

THE EU'S CIVILIAN HEADQUARTERS

Inside the control room of
civilian crisis management

Edited by
Giovanni Faleg

With contributions from
Elisabetta Bellocchi, Carina Böttcher, Torsten
M. Hoffmann, Ana E. Juncos, Birgit Loeser,
Francisco Esteban Pérez, Tobias Pietz,
Nicoletta Pirozzi, Mohamed Tabit



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The editor

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CONTENTS

Foreword

Pedro Serrano

2

Executive summary

5

INTRODUCTION

Giovanni Faleg

CHAPTER 1

Civilian HQ

The story so far

Francisco Esteban Pérez

10

CHAPTER 2

How to plan

Birgit Loeser

16

CHAPTER 3

How to conduct

Birgit Loeser and Francisco Esteban Pérez

24

CHAPTER 4

How to support

Elisabetta Bellocchi and Mohamed Tabit

31

CHAPTER 5

How to coordinate

Torsten M. Hoffmann

37

CHAPTER 6

How to integrate

Carina Böttcher and Tobias Pietz

44

CHAPTER 7

How to learn

Ana E. Juncos

51

CHAPTER 8

Civilian HQ

The road ahead

Nicoletta Pirozzi

58

CONCLUSION

Giovanni Faleg

Annex

66

Draft Guidelines for Command and Control Structure
for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management 67

Abbreviations

75

Notes on the contributors

78

FOREWORD

by

PEDRO SERRANO

Head of Cabinet of the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

15 years after its creation, we find ourselves at a good moment to review the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and take stock of its performance, achievements and weaknesses. And I am well placed to reminisce on this, since I had the privilege of developing this initiative and leading it to a successful outcome.

There is a tendency to think that administrative structures are the product of a master plan that was there from the start. They are, in a way, anonymous, or perceived at best as the result of a collective effort. Having worked on CSDP, in and out, for the past 22 years, ever since its inception, I can certainly testify that this is not entirely so. The development of CSDP has been a combination of approximations to a vision, more or less collectively expressed, and successive implementation efforts that in turn have further helped in shaping that vision and turned it into concrete realities. And those implementation efforts have been driven by the women and men who were chosen to carry out such tasks, or were sometimes simply discovered along the road.

I have been part of this privileged group of women and men, and so has been General Francisco Esteban Pérez who worked with me on the creation of the CPCC in 2006–07 and who is now heading it as Civilian Operations Commander. I have narrated in previous writings that, in the early days of civilian CSDP post the 1999 Helsinki European Council, those of us sitting in the EU Council working group in charge of developing the civilian aspects of crisis management, CivCom, didn't even know where to start, or what a civilian

crisis management mission could look like. Progressively we found our bearings and during the Spanish Presidency of the Council in 2002, we developed and obtained Council approval for key concepts of civilian crisis management, including for command and control and for police executive missions. We also obtained Council agreement for the first ever civilian CSDP mission, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, replacing the UN International Police Task Force.

A few years later, and after the deployment of three or four more civilian missions, at the end of 2005, I was appointed Director of DGE 9 within the General Secretariat of the Council. DGE 9, together with DGE 8, were the administrative structures created within the Council Secretariat to pursue the development of CSDP. Both directorates worked at what was then called the 'political-strategic level', basically meaning that they had no direct operational responsibilities. DGE 8 was in charge of the political-military aspects, working closely with the EU Military Staff. DGE 9 was responsible for the development of civilian CSDP.

The Franco-British battle on the development of military command and control structures within the EU, which the UK fervently opposed, spilled over into the civilian field. Consequently, the command structure of the civilian missions ran directly from the PSC/Council to the Head of Mission in the field. This situation soon revealed its weaknesses. Member States, rightly so, were expecting that their guidance would be promptly translated into action by the missions and that the security of their personnel would be duly ensured.

Both of these goals were in reality difficult to attain if all responsibilities were vested in a Head of Mission, thousands of miles away and only occasionally coming to Brussels. Member States therefore rightfully turned to the Council structure established to support civilian CSDP missions, and to me as its director. I remember in particular questions raised regarding the fulfilment of EU duty of care regarding a police support mission we deployed within the African Union mission to Darfur. The British were particularly vocal on this. I took the opportunity and travelled to El Fasher accompanied by the UK CivCom delegate. Clearly, improvement in the deployment conditions was necessary.

This visit was a tipping point towards the creation of a civilian command structure in Brussels and I took advantage of the fact that it was precisely the British, those that were most opposed to the creation of any OHQ capability in Brussels, that were pushing for 'duty of care' responsibilities. This allowed me to make the point that, if the Brussels structure that I was heading was to be considered responsible for civilian missions, it had to be granted the authority to fulfil this responsibility.

So, duty of care was at the origin of the CPCC. It remains a key component of the responsibilities of the CPCC and also shaped the new civilian chain of command. In fact, following the military example, it was proposed and decided to take the civilian chain of command out of the Council Secretariat administrative hierarchical chain, to ensure that responsibility for command decisions, particularly those that could affect the security of deployed personnel, would not be lost in a complex bureaucratic web. There had to be one single person, clearly identified, taking such decisions, under the political authority of the High Representative, and responding directly to the Council. The Civilian Operations Commander was born.

Another relevant question that arose then was whether we would give broader civilian CSDP responsibilities to the CPCC, notably with regard to its conceptual development, and political strategic responsibility for the planning and conduct of civilian missions.

As Director of DGE 9, I had in fact exercised all these functions and had some hesitations about breaking up my 'kingdom'. Here Robert Cooper, my Director General at the time, had clearer views and, rightly, encouraged me to develop the CPCC as a truly and exclusively civilian command structure, keeping DGE 9 as the administrative body supporting the work of CivCom, reflecting on further civilian conceptual developments and channeling political guidance both for the planning and conduct of operations. This also paved the way shortly thereafter for the merger of civilian and military strategic planning structures (DGE 8 and 9) into a new Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). This step brought greater coherence to CSDP as it allowed joint consideration of all CSDP tools when facing a crisis situation, instead of the pursuit of separate efforts and proposals in the civilian and military fields.

This approach has been maintained and even further strengthened under current structures, where all CSDP responsibilities at the political and strategic level are under one Deputy Secretary General for Security and Defence within the EEAS. He/she is supported in carrying out these tasks by a Director for the Integrated Approach for Security and Peace (ISP). The goal now is not only to take into account what the CSDP response should be, but to look further into how any CSDP response would fit within a broader EU integrated approach, comprising all instruments, to address the crisis in question coherently and as effectively as possible. It would not be too far-fetched to claim that these developments have their origin in the creation of the CPCC. Even less so bearing in mind that the same person was responsible for their development and implementation, as I had the privilege of adjusting the old CSDP structures in order to facilitate their insertion within the EEAS, in my previous job as Deputy Secretary General of the EEAS.

One final consideration. In the early days of CSDP, when it was still called ESDP, I exchanged often with Robert Cooper on the ideal profile for a Civilian Operations Commander. Robert was clearly supportive of an expert profile. Operations should be run by those

that know what the reality on the ground looks like. I agreed fundamentally with him, although I was equally conscious of the peculiar nature of this job that requires equally well-honed diplomatic skills in order to deal with CivCom delegates and PSC ambassadors, Commission colleagues and even EU Members of Parliament. And in truth it is not easy to find professionals that fit both descriptions. My personal conclusion after 15 years of CPCC is that if what we are aiming at primarily is effectiveness on the ground and security of our personnel, we should entrust missions to a highly experienced and senior police officer, as most of our CSDP civilian missions have a very strong police-related component. At the same time, if we do not want the Civilian Operations Commander to drown in the Brussels labyrinth, he/she needs to be ably and directly supported by a savvy Brussels official, ideally with experience in the field. Of course, it could be also argued that this combination of skills can or should be reversed. In fact, out of the five Civ Ops Commanders we have had until now, two have been diplomats. In any case, it is clear that you do need a combination of both types of expertise.

I am grateful for having been offered the possibility of sharing some thoughts on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the CPCC. I am even more grateful to colleagues that have accompanied me on this CSDP journey, helping shape concepts, structures, procedures and missions. Paco Esteban, as already mentioned, is one of them, but you will allow me to refer to two more: Stefano Tomat, currently Director for ISP, with whom I have been sharing CSDP joys and sorrows since 2005; and Barbara Gallo who has accompanied me faithfully and critically, I mean with pertinent criticism, in the development of CSDP over the past seven years. My debt is of course much larger. I am impressed by the quality and dedication with which so many colleagues have served and continue to serve the European Union to enhance its security and help it confront challenges we could not even fathom when this CSDP adventure started 22 years ago. This is not an anonymous effort. It is the individuals that give strength to our common endeavour.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) is the EU's operations headquarters (HQ) in charge of command and control for civilian crisis management missions launched under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Since its establishment in 2007, it has played a pivotal part in enabling the EU to fulfil its role as a global security provider, in a variety of conflict and post-conflict settings, from Afghanistan to the Central African Republic. Despite the fact that it performs such a critical function, the public is largely unaware of the existence of an EU civilian HQ. The question hence arises: why has the EU equipped itself with an operations headquarters for civilian CSDP in the first place, and how has it worked in practice?

This *Chaillot Paper* is unique, because it is the only study accounting for the creation, inner workings, and evolution over the years of the CPCC. It shows how the HQ has adapted to cope with a growing demand for civilian CSDP deployments arising from the new challenges of a multipolar world. It draws on the best living institutional memory of the CPCC, while also looking forward to what future lies ahead for the HQ, considering ongoing geopolitical transformations, accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine; but also taking into account the higher level of ambition set by the Civilian CSDP Compact and the Strategic Compass.

The structure of the *Chaillot Paper* has been conceived to provide readers with an overarching perspective on the CPCC's past, present and future. Chapter one describes the story so far: why and how it was created. The volume is subsequently divided into two parts.

The 'control room' (chapters 2 to 5): this part accounts for the different functions that the operations headquarters performs as part of its mandate: *planning, conduct, support and co-ordination*. Here, CPCC staff have provided

practical explanations of how each function has been created and carried out and what lessons can be drawn for future improvements, based on their first-hand experience.

The 'expert room' (chapters 6 to 8): this part takes a step back from the insider's perspective of the preceding chapters, and evaluates the performance of the HQ *vis-à-vis* three operational challenges: first, how to strengthen synergies between civilian CSDP and other EU actors and institutions as part of an integrated approach; second, how to foster learning and adaptation to better face emerging challenges; and finally, how to navigate the road ahead, indicating possible scenarios for the future.

The conclusion focuses on the current geopolitical shocks that are redefining the very presence of CSDP missions in crisis settings, including civilian ones. The beginning of the current decade has in fact exposed the EU to unprecedented strategic challenges, which by necessity require an enhanced ability to plan, command and control civilian missions, coping with a more hostile environment in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods. Against this backdrop, what the CPCC has achieved in 15 years of operations should be regarded not as a point of arrival, but a starting point to further strengthen the HQ's capacity to address a greater variety and diversity of threats.

INTRODUCTION

by
GIOVANNI FALEG

Beyond a narrow circle of policymakers, official and experts, few ordinary people know that the European Union deploys civilian missions to crisis settings, alongside military operations, in the framework of the CSDP. Even fewer know that in 2007, the EU set up an operations headquarters (HQ)⁽¹⁾ to ensure command and control for these civilian missions. The official name of this body is the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), a rather cryptic bureaucratic term that has contributed to its true functions and pivotal role in the evolution of the EU as a global security provider being largely hidden from the broader public.

The development of specific policy framework and instruments for civilian crisis management are unique features of the EU, unmatched elsewhere in the international community. This raises an important research question concerning why the Union has gone to such lengths to provide itself with a permanent structure for command and control, how it was conceived, whether it has worked (and adapted) in practice to face evolving threats, and what can we expect from the future, particularly given the boost provided to this policy area since the adoption of the Civilian CSDP Compact.

Civilian crisis management has accompanied the rise of the EU as a regional, then global, power in the transition towards a multipolar world.

In case all this already sounds too bureaucratic, technical, or even unexciting, try considering the following. There are two ways to represent CSDP missions in a map. The usual way is to list all countries where the EU is present (or has been present), highlighting the type of mandate and staff deployed. The other, less conventional approach is to look at the list of major conflicts and crises of the last 20 years, and realise that the EU has deployed civilians in most of these theatres, in some cases in combination with military personnel. Despite all its operational shortfalls and capability constraints, civilian crisis management has accompanied the rise of the EU as a re-

gional, then global, power in the transition towards a multipolar world. Like other control rooms in EU foreign and security policy, the CPCC has therefore enabled engagements in conflict or post-conflict settings where new rules of geopolitics have been written, from Iraq to the Western Balkans. Some authors use the term 'teething' or 'learning by doing' to describe the process of adaptation of EU civilian power to a rapidly

changing international system: all these processes stem from, or pass through, the civilian operations headquarters. As the famous Pirelli advertising slogan goes, 'power is nothing without control'.

(1) When referring to the CPCC, the acronym HQ always stands for 'operations headquarters'.

CSDP missions and operations have been deployed throughout major conflicts over the past 20 years



Data: NATO, 'Operations and missions: past and present', 2021; NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, 'Operations', 2022; EEAS, 'Ongoing and Completed Missions' 2022; EEAS, 'Missions and Operations', 2021; UCDP/PRIO, 'Armed Conflict Dataset version 21.1', 2021

Chapters 2 to 5 enter ‘inside the control room’, to describe the different functions that the HQ performs as part of its mandate. Each chapter, authored by a CPCC staff member, deals with a distinct function, providing a detailed and practical explanation of how the function was created, how it has been performed, and how procedures can be improved in the future. Chapter 2 covers the ‘planning’ function

What is (EU) civilian crisis management?

Civilian crisis management can be defined as the deployment of non-military personnel in a crisis setting, that may be violent or non-violent, with the purpose of performing a variety of peacebuilding tasks at different stages of the conflict cycle.

Since the inception of its security and defence policy, the EU has been involved in the development of a civilian crisis management concept, institutions and capabilities under the legal framework provided by Article 17.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and later Art. 28 of the Treaty of Lisbon. Several factors pushed the EU to develop a civilian capacity, alongside the military dimension. First, changes in the post-Cold War security environment, generating a momentum for more comprehensive, coordinated civil-military planning and interventions in crisis situations. Second, the desire of some EU Member States, particularly neutral countries, to counterbalance progress towards military integration, following the Saint Malo Declaration (1998), thereby avoiding a militarisation of the EU. Third, the growing distrust *vis-à-vis* UN crisis management, prompting the EU to increasingly engage in peacebuilding, with a specific operational niche in civilian crisis response. EU civilian crisis management has experienced rapid institutionalisation, thanks to policy consensus and the role of powerful communities of practice⁽¹⁾.

Today, it is difficult to imagine the CSDP without its civilian component. In 2022, the EU deploys 11 civilian missions (out of 18 in total). Approximately 42 % of the total personnel deployed in CSDP missions and operations today are civilians. At the same time, changes in the security environment around the EU, the transition towards a multipolar world, combined with a new and diverse array of threats have affected the performance of civilian CSDP over time. While the demand for civilian CSDP has been constantly growing in the past number of years, responses have struggled to adjust to the new context and the EU has found it difficult to deploy its full crisis management potential. To address these challenges, the Civilian Compact, adopted in November 2018, has sought to raise the level of ambition in civilian CSDP, as well as the capabilities available to carry out civilian missions. A new version of the Compact is expected to be adopted in 2023, to adapt to further systemic and geopolitical changes exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic and the 2022 war in Ukraine.

Duration of Civilian CSDP Missions

As of April 2022

EUPM BiH

01 Jan 03 – 30 Jun 12

EUPOL PROXIMA

15 Dec 03 – 14 Dec 05

...replaced by... EUPAT

15 Dec 05 – 14 Jun 06

EUJUST THEMIS

15 Jul 04 – 14 Jul 05

EUPOL KINSHASA (DRC)

01 Jan 05 – 30 Jun 07

EUPOL RD CONGO

01 Jul 07 – 30 Sep 14

EUJUST LEX-Iraq

01 Jul 05 – 31 Dec 13

AMM

15 Sep 05 – 15 Dec 06

EUBAM Rafah

25 Nov 05 – present

EUPOL COPPS

01 Jan 06 – present

EUPOL Afghanistan

15 Jun 07 – 31 Dec 16

EULEX Kosovo

04 Feb 08 – present

EU SSR Guinea-Bissau

01 May 08 – 30 Sep 10

EUMM Georgia

01 Oct 08 – present

EUAVSEC South Sudan

18 Jun 12 – 17 Jan 14

EUCAP Sahel Niger

12 Jul 12 – present

EUCAP NESTOR

16 Jul 12 – 12 Dec 16

EUCAP Somalia

12 Dec 16 – present

EUBAM Libya

22 May 13 – present

EUAM Ukraine

01 Dec 14 – present

EUCAP Sahel Mali

15 Jan 15 – present

EUAM Iraq

16 Oct 17 – present

EUAM RCA

09 Aug 20 – present

(1) For a detailed analysis of the rise and evolution of EU civilian crisis management, see: Faleg, G., *The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Learning communities in international organisations*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 129–161. For an assessment 20 years since the creation of the CSDP, see: Fiott, D. (ed.), *The CSDP in 2020: The EU's legacy and ambition in security and defence*, EUISS, March 2020 (<https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/csdp-2020>).

(the P of CPCC), showing operational planning methodologies and procedures as they have evolved up until today. Chapter 3 deals with the ‘control’ function, addressing the conduct of missions (the second C of CPCC). Chapter 4 deals with the capability development process (the third C of CPCC), to explain how civilian CSDP missions are supported and equipped to perform their mandate. Chapter 5 explains how to ‘coordinate’, analysing measures taken at the operational/tactical level contributing to a more coherent and coordinated approach to civilian and military CSDP interventions.

Chapters 6 to 8, in contrast, take us into the ‘expert room’. Here, contributions answer the question of whether the HQ has worked and will work in the future. Each chapter is authored by an external expert, taking a step back from the insider’s perspective provided in the first part of the volume. Authors were asked not just to explain, but also to evaluate the performance of the HQ over time, focusing on three selected key operational challenges. The chapters define the challenge, explain what is at stake from the point of view of the civilian HQ, and what can be done to improve the functioning of the CPCC in the future. The first challenge, addressed by chapter 6, is ‘how to integrate’ concerns regarding the role of civilian CSDP as part of the EU’s integrated approach, recognising the need for CPCC to operate in synergy with other EU actors and institutions, beyond civilian–military coordination. The second challenge, addressed in chapter 7, is ‘how to learn’: this chapter looks at the capacity of CPCC to foster learning and adaptation to better face emerging challenges and take account of experience gained on the ground. The third challenge, addressed by chapter 8, is to discern what future lies ahead for the EU’s civilian HQ, and how to make it fitter for the level of ambition set by the Civilian CSDP Compact and the Strategic Compass.

The CPCC turns 15 in June 2022. Taking stock of what has emerged from the control

and expert rooms, the concluding chapter makes a general assessment of what the civilian HQ’s role has been in shaping the EU’s evolution as a security provider, and what are the key implications of this analysis for policy-planners as they engage in discussions on the new Compact⁽²⁾.

(2) See: European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management (CoE), *Compact 2.0: Integrating Civilian CSDP into the Strategic Compass*, Berlin, August 2021 (https://www.coe-civ.eu/fileadmin/assets/knowledge_hub/f-_strategic_context_of_civilian_csdp/fft_paper_compact_2.0-strategic_compass.pdf).

CHAPTER 1

CIVILIAN HQ

The story so far

by
FRANCISCO ESTEBAN PÉREZ

'We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations.'

European Security Strategy, 2003

What is a headquarters? It is the managerial and administrative centre of an entity from which a commander, supported by key managerial and support staff, performs the function of command. The main reason for setting up an EU civilian operations headquarters in 2007, after having launched civilian CSDP missions in Aceh, Congo, the Balkans, Georgia, Iraq and the Palestinian Territories, was that for the first time, the Union was to embark on deploying (i) a civilian CSDP mission with a partly executive mandate in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) and (ii) a mission in a high-risk environment in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan).

CSDP missions and operations – categorisation

Military CSDP mission

> non-executive (training) mandate,
e.g. EUTM Mozambique

Military CSDP operation

> executive mandate e.g. EUNAV-
FOR Atalanta

Civilian CSDP mission

> non-executive, e.g. EUMM Georgia;
executive mandate, e.g. EULEX Kosovo

The intervention assumes temporary custodianship of a 'governmental function' that normally falls under the remit of the host state.

Hybrid mandates are also possible where selected elements of the mandate are executive and others non-executive.

Military CSDP missions are composed of military personnel, contingents and equipment provided by Member States.

Civilian CSDP missions are composed of seconded personnel from Member States and international and local contracted personnel.

THE EARLY YEARS: CSDP MISSIONS WITHOUT COMMAND AND CONTROL

Following the Cologne European Council in 1999 and later with the Treaty of Amsterdam entering into force amending the TEU, the Western European Union (WEU)⁽¹⁾ security and defence roles were transferred to the EU in 2001, focusing primarily on the military dimension of the newly created European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (later CSDP). The approximately 100 strong EU Military Staff (EUMS) was put in place, as well as a clear military chain of command including a strong EU Military Committee (EUMC) and Chair EUMC, with the options for national and one joint operations headquarters, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Allied Command Operations. The mirroring – or not quite mirroring – civilian CSDP structures were set up in parallel with the Council Working Party 'Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management' (CivCom)⁽²⁾, pushed mainly by former non-aligned and Nordic countries wary of a 'militarisation' of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). A comparatively small police unit of some five police officers would work alongside an even smaller (3 staff) Rule of Law Division within the so-called DGE IX Directorate put in charge of civilian CSDP.

