Mapping the future of the AU-EU partnership

By
Giovanni Faleg, Marleen de Haan and Christian Dietrich
AFRICA ATLAS

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The partnership between the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) is going through challenging times, as are relations between European and African countries more broadly (1). Geopolitical factors, particularly since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, intertwined with intra-Africa dynamics have profoundly modified the tone, tempo and content of policy discussions between the two continents. Examples of how relations have become more strained and fractured include:

> Intra-continental divergences over the war in Ukraine and certain African countries’ non-alignment with the West

> waves of military takeovers and democratic backsliding, particularly in West Africa since 2021

> the end of the French Operation Barkhane in Mali and its implications for the regional security architecture in the Sahel

> the rise of anti-Western sentiment and narratives across the continent, exacerbated by Russian foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns, as well as the expanded presence of the Wagner Group in some theatres.

The last AU–EU Summit, held in February 2022, sought to recast and repurpose inter-continental relations, through a Joint Vision for 2030 (2) which committed member states of both Unions to build a common future as closer partners (3). The choice of moment to declare such an ambition was unfortunate: it followed the Covid-19 pandemic which significantly affected African economies and complicated relations with the EU on issues such as vaccine patents, while the economic shockwaves of the war in Ukraine, affecting food and energy supplies, have driven the two partners further apart (4). With EU diplomatic and military efforts pivoting East, dialogue between the EU and the Southern Neighborhood has become mired in miscommunication and misperceptions and threatened by foreign information manipulation and interference. More than one year after the Summit, progress towards the achievement of the policy priorities agreed by continental leaders risks falling short of delivery and implementation (5). Furthermore, as Africa has gained geopolitical weight and greater self-confidence in pursuing strategic autonomy, for instance through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), EU countries have failed to substantially change their strategic approach and convey a clear level of ambition to African partners. This gap in perceptions and expectations is illustrated for example by African countries’ general scepticism towards the Global Gateway. While Europeans hail it as the response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the African

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side merely sees meagre new funds that are unlikely to make a difference.\(^6\)

Yet as the adage goes, ‘when the going gets tough, the tough get going’. It would be normatively, as well as analytically, wrong to assume that the AU–EU partnership has been irremediably weakened due to a difficult political and diplomatic context. A fairer assessment would instead state that the international system in which both partners interact has changed, thereby creating new spaces for power competition and letting new actors project influence in a diverse, multi-faceted and politically fragmented continent\(^7\). Precisely due to these systemic changes, it is of paramount importance that the two continents revive their relations, not only by adjusting to the new international order, but by seizing the chance to jointly shape it\(^8\). To what extent can decision-makers in both continents move from a ‘partnership of equals’ to a mutually beneficial ‘geopolitical partnership’ that contributes to a fairer international system? What are the challenges and opportunities arising from the AU–EU Joint Vision for 2030? By addressing these policy questions, this Chaillot Paper aims to chart the way forward for the AU–EU partnership, providing policymakers from both continents with an analytical tool to track the implementation of policy priorities identified at the 2022 Summit, against the backdrop of geopolitical challenges.

The volume reverses the usual ratio of text to visuals in EUISS publications. Here, we have decided to let data speak through graphics, charts and maps. Short texts outlining the main policy messages accompany the graphics, seeking to convey a more direct, impactful message to the reader regarding the possible trajectories of the partnership.

The Chaillot Paper is organised as follows: each one of the four chapters focuses on a priority area identified by the latest AU–EU Summit Declaration, specifically: (i) prosperity and sustainability; (ii) peace and security; (iii) migration and mobility; and (iv) commitment to multilateralism\(^9\). Within each chapter, maps and supporting text boxes are displayed to answer two sets of questions:

1. **What’s up?** What is going on in sectors that are defined as priorities for the relationship? What are the main trends and related policy needs, which require common engagement to devise effective responses?

2. **What to watch out for?** What should policymakers watch out for in the coming months and years? More specifically, what are the most relevant challenges and opportunities for policy action given geopolitical transformations?

Each chapter, therefore, seeks to develop a specific narrative for the evolution of the AU–EU partnership, starting from the current state of play and identifying the entry points for successful cooperation between the two continents. This ‘geopolitical atlas’ has been produced by drawing on public datasets and secondary sources, as well as consultations with African and European experts and policymakers between September 2022 and May 2023. All graphics and visuals are based on data collection and analysis conducted by the authors.

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The first summit marked the start of the institutionalisation of Africa-EU dialogue. It was held under the aegis of the Organisation of African Unity and the European Union. The Cairo Declaration was a joint statement on common stances and joint commitments to regional economic cooperation and integration, the integration of Africa in the world economy, human rights and democracy, peacebuilding and conflict prevention; and development.

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A GLOSSARY OF AU-EU RELATIONS

A key limitation of this atlas is that it does not (and could not) encompass all data and maps that are relevant for the partnership. It is neither an encyclopaedia, nor a yearbook. The chapters, and the maps and infographics within them, reflect specific analytical choices by the authors to best answer the research questions outlined above, given common constraints in working with data with regard to comprehensiveness, timeliness and quality. While the authors do not claim to exhaustively cover any one issue area, this atlas offers illuminating angles and context on them. It also treats maps as a concept rather than a strict representation of topography as it maps themes that have been selected based on a qualitative assessment of key policy priorities for the AU–EU partnership, based on three elements:

1. the declared commitments included in the Joint Vision (what the AU and EU jointly perceive, and thereby declare as priorities);

2. the needs, challenges and opportunities for the partnership emerging from expert opinions and publications from African and European institutions, based on a review of the literature and secondary sources available;

3. analysis of relevant data from Afrobarometer and other surveys that track public and civil society attitudes.

Therefore, the themes included in this atlas reflect the goals and targets to which decision-makers have publicly committed, what experts think about these, as well as the demands of civil society. Besides clarifying the methodological choice, this approach helps to delimit the amount of information included in each visual. A full atlas would not only have been impossible to deliver, but also unnecessary to address the analytical questions raised in the introduction – i.e. to identify what kind of AU–EU partnership can best cope with and shape a changing multipolar order.

Against this backdrop, the following glossary can help the reader better understand the policy significance of selected themes, their definition, and how they fit into the overall narrative of this volume.

Chapter 1: Prosperity and Sustainability

What’s up?

**Food sovereignty**: Food security is defined by the World Bank as a situation where ‘all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (10). The 2007 Nyéléni Declaration defines food sovereignty as ‘the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through sustainable methods’ (11). A rising world population, a global pandemic, and the war in Ukraine combined with climate change impacts and a surge in inflation have disrupted food production, distribution, accessibility and affordability across the globe. Vulnerabilities in African food systems have been particularly exposed, fuelling further concerns about resilience and sustainability in the food and agriculture industry. Whether the continent will be able to become the world’s breadbasket and tackle food insecurity, or not, will be determined by policy action taken with global

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partners, and specifically with EU actors, to address current gaps and deficiencies (12).

**Powering development:** The lack of sustainable energy supplies, and in particular limited access to electricity services, is one of the most critical factors hampering the development of the African continent and the empowerment of its citizens. Access to energy has enormous implications for the daily lives – as well as for the future – of African people, since access to reliable, sustainable and affordable electricity services is a fundamental prerequisite for human progress and economic development (13).

**Education and skills:** To spur a fourth industrial revolution and economic competitiveness, African countries need to harness the brainpower of their young and dynamic populations. Even in the context of competing crises – inflation, energy, food security, climate – this is a crisis too severe to ignore, as statistics show that nearly 9 in 10 children in sub-Saharan Africa are unable to read and understand a simple text by the age of 10. Failure to address the education crisis and integrate the continent’s growing young population into the formal economy is a perfect recipe for upheaval and social unrest, a scenario that is neither in Africa’s, nor in Europe’s, interest (14).

**Healthcare:** Financing health systems in Africa is essential. The World Bank estimates that Africa needs between $2 billion and $3.5 billion a year just for epidemic preparedness (15). The implications of the Covid-19 pandemic, alongside other diseases, such as malaria and tuberculosis, show how critical healthcare is for the future of the partnership, and for a more people-oriented and fairer relationship between the two continents. The health sector hence offers an opportunity to strengthen the AU–EU partnership in a way that aligns with Africa’s objectives, adopting a long-term vision for fostering the development of resilient health systems (16).

What to watch out for?

**Environmental shocks:** Environmental factors will constitute a huge challenge for Africa–Europe relations in the years to come. Extreme weather events, heat stress and irregular rainfall patterns, among other factors, will lead to greater instability and pressure on scarce resources, clashing with the continent’s soaring demographic growth. Food production and trade between Africa and Europe are likely to be disrupted.

**Debt and state fragility:** The debt burden in the continent has increased in recent years, aggravated by exogenous shocks (such as the Covid–19 pandemic) and against the backdrop of other structural economic problems. A fragmented creditor base and vulnerability to inflation paint a rather grim outlook for African countries, especially in the event of future economic shocks. This could seriously jeopardise a sustainable AU–EU partnership.

