

THE NEW CIVILIAN CSDP COMPACT

Food for Impact

Edited by

Giovanni Faleg, Volker Jacoby, Karin Limdal,
Marleen de Haan, Patrick von Rakowski

With contributions from civilian CSDP
experts and practitioners



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Foreword

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Brussels, May 2023

Adopted in a rapidly evolving and geopolitically complex security landscape, the EU's Strategic Compass for Security and Defence calls for a new impetus for civilian Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP). An effective and flexible approach is necessary to adapt to the fast-changing security needs on the ground. A new Civilian CSDP Compact was adopted by Member States on 22 May 2023.

Almost five years ago, the adoption of the first Compact was a milestone. The first Civilian CSDP Compact has significantly increased the visibility of civilian CSDP and provided a structured approach to strengthen processes and capabilities at the EU and at the national levels. Based on the guidance of the Strategic Compass, the new Civilian CSDP Compact builds on the progress made so far and further strengthens civilian CSDP. The main objective is to position civilian missions as well as civilian CSDP as a whole as an effective tool for the EU and its Member States to tackle current, emerging and future security challenges.

This document gathers the views and reflections of experts specialised in the EU's CSDP with a focus on its civilian missions. On behalf of SecDefPol within the European External Action Service (EEAS), we would like to express our gratitude to all experts for sharing their ideas and insights, and to the European Union Institute for

Security Studies and the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management for assembling and compiling them in this useful and timely publication.

The ambition of the EEAS for this exercise was to ensure that the process leading to the new Compact has been informed and inclusive. This means that beyond involving all relevant stakeholders at the level of the EU and in Member States, the wider community of experts was also given the opportunity to contribute to the process and its results. The analysis provided by think tanks, NGOs and state agencies was highly valued as they shed light on potential blind spots and raised awareness beyond the traditional policy community. Our appreciation goes to all the contributors and I hope that you find this book to be both useful and inspiring!

Executive Summary

This book presents 38 reflections from EU civilian crisis management experts, which fed the policymaking process leading to the adoption of the new Civilian CSDP Compact on 22 May 2023. Contributions have been divided into chapters according to five key cross-cutting themes, which were considered as central for the negotiation of the new Compact.

- > The first chapter provides ten contributions to achieve a more joined-up civilian CSDP, and discusses specifically the integrated approach, cooperation between CSDP and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and civil-military cooperation. Recommendations address both vertical issues, such as links between HQ and operational levels, as well as horizontal ones, including the need for better integration of security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and *reintegration* (DDR) into civilian CSDP mission mandates.
- > The second chapter covers capability development. The five contributions focus on improvements in the areas of seconded personnel and women's participation and discuss what type of missions would be fit for an altered geopolitical context. Inputs set ambitious targets for the new Compact, calling for sharper commitments to enable civilian CSDP to sustain its higher level of ambition with the necessary capabilities to do so.
- > The third chapter on training is composed of three contributions, which analyse how to make training implementation more efficient and effective, especially from the point of view of understanding the environment in areas of operations, as well as increasing quality, quantity, accessibility, timeliness and requirements of training programmes.
- > The fourth chapter deals with the planning, analysis, assessment and evaluation of missions. It includes eight

contributions on a wide range of sub-themes, such as knowledge management structures, evaluation and assessment, analysis capabilities as well as overall objectives of civilian CSDP. It is argued that there is a need for a more standardised, institutionalised approach to both knowledge management as well as monitoring and evaluation.

- > Finally, the fifth chapter highlights twelve issues that were not previously articulated in the first Compact but that have gained attention over recent years. These include among others climate and security, youth, peace and security, peace mediation and (gender-responsive) leadership.

The conclusions discuss and recapitulate themes that have recurred throughout the various contributions. They reflect on the first Compact and where we stand now compared to five years ago. It is argued that despite the 2018 commitments, there are still important limitations with regard to:

- > the coordination between (civilian) CSDP and other actors, particularly JHA;
- > the lack of a systematic and institutionalised process for knowledge management, assessment and evaluation;
- > commitments towards capability development;
- > capacity to adapt training programmes to new operational requirements, particularly in new areas of engagement.

As the geopolitical context in the past two years has created an urgency to fulfil the commitments of the first Compact, contributions suggest that the new Compact provides a good opportunity to set out more detailed and up-to-date commitments, switching the emphasis from a strategic reflection on Europe's level of ambition to one focused on the implementation of the declared goals.



Introduction

Jointly authored by
CoE, EUISS, IAI AND SWP

The need for civilian CSDP

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its principal tool – the civilian crisis management missions – are tasked to prevent and manage conflicts and crises, thus allowing the EU to promote peace, security and stability beyond its borders. Their strategic value-added is threefold.

Firstly, civilian CSDP missions deliver major benefits for host countries and their societies by fostering conditions for secure and stable societies, promoting the rule of law, and providing critical support for development. Secondly, by strengthening conditions for secure societies in host countries, the missions also enhance the security of the Union and its citizens. This is commonly referred to as one aspect of the internal-external security nexus. Thirdly, by demonstrating the EU's credibility as a security and defence actor, these missions establish the Union as a serious and trustworthy player on the international peace and security stage and underscore the Union's commitment to preserve peace and strengthen international security.

In 2016, the EU introduced the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy⁽¹⁾, which set out a more robust vision for the EU's security and defence. The focus therein lay in enhancing the military aspect of CSDP. However, in the context of an increasingly multipolar world, the ascent of the EU as a regional and also global power has been accompanied by the recognition of the crucial importance of civilian crisis management. In 2018, the EU's 27 Member States (MS) agreed on the first Civilian CSDP Compact⁽²⁾, in which they committed to raising the level of ambition and the capabilities of civilian CSDP, thus taking a qualitative and quantitative leap forward in this field.

In essence, civilian crisis management involves sending non-military personnel to a crisis, be it violent or non-violent. Their mission is to carry out various monitoring, capacity-building and advisory tasks at different stages of the conflict cycle. In an ever-changing global security environment, the civilian component of CSDP is becoming ever more crucial. At the time of writing, the EU deploys 12 civilian missions out of a total of 19 CSDP missions and operations⁽³⁾. Civilian personnel make up roughly half of all personnel⁽⁴⁾ currently deployed in CSDP missions and operations.

(1) European External Action Service, 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy', 14392/16, November 2016 (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en).


(2) Council of the European Union, 'Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact', 19 November 2018 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14305-2018-INIT/en/pdf>).

(3) EUPM Moldova has been established, but not yet launched.

(4) 'Missions and Operations', EEAS website (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en).

CSDP civilian missions

Personnel (as of 31 Dec 2022) and average annual budget of current mandate



* Personnel figures for EUMA Armenia were not available as of 31 December 2022 as the mission had not yet been launched. NB: Does not include Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office (KSC/SPO) personnel. Heads of Mission are coded as contracted personnel. Data: SIPRI, Multilateral Peace Operations Database, 2023; Council of the European Union, 2023; European Commission, GISCO, 2023

Where does civilian CSDP find its place in a changed (and ever-changing) global security environment?