Notwithstanding its limitations, this small team managed not only to lay down the conceptual ground for mounting civilian CSDP missions, but also surprised all by setting up its first civilian missions in 2003, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia

and Herzegovina (BiH), followed by EUPOL Proxima and the EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, EUJUST Themis in Georgia, EUPOL Kinshasha (DRC) and EUPOL RD Congo in Congo, EUJUST LEX-Iraq, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), as well as EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories.

Until 2007, there was no Civilian Operation Commander (CivOpCdr) appointed for any mission, and no explicit discharge of a duty of care – command lines (if at all in place) ran via the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) of the respective region or country. The services back in the General Secretariat of the Council, to which the CSDP structures then still belonged, had no control or say over the missions. They prepared the necessary legal and planning documents, selected staff and helped out where possible in mission support-related matters. However, there was no line of command other than that from the Head of Mission (HoM) to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the Council. The prospect of deploying a more robust mission encompassing more than 200 staff and with an executive mandate (Kosovo) and in an area where duty of care would be a real challenge (Afghanistan), led the former Director of DGE IX, Pedro Serrano, together with one of the police experts (current CivOpsCdr, Francisco Esteban Pérez) to propose the concept of a 'proper civilian headquarters' with command and control functions.

This conceptual work relied on two policy processes. First, the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council in December 2003. The latter recognised that security challenges had to be tackled with the full spectrum of EU capabilities and resources, and that the EU needed to be more active, more coherent and more capable, thereby

(1) The WEU was developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Its mission was to formulate a common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role.

(2) Set up by Council Decision 2000/354/CFSP of 22 May 2000.

committing the EU to improve its effectiveness in civilian crisis management based on experience in civilian crisis management operations and lessons learnt⁽³⁾; Secondly, the famous 'Hampton Court' discussions that were concretely looking into how CSDP could be rendered more effective⁽⁴⁾.

The background being, as it was later put in the document creating the CPCC, that:

'A single and identifiable chain of command is imperative for the safe and efficient conduct of any ESDP crisis management operation. It is the structure through which command instructions flow down from the political to the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and through which control is exercised by specified procedures and feedback'⁽⁵⁾

The need for a clear chain of command structure was therefore evident and the idea was to have 'something' equivalent to the EUMS – hence the first working title 'European Union Civilian Staff' designating what would eventually become the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability⁽⁶⁾.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CIVILIAN PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY

In June 2006, SG/HR Javier Solana dispatched a letter to the Heads of State and Government outlining specific ideas for strengthening the EU's crisis management structures, including setting up the post of a dedicated single CivOpsCdr and a clear centralised chain of command for all civilian ESDP operations supported by dedicated staff⁽⁷⁾.

In spring/summer 2007, after lengthy negotiations, the Member States reached agreement on the command and control structures for civilian CSDP missions and the roles and responsibilities of the CivOpCdr and other key personnel⁽⁸⁾. The recommendations also contained standard provisions to be used in the planning documents (Concepts of Operations – CONOPS and Operation Plans – OPLAN) and legal acts for present and future civilian CSDP missions with a view to a unified and single reporting line: the CivOpCdr, appointed for each mission, would have command and control authority at strategic level over the planning and conduct of all civilian crisis management operations and the contributions put at the disposal of civilian ESDP operations by Member States, under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the overall authority of the SG/HR, without prejudice to

(3) European Council, 'Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP', Adopted by the European Council, 17–18 June 2004.

(4) Council of the European Union, 'Follow-up to Hampton Court: CFSP and ESDP – Initial orientations by SG/HR', ST 15780/05, 14 December 2005; Council of the European Union, 'Follow-up to Hampton Court: CFSP and ESDP', ST 10512/06, 14 June 2006.

(5) Council of the European Union, 'Draft Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management', ST 9919/07, 23 May 2007 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9919-2007-DCL-1/en/pdf>).

(6) Council Decision of 22 January 2001 on the establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union, OJ L 27, 30 January 2001, pp. 7–11 (<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001D0080&qid=1650979071686&from=en>).

(7) Council of the European Union, 'Follow-up to Hampton Court: CFSP and ESDP', ST 10512/06, 14 June 2006.

(8) The first guidelines on command and control structures were developed in 2002 and applied as a provisional command and control (C2) reference for civilian ESDP operations of any type. The actual chain of command for each, then civilian, ESDP operation was addressed in the Joint Action adopted by the Council.

the European Commission's competences in implementing the CFSP budget. The CivOp-sCdr being the overall commander of all civilian Heads of Mission and reporting directly to the HR, and through him, to the Council.


The CPCC would become essential to ensure a proper duty of care for deployed personnel and to allow the PSC to perform its politico-strategic functions more completely⁽⁹⁾. It was to be established in the General Secretariat of the Council to assist the CivOp(s)Cdr/Director of the CPCC in planning and conduct of the operation(s), replacing the original Police Unit within the Directorate General for civilian crisis management planning (DGE IX).

The diagram opposite depicts the 'location' of the CPCC within the European Union crisis management structures in 2007, with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on top supported by the EU Situation Centre (EU SitCen) providing broader intelligence analysis, the regional Managing Directorates, the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) in charge of the integrated civilian-military planning within the sphere of the CSDP and the CPCC and EUMS with the CSDP missions and operations headquarters. The aforementioned entities interact with the Member States' decision-making process with the Council on top supported by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the PSC dealing with all aspects of the CFSP, including CSDP, supported by CivCom and the EUMC.

The CPCC was essentially established on 18 June 2007 through the endorsement of the 'Draft Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management' by the Council in its 2808th meeting of the Council of the European Union (General Affairs and External Relations) in

EU crisis management structures

2007



(9) Serrano, P., 'Truth and dare – A personal reflection on 20 years of CSDP', in *The CSDP in 2020 – The EU's legacy and ambition in security and defence*, op.cit.


Luxembourg⁽¹⁰⁾. In the following months, the number of administrative staff for the operational management of civilian crisis management operations tripled.

With the aforementioned provisions in place (see also doc. 9919/07 DCL 1 in the annex to this volume), civilian CSDP was finally endowed with the equivalent of what the military already had in terms of an operations headquarters – even though the name was not granted due to political sensitivities and thus the supporting structure became what we know today as the CPCC. Its functions are exactly those of an OHQ and this is to plan, conduct and support missions and to assist the CivOpsCdr in the discharge of the duty of care and reporting to Member States.

This set-up was not altered with the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in January 2011. Like the other CSDP structures, the CPCC's specificities, notably in terms of reporting lines, were to be preserved in accordance with the decision establishing the EEAS⁽¹¹⁾.

Structure of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

2008



Data: EU – Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, 2022

Civilian Operations Commanders/Directors of the CPCC

— Diplomat — Police — Gendarmerie

Pieter Feith

NL, Jun 07 – Feb 08

Hansjörg Haber

DE, May 11 – Feb 14

Vincenzo Coppola

IT, Sep 18 – Apr 20

Kees Klompenhouwer

NL, May 08 – Apr 11

Kenneth Deane

UK, Jul 14 – Jun 18

Francisco Estebán Perez

ES, Oct 20 – present

Data: EU – Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, 2022

⁽¹⁰⁾ Council of the European Union, Document no. 10381/07, 'I/A' Item Note, Brussels, 4 June 2007. Unlike the European Union Military Staff which was established through Council Decision (2001/80/CFSP), there is no dedicated Council Decision in place for the establishment of the CPCC.

⁽¹¹⁾ The EU External Action Service was set up by Council Decision (2010/427/EU) of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. All staff in the departments and functions of the General Secretariat of the Council's CSDP and crisis management structures were transferred *en bloc* to the EEAS with effect of 1 January 2011.

THE CIVILIAN PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY TODAY

If ever proof were needed that it was the right decision to find an equivalent to the military way of commanding and controlling missions that operate in difficult terrains, then the Covid-19 pandemic certainly will have provided this. As highlighted in the initial lessons report, the fact that there was a single chain of command and the possibility to take responsible decisions protecting both the EU's political interests and the lives of staff, was demonstrated clearly in the challenging period when the CivOpsCdr and CPCC had to face an overwhelming number of pressing issues to tackle and decisions to take.


It is fair to say that, 15 years after its establishment, the CPCC has developed into a mature headquarters with more than 120 staff consisting of EU officials, seconded national

experts, contract agents and civilian CSDP mission members with the duty station in the CPCC (the so-called Brussels Support Element – BSE), successfully assisting the CivOpsCdr/ Director of the CPCC in the planning and conduct of the EU's civilian CSDP missions.

It oversees the planning and conduct of 11 civilian CSDP Missions in Georgia, Kosovo, Ukraine, Libya, the Palestinian Territories (Ramallah and Rafah), Niger, Mali, Somalia, Iraq and the Central African Republic and the EU Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell for the Sahel (RACC) with approximately 2 000 staff deployed in the field. It also contributes to further conceptualising CSDP through lessons learning and developments of best practices.

Structure of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability 2022

Data: EU – Civilian
Planning and Conduct
Capability, 2022



CHAPTER 2

HOW TO PLAN

by
BIRGIT LOESER

WHAT IS OPERATIONAL PLANNING?

Operational planning and mission set-up falls directly under the core competences of the CPCC under the direction of the CivOpsCdr. It encompasses a complex process that aims to translate the political-strategic aims, objectives and choices defined in the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) agreed by Member States into operational delivery. The operational planning work primarily consists of identifying the mission objectives, related mission tasks and outputs as well as the means to achieve these in a defined sequence, including budgets and staffing. The work is underpinned by comprehensive fact-finding and analysis as well as coordination and negotiation at various levels, including in the field. Operational planning does not end with mission launch but continues throughout the entire life cycle of a mission in view of an ongoing assessment of progress made, including outputs and outcomes.

The present chapter⁽¹⁾ describes the operational planning methodology and the central role played by the CivOpsCdr and the CPCC. It will explain how the approach to operational planning has developed over time, what has been achieved and what yet remains to be done⁽²⁾.

HOW IT HAS WORKED

When the CPCC was set up in 2007, its first organigram did not feature a dedicated planning department. There was only the post of CivOpsCdr and Deputy/CoS office, there was a very small Mission Support and Conduct of Operations Division, but no planning department or expertise. That same year saw nonetheless the launching of a mission that had been planned previously: EUPOL Afghanistan, which was set up in haste, building on an earlier German police support project, and with few considerations then given to logistical and security aspects, which meant that the CPCC struggled for quite some time before this mission was 'landing on its feet' and able to deliver. There was also a serious planning effort under way for EULEX Kosovo (due to be launched in 2008) which, in contrast, was

(1) The present chapter is written from the perspective of the author, who played a central role in this process having been Head of Planning from 2010 until 2015 and, again, led planning efforts of the CPCC in the period 2018 until 2021 as Deputy Civilian Operations Commander/Chief of Staff.

(2) This does not include the so-called political-strategic planning that remains the responsibility of another department in the EEAS (ISP, previously CMPD).

being coordinated by a large dedicated planning team based in Pristina ('EUPT' – almost a mission in itself), in charge of making sure that this first ever executive mission, manned by around 2 000 international staff, would be a success.

In autumn of that same year (2007), during the Portuguese presidency of the EU, the United Kingdom raised concerns about the security situation in a country on the west coast of Africa – Guinea Bissau. The competent Council Secretariat CSDP services, to which the CPCC then still belonged, were tasked to submit proposals for a CSDP engagement to help counter the risk of this tiny but strategically located country becoming a narco state. The EU mission in support of security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau (EUSSR Guinea-Bissau) was eventually conceived as a civilian CSDP mission, despite the fact that it contained military tasks and staff, and was the first and so far only mission to combine civilian and military resources. Guinea-Bissau being in Africa, the Head of Sector Africa within the Conduct of Operations Division (the author of this chapter) was nominated Head of Planning and immediately debriefed by those that took part in the planning of the earlier Afghanistan mission, urging that lessons be learned to avoid failure of mission set-up.

The Head of Planning developed *ad hoc* (as no blueprint existed, not even from previous planning efforts) what later would represent the blueprint of the CPCC 'art of operational planning' and that would apply for the next eight years, guiding the operational planning of the following seven missions: EUMM Georgia, EUCAP Nestor, EUAVSEC South Sudan, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUBAM Libya, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUAM Ukraine. The ingredients were simple, based on commonsense and on what was known from military planners:

- > the setting up of a dedicated Planning Team composed not only of subject matter

experts who would be the core planners (police/judiciary), but also logistics experts, finance, human resources, intelligence, medical experts, press and information experts, including from the European Commission, that would meet daily/weekly, depending on the timelines set.

- > the setting out of a clear distribution of tasks (nicknamed 'troops to task') with each member of the Planning Team assigned to specific deliverables along a roadmap agreed with Member States.
- > a Technical Assessment Mission ('TAM'), which would later almost become a CPCC trademark and that would notably help ensure that every planning decision was fully informed by the realities on the ground, including responsible budgeting and resourcing as well as ensuring local buy-in and full complementarity with activities by other stakeholders such as the EU Delegations (EUDEL), Member States and/or regional organisations such as the UN.
- > regular debriefings to the CivOpsCdr ('rolling briefings' and/or 'mission analytical briefings' called 'MAB') to seek his constant guidance in the process.

EUSSR Guinea Bissau was eventually launched in Spring 2008. Its early closure was solely due to the gravity of changes on the ground⁽³⁾. For the planners, the main lesson was that of the already described blueprint of an enlarged experts' planning team and structured approach to tailor-made planning, that had worked very well.

In the late summer of that same year (2008), there was the totally unexpected and urgent requirement to establish a mission to monitor the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia as negotiated by President Nicolas Sarkozy, then head of the rotating EU presidency, with the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. As

(3) The assassination of the President and army Chief of Staff in one night, the cruelty of which could not be foreseen, entailing the impossibility of working henceforth with the ruling government.

there was only a six week timeframe for the entire operational planning process, the only chance to succeed was to assign half of the CPCC to a planning team (led again by the author – then Acting Head of Operational Conduct). There was also a smaller planning team operating from Tbilisi, each working literally day and night and each following, under the guidance of the Head of Planning Team, exactly the pattern of the planning for the EU SSR Guinea-Bissau mission, including the development of a CONOPS and OPLAN, Council Decisions, budget, press statements etc in record time and, as it turned out later, of a quality that ensured the relevance and usefulness of these central planning documents for quite some time. Despite this clear success, the overwhelming conclusion from the CPCC leadership was that ‘never again’ would the CPCC be ‘pared down’ to deliver on planning in such an *ad hoc* way at the expense of conducting remaining missions. The decision was made to set up a dedicated Planning Division.

It took more than a year before this was accepted at least in part at the administrative level. The setting up initially of a dedicated Planner’s Section (rather than a fully-fledged Division) in January 2010 as part of the CPCC Chief of Staff office coincided with the establishment of the EEAS⁽⁴⁾ and CSDP structures being moved to this new entity. With no imminent missions to plan for, the team of five headed by the author set to work on conceptual issues such as the Mission Analytical Capability (MAC) concept (2010), the CSDP Justice and Police strengthening concepts (2011), the medal service concept (2011) and contributions to civ-mil considerations/civ-mil operations headquarters in the framework of the ‘Weimar’ debate. Mixing conceptual work and operational planning became a core task for CPCC planners as they knew best what more was needed in terms of concepts, and they are the first users as all concepts are utilised during operational planning. CPCC planners also took part in the civ-mil exercises CME09 and

CME11 where *inter alia* the newly developed ‘benchmarking concept’ (2012) was put to test, which provided for a more structured approach to defining mission tasks, against clear objectives and milestones to be achieved with relevant adequate resources based on a clear ‘baseline’ defined by planners – a prerequisite for professionalising operational planning and a standard that still retains its pertinence.

It was only in 2012 that the decision was taken by Member States to follow through on the long-conceived idea of complementing the already existing military mission by a regional civilian CSDP mission to help Somalia fight piracy. The CPCC planning team followed the same approach as before, but this time was faced with a two-fold challenge: first, the task was to establish for the first time a regional mission that would cover not only Somalia but also Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania and the Seychelles – all countries had to be visited and various logistical issues had to be sorted out, with each country of course having differing procedures when it came to local labour law, car renting options etc; second, it turned out that two countries (Kenya and Tanzania) were not at all ready for a civilian CSDP mission. Both countries were weary of hosting a CSDP mission and considered this a downgrading of their status as peaceful countries – this meant that in addition to its other tasks the CPCC Planning Team was obliged to undertake very complicated political negotiations, which normally is not its remit. This put an additional burden on the TAM team which was touring all countries over a period of four weeks, leaving little time for each to do all the necessary fact finding and pre-deployment arrangements. Our main internal CPCC lesson from this planning effort thus centred on airing with the leadership the need to ensure local political buy-in prior to operational planning.

Another sobering lesson consisted in the acknowledgment that even the most careful security assessments and considerations might

(4) The EU External Action Service was set up by virtue of Council decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010. All CSDP structures were transferred to this new EU institution with effect of 1 January 2011.

not be enough: in fact, Djibouti was selected as mission HQ due to being considered as more secure than Mogadishu. The terrorist attack that occurred in May 2014 injured three staff members seriously; the first such experience for any CSDP mission.

In parallel, still in 2012, there was an urgent call to plan another mission that would later be known as 'EUAVSEC South Sudan' – a mission in support of the strategically important airport of Juba for Africa's newest, land-locked state that had just become independent from Sudan and required a lot of international support to be delivered via that very airport to develop into a functioning state. Earlier EUSR ideas to lend support more widely to security sector reform (SSR) were much more ambitious, but the Arab Spring diverted international attention elsewhere. This tiny mission was planned based on the previous, tried and tested pattern (Planning Team, TAM, road map etc) and saw for the second time subject matter experts hired by the CPCC to tackle the specific themes of the mission: in the case of EUCAP Nestor, it had been maritime experts, now, it was aviation security experts, including from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Another example of best practice to be repeated later.

And as if that year (2012) was not already sufficiently challenging, there was the urgent need to follow through on the political commitment to also plan a mission in support of counter terrorism efforts in Niger. Thanks to the hiring here again of subject matter experts and, for the first time, a simplification of the procedures – only a 'CONOPS Plus' would be written and approved prior to mission launch – the CPCC managed to also have this new mission set up on time and with solid enough planning documents and parameters in place. Here, for the first time, the newly developed 'Visiting Experts' concept came into play. This concept was devised by CPCC planners to help reconcile Member States' own ambitions regarding the enhanced use of civilian CSDP as a foreign and security policy tool, which contrasted however with their constraints in delivering sufficient specialised experts as these were also needed back home: the Visiting Experts concept would

allow shorter deployments in well-planned sequences, which was also more cost-effective and reduced risk exposure.

A detailed internal report on lessons from all three parallel operational planning efforts, in addition to exercise ML12 (a joint civ-mil exercise, ML standing for 'multilayer'), was written up by the planning section of the CPCC, with the strong recommendation to have the team set up as a proper 'Division' given the increasing complexities of operational planning and given the level of responsibilities of the team leader.

During this time, a range of civ-mil synergies working groups compared notes with the military way of planning and conduct, to identify common lessons and opportunities for closer cooperation. This work led to the setting up of the 'Yves de Kermabon' Task Force that would work throughout 2012 and 2013 to revise the 2003 'crisis management procedures' defining the decision-making process for CSDP. The new version, eventually adopted in 2013, took account of many CPCC good practices, including the added value of TAMs, but also the simplified planning procedures used in Niger (CONOPS Plus), the attribution to the OpCdr of the OPLAN that was previously the responsibility of the HoM, and the new practice of proceeding with two Council decisions, one deciding on the mission with a HoM and 'core team' empowered to deploy to help with conceptual and logistical preparations, and a second launching the mission once initial operational capability (IOC) was achieved. This was perhaps the most important novelty that the CPCC planners pushed for as they learned how critical it was to remain credible when launching a mission – it can only deliver if enabled to do so, something pertaining directly to the discharge of the Commander's command and control as they too can only be held responsible for achieving results if adequate means and resources are put in place.

In 2013, CSDP planners were again confronted with the challenge of setting up yet another mission in a very short timeframe: EUBAM Libya in support of integrated border management against the background of increasing

migration pressures. Again the option of a 'CONOPS Plus' was used, but this time, circumstances were such that, for the first time, planners had to cope with a serious rift in Member States' political ambitions, with some wanting a large mission deployed in the entire country, and some being more cautious (realistic?) about what could be done in an extremely volatile political and security environment. As Head of Planning, at the time the author, after returning from the TAM, made the explicit point to CivCom that the conditions and circumstances necessary for the success of this mission were not in place, something that was quickly proven with the mission having to redeploy shortly after its launch. Once more it showed that political wishes and aspirations did not always match realities on the ground.

The operational planning for the civilian mission in Mali as a complement to EUTM Mali as well as EUCAP SAHEL Niger followed suit in 2013/14 and was done successfully applying the formula of for the first time deploying the HOM and his core team early on in the process. Also for the first time, new coordination modalities were applied that had just been negotiated by the CPCC planners with the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO). These foresaw *inter alia* the early exchange of respective mission objectives, tasks and benchmarks to ensure full complementarity – a clear success therefore.

Planning for EUAM Ukraine throughout the summer and autumn of 2014 also followed the usual path, but here again, there were serious divergences within EU Member States, very similar to what had occurred *vis-à-vis* Libya regarding the aims and scope of the mission, which hampered the planning process severely. There were Member States, mainly from Eastern Europe, keen to roll out the civilian CSDP mission instantly throughout the country and others who were less convinced on the need to engage and who wanted to move more slowly. A lot of wordsmithing was needed to

get all the planning documents through the various Committees.