**Urban population growth:** Africa is and will continue to be affected by changing urbanisation trends. There are expected to be 824 million urban dwellers in the continent in 2030, and 1.5 billion in 2050, against 548 million in 2018. Urbanisation can be both an obstacle as well as an opportunity for a deeper partnership.

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with Europe: if managed, and supported by EU policies and funds, it can trigger the benefits of agglomeration economies, with a positive impact on intra-African trade and industrial competitiveness.

Chapter 2: Peace and Security

What’s up?

**Fragile democracy:** Africa has experienced democratic backsliding, in the wake of military coups, faltering transitions to civilian rule and due to long-entrenched authoritarian leaders who retain a firm grip on power. At the same time, the majority of Africans have remained committed to good, democratic and accountable governance, as well as free and fair elections. An Africa based on democracy and good governance is clearly articulated as a priority of the AU’s Agenda 2063. In this context, EU-Africa cooperation on inter alia electoral observation and countering foreign interference can help consolidate African democratic processes to unlock the future that Africans want.

**Managing the military:** The key to internal and regional stability is accountable, professional and financially efficient and viable African security forces. Without legitimate, transparent and accountable forces, and effective justice systems, African state security apparatuses may exacerbate domestic instability, instead of countering major threats such as violent extremism and terrorism.

**Challenging borders:** African borders not only divide, but also connect and facilitate movement. This holds economic potential: free movement of goods, people and services allows African countries to maximise their comparative advantage and create prosperity through trade. Yet the porosity of some African borders means that they are conduits for transnational violence, illicit trafficking and illegal migration, which boosts informal economies and creates obstacles for formal economic development and security. Stable borders are thus a prerequisite for a secure and prosperous Africa.

**Maritime capabilities:** In the wake of the invasion of Ukraine, the importance of maritime stability in African waters has increased, as the key sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that surround the African continent are critical for economic, food and energy security. This is particularly the case in the Gulf of Guinea and the Gulf of Aden, where besides a multitude of regional and global actors, pirates patrol the waters, posing a threat to the safety of ships and hampering commercial and security interests. Stronger African naval forces are needed to safeguard African security interests and economic development, protect shipping and ensure security on the seas.

What to watch out for?

**Organised crime:** Transnational organised crime remains firmly rooted – and continues to thrive – on the African continent. Transnational criminal routes connect Africa to the rest of the world, including Europe. African countries constitute source, transit and destination countries for a wide variety of illicit trafficking, including in wildlife, drugs, works of art and small arms. As criminal supply chains increasingly stretch throughout the EU and Africa, isolated efforts are not sufficient to tackle the growing problem of illicit trafficking and concerted efforts are needed to address its causes and consequences.

**Violent extremism:** The intensity of violent extremism has increased over the past decade. Initially primarily located in hotspots in the Sahel and Horn of Africa, extremist groups have expanded their scope to Coastal West Africa and Southern Africa. Besides posing existential security threats to African citizens and threatening African political structures, this also has implications for EU–Africa cooperation. How can the AU and the EU navigate the reality of non-state armed groups by diplomatic means?
**INTRODUCTION**

**Popular discontent:** The quality of a democratic system of governance is determined not only by the number of elections and political parties, but also by the extent to which all citizens can voice their concerns and are heard. Citizen engagement is an area in which the EU can leverage expertise and assist African countries to boost peace and security in the continent by building resilience from the grassroots level.

**Chapter 3: Migration and Mobility**

**What’s up?**

**Regular mobility vs irregular migration:** Global shocks, but also structural challenges such as demographic changes, are making migration governance increasingly onerous, at a time when the issue of population movement and migratory flows within Africa and towards other regions has returned to the forefront of policy debates. To facilitate regular mobility and address irregular and forced migration, African and European countries need to step up their cooperation, to better respond to Africans’ longstanding demands for greater access to legal mobility, less cumbersome visa regimes, and the protection of migrants’ rights.

**Remittances:** Remittances represent one of the most direct and tangible links between migration and development. Remittances account for larger inflows of capital than foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) received by low- and middle-income countries. In 2022, remittances accounted for 2.5% of sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP. Despite the fact that remittances are the financial lifeblood of many developing countries in Africa, they are not accorded much prominence in the Joint Vision for 2030. Insofar as remittances constitute a stable source of foreign currency and a steady source of development finance\(^{(17)}\), their role in how migration policies are formulated should deserve more attention in the future AU–EU partnership.

**Displacement:** The number of forcibly displaced people has increased in recent years and will keep increasing, pushed by factors such as climate events, environmental degradation, and conflicts. Policy discussions about migration and mobility will have to take into account the need for extra support to countries affected by displacement, as well as accelerate efforts to prevent and mitigate situations that trigger population displacements.

**What to watch out for?**

**Still not connected:** Improved connectivity, infrastructures and rules facilitating movement from one region to another are key to transition towards a regime of open and regular mobility. Most African countries remain significantly far away from developing ‘mobility-friendly’ infrastructures\(^{(18)}\). AU–EU cooperation has untapped potential to deliver a sustainable network paving the way for the achievement of free movement objectives, with positive spillovers on other migration challenges.

**Climate migration:** In Africa, climate mobility figures are projected to increase for both internal and cross-border migration. Most climate mobility will be internal: estimates suggest that by 2050 the number of internal...
climate migrants will have quadrupled\(^{(19)}\). Cooperation on mitigating climate change and providing people with the capacity to adapt to intensified natural hazards will prove critical for how displacement is experienced and managed in the future in the EU and Africa.

**Digital migration:** Migration is increasingly gaining a digitalised dimension: visa and travel itineraries are arranged online and remittances sent via digital financial channels. With increased digitalisation comes a novel set of challenges and opportunities for the partnership. How can digitalisation be harnessed as a tool to improve access to migration pathways and to prevent it from exacerbating inequalities?

Chapter 4: International Order

**What’s up?**

**Integrating the continent:** At the dawn of the 2020s, Africa seemed to be embarking on a decade of unprecedented economic integration and growth, boosted by the creation of the AfCFTA, and sustained by the widespread diffusion of technological innovation, hopes of democratic transformation, and the continent’s new prominence in global geopolitics. That scenario has been seemingly reversed after geopolitical shockwaves have increased political fragmentation across the continent. How can integration policies and economic transformation be fostered in support of a more resilient and sustainable future for Africa?

**Stronger together:** Since the war in Ukraine, the debate over African agency in international politics has gained new momentum. The question arises as to whether African countries will be able to shape the emerging international system, and whether they will be given the opportunity to get ‘a seat at the table’, make their voices heard, and be adequately represented in leading international forums, beyond recent decisions taken by the BRICS and G20.

**Security provision:** Armed conflict trends and multiple forms of violence continue to hamper progress towards peace and prosperity in the African continent. Recent years have been marked by disillusionment about the capacity of foreign interventions to resolve those conflicts and achieve stabilisation objectives. This makes African countries ‘net contributors’ to global peace and security, but not net recipients of stability. How can security provision be adjusted so as to better address peace and security needs as threats evolve in the continent?

**What to watch out for?**

**A new power play:** Sub-Saharan Africa is becoming a testing ground for malign influence operations. While violent extremism and terrorism will remain security priorities for the continent in the next decade and beyond, hybrid threats constitute an exponential challenge in the transnational security landscape. The most prominent rising form of hybrid threat in the continent is information manipulation, an intentional and often covert use of media, manipulating public discourse to mislead and cause harm. It encompasses ‘three criteria: a coordinated campaign, the diffusion of false information or information that is consciously distorted [or intentional suppression of information], and the political intention to cause harm’ \(^{(20)}\). In contexts characterised by competing narratives, information manipulation

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can be used to stealthily influence perceptions on the ground or fuel a conflict by creating confusion.

**Foreign powers**: Given the world’s growing multipolarity, Africa risks experiencing a proliferation of proxy wars on its soil. Some regions are particularly affected, as shown by proxy confrontations between Gulf powers in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region. However, trends in the Sahel and in West Africa, as well as other parts of the continent, show that in future Africa could be more vulnerable to external meddling by outside powers, including Russia, China, the Gulf states and Türkiye, as competition for resources intensifies and due to spillovers from other conflicts (e.g. Ukraine) into the African theatre.

**Strategic choices**: That Africa is not a country, as has often been observed, has been amply demonstrated by the divisions on display between African countries in international forums. Intra-continental divergences are likely to be exacerbated by geopolitical factors, such as foreign proxies, as well as endogenous ones, such as political and economic developments within countries. Lack of political cohesion, in the absence of a solid continental integration process, poses a serious challenge to African countries’ role in the evolving and potentially increasingly fragmented multipolar system. A divided continent in a divided world would clearly be detrimental to African interests and needs – as well as to those of Europe.

Having defined the overall approach and key themes included in the paper, let us now focus on each policy priority for the AU-EU Partnership, and examine what is needed, what is already provided, what challenges lie ahead, and identify foundations for a constructive partnership.
Africa is roughly three times the size of the European continent, spanning 8,158 kilometres from Tangier to Cape Town and 7,034 from Dakar to Mogadishu as the crow flies. Deserts and drylands cover almost two thirds of its landmass. Its coastline measures 26,000 kilometres as compared to Europe’s 32,000. It is home to 1.4 billion people, that is 17% of the world’s population and almost twice that of Europe.

