New bearings for EU security and defence?

By
Daniel Fiott and Gustav Lindstrom

With contributions from
Isabel Ferreira Nunes, Bastian Giegerich, Justyna Gotkowska, Volker Jacoby, Elena Lazarou, Alessandro Marrone, Jean-Pierre Maulny, Kristi Raik, Teija Tiilikainen
STRATEGIC COMPASS

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The authors

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The EUISs Chaillot Paper series

The Chaillot Paper series, launched in 1991, takes its name from the Chaillot hill in the Trocadéro area of Paris, where the Institute’s first premises were located in the building occupied by the Western European Union (WEU). The hill is particularly known for the Palais de Chaillot which was the site of the signing of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and housed NATO’s provisional headquarters from 1952 until 1959.

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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive summary</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing the EU's ability to act</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing Europe and enhancing its resilience</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investing in capabilities and technologies</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 4</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deepening the EU's partnerships</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexes</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 1 –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUISS support for the Strategic Compass process</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 2 –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questionnaire for the Chaillot Paper authors</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 3 –</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUISS Survey</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes on the contributors</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Chaillot Paper provides an in-depth analysis of European security and defence policy ahead of the adoption of the Strategic Compass in early 2022. It also offers numerous recommendations and policy considerations in support of the implementation phase of the Compass. To this end, the report combines the insights of eleven expert contributors and the results of a questionnaire sent by the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) to 120 individuals representing government-affiliated research institutions, institutions affiliated to international organisations, think tanks and universities.

The Chaillot Paper is structured along four chapters. These mirror the four baskets associated with the Strategic Compass: crisis management, resilience, capabilities and partnerships. The analysis suggests that while the EU has come a long way in the security and defence domain, there is still progress to be made and specific considerations to be taken into account.

Within the crisis management basket, the geographical regions likely to require most attention from the EU over the next ten years are the MENA region and Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Concerning planning and conduct capabilities for crisis management, survey respondents suggest that current military planning and conduct structures are not well suited to meet the threats and challenges the EU will face in the next 5 – 10 years. Specifically, just 8% of respondents agree that such structures are currently adequate. On the civilian side, 34% of respondents consider current planning and conduct structures to be well-suited. Looking ahead, greater flexibility represents an opportunity for improvement. Examples of such measures include experimenting with the use of Article 44 TEU, considering ‘scalable’ mission mandates for certain civilian missions and further leveraging opportunities offered by the newly created European Peace Facility.

In the area of resilience, several tasks are identified as the most pressing over the coming 5 – 10 years. Among those given the highest level of attention (high importance and medium importance) are countering hybrid threats, cyber defence, the protection of critical infrastructure, counter-terrorism, assistance for public health, border management, and managing the security-related effects of climate change. To promote resilience, the EU could take a broader outlook that goes beyond the common security and defence policy (CSDP). This should help better respond to threats emanating from strategic domains such as the maritime, space and cyber environments. A potential building block is to leverage existing concepts, such as the Coordinated Maritime Presences concept, to new areas such as the Indo-Pacific. More reflection is likewise needed to understand the potential applicability of Articles 42.7 TEU (‘mutual assistance clause’) and Article 222 TFEU (‘solidarity clause’). Over 90% of survey respondents agree that the EU should be prepared to support a Member State or Member States after the invocation of either clause.

Concerning capabilities, there is a recognition that EU Member States will continue to face a considerable number of civilian and military capability gaps. To develop the full spectrum of capabilities needed to meet its level of ambition in security and defence, the Strategic Compass may need to define capabilities beyond CSDP terms. Specific capability clusters that may provide the most utility to the EU over the coming 5-10 years include air capabilities (aircraft, strategic transport, tankers), enablers (space, cyber, training) and naval capabilities (frigates, submarines, and unmanned vehicles). With respect to domain areas, EU Member States are likely to need to enhance their presence at sea and in space.
Relating to space, without the modernisation and protection of the EU’s space-based capacities, there is a risk that the Union’s ability to conduct military operations, monitor arms trafficking, scout illegal maritime activity and observe environmental and climactic changes from space will be undermined.

With regard to partnerships, the Strategic Compass offers an opportunity to reassess how the Union thinks about partnerships in relation to security and defence. Survey respondents allocate the most importance to ‘using partnerships more closely with international organisations such as NATO, the UN, AU and ASEAN’ (92 % giving this high/medium importance) and ‘using partnerships to support sub-regional security integration’ (83 % assigning this high/medium importance). Overall, there is growing recognition that strategic competition impacts partnerships, so that these are seen less in transactional terms and more in line with whether partners share the same sets of values, or at least, interests. As a result, the Strategic Compass represents an opportunity to solidify and further develop the conceptualisation of partnerships towards states, international organisations, non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private sector entities.

Overall, this Chaillot Paper should be seen as one part of a broader contribution by the EUISS to the Strategic Compass process. The Institute was actively engaged with providing analytical input to the process through the organisation of workshops. Indeed, out of the approximately 50 dedicated workshops organised during the Strategic Compass dialogue phase, the Institute was responsible for co-organising 12 workshops along with 9 different EU Member States and the European External Action Service (EEAS) (see Annex I for the full range of activities). Additionally, the EUISS also supported a range of other activities through the moderation of panels, speaking engagements and direct substantive input during the Compass drafting phase.
INTRODUCTION

Over the past twenty years the European Union has enhanced its role as a security and defence actor. The EU has proven its ability to deploy civilian and military missions and operations to its near and wider neighbourhoods. Since the early 2000s, the CSDP has evolved from a political concept on paper into more than thirty civilian and military deployments. Today, the CSDP can claim its own autonomous decision-making apparatus and nascent command and control (C2) facilities. While it is true that many EU missions and operations are conducted in relatively low-intensity environments, deployments are varied and tackle a range of tasks such as capacity building, military training, border monitoring and naval operations (1).

Since 2016, and beyond CSDP missions and operations, the Union has intensified work on a broader set of security and defence tools that include capability development and defence–industrial policy (2). For example, today the EU can finance and develop military capabilities to support the European defence industry. The EU is also investing in dual-use transport infrastructure to facilitate military mobility across Europe. What is more, the EU is generating the capacities required to counter hybrid threats such as the manipulation of the information environment, attacks and disturbances against critical infrastructure and election interference. Bridging its efforts between security and defence and justice and home affairs also allows the EU to address cross-border security concerns such as cyber-attacks and the instrumentalisation of irregular migration and borders.

The EU has, therefore, sought to build on CSDP with a broader EU security and defence policy that moves beyond crisis management and capacity building. Such a shift reflects the evolving and intensifying threats facing the EU. In 2021 alone, the Union has had to contend with forced irregular migration into the EU facilitated by Belarus and an air hijacking over EU airspace, further deteriorating ties with Russia, war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the international response to the Covid–19 pandemic, tensions with Turkey, strained trade and investment relations with China, conflict in the Sahel, the withdrawal from Afghanistan and more. This is not even to speak of concerns about the transatlantic relationship, with Washington focusing on China and the Indo–Pacific. The climate and digital transitions equally pose major security concerns for the EU.

The weight of such threats, risks and challenges calls for a robust and sustained diplomatic and security effort by the EU. CSDP alone cannot be the answer as it largely addresses crisis management tasks and does not exploit the full potential of the EU’s foreign, security and defence tools. What is more, the EU is also trying to make sense of the insecure world around it with a narrative that galvanises the efforts of institutions, Member States and citizens. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security and Vice-President of the European Commission...

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The EU Threat Analysis is novel in that it was a revision or a replacement of the EU Global Strategy, even if it will update how the EU understands the world it inhabits. In fact, one of the key and novel features of the Strategic Compass is that it is based on a classified intelligence EU Threat Analysis (5). Unlike the EU Global Strategy, the Compass process began in November 2020 when the EU Intelligence Centre (INTECEN), the EU Military Staff (EUMS) intelligence branch and national intelligence agencies assessed the strategic risks facing the Union today and how they would evolve in the decade leading up to 2030.

This is where the EU’s Strategic Compass is supposed to come in. Part strategy, part action plan, the Strategic Compass will provide greater direction for the Union’s efforts in security and defence out to 2030. It will do this by providing an account of the strategic environment of the EU and defining key deliverables that need to be achieved over the next ten years. The Compass should not be seen as a revision or a replacement of the EU Global Strategy, even if it will update how the EU understands the world it inhabits. In fact, one of the key and novel features of the Strategic Compass is that it is based on a classified intelligence EU Threat Analysis (5).

The EU Threat Analysis is novel in that it was not a politically agreed document, and EU Member States did not have the opportunity to dispute or amend (by toning down or removing) the conclusions of intelligence officers. While the document remains classified, we have a general overview of the scope of the threats facing the EU. Indeed, the Threat Analysis differentiated between three sorts of threats: global, regional and state/non-state led. At the global level, the Threat Analysis identified economic rivalry, resource dependencies, migratory pressures and military force as the major threats facing the EU. In particular, the Threat Analysis stated that regional powers will attempt to exploit the fragilities of certain states and the spill-over effects of crisis situations. Lastly, the Threat Analysis outlined how state and non-state actors are using unconventional or hybrid tactics such as information operations, terrorism and disruptive technologies to undermine the Union’s security (6).

The Threat Analysis therefore not only set the parameters of the Strategic Compass process but it also updated the strategic assessment embedded in the EU Global Strategy, which already assumed that the EU was under threat (7). More accurately, if the Global Strategy can be likened to a ‘national security strategy’, then the Compass can be seen as a sort of ‘White Book’ on security and defence. In any case, the Strategic Compass was initiated to provide greater clarity on an implementation plan that

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derived from the Global Strategy (8). Specifically, the Compass has to provide a detailed account of how the EU will secure the level of ambition on security and defence that it agreed in November 2016. This level of ambition called for the EU to be better at responding to crises, engaging in capacity building and protecting Europe and Europeans. The Council Conclusions in which this level of ambition was outlined never quite articulated how the Union should achieve these tasks (9).

The Strategic Compass document should be adopted by the European Council in March 2022, and it will be implemented by the EU and its Member States by 2030. On 15 November 2021, HR/VP Borrell presented the first draft of the Compass to EU defence ministers. While the document has still not been endorsed by EU Member States, the HR/VP’s foreword to the draft indicated that concrete policy ideas had been presented to governments aimed at ensuring that the Union can act more quickly and decisively when facing crises, secure EU citizens against fast-changing threats, invest in the capabilities and technologies that the EU needs and partner with others to achieve common goals (10). Until the end of February 2022, EU Member States will be able to make substantive contributions to the draft document. Based on this feedback, the HR/VP will be expected to deliver two re-drafts of the Compass in early 2022.

Indeed, the draft delivered in mid-November 2021 is supposed to stimulate EU Member States into thinking about whether existing EU tools and approaches in security and defence are fit-for-purpose in tackling the threats outlined by the EU’s intelligence actors. The few months until March 2022 may seem like a slim timeframe in which to provide feedback on the first draft, but in fact EU Member States have been engaged with the drafting process since at least February 2021. Based on a series of scoping papers prepared by the EEAS, Member States were engaged in a ‘dialogue phase’ between February and October 2021 where they drafted over 25 non-papers and organised approximately 50 workshops on various aspects of EU security and defence (see Annex 1 on page 52). Member States are, therefore, well-prepared for the remaining months of negotiating the Strategic Compass text.

Nevertheless, with the remaining few months of negotiation left there is a need to couple the reflections of EU Member States and the EEAS with the views of the research and analysis community. This is essential as the Compass is likely to define the shape of CSDP and EU security and defence for the coming decade (11). Indeed, this Chaillot Paper is designed to provide the EU Member States and EEAS with further views on the strategic threats facing the EU and what more the Union can do to address them. The HR/VP’s foreword to the Compass already indicates that the EU must ready itself for greater global strategic competition and it must also rethink how it conducts itself as a crisis manager and capacity builder (12). There is, therefore, a clear need to be more concrete in the ways that the Union can protect Europe and Europeans. The Chaillot Paper addresses these themes by drawing together the expertise of various think tank and research analysts from across the EU, and it complements the findings with the results of a survey conducted by the EU Institute for Security Studies in February–April 2021.

More specifically, this Chaillot Paper informs the Strategic Compass process through four questions that are inspired by the framework of the ‘dialogue phase’ that began in February
2021 and ended in October 2021. During this phase, the EEAS and EU Member States agreed to divide the reflection process into four ‘baskets’: (1) crisis management; (2) resilience; (3) capabilities; and (4) partnerships. Clearly, it is rather artificial to separate each of these baskets when thinking about EU security and defence. Furthermore, it is also clear that the baskets on crisis management and resilience are action-oriented, whereas the baskets on capabilities and partnerships can be considered as the means needed to ensure that the Union is resilient and a more effective crisis manager. Nonetheless, for the purposes of providing an analysis that is focused and structured it makes sense to follow the same framework used during the dialogue phase of the Compass.

Accordingly, the four questions that this Chaillot Paper addresses are:

1. **Crisis management**: How should the EU adapt its civilian and military missions and operations between 2021 and 2030? In what ways can they be adapted to address the global, regional and state/non-state threats identified by the EU Threat Analysis?

2. **Resilience**: What does resilience mean in the context of the threats facing the Union? How can the EU strengthen its resilience with security and defence instruments?

3. **Capabilities**: What critical capability gaps does the EU need to fill over the next 5–10 years? Are there specific technologies and programmes that should be prioritised?

4. **Partnerships**: How should the EU conceive of partnerships in security and defence and is there room to reframe how the Union thinks about strategic partnerships?

In addition to the contributions of the 11 authors, this Chaillot Paper benefits from an anonymous survey that was conducted by the EUISS in February 2021. The online survey composed of 21 multiple choice and open-ended questions was sent to over 120 individuals from think tanks and universities based in the EU (see Annex 3 on page 54 for the questions). Overall, 76 individuals responded to the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 63%. Out of this number, 23 individuals represented government-affiliated research institutions, 6 international organisation-affiliated research institutions and 47 independent think tanks or universities. The initial 120 invitees were selected on the basis of a geographical and gender balance, as well as their expertise in the field of EU security and defence. No government or EU officials were surveyed in order to avoid any institutional bias. The survey responses are found in each chapter: multiple choice answers are represented in the form of visuals, and open-ended question responses can be found in clearly marked boxes.
ENHANCING THE EU’S ABILITY TO ACT

The Strategic Compass will have to establish how the EU can continue to be an effective crisis manager and capacity builder in the years leading up to 2030. Crisis management and capacity building are at the core of the EU’s security and defence policy and the Union can already draw on a 20-year experience of civilian and military deployments outside the territory of the EU. Today, the EU deploys land and naval personnel to geographical states and areas such as the Central African Republic, the Horn of Africa, Ukraine and more. In this sense, the EU continues to plan and conduct crisis operations and capacity building missions in line with the ‘Petersberg Tasks’ (1), the Illustrative Scenarios (2) and the Headline Goals. These guiding principles underline that the EU should be able to effectively undertake tasks such as peace enforcement, rescue and evacuation, combat operations, civilian assistance and more. At a basic level, the Strategic Compass offers an opportunity to reassess the feasibility and necessity of such tasks in light of the threats identified by the EU Threat Analysis (3).