Political wishes and aspirations did not always match realities on the ground.

In this same period, CPCC planners developed further conceptual documents, among them the drafting of guidelines for mentoring, monitoring and advising (MMA) that mission members had been asking for for quite some time and that the UN also then much welcomed, making them applicable

to UN missions. The related training material that was developed since by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) has proved similarly useful. Another important document produced by CPCC planners at the time was a methodology for 'internal support reviews' that would allow the Commander to more effectively ensure that initial operational capability (IOC) and full operational capability (FOC) had been attained as a key feature for effective command and control. There was also work done on a systematisation of all concepts elaborated so far underpinning civilian CSDP which resulted in a concepts 'compendium' and a 'hierarchy of concepts' presented by the CPCC to Member States in 2014.

As a response to the increasing number of civilian CSDP missions requiring adequate capabilities, the idea of developing a possible new 'Headline Goal' was mooted. Eventually, the CPCC's idea to plan capabilities around 'generic tasks' based on the earlier defined 'mission model structure' prevailed, an approach that also found its way into the later agreed Civilian Compact commitments.

Most important however was the work undertaken at this time together with the European Commission Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) on a possible 'Shared Service Centre' that CPCC planners advocated decisively as, time and again, despite all the good practice developed for mission set-up, there always remained one major shortcoming delaying the process, namely the procurement of assets needed for each mission, whether cars or premises or protective security equipment etc. A feasibility study from 2015 presented a

variety of options from which, eventually, the so-called ‘Mission Support Platform’ and the setting up of a warehouse was derived. This, however, was insufficient. Finally, at the end of these five years of continuously setting up new missions, CPCC planners captured all best practice in an internal ‘Planning Standard Operating Procedures’ (SOPs), including templates, in a format that was easy to use for future operational planning.

Due to a major overhaul of personnel which led to a loss of institutional memory, these Planning SOPs were forgotten and not put to use when EUAM Iraq was set up in 2017. Much of the earlier painful lessons from Afghanistan had to be relearned as IOC was lacking when the mission was launched. EUAM RCA, in contrast, launched in 2020, was planned ‘by the book’ due to institutional memory being restored as a result of coincidental circumstances ⁽⁵⁾.

HOW IT CAN BE IMPROVED

Despite the good work done thus far by CPCC planners and (Commission) colleagues, major shortcomings remain that can best be summarised as follows.

First, all that the CPCC has so far developed in terms of operational planning methodology has been informed either by Gendarmerie/Carabinieri/Guardia Civil officers who all enjoy regular staff training by the military. There was no template for civilian planning. To date there are no ‘civilian planners’ that have the know-how – all is done *ad hoc* and *sui generis* based on common sense and best

practice acquired over time in a ‘learning by doing’ mode.

Second, there is also a lack of appreciation of the role of planning in the process of setting up, conducting and closing missions. Too often, planning is left to planners while (i) it involves a variety of stakeholders and experts – it is always a team effort; and (ii) it is a recurrent effort that does not end with mission launch – conduct implies regularly reviewing progress in achieving set objectives and also reviewing performance and organising capabilities accordingly.

Third, setting up civilian CSDP missions remains in many respects a greater challenge than mounting military missions and operations because (i) there are no staff readily deployable: each mission member is handpicked for the job and is usually not prepared as it is not normally foreseen in the career of a regular MS police officer, judge, prosecutor and the like to go abroad to mentor, train and advise peers; (ii) recruitment is one of the two main delaying factors as for all staff, there has to be a fair selection process that also respects national preferences; for contracted staff, there is furthermore a cumbersome process involving grading that takes very long; (iii) the other major delaying factor remains the already mentioned procurement process linked to the CFSP budget that follows Commission rules, including tenders for major expenses.

Despite many constructive efforts, lessons are insufficiently captured and translated into practice. Too much relies on the personal experiences and memories of staff members. While the benchmarking concept, the IOC and FOC guidelines and internal support reviews provide a solid framework for mission planning and conduct, impact evaluation is still not being done systematically although it could easily be carried out building on

(5) Both the then Civilian Operations Commander General Enzo Coppola, and his Deputy/Chief of Staff (the author of this chapter), had returned to the CPCC after some years of absence. They both restored the institutional memory that had been lost in-between.

CSDP integrated approach in mission planning and conduct

Mission planning and conduct is a team effort that can only work successfully if fully integrating at all times all required functions. While there is, in accordance with the 2013 crisis management procedures, a clear distinction of tasks and responsibilities within each of the phases of a mission cycle, the entities involved are not working in isolation but from the start in a team as political-strategic decision making, for instance, must be informed by early operational expertise and analysis. The department responsible plays a central role in any given phase, surrounded and assisted by layers of colleagues, some internal to the EEAS, while the involvement of others is more marginal/remote and they are only occasionally roped into the work.



Data: EU – Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, 2022

work commissioned back in 2012/3 (see the Swedish-financed feasibility study shared with Member States in 2014)⁽⁶⁾.

Finally, politics kick in too often, as illustrated earlier. A lot is demanded of civilian CSDP but these demands are not always matched with adequate resourcing. There is also a mismatch of expectations and certainly at times a lack of understanding of how this instrument (civilian CSDP missions) functions, what it can deliver and what not.

These shortcomings are all well-known and are regularly discussed. There have of course been numerous attempts to mitigate them, driven mainly by the CPCC, but also Member States and the European Commission⁽⁷⁾. The Civilian Compact commitments of 2018

represented the most explicit recognition by Member States at the highest political level of the need to develop civilian CSDP further, taking the above lessons, needs and challenges into account. The creation of the Berlin Centre of Excellence in 2019, which was much welcomed as a driver in support of implementing these commitments, represented another positive development in this vein.

For operational planning to succeed in the future, it will be important to ensure the following⁽⁸⁾:

- > Better matching the political objectives of all 27 Member States and the means and resources allocated by them and the EU as an institution to civilian CSDP, for it to be an effective and credible instrument at

(6) Cost Benefit Analysis on the feasibility of setting up a Shared Services Centre for the management of Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and European Union Special Representatives and their Offices, Contract No CFSP/2013/14, May 2014.

(7) These are for example (i) better defined and standardised job descriptions; (ii) enhanced pre-deployment training programmes, including an e-training module for civilian CSDP operational planning (still in the making); (iii) more framework contracts to speed up procurement; (iv) upgrades in the warehouse as well as (v) the development of important software tools to help facilitate many of these processes (e.g. CiMA, Goalkeeper etc); (vi) the recent reinvestments in mission analytical capacities; (vii) recent renewed investments in enhanced strategic communications, to name just a few.

(8) It cannot be stressed enough that planning is a collective effort involving not only all divisions of the CPCC, but also FPI, EUDELs, EUSRs – and very importantly, Member States who set the political-strategic aims and targets and who deliver all the resources (financial and human resources). In 2022, when we celebrate 15 years of existence of the CPCC, we must first and foremost acknowledge the tremendous achievements made by all staff involved in the planning stage – as said in the introduction 'no plans – no missions'. It is however also true that this work remains hidden, not very well known and certainly not recognised. It is the hope of the author that this paper will foster enhanced interest in exploring the importance of operational planning in the interest of the CPCC performing to maximum efficiency in the years to come.

the service of the EU's foreign and security policy/CSDP; this would imply an earlier involvement of operational planners in the political/strategic decision-making.

- > Accurately defining from the outset the baseline for each mission, with realistic objectives and tasks that take account of local political buy-in and local absorption capacity as well as relevant security and health parameters.
- > Investing further in the national preparation and selection of skilled mission staff that also diligently apply the code of conduct and standards of behaviour that are critical for mission efficiency and credibility.
- > Investing further in professionalising the CPCC planners' team by upgrading it to a proper Division to match the level of responsibility and by providing systematically dedicated training to all staff involved in the planning process, which does not stop at mission launch but continues during the entire conduct phase, as plans need to be adjusted and progress measured via the benchmarking concept.
- > Considering to discuss again the option of a 'Shared Service Centre' to ensure higher levels of standardisation and cost efficiency as well as speed of deployment based on the earlier findings of the 2015 feasibility study.

CHAPTER 3

HOW TO CONDUCT

by

BIRGIT LOESER AND FRANCISCO ESTEBAN PÉREZ

WHAT IS CONDUCT?

Mission ‘conduct’ is a core task of the CivOpsCdr, supported by the CPCC. In essence, it consists of overseeing the successful implementation of the missions’ mandates with a view to accomplishing defined mission objectives and achieving end states. As such, it implies the control and guidance on a day-to-day basis of the proper execution of mission tasks. Focus is on the support provided and the command function whenever direction and control is required, also in view of the important duty of care. The present chapter will show the central role played by the Conduct of Operations Division (CPCC.1), which is the largest of the four divisions designed to support the CivOpsCdr/Director of the CPCC.

HOW IT HAS WORKED

General role of the Conduct of Operations Division

When the CPCC was set up in 2007, one of the key aims was to ensure enhanced and effective day-to-day management of the EU’s civilian missions. To this effect, it was important not only to establish and install the function of a single dedicated CivOpsCdr, but also that of dedicated ‘desks’ that would support him/her

in the day-to-day command and control. In pursuance of this objective, the previous ‘Police Unit’ of the DG IX with its police officers, but also handful of EU officials who were by then working in that Unit, as well as the Head of the Police Unit, a senior police officer of the rank of Brigadier General, was transformed and endowed with new functions. In fact, the officers and officials serving in the Police Unit were *de facto* already exercising such ‘conduct’ functions, but without formalised authority. Now, they had the formal authority to assist the CivOpsCdr in taking decisions with executive effect.

The Conduct of Operations Division was from the beginning composed of dedicated desks through which missions would report on operational aspects and whose staff would be in contact, on a daily basis, with the missions to provide guidance and support. Each desk was composed of a subject matter expert according to the missions’ main mandate (police, justice, border, etc), and a policy officer (EU official) who would perform political adviser functions, including handling of liaison with Member States in the CivCom. The other distinctive feature was the ‘onestop shop’ function of the desk, which was the main information hub and driver of all that concerned the mission internally within the CPCC: the underlying principle was that of a structure corresponding to the desk in the centre, surrounded by a ‘first layer’ constituted by the CPCC’s mission support (then still including human resources), duty of care and planners,

and encapsulated by a ‘second and outer layer’ of then CMPD (later ISP) legal adviser (until the CPCC got its own legal adviser position), the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN), the EUMS and finally the Commission who all had to play their role in a concerted and coordinated manner to help ensure that the mission was sufficiently guided and supported in its tasks, under the overall authority of the CivOpsCdr. This principle ensured that all matters related to the mission were adequately processed, including mission reporting, recruitment/staffing, procurement, duty of care etc.

The Conduct of Operations Division, which is the biggest division within the CPCC, is divided into three sections, each with a specific geographical focus, covering respectively Europe, Africa and the Middle East/North Africa.

Conduct as an integral part of the mission planning cycle

As explained in the chapter on operational planning, mission conduct is intimately linked with planning throughout the mission’s life-cycle, as the mission may be making progress in some dimensions but might need to be adjusted in others, depending on the evolving situation on the ground, continued political will and readiness to cooperate, as well as the overall absorption capacity of the host state.

The most important tool and main reference document of the fully integrated desk is the OPLAN agreed by the Member States and the CivOpsCdr’s agreed Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) translating mission objectives from the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) and the mission’s tasks and main lines of operation from the CONOPS into concrete mission activities and sequenced benchmarks.

To give an example: Lines of Operation in a CONOPS could read as follows:

- > Provide advice to the Ministry of Interior on the development of national counter-terrorism and organised crime strategies, and
- > Perform mapping and gap analyses to identify possible future EU support to the implementation of the strategies.

Building on this, the OPLAN might look like this:

OPLAN

Decisive point

- > Develop a strategic approach to counter-terrorism in line with internationally recognised standards

Desired outcomes


- > A national counter-terrorism strategy is drafted
- > The inclusion of human rights elements is ensured in the national counter-terrorism strategy

Tasks

- > Assist Ministry of Interior (MoI) in coordinating input from local and international stakeholders when drafting the national counter-terrorism strategy
- > Enhance human rights capacities within the MoI through advising, mentoring and training provided to its Counter-Terrorism unit

The Mission Cycle

The cycle of any mission includes the sequencing of crisis identification, decision making to engage with CSDP, operational planning, conduct and evaluation as well as full termination. This chart shows how the tasks of operational planning, conduct and support follow a clear political direction: the 'why' and the 'what' that informs the mission design ('how'), including the choice of concrete activities undertaken by the mission with a view to achieve previously defined aims and objectives.



Building on this, the MIP would translate the mission tasks into the following activities:

Activities

Task

- > Enhance human rights capacities within the MoI through advising, mentoring and training provided to its Counter-Terrorism unit.

Activity 1

- > The mission advises the MoI's relevant stakeholders on the development and adoption of strategic documents in compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) standards.

Activity 2

- > The mission mentors and advises the Deputy Minister of Interior for Strategic Planning on the integration of IHL aspects into strategic documents.

Activity 3

- > The mission mentors and advises the MoI's Head of Counter-Terrorism Unit on IHL aspects in view of counter-terrorism activities.

Activity 4

- > The mission delivers a training course on IHL to staff in the Counter-Terrorism Unit and other relevant stakeholders of the MoI.

During the earlier operational planning phase the mission will have received adequate funds and personnel to execute these activities.

The operational desks' tasks essentially consist in monitoring and assessing – in an integrated manner – progress made and in helping

adjust where necessary any missing enabling factors or means that are required to succeed in achieving the mission end-state.

At regular intervals, the Integrated Approach for Security and Peace Directorate (ISP), that earlier will have produced the CMC, will conduct a 'Strategic Review' to assess if the original political-strategic parameters of the mission have changed and if any fine tuning is necessary. This is *inter alia* informed by a so-called 'operational assessment' provided by the CPCC in consultation with the mission as well as fact-finding and analysis from a political perspective. Any new directions agreed upon by Member States would require planners to review the OPLAN or even the CONOPS, depending on the extent of changes occurring. A lack of acceptance and collaboration with the civilian CSDP mission by local counterparts is often highlighted in a mission's strategic review; on the other hand, the host country may value the support provided and request additional support from the mission on other areas. Member States' commitment, or the lack thereof, can also contribute to a change in the mission's level of ambition, as was seen for example in the review of the mission in Somalia.


Conduct as a day-to-day task

To oversee mandate implementation implies that the operational desks are intimately familiar with the mission, its mandate and its current activities. The operational desks closely monitor the mission's activities through both formal (regular mission reports, regular video teleconferences and regular visits) and informal daily contacts (phone calls and e-mails). Civilian CSDP missions formally report to Member States through the CivOpsCdr. In practice, the operational desks are the first recipients and reviewers of any formal reporting products, notably the so-called

CSDP Mission Evaluation Tools and Sequences for Mission Conduct

Ensuring continuously operational capability and output

A number of tools are used during the day-to-day CPCC-led conduct of operations in order to ensure the Civilian Operations Commander of the effective execution of mission tasks with a view to fully achieving its mandates set at the political level. Crucially, operational capability (a mission must have the means to deliver) and changing political parameters that might require a mission review (strategic review) are interlinked.



Data: EU – Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, 2022

Weekly Operational Summaries (WOS), Special Reports and Six-Monthly Reports (SMR)⁽¹⁾.

The WOS provide weekly retrospective overviews of activities carried out by the missions and include a short assessment of the current political and security situation on the ground, whereas the Six-Monthly Reports are not only much more detailed, but also provide an analysis of the progress made in mandate implementation as well as an outline of planned activities for the next six-months period. They highlight areas where support or guidance are required. While the WOS and usually Special Reports are only transmitted electronically to

Member States for information, Six-Monthly Reports are presented to Member States in dedicated meetings, often in presence of the HoM, and during which Member States may provide political guidance.

The CivOpsCdr receives daily updates on the latest developments pertaining to each mission and also attends the weekly video teleconferences (VTCs) for first-hand information and any guidance or decision in terms of command and control. These VTCs are organised and attended by the integrated desk as any matter raised might give rise to a need for information, analysis or for a decision to be

(1) In addition to the reports indicated above, EUMM Georgia provides monthly reports on its activities given its monitoring tasks.

taken, be it with regard to staffing, logistics, security or operational aspects.

Here, it is important to recall the notion of ‘operational capability’ that is key to mission delivery: as outlined in the chapter on operational planning, the CivOpsCdr, who is ultimately responsible, can only be made accountable for missions that have a minimum capability to perform their duties to achieve progress. If such capability is lacking, remedial action is needed. This mostly occurs in the case of understaffing but can also relate to logistical matters (insufficient armoured vehicles or lack of secure Communications and Information Systems (CIS)) or can also be broader: for example, a deteriorating security situation. It is a core task of the integrated desk to assess such operational capability at all times. If in doubt, the CivOpsCdr can request an ‘internal support review’ (ISR), to which the desk would critically have to contribute, mainly with information and analysis, to assess the situation and to make adequate recommendations to the CivOpsCdr for further handling and decision.

The intrinsic inter-relationship and inter-dependency of ‘ends, ways and means’ cannot be underlined enough. Each cog in the machine works together and in unison with the other elements, thus, it is the operational desks that are part of each of the related workstrands: budgeting, staffing, security, etc, as these enabling functions are the ones that allow the mission to perform.

Altogether, this myriad of different formal and informal contacts enables the CivOpsCdr and the CPCC to closely follow mission developments and to provide guidance and direction to missions on their operational activities. In particular, the VTCs have proven to be an indispensable tool, both to oversee missions’ activities, and as a platform to perform command and control.

For the missions, there are also some distinct advantages associated with having a fully

dedicated multi-functional operational desk as a ‘spider-in-the-web’, in particular as only a few mission staff members are familiar with the EU’s complex decision-making structures that also involve regular interaction with the Commission services, notably the FPI, but also ISP, the Security and Defence Policy Directorate (SECDEFPOL), the Legal Service, the SitCen etc. It is not the CPCC alone that is responsible, all the various units and departments have an important complementary function (see also chapter 6 in this volume which deals with the so-called ‘integrated approach’).

The need for such close interlinking has been highlighted in numerous policy documents, most importantly in the EU Global Strategy (2016) which called for a more ‘joined-up approach’ to crisis management. The political imperative to eliminate silo-thinking and to exploit synergies has also trickled down to the working level where it has fostered improved communication as well as coordination and cooperation among institutions and agencies. Concretely, this means, for example in the case

of Libya, a weekly gathering of the CPCC desk as well as representatives from the EU Delegation to Libya, EUBAM Libya, the EEAS geographical desks, ISP and the European Commission to develop a common understanding of in-theatre developments and to explore potential synergies. Moreover there is increased interaction by the CPCC

with the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies, seconding agencies and project staff working for the Commission as they too play a role in some of the civilian CSDP missions’ activities.

How it can be improved

Lying at the heart of the CPCC’s daily work, the ‘conduct’ of civilian CSDP missions has come a long way and has become increasingly streamlined and professionalised. Yet, the main challenge derives from the fact that,

I t is a core task of the integrated desk to assess operational capability at all times.

similar to the absence of 'natural born planners', there is a lack of a script, a lack of codification of the 'art of mission conduct' that would help facilitate preserving institutional knowledge. A lot relies on the readiness of newly arriving CPCC staff to learn the specific nature of the work of an operations headquarters with its notions of 'command and control' that are more similar to military procedures than to the rest of the EEAS where the CPCC remains embedded. Even for seconded police personnel from Member States that form the major part of the desks in the Conduct of Operations Division, sitting in an operations headquarters is not an experience they will have had in their previous professional lives.

There is thus a need time and again to impress upon the desk the importance of the fact that (i) the perpetual logic of planning is an intrinsic part of conduct; and (ii) that there is no 'conduct' unless all the needs and most importantly the enabling needs of a mission are being satisfied. This is the core task of a desk to understand: the predominant role of the desk is to coordinate and lead a team of experts that, together, feel responsible for the success of a mission – only thereafter comes the daily task of reading mission reports, analysing all factors and reporting up and sideways with a view to help guide and support that mission accordingly, and under and with the authority of the CivOpsCdr. Achieving this successfully remains a key task for the CPCC senior management.

CHAPTER 4

HOW TO SUPPORT

by
ELISABETTA BELLOCCHI AND MOHAMED TABIT

WHAT IS MISSION SUPPORT?

Mission support focuses on the enabling functions that are required for a mission to function. These include classically the mission's budget, logistics (housing, cars, stationery, communication tools, but also weapons and other security instruments), and human resources. As far as logistics and equipment are concerned, the functions involve procurement, management and archiving as well as disposal. In the field of human resources, the key functions are selection, recruitment, training and management. Mission support considerations play a central role in the operational design and planning of a mission and also remain a central feature during the conduct and closure phase.

When the CPCC was set up in 2007, mission support was still a 'one-man show', literally as occupied by one single desk exercising this function and guided by the principle of 'learning by doing'. The European Commission Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), which manages the CFSP fund, continues to play a key role and thus is a very close partner of everyone dealing with mission support.

While in the early days, procurement was done locally, *ad hoc*, over the years there has been a trend towards gradual centralisation for two main reasons: (i) cost efficiency and (ii) standardisation. Also in the field of human resources there has been a strong trend towards centralisation as, too often, the wheel had to be reinvented, which costs time and energy, in particular during mission set-up.