These and other geographic and climatic features have a significant bearing on the maps in this atlas. Areas of high population density on the shores of the Gulf of Guinea and the Great Lakes region contrast with vast swathes of nearly uninhabited deserts and rainforests. While the Atlas Mountains and the Sahara Desert act as great natural barriers, the fertile floodplains of the vast rivers of the Niger and the Nile are inhabited by millions of people.

To account for these constants and to facilitate comparison of the maps in this atlas, the authors have opted for one map projection and similarly sized maps throughout. However, on a few occasions, multivariate country-level or timeseries data necessitated a faceted layout of plots that vaguely resembles the shape of the African continent.
PROSPERITY AND SUSTAINABILITY
Optimising resources

African food systems have traditionally been fragile, but they have recently been severely impacted by inter alia a global pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the effects of climate change and spiralling inflation. Although African governments have prioritised agricultural reforms as well as investment in technological innovation and private sector development, the continent faces unprecedented food insecurity.

The quest for African food sovereignty exposes two basic policy needs: first, to improve land use and develop the blue economy, to allow countries and societies to reap their full potential, thereby making food both available and affordable; secondly, to reduce dependence on foreign actors and global supply chains, hence reducing vulnerability to external shocks.

Although most African countries generally show a positive correlation between the availability and sustainability/adaptation dimensions of the Food Security Index (FSI) from 2015 to 2022, they still lag behind the rest of the world. Availability in Africa is 19 % less than the global average (scoring 47 and 58, respectively). Sustainability and adaptation is 9 % less (49 and 54, respectively). While most African countries’ scores have improved from 2015 to 2022, the continent still lags behind the rest of the world. Availability in Africa is 19 % and sustainability and adaptation is 11 % below the global average.

It should be noted that the GFSI does not currently document countries with significant food security issues, such as Somalia and DR Congo.
POWERING DEVELOPMENT

Lighting up the continent

Driven by demographic and economic growth, Africa’s GNI per capita is growing, and an unprecedented number of Africans are connected to the electrical grid. The continent has managed to literally put itself on the map as seen from space over the past 30 years. Despite positive developments many Africans are still without electricity: in 2021 about 583 million sub-Saharan Africans did not have access to electricity. Access to an electricity grid is significantly lower in rural areas (45%) as compared to urban regions (94%). To speed up the transition, and to meet growing energy demand in the coming years, access to reliable, sustainable and affordable electricity services is both a formidable challenge and a fundamental prerequisite for human and economic development, as well as peace and stability. In terms of renewable energy sources, Africa has abundant hydropower, wind and solar resources. Fostering their development is a key policy priority for the continent in line with commitments to accelerate climate action and achieve a sustainable energy mix. As the continent moves away from the traditional use of biomass and fossil fuels that currently account for a large part of its final energy consumption, a less carbon-intensive model of development would see a rise in the share of renewables in the energy mix, as well as gains in efficiency, digitalisation and the deployment of smart grids.

In addition, compared to other developing regions, Africa’s development trajectory is accompanied by a relatively small increase in CO2 emissions. While this is due to several factors, such as the continent’s marginal role in global value chains, the decoupling of GNI growth and CO2 emissions is extremely relevant for how African development is perceived in multilateral discussions on climate change mitigation and adaptation, and African burden sharing.
EDUCATION AND SKILLS

Mind the gap

An additional 100 million young people will have entered the African labour market by 2030 according to estimates. While the pursuit of inclusive growth in Africa is critical, education alone is not sufficient to guarantee quality employment for young people and, in particular, young women. Labour market participation and secondary education enrolment rates, for instance, do not follow the same trends. While the latter has gone up for both men and women in most African countries, participation in the labour market has largely stagnated or decreased since 2022, with persisting gender disparities.

Geopolitics also come into play. Africa has come to be seen as a vast source of cheap labour and lucrative consumer markets by traditional and emerging global powers alike. A new ‘scramble for Africa’ has created market failures insofar as youth policies do not sufficiently address work deficits, including knowledge and skills gaps, and the vulnerabilities of young Africans but are instead centred on broader geo-economic interests. Due to the preponderant role of foreign economic actors, young Africans are increasingly exposed to precarious employment in an ever-expanding informal sector.

To make sure the youth bulge stimulates sustainable growth, new entrants to the labour market require adequate training and education, as otherwise they will struggle to find the right job opportunities. African countries need resources and instruments to improve technical know-how and enlarge the pool of skills available. Digital skills will be in high demand for human capital development with the advent of the 4th industrial revolution. New ways for foreign investment to create virtuous spillovers for the African labour base should focus on the quality – and not just the quantity – of jobs, such as security and conditions of employment, address the issue of youth marginalisation, promote gender balance, facilitate training and allow young Africans to directly access opportunities. The continent also requires resources to fund education and skills to satisfy the demands of its youth bulge. Young people in Africa are eager for knowledge and access to better educational and employment opportunities.
HEALTHCARE
A long way to go

While having managed to overcome the Ebola and Covid-19 pandemics, African countries still struggle to provide their populations with access to quality healthcare. Every year, hundreds of thousands of Africans die from curable and preventable diseases like malaria and tuberculosis (for example in 2021, 594,000 Africans died because of malaria). Specific needs, however, vary from country to country due to differences in the number and quality of healthcare facilities, healthcare expenditure, and different rates of exposure to dangerous or deadly diseases.

Challenges to accessibility also occur for a variety of reasons, and simply throwing money at the problem by building more facilities is no panacea. For instance, poor coordination among healthcare facilities can lead to fragmented services, making it more difficult for people to find the right care. People need the means to reach the right facilities to tend to their needs. A new approach to healthcare should therefore focus not just on quantity of services but also on quality and access. While affordable and reliable healthcare remains the immediate challenge in fiscally constrained environments, further regulation and harmonisation of health systems is needed in the long run.

The deserts and rainforests of the African continent present formidable obstacles to transport. By extension, they also hamper access to healthcare facilities. Beyond those areas, large swathes of land especially in sub-Saharan Africa remain distant. The median time it takes to get to the nearest healthcare facility from any of the pixels on this map is 330 hours. This figure drops to about 200 hours south of the Sahara.

Leading causes of death
Top three per country

- Digestive diseases
- Transport injuries
- Other infectious diseases
- Diarrhoeal diseases and malaria
- HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections
- Maternal and neonatal disorders
- Respiratory infections and tuberculosis
- Neoplasms
- Cardiovascular diseases

Access to facilities only in major towns.

While having managed to overcome the Ebola and Covid-19 pandemics, African countries still struggle to provide their populations with access to quality healthcare. Every year, hundreds of thousands of Africans die from curable and preventable diseases like malaria and tuberculosis (for example in 2021, 594,000 Africans died because of malaria). Specific needs, however, vary from country to country due to differences in the number and quality of healthcare facilities, healthcare expenditure, and different rates of exposure to dangerous or deadly diseases.

Challenges to accessibility also occur for a variety of reasons, and simply throwing money at the problem by building more facilities is no panacea. For instance, poor coordination among healthcare facilities can lead to fragmented services, making it more difficult for people to find the right care. People need the means to reach the right facilities to tend to their needs. A new approach to healthcare should therefore focus not just on quantity of services but also on quality and access. While affordable and reliable healthcare remains the immediate challenge in fiscally constrained environments, further regulation and harmonisation of health systems is needed in the long run.

The deserts and rainforests of the African continent present formidable obstacles to transport. By extension, they also hamper access to healthcare facilities. Beyond those areas, large swathes of land especially in sub-Saharan Africa remain distant. The median time it takes to get to the nearest healthcare facility from any of the pixels on this map is 330 hours. This figure drops to about 200 hours south of the Sahara.

Leading causes of death
Top three per country

- Digestive diseases
- Transport injuries
- Other infectious diseases
- Diarrhoeal diseases and malaria
- HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections
- Maternal and neonatal disorders
- Respiratory infections and tuberculosis
- Neoplasms
- Cardiovascular diseases

Access to facilities only in major towns.
Climate change is a global phenomenon that affects all regions of the world but has particularly harsh effects in Africa. Populations are hit increasingly hard and more frequently by natural hazards, such as floods and droughts, resulting in loss of life, displacement, destruction of infrastructure and economic damage. Africa’s natural environment has also been substantially altered by human intervention, thus compounding the risk of natural hazards and the impact these have on human lives and livelihoods.

What does this mean for the partnership?
The AU and the EU have developed an ambitious plan, reflected in the Joint Vision 2030, to ensure a ‘joint’ green transition. While this transition is a key requirement for achieving a sustainable growth model on both continents, ranging from the development of a circular economy to blue economies and biodiversity protection, policy reforms cannot work without a ‘regime change’ that breaks out of the vicious cycle of illicit trafficking in wildlife and environmental resources, crime and informal economic activities. This transition can only work through ambitious goals for environmental, social and public governance (ESG+) that consider ways to generate concrete and attainable value for citizens and public stakeholders.

**Disaster type**
- Drought
- Flood

**People affected**
- Jan 2000-Jul 2023, million

**Related features**
- Desert
- River
- Lake

In 2022, drought conditions in the Horn of Africa were worse than in 2011, when more than a quarter of a million people died of starvation.