In this respect, the Compass has to show in more detail how the Union will deliver on the level of ambition in security and defence that was set after the EU Global Strategy. As a first step, there is a need to grapple with the concept of ‘permissiveness’ and CSDP operations and missions (4). Indeed, the Union has become accustomed to deploying missions and operations in relatively low-intensity environments. This implied a high-level of permissiveness where the EU’s political objectives could be achieved without incurring severe political costs (e.g. loss of life or capabilities in theatre). However, today EU deployments operate in a more hostile strategic environment with the presence of strategic competitors and tactics such as disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks (5). The Compass offers a chance to think about how existing and future CSDP missions and operations can withstand such pressures.

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(1) The ‘Petersberg Tasks’ can be found in Article 43(1) of the TEU and they include: (1) joint disarmament operations; (2) humanitarian and rescue tasks; (3) military advice and assistance tasks; (4) conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks; and (5) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

(2) There are five Illustrative Scenarios: (1) peace enforcement; (2) conflict prevention; (3) stabilisation and support for capacity building; (4) rescue and evacuation; and (5) humanitarian assistance.


(4) Fiott, D., ‘As you were? The EU as an evolving military actor’, in The CSDP in 2020: The EU’s legacy and ambition in security and defence, op.cit., pp.110–123.

However, there is a need to think about the terms ‘crisis management’ and ‘capacity building’ in more detail (6). For example, the Compass affords the opportunity to question what tasks like peace enforcement or stabilisation mean in a world marked by greater strategic competition. The Union is used to responding to land-based crisis situations, but we should ask whether threats on the high seas or climate change would necessitate an EU crisis response. Additionally, we can ask whether capacity building should extend to developing maritime security and counter hybrid threat capacities in partner countries rather than police or judicial reform. In this sense, the Compass could paint a clearer picture of what the EU understands by crisis management and capacity building today.

The task of this first chapter is to reflect on the ways in which the EU’s civilian and military operations and missions should be adapted by 2030 given the global, regional and state/non-state threats identified by the EU Threat Analysis. To this end, this chapter is divided into three main sections. First, it looks at the geographical focus of CSDP and asks how the EU should adapt its crisis management and capacity building tools in light of the evolving threats in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods. Second, the chapter shows the ways in which the EU can use its crisis management and capacity building tools to respond to strategic competition. Finally, the chapter argues that the Strategic Compass has to find ways of incentivising the commitment of EU Member States to CSDP.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL CONTOURS OF EU CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

The prioritisation of threats will always be politically sensitive, especially if it is perceived that the interests of certain EU Member States are given precedence over collectively defined interests. While it is natural to expect that EU Member States will want the Strategic Compass document to reflect their particular interests and countries or regions of concern, the Strategic Compass will have to grapple with the full spectrum of threats facing the Union – regardless of where they emanate from. Prioritising one particular region would be to fail to understand the geographically interconnected nature of the threats, risks and challenges facing the EU today. As revealed by the survey conducted for this Chaillot Paper, the responses clearly show that the EU needs to respond to crises unfolding along both its immediate eastern and southern borders (see Figure 1). The results show that the EU is expected to, first and foremost, focus on its immediate eastern and southern neighbourhoods. Among the eight geographical regions listed as response categories, MENA came at the top, with 62 % of respondents assigning the region ‘high importance’ for future civilian and military crisis management deployments over the next ten years. At the other end of the spectrum was Latin America and the Caribbean, to which most respondents (87 %) assigned low importance.

For example, the Western Balkans is fragile and there is a need for the Union to develop its strategic presence in the region. Put in the starkest of terms, the EU cannot rule out a full-blown crisis in the region given

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tensions between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, the rise of nationalistic sentiment, deepening economic precarity, the pandemic, organised crime, migration and interference by Russia, China and Turkey. The Western Balkans represents the EU’s soft underbelly and faces numerous challenges such as illegal trafficking in goods and persons, irregular migration flows, organised crime and radicalisation. Additionally, the EU needs a more coherent and responsive strategy for the Baltic Sea region, the Black Sea region and the Arctic. These are geographical areas that are increasingly in the sights of authoritarian states.

The eastern neighbourhood is also facing substantial security challenges that stem from protracted conflict with Russia and Belarus. Rising political instability, hybrid threats, irregular migration, organised crime and the smuggling of weapons, people and narcotics pose direct risks to the EU. The events in Belarus, where people from the Middle East are brought to the country and forcibly taken to the border with Lithuania and Poland, is indicative of the type of tactic being used by hostile outside actors. The regime in Belarus is
instrumentalising irregular migration to undermine the EU’s borders in a bid to countermand the EU’s support for the pro-democratic opposition in Belarus. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries require a sustained and long-term approach to crisis management by the EU, even though action in this region is severely constrained by geopolitical considerations (7). While it is unlikely that the EU would get involved in military operations in the region, especially if it means confronting Russia, Moscow remains a threat on the EU’s borders and this means that the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) need to jointly deter Russia from potential aggression. The southern neighbourhood is also witnessing increased fragility due to protracted conflict. Without persistent engagement by the EU in North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East the Union’s economic interests are likely to be damaged. The spill-over effects of terrorism, irregular migration and climate change (8) are likely to create security challenges for the EU, especially in the ongoing context of the Covid–19 pandemic (9). Migatory flows of people might be manageable with proper investment in border control and a more coherent EU migration policy, but irregular migration may still give rise to internal social pressures and divisive political narratives. Yet, any enhanced presence in the southern neighbourhood should consider the EU’s relatively poor track-record in the region. The EU has had limited direct involvement in crises in Iraq, Syria and Yemen and its approach in Libya is based on a marginal local footprint — e.g. the EU border assistance mission is still largely operating from Tunisia.

The experiences of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 are likely to create a long shadow over the Union’s crisis management and capacity-building efforts in the southern neighbourhood. Not only does the example of Afghanistan point to the continued capability gaps in airlift that the European armed forces still face, but it has opened up a question about the nature of why Europeans should engage in crisis management in the first place. Of course, weariness with the Afghanistan stabilisation operation was already evident before the US-led extraction (10). Nevertheless, the experiences since Afghanistan in places such as Mali have certainly emboldened the view that military intervention might be too high a price to pay without clear political ambitions and will to stay in a theatre for a prolonged period of time (perhaps even indefinitely). One of the tasks of the Strategic Compass should therefore be to explain why it is necessary for the EU to engage in places like the Sahel. What is more, if the Compass sees engagement in such places as a fundamental necessity, then it needs to be clear about the capabilities required to undertake and sustain such engagement.

Despite the experiences of Afghanistan, the survey results in Figure 2 underline the continued appetite for robust military operations in semi- or non-permissive environments. Nearly 3 in 4 respondents identified joint crisis management operations in situations of high

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security risk in the region surrounding the EU as the most pressing task identified in the November 2016 Council Conclusions. In addition, even though the survey was conducted before the recent events in Afghanistan unfolded, there remains an interest in operations where the EU could field forces, capabilities and technologies that can ensure force protection and enhanced military intelligence. Of course, any level of ambition in security and defence requires that EU Member States make ready capabilities and personnel. For example, the EU Battlegroups (EUBG) have never been used by the Member States. A deployable force – even if highly capable – means little if there is no political appetite to deploy it.

Despite the obvious point about the relationship between capabilities and political will, the open questions posed in the survey gave rise to numerous responses on crisis response tools. Not only were there calls for the Headline Goal to be updated and for the EUBG concept to be overhauled, but the Union was urged to create rapidly deployable forces similar to the French Foreign Legion model and to create a European Special Forces Command. Going further, EUISS survey respondents suggested that the EU should establish a usable standing, high-readiness, force package under a single EU command that would respond to the full spectrum of operations.

Alternatively, when thinking about the Union’s future force capacities – e.g. the EUBGs or a ‘Rapid Deployment Capacity’ –, Member States should not neglect the fact that the EU has a comparative advantage in civilian action. In this sense, the EU needs to continue to prioritise security sector reform (SSR), as well as become more ambitious with regard to Demobilisation, Disarmament and Rehabilitation (DDR) in its CSDP actions. The Union needs to continue to address the full conflict cycle but this will require substantial improvements in the way the EU engages in and supports dialogue, mediation, mentoring and strategic advice. A renewed approach would promote greater local ownership of security and development processes through CSDP missions, and enhance the EU’s processes of

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**FIGURE 2** | Given the possible evolution of threats over the next 5-10 years, which are the most pressing civilian and military tasks identified by the Council Conclusions of 1 November 2016 (14149/16)?

% of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Description</th>
<th>% of Respondents</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint crisis management operations in situations of high security risk in the regions surrounding the EU</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian capacity building and security sector reform missions (monitoring, mentoring and advising, training <em>inter alia</em> on police, rule of law, border management, counter-terrorism, resilience, response to hybrid threats, and civil administration as well as civilian monitoring missions)</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime security or surveillance operations, including longer term in the vicinity of Europe</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian and military rapid response, including military rapid response operations <em>inter alia</em> using the EU Battlegroups as a whole or within a mission-tailored Force package</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint stabilisation operations, including air and special operations</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military capacity building through advisory, training, and mentoring missions, including robust force protection if necessary, as well as military monitoring/observation missions.</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air security operations including close air support and air surveillance</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitution/executive civilian missions</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

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engagement with host governments, civil society and private actors\(^{(12)}\).

**Survey recommendation 2**

The Strategic Compass needs to articulate why the EU should be engaged in the eastern and southern neighbourhoods. Drawing on the experiences of Afghanistan, the EU Member States should outline why they believe engagement in places like the Sahel is critical for European security. In addition, there is a need to reflect on the mandates for CSDP missions and operations and to ascertain whether they deliver on enhancing the security of Europeans and citizens based in host nations. Furthermore, it may be necessary for the EU Member States to consider the potential exit strategies involved in certain crises. While there are fundamental differences between the security dynamics in Afghanistan and say the Sahel – not least because the Sahelian countries actively invited the Union to deploy – there is clearly a need to plan in case the EU needs to leave a theatre in a less than orderly fashion. Finally, if there is no EU appetite to deploy CSDP military missions and operations to respond to crisis situations, then the Union needs a more coherent strategy for deploying non-military tools such as law enforcement, technical support and intelligence cooperation.

Furthermore, the Compass could more concretely address how CSDP can be used to ensure the Union’s maritime security. Building on its existing efforts, the EU will need to continue to focus on the Mediterranean Sea and African waters such as the Gulf of Guinea, the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Aden, Persian Gulf, the Swahili Coast and the Mozambique Channel. These maritime areas in Africa are closely linked to the security of transported goods, organised crime, piracy and illegal human trafficking and local and international terrorism. What is more, climate change-related conflict and challenges are seen as two particular areas of concern in Africa and the Arctic but drought, forest fires and unexpected meteorological events such as floods and tornadoes hit Europe directly too. In this respect, the EU needs to be better prepared to tackle climate- and health-related crises that may also help give rise to hybrid threats.

**Survey recommendation 3**

To better embed maritime security in CSDP, the Strategic Compass should further strengthen the Union’s coastguard and border functions and invest in naval capabilities that can enable the EU to contribute to free and open access to maritime routes, engage in rescue and evacuation efforts and protect overseas territories and EU citizens in key maritime areas. Building on the EU’s Maritime Security*, Arctic** and Indo-Pacific Strategies, the Union needs to factor in the potentially devastating effects of climate change for coastal and littoral communities and increased demand from partners for an EU response to climate crises.


Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

GEARING UP CSDP TO RESPOND TO STRATEGIC COMPETITION

According to many survey respondents, the Compass will need to address how growing strategic competition may hamper its efforts for prolonged and deeper engagement in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods. Strategic competition will be a growing issue for the EU as it plans for crisis management and capacity building missions and operations. As the survey results in Figure 3 show, those individuals polled were split on the relevance of the ‘Petersberg Tasks’ to meet the geopolitical challenges facing the EU in the years leading up to 2030. Strategic competitors such as Russia, China and Turkey are also present in the EU’s southern and eastern neighbourhoods and they are looking to fill strategic vacuums along the Union’s borders, even if the tactics they employ to do so vary. Russia and China are both pursuing geopolitical and economic interests in a growing number of states, and the risk of poorly concealed proxy wars is rising. This implies that the EU has to better integrate counter-hybrid threat strategies and capacities in its missions and operations. Many of these hybrid threats are transboundary and trans-sectoral in nature and they serve as a major common denominator in the threat perceptions of EU Member States.

Competitors such as Russia are effectively interested in changing ‘facts on the ground’, to make it harder for the EU to exert its interests and values and to buy political leverage vis-à-vis the Union. Libya, Syria, Belarus and Ukraine are noteworthy examples of where Russia exerts malign influence to undermine legitimate governments and instrumentalise borders and information in order to make it harder for the EU to pursue peace and stabilisation efforts. Turkey has also used a mixture of border politics, information manipulation and provocative maritime actions to undermine security in the Eastern Mediterranean. Additionally, the potential for conflict with China over its growing presence and geopolitical strategies in Europe, Eastern Asia, the Middle East and Africa (e.g. the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative) should not be taken lightly either. Here, the EU is facing a conflict over narratives with China and it is confronted with the proliferation of Chinese political norms, which are actively supported by Beijing’s state-backed commercial operators in countries close to the Union.

Even though CSDP should grapple with strategic competition and more hostile environments, it is clear that the EU has the ambition to secure its interests beyond its immediate

neighbourhoods. In particular, HR/VP Borrell’s foreword to the Compass already makes clear that the Union should protect its interests on the high seas, cyberspace and outer space.\(^{(14)}\) As Figure 1 earlier indicated, one obvious area where this increasingly applies is the Indo-Pacific where China is becoming more assertive. Developments in the Indo-Pacific are likely to have a direct effect on the EU’s economic prosperity and security, as well as the Union’s partnership with the United States. Maintaining access to vital resources such as energy, raw materials, pharmaceuticals and technological components such as micro-chips is vital for the EU’s economic prosperity. For example, China, Indonesia, Japan and Australia amount to 11% of the EU’s import dependence as a value of total intra- and extra-EU imports, but this relatively small amount includes critical supplies such as base metals and ores that are still concentrated in the hands of these countries.\(^{(15)}\)

However, if the EU is going to adapt its crisis management and capacity building tools to be better prepared for strategic competition, there is a need to reflect on the current state of the Union’s C2 capacities. Even though the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) has been developed to enhance the EU’s military C2 capacities, the reality is that years after its establishment it still does not have a full complement of staff or resources to undertake its tasks properly.\(^{(16)}\) As the results of the survey show, 80% of respondents strongly disagree or disagree that the Union’s

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\(^{(14)}\) ‘A Strategic Compass to make Europe a security provider’, op.cit.