Equipping the civilian CSDP missions with the right assets, at the right moment and in the right place is a critical process that lies at the heart of the CPCC's responsibilities, both during planning and conduct. The best cybersecurity or border management expert cannot perform their mandate without specific means and capabilities.

As part of our integrated approach to external conflicts and crises, the CPCC aims to ensure that civilian CSDP missions are able to deploy more rapidly in line with the Civilian CSDP Compact⁽¹⁾. This chapter explains how to equip civilian CSDP missions and indicates what avenues are being pursued to further streamline procedures and enhance their effectiveness and what limits might remain regardless of the efforts undertaken.

(1) Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, as adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council at its meeting held on 19 November 2018 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14305-2018-INIT/en/pdf>).

HOW IT HAS WORKED

Human resources

The 'human capital' in civilian CSDP missions is the main enabling capability for mandate delivery. It is the experts in policing and the rule of law that mentor and advise, monitor and train in view of achieving mission objectives. The early mandates focused on classical policing, nowadays mandates require specialised experts such as in the field of border management, counter terrorism, aviation security, maritime security, financial control, parliamentary control, criminal justice, human resources management, etc. As the mandates of civilian CSDP missions become ever more sophisticated, there is a more urgent need to define such profiles and to find sufficient numbers of qualitative experts that are ready to join a civilian CSDP mission matching the need of the host country.

Qualified and motivated personnel are crucial to the CPCC's effectiveness and are key to the success of civilian CSDP missions. In 2022, more than 2 200 personnel originating from 27 Member States and third states, serve in the 11 civilian CSDP missions deployed on three continents. The recruitment and management of such a large number of staff with varied skill-sets and requirements is a complex and demanding undertaking at the best of times.

There are many different jobs and roles within the civilian CSDP missions, including Head of Mission, auditor, transport officer, building manager, communications expert, police adviser, prosecutor, constitutional court judge, legal officer, financial verifier, translator, spokesperson, planner, human resources manager, component manager, chief of staff to mention just a few.

It is important to understand in this context that each and every international post in a mission is processed by the CPCC Human Resources Division that launches a recruitment process through a 'Call for contributions' (CfC),

with job descriptions including tailor-made requirements that are sent to Member States who are responsible to ensure that individual experts apply and pass the selection process, including CV screening and interviews.

The CPCC publishes more than 800 vacancies and manages around 14 500 applications per year submitted by some 6 000 candidates. While each mission has its own mandate divided among various lines of operation, and operates in particular geopolitical and security contexts, specific qualifications, skills and experience are common to many job profiles across all the missions. The CPCC, in cooperation with the missions, plans, implements and evaluates three (ordinary) CfCs for each mission, extraordinary CfCs for urgent operational needs and some additional specific CfCs for visiting experts, specialised teams, and internships. Desks across the various CPCC divisions spend a great deal of their time in selection panels, as any expertise has to be assessed, be it CIS, political advisors, policing, management etc.

The whole process lasts usually around 16 weeks: it starts with the extension requests by Member States who need to confirm the renewal of the terms of their seconded personnel; only thereafter can the CPCC publish the vacancies followed by the selection (screening/interviews). Before deployment, selected candidates follow tailor-made pre-deployment training sessions.

The overall objective of the CPCC is to select the best candidate, capable of working in a team to address the challenges in the host country. But finding sufficiently qualified and motivated personnel presents numerous challenges:

First, it depends on the political will of Member States to second personnel across all missions; however, even if such will exists, there may simply be no means if the highly qualified and specialised experts are needed back home.

Second, from the staff's perspective, there are missions that are safer, or nearer to home, or that come with a higher risk but also a higher

per diem, or that are more or less prestigious politically and/or of interest career-wise.

Third, the mix-match of required skills; even if there are excellent experts, e.g. a seasoned customs expert, renowned at home, may not have the necessary skills to be a skilled mentor, advisor or trainer.

There are lastly also various challenges linked to language or intercultural experience or resilience and the ability to handle stress that limits the numbers of possible candidates.

Considering the high number of missions and experts to be deployed, the development of important supporting IT tools was necessary to allow better management of the human resources process and contribute to maximising an efficient use of resources.

Over the years, in light of experiences gained, and reacting to all these constantly shifting challenges, the CPCC has refined the human resources process. By taking the initiative and consulting with the missions and FPI, the CPCC has ensured greater flexibility and enhanced preparedness through a higher degree of standardisation and dialogue with Member States. The biggest push however was when the Civilian Compact was launched by the Member States, who realised that they bear a core responsibility as they provide 'human capital', notably the seconded experts. In this regard, the CPCC systemised the CfCs to make it easier for Member States to plan for them; today, there are three 'ordinary' CfCs for each mission in a calendar year, in addition to so called 'extraordinary' CfCs for urgent operational needs. In 2015, the CPCC developed together with Member States the 'generic task list' and reviewed in light of this the 'mission model structure' document that lays down standard functions in every mission and which facilitates the definition of standardised job descriptions which, in turn, makes it easier for Member States to seek out such candidates. In parallel, the CPCC developed IT tools to underpin both recruitment and personnel management, such as the Goalkeeper and CiMA software. As regards preparedness, the CPCC

together with the ESDC as well as Member States and national institutes has invested massively over the last few years in training, both as regards general awareness training and pre-deployment training so as to ensure the best preparation for the job. Efforts concentrate on process (who? when? how?) and content (training in what?). Also in this regard, the earlier mentioned generic task list and mission model structure documents as well as the harmonised set of job descriptions play a central role, as does the library of concepts that the CPC compiles every year. There also has been a major investment in outreach to JHA actors to establish a link to their internal security needs and tap into their expertise and human capital. Similarly, the concepts of 'visiting experts' and 'specialised teams' were designed to allow highly specialised posts to be filled more easily. Another massive investment by the CPCC in collaboration with Member States was done in addressing the working environment in missions, in reinforcing the duty of care (e.g. the first ever mission staff survey was conducted in 2021, when the first psychologists and counsellors were deployed) and enhancing the mission leadership through tailor-made profiling, training and awareness raising. 'Campaigning' Member States also send officials to capitals to better explain civilian CSDP and related recruitment procedures and staffing issues to assist the respective states in their own preparedness to contribute effectively to this process.

Logistics

Logistical support comprises in itself a wide range of enabling functions: renting or refurbishing mission premises, renovating field offices, buying soft skin and armoured vehicles, transport to/from/within the field, purchasing equipment of all sorts (stationery, CIS, protective gear, etc.) are concrete examples of the work of the logistics staff in the civilian CSDP missions. While some of this is standard, each mission area is different and faces different legal or other challenges. For instance, in EU-CAP Sahel Mali, bringing armoured vehicles to

the centre of the country is not an easy process. It requires a detailed analysis of the mission's exact needs (e.g. numbers, sequence, technical specifications, road conditions, security considerations, maintenance) as well as clarity over any legal aspects (customs, export permissions) and commercial factors (market situation). In accordance with the rules applying to the CFSP budget, there is in addition a procurement process that involves preparing for a tender, evaluating all candidates, and awarding the contracts.

Currently, dozens of framework contracts are managed centrally in Brussels while the remaining contracts are managed locally. When the civilian CSDP missions make known any needs, the CPCC, in liaison with the FPI, drafts the technical specification of a framework contract that would support all civilian CSDP missions and therefore avoid the users losing time and launching separate framework contracts.

The processes require lengthy consultations with the stakeholders involved, and follow strict financial rules to prepare the tender, evaluate the candidates, and award the contracts. 'It is only when the contract is signed, that the challenges start', recalls a former Head of Division. Some challenges are related to the service provider or the transportation system, and some are due to the customs services in the host country, who are usually not familiar with the legal basis of the civilian mission compared to an established entity such as the EU Delegation. In many high-risk environments, the transportation of equipment is 'sensitive'. In Libya or Somalia, EU actors in the host country, in New York and Brussels intervene by *note verbale* to facilitate the importation and use of armoured vehicles. The example of armoured cars is one of many that shows the challenging environment in which civilian missions have to operate and the importance of establishing a robust logistics capability in the civilian mission and HQ.

Yet, the flexibility offered by any framework contract is usually overshadowed by the

practical challenges of procuring the vehicles in the host country.

The IT infrastructure

A functioning and secure IT system is another key requirement for the smooth and effective running of a civilian CSDP mission. Therefore, each civilian CSDP mission has its own IT infrastructure and network.

IT experts in the CPCC and the field start by creating users and roles for any new civilian CSDP mission. For instance, in EUAM RCA, the experts prepared and deployed laptops and mobile phones for the core team as of day one of the mission. In addition, the IT experts built a stable internet connection by using the available services from local or international internet service providers. In some countries experiencing internet disconnection, business continuity is ensured by a backup IT satellite system.

Security of communication is also a paramount criterion for any new or established civilian CSDP mission. Therefore, experts in the field and the HQ conduct regular security checks. Civilian CSDP missions rely on layers of protection, such as the permanent Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU) used by the EU institutions, agencies and bodies. The team is made up of IT security experts from the main EU institutions (European Commission, General Secretariat of the Council, European Parliament, Committee of the Regions, Economic and Social Committee). The civilian CSDP missions also have internal experts dedicated to managing information security incidents and cyber threats.

Together with the European Commission, mitigation efforts have been conceived over the years that, to a certain extent, have helped reduce the time spent on procurement and ensure better support to the Missions. In particular by setting up:

1. in 2012, a warehouse containing used and new equipment, including CIS;

2. framework contracts for specific equipment and services such as CIS and armoured vehicles;
3. a database for technical specifications;
4. the so called 'Mission Support Platform', a team of experts within the CPCC that centralises certain processes for greater standardisation and streamlining, notably in the field of digitalisation and procurement.


HOW IT CAN BE IMPROVED

Equipping civilian CSDP missions with the right assets at the right moment is not a 'one-man show'. Behind the scenes, women and men work 24/7 to support the host countries in their engagement to build civilian capabilities capable of addressing the challenges ahead.

In terms of logistics, the many new initiatives listed above are already bearing fruit. However, it has to be kept in mind that, back in 2015,

Command and Control

Enabling functions for support



ambitions went beyond the Mission Support Platform – the original intent was the setting up of a Shared Services Centre that would centralise services and processes within the CPCC on a much greater scale and thus reduce duplication and redundancy in the field. This would encompass both the logistics part and human resources tasks that are still largely processed in the field while in fact they could be done better by the CPCC. Looking again into the options presented in the feasibility study conducted at the time could be a good start. Furthermore, civilian CSDP missions would need an enhanced capacity of responsiveness to address urgent requests for evacuation in high-risk environments. Signing a framework contract with multiple suppliers for the same service or equipment would increase the competition to deliver the service.

For IT, the civilian CSDP missions, CPCC and FPI would need to invest in an Enterprise Resources Planning System connecting all the support functions (logistics, finance and procurement) to monitor the administrative side of the activities and consequently enhance the efficiency of processes.

For functional experts, the civilian missions would benefit from an increase in the number of international experts seconded by Member States in missions to at least 70 % of the actual international staff, and from enlarging the representation of women among international experts.

All of this good progress however should not give rise to the illusion that procurement times or recruitment processes can be reduced *ad ultimo* for an ever 'more rapid' mission set-up as sometimes advocated by external actors. In the field of staffing, the reality remains that the core of civilian CSDP staff are judges, prosecutors and police men and women whose own career profiles do not necessarily foresee their being deployed abroad to speak a different language and to teach the skills pertaining to their own profession. They must continue to be carefully selected and prepared for their challenging and responsible jobs.

CHAPTER 5

HOW TO COORDINATE

by
TORSTEN M. HOFFMANN

WHAT IS CIVILIAN-MILITARY COORDINATION?

It is widely accepted that there is a causal link between coherent civil-military interaction and improved operational effectiveness. It is argued that more coherence leads to more effectiveness, pushing the issue of civil-military interaction to the front of the international peace operations agenda. Coherent civil-military interaction can be analysed among a broad range of agents, across various dimensions, and at various levels. To avoid confusion and mix-up of the various levels, dimensions and agents, a typology is introduced distinguishing between four spheres of coherence, namely: agency coherence, whole-of-government/organisation coherence, international coherence and

international/local coherence. The aim of this typology is to draw a meaningful distinction between the agents, the dimensions and the levels of civil-military interaction ⁽¹⁾.

‘Whole-of-government coherence’ refers to consistency between the policies and actions of different departments and agencies of the same government. At the multilateral level the UN, EU, African Union (AU) and NATO are each engaged in various initiatives aimed at improving their own internal whole-of-organisation coherence ⁽²⁾. In the EU context, these efforts include strategy and policy documents leading to the EU’s ‘integrated approach to external conflict and crisis’, such as the Joint Communication on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach (CA) (2013), Action Plans on the CA (2015–2017) and the EU’s Integrated Approach (IA) as part of the Global Strategy (2016).

This chapter examines measures taken at the operational/tactical level of civilian and military CSDP interventions contributing to a more coherent and coordinated effort of civilian and military CSDP interventions as part of

(1) De Coning, C., ‘Civil–Military Interaction: Rationale, possibilities and limitations’, in Lucius, G. and Rietjens, S. (eds.), *Effective Civil–Military Interaction in Peace Operations: Theory and practice*. Springer, 2016, p.16.

(2) Ibid.

the EU's integrated approach to external conflict and crisis⁽³⁾.

HOW IT HAS WORKED

On 6 March 2017, the Council approved a concept note on the operational planning and conduct capabilities for military CSDP missions and operations⁽⁴⁾, establishing the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) to work in parallel and in a coordinated way with the CPCC.

The new MPCC is a permanent command and control structure at the military strategic level, in Brussels, responsible for the planning and conduct of non-executive military missions. Until the establishment of the MPCC, military training missions relied on Mission Commanders deployed in theatre, thus merging the military strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. This resulted in challenges, both in the planning and conduct of missions, sometimes leaving missions deployed in dangerous locations in need of more proactive support from strategic level headquarters. Similarly, the interaction between civilian and military CSDP missions deployed in the same theatres was focusing on the tactical level without coordinated guidance from the civilian and military headquarters respectively.

The Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC) was hence created to bridge this gap and to ensure

maximum coordination of civil-military synergies and sharing of expertise. The JSCC brings together civilian and military expertise in key mission support areas at the Brussels level, in order to work on a daily basis to further strengthen and enable effective civilian/military coordination and cooperation in the operational planning and conduct of CSDP civilian and non-executive military missions⁽⁵⁾. Thus, it contributes to the full implementation of the EU's integrated approach to external conflicts and crises introduced in the EU Global Strategy⁽⁶⁾, while respecting the respective civilian and military chains of command and the distinct sources of financing.

Without prejudice to the tasks performed by the existing Mission Support Platform, the JSCC brings together the following joint support functions, such as:

- > Legal advisers
- > Intelligence experts
- > Action/desk officers responsible for current missions and operations
- > Planners
- > Logistics, including infrastructure experts
- > CIS experts
- > Security experts
- > Cybersecurity expertise
- > Strategic Communication and Information Operation expertise
- > Finance and budget experts
- > Medical experts
- > Human rights, gender, minorities and sexual exploitation and abuse expertise.

(3) Developments and aspects related to the EU's political-strategic level civil-military coordination and planning are discussed, among other issues, by Hynek, N., 'Consolidating the EU's crisis management structures: Civil-military coordination and the future of the EU OHQ', Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, European Parliament, 2010; Ehrhart, H.G., 'Civil-Military Co-Operation and Co-ordination in the EU and in Selected Member States', Study for the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Defence, Brussels, 2 October 2007; Khol, R., 'Civil-Military co-ordination in EU crisis management', in: Nowak, A. (ed.), 'Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way', *Chaillot Paper* No 90, EUISS, June 2006 (<https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/civilian-crisis-management-eu-way>); Debuysere, L. and Blockmans, S., 'Directorate ISP: No Deus Ex Machina for the EU's Integrated Approach', GPPI Peacelab, 5 June 2019 (<https://peacelab.blog/2019/06/directorate-isp-no-deus-ex-machina-for-the-eus-integrated-approach>); and Rieker, P. and Blockmans, S., 'Plugging the capability-expectations gap: towards effective, comprehensive and conflict-sensitive EU crisis response?', *European Security*, Vol. 28, No 1, January 2019, pp. 1-21.

(4) Council of the European Union, 'Concept Note: Operational Planning and Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations', ST 6881/17, March 2017.

(5) Council of the European Union, 'European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC): Terms of Reference and Organization', ST 9762/17, 9 June 2017.

(6) High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy', June 2016 (https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf).

OPERATIONALISATION OF THE JOINT SUPPORT COORDINATION CELL

The JSCC became operational on 3 September 2019 with the adoption of the MPCC/CPCC Standard Operating Procedures of the Joint Support Coordination Cell signed by the Director of the MPCC and CivOpsCdr/Director of the CPCC. It determines that the JSCC is a mechanism that functions as a working body based on existing resources of the MPCC, CPCC and other participants. No additional personnel or structures are generated to activate and implement the JSCC. However, other relevant EU actors, notably EEAS and Commission services, the European Peace Facility (EPF) mechanism, European Defence Agency (EDA) and other EU agencies, may be invited as required by the JSCC in order to regularly exchange information, share knowledge and facilitate coordination in the context of the EU integrated approach in the regions where both civilian and military missions and operations are conducted.

The JSCC is only activated in support of CSDP civilian and military missions, which are planned and conducted by the MPCC and the CPCC in the same or adjacent geographic areas. In April 2022, these are located in the:


- > Horn of Africa, namely EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia,
- > Sahel region, namely EUTM Mali, EU-CAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali and the Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell (RACC),
- > Central African Republic, namely EUTM RCA and EUAM RCA.

The core mandate of the JSCC is to facilitate information exchange, improve coordination and strengthen civilian-military synergies. It contributes to the EU's civil-military logistical efforts by providing a meeting platform for EU structures' logistics experts at the Brussels level to share knowledge, build trust, support the decision-making process of relevant actors, enable mutual logistic assistance and

Levels of cooperation and coordination

At headquarters level and theatre level

There are three levels of interaction within the framework of the Joint Support Coordination Cell. Interaction at headquarters takes place horizontally at the Directors level, level of Chiefs of Staff and level of so-called Action Officers/Desks.



Data: EU – Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, 2022

cooperation, and drive synergies between military and civilian logistics activities.

The establishment of the JSCC does not modify the agreed provisions for joint crisis response

planning for civil/military operations and the assistance to crisis response planning at the strategic and operational level for civilian missions, which remain within the remit of the EUMS until an Initiating Military Directive (IMD) is issued. As regards operational planning, the JSCC might be called upon to assist planning teams that the MPCC and CPCC will establish as required, mindful of respective mandates, planning and arrangements.

The JSCC does not exercise command and control authority, functions, roles and tasks. Activation of the JSCC is without prejudice of the respective civilian and military chains of command and the distinct sources of financing of CSDP missions and operations.

Under the guidance and responsibility of the Director of MPCC and the Director of CPCC, the Chiefs of Staff of the MPCC and CPCC jointly coordinate the regular work of the JSCC.

The JSCC meets at regular intervals and at three different levels:

- > MPCC Action Officers and CPCC desk officers and staff attend;
- > MPCC CoS and Branch Chiefs and CPCC equivalents; upon decision of CoS of the MPCC and CPCC, the JSCC convenes for *ad-hoc* meetings, or dedicated support teams are established for specific topics, limited in time and scope, convening military or civilian expertise as required;
- > Directors of MPCC and CPCC.

The first two years of the JSCC were marked by the ongoing Covid-19 crisis. However, regular meetings took place at all three levels either physically or through VTC. MPCC Action Officers and CPCC Desk Officers were in contact with each other on a weekly, at times daily basis, to exchange on actions taken by military and civilian missions in response to the coronavirus pandemic. MPCC CoS and Branch Chiefs and CPCC equivalents convened formally and informally on a regular basis either physically or through VTC due to Covid restrictions. The Directors of the MPCC and

CPCC, other than in the formal meetings, are also frequently in contact with each other to exchange notes on current topics. Facilitated by dedicated coordinators from the MPCC and CPCC, the working relationships at all levels within the framework of the JSCC can be described as excellent and there is no threshold with regard to communication or exchange of information on any issue.

In the regular meetings of the JSCC at various levels a broad range of topics is discussed at theatre and horizontal level. In December 2020, civilian and military missions were operating in three geographical areas and cooperation was facilitated through the JSCC: Horn of Africa/Somalia, the Sahel region/Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR). In addition, in Libya, the civilian CSDP mission EUBAM Libya and military CSDP operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI cooperate at theatre level and in Somalia EUCAP Somalia, EUTM Somalia and EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta exchange information at theatre level.

A regular topic for all theatres are exchanges of views on the political and security situation on the ground contributing to the situational awareness of the MPCC and CPCC. Topics with more practical implications include the coordinated delivery of training to the beneficiaries, logistics arrangements (including transportation within theatre and out of theatre, strategic evacuation [STATEVAC]), medical support coordination and cooperation (including medical evacuation [MEDEVAC]), security coordination, and thematic support such as with expertise (legal, political and gender advisory, CIS, project management, media).

On horizontal/cross-cutting topics, the CPCC and MPCC exchange regularly within the framework of the JSCC to ensure coordinated responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, (including scoping opportunities for joint acquisition of PCR capability, and exchanges of views on vaccination policies), exchanges of views on lessons identified and lessons learnt in civilian and military CSDP interventions, disinformation/hybrid threats, military exercises (e.g. EU Integrated Resolve), logistics and strategic communication.