Many people are affected by floods in the Niger river delta, a densely populated area.

In 2002, 10 million people, or nearly one third of Mozambique’s 2012 population, have been affected by droughts or floods since 2000.
DEBT AND STATE FRAGILITY

Navigating the permacrisis

Africa’s ongoing sovereign debt crisis has intensified in the past decade and is likely to worsen in the coming years. In a climate of geopolitical turmoil and rising interest rates, Africa’s public debt has doubled between 2010 and 2022, rising from 32.7% to 65%, and creditors have diversified. Following Zambia and Ghana, several African countries risk default due to unsustainable debt servicing costs in the coming two years. China has often been portrayed as one of the main causes of African debt problems. However, Chatham House research suggests that debt-trap diplomacy is not the root cause of African debt distress. Chinese lending accounts for 12% of Africa’s private and public external debt, which increased more than fivefold to $696 billion between 2000 and 2020. China is a major creditor to many African nations, but its lending has fallen in recent years and is set to remain at lower levels. Rather than being attributable to a single lender, the main negative factors affecting African sovereign debt are its sheer volume, an increasingly large and diverse creditor base, and geopolitical tensions that create turmoil in the markets.

What does this mean for the partnership?

A lasting solution to Africa’s debt distress requires multilateral frameworks going beyond the AU–EU partnership. Debt as well as other financing gaps require cooperation between the EU, its Western partners and other global players, above all China. In this regard, the AU–EU partnership can still help build new foundations for a fairer multilateral system to address Africa’s macrofinancial instability. In such a system, the AU would have a stronger voice, including through a fully operational AfCFTA, where larger amounts of private finance can be mobilised and aligned to environmental, social and governance considerations, and where decision-makers can identify and implement mutually-beneficial initiatives to navigate a way out of a financial permacrisis.
While Africa’s overall population is growing, its urban population is expanding even more rapidly. This brings unique challenges. Currently, 42% of sub-Saharan Africans live in cities, compared to 31% in the year 2000. The uncontrolled expansion of cities and the creation of large informal settlements on their peripheries may lead to additional vulnerability to climate change and exert upward pressures on goods and services. This, in turn, may increase unemployment, inter-group inequality, and lower tax receipts by fostering employment in the informal economy.

The dynamics of African urbanisation involve more than just numbers corresponding to fast demographic growth. Urbanisation is a contentious political process, which has resulted in a deep transformation of African cities: not only have they become increasingly populous, but they have become geopolitical spaces riven by competing claims and grievances related to housing, infrastructure, participation and identity. They can thus pose serious risks to political and social stability.

What does this mean for the partnership?

The AU-EU partnership cannot fulfil the 2030 vision without developing a ‘city-to-city’ partnership between the two continents, fostering investment, exchange of knowledge and best practices, and other forms of cooperation to support sustainable urbanisation processes. This is a prerequisite for formulating effective responses to fragility, conflict and violence. Establishing a forum of European and African cities can be a first step towards institutionalising dialogue between public actors, private actors and representatives of civil society, with the aim of creating favourable conditions for investment and improving urban governance processes.
PEACE AND SECURITY
Since 2019, democracy has regressed in several African countries following a series of coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Gabon and Guinea, among others. Combined with a faltering transition to civilian rule in Sudan and the increasing political longevity of dictatorial rulers in Equatorial Guinea and Eritrea (to name but two), parts of Africa have experienced democratic backsliding. The rise in the number of coups is emblematic of the fragility of democratic systems and transitions which are further weakened by foreign actors spreading disinformation and meddling in domestic politics, including elections. Consequently, African elections are often subject to fraud and manipulation, tainted by corruption or mired in violence. Yet surveys suggest the majority of Africans remain committed to democracy and would like their governments to improve representation and accountability. To this end, Africa needs to bolster its democratic resilience by overcoming obstacles to free and secure elections, such as vote-rigging, media restrictions, foreign influence operations and electoral violence. Unequivocal condemnation of unconstitutional takeovers of power and the strengthening and expansion of electoral observation missions, such as the African Union Election Observation Mission, can help establish safe and transparent electoral processes.

Background shading shows a country’s electoral democracy index score. Often a darker red shading correlates with fewer elections, and red and orange shading indicate poor conditions for democratic elections. Since the Covid-19 pandemic started in 2020, there have been almost twice as many cases of backsliding year-on-year (58 %) than amelioration (32 %) in electoral democracy scores.
Four of the top seven spenders in absolute terms are North African countries. Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya are the top three in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Zimbabwe’s high share of government spending contrasts with its overall relatively average per capita expenditure.

There is not one archetype of the African military. Security apparatuses vary in size, composition and their relationship to governments. However, it is safe to say that African states spend remarkably little on their armed forces by comparison with countries in other parts of the world. In 2021, total African defence spending amounted to a mere 2.1% of the global total. Yet, African countries face such daunting tasks as countering the spread of violent extremism, while financial constraints pose serious obstacles to creating effective security forces; make it difficult to secure the needed equipment; and militate against proper conduct in environments where training and salaries are not guaranteed.

Coupled with ethnic or political tensions and grievances that permeate relations between the military, the government and civilians, this may lead military forces to safeguard their political and financial interests by virtue of their control of the means of violence. Without democratic structures to hold military leaders accountable or with the military entrenched in political structures, political authorities may be upheld or overthrown depending on the support of African armies.

African security forces need clear structures of accountability and financial management. Better public expenditure management, including of security sector expenditure, is needed to improve the quality of security forces, as is the development, in parallel, of effective justice systems. Learning from best practices and monitoring, reviewing and improving public expenditure management may generate efficiencies in expenditure on military and security forces.

**MANAGING THE MILITARY**

Improving the accountability of the security sector
African borders constitute both a security challenge and a source of economic potential. As free movement of goods, people and services is critical for African economic development, establishing open borders is a priority for the AfCFTA. However, rather than being open, some borders are porous; if unregulated, they can serve as conduits for trafficking, crime and conflict. By its very nature, conflict in border areas has a high chance of spilling over – with national cascading into transnational conflict. Unregulated borders also hinder the fight against other transnational challenges, such as terrorism or the spread of disease.

Africa needs stable borders to promote mobility that can generate economic opportunities. Secure borders can foster trade and commercial interactions, while facilitating counter-terrorist operations and reducing trafficking and smuggling. Border stability is thus not only key for internal security, and mitigates the risk of conflict spilling over to neighbouring countries, but it is a prerequisite for regional integration, to attract investment and thus nurture sustainable economic development. To ensure stable borders, Africa needs to upgrade infrastructure connecting border areas with the urban centres, and to improve governance of border areas to facilitate legal cross-border movement of people and goods, thus reducing the gap between centre and periphery and improving participatory opportunities for border communities.
MARITIME CAPABILITIES

Unexplored depths

Key sea lines of communication (SLOCs) surrounding Africa gained in importance in the wake of the war in Ukraine, which obstructed trade in energy, food and fertilisers. The Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea are crucial highways for substantial global trade flows. Therefore, international actors have stepped up their presence in those waters to safeguard their economic and security interests. Even though international counter-piracy efforts were ostensibly the main reason why actors increased their presence, particularly around the Horn of Africa, analysts have also pointed at the increased geopolitical competition that is playing out in African waters.

While countries like Nigeria, South Africa and Algeria have established a strong presence at sea, most African countries’ potential for naval force remains untapped. However, for Africa to develop sustainably, it needs to build up its naval presence and become its own maritime security guarantor. Currently, in SLOCs remains dependent on external powers that first and foremost promote their own security and economic interests (a case in point being illegal overfishing by Chinese vessels off West Africa). The density of international actors also creates new interfaces and tensions that could lead to conflict.

For Africa to fully realise its potential as a maritime actor, African countries need to invest in new naval capabilities and in the modernisation of naval assets, despite budgetary constraints. Furthermore, Africa could leverage and reform existing regional cooperation structures and mechanisms, such as the Yaoundé Architecture, to harmonise African maritime security efforts. Finally, on the international level, stronger dialogue and cooperation with international actors could prevent international competition from escalating further.
Transnational organised crime (TOC) remains firmly rooted – and continues to grow – on the African continent, undermining security and economic development. Africa is an attractive target for international criminal groups due to its wealth of mineral and natural resources and the struggle to police related illicit trade. Trafficking routes and informal markets connect local criminals in Africa to the world: ivory harvested from Malawian Elephants is shipped to Thailand; ancient Islamic cultural objects are trafficked to the Gulf region; drugs like heroin, cocaine and cannabis are increasingly produced and shipped to (among others) European destinations. Traffickers increasingly exploit digital technologies and platforms, utilise a decentralised and globalised modus operandi, and diversify their activities. Consequently, criminal activities that were once separate have become increasingly intertwined with more disruptive and destabilising effects. Interlinkages between transnational organised crime and terrorism have become increasingly evident and may further fuel instability in the continent – as attested, for example, by the links between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the drug trade, and kidnappings for ransom and piracy attacks carried out by al-Shabaab.

What does this mean for the partnership?