\(^{(15)}\) Fiott, D. and Theodosopoulos, V., ‘Sovereignty over supply? The EU’s ability to manage critical dependences while engaging with the world’, Brief No 21, EUISS, December 2020, p. 4 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/sovereignty-over-supply).

\(^{(16)}\) ‘Marching to where? The operational dimension of the EU Strategic Compass’, Workshop Report, EU Institute for Security Studies and the Clingendael Institute, 28 April 2021 (https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/marching-where-operational-dimension-eu-strategic-compass).
The Strategic Compass should outline how the EU Member States will dedicate the appropriate level of capacities to the MPCC and CPCC. Such a measure should be accompanied with a clearer understanding of the C2 tasks that should be undertaken by the MPCC and CPCC. If the Union is to respond through civil and military action to strategic competition then the MPCC and CPCC may need to be adapted. For example, the MPCC could become a fully-fledged EU headquarters for the C2 of all CSDP executive and non-executive missions and operations. By 2030, it should also be given responsibilities for C2 of all EU live military exercises and the conduct of an EU operation on the high-seas.

The risk with the Strategic Compass is that the MPCC will be given a greater mandate, while still lacking essential personnel, technical systems and equipment.

Short of the idea of merging the MPCC and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the EU could redouble its efforts to improve MPCC–CPCC coordination. This can already be achieved by enhancing the Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC). As far as civilian planning and conduct structures are concerned, respondents to the survey were also unconvinced that civilian structures were fit-for-purpose for the threats the EU is confronted with (see Figure 5). Specifically, a minority 22% of respondents agreed that the CPCC is well-suited to address forthcoming threats and challenges. In this respect, the CPCC also needs to evolve in light of the many challenges facing the Union, particularly when it comes to countering hybrid threats and developing capacity in areas such as cybersecurity and countering disinformation. Although the Civilian CSDP Compact already acknowledges such needs (17), the Compass is nevertheless an ideal vehicle through which to reinforce this need and to create linkages with the MPCC in this regard.
CHAPTER 1 | Enhancing the EU’s ability to act

INCENTIVISING ENGAGEMENT IN EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND ENHANCING FLEXIBILITY

One of the core challenges facing the Strategic Compass in the area of crisis management is how to bridge intentions with action. Even though the Compass may outline an ambitious plan of action for the Union in the years leading up to 2030, greater commitment on the side of Member States to deploy and consider the potential use of force is required. One way of generating greater interest in CSDP is to ensure that missions and operations contribute to securing European interests. Indeed, one of the chief reasons why CSDP has remained marginal in the minds of national capitals over the past twenty years has been that it does not tackle the core security interests of a majority of Member States. Without CSDP evolving beyond a limited crisis management tool for low-intensity environments, national defence planners cannot be expected to commit to EU security and defence beyond the present level of engagement.

Disagreement between the EU Member States is perceived as the major reason for a lack of progress under CSDP, but it is also true that several EU governments view CSDP as an inflexible policy tool. Decision-making can be slow and mandates and financing may be contested under the unanimity principle, so some Member States are forced to launch missions and operations outside of the EU framework. Initiatives such as Operation Agénon (EMASOH) or the Takuba Task Force are good examples. Of course, such deployments still contribute significantly to European security but they are deemed more flexible than CSDP deployments. For example, in the case of

The Strategic Compass should experiment with using Article 44 TEU to allow willing and able EU Member States to conduct specific missions and operations or indeed specific taskings within existing CSDP mandates. The use of Article 44 TEU could allow Member States to use CSDP and the EU’s broader crisis management toolbox, while also playing to their specific geographical concerns and comparative advantages. Furthermore, more frequent exercises at the EU level could allow not only for greater buy-in to CSDP on the part of EU Member States, but exercises could also be used to draw in partners. Given that there is no consensus on the use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)* for EU foreign and security policy, Article 44 TEU might provide a pragmatic and flexible legal basis for action.

EMASOH Denmark was able to join, whereas it has an opt-out from military CSDP and does not participate in military CSDP operations. Of course, it is not inconceivable that such missions and operations could better connect with CSDP deployments (e.g. EMASOH and EU-NAVFOR Atalanta), but before this can happen there is a need to reflect on the political parameters and possibilities of CSDP.

In this respect, it is necessary to think about how the EU framework can be made more flexible while offering willing and able Member States the opportunity to make use of the Union’s broader security and defence toolbox (18). Greater flexibility should not be read as a means by which a minority of Member States — however big — can shape EU security and defence to their own particular national interests and agendas. A certain degree of operational flexibility and scalability could certainly enhance commitment to EU missions and operations over the next 5–10 years. Greater flexibility may also further advance an EU integrated approach by bringing together military and civilian CSDP bodies and policies with Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), finance, health and economic ministries from across the EU.

Flexibility will also be key if the EU wants to partner with NATO or the US on specific civil and military engagements. First, a clear-eyed approach to the types of missions and operations that NATO allies do not want to undertake could be a basis for the EU to step up its contribution to transatlantic burden-sharing. Second, the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements could be further improved to enhance EU and NATO decision-making. However, one challenge is that the consensus rule in NATO leads to decisions to block the use of command, control and planning capabilities. Short of an agreement in this regard, a group of willing EU Member States could focus on developing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects that enable autonomous C2 capabilities and the ‘EUFOR CROC’ project in PESCO could serve this end. Finally, there is also a need to ensure that new financial instruments such as the European Peace Facility (19) (EPF) contribute to common operational costs.

Additionally, flexible and scalable mission mandates are of relevance for civilian CSDP engagements. Such mandates could allow the EU to enhance its adaptability to crises, and these mandates could be translated into scalable operations with an increased focus on smaller-scale efforts such as mixed or specialised teams. In line with the principles

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of the Civilian CSDP Compact, scalable and flexible mandates and smaller specialised missions and operations could enhance the Union's capacity to act. This method can only be effective, however, if missions are planned in accordance with a comprehensive conflict analysis, in full cooperation with the host government. Furthermore, there is also a need to ensure close coordination between the Council of the EU, the EEAS, EU Delegations, JHA actors such as Frontex, Europol and Eurojust and host governments. The European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management could play a role in enhancing such coordination.

Striving towards a genuine EU integrated approach to crises and conflict would be beneficial, as it would allow Member States to dedicate personnel and resources that go beyond contributions purely in military or security terms. Broadening the scope of the integrated approach could allow EU Member States to draw on civil or private services for medical care, logistics and transportation, especially given that only a handful of Member States have these capacities under national control. In relation to civilian missions, it is imperative to continue to involve ministries of the interior and justice in planning and recruitment. Here, EU financial instruments such as the Trust Funds or the Neighbourhood, Development and International Co-operation Instrument (NDICI) will remain vital for improving local ownership and resilience.
CHAPTER 2

SECURING EUROPE AND ENHANCING ITS RESILIENCE

If the first chapter focused on how the Compass can realign the Union’s approach to crises and capacity building outside the EU, then this chapter on resilience addresses the threats that directly affect the Union. The notion of ‘resilience’ is not new for the EU. Indeed, back in 2012 the EU framed resilience as an ability to withstand, adapt to and recover from shocks and stresses but the Union largely applied this definition to challenges such as food security and climate change (1). The EU Global Strategy took this understanding a step further by referring to resilience as ‘the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises’ (2). In this sense, the Global Strategy broadened the scope of the definition to include challenges such as democratic health and sustainable development as well as including individuals – and not just states – in resilience strategies.

The EU Global Strategy underlined the fact that resilience covers security threats that emanate from outside the Union, which can cause significant damage on the territory of the EU (3). Following the Global Strategy, the EU further developed its concept of resilience and was more specific about the areas that should be included in the Union’s resilience building strategies. These included economic resilience, climate change, environmental degradation, migration and forced displacement, critical infrastructure protection, energy security, civil protection, health risks, cybersecurity and hybrid threats (4). This broadening of the concept of resilience fits with the EU’s Security Union Strategy from 2020, which adds to the wide set of issues that could challenge the EU’s resilience including terrorism, technology production and supply chain resilience (5).

Clearly, the growing reach of the term ‘resilience’ is being driven by security threats. For example, the experience of Russia’s illegal seizure of Crimea had the catalysing effect of pushing the EU and NATO closer together, but it also meant that the Union developed tools to counter disinformation, boost its cybersecurity, protect critical infrastructure, enhance border protection and more. There have also been attempts to directly influence democratic

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elections and processes in the EU (6). Terrorist incidents and cyberattacks on the Union’s territory have also given rise to the same tools. Furthermore, the rise of global powers such as China has intensified the Union’s focus on critical supply chain security and it has led to the need to better protect key technologies (7). The Covid–19 pandemic has also raised fundamental questions about security of supply of strategic resources and equipment (8).

In the context of the Strategic Compass, however, it is necessary to build on these notions with a clearer understanding of how resilience specifically relates to the security and defence of the Union. This is not an easy task because, as we have already seen, the concept of resilience is broad and constantly moving (9). What is needed, therefore, is a plan of action for how the EU will develop an integrated approach to ensuring its resilience across multiple domains located across the internal-external security nexus (10). One of the key dimensions likely to be tackled by the Compass is hybrid threats such as foreign manipulation of information and cybersecurity, but the Compass is also likely to address technology dependencies and the security of strategic domains such as maritime, air, outer-space and cyber environments (11).

This second chapter asks what resilience means in the context of the threats facing the Union and how best the EU can use its security and defence instruments to strengthen its resilience. To this end, the chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section looks at the main areas of resilience that could be tackled by the Strategic Compass. More specifically, the section looks at the need to counter hybrid threats, deal with climate and environmental crises and protect the global commons. The second section then focuses on the EU’s response capacities through the mutual assistance (Article 42.7 of the Treaty of the EU) and solidarity (Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) treaty provisions. It contends that the Compass can bolster the Union’s resilience through enhanced intelligence capacities and exercises.

SCOPING OUT OF THE CONTOURS OF RESILIENCE IN THE COMPASS

While it is likely that resilience will remain the primary task of national governments, it is worth considering what role the EU should play in assisting them during crises and shocks. Accordingly, based on the EU Threat Analysis conducted at the end of 2020 it seems

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(11) ‘A Strategic Compass to make Europe a security provider – A Foreword’, op.cit.
reasonable to expect the Compass to address the following challenges to the Union’s resilience: (1) managing critical supply and climate threats; (2) countering terrorism and hybrid threats; and (3) ensuring the security of interests and infrastructure in the maritime, space and cyber domains. Each of these areas may not necessarily require a military response but this only makes it more challenging for the EU to develop actions for resilience. As the HR/VP has remarked in his foreword to the first draft of the Compass, ‘the tools of power are not only soldiers, tanks and planes but also disinformation, cyber-attacks, the instrumentalisation of migrants, the privatisation of armies and the political control of sensitive technologies or rare earths’ (12).

The first major area of resilience is critical supply. In this respect, being able to manage scarce resources in times of emergencies is an area where demonstrating an EU added-value is possible. The EU’s initial reaction to the pandemic, however, reveals that there is some way to go here. Learning from the gaps in the supply of medical equipment should serve as an important lesson for potential shortages of military equipment and supply shortages during times of crisis. The Compass should make clear that the EU Member States need to better manage critical supplies during health crises and conflict and war, including the provision of basic food supplies and secure critical supply chains. Again, the EU has the policy and financial resources to address these types of vulnerabilities but there is still no coherent system in place to ensure EU-wide supply in times of crisis.

### Survey recommendation 9

Prepositioned stockpiles and earmarked financial resources can be among the practical means to make European responses more robust during complex crises, although there is a need to identify what specific capabilities would be required for particular tasks at any given time. In particular, the EU could attempt to set its own standards and minimum thresholds and to develop verification mechanisms to ensure that EU Member States are prepared to back up systems for energy, water and cyber infrastructures.

The first major area of resilience is critical supply. In this respect, being able to manage scarce resources in times of emergencies is an area where demonstrating an EU added-value is possible. The EU’s initial reaction to the pandemic, however, reveals that there is some way to go here. Learning from the gaps in the supply of medical equipment should serve as an important lesson for potential shortages of military equipment and supply shortages during times of crisis. The Compass should make clear that the EU Member States need to better manage critical supplies during health crises and conflict and war, including the provision of basic food supplies and secure critical supply chains. Again, the EU has the policy and financial resources to address these types of vulnerabilities but there is still no coherent system in place to ensure EU-wide supply in times of crisis.

### Survey recommendation 10

The Strategic Compass should set out clear guidelines for the interaction of military and civilian capacities and services during times of health and climate crises. In particular, the Union needs to outline the most appropriate chain of command for the integrated use of armed forces and civilian capacities during crises that occur on the territory of the EU or along the Union’s borders. This is a particularly salient issue given that the Union needs to plan for potential future invocations of the Solidarity Clause (Article 222 TFEU).

In addition to raising awareness about critical supply, the Covid–19 pandemic should also give rise to a reflection about how the Union’s civilian and military capacities can address crisis response in times of health and climate crises (13). Here, the role of civilian authorities and the armed forces needs to be carefully balanced, and it should be recognised that the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) should play a leading role for civilian crisis response along with Council of the EU bodies like the Integrated Political Crisis

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(12) Ibid.

Response. There is a risk, of course, that seeing every vulnerability through a military lens may over-securitise issues and hinder a more comprehensive approach to preparedness and crisis response. However, as the results to Figures 6 and 7 reveal, the EU should see its unique blend of civilian and military crisis response tools as an asset.

Furthermore, both sets of results in Figures 6 and 7 show that there is a need to use the EU’s civilian and military tools to respond to hybrid threats, terrorism and cyber vulnerabilities. In terms of military capacities such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, survey respondents believe that the EU needs to prepare for countering hybrid threats (95 % combined high and medium importance), cyberdefence (94 % combined high and medium importance), counter terrorism (89 % combined high and medium importance) and the protection of critical infrastructure (84 % combined high and medium importance).