It is recognised that the JSCC is a well-established tool facilitating interaction and coordination between MPCC and CPCC. The civilian-military nature of the overall effort to strengthen the EU's crisis management structures remains of central importance, emphasising that the principle of a clear chain of command must be fully respected, including the need to distinguish between respective military and civilian chains of command.

OTHER FORUMS SUPPORTING CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION

The JSCC is the only dedicated forum for civil-military coordination in the domain of civilian and military CSDP interventions. However, there are additional forums, organised and hosted by military CSDP structures, to which civilian CSDP stakeholders are regularly invited at various levels, to exchange and facilitate situational awareness on a broad range of topics related to CSDP interventions on the political-strategic and operational level.

EU Commanders' Conference

The annual EU Commanders' Conference, convened by the DG EUMS, invites commanders of EU Operations, Commanders of Parent HQs of EU OHQs and FHQs pledged to the EU, MPCC, ISP and CPCC to exchange views on current topics of a political-strategic nature. The aim of the conference is to strengthen the conduct of EU CSDP operations and missions and provide an opportunity for the commanders of civilian and military CSDP missions and operations to share knowledge and experience and engage in broad-ranging and stimulating discussions.

MPCC EUTM's Mission Force Commanders conference

This conference is organised by the MPCC as an annual event at the military-strategic level. It can take place bi-annually based on the Mission Force Commanders rotation plan (normally 6 months) and the guidance of the Director of MPCC. It is one of the key events for the MPCC, serving as a platform for addressing relevant topics at Commanders' level. It gives the opportunity to the participants to exchange views and information in their respective areas of expertise and engage with the key stakeholders in Brussels. Keynote speeches and presentations are delivered by relevant stakeholders, such as the EEAS SG, the Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (CEUMC), Deputy Secretary General CSDP and Crisis Response (DSG CSDP-CR) and ISP. The CPCC is one of the main contributors and the CivOpsCdr is always invited to attend and exchange with the participants.

EU HQ CMs

The European Union Headquarters Coordination Meetings (EU HQ CMs), organised by the EUMS, is an informal meeting format with the aim to exchange information and views between representatives of the EU HQ Community (EU OHQs, HQ EUROCORPS, SATCEN, CPCC, EUMS and MPCC) at the working level. These bi-annual two-day meetings are usually hosted in rotation by the EUMS in Brussels (once a year) and by one of the five EU OHQs. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, EUHQ CMs were also conducted in virtual and hybrid modes. Although these meetings have a purely informative purpose without any decision-making mandate, they constitute a very useful forum to identify and discuss issues of mutual interest between civilian and military stakeholders. General updates from all civilian and military CSDP missions and operations contribute to the overall situational awareness of stakeholders in relevant headquarters.

COORDINATION ON THE GROUND IN THEATRES

Coordination and cooperation in theatres among civilian and military CSDP missions and operations varies depending on the mandate and structure of the missions and operations and local circumstances. Establishing and maintaining those relationships is less formalised and guided from headquarters and depends often on the individuals on the ground.

The EU Delegation, and the Head of Delegation in particular, is the focal point of EU presence in third countries and should – at that level – play a central role in delivering and coordinating EU dialogue, action and support, while respecting the autonomy of CSDP missions/operations within their CSDP mandates ⁽⁷⁾. In order to foster coherence among EU actors, the EU Delegation organises HoM meetings and, depending on local circumstances, other EU coordination. HoMs meetings are usually held once a month and where a CSDP mission or operation is present in theatre, the Head of Mission/Force Commander should be invited to all EU HoMs meetings. Readouts of these meetings are disseminated to all relevant stakeholders in theatre and at headquarters level.

Other coordination meetings at managerial or technical level are organised based on the needs and direction of the Force Commander and Heads of Mission. Depending on local circumstances, informal exchanges may occur on a daily basis if for example the civilian and military CSDP missions are co-located in the same compound (e.g. in Mogadishu, Somalia). However, even if located in more remote geographical locations, exchanges and meetings may be organised quite frequently (e.g. Bamako, Mali).

More frequent rotations of military personnel in military CSDP missions may sometimes delay cooperation efforts when newly arrived personnel are settling in. On average, military personnel rotate every 5–6 months, while seconded personnel of civilian CSDP missions remain for approximately 1–1.5 years in theatre and contracted personnel (usually recruited in support functions) stay for several years, sometimes as long as the civilian CSDP mission is in place. HoMs remain on average for 2 years, compared to 5–6 months terms for Mission Force Commanders of military CSDP missions.

To compensate these potential gaps and to ensure institutional memory, civilian and military CSDP missions and operations may conclude administrative arrangements at theatre level to enhance cooperation and coordination between CSDP missions.

Administrative arrangements are in place between all civilian and military CSDP missions and between EUBAM Libya and EU NAVFOR IRINI, regulating topics related among others to medical support, security, information sharing, means of transport (air, land and sea), and training projects.

HOW IT CAN BE IMPROVED

Civil-military interaction at the operational and tactical level between civilian and military CSDP missions and operations is institutionalised through the Joint Support Coordination Cell and other institutionalised meeting formats at the headquarters level as well as in theatre. However, lessons and internal reporting show that current coordination and cooperation mechanisms can be further enhanced.

(7) European External Action Service, 'Best practice guidelines – Coordination and cooperation between CSDP missions/operations, EU Delegations and EU Special Representatives', ST 12052/16, September 2016.

Especially in the support domain, efforts towards further collaboration requiring a joint procurement effort are impeded due to the different financial regulations under which civilian and military CSDP missions and operations operate. Civilian CSDP missions are funded through the CFSP budget, which excludes expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications in accordance with the limitations provided for by Article 41(2) TEU, while military CSDP missions and operations are funded through Member States cost sharing and the EPF, which replaced the so-called Athena mechanism ⁽⁸⁾. Overcoming this legal constraint in order to allow joint procurement would further facilitate collaboration in a number of areas in the support domain such as joint procurement of transport capacities, medical supplies and equipment, and personal protective equipment.

Although information exchange between civilian and military CSDP is at a satisfactory level, the exchange of documents containing classified information is sometimes challenging. Different information technology systems and networks often prohibit the direct exchange of such material between entities in the field or with headquarters in Brussels. Several initiatives are ongoing to further improve the CIS infrastructure with the aim to improve secured communication and exchange of information between actors.

The physical colocation of the EUMS/MPCC and CPCC headquarters contributes significantly to enhanced cooperation between military and civilian CSDP entities. Preserving the co-location of the MPCC and CPCC in a dedicated headquarters building in Brussels should ensure coherence and synergy in planning and conduct, especially when joint civilian-military CSDP responses are required in the same theatre.

Efforts will continue to further strengthen coherent civil-military interaction at all political-strategical, operational and tactical levels and to improve operational effectiveness contributing to the EU's integrated approach to conflicts and crises.

(8) The Athena mechanism handled the financing of common costs relating to EU military operations under the EU's CSDP. See also: Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 of 27 March 2015 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena) and repealing Decision 2011/871/CFSP.

CHAPTER 6

HOW TO INTEGRATE

by
CARINA BÖTTCHER AND TOBIAS PIETZ

WHAT IS INTEGRATION?

The need to coordinate the various entities and policies of the EU in the field of foreign and security policy has been acknowledged since the very beginning of the Union. The legal basis for such a coordinated approach of the EU to its external action can be found already in Art. 21.3 of the TEU, which calls for ‘consistency between the different areas of external action and between these and its other policies’ ⁽¹⁾. A major step forward for this consistency was introduced in 2013 with the release of the Joint Communication on ‘the EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises’, which sought to coordinate the full range of instruments and resources for a more consistent, effective and strategic external action. In 2016, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) went even further and introduced the integrated approach for EU external action. The approach was then conceptualised and defined through Council conclusions adopted on 22 January 2018 ⁽²⁾.

Ever since, the integrated approach has become – at least in the official discussions, conclusions and general guidance – something like commonsense for the EU and its Member States ⁽³⁾. This chapter assesses the extent to which this commonsense actually has been put into real practice, and what role the CSDP is playing (or could play), especially its civilian missions and their operations headquarters, the CPCC ⁽⁴⁾.

HOW IT HAS WORKED

CSDP civilian and military missions ⁽⁵⁾ have played a very visible role in the EU’s foreign and security policy since they were first deployed in 2003. In comparison to European financial support or Commission-implemented projects, the presence of personnel of Member States in missions on the ground, whether civilian, police or military, is more evident, and can even be used for publicity purposes, thus often showing better why and how the EU is engaged in a certain crisis situation. CSDP

(1) See Faleg, G., ‘The EU: from comprehensive to integrated approach’, *Global Affairs*, Vol. 4, No 2-3, 2018.

(2) Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises’, 5413/18, 22 January 2018.

(3) Authors’ interview with EU official, Brussels, 17 December 2021.

(4) In addition to classical desk research, the authors conducted 12 interviews with EEAS officials from Brussels and field missions as well as think tanks. Insights from these interviews are referenced anonymously as agreed upon with the interviewees.

(5) Pre-Lisbon ESDP.

has changed significantly since the Treaty of Lisbon ⁽⁶⁾. Originally, missions and operations were crisis response-driven, ‘fast in, fast out’ ⁽⁷⁾, with light planning structures. With the advent of the EEAS, these interventions are now embedded in a ‘more systematic and bureaucratic structure’ ⁽⁸⁾. Decision-making for civilian CSDP now includes nine working groups and sub-groups under the Council, and a comparable number of divisions in the EEAS is involved in the course of planning and conduct of missions – which is totally different to the rather *ad-hoc* and very flexible approach that prevailed at the beginning of CSDP. This has been accompanied by a change in the general approach of missions and operations: most of them now concentrate mainly on the areas of capacity building, training and advising, turning CSDP into a ‘security and defence cooperation tool’ with a rather long-term deployment horizon ⁽⁹⁾. Moreover, since the EUGS, the external action of the EU has often been dominated by internal security issues such as migration. Under the heading ‘protection of Europe’, significant parts of CSDP were thus aligned to address these issues more effectively ⁽¹⁰⁾.

All these developments have moved CSDP missions and operations closer to activities implemented by other EU bodies, whether the European Commission, agencies like Frontex and Europol, or EU Delegations in host countries. Long-term advising, capacity-building and training needs much closer coordination with other actors than a monitoring mission or stabilisation operation. The challenge of

operationalising the EU’s integrated approach further is thus of strong relevance for CSDP missions. In addition, the level of ambition of CSDP has decreased since Lisbon while the politicisation of missions and operations has increased ⁽¹¹⁾. They now have less personnel and more specialised mandates as compared to larger endeavours with a diversity of tasks and mandates pre-Lisbon. The role of Member States, their varying interests and different degrees of commitment to CSDP have also complicated matters. To speak with one voice or to ‘deliver as one’ under these circumstances is both a key demand and a major challenge.

The integrated approach in Brussels

The most relevant partners to CPCC with regard to the integrated approach in the EEAS, are the ‘Security and Defence Policy’ (Sec-DefPol) and ‘Integrated Approach for Security and Peace’ (ISP) Directorates, as well as geographical desks. From the side of the EU Commission, *inter alia*, the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA), the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, the DG Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) ⁽¹²⁾, and the Commission JHA agencies Frontex, Europol, Eurojust, and CEPOL play an important role for an integrated approach – as do EU Member States. In their interplay, it must be considered that CSDP as an intergovernmental tool has fundamentally different mechanisms and caveats than Commission instruments.

(6) See Pietz, T., ‘EU Crisis Management: Back to the Future’, *Internationale Politik Quarterly*, June 2021 (<https://ip-quarterly.com/en/eu-crisis-management-back-future>).

(7) Authors’ interview with EU official, Brussels, 10 November 2021.

(8) Karjalainen, T. and Savoranta, V., ‘The EU’s strategic approach to CSDP interventions: Building a tenet from praxis’, *FIIA Analysis*, October 2021, p.8.

(9) Ibid.

(10) See Pirozzi, N., ‘The Civilian CSDP Compact: A success story for the EU’s crisis management Cinderella?’, Brief No 9, EUISS, October 2018, p.4 (<https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/civilian-csdp-compact-%E2%80%93-success-story-eu%E2%80%99s-crisis-management-cinderella>).

(11) See Juncos, A.E., ‘Beyond civilian power? Civilian CSDP two decades on’, in *The CSDP in 2020: The EU’s legacy and ambition in security and defence*, op.cit., p.81; Pietz, T., ‘How a focus on migration could weaken the EU’s crisis management missions’, *World Politics Review*, August 2018.

(12) Further Commission DGs of importance for CSDP are DG ECHO, DG JUST, DG NEAR, DG CLIMA, DG ENV, and DG MARE.

There is a variety of documents which are relevant for embedding civilian CSDP with other instruments in an integrated manner. Overarching strategies, like regional or thematic strategies⁽¹³⁾, can be helpful as frameworks under which all external action is considered, for example the EU-wide strategy on SSR⁽¹⁴⁾. Such strategies translate the overarching goals from e.g. the EU Global Strategy and the available means with regard to a specific region or issue area. In crisis situations, the instrument of a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) should help the EEAS to consider all the different options for action. Later, in the CSDP planning process especially, the crisis management procedures should ensure integrated planning. Several of the documents have in common that they are not always used properly⁽¹⁵⁾.

After the presentation of the EUGS in 2016, there have been notable changes in the EEAS structures to bring forward the integrated approach. The most recent was the creation of the ISP Directorate in 2019. ISP now represents the integrated approach in the EEAS as a fully-fledged directorate led by a Managing Director⁽¹⁶⁾, next to a conduct pillar through the CPCC, and a policy pillar through SecDefPol.

In daily practice, the structural changes have led to some encouraging progress, but challenges remain. Especially in the planning phase for civilian CSDP, progress was made towards more integrated action⁽¹⁷⁾. In the

strategic planning phase, ISP is in the lead to gather input from all relevant divisions. A recent example of this was the process initiated by ISP to produce a PFCA for Mozambique⁽¹⁸⁾. This strategic planning process is a good example of what an integrated planning process can look like⁽¹⁹⁾. While the result of the PFCA process was somewhat predetermined (political discussions indicated a strong tendency towards a military CSDP mission in advance), 'walking the walk together' produces joint learning and is therefore important for the services. Currently, a new PFCA for Eastern DRC is under discussion⁽²⁰⁾. There seems to be a clear momentum for integrated action in new settings starting with a PFCA, but such an integrated approach does still not work for complex situations where different EU actors have been engaged in parallel for some time already. In these environments, too many existing factors, actors, and interests are limiting integration⁽²¹⁾.

In the implementation phase of missions, there is a mixed picture of how well the integrated approach is applied. On the positive side, strategic reviews of missions are always conducted in an integrated way⁽²²⁾. When it comes to information management, many desk officers by now have internalised the mantra. For example, mission desk officers often circulate draft reports to the other crisis management directorates and the geographical desk and ask for comments. At the same time, this does not happen very much the other way around, for example from the side of the geographical

(13) See e.g. Council of the European Union, 'The European Union's Integrated Strategy in the Sahel – Council Conclusions', 16 April 2021 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7723-2021-INIT/en/pdf>).

(14) Council of the European Union, 'Council conclusions on EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform (SSR)', 14 November 2016 (<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24227/ssr-st13998en16.pdf>).

(15) Authors' interview with EU official, Brussels, 10 November 2021.

(16) Debusere, L. and Blockmans, S., 'Directorate ISP: No Deus Ex Machina for the EU's Integrated Approach', PeaceLab Blog, 5 June 2019 (<https://peacelab.blog/2019/06/directorate-isp-no-deus-ex-machina-for-the-eus-integrated-approach>).

(17) Authors' interviews with EU officials, Brussels, 10 November 2021 and 6 January 2022.

(18) While the result of this process was the military CSDP mission EUTM Mozambique launched in 2021, the model process is the same when a civilian mission becomes an option.

(19) Authors' interview with EU official, Brussels, 17 December 2021.

(20) Authors' interview with EU official, Brussels, 17 December 2021.

(21) Authors' interview with EU official, Brussels, 17 December 2021.

(22) Authors' interview with EU official, Brussels, 26 November 2021.

desks to the CPCC⁽²³⁾. So, information that missions could provide is not systematically considered when formulating political decisions. Several interviewees mentioned an unwritten hierarchy among the different services which becomes apparent in such situations⁽²⁴⁾. Crucial to the issue of information sharing is that there are no reporting guidelines that officers adhere to. The sharing of documents and asking for comments is at the discretion of the individuals working at the desks. How well the integrated approach is experienced therefore depends on personal connections and knowledge of or links with relevant counterparts in other organisational structures.

There is a lack of knowledge management and no institutionalised mechanisms for information sharing. While individuals mostly do their best to share information with their counterparts, this bears the risk that information and processes get lost with rotation or temporary personnel gaps. In the absence of institutionalised processes, it is all the more important how well the respective leadership promotes the integrated approach. So far, it is at the choice of (managing) directors if and how regularly they meet, if they travel to missions together or include the work of other directors in the directives for their own staff.

In the interplay of the EEAS and Commission, joint programming often does not take place. Also, information exchange on projects depends strongly on the individual context. The new instrument for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), follows the reasoning of a more integrated approach. Some expect a better overview and more coordinated programming from it⁽²⁵⁾. A joint analysis is mandatory to start programming with NDICI.

It is initiated by the EUDEL, others then contribute⁽²⁶⁾. CSDP missions should be consulted at an early stage to ensure that Commission projects are well coordinated with CSDP activities. Especially since civilian missions in the last few years have administered increasing amounts of money through their project cells, there is more risk of overlap and coordination is key.

With the new tasks that emphasise internal security interests in external action, cooperation and coordination between civilian CSDP structures and JHA actors have gained relevance. So far, personal connections and extensive knowledge from both worlds is rare. Therefore, bringing the agenda forward relies on new formats. At the moment, contacts are at the level of getting to know each other⁽²⁷⁾. The CivOpsCdr started a series of exchanges with his counterparts in the leadership of the relevant Commission DGs and with the Heads of the Home Affairs Agencies⁽²⁸⁾. There are already many exchanges at working level, and JHA agencies are now always invited to take part in the annual seminar for HoMs which the CPCC organises. Also, the Integrated Strategic Planning for CSDP and Stabilisation (ISP.3) now regularly consults relevant JHA agencies during strategic reviews.

The integrated approach in EU capitals

EU Member States as the ‘owners of CSDP’ play a crucial role for civilian CSDP planning and guidance from Brussels. But their role *vis-à-vis* the integrated approach is so far underexposed and does not feature much as a topic in the literature. They can act as enablers for integration, but also as spoilers.

(23) Authors' interview with EU official, Brussels, 20 December 2021.

(24) Authors' interviews with EU officials, Brussels, 20 December 2021 and Pristina, 20 December 2021.

(25) Authors' interviews with EU officials, Brussels, 17 December 2021 and 6 January 2022.

(26) Authors' interview with EU official, Brussels, 17 December 2021.

(27) Authors' interview with EU official, Brussels, 14 December 2021.

(28) Authors' interview with EU official, Brussels, 6 January 2022.

Understanding CSDP, its possibilities, challenges and the underlying procedures is already quite complex. Under the steady rotation of personnel in Brussels embassies and foreign ministries, it can be difficult to grasp the full scope of the EU integrated approach with its wide array of instruments⁽²⁹⁾.

Moreover, not having access to the full spectrum of information makes it difficult for Member States to consider all possible types of EU engagements when taking decisions for civilian missions. While the PSC and CivCom get the reporting from missions, the picture from the side of the Commission is often incomplete when it comes to projects. Often, implementers only produce technical reports, but projects are not considered in their full political scope⁽³⁰⁾. At the same time, Member States' bilateral projects in the missions' operating areas are not necessarily considered in terms of their political implications for EU external action. Generally, the coordination between the EU and its Member States needs more consideration⁽³¹⁾.

Member States in their political guidance function have a strong capacity to exercise pressure on the service to go beyond information sharing and consultation⁽³²⁾. But in practice, it is challenging for them to even consolidate their own national positions which they represent throughout the various Council working groups and sub-groups⁽³³⁾, often leading to an 'atomisation' of Member State positions⁽³⁴⁾. Therefore, when Member States articulate conflicting positions e.g. in the PSC and Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI), this can hamper an integrated EU planning process.

On aligning internal and external policies between JHA and CSDP, Member States could push for more cooperation on the political level. Recent initiatives from within CSDP structures to reach out to Member States' ministries of the interior could therefore be fruitful.

The integrated approach in the field

EU external action in the field can comprise a whole range of instruments and actors, ranging from civilian CSDP missions, military operations, diplomatic tools such as EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), to projects of the European Commission, embedded experts from specialised agencies like Frontex, as well as the official EU Delegations. In addition, EU Member States might add to the picture by sponsoring bilateral activities with the host nation – or even by directly funding specific projects administered by a mission or operation.

That competition in the field has been met so far by the absence of any structured co-operation, or concrete guidance or systematic procedures from Brussels⁽³⁵⁾. An illustrative example is the EU's engagement in Mali, where, in 2017, a CSDP civilian mission, one CSDP military operation, an EU Stabilisation Action as well as a 'CSDP-like' Commission project were not only running in parallel but also with overlapping target groups and local counterparts – and without sufficient coordination⁽³⁶⁾.

(29) Authors' interviews with CMC officials, Helsinki, 21 December 2021 and SIPRI official, Stockholm, 10 December 2021.

(30) Authors' interview with EU official, Brussels, 6 January 2022.

(31) Authors' interview with CMC officials, Helsinki, 21 December 2021.

(32) Authors' interview with EU official, Brussels, 27 October 2021.

(33) Authors' interview with SIPRI official, Helsinki, 10 December 2021.