In the Joint Vision 2030, the EU and the AU committed to creating ‘a space of solidarity, security, peace and sustainable prosperity’. Such a space cannot be achieved without stopping and reversing the spread of transnational organised crime. The EU-funded project ENACT – Enhancing Africa’s Response to Transnational Organised Crime – provides a platform through which the EU can support capacity building of African stakeholders. However, more funding and resources are needed to support African countries in their fight against organised crime. Funds are needed, for example, to provide the necessary training to journalists, civil society organisations and relevant authorities. Furthermore, the partnership’s funds could help African governments to conduct TOC investigations, and set up and implement up-to-date TOC-prevention strategies that account for how novel technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) may impact the way transnational criminal groups operate.

**More crime**

*Criminality Change 2019-2023*

*Year* | 2019 | 2021 | 2023
--- | --- | --- | ---
Côte d’Ivoire | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.0
Guinea-Bissau | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.5
Congo | 4.5 | 4.5 | 5.0
Senegal | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.5
Namibia | 5.5 | 5.5 | 6.0
Botswana | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.5
Nigeria | 6.5 | 6.5 | 7.0
South Africa | 7.0 | 7.0 | 7.5

**Rising crime**

Global Organised Crime Index, subindex scores, 2023

The Global Organised Crime Index is subdivided into two components: criminality and resilience. Criminality is measured by assessing criminal markets and criminal actors. Resilience assesses the quality and efficacy of national measures to withstand and disrupt organised criminal activities.

In 2023, Cape Verde, Nigeria and Senegal are the most resilient to organised crime. While Southern Africa scores lowest on criminal actors and highest on resilience, it has witnessed a significant rise in criminality between 2019 and 2023. Criminal markets flourish most in Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa.

**What does this mean for the partnership?**

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VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Who fills the governance vacuum?

Violent extremist groups in Africa have proliferated and become more deadly over the past two decades. In the early 2000s, violent extremism was still concentrated in hotspots such as the Great Lakes region and Southern Africa. However, it has become increasingly entrenched in the Horn of Africa, Madagascar, Libya and spilled over from the Sahel to the West African coast.

As they no longer have the monopoly on the use of force, the political authority of African state regimes has become more fragmented. Violent extremist groups’ tactics are not limited to the use of force. In some cases, they also seek to control movements of people and goods as well as natural resources. Groups may tap into and exploit existing grievances among the population and provide services in areas where the government does not. As a consequence, the social contract between African states and their citizens has become weakened as states fail to provide their citizens with basic services and protect them against violent groups. With the means of violence and the provision of services no longer centralised in the state, power is dispersed and fractionalised among various armed insurgent groups.

What does this mean for the partnership?

African governments’ global commitments, actions and credibility are at stake given the diffusion of power away from the state. The EU, on the other hand, needs to review the security assistance and support that it provides to African countries battling violent extremism. The past ten years of EU counterterrorism efforts in Africa show that countries that previously cooperated with the EU are increasingly turning to other international actors for help, such as Russia and the Wagner Group in Mali and Burkina Faso. Through its investment in civilian CSDP missions, the EU has developed a new and unique tool that can help address root causes of violent extremism. But better cooperation between CSDP missions and regional security initiatives undertaken by the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) may be necessary to upgrade security cooperation and to counter violent extremism more effectively.

Who fills the governance vacuum?
Citizens’ concerns have all too often been dismissed by African elites. Recent research shows that 44% of African citizens feel that their views are disregarded by decision-makers. Only 22% of people think local government councillors ‘listen to what the people have to say’. Most worryingly, the gap between what African people want and what the government actually provides is growing. The belief that their countries are going in the wrong direction was shared by 62% of Africans in 2021, up from 47% in 2013. As citizens feel that their voices are not heard, they also become less likely to actively participate in civil society, causing African states to miss out on the valuable social, political and financial capital that citizen engagement can create. The potential is enormous, and with expected rising demographic trends and the advent of a digitalised society in which people interact via online, mobile and social media channels, this will only increase.

**What does this mean for the partnership?**

The EU-AU partnership should tap into citizen engagement to boost peace, prosperity and security in the continent. Strengthening civil engagement is key in creating autonomous and self-sufficient systems spanning many of the priority areas outlined in the Joint Vision 2030 and the Agenda 2063, including food and healthcare sovereignty, energy access and democratic accountability. The EU-AU partnership should aim first and foremost to strengthen its transparency and openness and to create more spaces for inclusive, bottom-up processes and dialogues to shape the policy priorities of the partnership. This would allow EU and AU civil society to engage and exchange knowledge on EU-Africa relations, thus helping construct a partnership that would enshrine both African and European aspirations.
MIGRATION AND MOBILITY
REGULAR MOBILITY
Fifty shades of movement

While regular mobility is only occasionally alluded to in policy and media debates, it accounts for the bulk of African migration. For Africa, migration is part of the reality of life and – if managed effectively – can provide a variety of benefits, including enhanced productivity, trade and knowledge exchange. African mobility takes many forms. Most of it is intra-African migration, which is largely centred around economic activity involving cross-border movements of trade and people, including circular and seasonal migration.

Compared to Asia (41%) and Europe (24%), the African diaspora makes up only a small proportion (14%) of the global migrant population. About a quarter of the African diaspora resides in Europe, which generates a wealth of African culture through languages, food, music and film. Source countries benefit from the gained skills of migrants as well as the remittances that they send home.

African migration policy has been shaped by European concerns about irregular migration. African governments attach low priority to migration management and the number of African academic institutions offering migration studies courses remains low. A stronger African voice in the (international) policy and academic communities could be achieved through establishing institutions and expertise on migration management that could help shape policies and initiatives driven by truly African objectives. Currently, the AfCFTA provides a regional framework for free movement. However, its implementation is behind schedule as limited resources and capacities impede progress.

In 2020, 52% of African migrants (21 million) lived in Africa. 91% of Western African migrants stayed within Western Africa, while only 23% of Northern African migrants stayed in their subregion of origin.

Number of countries to which a passport gives visa-free access

Intra-African migration

Each subregion and their migration patterns are represented on the map. It shows the ease of travel and the number of countries to which a passport gives visa-free access. The map highlights the number of migrants from different African subregions.

International migrants

The map also shows the Subregion of origin and destination of African migrants, including the number of migrants from and to specific countries in 2020.
In about 3,500 incidents in Africa from 2014 to 2023, 3,000 migrants were reported missing and 9,600 were reported dead. During the same period, in the Mediterranean, 17,200 were reported missing and 9,200 dead.

- Incidents involving missing migrants since 2014

IRREGULAR MIGRATION

Porous borders and lives lost

Despite making up only a small proportion (15%) of all African migration, there are still millions of Africans who move irregularly. Irregular migration is a complex issue that is difficult to measure – not least because there is no universally accepted definition – and is driven by a whole host of economic, political and security-related factors. Irregular migrants are often forced to use more dangerous routes and, rather than relying on legal processes, frequently pay large sums of money to people smugglers who facilitate their departure. In so doing, people become vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Migrants, on their journey, may alternate between regular and irregular status: a person may enter a country irregularly but then apply for asylum; or vice versa enter regularly but then overstay their visa. The shifting nature of irregular migration further complicates data collection.

Nonetheless, key trends and irregular migration routes can be deduced from this plethora of incomplete information. Among the least documented are migration routes across central and southern Africa. These were traditionally used by miners workers travelling irregularly to seek work further south. More recently, they have come to serve as a passage for East African refugees.

In West Africa, migrants traverse historic trans-Saharan trade routes that originally connected ancient trading posts. North Africa functions as an origin, transit and destination region. Over the course of many years, migrants have been leaving North African coastlines bound for Italy and Malta. From the 1970s until 2014, the number of irregular migrants arriving in Italy remained relatively constant. After a sharp rise in 2014, followed by a relative decrease between 2017 and 2019, numbers have increased significantly since 2020. However, data from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) shows that the route remains highly dangerous. The first quarter of 2023 has been the deadliest since 2017. In North Africa, the rise of populist rhetoric and heightened xenophobia targeting migrants has contributed to more perilous journeys and a growing number of fatalities along the Mediterranean migration route.

To stimulate regular migration, African countries would benefit from harmonising their respective administrative processes. Legal migration pathways, like visa facilitation and family reunification schemes, facilitate regular migration. However, these pathways are not a panacea, and the number of people able to benefit from them may be limited. For the poorest and worst off, there remain obstacles to using regular migration routes. Better quality data on irregular migration, and investment in research and pooling and harmonisation of existing data, is also urgently needed.
The most tangible links between migration and economic development can be measured by the direction and volume of remittances. Money sent by the African diaspora to home countries exceeds the total amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development aid (ODA) on the continent. For example, Nigeria received about $20 billion in remittances in 2022, which is approximately six times greater than its FDI in the same year. On average, remittances account for 2.6 % of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, yet this varies significantly and is much higher in many countries (for example, 9.6 % in Senegal, 12.6 % in Guinea-Bissau and 26.8 % in the Gambia.)