Where civilian capacities are concerned, respondents stated that resilience could be enhanced in the areas of border management, countering people trafficking, public health, climate change, countering hybrid threats, cyberdefence and countering terrorism. These assumptions would appear to make sense given that the EU’s strategic competitors are increasingly using the ‘grey zone’ of ambiguous...
FIGURE 7 | Utilising its civilian mechanisms, which are the most pressing tasks needed to protect the EU over the next 5-10 years? % of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>High importance</th>
<th>Medium importance</th>
<th>Low importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistance for public health (e.g., pandemic response)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering hybrid threats</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber defence</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border management</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing the security-related effects of climate change</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering people trafficking</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of critical infrastructure</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime security</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial defence</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals may include rounding.
Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

Survey recommendation 11
In order to counter hybrid threats such as disinformation, cyberattacks and the instrumentalisation of irregular migration at the Union’s borders, there is a need to deepen the EU’s efforts in areas such as increasing media literacy skills and training at home and abroad, developing intelligence capacities and the management of open-source data, deploying strategic communication attachés to EU Delegations and generating a database of civilian experts with niche knowledge (data protection, CBRN, harbour and airport management, energy and water management, etc.).

Survey recommendation 12
The EU Member States should use the Strategic Compass to further develop the Union’s intelligence capacities to counter hybrid threats. Further still, the EU structures should dedicate resources to strategic foresight and contingency planning, as well as conduct more frequent threat assessments at the EU level. Additionally, the EU has seen a proliferation of strategies (connectivity, hybrid threats, Indo-Pacific, maritime, space, etc.) in recent years and so more should be done through the Strategic Compass to improve coherence between them.
political and legal norms to disrupt the Union’s interests\(^{(14)}\).

More specifically on countering hybrid threats, the EU needs to be better placed at deterring hybrid threats in the first place. For example, the possibility of imposing sanctions on individuals or groups responsible for cyberattacks against the Union is a positive start by the EU. However, the EU can also enhance its deterrence of hybrid threats by increasing the scope and frequency of hybrid exercises. This is a key way to ensure that the EU’s institutional architecture is responsive to the broad sweep of hybrid threats\(^{(15)}\). For example, the ongoing border crisis with Belarus shows how the instrumentalisation of people, disinformation and military manoeuvres near the border can test the Union’s security. In this respect, the EU needs to enhance its intelligence capacities to better understand how hybrid threats are combined by strategic competitors. On this front, the Union still faces considerable constraints as the bulk of intelligence resources remain with the EU Member States. Notwithstanding the presence of the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, there are still constraints in terms of staff members working on intelligence in the EEAS and the types of intelligence they can collect (e.g. open source rather than active intelligence gathering)\(^{(16)}\).

Finally, there is a need for the Strategic Compass to clearly outline ways in which the EU can protect its interests and values on the global commons. In particular, the maritime, space and cyber domains are under risk of becoming theatres for strategic competition\(^{(17)}\). There is a danger that established norms, law and practices in these domains may be undermined for geopolitical reasons. At sea, we are witnessing a rise in hybrid threats through the use of commercial fishing ships, energy research boats and coastguard vessels to claim territorial rights and control of resources\(^{(18)}\). CSDP missions and operations can play an enhanced role in situational awareness and intelligence gathering in the maritime domain. EU naval operations already provide the Union with a presence at sea, but this can be expanded in terms of the geographical areas covered by the EU and the tasks conducted. Work is already underway to this effect in the Gulf of Guinea\(^{(19)}\), but there is scope to expand the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept to the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, the Union should be more confident in using its naval operations as nodes through which partners can be brought onboard for live exercises, port calls and other confidence and awareness-raising activities at sea.

In outer space, there is a need for the Union to rapidly develop its resilience due to the growing congestion of space and the presence of
key EU-space based capacities such as Galileo or Copernicus (20). Space is being used by a greater number of private and state actors, which increases the risk that the EU’s interests in this domain are threatened. Without space there would be no Galileo or Copernicus, and neither would the EU be able to rely on the geospatial intelligence provided by the EU Satellite Centre (SatCen). Space is a source of economic prosperity for the EU and it enables a wide range of activities including positioning and communications. Accordingly, the Strategic Compass should underline the importance of the EU Space Programme and the Union’s efforts in developing Space Traffic Management (STM) capacities.

In the cyber domain, state-backed groups and state agencies are hacking European computer systems to, among other things, steal and manipulate data and instigate kinetic risks (e.g. electricity outages) (21). There is a clear need for CSDP missions and operations to be made resilient against cyberattacks. More than this, however, the Union should ensure that CSDP missions can better develop the resilience of partners. For example, host countries that are located in or near critical strategic domains (e.g. Middle Eastern and East African states and the maritime routes of the Indo-Pacific) will require greater capacity in the domain of cybersecurity. The forthcoming revision of the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive will also ensure that EU Member States not only better report and enforce EU legislation in the cyber domain but also craft responses to new technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (22).

MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND SOLIDARITY

Another important aspect of the EU’s resilience relates to Treaty provisions that are designed to ensure that EU Member States can rely on EU efforts in case of a major crisis on its territory through armed aggression, terrorism or natural and man-made disasters. In this respect, the mutual assistance clause (Article 42.7 TEU) and the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU) are recognised as a potential additional layer of reassurance and security. The very existence of both treaty articles implies that a basis for shared interests, or even collective

Survey recommendation 13

In order for the EU to respond to threats emanating from strategic domains such as the maritime, space and cyber environments, the Compass should be used to emphasise the importance of a physical presence around the world through naval deployments, intelligence capacities and exercises. The EU should deploy naval assets to protect sea lanes of communication and critical maritime infrastructure. In space, the Union should invest in space traffic management capacities and ensure the security of the Galileo and Copernicus systems. Finally, to ensure its cybersecurity the EU should continue to develop its Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox and complement this with rapid reaction cyber teams that can be deployed in the EU during crisis situations.


security, exists in the EU. This point is also strongly implied in the survey results shown in Figure 8. As shown in the diagram, 59% of respondents strongly agree that the EU should be prepared to support Member State during an invocation of either Article 42.7 or Article 222. From a different perspective, only 1% of respondents disagree that the EU should display such commitment.

There are questions about how, when and why the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses could be triggered by Member States in times of crisis. In particular, we must acknowledge that whereas the two clauses are focused on the EU’s internal security, CSDP missions and operations are geared toward external threats. This means that different mechanisms and responses would be required depending on the treaty article and crisis in question. Under an Article 42.7 situation CSDP tools would be excluded from a response, save perhaps for where the crisis spills over into the Union’s near geographical surroundings. Where Article 222 is concerned, CSDP is also generally excluded although the Council of the EU may decide to utilise CSDP frameworks and mechanisms depending on the crisis in question. Either way, these legal parameters impose on the Union a need to clarify what tools could be used for crisis response under each treaty article.

The growing threats facing the EU make the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses more relevant than ever, even though a majority of EU–NATO countries still view Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as the bedrock of collective defence. Over the next 5–10 years there is a lower probability for state-on-state armed attacks against EU and NATO members and allies, although they cannot be completely discounted. Possible scenarios involving Russian hybrid warfare in the Baltic region or conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean should not be underestimated. EU Member States could possibly fall victim to terrorist attacks, hybrid campaigns or natural and man-made disasters (e.g. oil-spills or another pandemic). Furthermore, the likelihood of a major cyberattack on the EU should not be discounted either, especially given how cyberattacks can immobilise banking, energy, water, healthcare and communications systems. In such cases, an EU Member State could find itself overwhelmed by a complex and intense crisis in a relatively short period of time.

However, despite a pressing need to develop the EU’s response capacities in the event of either legal provision being triggered, there is still a lack of clarity over how they could be applied. For example, what would happen in a case where both provisions are triggered and how would the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses apply should an EU–NATO Member State or ally trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty simultaneously? Both the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses raise important political issues and sensitivities because of the security guarantee under NATO. The reality today is that the majority of EU Member

FIGURE 8 | The EU should be prepared to support member states in case of an invocation of Article 42.7 TEU (mutual assistance clause) and Article 222 TFEU (solidarity clause) % of respondents

Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree

Totals may include rounding. Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

States plan for their common defence in NATO because it ensures a direct link to US military engagement. The EU does not currently have the capabilities or force and military structures to ensure a like-for-like security and defence guarantee. Indeed, deriving capabilities from the two Treaty articles is likely to push the Union in the direction of collective defence and this would likely be a step too far for many EU Member States.

There is, however, a need to think about how the mutual assistance clause could be applied in a complex collective scenario involving non-military threats. In particular, there are crises that fall under the threshold of NATO’s Article 5 and a coherent EU response to such situations could certainly benefit European security. However, the only time Article 42.7 TEU was triggered was in 2015 by France following the Paris terrorist attacks, but this case study has its limitations in terms of lessons learned for every possible form of crisis. In this respect, the EU could use the Strategic Compass to push for more scenario-based discussions on Article 42.7 TEU in cases such as countering illegal migration surges at the Union’s borders, cyber assaults on critical networks, foreign state-backed disinformation or manipulation campaigns against the Union, hostile foreign activities aimed at disrupting energy supplies or attacks against an EU Member State.

Such scenario-based discussions are important, but they should lead to concrete assessments of the capabilities that would be required in each crisis situation. As Figure 9 underlines, over half the respondents strongly agree that the Union should be prepared to use the civilian and military assets it has at its disposal for Article 42.7-type crises. Of course, triggering Article 42.7 would be highly context-dependent and there is the complication that this specific treaty provision does not automatically trigger an EU institutional response – the triggering and response is left to EU Member States. In this sense, the Compass could help clarify the relationship between the EU’s range of tools and the exclusively intergovernmental nature of Article 42.7. In the event of a cyberattack against an EU Member State, for example, would the Union’s Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox be automatically available to the Member State in question?

Both the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses raise important political issues and sensitivities.

Furthermore, it is worth considering how the EU can optimise its responses for the possible triggering of Article 222 TFEU. The Council Decision of June 2014 on the Solidarity Clause imposes a relatively high threshold where an EU Member State must be completely overwhelmed with a crisis before it can trigger the treaty article. Only once this threshold is met, which implies that a State cannot ensure its own security, can the handling of the situation be placed in the hands of EU institutions. Having said this, there are scenarios where the Solidarity Clause might be invoked to the benefit of the EU Member States affected. A wider regional natural, climate change-related or man-made disaster (e.g. extreme long-lasting droughts, floods or severe chemical pollution incidents)
affecting several EU Member States could be difficult to handle nationally and this may re-
quire an EU response. In such cases, the Soli-
darity Clause could be used to limit the effects of catastrophic events.

Finally, another area of critical concern that is made relevant in the context of the mutu-
al assistance and solidarity clauses is cyber-
security. Indeed, the EU’s 2020 Cybersecurity Strategy clearly refers to the fact that a cyber incident or attack could constitute the grounds for an invocation of Article 222 TFEU. Like-
wise, cyberattacks against the EU could give recourse to an invocation of Article 42.7 TEU.

As called for by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, there is a need to bet-
ter prepare for such events (24). In the con-
text of the Strategic Compass, therefore, a well-defined framework for the future activa-
tion, scope and operational implementation of the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses as a response to cyberattacks should be discussed – but not necessarily publicised to maintain a certain ambiguity and flexibility with respect to response options. Additionally, focusing on cybersecurity should not come at the expense of scenario-based discussions and exercis-
es in the areas of illegal immigration, attacks on critical civilian infrastructure (e.g. airport, maritime or satellite communication systems) and biowarfare.

According to respondents and chapter contributors, the EU and its Member States have a mixed record of using CSDP to stimulate capability development. CSDP has proven incapable of providing the required impetus for ambitious capability development in Europe (1). As things stand today, the EU’s level of ambition in security and defence is unachievable in its entirety and the Union would find many of the existing Illustrative Scenarios extremely challenging to conduct (2). Indeed, EU Member States could not conduct the recent rescue and evacuation tasks faced in Afghanistan alone due to a lack of strategic enablers, even though rescue and evacuation is included in the current set of Illustrative Scenarios. There can only be an artificial comfort to be drawn from the knowledge that capability development efforts among European allies in NATO does not fare much better (3).

Even with the Strategic Compass, EU Member States will continue to face a considerable number of civilian and military capability gaps. Persistent capability gaps can be traced to a sustained period of underinvestment in armed forces and questions about how the Covid–19 pandemic might effect defence budgets in the coming years (4). Indeed, while total European defence spending grew from 1.25 % of GDP in 2014 to 1.64 of GDP in 2020 (5), spending is still not high enough to fill capability gaps and modernise Europe’s armed forces. Added investment in defence remains the genuine litmus test of whether EU Member States are truly dedicated to developing capabilities. Yet, the challenge facing the Union to develop capabilities between now and 2030 is daunting. Despite the 60 PESCO projects currently underway, and the capability development projects that will start under the European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2022, EU Member States need to not only fill existing capability gaps but also invest in the modernisation of their forces (6).

If the EU is to develop the full spectrum military capabilities needed to meet its level of security, investment in capabilities and technologies will be essential. The Strategic Compass outlines a number of initiatives that aim to address capability gaps, including the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). These initiatives are intended to provide a framework for Member States to work together to develop capabilities that fill identified gaps.

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ambition in security and defence, then the Strategic Compass cannot narrowly define capabilities only in terms of CSDP. Indeed, the EU’s defence capability development tools already allow Member States to develop capabilities that are required for national, EU and NATO capability needs and targets. In this sense, the core task of this third chapter is to examine the type of capability gaps currently facing the EU and to underline the importance of filling them by 2030. Furthermore, this chapter offers an analysis of EU and national defence planning processes and it calls for greater investments in emerging and disruptive technologies. In this respect, the Strategic Compass has the challenge of focusing on present and future capability requirements.

PERSISTENT CAPABILITY GAPS

The gaps in European military capabilities are well-known. As the survey results show at Figure 10, the EU is perceived to have capability shortfalls in the areas of naval and air capabilities and strategic enablers (e.g. space, cyber and training). Surprisingly, despite the growing importance of territorial defence many respondents believed that land capabilities should be less of a priority for the EU. It is difficult to provide a concrete explanation for such a result, save for the fact that respondents may have felt that land capabilities should be developed in a NATO context or that land capabilities such as tanks are less relevant for CSDP missions and operations. Either way, the capability gaps facing European governments in the EU and NATO are relatively clear. In addition to deficiencies in the area of C2 capacities, shortfalls persist in the following areas:

- **Air:** fighter ground attack aircraft, air-to-air refuelling tankers, strategic heavy-lift transport, air medical evacuation helicopters, electronic intelligence aircraft, maritime air patrol and combat unmanned aerial vehicles.

- **Land:** light and armoured vehicles, Main Battle Tanks, long-range artillery, land-based short and medium-range air missile defence capacities.