(34) Authors' interview with EU official, Brussels, 27 October 2021.

(35) Authors' interviews with EU officials, Brussels, 10 November/20 December, 26 November, Pristina, 20 December 2021.

(36) Pietz, T., 'Flexibility and "Stabilization Actions": EU crisis management one year after the Global Strategy', ZIF Policy Briefing, September 2017 (https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ZIF_Policy_Briefing_Pietz_GSVP_Sept_2017_EN.pdf).

Where cooperation and coordination between EU actors on the ground occurs, it has been mostly driven by personal relationships, informal set-ups and *ad hoc* solutions⁽³⁷⁾. There will be no cooperation if the Head of Mission (HoM) and the Head of Delegation (HoD) do not get along⁽³⁸⁾. Where senior management interacts well, there have been numerous examples of a systematic and regular exchange of information. However, such coordination is often still far from joint programming or a true integration.

As CSDP missions – other than originally foreseen – have become long-term engagements with intense personal and organisational relationships to host governments, as well as extensive regional intelligence, they should play a key role in facilitating an integrated approach for the field⁽³⁹⁾. And they often do so in an informal, thus unsystematic, manner⁽⁴⁰⁾. Some missions have started to enable a more integrated European approach in their area of deployment. EUCAP Sahel Niger, for example, has recently pushed for a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Frontex and Europol, especially to receive visiting experts from these agencies. It is a good practice for missions to propose projects that are then funded by the Commission or a Member State. A recent example is a project at EUCAP Niger, bilaterally funded by Germany, which led to the revival of a project at EUDEL – but also implemented by the mission⁽⁴¹⁾.

HOW IT CAN BE IMPROVED

A lot has already happened: most importantly, there is now a lot of awareness and information sharing among the involved stakeholders. But to fully implement the integrated approach, the EU must go beyond just strengthening communication and knowledge across CSDP, Commission and relevant Agencies regarding each other's mandates, and actually set up permanent processes. Structural changes are needed to move forward.

The creation of the EEAS has led to more capacities for planning, cooperation and coordination, but also created heavy bureaucratic structures that make it harder to act. The initial idea of fast crisis response is – theoretically – still in the toolbox of civilian CSDP. But civilian

CSDP structures, including the CPCC, are not made for fast action and lack flexibility. Once rapid crisis response might become necessary, 'the integrated approach goes out of the window', as one interviewee remarked⁽⁴²⁾. The EU should revisit its performances in this field and reflect on how structures could become more flexible to accommodate such action, even in an integrated approach.

Currently, integration seems to be a solely personality-driven approach. That needs to change by applying better guidance and systematic solutions. Moreover, the knowledge gap between the Commission, EEAS and CPCC about their work, their advantages and disadvantages, needs to be closed. Systematic

(37) Authors' interviews with EU officials, Brussels, 10 November/20 December/26 November, Pristina, 20 December, Niamey, 28 December, and CMC officials, Helsinki, 21 December 2021.

(38) Authors' interview with EU official, Pristina, 20 December 2021.

(39) Authors' interviews with EU officials, Brussels and Pristina, 20 December, Niamey, 28 December 2021.

(40) Authors' interviews with EU officials, Brussels and Pristina, 20 December 2021.

(41) Authors' interviews with EU official, Niamey, 28 December 2021.

(42) Authors' interview with CMC officials, Helsinki, 21 December 2021.

collection and dissemination of examples and good practices of what kind of cooperation is actually possible could be a concrete step in the right direction. Training and peer coaching of senior management could be helpful as would be a new nomination and selection process for senior positions. Senior management should not only be competent but already experienced in working in a cross-sectoral way.

Member States will be decisive for the integrated approach, because they are the only ones who can apply political pressure for much-needed structural changes. In addition, Member States themselves need to become better at implementing a whole-of-government approach – speaking with one voice in all relevant forums in Brussels. Joint (country) meetings can be a solution where Commission, JHA agencies and missions are briefing jointly on their activities to the same Council Working Group.

In the field, structural changes are needed, including the merging of missions and delegations. Missions should have the leeway for creative solutions as long as institutional flexibility (as called for in the Civilian CSDP Compact) has not been achieved.

In general, coordination and cooperation needs to be institutionalised throughout the whole cycle, at all stages, beginning with the planning stage and ending with transition strategies. Finally, for the CPCC to find its role – not only but especially in a European integrated approach for external action – it needs more (and more operationally experienced) staff and resources to become a true operations headquarters.

CHAPTER 7

HOW TO LEARN

by
ANA E. JUNCOS

WHAT IS LEARNING?

Compared to other global or regional organisations such as the UN, NATO or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the EU's involvement in international security is relatively recent, dating back only two decades. As the 'new kid on the block', the EU had to learn the ropes rather quickly, for instance, by drawing lessons from other actors such as the UN or the OSCE or adopting international best practices in policing assistance or SSR⁽¹⁾. However, learning by doing, i.e. from its own experience in planning and conducting CSDP missions and operations, has provided by far the biggest source of knowledge and has become a key driver of change and innovation, particularly in the area of civilian CSDP. The deployment of over 20 civilian missions since 2003 has provided rich evidence about what to do and, perhaps more importantly, what not to do. This has allowed the EU to adapt to a changing international security context and to existing and emerging threats.

This contribution provides a brief overview of the role the CPCC plays in facilitating learning processes in civilian CSDP and in the institutionalisation of those lessons learned. It explores the extent to which learning has contributed to adaptation and innovation in the

field of civilian CSDP over time. It also identifies some of the obstacles that have disrupted learning processes in the past and how civilian CSDP might deal with these problems in the context of emerging challenges.


HOW IT HAS WORKED

For an international organisation such as the EU, learning constitutes a complex process because it involves not only the collection and processing of specific lessons by individuals, but its institutionalisation at the organisational level. In other words, the lessons cycle goes from the observation and then identification of lessons to their implementation (lessons learnt) (see diagram opposite).

In the case of civilian CSDP, this is compounded by the need to ensure that learning 'travels' from the field where a mission is deployed (tactical level) to the strategic and political levels in Brussels. A key learning mechanism in CSDP are the bi-annual reports produced by the missions, which include a lessons-learned component. This review process ensures flexibility and accountability: (i) it allows for mission mandates to be adjusted in response to


(1) For instance, on how the EU adopted and developed its own SSR policy, see Faleg, G., 'Between knowledge and power: epistemic communities and the emergence of security sector reform in the EU security architecture', *European Security*, Vol. 21, No 2, 2012, pp. 161-184.

CSDP lessons learned cycle



Data: EEAS, Guidelines on Civilian CSDP Lessons Process, 2018

Civilian CSDP lessons governance



Data: European Parliament, CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons learned processes, 2012

changes of conditions on the ground; and (ii) Member State representatives sitting on EU committees can exercise oversight of developments on the ground and any required adjustments. The CPCC plays a key role in these processes as it is responsible for collecting lessons learned from the six-month reports submitted by Heads of Missions and collecting lessons after the planning phase and termination of missions. Those lessons are then presented to CivCom and the PSC for debate among the Member States.

While the EU has been able to learn from a wealth of experiences, observations from missions have not always found their way to the politico-strategic level. This is where the role of the CPCC as the EU's institutional memory in civilian crisis management becomes crucial. Problems relating to the institutionalisation of learning have resulted from both individual and institutional factors. For learning to have an impact on policy it needs to be transferred from the individual to the organisation and become institutionalised. At the individual

level, high rotation levels have impeded the learning process and the development of an institutional memory. The problem has been exacerbated by the lack of a ‘learning culture’ within the organisation and individual incentives to learn⁽²⁾. This was particularly noticeable in the early years of civilian CSDP when learning processes were less standardised and depended more on the willingness and ability of particular individuals to communicate and share lessons learned. The creation of the CPCC and the increasing professionalisation of learning in the civilian CSDP dimension has gone some way to address these problems, but has not done away with them.

Institutional obstacles to learning remain. The obvious one has to do with the complexity and fragmentation of CSDP structures, which increases the probabilities of learning not reaching the targeted audience. Lack of transparency – as lessons learned might be part of confidential reports – can also prevent learning. Perhaps the most significant issue here relates to the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP and the political nature of learning⁽³⁾. Learning requires consensus among the Member States because different lessons may be drawn from the same event. Moreover, political sensitivities might get in the way of the right lessons being learned. Again, here the role of the CPCC is crucial in steering learning processes in civilian CSDP and acting as the intermediary between the politico-strategic and the tactical levels.

What the EU has learned: learning by doing and from failure

There are plenty of examples of learning in civilian CSDP, as recorded elsewhere⁽⁴⁾. This section provides a succinct overview of how such learning processes have evolved over time and reflects on how this learning might be leveraged when addressing future challenges, as well as what this tells us about the EU’s ability to learn.

The first thing to note is that learning has been facilitated by periods of crisis or structural change. It is well known that individuals and organisations are more likely to re-evaluate extant practices and procedures when faced by a new challenge or critical juncture⁽⁵⁾. In the case of the EU, its first ever experience of crisis management took place in the early 1990s when Europeans were not only faced by the uncertainty unfolding from the fall of the Soviet Union but also the Yugoslavian wars in their neighbourhood. These early experiences would inform subsequent developments in civilian CSDP, for instance, how to run a monitoring mission or challenges related to civilian administration⁽⁶⁾. Linked to this is the fact that learning is more likely to derive from perceived failure than from success, as failure will provide a greater motivation for an individual or organisation to reassess its procedures and means⁽⁷⁾. Having said that, learning should not become a shame and blame game as this might disincentivise actors from

(2) European Parliament, ‘CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons learned processes’, Study prepared by the Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Brussels, 2012 ([https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/457062/EXPO-SEDE_ET\(2012\)457062_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/457062/EXPO-SEDE_ET(2012)457062_EN.pdf)).

(3) For a comparison of how this affects the EU, UN and OSCE differently in the area of civilian CSDP see Dijkstra, H., Petrov, P. and Mahr, E., ‘Learning to deploy civilian capabilities: How the United Nations, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and European Union have changed their crisis management institutions’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 524–543.

(4) See ‘CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons learned processes’, op. cit.; Smith, M. E., *Europe’s Common Security and Defence Policy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017.

(5) Checkel, J., ‘Why comply? Social learning and European identity change’, *International Organization*, Vol. 55, 2001, pp. 553–88.

(6) See Juncos, A.E., *EU Foreign and Security Policy in Bosnia: The politics of coherence and effectiveness*, Manchester University Press, 2013.

(7) Haas, E. B., *When Knowledge is Power*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1990, p.45.

engaging in processes of learning, something which has also affected CSDP⁽⁸⁾.

Having clarified some of the conditions under which one might expect (or not) learning, it is possible to identify three phases of learning in the development of civilian CSDP: an initial phase from the launch of the first operations in 2003 to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009; a more inward-looking phase or consolidation phase between 2009 and the adoption of the EU Global Strategy in 2016; and more recently, a phase of revitalisation, with new initiatives launched in this area.

Teething problems: the early years of civilian CSDP (2003-2009)

The launch of the first civilian missions in the early 2000s was a propitious period for learning. The EU launched for the first time a police mission in 2003 (EUPOL Bosnia), a rule of law mission in 2004 (EUJUST Themis in Georgia) and an SSR mission in 2005 (EUSEC RD Congo) and expanded its know-how in monitoring with missions such as in Aceh, Indonesia. By the end of the period the EU had deployed 16 civilian missions in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, an impressive accomplishment given its modest beginnings. The activism of the EU in civilian CSDP was impressive especially compared to military operations. This was not without its challenges. The planning and operational capabilities of the EU were tested to the limit, and one of the main lessons learned was the need to improve capabilities in this area with the establishment of the CPCC in 2007. But there were also plenty of other 'teething problems' which needed addressing.

The establishment of the CPCC has aided the professionalisation of learning processes.

Some of the key lessons (learnt) during this period included the need to have clearer mandates including appropriate benchmarking systems, the need to strengthen fact-finding missions to support planning, or more flexible financing and procurement systems to facilitate the deployment and running of a mission⁽⁹⁾. Better coordination among EU actors on the ground would become a lesson identified by most missions, feeding into the development of a comprehensive/integrated approach. Perhaps one of the most important lessons from this period had to do with the need to expand the scope of tasks covered by civilian CSDP from very narrow police missions to more holistic rule of law and SSR missions to address links between the police, judicial and prison sectors.

Characteristic of this period was a rather *ad hoc* approach to learning. Leaner institutional structures and procedures in civilian crisis management resulted in key individuals, both in Brussels and on the ground, and Member States playing a strong role in learning processes. On the plus side, this meant speedier responses to crises. For instance, in the face of rigid financing rules, some missions such as the monitoring missions in Aceh or Georgia had to initially rely on Member State contributions. On the negative side, learning processes during this period were impacted disproportionately by the rotation of personnel in strategic positions. Also, informal solutions were ultimately not sustainable. The expansion of EU civilian crisis management structures over time, including with the establishment of the CPCC, has aided the professionalisation of learning processes. However, it has had the effect of reducing flexibility and the ability of EU structures to respond quickly to learning

(8) 'CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons learned processes', op.cit.

(9) For an illustration of learning stemming from EUPM Bosnia, see *EU Foreign and Security Policy in Bosnia: The politics of coherence and effectiveness*, op.cit.

from the ground as any adjustments requires coordination among a wider array of actors.

From the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty to the adoption of the EUGS (2009-2016): Learning in times of crises

The establishment of the EEAS contributed to the professionalisation and standardisation of learning in civilian CSDP. It also resulted in learning processes that were more in line with those followed by the military structures, notably the EUMS⁽¹⁰⁾. Having said that, learning in civilian and military CSDP largely remained as two separated processes. It was argued earlier that learning might be accelerated during times of crisis and uncertainty, when new ‘windows of opportunity’ open to actors. There was no shortage of crises during this period – from the eurozone crisis to the Arab Spring and conflicts erupting on the southern and eastern flanks of the EU (e.g. the Syrian and Ukrainian crises respectively). Yet, for most of this period, little activity was detected in relation to civilian crisis management, with only six new missions deployed during this time. Crises, in particular the consequences of the eurozone crisis, diverted attention and resources from learning processes in civilian CSDP⁽¹¹⁾. In addition to this, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty reforms, namely the establishment of the EEAS, consumed much energy in Brussels and led to an impasse in the institutionalisation of lessons learned, for example, relating to rapid procurement, training

and recruitment of personnel, or establishing secure communications. While many of these lessons had already been identified in the past, they still hindered the deployment of missions in Mali or Ukraine⁽¹²⁾. Yet, it is possible to see renewed effort in implementing lessons learned relating to the comprehensive approach as identified in the Annual Reports of that period⁽¹³⁾.

From the EUGS to the Covid-19 pandemic: towards a more pragmatic approach

After a period of impasse, focused on consolidating the Lisbon Treaty institutional reforms, the EUGS opened a new phase of learning and innovation in civilian CSDP centered around the development and implementation of the Civilian CSDP Compact. The EUGS emphasised a more pragmatic approach to international security with its concept of ‘principled pragmatism’ and prioritising resilience-building in the neighbourhood. While civilian CSDP missions are still considered a ‘trademark’ of CSDP, the EUGS also concedes that ‘the idea that Europe is an exclusively “civilian power” does not do justice to an evolving reality’⁽¹⁴⁾. The EUGS already adumbrates some of the challenges and pressures civilian CSDP will be faced with in the post-2016 period.

The main problem throughout this period has been one of ‘capabilities’, i.e. the need to improve procurement, mission support, recruitment, deployment and training of civilian

(10) For example, the development of a Civilian Lessons Management Application (CiLMA) for recording lessons relating to civilian missions was modelled on a similar military database, the EUMS’ Lessons Management Application or ELMA.

(11) Bossong, R., ‘EU civilian crisis management and organisational learning’, Economics of Security Working Paper 62, Economics of Security, Berlin, 2022; Smith, M.E., ‘Developing a “Comprehensive Approach” to international security: Institutional learning and the ESDP’, in Richardson, J. (ed.), *Constructing a Policy-Making State? Policy Dynamics in the European Union*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012.

(12) Council of the EU, Annual 2014 CSDP Lessons Report, EEAS(2015) 256, 3 March 2015.

(13) Council of the EU, Annual 2016 CSDP Lessons Report Brussels, EEAS(2017) 252, 12 May 2017. For instance, the creation of a CSDP Lessons & Best Practices portal aimed to facilitate such an exchange.

(14) High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, ‘Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, 26 June 2016, p. 4 (https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf).

capabilities⁽¹⁵⁾. While not a new problem, the low availability of national experts and limited willingness of the Member States to deploy them in EU missions has been felt by most missions currently deployed. The small civilian CSDP budget and lack of (financial) incentives for individuals and Member States to deploy abroad have also complicated matters⁽¹⁶⁾. The need to implement an integrated approach to conflicts and crises also necessitates better coordination between civilian and military actors. Another significant lesson of the past ten years has been the need to improve synergies between the external and internal dimensions of security. Civilian CSDP has been increasingly challenged by the growing involvement of the Commission and other EU-level agencies (e.g. Frontex) active in internal security matters such as migration and border monitoring. Another interesting development has been the use of article 28 which saw the launch of the EU Stabilisation Action (EUS-TAMS) under the EU Delegation to contribute to rebuilding the civilian administration in Mopti and Segou (Mali) in 2017.

Drawing on lessons identified, the Civilian CSDP Compact of 2018 has sought to address these issues as well as to ensure a civilian CSDP fit to deal with new emerging challenges and threats. Increasing geopolitical competition at the international level and the focus on developing the EU's strategic autonomy ushered in by the EUGS have put pressure on civilian CSDP to adapt to new external threats in the form of hybrid threats, disinformation and cybersecurity. An example of initiatives undertaken in this domain is the

development of a mini-concept on civilian CSDP support to countering hybrid threats. The climate-security nexus is also emerging as a key area of concern for civilian CSDP, illustrating again how lessons learned from experience and from others have facilitated change in this field. The new Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security adopted in October 2021 foresees

The climate-security nexus is also emerging as a key area of concern for civilian CSDP.

stronger integration of climate change impacts in the planning and conduct of civilian CSDP missions through situational awareness and awareness raising, the management of the environmental footprint of the missions, and the provision of capacity building in this area⁽¹⁷⁾. With civilian CSDP taking on new areas such as cli-

mate change or hybrid threats, this has also resulted in increased workloads and the need to develop the required in-house expertise within the CPCC (as well as in missions).

HOW IT CAN BE IMPROVED

As illustrated above, the EU has been able to change and adapt its civilian CSDP missions over time based on learning from past experiences and learning from others. This has often involved adjusting mandates to conditions on the ground, improving the quality and the amount of resources available to missions, and incremental changes to civilian CSDP structures and procedures. Thus, learning can be seen to have been one of the main mechanisms

(15) See, for instance, the final evaluation of the EU-CIVCAP project regarding the key challenges and lessons learned in relation to EU conflict prevention and peacebuilding: Juncos, A.E. et al., *EU-CIVCAP Policy Recommendations: Executive Summary of the Final Report including Guidance for Policymakers*, 2018 (https://eucivcap.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/eucivcap-executive_summary-policy_recommendations.pdf).

(16) On incentives, see Böttcher, C., 'Exploring EU Member States' good practices incentives for more secondment into Civilian CSDP Missions', *DGAP Analysis* No 5, July 2020 (https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/dgap-analysis-2020-05-en.pdf).

(17) EEAS, 'Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security', EEAS (2021)770, 5 October 2021, p.7 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12537-2021-INIT/en/pdf>).

of remedying problems and addressing unintended consequences not foreseen during the planning of missions. In the early 2000s, the EU did not have any experience in monitoring ceasefires or training prosecutors; it did not have any prior doctrine or experience in policing assistance or rule of law. Since then, it has become one of the key actors in the field of civilian crisis management and security sector reform. To a great extent, this achievement has been made possible by the EU learning from its own experiences and those of others. Some of this learning has also stemmed from (perceived) experiences of failure.

However, as recent crises in the East and the South and the Covid-19 pandemic have shown, the world has become more unpredictable than it ever was. The EU thus needs to become more of a 'protean power', i.e. it needs to develop its ability to innovate and improvise in uncertain circumstances ⁽¹⁸⁾. When it comes to civilian CSDP, we have seen some evidence of the EU's ability to respond creatively in the past, from the adoption of practical solutions to financing and recruitment when there was a demand for urgent deployments (e.g. Aceh or Georgia) to informal coordination arrangements on the ground, including in the context of Covid-19. However, more often than not, the incorporation of lessons learned has only led to slow and gradual adjustments rather than radical changes. The context we live in, with increasing complexity and uncertainty at the international level, especially in matters of security, requires an alternative approach to the exercise of power in normal situations (where we can calculate risk and predict outcomes). It requires agility and creativity to deal with uncertainty and more room for experimentation. The EU's agility will be particularly tested when confronting key challenges such as hybrid threats or climate disasters and in specific geographical areas such as in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods. There are also significant obstacles to the vision of a more creative and innovative civilian CSDP, not to

mention the strictures of decision-making at 27. A more adaptive approach necessitates innovative solutions that ensure buy-in from the Member States, while reducing their temptation to micromanage every aspect of the EU's civilian missions. The CPCC, as the institutional memory in civilian CSDP, will need to learn to navigate complexity and uncertainty not just outside the EU, but also within.

(18) Katzenstein, P.J. and Seybert, L.A. (eds), *Protean Power: Exploring the uncertain and unexpected in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018.