Remittances are not only higher than ODA and FDI, but also stimulate development very effectively as the money goes directly to recipients. They provide local communities with the financial means to send children to school, to access healthcare, build facilities and infrastructures or to achieve other socio-economic goals. Research indicates that, for instance, Ghanaian children that have a family member living abroad are 54 % more likely to attend secondary school. A UNESCO report has indicated that lower fees on money transfers could lift private expenditure on education by about $1 billion annually. Not all remittances are sent through formal channels or digitally, however. Cash transactions are still common practice.

The significance of remittances for development and for the EU-Africa partnership should not be underestimated. Access to bank accounts and financial literacy rates remain low in Africa. Legislation that incentivises remittances and diaspora investment could be of considerable help to African societies. Fees and foreign exchange charges still make Africa the costliest continent to which to send remittances. Rolling out a more extensive, inclusive and digitalised financial infrastructure could help boost peoples’ savings which in turn can serve socioeconomic objectives and help achieve African development goals at the grassroots level.

In the absence of hard data, bilateral remittances are estimates based on data on migrant stocks, host country incomes and origin country incomes.

**Region of remittance-sending country**

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**Region of remittance-receiving country**

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**Going out**

77 % of remittances from Africans having migrated within the continent are intra-African remittances, with the African diaspora in Europe only accounting for 3.8 %. Nigeria receives 23 % of remittances sent from Africa, with France, Ghana, Zimbabwe and South Sudan making up the rest of the top five.

**Coming in**

While the United States is the biggest single sender of remittances to Africa with $13 billion, Europe is the biggest sending region with $32 billion or 54 % of all remittances sent to Africa. Egypt, Nigeria and Morocco are by far the largest remittance recipients of a combined $60 billion. While 89 % of Morocco’s remittances originate in Europe and 79 % of Egypt’s in Asia, Nigeria’s are almost evenly distributed between Europe, the Americas and Africa.

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**REMITTANCES**

Africa’s trump card

REMITTANCES

Africa’s trump card

The most tangible links between migration and economic development can be measured by the direction and volume of remittances. Money sent by the African diaspora to home countries exceeds the total amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development aid (ODA) on the continent. For example, Nigeria received about $20 billion in remittances in 2022, which is approximately six times greater than its FDI in the same year. On average, remittances account for 2.6 % of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, yet this varies significantly and is much higher in many countries (for example, 9.6 % in Senegal, 12.6 % in Guinea-Bissau and 26.8 % in the Gambia.)

Remittances are not only higher than ODA and FDI, but also stimulate development very effectively as the money goes directly to recipients. They provide local communities with the financial means to send children to school, to access healthcare, build facilities and infrastructures or to achieve other socio-economic goals. Research indicates that, for instance, Ghanaian children that have a family member living abroad are 54 % more likely to attend secondary school. A UNESCO report has indicated that lower fees on money transfers could lift private expenditure on education by about $1 billion annually. Not all remittances are sent through formal channels or digitally, however. Cash transactions are still common practice.

The significance of remittances for development and for the EU-Africa partnership should not be underestimated. Access to bank accounts and financial literacy rates remain low in Africa. Legislation that incentivises remittances and diaspora investment could be of considerable help to African societies. Fees and foreign exchange charges still make Africa the costliest continent to which to send remittances. Rolling out a more extensive, inclusive and digitalised financial infrastructure could help boost peoples’ savings which in turn can serve socioeconomic objectives and help achieve African development goals at the grassroots level.
Displacement has recently accelerated on the African continent as a result of natural disasters and conflict. In 2022, Africa saw a 12% increase in the number of displaced people, totalling 36 million at the end of the year, or 44% of the global total. Already since the outbreak of violence in Sudan on 15 April 2023, an additional 1.6 million people have been forcibly displaced. The eight crises that are the primary drivers of this displacement are located in Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and Mozambique.

Escalating and protracted crises and the difficulties people encounter in reestablishing livelihoods after they have been displaced drive up the figures. Camps and organisations that provide shelter to refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) are ideally temporary solutions. But as crises drag on and become drawn-out and the mobility of people living in camps is restricted, they end up in limbo – not being able to return but similarly unable to rebuild their lives elsewhere.

Add climate change to the equation and grim scenarios of mass displacement come to mind. Further acceleration of displacement in Africa will come with a heavy price and jeopardise Africa’s development goals on almost all fronts. The EU–Africa partnership should prioritise tackling drivers of displacement (e.g. climate change mitigation and adaptation, conflict mediation efforts) as well as focus on how to provide displaced people with better and faster opportunities to rebuild their lives. A critical step could be shifting from policies that are primarily place-centered (providing shelter, relocating elsewhere) towards policies that are focused on maintaining social constellations (religious, ethnic, labour and family networks) and nurturing relations between displaced and host communities. These social ties are an indispensable resource for people seeking to rebuild their lives.

**Conflicts causes displacement**

Refugees and IDPs by country of origin, 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Internally displaced persons</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DR Congo’s eastern neighbours Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zambia host a combined total of 733 000 DR Congolese refugees.

Uganda has a refugee population of 1.5 million, or 5% of its total population of 47 million.
Improved connectivity, through better infrastructure and transport, has been a longstanding priority of the EU–Africa partnership. Not without reason: better connectivity enables people to travel more easily and securely, whether for work, education, to join family members or to seek refuge. This creates a range of economic and security benefits, such as opportunities to avoid dangerous irregular routes, increased tourism and remittances. Thus, to make the most of migration as a development tool, transport and connectivity are critical.

Getting there, however, is still an ongoing process. The extent to which African countries are connected and have extensive and well-maintained infrastructure varies widely. Even countries which rank highly in terms of infrastructure quality, such as South Africa and Tunisia, struggle with mismanagement, corruption, cronysim and criminal activities that have undermined and even reversed trends in infrastructure development. Estimates by the African Development Bank have suggested that Africa needs $130–170 billion a year to develop its infrastructure, and that in 2018 there was a financing gap of between $68–108 billion. Conflict and climate change may further drive up costs for future infrastructure development and maintenance.

**What does this mean for the partnership?**

While the political and institutional framework to develop qualitative infrastructure in Africa exists, budgetary and technical constraints often pose problems for implementation. As articulated in the Joint Vision 2030, investment in sustainable infrastructure within the framework of the Global Gateway Investment Package for Infrastructure Development Africa (PIDA) and the AfCFTA, with positive spillovers for job creation, skills and human development. Specifically, in light of the climate and debt crisis the EU Africa partnership should prioritise making infrastructure development climate-resilient, and enhancing connectivity.

Cape Town to Algiers stretches about 10 500 km by road - the same distance as Lisbon to Ulaanbaatar. The distance from Dakar to Mogadishu is about three times as far (9 400 km) as from Naples to Tallinn.

The TCI is part of the Africa Infrastructure Development Index (AIDI), produced by the African Development Bank. It measures a country’s total length of paved roads in relation to both the number of inhabitants and the amount of exploitable land area.
**Mass disasters**

Mass disasters are classed into different types by the International Disaster Database. The population of East Africa, the most populous African subregion, has been hardest hit by disasters since 2000. Western Africa, though almost as populous, has recorded less than half the number of affected people. However, measured against the 2022 population, the total number of people affected by disasters between 2000 and 2022 as a share of the population was highest in Southern Africa at 65%.

**Net migration**

Net migration (immigration minus emigration) is derived as the difference between population change and population 'natural increase' (births minus deaths).

With the consequences of climate change becoming increasingly tangible in Africa, the urgency of the climate change—migration nexus is clear, in the same way that there is a clear correlation between conflict and climate change. Estimates suggest that there will be between 25 million and 1 billion climate migrants globally by 2050. African countries will be among the hardest hit by the effects of global warming, as a result of which people will increasingly be on the move.

Research shows, however, that the links between climate change and migration are complex and that reality does not necessarily support predictions of a mass exodus from Africa. People make a decision to migrate based on various economic, social and political factors and less than 1% of Africans who expressed a desire to leave their country mentioned climate change as the primary reason. Research suggests that while there is a link between climate change and net migration, no generalisations can be drawn on a continental scale as a range of factors including local conditions, geography and the political situation also enter the equation. Migration is primarily a coping and adaptation strategy vis-à-vis climate change, for instance in the case of rural—urban migration due to the degradation of agricultural land. Despite having gained widespread policy and public attention, notions that future large flows of international climate migrants and refugees will entail adverse consequences so far have limited scientific backing.

**CLIMATE MIGRATION**

A gathering storm

**What does this mean for the partnership?**

Besides accommodating and offering the necessary protection for populations displaced by natural disasters, the EU–Africa partnership should prioritise reinforcing the adaptive capacity of local populations against climate change and natural hazards. Improving the resilience of communities will reduce the humanitarian impact of climate change. Populations that are well-equipped to handle climate hazards are less likely to move primarily because of climate change. This underlines the importance of mainstreaming climate concerns throughout the partnership’s priority areas, including in the field of migration.
Migration can be defined as ‘movement from one location to another’. These movements and locations are no longer strictly physical. Processes, information and mobility have gained a digital dimension. Prospective migrants can apply for visas online; people who might have moved for better access to or exchange of information can now remain where they are thanks to international telephone and internet connections; and remittances are sent via digital payment instruments, including cryptocurrency.