- **Maritime:** aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, attack submarines, amphibious ships and transport, harbour protection, maritime situational awareness and anti-submarine warfare capacities and mine countermeasures.

- **Space:** satellite communications, Space Traffic Management capabilities and modernised secure communications links.

- **Enablers:** force protection technologies and systems, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies and cyber-defence capabilities.

European armed forces will have to engage rapidly in the modernisation of capabilities, particularly in areas such as armoured vehicles and defence against long-range and short-range missile threats. What is more, it is critical that the Union collectively develops
the means necessary for enhancing its presence at sea and in space. To date, the EU lacks sufficient capacities to ensure its manoeuvrability and resilience at sea and for this reason it is welcome news that the Union will develop European patrol class vessels (9). The same can be said for outer space, but this domain is especially critical because of the presence of EU space-based infrastructure such as Galileo and Copernicus. Indeed, without the modernisation and protection of the EU’s space-based capacities there is a risk that the Union’s ability to conduct military operations, monitor arms trafficking, scout illegal maritime activity and observe environmental and climactic changes from space will be undermined (10).

Despite these recognised capability shortfalls, the EU has also made positive steps forward in the area of military mobility (11). This area is a particular capability that brings together transport infrastructure, legislation and regulation and dual-use technologies. Military mobility is a key plank of EU–NATO cooperation and it is a test case for whether the EU can deliver a major capability and

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**Survey recommendation 14**

The EU Member States should use the Strategic Compass to create capability cluster packages to ensure that investment is properly directed and that key platforms can be reinforced by high-tech strategic enablers. In particular, as a matter of urgency the EU needs to invest in a European next-generation fighter such as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), combat and ISR drones, hypersonic propulsion technologies, missile defence systems, next-generation Main Battle Tanks, automated ground combat systems, the development of a carrier strike group and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

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(9) ‘Naval gazing? The Strategic Compass and the EU’s maritime presence’, op.cit.


contribution to Europe’s security (12). It is important that the momentum is maintained and it is positive that third states such as Canada, Norway and the United States are part of the PESCO project on military mobility. Nevertheless, the Union should move at a more rapid pace in putting in place legal and administrative regulations and standards. In partnership with NATO, the EU can also consider the future of the project by volunteering new future steps under the Strategic Compass. This could include steps for logistics centres for the storage of critical equipment, even if this might pose a challenge for financing under the Connecting Europe Facility mechanism.

The Strategic Compass should underline the importance of strategic enablers. Military mobility is an excellent example of EU–NATO cooperation on capability development but greater investment is required by the EU. Additionally, electronic warfare capacities and cyberdefence capacities are urgently needed. Moreover, investment in emerging and disruptive technologies such as AI and quantum computing remain critical and the EU should be bold enough to develop a common military cloud. An EU Cyber Response Operations Centre is required too, and this could lead to more standardised civil–military training in the area of cybersecurity.

There is also a need to continue to develop civilian capabilities based on the conclusions of the Civilian CSDP Compact. Looking to the 2030 horizon under the Strategic Compass, it is necessary for the EU to consider the recruitment and deployment of conflict analysis, environmental and climate-security specialists in civilian missions. Such expertise would increase the Union’s suite of capacity-building measures, boost partnerships with fragile countries and allow the EU to combat environmental crimes. This includes streamlining EU training and recruitment, removing procedural and financial obstacles to personnel contributions and enhancing coordination between ministries of foreign affairs and other relevant national ministries. In particular, recruitment for civilian expertise should focus on critical expertise profiles such as judges, prosecutors, cyber experts and other personnel that can help counter hybrid threats. Key skills here include criminal investigation expertise, language skills and expertise on human rights, gender, rule of law and countering corruption and disinformation.

The Strategic Compass should stress the need to deliver on the Civilian CSDP Compact and the objective of being able to deploy a civilian mission of 200 staff in 30 days with all the necessary equipment provided by the Civilian Warehouse. Furthermore, to support the 22 commitments made under the Civilian Compact it will be necessary for civilian missions to better rely on specialised teams and multinational formations such as the European Gendarmerie Force or Civilian Response Teams for specific areas such as cyber, disinformation, strategic communication, terrorism and climate change.

There is a need to better incentivise the proposed career path for officials within civilian missions, but this implies that national internal security structures adapt to the demands of the shifting international security environment. There is also a need to ensure that civilian CSDP ensures cross-fertilisation with

JHA bodies and mechanisms. Additionally, civilian CSDP would benefit from expertise on early warning, situational awareness, strategic foresight and preventive action. Such expertise should be used in an interdisciplinary manner and in conjunction with partners on the ground. In this respect, such skills and expertise would boost the Union’s capacities to anticipate threats, risks and challenges. Such steps can only be supported from dual-use capabilities such as the EU Satellite Centre, which provides valuable geospatial intelligence to monitor conflict zones, uncover illegal activities such as logging, trafficking in waste, illegal fishing, activities that finance terrorism, border management, etc.

DEFENCE SPENDING AND PLANNING

Following the 2008 global financial and economic crisis, defence budgets in Europe hit a downward curve and this greatly affected the financial bandwidth needed to invest in capabilities. During this depression in defence spending, Research and Development (R&D) was particularly hit and this has meant that today there is an investment lag in critical technology areas. This is why the Strategic Compass needs to reinforce the message that EU Member States should invest more in defence. PESCO, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the EDF can help in this regard but they are no substitute for national investments in defence. However, this may be a challenge in the context of the unknown economic consequences of the Covid–19 pandemic. Thus far, defence budgets appear to have been ring–fenced or even increased due to the changing threat landscape facing the EU. However, there is no guarantee that this situation will last as national budgets are geared to addressing the EU’s economic recovery in the coming years.

Additionally, any ambitious approach to EU capability development in the Compass will have to contend with the well–documented fragmentation and duplication of European civilian and military capabilities. As the survey results in Figure 11 show, respondents clearly feel that the EU’s capability development process is not currently fit–for–purpose for the threats facing the Union over the next 5–10 years. Two-thirds of respondents either disagree or strongly disagree that the capability development process is not adequate enough to help address looming threats and challenges. For example, PESCO was initially designed to provide the framework through which capability shortfalls could be addressed, but it is not living up to expectations and projects do not consistently address high–end capability needs (13). In this respect, an important

FIGURE 11 | The current EU military capability development process* is fit–for–purpose for the threats and challenges facing the EU over the next 5–10 years

% of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Data: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021

political dimension of the Strategic Compass will be to re-emphasise the need to commit to the twenty binding commitments already embedded in the notification establishing PESCO. Such commitments need to be treated with a greater sense of urgency by Member States.

Furthermore, the Compass first has to help streamline seemingly cumbersome EU capability development processes and it can do so by clarifying the strategic scenarios the EU should plan for. While we should recognise that the EU’s capability development process is still young, and that some strategic patience will be required to see how and in what ways the system delivers capabilities for Member States, this is not an adequate excuse to shy away from streamlining efforts. Part of the challenge is ensuring that individual capability development tools are brought together so that the Headline Goals, the High Impact Capability Goals (HICGs), the Capability Development Plan (CDP), CARD, PESCO and EDF better align. There is also a necessity to continue to show how the EU capability development process relates to the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP).

Beyond the streamlining of EU capability development processes, however, there is a need to recognise the long-standing issue of a lack of national buy-in for EU security and defence efforts (14). There must be a structural reason why EU Member States do not adhere to the binding commitments in PESCO or live up to EU capability targets. Today, national defence planners only view EU requirements as a distant third behind national capability priorities and NATO planning requirements. The reality is that CSDP only represents a small fraction of the defence tasks facing defence ministries, and a majority of EU Member States are increasingly focused on territorial defence where CSDP has no role. Most European states in the EU and NATO prefer to develop capabilities to meet the challenge of territorial defence, and this means that a priority is given to the NDPP.

To increase the interest of national defence ministries in EU capability development processes, the Strategic Compass could call for a political annual progress report that provides an easily digestible overview of the progress made (or lack thereof) in capability development for foreign and defence ministers. More specifically, the annual progress report could bring together the priorities of the CDP, CARD, EDF and Headline Goals and ensure that the report involves the Chief of Defence Staff, National Armaments Directors, the Cabinet of Defence Ministers and even finance ministries in EU Member States.

Survey recommendation 17

To increase the interest of national defence ministries in EU capability development processes, the Strategic Compass could call for a political annual progress report that provides an easily digestible overview of the progress made (or lack thereof) in capability development for foreign and defence ministers. More specifically, the annual progress report could bring together the priorities of the CDP, CARD, EDF and Headline Goals and ensure that the report involves the Chief of Defence Staff, National Armaments Directors, the Cabinet of Defence Ministers and even finance ministries in EU Member States.

FIGURE 12 | The current EU civilian capability development process* is fit-for-purpose for the threats and challenges facing the EU over the next 5-10 years

% of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Indeed, the first CARD report and PESCO review reinforced the view that EU capability development mechanisms and initiatives should be further embedded in national defence planning. In this regard, there is a growing realisation that EU capability development efforts address the broad capability suite and not just a narrow focus on the CSDP. It should therefore be noted that EU capability development processes are not designed to respond solely to the capability requirements of CSDP. In fact, capabilities developed within an EU setting are increasingly geared to simultaneously filling capability gaps in NATO. A number of PESCO and EDF projects are indeed relevant for NATO and specific projects and it is ultimately up to EU Member States to decide where to use capabilities they develop in the EU framework.

Finally, civilian capability development processes should be addressed by the Strategic Compass. Based on the Civilian CSDP Compact, EU Member States could use the Strategic Compass to establish and implement capability development through a clustered approach focusing on specialised capability needs. The National Implementation Plan (NIP) process embedded in the Civilian Compact could also be further strengthened by the Strategic Compass, but there remains a need for EU Member States to commit to capability development and the provision of personnel and enablers. Based on the survey results found in Figure 12, respondents were more positive about the civilian capability development process when compared with its military counterpart.

**DEFENCE INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGIES**

Technological and defence–industrial competition is a reality in today’s geopolitical environment. Without mastery of critical technologies and control over critical supply chains, it will be difficult to sustain any notion of European technological autonomy or sovereignty. In particular, the defence and space industries are facing unprecedented global competition and Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) such as AI, robotics, automated systems, quantum computing and cyber technology are underpinning and potentially altering the global balance of power. EU tools such as the EDF are vital to enhancing the Union’s defence–technological development, although such tools should pay attention to supporting transnational cooperation and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in a balanced manner. While technological solutions can never be a panacea, the EU would be right to stress the relevance of innovation and emerging and disruptive technologies in the Strategic Compass.

The EU would be right to stress the relevance of innovation and emerging and disruptive technologies in the Strategic Compass.

Dual-use technologies are also likely to play a significant role in helping the EU Member States develop capabilities that can also respond to unconventional security threats and challenges such as cyberattacks, health crises and climate change. In this respect, investments in energy-efficient technologies can help the EU enhance its sustainability in the field while also reducing strategic dependencies on fossil fuels. However, substantial investments in the space sector will be required.

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if the EU is to maintain its autonomy. Satellite communications are vital for defence and security, humanitarian deliveries, civil emergency response, natural disasters and climate change and secure diplomatic exchanges. In this sense, the Compass should not only underline the importance of enhancing synergies between the civil, space and defence sectors in the EU, but it should also give the right impulses for key technologies related to secure communications and space traffic management.

Fortunately, the EU is already undertaking work on technology and innovation. In the context of the European Defence Agency (EDA), there is work on Key Strategic Activities (KSAs) and the Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA) which are mechanisms designed to identify important technologies and industrial processes for the EU. Additionally, in the context of the EDF the European Commission is dedicating a slice of the Fund to disruptive technologies. Moreover, the Commission has published an Action Plan on Synergies between the defence, space and civil domains. The Strategic Compass can reinforce these efforts, but perhaps it can also stress the importance of technological dependences and security of supply. Indeed, the Union still faces a number of vulnerabilities in critical supply areas (e.g. semiconductors and precious metals) and the Compass should help to address how strategic dependences can be managed in the years coming up to 2030.

Ensuring that the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) can stimulate industrial competitiveness in a balanced way is crucial for Europe’s skills, industrial capacities, innovation and economic well-being. Yet there is a need for the Strategic Compass to underline the importance of technological modernisation and digitalisation. Here, the Compass could stress the importance of developing a coherent EU approach to security and defence and disruptive technologies and processes such as AI, big data, quantum computing, the Internet of Things and more. However, the Strategic Compass should be aware of buying fully into a ‘technology-driven’ approach to capability development. Indeed, defence research and innovation are essential but policies should not neglect the fact that only platforms and systems will contribute to greater military capabilities for the EU.

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Partnerships have always been fundamental to CSDP. The past has seen various partners contribute to CSDP missions and operations and there are a number of partnership agreements in place to ensure that the EU works with non-EU states and regional/international organisations on security and defence. For example, countries such as Canada, Chile, Georgia, Moldova, Norway, Serbia, Turkey, Switzerland and Ukraine have directly contributed personnel to EU-led missions. The Union also maintains approximately 20 Framework Partnership Agreements (FPAs) for crisis management missions and operations with Australia, Canada, Chile, Iceland, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Vietnam and more. Yet, CSDP partnerships should not be defined solely in terms of personnel contributions and agreements. Indeed, the Union has used CSDP to help certain states build their capacity against security and defence challenges. The existing four EU military training missions to the Central African Republic, Mali, Mozambique and Somalia are testament to how the EU works with host governments to help deliver security sector reform and training.

With the Strategic Compass, however, there is an opportunity to reassess how the Union thinks about partnerships and security and defence. It is for this reason that EU Member States insisted on having a specific “basket” on partnerships during the Compass dialogue phase (2). One of the key challenges facing any reassessment of partnerships through the Strategic Compass is precisely what the EU means by “partnerships”. We have seen above that CSDP partnerships traditionally encapsulate cooperation on EU missions and operations and capacity building. The Compass will certainly have to consider how these traditional forms of partnerships can be enhanced based on the threat analysis conducted in November 2020. In this sense, the definition of partnerships is likely to be expanded beyond CSDP to include areas such as maritime security, cybersecurity and countering hybrid threats – these are security issues that were not originally part of CSDP partnerships but they have obvious relevance to the Union’s security and defence.

Under the Strategic Compass, therefore, there will be a focus on ‘EU security and defence partnerships’ rather than a narrow interpretation of ‘CSDP partnerships’. For example, the United States may not necessarily want to contribute to CSDP missions and operations but there is a growing desire to build the EU-US partnership in relation to capability projects (e.g. military mobility), maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, cybersecurity and countering hybrid threats. Furthermore, through its Strategic Partnership Agreements...