CHAPTER 8

CIVILIAN HQ

The road ahead

by
NICOLETTA PIROZZI

In the last few years, significant efforts have gone into further developing the non-military dimension of the EU's CSDP, in particular through the so-called Civilian Compact in 2018 and, to a lesser extent, in the framework of the process for the adoption of a Strategic Compass in 2022 ⁽¹⁾.

Launched in November 2018 within the wider framework of the 2016 EU Global Strategy ⁽²⁾, the Civilian Compact aimed to promote a comprehensive review of civilian crisis management in order to adapt it to the new geopolitical challenges. The Compact has widened the scope of civilian missions and operations in order to address new challenges such as irregular migration, hybrid threats, cybersecurity, terrorism and radicalisation, organised crime and support for capacity building and border management as well as maritime security and the protection of cultural heritage. In line with

the nature of the new tasks, the Compact has also called for increased coordination between CSDP and JHA structures, including EUROPOL, EUROJUST and Frontex.

The Civilian Compact has undoubtedly re-kindled interest in civil crisis management among Member States ⁽³⁾. They have developed National Implementation Plans (NIPs) and are currently engaged in the implementation of commitments undertaken in the framework of the Compact to further develop their national contributions to civilian CSDP ⁽⁴⁾. However, the objective included in the Compact to raise the proportion of seconded personnel to at least 70 % of international staff of civilian missions by 2023 seems unlikely to be achieved. While the demand for civilian CSDP is growing, civilian CSDP missions have become increasingly reliant on the contributions of a small group of supportive Member States (France,

(1) Council of the European Union, 'Conclusions on the Establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact', (14305/18), 19 November 2018 (<http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14305-2018-INIT/en/pdf>) and Council of the European Union, *A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security* (7371/22), 21 March 2022 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/en/pdf>).

(2) High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy', June 2016 (https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf).

(3) Although this has come with the risk of distorting the original functions of civilian CSDP missions, which may result in a reduction of stabilisation activities – most needed in countries affected by conflict and crisis – in favour of an increased focus on migration issues.

(4) Council of the European Union, 'Council Conclusions on Civilian CSDP Compact', (14740/21), 13 December 2021 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14740-2021-INIT/en/pdf>).

Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden). In August 2020, seconded staff represented 54 % of total international personnel deployed, and the big five provided 60 % of that number. In 2021, 18 Member States did not second any personnel for the 11 ongoing civilian missions.

The Strategic Compass, which aims to set out a common strategic vision for EU security and defence on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of key threats and challenges to the Union, its Member States and citizens, is also expected to contribute to the conceptual and concrete development of civilian crisis management. The Compass identifies a new level of ambition also for civilian CSDP, with a view to making it more robust, flexible and modular, also through a new Compact to be approved by 2023. The Compass confirms the objective included in the Civilian Compact to make the EU able to deploy a civilian mission of up to 200 fully equipped personnel within 30 days, including in complex and challenging environments.

However, these significant conceptual developments, implying an expanded range of tasks for civilian CSDP, have not gone hand in hand with an increase in human and financial resources. Some 2 100 staff currently work in the field in CSDP civilian missions and a further 120 in headquarters. The total cost of the civilian CSDP missions is currently only around €281 million per year.

Given the level of ambition identified in the strategic documents recently adopted by the EU and the greater demand for civilian engagement by the EU and its Member States, one central question relates to the capacity to plan and conduct missions that can provide an effective response. How can the current structures in Brussels be strengthened in order to

face the new needs? Has the time come to consider the idea of establishing a fully-fledged civilian HQ? What kind of synergies can we imagine with the CSDP military side?

The scenarios developed below offer some inputs and reflections on the challenges and options ahead, starting with a minimalist approach and outlining more ambitious steps for the future ⁽⁵⁾. Despite the existence of different views on the interventions required, based also on diverse professional experiences in various CSDP structures and missions, there seems to be a consensus among practitioners on the need to streamline and reinforce the capacity of the EU to provide planning, conduct and control of civilian CSDP missions on the ground as a central component of the EU's foreign and security policy ⁽⁶⁾.

SCENARIO 1: MINIMALIST OPTION - A STRENGTHENED CPCC

The Strategic Compass provides that the CPCC, currently an EEAS Directorate serving as the operations headquarters for civilian CSDP missions, should be strengthened to be able to plan, conduct and control current and future civilian missions. At the same time, cooperation and coordination between the military and civilian structures should be reinforced through the Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC), which brings together civilian and military expertise at the strategic level.

(5) They are based on desk research conducted on the main documents produced by EU institutions in the CSDP field and a series of semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in civilian and military CSDP structures in Brussels and missions on the ground.

(6) The author would like to thank Natalina Cea, Head of Mission, EUBAM Libya, Marta Costantino, Chief of staff, EUCAP Sahel Mali, Francisco Esteban Pérez, Civilian Operations Commander/Director CPCC, Antti Häikiö, Former Senior Strategic Advisor, Civilian CSDP, Security and Defence Policy (SECDEFPOL.1), Crista Huisman, Head of Sector Civilian CSDP, Security and Defence Policy (SECDEFPOL.1), Birgit Loeser, Former Deputy Civilian Operations Commander/Chief of Staff, CPCC, Giovanni Manione, Deputy Head of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and Mihaela Matei Deputy Civilian Operations Commander/Chief of Staff, CPCC for their valuable inputs and useful suggestions and criticisms.

Although minimalistic, this option would require a number of corrective actions in the current set-up of the CPCC, its relations with other civilian CSDP structures and its role *vis-à-vis* civilian missions on the ground.

In fact, the current status of the CPCC as a directorate of the EEAS exposes it to a continuous turnover of personnel due to time limits on the secondment of staff coming from Member States and mobility of officials among the EEAS departments. This has hampered institutional memory and specialisation, for example when it comes to the planning of civilian missions. Looking ahead to the future, the CPCC would benefit from flexible contractual modalities for its staff in order to preserve an adequate degree of professionalisation and training, ideally rotating from and to missions or similar institutions such as the UN or the OSCE.

The professionalisation of CPCC staff has become even more pressing given the need for new profiles more suited to address emerging challenges. Not only during the Covid-19 crisis, but already before this, did it become clear that the duty of care is an increasing concern given the profound changes in the geopolitical environment and the increasingly volatile and risky theatres in which civilian CSDP operates. This warrants the establishment of a dedicated duty of care division within the CPCC. In addition, in order to tackle disinformation and misinformation, the CPCC should be able to rely on key capabilities such as mission analysis, CIS, and strategic communication capabilities. Similarly, adequate expertise is crucial in the field of climate change, which goes well beyond the footprint and awareness training for mission staff, and includes the analysis of the nexus between climate and crises, advocacy work on the ground,

as well as capacity building in the field of climate and security (i.e. bringing those who commit climate crimes to justice).

The deployment of duly trained civilian personnel remains a challenge for the CPCC. The level of ambition of 200 personnel to be deployed in 30 days can be achieved – and it has been achieved in the past, with notable examples being the monitoring missions in Aceh (Indonesia) in 2004 and Georgia in 2018. However, it is important that the next Civilian Compact clearly identifies how to get there, including logistics and support functions, and how to mobilise the necessary human and financial resources. Overall, the enhanced use of the Goalkeeper platform⁽⁷⁾ by the CPCC and its cooperation with the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management (CoE) in Berlin⁽⁸⁾ could help in this direction.

The deployment of duly trained civilian personnel remains a challenge for the CPCC.

Also, the objective of flexible deployments would require adaptation by the CPCC of crisis management procedures, given that the current decision-making and force generation processes are far too cumbersome to allow the quick deployment of specialised teams.

In addition, seconded and contracted civilian staff are subject to different regulations and reporting lines, which complicates management tasks further. The situation could improve with a common staff regulation for both categories of personnel, including the equivalence of salaries (in the case of seconded staff, EU institutions pay only an allowance, while the salary is paid by the Member States).

The current CSDP architecture within the EEAS separates policy, planning and operations in different structures, namely SECDEF-POL, ISP and the CPCC. Despite being closely

(7) Goalkeeper is a web-based platform that supports training, recruitment, capability development and institutional memory in the context of EU and international crisis management (<https://goalkeeper.eas.europa.eu/>).

(8) European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management (<https://www.coe-civ.eu/>).

interconnected, the lack of a clear hierarchy and the confusion over division of labour among them fuels interinstitutional infighting, which is detrimental for the outcome. Examples of overlapping can be found in the competences for strategic and operational planning concerning the set-up and review of civilian missions between ISP and CPCC or in the implementation of the Civilian Compact between SECDEFPOL and CPCC. The establishment of an overarching structure or authority to provide overall guidance for the three directorates, possibly with a direct entry point to intergovernmental decision-making through the CivCom Chair, would help in the direction of a more coordinated and effective effort.

As far as the relationship between the CPCC and missions on the ground is concerned, desk officers in charge of different geographic areas of deployment (Europe, Africa, Asia/Middle East) play a key role in the planning and conduct of missions. It is therefore of the outmost importance that they have adequate seniority and expertise, and that the reporting line between them and the CivOpsCdr/CPCC Director and the HoMs is clarified. Horizontal functions in CPCC should also be strengthened with a view to coordinate the work of desk officers and monitor missions in a more effective way, in conjunction with FPI for the budgetary aspects.

Finally, some progress has been made in terms of cooperation between CSDP and JHA actors in the past few years, namely through pilot projects in Niger and Libya, exchanges among heads of agencies, and a dedicated mini concept⁽⁹⁾ in the framework of the Civilian Compact. However, in order to make this cooperation work, policy and operations should be aligned and this could be ensured only by equipping the CPCC with adequate expertise in this field and/or establishing more liaison officers with JHA agencies. This should be accompanied by closer cooperation between

the PSC and COSI in Brussels and platforms involving all the relevant line ministries (Interior, Defence, Justice, Foreign Affairs) in national capitals.

SCENARIO 2: AMBITIOUS OPTION – A FULLY-FLEDGED CIVILIAN HQ

Ideally, a civilian HQ should be responsible for the entire process of mission planning, deployment and conduct, as well as strategic review and lessons learned, based on impact assessment. However, due to the non-linear development of civilian CSDP and the progressive integration of its structures within the EEAS, these functions are currently allocated to different civilian CSDP bodies, namely the CPCC, SECDEFPOL and the ISP. Establishing a fully-fledged civilian HQ would require integrating these functions in one structure – possibly the CPCC – and giving this structure the status of an Agency outside the EEAS.

However, as mentioned above, this goal is controversial, as many stakeholders contest its validity either on the grounds that the CPCC was not created for this purpose or by making a comparison with the military field, where the operational planning (under the remit of the EUMS) is separated from the strategic planning (in the hands of the MPCC). However, the evolution of the nature of the threats facing the EU and the connected elaboration of new concepts and tasks in the CSDP sector make a revision of the current institutional set-up in both the civilian and military fields at least advisable.

(9) Mini-concepts are documents produced by SECDEFPOL that aim to frame possible areas for increased civilian CSDP efforts, and to provide a conceptual basis for strategic and operational planners to identify possibilities in the context of designing or reviewing mission mandates, including strategic and operational lines of activity. See: Council of the European Union, 'Implementing the Civilian CSDP Compact: Suggestions for common master messages', (10815/21), 14 July 2021 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10815-2021-INIT/en/pdf>).

Moreover, there are concerns that if the civilian HQ is established as an agency separate from the EEAS, it might lose a direct link to the political decision-making structures, namely the PSC, which exercises political control and strategic direction on all CSDP missions under the control of the Council and the High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP), and CivCom in its advisory role. This risk could be overcome by establishing correct procedures that ensure an earlier involvement of the new HQ in the political decision-making process, with a view to match expectations with capabilities (both financial and human).

This would also help in better aligning the political and the operational levels of civilian CSDP. In fact, operational experience has shown a tendency to use missions on the ground to compensate the EU's lack of political initiative. As a consequence, there is a fundamental confusion and constant tension around the role of civilian missions, which have often very limited and technical mandates, but intervene in sectors that are at the core of the relationship between the state and the citizens, and therefore inherently political. If CSDP missions are normally considered as a crisis management instrument, their nature and the duration of their deployment – an average of 6–7 years, with missions such as EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah having been active for 16 years now – make them more an instrument of state-building.

Having a fully-fledged HQ with a direct link to the political decision-making process could also help in the direction of overcoming this ambiguity, by developing more targeted mandates of civilian missions and better coordinating them with the political-institutional action. This would also help in achieving a more realistic assessment of the role and impact of missions on the ground compared to the overall objectives of the EU's action in a specific crisis theatre, and this would also favour a more effective review and exit strategy process for civilian missions.

SCENARIO 3: LONGER-TERM OPTION – TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED CIVILIAN- MILITARY HQ

The idea of a joint civilian-military operations headquarters is not new: it dates back many years and there have been many attempts at the political level to advance this project, as attested notably by the 'Chocolate Summit' or Tervuren debate, the later 'Weimar discussions', the attempt to create a 'Civ/Mil Cell', the Hampton Court deliberations and the like, as also mentioned in the earlier chapters.

In the current debate, the idea of a joint civilian-military chain of command still seems impracticable in the short-medium term, due to the obstacles related to different financial mechanisms for civilian and military missions and the lack of consensus on military CSDP among Member States, or even indeed undesirable, due to the diverging strategic cultures in the civilian and military fields. Nevertheless, it should remain a long-term goal if the EU wants to be serious about an integrated approach and act in line with its strategic objectives.

In the meantime, a number of steps can be taken to work in this direction, such as the co-location of civilian and military crisis management structures in one building, and the synchronisation of planning and reporting of civilian and military missions. At the operational level, the creation of joint capacity for situational awareness, procurement of transport, medical facilities, IT, communication and protection facilities would facilitate cooperation and at a certain point make it feasible to run jointly civilian-military missions on the ground. This could take the form of civilian missions embedded in military missions, or civilian and military missions deployed

jointly, or the sequencing of military and civilian missions on the basis of an overall concept of stabilisation.

This would also require the identification of a figure responsible for the overall diplomatic-political guidance overseeing civilian and military missions on the ground, such as the Head of Delegation.

THE COST OF INACTION

The development of the strategic and operational approach to security by the EU and its Member States has significantly influenced the evolution of the civilian dimension of CSDP. The Civilian CSDP Compact and the Strategic Compass have identified new – if not more ambitious – tasks and objectives that cannot be accomplished without a serious reform and rationalisation of existing bodies and procedures. The CPCC and its Head/Civ-OpsCdr should be at the centre of this updating process with a view to equipping the EU with a functioning structure – and possibly a fully-fledged HQ – to translate its ambitions into concrete action on the ground. The cost of inaction – a suboptimum scenario in which the CPCC is not strengthened – would be a dysfunctional civilian CSDP, which means the inability of the EU to perform crucial tasks and responsibilities in terms of crisis management and state building, therefore undermining its credibility as a security actor. Given the urgency of the issues at stake, but also to sustain the aspiration of a more closely integrated European Union, a political initiative should be advanced immediately following the adoption of the Strategic Compass, with a view to discuss a reform proposal in the framework of the process that will lead to the next edition of the Civilian CSDP Compact in 2023.

CONCLUSION

by
GIOVANNI FALEG

Pretty much in the same way that a human brain evolves and learns, operations headquarters need to adapt to new geopolitical realities and strategic needs. Threats in the EU's neighbourhood have intensified to a point that they affect the very presence of CSDP missions in theatres, including civilian ones. Two concrete examples stand out, in the EU's Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods respectively.

As a direct consequence of the 2022 Russian military invasion of Ukraine, the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine has been forced to evacuate, suspending the implementation of its mandate. Since 2014, EUAM Ukraine provided advice and support to the implementation of civilian security sector reform in the country, re-establishing trust between citizen and law enforcement institutions. During eight years of operations, EUAM Ukraine has been confronted with challenges that go beyond those that were originally linked to its mandate. Hybrid threats, and particularly cyberattacks and information manipulation by Russia and non-state groups, have intensified year after year, up to the point that they undermined the mission's mandate, as a result of activities aimed at manipulating public perceptions of the EU, or harming Ukrainian IT infrastructures. Additionally, the challenge of organised crime has increased in Ukraine since the launch of EUAM Ukraine,

prompting the mission to advise the creation of a Regional Organized Crime Task Force (ROCTaF), which was established in Kharkiv in 2017 and comprised of prosecutors, police, and other law enforcement officials. EUAM has not only witnessed the resurgence of a large-scale military conflict in Europe, but also a progressive intensification of security challenges, which has modified the threat environment since the mission started. It is expected that other CSDP missions will need to factor in an altered geopolitical landscape as part of their mandates.

Transformations of similar scale are happening in other contexts too. In Mali, the EU has deployed a civilian capacity-building mission (EUCAP) since 2014, which operates alongside a military training mission (EUTM), with the objective of supporting Mali's internal security forces and civilian administration to strengthen good governance and the rule of law. Here too, the gradual intensification of security challenges affecting the mission's mandate, from violent extremism to hybrid threats⁽¹⁾, has been combined with developments that

have profoundly modified the environment in which CSDP operates, with both staff safety and strategic implications for the EU. As a result of the 2021 *coup* and the decision by the Malian military junta to delay the democratic

The time for strategic thinking is over, now the time has come for strategic action.

(1) See: Faleg, G. and Kovalčíková, N., 'Rising hybrid threats in Africa: challenges and implications for the EU', *Brief No 3*, EUISS, March 2022 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_3_Hybrid%20threats%20in%20Africa_0.pdf); Faleg, G. and Mustasilta, K., 'Salafi-jihadism in Africa: a winning strategy', *Brief No 12*, EUISS, June 2021 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_12_2021.pdf).

transition, a coordinated withdrawal of Operation *Barkhane* and Task Force *Takuba* was agreed on 17 February 2022 by France and its partners, putting an end to nine years of counter-terrorism efforts⁽²⁾. This, in addition to other *coups* that have occurred in the region, has led to a fundamental reshuffle of the security architecture in the Sahel, of which Mali had been the main operational theatre. Against this backdrop, CSDP missions are confronted with a wholly new situation, including a more insecure context, hostile geopolitical actors (particularly the Wagner Group), and unfriendly state authorities.

As this volume has shown, the CPCC has allowed the EU to develop its command-and-control functions for civilian missions. Readers should now have gained a detailed understanding of why this operations headquarters was created, how it has functioned and evolved over time, and what improvements have been recommended on the basis of operational experience and learning. The last decade (2010–2020) has provided sufficient time for strategic reflection, leading to the adoption of the (first) Civilian Compact, whose aim was to help the EU to swiftly and effectively respond to existing and evolving threats and challenges. The beginning of the current decade has however exposed the EU to unprecedented geopolitical shocks: the time for strategic thinking is over, now the time has come for strategic action. For the civilian headquarters, this inevitably entails entering a new phase, by necessity rather than by choice. The Strategic Compass⁽³⁾ calls for the CPCC to be strengthened to improve its ability to plan, command and control current and future civilian missions. The scenarios outlined in chapter 8 show possible ways forward under a renewed Civilian Compact, but it will be up to policy and decision-makers to choose which architecture is best fitting for the civilian CSDP, given the declared higher level of ambition and a more

hostile environment requiring a ‘quantum leap’ forward⁽⁴⁾. The institutional memory of what the CPCC has achieved in several years of operations stands in this regard not just as a static legacy or a collection of anecdotes, but a precious and irreplaceable fund of knowledge and expertise that shapes the EU’s unique contribution to building peace and its capacity to foster resilience *vis-à-vis* geopolitical, hybrid, cyber, climate-related and future risks.

(2) ‘Mali : la France acte son retrait avec la fin de l’opération militaire “Barkhane”’, *Le Monde*, 17 February 2022.

(3) Council of the European Union, ‘A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, Doc 7371/22, Brussels, 21 March 2022, p. 28 (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf).

(4) *Ibid.*

ANNEX

**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**Brussels, 3 December 2021
(OR. en)**

9919/07

DCL 1

COPS 96

PESC 636

CIVCOM 264

RELEX 380

DECLASSIFICATION

of document: ST 9919/07 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

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Subject : Draft Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU
Civilian Operations in Crisis Management

Delegations will find attached the declassified version of the above document.

The text of this document is identical to the previous version.

**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 23 May 2007

9919/07

RESTREINT UE

COPS 96

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NOTE

From : Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

To : Political and Security Committee

Subject : Draft Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU
Civilian Operations in Crisis Management

Delegations will find attached the Draft Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management as finalised by CIVCOM.

Draft Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management

I. REFERENCES

- a. Title V of Treaty on EU;
- b. Presidency conclusions of FEIRA, NICE and GÖTEBORG;
- c. Report of the Panel on United Nations peace operations known as Brahimi Report.
- d. Doc. 6922/02 on Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Police Operations in Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management.
- e. Doc. 6923/02 on EU Concept for Police Planning.
- f. Doc. 11127/03 on Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management.
- g. Letter of SG/HR to the Heads of State and Government on Hampton Court Follow-up, dated 13 June 2006.
- h. Council Decision 2005/395/CFSP of 10 May 2005 amending Decision 2001/80/CFSP on the establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union.

II. INTRODUCTION

1. A single and identifiable chain of command is imperative for the safe and efficient conduct of any ESDP crisis management operation. It is the structure through which command instructions flow down from the political to the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and through which control is exercised by specified procedures and feedback.
2. Since 2002, the “Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU police operations” ⁽¹⁾ have been applied as a provisional command and control (C2) reference for civilian ESDP operations of any type. The actual chain of command for each civilian ESDP operation has been addressed in the Joint Action adopted by the Council.
3. Experience has shown that improvements are needed. In his letter of 13 June 2006 to the President of the European Council, the Secretary-General/High Representative put forward specific ideas for strengthening the EU’s crisis management structures, including appointing a Civilian Operation Commander to establish a clearer chain of command for civilian ESDP operations.