This digitalisation of migration will have distributional impacts. It may, on the one hand, reduce inequality by offering greater connectedness to those who are physically and geographically distant, thereby helping to reduce rural–urban divides. On the other hand, however, it may promote inequality, as without inclusive and equal access to digital tools, digitalisation merely speeds up connectivity for those already connected, leaving those in remote locations, without access to the grid, increasingly isolated. In this way, it may reinforce gender-based or rural–urban inequalities.

**What does this mean for the partnership?**

The EU–Africa Partnership aims to establish accessible and inclusive infrastructure on the continent. Without considering the impacts of the digitalisation of migration on inequalities, inclusiveness may be difficult to achieve. The partnership should consider the implications of digital technologies for migration. Who will profit and who will fall through the cracks? How can digitalisation be harnessed to reduce inequalities and facilitate free movement of people, rather than as a tool to reduce inequalities and facilitate free movement of people, rather than as a process that may increase inequality? More research and data are needed on the partnership should consider the implications of the digitalisation of migration on inequalities, accessibility and inclusiveness may be difficult to achieve.

**Country access to international connectivity**

Mode of connection (latest data available)

- **Fiber**
- **Satellite**
- **Submarine cable**

**Change in international bandwidth usage**

Mbit per inhabitant per year, 2016−2021 compared to 2010−2015

**Minutes per inhabitant per year**

2016−2021 compared to 2010−2015

More bandwidth, fewer phone calls

People across the continent use more international bandwidth, and fewer traditional telephone calls to connect between countries.

**International connections shift online**

As phone traffic decreased, internet bandwidth usage picked up in each subregion, 2010−2021

- **International telephone traffic**: 1 000 minutes per person per year
- **International bandwidth usage**: Mbit per person per year

Change in international telephone traffic

Minutes per inhabitant per year, 2010−2015

Minutes per inhabitant on average 2016−2021
INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Africa needs more and better regional integration as a prerequisite for growth and development. Fully implementing economic integration in the continent, particularly through the ACFTA, can unlock growth more rapidly than in any other domain in which African countries fail or struggle to integrate. In a globalised international system increasingly characterised by multipolar competition, an African regional bloc, integrated at both economic and political levels, is a precondition for geopolitical relevance—and perhaps the only adequate response to the pressures of globalisation.

However, progress has been slow and institutional-political fragmentation at the sub-regional level has jeopardised substantive regional integration. African countries score on average 0.327 (where a score of 1 indicates being fully integrated) on Africa’s Regional Integration Index. This shows that continental integration remains limited, leading to high trade costs, a fragmented investment landscape, and weakening the competitiveness of African countries on the global stage. Strategic autonomy also stands to suffer since fragmented strategic interests and priorities make African countries more dependent on foreign investments, and thereby vulnerable to foreign influence and interference. In order to address geopolitical shockwaves, new impetus must be given to efforts to forge political unity on the continent. The AU, 20 years after its foundation and despite its norm-setting and interventionist ambitions, has shown limited capacity to address the continent’s needs, particularly in terms of peace and security, and is witnessing growing disagreement among its member states on key issues, such as the diplomatic response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Regional Economic Communities, while envisioned as the building blocks of African integration, have not fully achieved that objective.

Providing the AU with means to fulfil the Agenda 2063 commitments, upgrade regional integration structures so as to empower RECs in their regional mandates, and building the infrastructure that can connect Africa are therefore key priorities for the future of the continent in the changing international system. Implementing these steps should significantly improve African agency and resilience.

The AFRICA Regional Integration Index measures the continental integration of each African country across five subindicators: Trade integration, Free movement of people, Productive integration, Infrastructural integration, and Macroeconomic integration. Regional organisations recognised by the AU include AMU, CENSAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC.

Regional Integration Index

2019

The AFRICA Regional Integration Index measures the continental integration of each African country along five subindicators. While countries across North Africa tend to have relatively well-integrated infrastructures and macroeconomics, some Southern African countries score higher on trade integration.
**STRONGER TOGETHER**

Claiming a seat at the table

African countries need a stronger voice in world affairs and in shaping multilateral decisions. Although African agency has grown in the past number of years and the continent is integrated into the global economy, the multilateral system hardly reflects the interests and needs of African countries, whose voice remains marginal – including on key issues such as climate negotiations, cybersecurity and data protection, or representation in Bretton Woods institutions to achieve fairer macroeconomic policies and conditionality. As a result, African countries remain heavily dependent on and vulnerable to globalisation, without sufficient capacity to reform the international system’s regulatory and governance frameworks. Given Africa’s renewed geopolitical prominence in the world, the lack of a coherent voice to advance African interests is just one of the issues. More structural obstacles include the deterioration of nearly all security and macro-economic trends, which weakens Africa’s diplomatic posture and reinforces dependencies on external political and economic actors. Furthermore, in an era of fast-paced technological development, energy and raw material pressures are likely to exacerbate the resource curse, shifting the focus of strategy-making away from long-term planning to accommodate short-term gains. Finally, political fragmentation at the local and regional levels hampers the emergence of a ‘consensus’ on key decisions affecting the future of the continent.

It is clear therefore that providing the AU and the RECs with the right tools and resources to steer the continent’s international engagement, so that Africa can become a leading player in global politics and protect the interest of its citizens, will be a high priority in the years to come.
SECURITY PROVISION

Matching supply and demand

The conflict landscape in Africa is deteriorating and armed conflict trends hamper prospects for stability and growth. In the last decade, state and non-state conflicts, civil wars, violent extremism and last but not least military coups have increased in absolute and relative terms compared to other continents. Once conflicts appear, they leave instability in their wake. In fact, relapse into the cycle of violence is statistically more likely than the path of resolution and transition to peace.

Against this backdrop, although 73% of UN Security Council resolutions in 2020 dealt with peace and security in Africa, African countries are not only recipients of peace operations. African countries are increasingly providers of security in conflict-affected settings at the regional and sub-regional level. For instance, 32% of the military and police personnel of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) come from neighbouring members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and 31% of the uniformed personnel of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) come from Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) countries. African-led peace support operations also comply with this logic. This double trend – an increase in African demand for security and an increase in African supply of security – poses two challenges. First, a risk of militarisation of solutions to crises, which translates into a lack of efficiency and effectiveness in addressing the root causes; second, a risk that rising financing needs for African security, without adequate mechanisms and (in some cases) democratic oversight, could work to the detriment of sustainable and accountable African security sector reform, which may further exacerbate, rather than alleviate, conflict situations. This could create a vicious circle whereby African countries are simultaneously security beneficiaries and providers without scrutiny into what implications this could have for conflict dynamics at the regional and local levels.

Political violence involving militia

Violent events involving militia have tripled and fatalities have more than doubled from 2012 to 2022.

The share of African peacekeepers in Africa-based UN operations has hovered just over 50% since 2012. Meanwhile, that figured dropped to 8% for operations outside Africa in 2022.

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A NEW POWER PLAY

Foreign information manipulation
and interference

There is mounting evidence that hybrid threats are rising in Africa, affecting many countries’ prospects for stability, resilience and prosperity. The African ‘infosphere’, the geopolitical space where knowledge, information and narratives circulate, is increasingly fragile, and vulnerable to the actions of malign actors. Technological progress and digital transformations have resulted in the greater prominence and size of the African infosphere, with growing numbers of internet and social media users exposed to new types of threats to personal and societal security.

Meanwhile, the ‘global battle of narratives’ has prompted actors to engage in various forms of hybrid campaigns, specifically foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), to influence foreign audiences for political gains. Hybrid actors also tend to target and exploit situations where fragility, conflict and violence are prevalent. They capitalise on the inability of African governments to provide effective governance and services, including the provision of security in ungoverned or contested spaces. African contexts (including the Sahel, Horn of Africa, Central Africa and Great Lakes) hence provide fertile territory for malign actors to conduct hybrid operations and test old tactics in new settings, specifically to gain control of ‘valuable’ geopolitical and geo-economic spaces that present an economic, political, technological or military advantage.

What does this mean for the partnership?

A fragile and vulnerable infosphere in Africa is a key obstacle to peace and prosperity, as it can allow hostile narratives to change the perceptions and behaviours of populations, as well as create operational hubs in African countries for predatory actions by malign actors. If the African continent becomes the next frontline in the global battle of narratives, this could be to the detriment of African strategic interests and autonomy, with the risk of countries being embroiled in proxy confrontations. Additionally, hybrid threats may compound other threats, including violent extremism and transnational organised crime, and hinder peaceful transitions towards inclusive and accountable governance systems. This could have serious consequences for the security of African societies. Antidotes to foreign interference and hybrid threats include building building capacities at the national/regional level; support to African integration through the AfCFTA; and initiatives aimed at building resilience in countries’ infospheres.

### Political violence involving external actors

% of events per country, Jan 2020-May 2023

To get a sense of violent events involving foreign actors, we can compare them to the overall number of recorded violent events per country and type of event. In order to separate the signal from the noise we discarded stark outliers by only considering countries and event types comprising a minimum 50 recorded events.