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(SPAs) with Canada (signed in 2016) and Japan (signed in 2018) the Union has tried to tie together trade agreements with security agreements in areas that go beyond the traditional scope of CSDP (e.g. maritime security, cybersecurity, environmental protection, etc). In this respect, a key challenge is being able to capture the diversity and specificity of actors that the Union wants to work with in the area of security and defence.

Furthermore, this broader approach to security and defence partnerships gives the Union the opportunity to reflect on past strategic partnerships that may appear problematic or devoid of meaning today due to geopolitical shifts and events. For example, the Union still maintains strategic partnerships with Russia and China but the content and purpose of these partnerships is questionable today given that they are now strategic competitors for the Union. Consider that the EU-Russia strategic partnership was signed in 2011 – three years before Moscow invaded Ukraine. In this sense, the EU’s security and defence partnerships take on a normative basis because the Council of the EU has been very clear that partnerships should be founded on the basis of shared values and whether they contribute to respect for international law and a multilateral, rules-based order. Due to growing authoritarianism in international relations, there is a sense in which partnerships with the EU in security and defence can support an open, multilateral global order. Thus, the Strategic Compass provides an opportunity to rethink how the EU develops and deepens its partnerships in an era of strategic competition.

The aim of this final chapter is to provide a reflection on the challenges of reassessing partnerships in the context of the Strategic Compass, as well as offering recommendations for how EU Member States can advance cooperation on missions and operations, capacity building and wider security and defence policy issues along the way. In particular, the chapter focuses on what should be the main guidelines for the EU’s partnerships, how they may evolve in light of strategic competition and what additional resources will be required to maintain and extend partnerships.

**PARTNERSHIPS AND CAPACITY BUILDING**

The majority of the EU’s existing capacity building missions are active in regions with significant instability such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. It is important that the Union continues to provide capacity to these regions, not least because security challenges can spill over from these areas into geographical areas close to the EU. The Union should also continue to promote an integrated approach to instability and capacity building because while the Union will now be able to provide lethal equipment to host-nation security services and armed forces through the EPF, there can be no substitute for capacity building across the whole of government and society in fragile countries and regions. This means that the EU should maximise the use of the NDICI in conjunction with EU-led civilian and military missions, as this is one of the effective ways of implementing the EU’s integrated approach and assisting with peacebuilding and societal resilience.

The Strategic Compass could also afford an opportunity to review how the Union’s tools are combined and used in fragile regions. Such a stocktaking could certainly play into a broader review of how far the Union is implementing an integrated approach in practice. Indeed, there needs to be an honest appraisal of how
far EU institutions and bodies such as the European Commission and EEAS are working together in the field in practical terms. Further than this, it is necessary for the EU to think through the logic of capacity building. In many respects, capacity building should be seen as a means to an end but the Union is not always entirely clear on what this ‘end’ is. The risk is that capacity-building missions will be viewed by partners as only a subsidiary of military missions and operations, which means that capacity-building missions are directly linked to the success or failure of military engagement. This is problematic as capacity building should be linked to an integrated EU response to fragile zones that transcends a purely military approach to crises.

What is more, and as indicated in Figure 13, the integrated approach is supposed to lead to strengthened partnerships with regional bodies such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). However, more can be done to boost the operational dimension of such partnerships. It is also important for the EU to renew its partnership with the United Nations (UN), especially as multilateralism is under increasing pressure – recognising that much collaboration is already ongoing. An example of such cooperation is the periodically updated UN-EU joint priorities on peace operations and crisis management. Here, the EU and UN can strengthen collaboration by focusing on new areas of action such as environmental protection and climate change. Indeed, increasingly the EU and UN will need to work closer

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**Survey recommendation 18**

The Strategic Compass should outline a more modular approach to capacity building partnerships through civilian CSDP. To cater to the specific needs of partners, the EU needs to develop integrated partnership packages that include the provision of equipment and expertise to fragile partners. In particular, the EU should work with partners to develop strategies for countering cyberattacks and the foreign manipulation of information. Furthermore, strategic partnerships can only be strengthened, and strategic competitors dissuaded, through a long-term EU political presence in key partner countries and regions.
together on the climate–security nexus (9). As the Union develops its own Roadmap for Climate and Defence (6) and a Concept for an Integrated Approach to Climate and Security (7), the EU cannot afford not to build on the UN’s work on climate-security early warning and its efforts on the link between environmental crime and narcotics. Additionally, working with the UN on the climate–security nexus can mean that international crisis response mechanisms are better prepared to address environmental factors that influence conflict cycles.

Despite these needs, however, there is still some way to go before the EU can claim to have a truly integrated approach to crises. To date, non-executive military missions can be established faster than civilian counterparts and this disconnect can push military personnel into roles for which they are not trained or equipped. Any EU stabilisation efforts will require local buy-in, ownership and political dialogue and there is a need for the EU to invest in cross-border operational cooperation to ensure that a truly regional approach to crises can take root. This will require close cooperation between donor and recipient countries. In this respect, instead of relying on military training missions the EU could look at how military and security actors could operate with unfamiliar and non-military structures like finance and treasury specialists – building stability by, for instance, helping ensure that troops are paid on time.

Yet, even if the EU has focused its capacity-building efforts on Africa this region cannot be the only priority. It is, for example, also necessary for the Union to deepen its cooperation with the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries. In particular, the EU should develop ambitious responses to the security situation in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – these countries are especially important given their close economic and trade ties with the Union. For example, while the EU will not be expected to play a hard security role in this region any time soon, it should nevertheless engage in capacity-building efforts with EaP countries in areas such as security sector reform, cybersecurity, countering disinformation and foreign intelligence operations (8). This could be an effective way to dissuade Russia from trying to increase its sphere of influence in eastern Europe.

This same logic should also apply to the EU’s approach to capacity building and partnerships in the Western Balkans (9). There is a need for the Union to provide a coherent

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(5) ‘Compact 2.0: Integrating Civilian CSDP into the Strategic Compass’, p. 6, op.cit.


framework for all of the activities it undertakes in the region, especially given the rising tensions in that part of the world and how the politics of EU accession is being instrumentalised by regional and foreign actors to undermine the Union’s presence in the Western Balkans. Not only should the EU use its significant economic leverage in the region to ensure local ownership for security, but the Union should actively invest in the region to counter hybrid threats, enhance cybersecurity and combat disinformation and foreign interference. What is more, the EU needs to ensure a suitable linkage between security and defence and economic investment in the Western Balkans. For example, investment in transport networks in the region should be combined with the financing of cybersecurity capacities.

**STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND PARTNERSHIPS**

Another major development in the way the EU conceives of partnerships relates to growing global strategic competition. In this sense, partnerships are increasingly less seen in transactional terms and more in line with whether partners share the same values and interests. This normative aspiration should also be combined with whether partnerships can contribute to effective problem-solving and the more efficient utilisation of resources, also by increasingly including the private sector as is likely to be underlined in the forthcoming Global Gateway strategy. In this sense, it is important to ascertain whether partnerships are sustainable and durable over time. To date, it is unclear whether all of the EU’s partnerships meet these requirements. In the past, the Union was eager to brand most of its international relationships as ‘partnerships’, but this has proven unsustainable given the rise of authoritarianism and the relative decline of the United States and Europe. It is already clear that the EU’s existing strategic partnerships with Russia and China appear somewhat contradictory today given that these two countries are the EU’s clearest strategic competitors.

To be sure, calls for a reassessment of EU partnerships in light of major international events is nothing new for the Union. After the EU Global Strategy, partnerships were framed in terms of the post-Brexit settlement with the United Kingdom and the relationship with the Trump administration. What is different in the context of the Strategic Compass, however, is that the EU’s partnerships are increasingly viewed through the prism of strategic competition. In particular, there is a sense in which the EU needs to respond to the growing threats and challenges emanating from authoritarian powers such as Russia and China. The Union and its Member States recognise that the EU’s partnership with the United States is particularly important in this regard. Indeed, since the election of President Biden the EU and United States have attempted to strengthen the transatlantic partnership and the Joint Communication for a new EU-US agenda for global change underlined that ‘Europe and the US face a growing number of serious transnational threats, from hybrid and military threats, violent extremism and global terrorism, to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’.

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With regard to Russia, the EU is expected to play a complementary role to NATO in strengthening the defence of eastern partners and its own EU Member States. Militarily the EU’s role is rather marginal, but it is more significant with regard to resilience. Moscow sees it as its strategic interest to create divisions among and within EU Member States and NATO allies. In recent years, Russia has pursued disinformation and influence operations in Europe and the US through a variety of informational, technological and economic means. For example, it has interfered in the US and French presidential elections, hacked the IT system of the German and Norwegian parliaments and supported various populist parties of the left and right across Europe. The EU has developed a range of tools to counter hybrid threats and this means that the EU’s contribution to security goes beyond CSDP. Nevertheless, the EU’s partnership strategy needs to take account of the fact that Russia is engaging through proxy forces in the EU’s neighbourhood and this implies a greater need to boost the capacity of partners to withstand threats of a hybrid nature.

China will be a top priority for the US and EU for decades to come. China’s rise poses fundamental challenges to Western security, values and technological superiority. As it aims to strengthen its regional and global influence, China is increasingly having a destabilising effect on international security and it is employing hybrid tactics below the threshold of conventional warfare to advance its political objectives. The need to position itself vis-à-vis sharpening US-Chinese rivalry puts the EU in an uncomfortable situation. It is difficult to find a balance between values and economic interests, and to find ways to defend both. Zooming in from this broad picture to CSDP, countering hybrid threats is increasingly relevant with regard to China. For example, the EU’s activities in the fields of countering disinformation and cyber threats need to pay more attention to China in future. Through its Strategy on Cooperation with the Indo-Pacific, the EU can make a contribution to security in South East Asia in the form of CSDP missions that help develop capacities and resilience.

Faced with increased strategic competition, there is an opportunity to use the Strategic Compass to enhance the flexibility of CSDP partnerships as they specifically refer to the deployment of EU civilian and military missions and operations. This is certainly reflected in the survey results found at Figure 14, which indicates that the EU’s partnerships need to evolve with the shifting strategic landscape. Indeed, the model for CSDP partnerships for missions and operations might well be outdated and there is a need to move beyond a ‘one size fits all’ approach to partnerships. A more flexible and varied CSDP partnership format is required that allows different non-EU partners to engage in specific geographical regions. In this respect, CSDP partnerships should not be the only form of

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Strategic Compass | New bearings for EU security and defence?

cooperation possible with the EU on security and defence matters. Partnerships should be built without geographical constraints in areas such as training, interoperability, standards, information exchange, technology partnerships and defence diplomacy.

For example, flexible tools such as the CMP concept could be used to build up partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. There is a lot of potential for the EU to develop partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific, especially when it comes to joint exercises and information exchange. Japan is an obvious contender for a closer partnership, especially in the fields of cybersecurity, resilience and maritime security. However, a greater EU presence in the Indo-Pacific could help develop relations with countries such as India, South Korea and more.

Stronger maritime partnerships based on a flexible cooperation model can allow for an enhanced ‘plug and play’ mentality and a shift in the way partners view the EU as a convening power. In particular, live exercises could certainly boost the visibility of the EU in the region.

Increasing strategic competition also implies that the CSDP framework may need to be made more flexible to encourage partners to cooperate with the Union. To tackle insecurity in the European neighbourhood, new kinds of strategic partnerships could be developed for key non-EU allies such as the United States, United Kingdom, Norway and Canada as well as with countries in the EaP and even Latin America. Given that the creation of specific institutional arrangements is not foreseen, it is therefore important for the EU to think about the most effective way to develop security and defence consultations. One way would be to focus partnership dialogues on pressing thematic issues such as hybrid threats, security in the Arctic or even cyberdefence. Furthermore, partners could be invited within the EU framework to work on joint conflict analysis, intelligence cooperation or even to engage in common situational awareness activities and exercises.

Beyond partners such as states or international organisations, however, the Strategic Compass could stress the importance of engaging with non-state actors such as NGOs and private actors. Working with actors that have an active presence on the ground in crisis situations would allow the EU to gather information on conflict dynamics in a more effective and timely manner. It would also give non-state actors greater buy-in to EU crisis management procedures and concepts, and this would allow the Union to attain a better understanding of conflict dynamics. In turn, this could lead to more effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts. Of course, this is not a new idea but there is a pressing need to find new mechanisms for this type of engagement.

THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

For many EU Member States, NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence. Deeper political consultations and information exchange between the EU and NATO would be of benefit, especially if this paves the way for joint dialogue on current and future security and defence needs and challenges. Although the question of a ‘division of labour’ between the EU and NATO is sensitive, both the EU Strategic Compass and NATO Strategic

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(16) Revamping CSDP partnerships in the shadow of Brexit, op.cit.
Concept should clarify the strengths of each organisation and how policy responses can be best utilised for the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. Here, it should be recalled that each organisation is unique – one is a military alliance, the other a political organisation – and each has its own decision-making autonomy. Nevertheless, the EU and NATO should continue to strengthen their efforts in military mobility, countering hybrid threats, strategic communication, ensuring operational coherence and addressing emerging security challenges.

In many ways, it is fortunate that the EU Strategic Compass and the revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept are happening almost in parallel to each other. Such a process provides the EU and NATO with an opportunity to better manage relations between the two organisations in areas such as crisis management and collective defence. The process may also make it possible to undertake a political stocktaking of the existing areas of EU–NATO cooperation to ascertain whether the common actions are really delivering. Keeping in mind the ‘single set of forces’ principle, it should be possible for the EU and NATO to build on their existing cooperation in fundamental security areas such as EDTs, cyberdefence, outer space and climate change. By extension, the Strategic Compass should also provide a level of ambition for EU–US relations that tackles contentious issues such as defence industrial cooperation and market access.

Finally, the EU and US can also enhance their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Although the so-called ‘AUKUS affair’ has raised questions for Europe, steps to ensure that the EU can play a full role in the region in line with the 2021 EU Strategy on Cooperation with the Indo-Pacific is of paramount importance for the Union. In this regard, the Strategic Compass should not only reiterate the importance of the EU’s role in the Indo-Pacific but it could also offer opportunities for enhanced cooperation in the region. For the EU, ASEAN will be a key interlocutor and partner in the region but the Union could also diplomatically push to be associated with the ‘Quad’ arrangement with the US, Japan, Australia and India.

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CONCLUSION

The Strategic Compass promises to provide the EU with both a revised strategic vision and a plan of action for the next decade until 2030. Save for a potential revision of the EU Threat Analysis in around 2025, the Compass needs to comprehensively answer the same questions posed at the start of this Chaillot Paper. Indeed, by March 2022 national planners across the EU should be left with no doubt about the type of civilian and military missions and operations the Union should plan and be prepared for until 2030. The Compass should also outline the type of strategic environments Europe—an armed forces, police, customs officials and other personnel will face and what strategies, technologies and resources they can rely on. Furthermore, the Strategic Compass should explain how the EU will enhance Europe’s resilience and promote its values and interests. Finally, the Compass must lucidly outline what capabilities and partnerships are needed for the EU to fulfil its level of ambition in defence.

However, perhaps it is also worth stressing what the Strategic Compass is not. First, it is not a replacement for the EU Global Strategy, even if it updates the Union’s strategic reading of the threat landscape. It is rather a follow-on document that more concretely addresses the level of ambition in security and defence set by Member States in November 2016. Second, it should not necessarily pave the way for any follow-on strategy. Put another way, if another EU-level document is needed to more precisely describe the findings of the Compass, then the Compass process would have to some degree failed in its core objective. Third, and most importantly, the Strategic Compass cannot be seen as a silver bullet for the lack of commitment to EU security and defence. In this sense, while the Compass can incentivise cooperation and lead to a greater sense of strategic solidarity, it is only the EU Member States that can decide to spend more on defence, dedicate capabilities and personnel to missions and operations or to develop capabilities collectively.

Indeed, those involved in the drafting and negotiation of the Strategic Compass will be aware of the intractable hurdles that face deeper cooperation under the CSDP. The Union has had more than twenty-years’ worth of experience in trying to develop EU security and defence. To be sure, since 2016 there has been greater momentum and a good number of new tools was developed. One might put this largely down to the nadir of transatlantic relations from 2017 to 2021 and Brexit. In this respect, it will be interesting to see whether the current state of international affairs will have any major effect on the new initiatives and strategic outlook embedded in the Strategic Compass. The relationship with Washington is far from rosy, even with a new administration. However, beyond the withdrawal from Afghanistan or the ‘AUKUS affair’, it will be interesting to see how far EU Member States are willing to address their strategic competition with Russia and China within an EU context, and, more specifically, within a document about security and defence.

This Chaillot Paper has reflected on all of these questions. Based on the collective efforts of 11 analysts and a survey, the volume has touched upon both the opportunities afforded by the Strategic Compass and what continued political faultlines exist in debates about EU security and defence. We began our analysis with four sets of questions that were designed to address each of the four baskets that comprise the Strategic Compass: crisis management, resilience, capabilities and partnerships. Based on the collective analytical thoughts and the EUISS survey results, this Chaillot Paper has presented 20 specific recommendations that could be considered during the negotiation phase that will run from November 2021 to at least February 2022. To this end, we summarise the major recommendations and conclusions from each chapter below.
ENHANCING THE EU’S ABILITY TO ACT: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CAPACITY BUILDING

In terms of crisis management, there is agreement that the EU will face a far tenser environment in which to deploy missions and operations in the future. The years to 2030 will see a crisis management landscape marked by intractable political crises that can be exploited by the Union’s strategic competitors. There is also an acknowledgement that EU crisis management concepts should adapt to the ongoing evolution in technology and information warfare. In this sense, one of the major tasks facing the Strategic Compass is to adapt the EU to less permissive environments. Such an adaptation is not just about concepts or new illustrative scenarios, for there is a need to ensure that the EU updates its strategic guidance, capability development and C2 functions. What emerges from the discussion in Chapter 1 is that the EU today faces a greater task of enhancing its standing as a crisis manager than at any time since the inception of the CSDP.

While it is true that this Chaillot Paper has outlined a number of ways in which the EU can boost the attractiveness of civilian and military action under CSDP, the reality is that there are major questions that EU Member States need to confront during the Compass negotiation process. First, there is a need to contend with arguments about military intervention. After the experiences of Afghanistan, it seems as if there is little consensus on whether Europe’s defence ministries should plan for expeditionary missions or rather focus more on territorial defence. Second, there is a debate about how the EU can better geographically balance its action under CSDP between its southern and eastern neighbourhoods. Finally, it remains to be seen whether the Strategic Compass will radically alter how EU Member States view the CSDP.

'Crisis Management Basket' - recommendations and considerations

> Avoid decompartmentalising the southern and eastern neighbourhoods. To do so would be to risk solutions to transboundary threats that do not respect neatly defined geographical classifications.

> The EU needs to step up its approach to security and defence in the Western Balkans. It is a fragile region that is intimately linked to European security, yet it is increasingly falling prey to the designs of strategic competitors such as Russia and China.

> While it is not the role of the EU to find military solutions to Russia’s actions, the Union can step up its efforts to build capacity in the Eastern Partnership countries in the areas of countering foreign manipulation of information and cybersecurity.

> In Africa and the Middle East, the EU needs to plan for an era of strategic competition where powers actively try to undermine and deny the Union’s efforts to stabilise conflict zones such as the Sahel.

> Beyond its immediate borders, the EU needs to enhance its presence in the Indo-Pacific. This can be achieved by using and expanding existing EU naval operations and new tools such as the Coordinated Maritime Presence.

> The EU needs to adapt its crisis management concepts for the twin challenge of climate change and natural disasters. Armed forces may be required as a last resort to help deal with natural disasters both within and outside the EU.
The Union’s concept of crisis management needs to be better adapted to responding to the full conflict cycle and hybrid threats. The Union’s C2 capacities need adapting to such features of contemporary crisis response too.

To incentivise action within an EU framework, greater flexibility is required to allow for coalitions of the willing to undertake military action and to ensure that the EU can support European-led ad hoc missions and operations.

SECURING EUROPE AND ENHANCING ITS RESILIENCE

An absence of resilience can lead to protracted crisis and the further exploitation of vulnerabilities by strategic competitors. Based on the analytical reflection and survey in this Chaillot Paper, it is clear that the EU needs to continue to conceive of crisis response in a comprehensive and integrated manner. In practice, this means going beyond CSDP tools to address critical security risks such as hybrid threats, cybersecurity, climate and natural disasters and the protection of the EU’s interests and values on the global commons.

Chapter two called for a ‘whole of Union’ approach to resilience, beginning with the policy areas that need to be addressed. In particular, it is clear that the EU has much to learn from the Covid-19 pandemic, and so the Strategic Compass should assist with clarifying how the EU should respond to complex political, health and environmental crises.

Chapter two also made clear that the EU needs to better protect its interests and values in the global commons. Indeed, the Union’s safe and open access to the maritime, space and cyber domains is being called into question. Given the largely external dimension to the challenge of the global commons, the EU can already rely on CSDP tools and mechanisms – even if CSDP needs to be adapted to securing the Union’s access to strategic domains. Relatedly, in an era of strategic competition we cannot discount the importance of mutual assistance and solidarity between EU Member States. Should Article 42.7 TEU and/or Article 222 TFEU be triggered in times of crisis, the EU should be in no doubt about political and institutional roles or the response capacities required. Given that CSDP provisions and capacities play a circumscribed role under the mutual assistance and solidarity clauses, the Compass could provide greater direction for what other crisis response tools and mechanisms could be relied upon in times of crisis.

Resilience Basket - recommendations and considerations

- Resilience calls for a ‘whole of Union’ approach that brings together the Union’s complete set of crisis response tools. This approach should play to the EU’s civilian strengths in areas such as managing scarce resources.

- Working with partners such as NATO, the EU should continue to develop its own standards and minimum thresholds for the protection of critical infrastructure such as energy, water, cyber and electricity.

- The EU needs to continue to counter hybrid threats and terrorism, but this will require an ability to bring together a multitude of different public and private actors and to boost intelligence and information gathering capacities.

- Specific responses to resilience could include enhancing media literacy and intelligence, deploying strategic communication attachés to EU Delegations and investing in civilian specialists for niche tasks such as harbour and airport management.
The EU should use the Strategic Compass to enhance its access to the global commons. In particular, the Union needs to enhance its maritime and space surveillance capacities and it should develop further its naval presence in key regions such as the Indo-Pacific.

In the maritime domain, the EU could use the Strategic Compass to enhance its presence and partnerships through the conduct of live naval exercises and port calls. It should also prioritise the expansion of the Coordinated Maritime Presences concept to the Indo-Pacific.

In outer space, the EU should seek to rapidly develop its Space Traffic Management capacities to protect its interests in space, including Galileo and Copernicus. The Compass could help the EU deepen its reflection on the relationship between defence and space.

For many EU Member States, NATO remains the cornerstone of their defence and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is therefore of indispensable value. In this respect, it is important to understand the place and extent of Article 42.7 TEU in the context of transatlantic security.

With increased threats comes greater attention to Article 42.7 TEU and Article 222 TFEU. The EU needs to continue to conduct scenario-based discussions on these provisions, with a particular focus on areas such as the cyber and space domains.

More specifically on Article 42.7 TEU, the Union could use the Strategic Compass to clarify the available Union-level response tools that could be made available to Member States, especially if CSDP tools and mechanisms are not legally applicable.

Chapter three of this Chaillot Paper revealed that the EU continues to face a range of military and civilian capability gaps. If the Strategic Compass is to address the pressing threats facing the EU, then there is a clear need to fill critical capability gaps and invest in innovation for the future. In the air, cyber, land, sea and space domains the Union faces critical gaps and the recent experience of Afghanistan revealed the operational cost of not having strategic enablers. At the same time, EU Member States and NATO allies are increasingly focusing on territorial defence and this means that EU capability development processes must be geared to European capabilities more broadly, rather than just CSDP. In many respects, when we consider the range of capabilities and enablers outlined during the analysis and the survey, the task confronting the EU may appear insurmountable. Indeed, the sheer range of capability shortfalls facing European countries is significant and this is a challenge that has not been successfully remedied by NATO either.

Of course, if Europe is to fill the capability gaps it faces, a sustained financial commitment by European governments is required. A temptation to lower defence budgets in the post-pandemic era should be avoided. At the same time, the Strategic Compass offers EU Member States an opportunity to streamline the Union’s capability development processes and to enhance national buy-in for EU security and defence. Chapter three revealed that the Compass can achieve this by ensuring close coordination between EU and NATO processes and by prioritising capabilities that address core national interests. Where civilian capabilities are concerned, chapter three stressed that expertise and special skills are required if the Union is to comprehensively address challenges such as hybrid threats and cyber-attacks. Finally, the chapter made a case for
how the Compass should engage with emerging and disruptive technologies.

‘Capabilities Basket’ - recommendations and considerations

> Given the security threats facing Europe, governments will find it increasingly harder to avoid filling critical capability gaps. Future combat will require a technologically sophisticated and robust suite of capabilities that the EU cannot lose time in developing.

> Beyond the Strategic Compass, EU Member States need to make a long-term commitment to defence spending and collectively invest in capabilities. An alignment of budgetary cycles would help but sustained investments in defence are as important.

> There is a need to ensure close coordination between EU and NATO capability development processes, thereby prioritising military capabilities that can address the core national interests of EU-NATO countries.

> When developing future capabilities, the EU should give greater consideration to electronic warfare and cyber capacities. In fact, capability development processes will have to simultaneously fill critical gaps while also modernising Europe’s forces.

> The EU capability development process is perceived as being too complex and cumbersome. The Compass could help here by outlining measures to enhance the complementarity of EU efforts and to give political relevance to the process by involving key national stakeholders.

> The Union must avoid a purely ‘technology-driven’ approach to capability development and ensure that disruptive technologies do not dominate investments at the expense of military platforms and systems.

> Civilian capability development needs more effective training methods and an attractive career path for individuals that deploy with civilian CSDP missions. Increasingly, expertise should cover conflict analysis, cyber, strategic communication and environmental security.

> The EU should develop its maritime and space capacities, especially given that they can support economic prosperity in the EU. Furthermore, there is a need to ensure that military capabilities are made more energy efficient, while not undermining performance.

DEEPENING THE EU’S PARTNERSHIPS

Chapter four made clear that partnerships are a critical function of the EU’s security and defence efforts. There is a need for the Union to use the Strategic Compass to think about how it can deepen its existing partnerships, while also giving other potential partners a reason to engage with the EU. As a basis for cooperation, there is a need for the EU to engage with like-minded partners where it can most readily secure its interests and values. Indeed, the EU’s partnerships need to meet the challenge of increased strategic competition and for this reason there will be a tendency to prioritise certain partnerships. Close relations with NATO and the US are particularly valuable in a more tense security environment. Additionally, given the challenges facing multilateralism it is necessary for the Union to deepen its engagement with the UN and regional players such as the AU, ASEAN, OSCE and others.

The two main conclusions that derive from the analysis conducted in chapter four and the EU-ISS survey are: (1) the Union needs to enhance its model of capacity building; and (2) the EU
should think about enhancing the flexibility of CSDP. In both of these areas, the chapter proposes that the EU engages in diverse security areas such as hybrid threats, cybersecurity and environmental protection. The EU’s model of capacity building should be adapted with a clearer picture of the ends of EU engagement, to provide a greater geographical 360 degree approach and increased opportunities for joint conflict analysis and live exercises. Capacity building should also be viewed as but one element of a more ambitious integrated approach. In terms of the CSDP, flexible arrangements such as the CMP concept could allow the EU to engage partners more effectively.

‘Partnership Basket’ - recommendations and considerations

> Capacity building remains a core EU tool for partnerships and new tools such as the European Peace Facility will help in this regard. However, capacity building is a means to an end and it should be part of an integrated approach drawing on the full EU toolbox.

> The Strategic Compass is an ideal opportunity for the Union to undertake a review of its capacity building efforts and to assess how far EU institutions and bodies are working together in an integrated manner.

> Close cooperation with the UN and AU is critically important and more can be done to ensure that each actor shares a common approach to threats through joint conflict analysis, situational awareness and exercises.

> Capacity building should reflect a 360 degree approach that includes intensified cooperation with Eastern Partnership and Western Balkan countries. If capacity building is seen as an ‘Africa only’ tool, this will lead to a lack of buy-in by partners and EU Member States.

> Increasingly, the EU’s strategic partnerships will need to develop consistent and robust responses to competitors such as Russia and China. In particular, here partnerships should focus on countering cyberattacks and interference and the manipulation of migration flows.

> Flexibility can be achieved through the CMP and this could allow the EU to develop closer ties with countries in the Indo-Pacific. Beyond the maritime domain, it is necessary to provide greater flexibility through the CSDP.

> The relationship with NATO is fundamental but there is a need to develop deeper relations. The parallel tracks of the Strategic Compass and Strategic Concept offer an ideal opportunity for deeper dialogue.

> The EU needs a clearer agenda for the EU-US security and defence dialogue and concrete trust-building measures are required given the recent experiences of Afghanistan and the ‘AUKUS’ affair.

> The EU and NATO have a vested interest in developing cooperation in new areas such as resilience, emerging and disruptive technologies, outer space, cyberdefence and climate change.
ANNEX 1 - EUISS SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGIC COMPASS PROCESS

During the ‘dialogue phase’ of the Strategic Compass, which ran from February to October 2021, EU Member States were invited to provide input to the Compass drafting team in the EEAS. The dialogue phase began on 8 February when the EEAS produced a ‘Scoping Paper’, which set out the parameters of the Compass process and posed a series of questions to Member States structured into each of the four baskets. A meeting of EU foreign ministers on 22 February, a European Council Summit on 25–26 February and an informal meeting of EU defence ministers on 2–3 March provided the necessary political support for the process. Following the Scoping Paper, EU Member States provided input to the EEAS through written input and workshops.

During the dialogue phase, more than 50 workshops were organised and over 25 non-papers were circulated by EU Member States. Based on this input, the EEAS produced four working papers based on each of the four baskets. A paper on crisis management was shared with EU Member States on 23 April, the working paper on partnerships on 17 May, the working paper on capabilities and new technologies on 21 May and the working paper on resilience on 9 July. The EUISS was actively involved in the dialogue process and it assisted EU Member States with the organisation of 12 workshops including:

- 25 October – an online workshop on ‘CSDP and Partnerships’, organised by the EUISS and the EEAS.

> 14 October – an online high-level conference on ‘EU–NATO Cooperation and the Strategic Compass’, organised by the EUISS and the Slovenian Ministry of Defence.

> 4 October – an online workshop on the ‘Importance of Space for EU Security, Defence and Resilience’, organised by the EUISS and the Permanent Representation of France to the EU.

> 28 September – an online workshop on the ‘Strategic Compass and Capability Development’, organised by the EUISS and the Hungarian Ministry of Defence.

> 9 July – an online workshop on the ‘Cyberspace and EU Action to 2030’, organised by the EUISS and the Permanent Representation of France to the EU.

> 7 July – an online workshop on the ‘Strategic Compass and the Western Balkans’, organised by the EUISS and the Slovenian Ministry of Defence.

> 4 June – an online workshop on the ‘Strategic Compass and Security of Supply’, organised by the EUISS, the Finnish Ministry of Defence and the Latvian Ministry of Defence.

> 18 May – an online workshop on the ‘Strategic Compass and the European Defence Industry’, organised by the EUISS, the Spanish Ministry of Defence and the Real Elcano Institute.

> 28 April – an online workshop on the ‘Operational Dimension of the Strategic Compass’, organised by the EUISS, the Clingendael Institute, the Dutch Ministry of Defence and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
> 26 April - an online workshop on the ‘Strategic Compass and National Defence Planning’, organised by the EUISS and the Croatian Ministry of Defence.

> 12 March - an online workshop on the ‘Strategic Compass and Contested Global Commons’, organised by the EUISS and the Permanent Representation of France to the EU.

> 19 February - a high-level online conference on the ‘Strategic Compass and the Future of EU Security and Defence’, organised by the EUISS and the Portuguese Ministry of Defence.

Additionally, the EUISS was involved in a range of other related activities and it supported dialogue workshops organised by Belgium on the governance of EU security and defence (1–2 July 2021), France on strategic culture (18 June 2021), Portugal on maritime security (1 June 2021), EUNAVFOR Irini on maritime security (26 May 2021), Spain on geospatial intelligence (12 May), France on the objectives of EU security and defence (18 December 2020), Germany on defence capability development (24 September 2020 and 7 December 2020) and Croatia on the EU Threat Analysis (26 February 2020).

**ANNEX 2 - QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE CHAILLOT PAPER AUTHORS**

The 20 questions are grouped into the four baskets of the Strategic Compass reflection process. The 20 questions are as follows:

**Crisis management**

1. What are the main crisis management scenarios the EU should be prepared to respond to with civilian and military missions and operations over the next 5–10 years?

2. Which geographical area of the world should the Union prioritise for its security and defence, and why? Alternatively should it avoid prioritising geographical zones, and if so why?

3. Are the “Petersberg Tasks” (1) (Article 42 and Article 43.1 TEU) still relevant? If not, how would you amend and/or add to them and why?

4. Are the targets set under the Illustrative Scenarios and the Headline Goal processes for civil and military CSDP still relevant? If not, how would you augment them?

5. How can the EU member states be incentivised to dedicate greater resources to crisis management operations and missions?

**Resilience**

6. To what extent, and in what ways, should CSDP tools and mechanisms be used in support of an invocation of the mutual assistance clause (Article 42.7 TEU) and/or the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU)?

7. Are there any likely scenarios over the next 5–10 years that could require the invocation of the mutual assistance clause (Article 42.7 TEU) and/or the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU)?

8. Are existing crisis response structures (i.e. IPCR, EEAS Crisis Response System, etc.) fit-for-purpose to deal with enhancing

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(1) The Tasks are joint disarmament operations; humanitarian and rescue tasks; military advice and assistance tasks; conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management (e.g. peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation); and combating terrorism.
the resilience of the EU? If not, how should they be developed further?

9. Should specific capability benchmarks (i.e. forces, civilian experts, equipment) be put in place for security and defence tasks related to the EU’s resilience?

10. To what extent, and in what ways, could CSDP operations and missions help to protect European critical infrastructure within the EU and more globally?

Capabilities

11. Which civilian and military capability gaps need to be urgently filled over the next 5–10 years?

12. What specific military and civilian operational capability packages should be developed over the next 5–10 years?

13. In what ways can the eventual conclusions of the Strategic Compass be embedded in national defence planning processes? How can national ministries use commonly agreed priorities for capability development as a guide for their national processes?

14. Given the existence of PESCO and the EDF, what technological and industrial domains should be prioritised by the EU in the Strategic Compass over the next 5–10 years?

15. Are existing civilian and military capability development mechanisms fit-for-purpose? If not, how could they be adapted to ensure more focused EU-level capability development?

Partnerships

16. Are the EU’s capability-building missions and military training missions the most optimal manner through which to build security and defence partnerships in places such as Africa? If not, how could they be augmented or modified?

17. Keeping in mind geographical priorities and shared values and interests, how should the EU prioritise its strategic partnerships in security and defence?

18. What should partnerships in security and defence look like in practice? Should partnerships relate solely to participation in CSDP missions and operations or is there scope for deeper partnerships? If so, in what ways?

19. Are there specific areas of cooperation in the domain of security and defence that should be prioritised in the context of the transatlantic relationship?

20. How can the Strategic Compass reinforce efforts within the NATO alliance? Is there scope to develop the EU–NATO Joint Declarations and the Common Actions? If so, in what new ways?

ANNEX 3 - EUISS SURVEY

The 25 questions are grouped into the very same four baskets that will organise the findings and conclusions of the Strategic Compass.

Introductory questions

- Are you employed by a think tank associated with a government?
- Are you employed by a think tank associated with an international organisation?
- Are you employed by a think tank with no association to governments or international organisations?
- What is your main area of research at present?
Crisis management

1. Which geographical region will require the most attention from the EU in terms of civilian and military crisis management deployments over the next ten years? (Order in terms of priority over the next 5–10 years):

> All/Full spectrum (360 degree)
> Central Asia
> Eastern Europe
> Great Lakes
> Gulf of Guinea
> Horn of Africa
> Latin America and the Caribbean
> Middle East
> North Africa
> Sahel
> Other (please specify)

2. The ‘Petersberg Tasks’\(^{(2)}\) are still fit-for-purpose to meet the geopolitical dynamics over the next 5–10 years:

> Strongly agree
> Agree
> Neither agree nor disagree
> Disagree
> Strongly disagree

3. Given the possible evolution of threats over the next 5–10 years, which are the most pressing civilian and military tasks identified by the Council Conclusions of 14 November 2016 (14149/16)? (more than one answer is permitted):

> Joint crisis management operations in situations of high security risk in the regions surrounding the EU
> Joint stabilisation operations, including air and special operations
> Civilian and military rapid response, including military rapid response operations \(\text{inter alia}\) using the EU Battlegroups as a whole or within a mission-tailored Force package
> Substitution/executive civilian missions
> Air security operations including close air support and air surveillance
> Maritime security or surveillance operations, including longer term in the vicinity of Europe
> Civilian capacity building and security sector reform missions (monitoring, mentoring and advising, training) \(\text{inter alia}\) on police, rule of law, border management, counter-terrorism, resilience, response to hybrid threats, and civil administration as well as civilian monitoring missions
> Military capacity building through advisory, training, and mentoring missions, including robust force protection if necessary, as well as military monitoring/observation missions.

4. Current EU civilian planning and conduct structures are well-suited for the threats and challenges that the Union will face over the next 5–10 years:

> Strongly agree
> Agree
> Neither agree nor disagree
> Disagree
> Strongly disagree

5. Current EU military planning and conduct structures are well-suited for the threats and challenges that the Union will face over the next 5–10 years:

> Strongly agree
> Agree
> Neither agree nor disagree
> Disagree
> Strongly disagree

6. Are there ways in which the EU can enhance its response to crises? If so, how?

> Open question – no word limit

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\(^{(2)}\) See Article 42 and Article 43.1 Treaty on European Union. The Tasks are joint disarmament operations; humanitarian and rescue tasks; military advice and assistance tasks; conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management (e.g. peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation); and combating terrorism.
Resilience

7. The EU should be prepared to use civilian and military assets to respond to invocations of the mutual assistance (Article 42.7 TEU) and solidarity (Article 222 TFEU) clauses:

> Strongly agree
> Agree
> Neither agree nor disagree
> Disagree
> Strongly disagree

8. The EU institutions should be prepared to support member states in case of an invocation of Article 42.7 TEU (mutual assistance clause) and Article 222 TFEU (solidary clause):

> Strongly agree
> Agree
> Neither agree nor disagree
> Disagree
> Strongly disagree

9. Utilising its military mechanisms, which are the most pressing tasks needed to protect the EU over the next 5–10 years? (order in terms of priority):

> Assistance for public health (e.g. pandemic response)
> Border management
> Countering hybrid threats
> Countering people trafficking
> Counter-terrorism
> Cyber defence
> Managing the security-related effects of climate change
> Maritime security
> Protection of critical infrastructure
> Territorial defence
> Other (please specify)

10. Utilising its civilian mechanisms, which are the most pressing tasks needed to protect the EU over the next 5–10 years? (order in terms of priority):

> Air capabilities (aircraft, strategic transport and tankers, etc)
> Enablers (space, cyber, training, etc)
> Land capabilities (tanks, armoured vehicles, etc)
> Naval capabilities (frigates, submarines, unmanned vehicles, etc)
> Other (please specify)

11. In what ways should the EU ensure the resilience of the Union through its security and defence policy?

> Open question – no word limit

Capabilities

12. In order to ensure the operational robustness of military missions and operations, and within the context of PESCO and the EDF, which capability packages will be of most utility to the EU over the next 5–10 years? (Give order of preference):

14. The current EU military capability development process (4) is fit-for-purpose for the threats and challenges facing the EU over the next 5–10 years:

> Strongly agree
> Agree
> Neither agree nor disagree
> Disagree
> Strongly disagree

15. If the EU were to have a flagship capability project that it could support via PESCO and/or the EDF, what should it be?

> Open question – no word limit

16. Are there any civilian and military capability gaps that need to be urgently filled over the next 5–10 years? If so, what are they?

> Open question – no word limit

Partnerships

17. The EU’s existing partnerships in the area of security and defence are more than adequate to face security challenges over the next 5–10 years:

> Strongly agree
> Agree
> Neither agree nor disagree
> Disagree
> Strongly disagree

18. The EU’s civilian capability-building missions are the most optimal manner through which to build security and defence partnerships:

> Strongly agree
> Agree
> Neither agree nor disagree
> Disagree
> Strongly disagree

19. The EU’s military training missions are the most effective manner through which to build security and defence partnerships:

> Strongly agree
> Agree
> Neither agree nor disagree
> Disagree
> Strongly disagree

20. What should partnerships in security and defence look like over the next 5–10 years? (Rank in order of priority):

> Linking partnerships more closely with international organisations (e.g. NATO, UN, AU, ASEAN)
> Linking partnerships with defence exports
> Linking partnerships with trade deals
> Using partnerships to support sub-regional security integration (e.g. in the Sahel)
> Other (please specify)

21. In what ways can the EU enhance its partnerships through its security and defence policy?

> Open question – no word limit

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# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Artificial intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUKUS</td>
<td>Security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARD</td>
<td>Coordinated Annual Review on Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Capability Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>Coordinated Maritime Presence</td>
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<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilisation, Disarmament and Rehabilitation</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Defence Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDTIB</td>
<td>European Defence Technological and Industrial Base</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EMASOH</td>
<td>European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz</td>
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<td>EPF</td>
<td>European Peace Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERCC</td>
<td>EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUBG</td>
<td>EU Battlegroup</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR CROC</td>
<td>EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUISS</td>
<td>EU Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>EU Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>EU Military Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCAS</td>
<td>Future Combat Aircraft System</td>
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<tr>
<td>HICGs</td>
<td>High Impact Capability Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTcen</td>
<td>EU Intelligence and Situation Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCR</td>
<td>Integrated Political Crisis Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSRC</td>
<td>Joint Support Coordination Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSA</td>
<td>Key Strategic Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPCC</td>
<td>Military Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDICI</td>
<td>Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<td>NDPP</td>
<td>NATO Defence Planning Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>OSRA</td>
<td>Overarching Strategic Research Agenda</td>
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<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
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</table>
Abbreviations

QMV
Qualified Majority Voting

R&D
Research and Development

SatCen
EU Satellite Centre

SSR
Security Sector Reform

STM
Space Traffic Management

TEU
Treaty on European Union

TFEU
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

UN
United Nations

US
United States
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Over the past twenty years the European Union has enhanced its role as a security and defence actor. However, in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment, the Union faces new threats and security challenges and this calls for a unified, robust and far-reaching approach from the bloc and its Member States. The Strategic Compass, to be adopted in March 2022, will look to the 2025-2030 time horizon and propose strengthened security and defence measures in the areas of crisis management, resilience, capability development and partnerships. A first draft of the Compass was unveiled to EU defence ministers in mid-November 2021, but there are still months of political negotiation ahead on the precise content and framing of the text.

This Chaillot Paper seeks to inform the remaining months of negotiation on the Strategic Compass up to its approval in March 2022. It does so by offering numerous recommendations and policy considerations, combining the insights of eleven expert contributors and the results of an EUISS questionnaire responded to by over 70 individuals representing government-affiliated research institutions, international organisations, think tanks and universities. Based on these findings, the volume asks how the EU should adapt its civilian and military missions and operations between 2021 and 2030, how it can strengthen its resilience with security and defence instruments, what capabilities and technologies should be prioritised and how best to reframe how the Union thinks about strategic partnerships.