(1) Doc. 6922/02.

III. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

4. This paper clarifies the command and control structures in civilian ESDP crisis management operations in line with the responsibilities for each group set out in the SG/HR's letter to the President of the European Council on 13 June 2006. It sets out the functions, roles and responsibilities of the Civilian Operation Commander (CivOpCdr), who will have command and control authority over the contributions put at the disposal of civilian ESDP operations by Member States, without prejudice to the European Commission's competences in implementing the CSFP budget. This paper also seeks to render the civilian command structure more comparable with the military levels of command, thereby facilitating civil/military coordination, mutual support and coherence, where required.

IV. CONCEPT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

5. Command and Control is a complex concept. For the purpose of this document, the following three different aspects can be identified:
 - > Command and Control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated official over assigned human resources.
 - > As a process, the C2 process is a continuous "sense, assess, decide and act" cycle executed in order to accomplish an assigned mission. It is the process of issuing orders and monitoring/evaluating of the outcomes achieved. This happens through planning, organising, managing, coordinating and controlling resources (personnel, fund, equipment, etc), to achieve mission objectives. People and tools are the main components which enable the C2 process. Typically, the people are part of an operational unit and the tools are in form of integrated systems (information and technology means that can support the required level of data storage, transmission and analysis).
 - > As an architecture. The units and integrated systems are tied together by communication networks which combine to create a Command and Control Architecture.
6. These three aspects can be further developed:
 - 1) **Command status.** The authority, responsibilities and activities of an ESDP official in the direction and co-ordination of individuals, teams and units and in the implementation of orders related to the execution of civilian ESDP operations can be exercised according to the following command options:
 - a. **Full Command:** the authority and responsibility of a superior official to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of operations and administration and exists only within national services. No ESDP official has full command over the individuals, teams and units that are assigned to him through the Transfer of Authority. This is because Member States and contributing nations, in assigning those to EU, assign only operational command or control.
 - b. **Operational Command (OPCOM):** the authority assigned to an ESDP official to assign missions or tasks to subordinate officials, to deploy individuals, teams and units, to reassign them, and to retain or delegate it, as well as operational or tactical control as may be deemed

necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration and logistics. May also be used to denote the forces assigned to an ESDP official.

- c. **Operational Control (OPCON):** the authority assigned to an ESDP official to direct individuals, teams and units assigned so that he/she may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy them, and to retain or delegate operational control or tactical command or control as may be deemed necessary. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of the teams and units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.
- d. **Tactical Command (TACOM):** the authority assigned to an ESDP official to assign tasks to individuals, teams and units under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by a higher authority.
- e. **Tactical Control (TACON):** the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or actions necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

Such command and control options will have to be modulated on a case-by-case basis depending on the specific nature of each operation and/or of its components.

2) Command and Control as both a process and an architecture will aim at:

- a. Issuing orders and organising control procedures over all activities to enable the monitoring of progress and evaluation of the outcomes achieved.
- b. Defining the reporting and information exchange requirements among all actors involved in the operation to ensure the adequate flow of information. This implies reporting and information exchange within the established chain of command as well as with other external organisations to the mission (other international actors, NGOs, local authorities, etc).
- c. Identifying and ensuring the deployment of the necessary Communication and Information Systems (CIS). The mission should be provided with equipment that will guarantee the required secure, reliable and adequate Communications and Information Systems. These means should be in place in theatre of operations as early as possible. It would then facilitate the further deployment of the mission and its maximum efficiency.

V. EU CIVILIAN ESDP ARCHITECTURE

- 7. The chain of command is the succession of commanding officials from a superior to a subordinate through which command and control is exercised.
- 8. For all ESDP operations, the Council has overall responsibility in accordance with the Treaties. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises the political control and strategic direction as laid down in the Treaties and in relevant Council decisions; the various preparatory bodies, in particular CIVCOM, involved in civilian ESDP operations fulfil their advisory role to the PSC. The responsibilities of the Council and its structures, and the assignment of decisions to be taken at the various stages of preparing and launching a new operation, will remain unchanged following the appointment of a Civilian Operation Commander as described in paragraph 15.

9. When appointed, the Civilian Operation Commander, under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC and the overall authority of the SG/HR, will be the commander of the civilian ESDP operations at the strategic level (see below).
10. The Head of Mission (HoM) will exercise command and control at theatre level. The Head of Mission will be directly responsible to the Civilian Operation Commander (see below).
11. In order to ensure the coherence of the EU action in theatre, the Head of Mission shall, without prejudice to the chain of command, receive from EUSR (if appointed) local political guidance, especially with regard to matters for which the EUSR has a particular or stated role. The EUSR will not be in the chain of command of civilian ESDP operations, nor will he/she issue operation-related instructions to the HoM. EUSRs will also promote overall EU political coordination and help ensure that all EU instruments in theatre act coherently to attain the political objectives set out by the Council.
12. The respective roles and responsibilities of the Civilian Operation Commander and the Head of Mission are described below.

The Civilian Operation Commander (CivOpCdr)

13. The Civilian Operation Commander will exercise command and control at strategic level for the planning and conduct of all civilian ESDP operations under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC and the overall authority of the SG/HR. He/She will be the overall commander of all civilian Heads of Mission. He/She will report directly to the SG/HR, and through him, to the Council. Member States and third States contributing to an ESDP operation will transfer the command and control authority over their units and personnel to the Civilian Operation Commander. The full command over national personnel will remain with the National Authorities. He/she will be assisted by a COS/Deputy Civilian Operation Commander who will substitute the CivOpCdr when necessary to maintain continuity of command and control.
14. The main responsibilities of the CivOpCdr will include:
 - a. with regard to the strategic planning of civilian operations, contributing to the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) produced by DGE IX and producing the CSOs as Director of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC);
 - b. with regard to the operational planning of civilian operations, production of CONOPS and supervising production of the OPLAN;
 - c. with regard to the conduct of operations:
 - > receiving the transfer of authority of personnel, teams and units from contributing States to civilian ESDP operations through the Joint Action and taking overall responsibility for ensuring that the EU's duty of care is properly discharged in accordance with agreed Council policy, including as laid down in Doc. 9490/06;
 - > ensuring proper and effective implementation of the Council's decisions, including the PSC's decisions, also by instructions addressed as required to the Heads of Mission, so that the mission and tasks are accomplished in a manner consistent with the EU mission's objectives,

parameters and limitations (including directing their planning of security measures for personnel, assets, resources and information within the mission area);

- > providing advice and technical support to the HOM including with respect to logistics, procurement, personnel and financial aspects of the operation, in co-ordination with the European Commission as contracting authority as appropriate;
- > reporting through the SG/HR to the Council;
- > reporting to PSC and other Council bodies to keep them informed on issues within his/her area of responsibility;
- > monitoring the proper execution of the operation and being responsible for quality control;
- > relations with contributing third States on operational developments;
- > and acting as an interlocutor concerning individual civilian ESDP operations for operational purposes outside the operation area in which specific capacity he/she will serve as the main link between these operations and EU institutions, Member States and, where appropriate, other relevant parties (third states, regional and international organisations, etc); without prejudice to the competences of the crisis management directorates and to the European Commission's competences.

d. supporting the review and lessons learned processes for civilian crisis management operations.

15. The Director of the CPCC will be part of the General Secretariat of the Council under the authority of the SG/HR. He/she will direct the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) established in the General Secretariat of the Council to assist him/her in planning and conduct of the operation(s). He/she will have functional authority over planning capabilities and expertise contributed by the EUMS through the Civ/Mil Cell, and over the Watchkeeping Capability (WKC) as far as their support to civilian operations is concerned. He /she will participate in the Crisis Management Board. The joint action establishing a specific operation will include the appointment of the Director of the CPCC as Civilian Commander for that operation.

16. The Director of the CPCC will be appointed for an initial period of one year to implement the CPCC. The selection board will include the chair of the Political and Security Committee and the Secretary-General/High Representative will inform the Council of the person intended to be appointed.

Any subsequent appointment will be made by the Council at the level of deputy-director general or higher for a fixed term to ensure periodic rotation, subject to availability of a budgetary post for a temporary agent at this grade. Any selection board will include the chair of the Political and Security Committee.

The Civilian Heads of Mission (HoM)

17. Heads of Mission in theatre (appointed by Council decision) will assume responsibility and leadership of the mission in theatre. They will exercise command and control over personnel, teams and units from contributing States as assigned by the CivOpCdr together with administrative and logistic responsibility including over assets, resources and information put at the disposal

of the mission. They will coordinate as appropriate with other EU actors on the ground, including EUSRs.

18. The main responsibilities of the Head of Mission include:

- a. within the parameters set by the CONOPS and under the supervision of the CivOpCdr, developing an OPLAN to be approved by the Council;
- b. issuing instructions and orders for the effective conduct of the operation in theatre, assuming its coordination and day-to-day management, in accordance with the Command Status assigned by the CivOpCdr and defined in the Joint Action and following his/her directives, orders and instructions;
- c. being responsible for the security of the operation and for ensuring compliance with minimum security requirements applicable to the operation in line with the policy of the European Union on the security of personnel deployed outside the EU in an operational capacity under Title V of the TEU;
- d. fulfilling contractual obligations as “CFSP Special Adviser” to the European Commission regarding the implementation of the CFSP budget for the operation;
- e. reporting to the PSC and other Council bodies as directed to keep them informed on all relevant aspects of the operation;
- f. and representing the respective civilian ESDP operation in the operation area.

European Union Military Staff (EUMS) -Civ/Mil Cell

19. In accordance with its TOR, the EUMS through the Civ/Mil Cell will assist with planning, support (including the planning for a possible use of military means) and conduct of civilian ESDP operations. Moreover, the Civ/Mil Cell will provide a watch-keeping capability (WKC) in order to ensure 24/7 links with the various civilian ESDP operations and the CPCC. The WKC will be established within the OpsCentre without prejudice to its full activation for the planning and conduct of an autonomous EU military operation. Activation of the watch-keeping capability using the facilities of the OpsCentre in relation to each civilian operation should be confirmed in the respective Joint Action. It should contribute to ensuring a continuous monitoring and processing of operation-related information, consistent with the CivOpCdr's responsibilities as stated in paragraph 14 and should be available during the preparation of each civilian operation. For civilian operations, the services of the Civ/Mil Cell and the watch-keeping capability will be under the functional authority of the CivOpCdr, but will remain under the responsibility of DGEUMS.

EU Special Representative (EUSR)

20. EUSRs will provide local political guidance to the ESDP HoMs. EUSRs and the CivOpCdr will consult each other as required. The EUSR will not be in the chain of command of civilian ESDP operations.
21. EUSRs will also promote overall EU political coordination and help ensure that all EU instruments in theatre act coherently to attain the political objectives set out by the Council.

VI. EU CIVILIAN COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE

22. The chain of command is the succession of commanding officials from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. That is, a structure through which command instructions flow from the political to the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and through which control is exercised by specified procedures and feedback.
23. The EU civilian chain of command for civilian ESDP operations will be addressed in the joint action adopted by the Council. In general it can be summarised as follows:
- > Under the responsibility of the Council, the PSC shall exercise the political control and strategic direction of the civilian ESDP operations.
 - > The Civilian Operation Commander, under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC and the overall authority of the SG/HR, is the commander of the civilian ESDP operations at the strategic level.
 - > The Head of Mission (HoM) will exercise command and control at theatre level. The Head of Mission is directly responsible to the Civilian Operation Commander.
24. In order to ensure the coherence of the EU action in theatre, the Head of Mission shall, without prejudice to the chain of command, receive from EUSR local political guidance, especially with regard to matters for which the EUSR has a particular or stated role.

VII. COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE EVENT OF CO-OPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

25. The command and control structure described in this document is also designed to be applicable in an EU-led operation including some components provided by international organisations with particular expertise and experience in relevant fields. In such a case, the EU will receive the other components under OPCON, without prejudging the political decision on coordination with the other organisation. Consultations would be required between the EU and the international organisation in question.
26. Where the EU provides and leads a civilian support component to an operation led by an international organisation, the CivOpCdr will in accordance with paragraph 14 be responsible for exchanging appropriate information with the mission and exercising the necessary duty of care for EU personnel, including security measures. The Council will decide on a case by case basis on the liaison and/or command and control arrangements it wants to establish. Consultations would be required between the EU and the international organisation concerned. Based on lessons learned from past or ongoing supporting actions the Council will adopt a comprehensive EU concept with regard to supporting actions and will adopt for each specific operation clear guidelines and coordinating and reporting instructions for the Head of the support component setting

out the overall objectives of the EU support to an international organisation. These guidelines will also cover the management, safety and welfare of the EU component/personnel concerned.

27. The autonomy of decision making of the EU will in any case be respected.
28. In case of cooperation between civilian ESDP operations and an international organisation at tactical level, the role of the Head of Mission will be pivotal.

VIII. IMPLEMENTATION

29. In the light of the Council's deliberations, the selection process for the Director of the CPCC will be launched. Full implementation of the new structures will require reorganisation of existing staff (while continuing to manage existing operations) and recruitment of suitably qualified persons with the required skills and experience to fill identified gaps.
30. During the transitional phase to full implementation of the new structures, an interim operational capability will be established under the Director of the CPCC when he/she takes up appointment. Full operational capability should be achieved as soon as possible thereby allowing the CivOpCdr to exercise and assume full responsibility progressively.

ABBREVIATIONS

AU

African Union

BiH

Bosnia and Herzegovina

BIS

Budget Impact Statement

C2

Command and Control

CA

Comprehensive Approach

CAR

Central African Republic

CEPOL

European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training

CERT-EU

Computer Emergency Response Team–EU

CEUMC

Chairman of the European Union Military Committee

Cfc

Call for Contributions

CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Policy

CiLMA

Civilian Lessons Management Application

CIS

Communications and Information Systems

CivCom

Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

Civ-mil

Civil–military

CivOp(s)Cdr

Civilian Operation(s) Commander (*the plural form is used when the CivOpsCdr acts in a capacity for all Civilian CSDP Missions*)

CMC

Crisis Management Concept

CME09/CME11

Crisis Management Exercise (years 2009 and 2011)

CMPD

Crisis Management and Planning Directorate

CoE

European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management

CONOPS

Concept of Operations

COREPER

Committee of Permanent Representatives

CoS

Chief of Staff

COSI

Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security

CPCC

Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

CPCC.1

CPCC Conduct of Operations Division

CPCC.2

CPCC Chief of Staff/Horizontal Coordination Division

CPCC.2.OPHI

Operational Planning and Horizontal Issues Section

CPCC.3

CPCC Missions Personnel Division

CPCC.4

CPCC Missions Operational Support Division

CPCC.SDC

CPCC Security and Duty of Care Section

CSDP

Common Security and Defence Policy

DG

Directorate General

DGE

Directorate General External Relations

DGE IX

Directorate General for Civilian Crisis Management

DG CLIMA

DG for Climate Action

DG ECHO

DG for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

DG ENV

DG for the Environment

DGEUMS

Director General of EU Military Staff

DG HOME

DG Migration and Home Affairs

DG JUST

DG for Justice and Consumers

DG MARE

DG for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries

DG NEAR

DG for Neighbourhood and
Enlargement Negotiations

DRC

Democratic Republic of the
Congo

DSG

Deputy Secretary-General

EDA

European Defence Agency

EEAS

European External Action
Service

EEAS SG

EEAS Secretary General

ELMA

EUMS Lessons
Management Application

EPF

European Peace Facility

ESDC

European Security and
Defence College

ESDP

European Security and
Defence Policy

EU

European Union

EUAM

European Union Advisory
Mission

EUBAM

European Union Border
Assistance Mission

EUDEL

European Union
Delegation(s)

EUGS

European Union Global
Strategy

EU HQ CM

European Union
Headquarters Coordination
Meeting

EUMC

European Union Military
Committee

EUMS

European Union Military
Staff

EUPM

EU Police Mission

EUROCORPS

European Corps

EUROJUST

European Union Agency
for Criminal Justice
Cooperation

EUROPOL

European Union Agency
for Law Enforcement
Cooperation

EUSR

European Union Special
Representative

EUSSR

EU Security Sector Reform

EUTM

European Union Training
Mission

FFM

Fact-finding mission(s)

FHQ

Force Headquarters

FOC

Full Operational Capability

FPI

European Commission
Service for Foreign Policy
Instruments

Frontex

European Border and Coast
Guard Agency

HoD

Head of Delegation

HoM

Head of Mission

HQ (CPCC)

Operations Headquarters

HR

High Representative of the
European Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy

IA

Integrated Approach

IHL

International Humanitarian
Law

IMD

Initiating Military Directive

IMS

International Military staff

INTCEN

EU Intelligence and
Situation Centre

INTPA

Directorate-General for
International Partnerships

IOC

Initial Operational
Capability

ISP(D)

Integrated Approach
for Security and Peace
Directorate

ISR

Internal Support Review

IT

Information Technology

JHA

Justice and Home Affairs

JSCC

Joint Support Coordination
Cell

MAB

Mission Analysis Briefing

MAC

Mission Analytical
Capability

MENA

Middle East and North
Africa

MFF

Multiannual Financial Framework

MIP

Mission Implementation Plan

MMA

Mentoring, Monitoring and Advising

Moi

Ministry of Interior

MPCC

Military Planning and Conduct Capability

MS

Member State(s)

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDICI

Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Investment

NIP

National Implementation Plan

OHQ

Operations Headquarters

OpCdr

Operation Commander

OPLAN

Operation Plan

OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PCR

Polymerase Chain Reaction

PFCA

Political Framework for Crisis Approach

PMG

Politico–Military Group

PSC

Political and Security Committee

RACC

Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell for the Sahel

ROCTaF

Regional Organised Crime Task Force (Ukraine)

SatCen

European Union Satellite Centre

SECDEFPOL

Security and Defence Policy Directorate

SG/HR

Secretary–General/High Representative

SHAPE

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

SitCen

EU Situation Centre

SMR

Six–Monthly Report

SOP

Standard Operating Procedure

SOMA

Status of Mission Agreement

SSR

Security Sector Reform

STRATCOM

Strategic Communications

TAM

Technical Assessment Mission

TEU

Treaty on European Union

UN

United Nations

UNDPKO

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

VTC

Video–teleconference

WEU

Western European Union

WOS

Weekly Operational Summary

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

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Carina Böttcher is Special Assistant to the Executive Director at the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) and has also worked in ZIF's analysis team. Previously, she worked at the German Council on Foreign Relations, where she managed a project on the EU's civilian CSDP, and for the Federal Foreign Office with postings in Bangkok and Teheran. She has published on civilian crisis management, CSDP missions, peacekeeping and the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus.

Giovanni Faleg is a Senior Analyst at the EU-ISS, where he is responsible for analysis and research on sub-Saharan Africa. He also focuses on conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and the EU's integrated approach to conflicts and crises. He holds a PhD in European Studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and is the author of *The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Learning Communities in International Organizations* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) and *More Union in European Defence* (CEPS, 2015).

Torsten M. Hoffmann is an accomplished crisis management professional, governance and policy expert in operational analysis, strategic and operational planning. He has worked in several civilian SSR missions and military peacekeeping operations under the auspices

of the EU, NATO, UN and the World Bank in Afghanistan, the Baltic States, Kosovo, Mali, Rwanda, Serbia and Somalia. He holds a master's degree in Economics and Business Administration from the University of Turku and is currently finalising a master's degree in Civil-Military Interaction at the Helmut Schmidt University, the University of the German Federal Armed Forces.

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Birgit Loeser is a senior EU official with more than 25 years of professional experience in the EU's external and security policy (CFSP/CSDP), and is currently Head of Division MENA Regional Affairs within the European External Action Service (EEAS). Previously, she was appointed Deputy Civilian Operations Commander/Chief of Staff in the Operational Headquarters for civilian CSDP missions (CPCC). She has worked in various positions within the CSDP structures, oversaw the conceptual development of CSDP and led the operational planning of several civilian CSDP missions. She holds a master's degree in

Political Science from both the *Freie Universität Berlin* and the *Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris*.

Francisco Esteban Pérez is the Civilian Operations Commander for all EU civilian missions deployed under the umbrella of the CSDP and Director of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) at the European External Action Service. In this function, he commands the EU's 11 civilian CSDP Missions deployed on three continents. Prior to joining the EEAS in 2021, Major-General Esteban Pérez served as the Commander of the Civil Guard in Castilla-La Mancha, Spain. From 2019 to 2020, he served as Head of the Cabinet of the Director General of the Spanish Civil Guard.

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Mohamed Tabit has been Deputy Head of Division in the CPCC since 2016. He was previously political advisor to the French PSC Ambassador in Brussels in charge of crisis management from 2012 to 2016. In Paris, he occupied several cabinet positions in the

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Since its inception in 2007, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) has played a pivotal role in the evolution of the EU as a global security provider. This *Chaillot Paper* charts the development of the CPCC over the past 15 years, showing how the EU civilian HQ has adapted to cope with a growing demand for civilian CSDP deployments arising from the new challenges of a multipolar world.

Drawing on the knowledge, expertise and institutional memory of seasoned civilian planners and policymakers who are intimately familiar with the inner workings of the CPCC, the volume examines why the EU has sought to equip itself with an operations headquarters for civilian CSDP in the first place, and how it has worked in practice. It also explores what future lies ahead for the HQ, considering current geopolitical shocks and transformations, while taking into account the higher level of ambition set by the Civilian CSDP Compact and the Strategic Compass.