To illustrate, several neighbouring countries’ defence forces and private military companies fight Islamist insurgents in northern Mozambique. 17 out of 62 (or 27 %) events of explosions or remote violence involved such forces (either as perpetrators or targets).

In another example, 22 % of recorded instances of political violence against civilians in the Central African Republic were perpetrated by foreign actors, virtually all of them by the Wagner Group.

### Share of events by type and actor

Private military companies are known for their use of violence against civilians and suppressing unrest.

![Image of political violence map]

**Explosions/Remote violence**
- ** strategic developments**
- **Violence against civilians**
- **Battles**
- **Protests**
- **Riots**

Private military companies and UN/other NGO

**Country**

0 50 100
FOREIGN POWERS
Exerting influence and meddling in conflicts

Foreign involvement, including attempts to exert influence in crises and meddling in conflicts, has been a rising trend in Africa. Almost half of all wars today involve significant foreign forces, reflecting greater global power competition and greater engagement by middle and regional powers. Libya and Sudan are just two examples of how proxies can aggravate local dynamics. Foreign presence in the Horn of Africa has been growing in recent years. The Red Sea corridor has always been of strategic importance, but its role has become even more significant in the wake of the war in Ukraine, as the waterway is critical for the safe transport of energy to and from Europe. In recent years there has been a large build-up of foreign military bases in the Horn: Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea alone host about ten foreign military bases. A wide array of foreign powers has sought to gain a foothold in the region through a variety of military, economic and cultural means, such as through arms trade, vaccine diplomacy and debt relief. Foreign power proxies can sustain wars and make them more difficult to end.

What does this mean for the partnership?
Given the world’s growing multipolarity and the proliferation of threats, Africa will be at the epicentre of proxy wars between different players seeking to expand their presence on the continent or attempting to weaken their adversaries. One of the priorities of the AU–EU partnership could be to protect member states as much as possible from the implications of these trends, for instance by developing common tools and approaches to prevent, deter or counter foreign meddling. The partnership should also support stronger local accountability, leadership and democratic processes. Apart from the normative value of such an approach, this is strategically important as elections and transitional processes are paramount for the region to move forward and mitigate interference. The reinforcement of RECs, AU structures and multilateral initiatives for dialogue can also contribute substantially to make African countries less exposed and vulnerable to foreign involvement.

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Foreign governments meddle militarily

The number of foreign governments supporting armed internationalised intrastate conflicts with troops has risen sharply in the past decade.

While a few – mostly African – governments sent their troops to African conflict zones from 1990 to 2012, 2013 marked a sharp turn. Ever since, an increasing number and share of non-African countries have been sending their forces into active conflicts on the continent.

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Foreign military bases and deployments abroad

In 2022, 90 different countries supported 10 African governments in their internationalised intrastate conflicts by sending their own troops, totalling 157 instances of a foreign country sending troops to any one country.

Region of origin • Africa • Europe • Asia • Americas • Oceania

Military bases and deployments • 2022

Foreign militaries involved in active conflict • 2022

---

End of the Cold War

1990

9/11 attacks in the United States

2001

2022
The last infographic in this Chaillot Paper covers what we believe is a fundamental policy issue, the one connecting the dots between developments in different sectors. Africa's path towards peace and prosperity depends on a cooperative, rules-based global system promoting sustainable growth, as much as it does on internal cohesion and integration. In other words, given that a divided continent in a world that is divided or 'at war' would wipe out economic and human development gains, an integrated Africa in a reformed, equitable international system would probably be the most desirable scenario. However, the continent appears to be increasingly fragmented internally. Those divisions go beyond the inability of African countries to speak with a unified voice at the UN General Assembly, for example on the resolutions on Ukraine. The continent is witnessing territorial fragmentation across the centre/peripheries dividing line, especially as a result of actions by extremist groups; and a widening divide between democratic and autocratic countries. Cleavages also arise from the different impacts of global shocks on African countries. Some experience humanitarian stress, food insecurity and economic hardship, while others benefit from rising energy prices and the willingness of Western powers to diversify their supplies.

What does this mean for the partnership?

An 'integrated Africa' is mentioned as one of the key transformational outcomes of Agenda 2063. Yet intra-continental divisions stand in the way of attaining these ambitious objectives. The AU–EU Partnership should build integration through an emphasis on key functional priorities, generating positive spillovers for other sectors. Investment packages via the Global Gateway should not only facilitate transitions (in the fields of energy, digital technology, jobs, health and education) but also transfer know–how and skills and support sustainable connectivity solutions. To be truly ambitious, the EU’s Global Gateway support to African connectivity can be part of the solution for Africa to transcend the barriers created by geography, politics and history, fostering stronger solidarity among African countries, as well as between Africa and Europe.
The table below provides key starting points for stronger AU–EU cooperation to address challenges that affect both continents. The entry points are extrapolated from the ‘What to watch out for’ sections in the previous chapters and highlight the need for policymakers to take immediate action vis-à-vis challenges that could derail the partnership or grow exponentially as threats to the agreed priorities to address current needs (see “What’s up?” sections) in the coming years.

**PROSPERITY AND SUSTAINABILITY**

**Environmental shocks**

- The AU and EU should develop a truly ‘joint’ green transition, building a sustainable growth model on both continents.

- Ambitious goals for environmental, social and public governance (ESG+) can generate concrete and attainable value for citizens and public stakeholders.

**Debt and state fragility**

- The AU–EU Partnership can help build new foundations for a fairer multilateral system to address Africa’s macrofinancial instability.

**Urban population growth**

- Developing a ‘city-to-city’ partnership between the two continents would foster investment, exchange of knowledge and best practices, and other forms of cooperation to support sustainable urbanisation processes.

**PEACE AND SECURITY**

**Organised crime**

- Investment in international cooperation structures such as ENACT to fund training, transnational organised crime investigation and prevention strategies and operations.

**Violent extremism**

- Better international cooperation between security mechanisms from the EU, the AU and the RECs to tackle both the immediate security threats from violent extremist groups as well as better address root causes of violence.

**Popular discontent**

- Strengthen transparency and openness of the partnership to create spaces for inclusive, bottom-up processes and
politics to shape the policy priorities of the partnership.

MIGRATION AND MOBILITY

Connectivity

> Private and public investment in (climate-resilient) infrastructure to help bridge the African infrastructure financing gap and boost connectivity.

Migration and climate change

> Prioritise the rights and protection of climate-displaced people.
> Reinforce adaptive capacity of local populations against climate change and natural hazards.

Digital migration

> Invest in research and data collection on how the digitalisation of migration could be harnessed to reduce, rather than increase, inequality.

INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Information manipulation and interference

> Building capacities to counter FIMI at the national/regional level; support to African integration through the AfCFTA; and actions aimed at building resilience in countries’ infospheres.

Meddling by foreign powers

> Joint AU–EU development of tools and approaches to prevent, deter or counter foreign meddling.
> Support to local accountability, leadership, and democratic processes, as elections and transitional processes are paramount to mitigate interference.

Integrating the continent

> Reinforced investment packages via the Global Gateway should not only facilitate (green, digital etc) transitions but also transfer know-how and skills and support sustainable connectivity solutions to foster African integration.
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING

BASEMAPS

Natural Earth, 2023 (https://www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/).

PROSPERITY AND SUSTAINABILITY

Food sovereignty


Powering development


Healthcare

Environmental shocks


Debt and state fragility


Urban population growth


PEACE AND SECURITY

Fragile democracy


Cline Center, ‘Coup d’État Project’, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 15 December 2022 (https://clinecenter.illinois.edu/project/research-themes/democracy-and-development/coup-detat-project).


Managing the military


Challenging borders


Maritime capabilities


Organised crime


Violent extremism


Popular discontent


Remittances

Displacement


Still not connected


Climate migration


Security provision


Digital migration

Foreign powers


Strategic choices


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfCFTA</td>
<td>African Continental Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Artificial Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>Automatic Identification System</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel-Saharan States</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENACT</td>
<td>Enhancing Africa’s Response to Transnational Organised Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESG+</td>
<td>Environmental, social and governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIMI</td>
<td>Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSI</td>
<td>Food Security Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFSI</td>
<td>Global Food Security Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAES</td>
<td>Joint Africa-EU Strategy</td>
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<td>Mbit</td>
<td>Megabit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SLOCs</td>
<td>Sea lines of communication</td>
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<td>TCI</td>
<td>Transport Composite Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOC</td>
<td>Transnational organised crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Africa is experiencing a far-reaching social, economic and demographic transformation, while gaining increasing prominence in global geopolitics. To take account of these changes, this Chaillot Paper sets out to update our ‘mental map’ of the continent and zoom in on the trends and dynamics that are reshaping Africa and thus affecting its relationship with the European Union.

Modelled on an atlas, it presents a series of visually engaging maps, charts and graphics, to convey key messages and statistics on themes as diverse as food sovereignty, urbanisation, climate resilience, migration and mobility as well as peace and security. Using these infographics, it aims to chart the way forward for a modern and forward-looking partnership between the African Union and the European Union. The volume looks at all areas for collaboration that were identified in the AU–EU Joint Vision for 2030, tracking the progress made and, above all, underlining the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead.