity to react quickly, and adapt to changing circumstances on the ground, something that can be provided by the core response capacity and the specialised teams. Since the provision of civilian expertise is a rare and precious commodity in field operations, reaching this level of ambition could make the EU the go-to institution for non-military crisis response, and attract contributions from third countries. For this scenario to materialise, in addition to the internal-external security nexus the EU and member states should fully develop the three main strategic and operational enablers mentioned above, then concretely test the applicability of the new instruments and tools of the Compact in crisis situations.

Reaching this level of ambition could make the EU the go-to institution for non-military crisis response.

In the second scenario, an incomplete implementation of the Compact could strengthen civilian CSDP in specific areas or tasks, such as training or equipment, or by developing a closer collaboration with FSJ agencies. However, an inability to fully live up to the expectations set by the Compact would undermine the CSDP's credibility as an instrument for the EU's security

policy. Over time, this could incentivise member states to rely on other tools or frameworks, such as Frontex, in which to carry out civilian interventions, thereby reducing the policy relevance – and with that, the resources – of the CSDP.²⁰ An incomplete CSDP would most likely muddle through, remaining operational but failing to deliver on its stated objectives.

²⁰ Especially since there are substantial differences among member states on the strategic relevance of civilian CSDP. See: Carina Böttcher and Marie Wolf, "Divided in Diversity: Overcoming Europe's Incoherence in National Approaches to Civilian CSDP", *DGAPanalyse*, no. 3, June 2019.

Finally, the possibility of the Compact not being implemented at all should be also taken into account. Although such an outcome is unlikely to materialise, it is worth stressing the value of civilian CSDP for the EU and its member states. Not delivering on the Compact would basically entail a return to the Feira priorities, which, in other words, would mean addressing new and emerging threats with a 20-year old policy framework. Leaving aside the time, effort and money invested in the elaboration of the Compact, such a scenario would pose serious questions about the continued relevance of civilian CSDP and member states' commitment to it, and have serious implications for the implementation of the integrated approach to conflicts and crisis and the objectives of the EU Global Strategy.

The next five years will be decisive. Wiping out fifteen years of know-how and operational lessons learned in the conduct of civilian missions is not in the EU's best interest. Maintaining a civilian capacity within an obsolete and dysfunctional policy framework that falls short of flexibility, adaptability and responsiveness would also be disadvantageous. Revamping CSDP through the Compact, thereby making it a core component of the EU's integrated approach to security in a changing world, is the only way forward, both from the perspective of member states' interests and the EU's strategic objectives.





ANNEX

Abbreviations

5G
Fifth Generation Cellular
Network Technology

A2/AD
Anti-Access/Aerial
Denial

AFSJ
Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice

AI
Artificial Intelligence

AMISOM
African Union Mission in
Somalia

CARD
Coordinated Annual
Review on Defence

CDP
Capability Development
Plan

CFM
Cooperative Financial
Mechanism

CFSP
Common Foreign and
Security Policy

CIVCOM
Civilian Aspects of Crisis
Management Committee

COSI
Standing Committee on
Operational Cooperation
on Internal Security

CPCC
Civilian Planning and
Conduct Capability

CRTs
Civilian Response Teams

CDSP
Common Security and
Defence Policy

DDR
Disarmament,
demobilisation and
reintegration

DG DEFIS
Directorate General for
Defence Industry and
Space

DG DEVCO
Directorate General
for International
Cooperation and
Development

DG Home
Directorate General for
Migration and Home
Affairs

DG NEAR
Directorate-General
for Neighbourhood
and Enlargement
Negotiations

EADS
European Aeronautic
Defence and Space
company

ECAP
European Capabilities
Action Plan

EDA
European Defence
Agency

EDF
European Defence Fund

EDTIB
European Defence
Technological and
Industrial Base

EEAS
European External Action
Service

EIB
European Investment
Bank

EPF
European Peace Facility

ESDC
European Security and
Defence College

ESDP
European Security and
Defence Policy

EU
European Union

EULEX
European Union Rule of
Law Mission

EUMC
EU Military Committee

EUMS
EU Military Staff

EUNAVFOR
European Union Naval
Force

EUPOL
European Union Police
Mission

FCAS
Future Combat Aircraft
System

FSJ
Freedom, Security and
Justice

HICGS
High Impact Capability
Goals

HQ
Headquarters

HR/VP
High Representative of
the Union for Foreign
and Security Policy/
Vice-President of the
European Commission

IBM
Integrated Border
Management

IED
Improvised Explosive
Device

INF
Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces

IOM International Organisation for Migration	OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
IoT Internet of Things	OSRA Overarching Strategic Research Agenda
IPSD Implementation Plan on Security and Defence	PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation
ISP Integrated Approach for Security and Peace	PMG Politico–Military Group
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	PSC Political and Security Committee
JHA Justice and Home Affairs	R&D Research and Development
KFOR Kosovo Force	R&T Research and Technology
MFF Multi–annual Financial Framework	RPAS Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
MGCS Main Ground Combat Systems	SCCs Strategic Context Cases
MMA Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising	SSR Security Sector Reform
MPCC Military Planning and Conduct Capability	TEU Treaty on the European Union
MRTT Multi–Role Tanker Transport	TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation	UK United Kingdom
NIPs National Implementation Plans	UN United Nations
NRF NATO Response Force	UNDP United Nations Development Programme
OCCAR Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation	UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
OLAF European Anti–Fraud Office	WFP World Food Programme
	WTO World Trade Organisation

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The past 20 years of the Common Security and Defence Policy have taught us more about the EU as an international actor. While the Union has not entirely lived up to the ambitions set down by European ministers at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the EU has developed the ability to deploy civilian and military missions and operations. In more recent years, the EU has advanced cooperation on defence through the EU Global Strategy with a range of new tools.

Looking back over the last 20 years of CSDP, this book provides an analytical overview of the key historical developments and critically appraises the successes and failures charted over two decades. A host of leading think tank analysts and a senior EU official look at issues such as institutional design, operations and missions, capabilities, industry and civilian crisis management.

The book is not just a historical record, however: several chapters look at the geopolitical challenges facing the EU. The contributors look at emerging security challenges, the nature of permissibility, the internal-external security nexus, the defence industry and civilian CSDP. Together, the chapters underline the need for the EU to match its rhetoric on security and defence with capabilities and political ambition.



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