The EU has long been criticised for being slow to help its partners establish state structures and a monopoly on the use of force⁽⁵⁾. This has created opportunities that strategic competitors and rivals have been quick to take advantage of, particularly through hybrid campaigns and ‘sharp power’. For example, Turkey in Libya, Russia in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), and the Gulf States in Iraq, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea have all exploited the EU’s limited action. Additionally, the Covid-19 pandemic has put a strain on European security and defence policy, and Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine has further changed the landscape. These events have highlighted the need for the EU to be more proactive and effective in its approach to security and defence, and more systematically address emerging threats, such as foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI).

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the potential political and, especially, the security consequences of economic dependencies. As a result, the EU and its Member States must seek new partners for energy and raw materials while also taking a more proactive approach to security and defence. This includes building resilience in partner societies to protect against future threats.

To ensure stability and security in the face of mounting instability and external interference, the EU must increase its engagement

(5) See: Vogel, T., ‘The war in Ukraine highlights the failures of the EU’s Eastern Partnership’, *The Parliament*, March 2022; Bergmann, J. and Müller, P., ‘Failing forward in the EU’s common security and defense policy: the integration of EU crisis management’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 28, No. 10, 2021, pp. 1669–1687; Smit, T., ‘Towards a more capable European Union Civilian CSDP’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), November 2019; Pirozzi, N., *EU crisis management after Lisbon: a new model to address security challenges in the 21st century?*, Intersentia, Cambridge, 2015.

with neighbouring countries from East to South, as well as in key non-physical spaces where geopolitical competition occurs, such as the digital⁽⁶⁾ and information spheres⁽⁷⁾. To achieve this goal, the EU must reinforce state institutions and security sectors in these countries, thereby strengthening their resilience against external threats. In the future, it will no longer be possible for the EU to separate its foreign, economic and security policies from one another.

The European Political Community (EPC) could contribute to endowing the Eastern Partnership with a security and defence policy dimension, including a much-needed civilian component. At the same time, civilian interventions, ranging from security sector reform to civil administration support, should also benefit key partners on the southern shore of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and ensure a presence of the EU amid the activism of its strategic competitors⁽⁸⁾. Stronger linkages between civilian crisis management, cybersecurity and countering foreign interference should be forged stemming from key initiatives such as the EU cyber diplomacy toolbox or the FIMI toolbox. This would offer civilian CSDP new opportunities for engagement.

A new Civilian CSDP Compact

In just five years since the EU Member States agreed on the first Civilian CSDP Compact, the global security environment has deteriorated considerably. Crisis management increasingly involves handling multiple disasters, fragile states, covert competition, and politicised foreign advisory missions seen as a form of ‘neo-imperialism’⁽⁹⁾. Against this backdrop and with a view to the term of

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- (6)** See: Pawlak, P. and Delerue, F., ‘A language of power? Cyber defence in the European Union’, *Chaillot Paper* No 176, EUISS, November 2022 (<https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/language-power>).
 - (7)** See: Faleg, G. (ed.), ‘African Spaces: The new geopolitical frontlines’, *Chaillot Paper* No 173, EUISS, March 2022 (<https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/african-spaces>).
 - (8)** Ibid.
 - (9)** See: Faleg, G. and Kovalcikova, N., ‘Rising hybrid threats in Africa, challenges and implications for the EU’, Brief No 3, EUISS, March 2022 (<https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/rising-hybrid-threats-africa>).

the first Civilian CSDP Compact coming to an end, a new Civilian CSDP Compact has been adopted on 22 May 2023 during the Swedish Presidency of the EU Council. This Compact is aimed at tackling the difficulties that civilian CSDP missions face in changing and challenging mission environments through a renewed commitment on the part of the 27 EU Member States to substantially support those missions.

The first Civilian CSDP Compact has contributed to creating a more capable, more effective and more joined-up civilian CSDP⁽¹⁰⁾. It has also brought civilian CSDP to the fore of the political agenda and has established initial but essential elements for improving civilian capability development among EU actors and Member States.

Recent geopolitical events have emphasised the importance of focusing on and investing in various aspects of civilian CSDP, such as responsiveness, flexible mandates, and cooperation with other actors while building on recent advancements in civilian capability development to ensure effective and flexible EU crisis management. It is crucial that decision-makers continue to prioritise and invest in these areas to ensure the effectiveness and success of civilian CSDP missions and assure the continued growth of civilian CSDP. The EU's Strategic Compass gives significant space to civilian CSDP and has set the parameters which guide the new ambitious Civilian CSDP Compact⁽¹¹⁾.


Discussions leading up to formal negotiations of the last Civilian CSDP Compact lacked structured and comprehensive input from think tanks and NGOs. To address this, the EUISS and the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management (CoE), upon request from SecDefPol (EEAS), have compiled contributions from experts from think tanks, NGOs, but also some state agencies to inform discussions among Member States on the content of the new Compact. The inputs provide insights into identifying potential issues and raising awareness of blind spots in civilian CSDP

(10) See: Pirozzi, N., 'The Civilian CSDP Compact – A success story for the EU's crisis management Cinderella?', Brief No 9, EUISS, October 2018 (<https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/civilian-csdp-compact-%E2%80%93-success-story-eu%E2%80%99s-crisis-management-cinderella>).

(11) See: Fiott, D. and Lindstrom, G., 'Strategic Compass: New bearings for EU security and defence?', *Chaillot Paper* No 171, EUISS, December 2022 (<https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/strategic-compass>).

The mission cycle

Data: EU - Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, 2022



The cycle of any mission includes the sequencing of crisis identification, decision-making to engage with CSDP, operational planning, conduct and evaluation as well as full termination. This chart shows how the tasks of operational planning, conduct and support follow a clear political direction: the 'why' and the 'what' that informs the mission design ('how'), including the choice of concrete activities undertaken by the mission with a view to achieve previously defined aims and objectives.

Overarching situational analysis

The conceptual framework describing the potential comprehensive approach of the EU to the management of a particular crisis. It aims at developing a common appreciation of the crisis among EU stakeholders and at assessing the impact of the crisis on EU interests, values and objectives. It envisages possible lines of engagement and objectives for EU engagement in the short, medium and long term and seeks synergies across instruments.

CSDP mandate

The conceptual framework describing CSDP activity to address a particular crisis within the EU's comprehensive approach. The CMC defines the political strategic objectives for CSDP engagement, and provides CSDP option(s) to meet the EU's objectives.

Lines of operation

A planning document indicating the line of action chosen by the civilian/military OpCdr to accomplish the mission, thus translating the political intent into direction and guidance. It defines the 'lines of operation', related 'decisive points' and 'desired outcomes'.

Tasks

The operational plan of the CSDP mission further elaborates the operational details necessary for the implementation of the chosen line of action into specific tasks as per the civilian OpCdr's objectives indicated in the CONOPS. It contains the detailed mission 'tasks' and related 'benchmarks' and 'baseline'.

Activities

The Mission Implementation Plan breaks down the mission tasks into specific mission 'activities' which are conducted in order to produce specific effects (outputs) leading to the expected task outcome.

It guides the implementation of the missions' mandate, operational objectives and priorities in line with the CONOPS and the Operation Plan (OPLAN), in particular the benchmarking. The MIP translates the decisive points, desired outcomes and especially the related tasks into concrete mission activities.

structures. The experts' recommendations and concrete proposals are presented in an inclusive guide to help structure the creation of the new Compact.

The input was shared informally with all 27 EU Member States in early January 2023, paving the way for an even better-informed discussion of issues topical to the new Compact by the time of its adoption (22 May 2023).

This book, consisting of updated contributions from NGOs, think tanks and state agencies, shall set the stage for those actors engaging with the EU, but also with its Member States, and aims to accompany the implementation of the new Civilian CSDP Compact with a critical but constructive eye. The EUISS and the CoE stand ready to facilitate this dialogue throughout the implementation period of the new Compact.

CHAPTER 1

A joined-up civilian CSDP

Implementing the EU's integrated approach (IA) is crucial for effectively managing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It aligns all efforts of the Union towards a common goal, promoting peace, stability and security globally. The IA enhances the EU's external action to address complex and interconnected challenges by improving coordination and collaboration between various actors.

All tools available to the EU must be aligned and working towards the same goal, including the civilian CSDP. In this manner, it is essential to establish a more joined-up civilian CSDP as a core element of the integrated approach by, *inter alia*, establishing close cooperation between civilian and military CSDP, and aligning CSDP closely with the Commission services and other relevant EU actors.

Cooperation between CSDP actors and those from the JHA sector is another aspect of ensuring a more joined-up civilian CSDP. An effective framework for cooperation that fully reflects the nexus between internal and external security provides the much-needed synergies to manage emerging crises effectively. Only by effectively coordinating CSDP-JHA actors at all levels can much-needed mission capacities and competencies increase. To this end, decision-makers must take into consideration the interdependence between internal and external security and the mutual benefits that cooperation and coordination can bring.

These are only some of the aspects that show why there is a need to improve coordination and collaboration between the various actors involved in the EU's CFSP. Establishing a more joined-up civilian CSDP will contribute to a better European engagement that

is effective and efficient in responding to emerging crises around the world. The following experts' inputs outline tangible ways to establish a more joined-up civilian CSDP.

The integrated approach

Input 1: DCAF

Recommendation

As part of civilian CSDP's priority focus on civil administration, missions should leverage their political and technical expertise to build accountable governance and effective management structures in security institutions to make European Peace Facility (EPF) support more sustainable.

This means missions should emphasise two key reform areas: public financial management (PFM) and human resource management (HRM) to increase security institutions' capacity to manage and effectively use capability gains delivered by other instruments such as the EPF. At the same time, working on these areas provides an opportunity to strengthen transparency and accountability. Due to their impact on power structures, reforms in such areas are highly sensitive. Civilian CSDP missions with their level of political expertise and access to decision-makers would need to provide the necessary political accompaniment of such reform processes.

CSDP missions should increasingly focus on greater joined-up planning and delivery of security support, complementing instruments such as the EPF, for increased effectiveness and sustainability of support, as well as addressing the risks of engagement.

Why it matters

Sustainable reforms of partner security sectors require a holistic approach that enables equal emphasis on building the capacity of security institutions and strengthening their governance and management. Both are important, but the latter area is invariably

underdeveloped, and far more prone to encountering obstacles and blockages. As the Strategic Compass elaborates, instruments such as the EPF are indispensable for protecting security interests. Yet lessons from many contexts have demonstrated that in the absence of investments in governance and management, equipment support comes with significant political, security, financial and social risks, and last but not least may even jeopardise basic human rights principles. This may not be immediately evident in the short term, but the impact can be devastating.

Recent work by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) on rightsizing security sectors in fragile and conflicted-affected settings, as well as security sector governance and reform (SSG/R) in Somalia and Mali, has highlighted the enduring negative impact of not adopting a holistic process. The consequences of partners who are unable to pay in the mid- to long-term for the maintenance, operation, and associated personnel of the delivered equipment risks rendering delivered equipment useless and sets the stage for future tensions. Similarly, inefficiencies with regard to managing and deploying security personnel increases costs and affects morale.

At the political level, the perpetuation of exclusive power structures by strengthening certain political actors (especially the fact that once in place, it can prove difficult to reverse such trends), raises the risk of coups. With increasing pressure on resources for overseas aid within the donor community, one-sided support does not provide sustainable development and undermines value for money. And finally, with regard to a value-driven foreign and security policy, building capacity without accountability has proven to be disastrous in terms of protecting human rights and human security.

One example of this is EUAM Iraq and their work supporting HRM Systems and advising the Ministry of Interior.

Input 2: FBA

Recommendation

Linked to the existing early warning system and other analytical tools, the joint drafting process of the Political Framework of Crisis Approach (PFCA) should be better utilised. Regular integrated analysis should inform decision-making and adjustments on integrated action. A better linked-up analysis including several instruments in the EU crisis management toolbox could be more closely tied to the CSDP planning processes. The EU Delegations (EU-DEL) also need more personnel with political, peace and security sector expertise able to liaise with CSDP missions to create integrated action, drawing on several relevant instruments. Improved joint analysis coupled with existing crisis management planning processes would enable flexible and modular mandate design. It would also make the effects of civilian CSDP more relevant and visible within the integrated approach.

Why it matters

In order for integrated analysis to support decision-making and planning, the existing PFCA should resume more regularly or be updated after significant developments in the host nation. The PFCA steps and methods could be codified further including ensuring that sufficient time is provided. More harmonised monitoring and evaluation efforts between the instruments could then assist the PFCA process by further adapting timelines and sharing baseline data. The collaborative articulation of a vision and end goals could also be accompanied with a shared Theory of Change (*what do we, as the EU in a country, want to achieve within a given timeframe?*). This needs to acknowledge the challenges of reaching consensus and buy-in from the relevant stakeholders of the various EU instruments, considering the diversity of perspectives as well as organisational cultures in EU external action. It should aim to deepen the understanding of the often complex contextual challenges in the host nation to which the EU aims to tailor its support.

Joint analysis and assessment of operational options and initiatives along the humanitarian, development and peace continuum

can help involve all EU actors in the host nation and, at the same time, provide shared situational awareness, relevant for CSDP planning procedures. For example, reporting from the EU-DEL combined with timely joint field visits would further facilitate field-HQ interaction and enable a shared operational picture. The more contextual the analysis is, the easier it would be to adjust missions in a flexible and modular way.

As the key player for the IA, the EU-DEL needs personnel with experience in the political and security sector. Project managers and local expertise in security/military, justice, mediation, conflict resolution and civ-mil relations would help contextual programming that links up with CSDP missions (when in place). CSDP missions also need personnel functions to liaise with the EU-DEL to link peace, security and development. It would be a significant step forward to ensure that relevant EU instruments jointly contribute to integrated action on crisis management and stabilisation efforts. Moreover, best practice from the implementation of the integrated approach should be highlighted further. By showing how CSDP is embedded into the IA, it can be better understood and communicated.

Input 3: ZIF

Recommendation

To fully operationalise the integrated approach, the EU must go beyond communication and knowledge about each other's mandates and set up permanent processes among all actors in EU security and defence, at headquarters and in the field. Coordination and cooperation need to be institutionalised throughout the whole CSDP cycle, at all stages, beginning with the planning stage and ending with transition strategies. In order to implement this, structural changes are needed to move forward.

The knowledge gap between the Commission and the EEAS (particularly its Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability – CPCC) about their respective work, their advantages and disadvantages, needs to be closed. Systematic collection and dissemination of good practices regarding what kind of cooperation is actually possible could be a concrete step forward.

Training and peer coaching of senior management could be helpful as would be a new nomination and selection process for senior positions. Senior management should not only be competent but already experienced in working in a cross-sectoral manner.

Joint (country) meetings where Commission, JHA agencies and missions jointly brief the same Council Working Group on their activities would also enhance the IA.

In the field, structural changes are needed, maybe in some instances co-locating or even merging missions and delegations. Missions should have the leeway to apply creative solutions as long as institutional flexibility (as called for in the Civilian CSDP Compact) has not been achieved.

Finally, for the CPCC to find its role – not only but especially in a European IA for external action – it needs more (and more operationally experienced) staff and resources to become a true Operational Headquarters.

Why it matters

The creation of the EEAS has led to more capacities for planning, cooperation and coordination, but also established heavy bureaucratic structures that hamper rapid and targeted action. The initial idea of fast crisis response is – theoretically – still in the toolbox of civilian CSDP. But current civilian CSDP structures, including the CPCC, are not configured for fast action and lack flexibility.


The EU should review its performance and capacities in this field and consider how structures could become more flexible to accommodate such action, even in an integrated approach. Regular joint scenario exercises could help test the viability of the EU's IA with regard to crises requiring rapid response.

Since the Treaty of Lisbon and the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), the mandates of CSDP missions and operations more closely resemble activities implemented by other EU bodies, whether the European Commission, agencies like Frontex and Europol, or EU Delegations in host countries. Long-term advising, capacity-building and training calls for much closer coordination with other actors than a monitoring mission or stabilisation operation alone can provide.

The challenge of operationalising the EU's IA further is thus of strong relevance for CSDP missions. Currently, the IA seems to be a

Structure of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

2023



solely personality-driven approach. That needs to change by providing better guidance and enacting systematic solutions.

The integrated approach and SSR

Input 4: FBA

Recommendation

Sweden's Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) recommends that SSR continues to be highlighted as a Feira priority and therefore remains at the core of EU civilian CSDP missions. We further recommend that the new Civilian CSDP Compact highlights the role of civilian actors in whole-of-government reform, synergies between civilian and military support to SSR and the importance of understanding and enhancing security sector governance. This will enable a more holistic approach of support to partner countries and corresponding policy development and capacity-building.

The new Civilian CSDP Compact would benefit from highlighting the importance of an integrated approach to security sector governance for successful reform of security and justice institutions. This may enable missions to provide effective and sustainable support in this area through formalised structures for coordination between EU actors (including Member States), clear mandates for applicable EU instruments, well-defined responsibilities within the area of operation, as well as revised profiles of seconded staff and structures better adapted to joint EU analysis, planning and implementation in line with an integrated approach. An improved internal coordination structure, clear mandates, and well-defined responsibilities will also contribute to countrywide coordination and EU joint programming according to the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Development.


Why it matters

The Civilian CSDP Compact of 2018 included a commitment to strengthen the EU capacity to deploy civilian crisis management missions through a '[F]ocus on the Feira priorities of strengthening police, rule of law and civil administration in fragile and conflict settings as its core functions, underlining as well the importance of SSR and monitoring tasks'⁽¹⁾. SSR is crucial to prevent conflict, increase resilience to conflict, effectively counter violent extremism and rebuild the social contract with legitimacy and trust between state and people. However, the civilian SSR Training Requirements Analysis conducted by the Executive Academic Board of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) on SSR in 2020 identified a series of challenges to the implementation of SSR mandates. Rather than approaching SSR as a holistic, nationally-owned process where democratic governance is key, actual implementation tends more towards specific train-and-equip projects supported by sector-specific experts. There is limited evidence of results on outcome level. This calls for a new approach to deployment of experts with a combination of analytical, diplomatic and operational experience and/or a clearer team effort in SSR support where several experts with diverse backgrounds join forces. This is linked to an increased understanding of the wider concept of SSR, in line with the EU-wide SSR strategic framework (2016). While the policy is relevant and comprehensive, there needs to be further support to its implementation. This may require greater cooperation and information sharing within missions, between missions and other EU offices and instruments, and cooperation with national partners in line with the principles of inclusive national ownership in fragile settings. Understanding of non-state and hybrid security actors also needs further attention.

(1) General Secretariat of the Council, 'Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact', 19 November 2018, p. 4 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14305-2018-INIT/en/pdf>).

SSR and human security

SSR should focus on human security needs of citizens of both genders so that the security sector responds to those needs effectively, within a system of democratic governance.



Data: Folke Bernadotte Academy

The integrated approach and DDR

Input 5: FBA

Recommendation

In 2021, the EU launched its new approach to support DDR processes, emphasising several ways that the EU can support DDR within the integrated approach. The EU's support to DDR has previously been quite modest, without an overarching strategic framework that guides and permeates all of the EU's engagements. The new EU policy on DDR presents an opportune moment for the entire EU system to review its engagements and to explore further avenues for supporting DDR processes. This includes (but is not limited to): (i) encouraging Member States to include DDR as a subject to be integrated into all pre-deployment trainings and mission preparation, and (ii) considering DDR as a key thematic area for civilian CSDP missions to support. The EU has great potential to partner with the United Nations (UN) and support DDR processes globally through civilian CSDP, which is currently underdeveloped due to a limited knowledge of DDR within the EU system. These civilian engagements could for example range from assisting former associates in obtaining identification following demobilisation, to long-term re-integration support. Increased training of seconded staff and the integration of DDR in mission mandates would open up additional opportunities for the EU to support peace and stability globally in line with the integrated approach.

Why it matters

As articulated in the recently launched Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on 'An EU strategic approach in support of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants', DDR is 'an integral part of the EU's contribution to the non-reoccurrence of violence and to broader stabilisation, as

it addresses the risks posed by armed groups and supports the transition from armed confrontation to political engagement and inclusive governance'. DDR additionally has close ties with other areas of engagement, such as security sector reform/governance (SSR/SSG), where the EU is more advanced in its support.

The new EU approach to DDR also emphasises CSDP missions and operations as key mechanisms for the EU to engage in supporting DDR processes, stating that 'civilian and military CSDP missions and operations should contribute to an environment favourable to a DDR process by supporting national and local actors'. The EU is already operating in contexts where DDR processes are taking place (both via the presence of delegations and CSDP missions), but the Union is lacking the proper capacity and political support to engage. As international partners to the EU, such as the UN and the African Union (AU), are operating in the same areas and are engaged in support of these processes, it is additionally crucial for EU staff operating in the same areas to both have the mandate and sufficient knowledge of DDR to be able to engage with partners and ensure a conflict-sensitive approach.

Civilian CSDP–JHA cooperation

CSDP–JHA cooperation at the HQ level

Input 6: Isabelle Ioannides & Marie–Astrid Huemer

Recommendation

Firstly, defining strict rules of engagement tailored to the circumstances of the host country is key to enable genuine and institutionalised exchange of information between the CSDP mission(s) and the European Commission (EC) services active in a given country. When and where relevant, it would also be crucial to associate specialised EU agencies (e.g. Europol) at strategic level in planning

the CSDP mission and in the definition of the mission's mandate. In that context, clear rules (regarding methodology, timeline, form of cooperation and confidentiality) and their systematic use would facilitate the exchange of information.

Second, the creation of a joint alert mechanism at HQ level would foster synergies between the CSDP mission(s) and the EC, but also inspire and enable coherent EU approaches to JHA cooperation. In terms of policy planning, programming and monitoring, this mechanism would aim at informing the CSDP mission on relevant policy developments in the JHA field.

Third, the establishment of common pre-deployment training on JHA issues – both for uniformed and non-uniformed EU personnel – would nurture a common understanding of and shared organisational culture on rule-of-law issues across EU missions and relevant EC services. This training could take place at EU level (e.g., ESDC in Brussels or the CoE in Berlin) and would complement the pre-deployment/expert training received at national level.

Why it matters

The EU's stated objective has been to avoid a lack of cooperation between actors, building on their respective unique roles and mandates to reinforce cooperation and synergies (Commitment 20, Civilian CSDP Compact). For example, in Kosovo⁽²⁾ JHA teams working in EULEX were sometimes reluctant to share information on the functioning of the judiciary presumably because of the sensitive nature of the information and concerns about safeguarding confidentiality. However, this risk aversion was detrimental to proper cooperation between CSDP missions and EC services (e.g., DG NEAR) responsible for monitoring and supporting the implementation of JHA policy, since relevant information on progress in JHA reforms was not shared. Similarly, when the EC supports the drafting and implementation of counter-terrorism/counter violent extremism (CT/CVE) national action plans in the Western Balkan countries, it has access to information and develops processes that could be relevant

(2) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

to the work of CSDP missions present in the region or in any other CSDP mission. There is a need to ensure that the EU's integrated approach to crisis management, which has led to more cooperation between the CSDP and JHA, does not divert the EU's objective from crisis management to purely countering perceived EU internal security concerns (e.g., migration, border control, human trafficking). For instance, experts have argued that in the Sahel region, the EU's integrated approach has translated into an increased focus on security objectives through capacity-building of state security forces, while relegating to the backburner other key governance reforms and long-term approaches that seek to address the root causes of conflict.

Input 7: DCAF

Recommendation

At EU level:

- > Recognise civilian CSDP missions as a holistic European security instrument across the internal-external security nexus. This means giving JHA actors and internal security objectives equal consideration. One concrete way of doing this would be to integrate data from JHA actors, such as Europol's Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), into the mission set-up, review and planning processes to select mission countries and mandates.

At Member State level:

Enabling institutions

- > Consistent political commitment to and resourcing for police secondments
 - > MS need to demonstrate a strong political commitment to the internal-external security nexus and

police secondments, and to provide the necessary resources.

- > National policy that understands police missions as a security policy instrument
 - > MS should ensure policy coherence with regard to the instrument of civilian CSDP missions, ideally through a dedicated whole-of-government policy spanning external and internal security actors.
- > Awareness raising and sensitisation
 - > Internal security line ministries such as ministries of interior (MoIs) or ministries of justice (MoJs) should raise awareness and sensitise police institutions about pursuing security at home through police secondments.
- > Coordination and institutional arrangements
 - > Create clear coordination structures and processes that allow internal security actors like justice ministries, ministries of interior, and police organisations a (strong) say in the selection of relevant mission countries, shaping of mission mandates as well as strategic positions.

Enabling people

- > Relevant preparation of candidates
 - > Secondees should be sensitised about how they contribute to security at home, unpacking clearly the relevance of the secondment to immediate criminal phenomena as well as longer stabilisation goals.
- > Encourage acquisition of new skills
 - > Seconding organisations should aim to identify, measure and actively encourage the acquisition of both soft skills such as leadership and intercultural skills, as well as hard skills, such as investigation

methods and a better understanding of the international dimension of criminal phenomena.

- > Maximise the relevance and utility of information
 - > Respecting the limits of what information can be shared, systems should be put in place to collect, analyse and share with relevant decision-makers information obtained from secondees. Secondees should be provided with feedback to increase the relevance of their reporting.
- > Reap the benefits of new skills
 - > Seconding institutions should make the most of newly acquired skills and expertise by matching upon return wherever possible positions and functions.
- > Treat returnees as a strategic asset
 - > Maintain accessible records of who has acquired expertise and regional or local networks and contacts.

Why it matters

There is a fast-growing demand for civilian expertise in the EU's crisis management capacity that is not being matched by a growing supply in experts, especially police officers. One of the reasons for this is the fact that police organisations do not see how seconding their staff to CSDP missions helps security at home.

Recent work by DCAF has demonstrated that international police missions have a great potential to contribute to internal security objectives by providing a variety of different benefits. These include the ability to tackle the roots of transnational criminal phenomena and avoiding spill-over effects from fragile countries (upstream disruption); an improved information situation and access to on-the-ground information about political, security and crime-related patterns; significant skill development for secondees that directly benefits their professional tasks upon return; and the creation of a crisis-ready pool of experienced civilian experts to be deployed at short notice.

This added value for internal security does not come automatically. Maximising the benefits requires active engagement at policy, planning and operational level: enabling institutions as well as enabling people to pursue domestic security objectives at the same time as foreign policy.

CSDP–JHA cooperation at the operational level

Input 8: Isabelle Ioannides & Marie–Astrid Huemer

Recommendation

To build on strategic planning, operational conduct and information sharing (Commitment 20, Civilian CSDP Compact), it is crucial to more clearly define and distinguish roles between the CSDP missions and operations, on the one hand, and other EU JHA activities, on the other, as well as delineate responsibilities of actors working on JHA issues on the ground. For this to happen, systematic – even mandatory – consultations and exchanges of information should take place in the host country not only with EU JHA agencies and the CSDP missions, but also with relevant European Commission services. This is especially important when a specialised agency works on an area of responsibility of the European Commission. In that context, the deployment of EU liaison officers (e.g., Frontex officers deployed to manage the migratory flows to the EU), a function that has played a key role in fostering regular exchange of information between EU services and missions, could qualify as a best practice.

To address pre- and post-crisis needs (Commitment 21, Civilian CSDP Compact), including identifying possible loopholes in ongoing programmes and reform processes, CSDP missions and JHA agencies could develop and carry out joint activities during the implementation phase of EU support to JHA reforms. These activities could take the form of capacity-building training programmes and exchanges on expertise and could build on previous assessments.

Why it matters

Past CSDP experience has shown that the involvement of multiple representatives from various EU agencies/missions/services in JHA efforts can adversely affect reforms. It can result in security information being diluted and can create confusion as to actors' respective responsibilities. For example, multiple actors have been active on CT/CVE in the Western Balkans (and at HQ level), including the European Commission, EU liaison officers, special advisers, and EEAS and Council representatives. This has resulted in difficulties at the operational level (in the host country) in identifying whom to address, when and on what subject. For instance, in Kosovo, the tasks and responsibilities of those monitoring JHA policies and those in charge of assistance programmes was/is confusing to non-EU actors.

Given that combating trafficking in human beings is a priority for the international community, numerous donors have engaged in assistance programmes on this policy. However, in North Macedonia, for example, initial capacity-building activities involved exclusively police, prosecutors and judges despite the role that lawyers and labour inspectors could play in detecting, preventing and assisting victims of trafficking. Cooperation with other international organisations could have also bridged this knowledge gap.

CSDP–JHA cooperation at the non–EU level (international and local)

Input 9: Isabelle Ioannides & Marie–Astrid Huemer

Recommendation

In line with the integrated approach to EU crisis management, proactive early–stage consultation of all relevant JHA stakeholders, including local and international partners, on the planning, definition of the mandate and deployment of the CSDP mission is imperative. Equally, such consultation is necessary throughout the entire programming process (the mandate’s implementation, monitoring and evaluation).

In order to strengthen the JHA–related expertise within relevant CSDP structures (Commitment 20, Civilian CSDP Compact), it is crucial to develop guidelines for CSDP staff on their relations with local authorities, including on awareness raising. More specifically, the guidelines could cover customary law practices, social interactions with law enforcement services (*inter alia*, the police) or even best practices on the interaction between minorities and authorities. These guidelines would also complement the EU Policy on Training for CSDP and the EU Civilian Training Group (EUCTG) guidance (Commitment 5, Civilian CSDP Compact).

As the experience of EULEX Kosovo has manifestly shown, for new CSDP missions to be able to build on the experience of previous ones, be they EU or non–EU operations, in–country training (complementing the pre–deployment training) and/or induction courses are necessary. Such training and courses would enable newcomers to reflect on and learn from past activities in JHA policy in an objective and well–informed manner. In addition, better early mapping of ongoing JHA activities and relevant stakeholders would help in designing targeted intervention and coordinating policy.

Why it matters

Research and policy lessons have repeatedly pointed to the importance of ensuring a consistent EU approach to JHA reforms, avoiding duplication between activities and enhancing the effectiveness of EU interventions. It has also been shown that regular cooperation between all EU actors enables those involved in JHA reforms to consult with each other and share information and expertise for better planning, coordination and implementation of their respective tasks. This likely contributes to streamlining processes and improving cost-effectiveness, which in turn strengthens local positive perceptions of EU action (as unified and coherent) and safeguards the EU's credibility.

Local ownership is an underlying principle of the Civilian CSDP Compact that is considered vital for sustainable reforms. Engaging with ministries, professional bodies, and where relevant with municipal authorities, helps integrate local realities into the design and implementation of JHA programmes and initiatives, taking into consideration local knowledge of challenges, needs and expectations, and building legitimacy into the reform process.

Civil–military cooperation and coordination

Input 10: Egmont Institute

Recommendation

Recalling that the European Union's unique strength in managing and preventing crises lies in its ability to deploy both civilian and military assets and capabilities as part of a wider EU integrated approach to external conflicts and crises.

Considering that CSDP provides the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets from the Member

States and thus underlining that strengthening the civilian CSDP requires Member States to develop the required capabilities.

The Member States agree to:

Work effectively together with relevant international partner organisations and other EU instruments as part of a joined-up European approach, based on civil–military synergies within CSDP as well as close cooperation with the Commission services and other relevant EU actors as part of the EU’s integrated approach to conflicts and crises with a view to coherence and coordination with the wider EU engagement, including developmental, stabilisation, humanitarian and political dimensions;

Foster synergies and complementarity between the civilian and military dimensions of CSDP, including in areas of capability development and the operational planning and conduct of missions deployed in the same theatre, in particular in mission support.

Why it matters

There is a need for a boost to the creation and use of synergies between civilian and military missions deployed in the same theatre. At the theatre level, costs could be cut, and efficiency increased through merging security to protect civilian CSDP missions, for instance through the supportive close protection of civilian CSDP staff by military; shared analysis of the security situation; interoperability in IT systems; merging of logistical matters, such as equipment, sanitation, food supply, etc. Of course, such cooperation at theatre level presupposes equal cooperation at the strategic and planning level. Beside synergies, complementarity should be sought based on comparative advantages. In some cases, civilian operators can hook onto mechanisms on the military side, which are already operational. In other cases, the military could make use of civilian-led capabilities.

To identify such opportunities including joint training opportunities and adequate information-sharing modalities, joint planning and task division should be undertaken during joint meetings at CPCC and MPCC levels. Furthermore, given the fast-evolving context at theatre level notably due to a humanitarian crisis which could lead to the emergence of complex emergencies, protocols should be put in place to maintain a distinction between military

and humanitarian actors in the event that the CSDP mission envisages contributing to humanitarian operations. The EU Concept on Effective CIVMIL Coordination in Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief could be considered as part of the CSDP Training Programme curriculum.

CHAPTER 2

Capability development

The Civilian CSDP Compact, agreed upon in 2018, emphasises the responsibility of EU Member States to provide the necessary capabilities for missions to be effective. This responsibility is a central pillar of the Compact. Hence, effective capability development is crucial to enhance the EU's ability to manage and respond to crises with civilian tools. (National) capabilities are the systems and sets of assets in place within Member States to allow them live up to their commitments (among others set out in the Compact) and consequently put missions in the position to deliver their mandates. In the civilian CSDP context, these have included budgetary and legislative (regulatory) frameworks, training and competence building, career path development as well as seconding mechanisms in state institutions and agencies of Member States.

Capabilities are determined through political guidance and should be put in place within a strategic framework. For example, the secondment ratio (70/30), referring to the percentage of staff members seconded by Member States to missions, is a central political commitment to ensure Member States' ownership of CSDP missions, as secondment of staff provides the necessary human resources. However, if the necessary seconding framework, a generic capability, is not in place in any given Member State, secondment will likely not happen. Since 2019, the secondment ratio has been on the decline, and ever more staff are being contracted to civilian CSDP missions. This trend highlights the need for a structured civilian capability development process to assess the capability needs, develop requirements, conduct a gap analysis, periodically review the progress made in line with the new Civilian CSDP Compact and – this is the overall goal – to foster capability development among Member States.

Gender mainstreaming considerations and women's representation are further critical elements of capability development. Ensuring gender mainstreaming at all levels is essential to enhance the diversity and inclusivity of EU crisis management efforts. By ensuring that capability development processes account for women's contribution to essentially all aspects of peace and security, the EU can harness the potential of all stakeholders, resulting in more effective crisis management.

Secondment to missions, gender mainstreaming and women's representation are only some essential capabilities that can contribute to the EU's efforts under its civilian crisis management. No matter the exact capability, all of them require strategic planning and decision-making based on the political guidance from the newly adopted Civilian CSDP Compact. In conclusion, effective and structured capability development at the Member State level is essential to enable the EU to respond effectively and efficiently to crises and establish itself as a credible player for civilian crisis management in the international community. The following inputs from experts outline concrete ways to enhance capability development of Member States for civilian CSDP.

Seconded vs contracted personnel

Input 11: SIPRI

Recommendation

EU Member States must renew the original commitment from the 2018 Civilian CSDP Compact on increasing their national contributions to missions, especially in terms of human resources. The new Compact should include a commitment by Member States to jointly raise the number and share of seconded personnel to at least 70 % of international personnel across all missions and all levels, while aiming for 100 % seconded personnel in operational positions. The

new Compact should include text that reflects that efforts to raise the number of seconded personnel must contribute to geographic and gender balance among mission personnel. To make calls for more equitable burden sharing among Member States more explicit, the Compact should borrow language from the Strategic Compass on facilitating ‘fair share’ contributions to military missions and operations and extend this principle to contributions to civilian CSDP missions, for example in the context of a new civilian capability development process. Importantly, any commitment to raise the number and share of seconded personnel must be complemented with commitments to increase retention and post occupancy rates, and to reduce turnover rates, across all missions and personnel categories.


Why it matters

EU Member States must double down on their commitment to raise the number and share of seconded personnel in missions following the establishment of the new Compact in 2023. The effectiveness and credibility of civilian CSDP as a political instrument owned by EU Member States depends on it. Member States recognised this when they established the current Compact in 2018 and set a target for raising the share of seconded personnel to at least 70 %. The fact that the number of seconded personnel has not structurally increased since 2018 and the share of seconded personnel has decreased overall—from 66 % to 60 %—and in nearly all missions is undermining the narrative that the Compact has been largely successful, and that Member States have been genuinely committed to strengthening civilian CSDP. Member States cannot afford to drop or lower the 70 % target as this would signal that they are lowering their ambition when the opposite is needed. Indeed, the Strategic Compass emphasised the need to further strengthen the EU’s ability to act whenever crises emerge, including through civilian CSDP.

The commitments to raise the number and share of seconded personnel in missions need to be refined and complemented in the new Compact. The current 70 % target is a blunt and arbitrary target that does not consider the large differences in secondment rates within missions, between different post categories. In principle, all personnel in civilian CSDP missions should be provided

Seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions

Share of total per personnel type, %



NB: Does not include Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office (KSC/SPO) personnel. Data: SIPRI, 2023

by EU Member States, pursuant to the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In practice, many operational positions in missions can only be filled by seconded public servants, such as police officers or judges. For various reasons, many non-operational positions in missions have become filled primarily by contracted personnel. Since 2018, the share of seconded personnel has remained high among operational personnel (well above 70 %) and low among non-operational personnel (well below 70 %). The ratio of operational to non-operational personnel varies substantially between missions, which affects secondment rates at the mission level. Refining the 70 % target by adding that it applies to all levels incentivises missions and Member States to increase secondments among non-operational personnel. Aiming for 100 % seconded personnel in operational positions incentivises missions and Member States to increase secondments among operational personnel, even when that share is already relatively high. It is also a way to raise the ambition for the commitment to increase secondments while acknowledging that

missions have different compositions. Any commitment to raise secondments must be complemented with commitments to increase retention and post occupancy rates, and to reduce turnover rates, stipulations that are totally absent in the 2018 Compact. This is not only critical for increasing secondments, but also contributes to the effectiveness of missions by reducing their recruitment needs and capacity gaps, and by prolonging the average tour of duty of their personnel.

Women's participation

Input 12: SIPRI

Recommendation

EU Member States must use the new Civilian CSDP Compact to sharpen their commitment to reduce and eventually eliminate gender gaps in civilian CSDP missions. Already in the preamble, Member States should unequivocally reaffirm their unwavering commitment to promoting gender equality—a core value of the EU—in the EU's external action, including through its civilian CSDP. The new Compact must recognise that removing gender imbalances in missions is a necessary step towards ensuring equal and meaningful participation of men and women, and essential for preserving the EU's credibility as a promotor of gender equality. The new Compact should therefore include a strong commitment to increasing women's representation and underline that gender parity remains the long-term objective. Specifically, Member States should: (i) endorse the CPCC's Strategy and Action Plan to Enhance Women's Participation in Civilian CSDP missions 2021–2024; (ii) aim to increase the representation of women to at least 40 % across all missions and personnel categories; and (iii) commit to ensuring gender parity in appointments of Heads of Mission and other senior management positions. Member States should also request an evaluation of the CPCC's Strategy in the first half of 2025 and aim to adopt

a comprehensive gender parity strategy for CSDP in the second half of 2025, under Denmark's Presidency of the Council of the EU.

Why it matters

The new Compact must be more ambitious and less ambiguous than its forerunner when it comes to gender balance and increasing women's representation in civilian CSDP missions. The 2018 Compact has a commitment to 'promoting' an increase in women's representation without linking this to expected outcomes or targets and makes no reference to gender parity. Introducing these elements would make the new Compact more goal-oriented on this issue and improve it in terms of benchmarks and accountability. It would also bring the objectives for civilian CSDP more into line with existing EU policies, such as the Strategic Approach to Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Gender Action Plan III, and the European Commission's Gender Equality Strategy, as well as international organisations such as the UN and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which have had fully-fledged gender parity strategies in place for their military and civilian field operations since 2017 and 2019, respectively.

An upgraded commitment on women's representation would signal strong support to the EEAS and CPCC, which have made notable progress in this area in recent years. The new Strategy and Action Plan on Women's Participation in Civilian CSDP is a striking example of this. The suggested 40 % target is borrowed directly from it. The strategy looks beyond numbers and aims to break down structural barriers to participation by fostering institutional change through four areas of strategic engagement: (i) equal opportunities in candidacy, recruitment, retention and career development; (ii) an inclusive and harassment-free work environment; (iii) leadership engagement; and (iv) strategic communication and networking. An endorsement of the strategy in the new Compact and the perspective of an evaluation will increase accountability and stimulate reflection during implementation. To enable this, the CPCC should develop additional indicators and metrics for measuring progress, in addition to the actions already listed in the action plan. Finally, including a comprehensive gender parity strategy as a deliverable of the new Compact would provide a timeline for developing it. The

strategy could be adopted in the second half of 2025 around the 25th anniversary of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on WPS. This initiative could be sponsored by a group of like-minded Member States led by Denmark, which will hold the EU Presidency at this time.

Type of missions

Input 13: DGAP

Recommendation

Consider the option: Civilian CSDP missions could offer – by invitation of a country, city or region – to inspect and certify government and broader institutional structures. Although narrow in its activities, this type of mission should be able to cover the full range of existing (and future) CSDP mandates from civil administration to rule of law to protection of cultural heritage, adding up to a comprehensive whole. Host governments would apply to be certified for fulfilling standards set by EU governance professionals. Such ‘TÜV’ teams (TÜV is a German acronym for Technischer Überwachungsverein, a technical inspection association that delivers certification of road-worthiness) would serve to incentivise the take-up of European-style governance at a time of global system competition, as well as establishing the EU flag as a mark of approval for international investors, and potentially providing the basis to expand these TÜV-certified missions on a region-wide/cross-border basis.

If standards are found to be sub-par and it is desired by the host, the TÜV-certified mission could be followed by a ‘traditional’ capacity-building or advisory mission. The TÜV team could then visit again after an agreed interval and make another inspection, while the mission is running. This time, their assessment would also cover the impact of the capacity-building or advisory mission so far. Successful certification would mean the end of the capacity-building or advisory mission. The TÜV teams would fall within the Specialised Teams category and would be pre-assembled and work in the same configuration when sent to different countries,

cities, or regions – each specialised for a different mandate area. However, they would not complement a mission in the usual modular fashion but rather bookend it.

Why it matters

The demand side argument: In the four short years since EU Member States wrote their Civilian CSDP Compact, the international environment has further deteriorated. International crisis management increasingly means dealing with parallel disasters, fragile statehood, (c)overt system competition and the politicisation of foreign advisory missions as vectors of ‘neo-imperialism’. Crisis response has become costlier and more complex than ever, but crisis prevention has become harder too. The ‘TÜV teams’ would prevent the emergence of crises by road-testing domestic institutions. It would create these incentives by providing a stamp and hallmark of quality which would draw in investors – not just under the EU’s Global Gateway programme, but also Chinese, Gulf and North American initiatives, as well as local financial players. The regular ‘TÜV’ test would be based on a set of benchmarks, drawn initially from EU expertise but increasingly also from success stories as well as a degree of mutual learning as more countries join the club and become certified to spread TÜV standards.

The supply side argument: Member States and the EU have assessed that their international influence lies primarily in their combined regulatory power. This is not a new idea. But whereas, in the 1990s, the EU spread its standards abroad mainly by means of reputation and success, it increasingly does so by blunt leverage, using the *quid pro quo* of access to the EU internal market. This method may work well *vis-à-vis* China or the United States but can have negative implications for fragile neighbours, dependent on EU markets. The EU is also increasingly criticised for confusing its market standards with the ‘rules-based international order.’ It would therefore mark a welcome correction if the EU now expanded its understanding of regulatory power to include standards in statecraft. Developing ‘TÜV teams’ would confirm the EU’s commitment to its values and principles and would signal a refusal to compromise in a competitive geopolitical environment. China and Russia have proved ready to win over regimes of all kinds by offering support without overtly

imposing conditions. This could create a global race to the bottom when it comes to governance standards. But as the only major power ready not only to codify its standards but also attract allies by this means, the EU would resist this trend. The EU would offer an attractive and feasible alternative as well as assistance to get there.

Input 14: FBA

Recommendation

Both existing and new types of missions should be better underpinned by regular context analysis to support decision making, respond to concrete needs of the host nation and to become an integral part of the EU's overall political vision. As part of the integrated approach to external conflict and crisis, civilian CSDP missions need to have a flexible and modular approach, respond to new realities, and at the same time be open to new developments such as a deepened approach to civ-mil relations and potential integrated missions. With the current war in Ukraine, the geographical focus for civilian CSDP has naturally shifted more towards the Eastern neighbourhood. This leads to the need to revisit existing concepts such as civilian administration and other relevant aspects of today's missions.

Why it matters

Acknowledging the importance of interlinked engagement of various EU instruments through the integrated approach (in which civilian CSDP is a relevant tool) creates the basis for new developments. New types or updated missions therefore need to respond to an *integrated context analysis* that focuses on the host nation's circumstances and needs on the ground. The full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine on the EU's borders underlines the necessity to further develop connections between external and internal action linked to peace, security and development as well as the JHA instruments. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has directed the geographical focus of civilian CSDP to the Eastern neighbourhood.

The current situation calls for active CSDP support throughout the various stages of conflict, which is linked to ongoing analysis

and a flexible and modular approach. This could for example enable executive and/or robust elements such as executive investigators, gendarmerie forces or similar. It could also facilitate closer ties between civilian and military CSDP missions and operations, or even lead to the creation of integrated missions. Although the current focus on civilian CSDP, including civilian administration, rule of law and police as well as SSR and monitoring, offers a rather broad scope for mission mandate design, given the state of play with an ongoing war in Europe it is high time for some deeper reflection on how to better merge the civ-mil aspects.

The war in Ukraine creates not only an acute IDP/refugee and humanitarian crisis that calls for appropriate and immediate responses, but it also requires a deeper look at the existing civ-mil approach and the possibility for combining the two dimensions in integrated missions. Furthermore, the need for a post-war effort to restore confidence-building, support a reconciliation process, and improve *inter-national* relations and to create conditions for future *intra-country* interaction makes civilian CSDP appear somewhat circumscribed in its current shape and form. A discussion on how synergies between civilian and military CSDP can deepen seems predictable given the war in Ukraine. Based on the current possibilities of the Feira priorities outlined for civilian CSDP, some concrete suggestions including stronger civ-mil synergies can however still be made within the existing framework.

CHAPTER 3

Training

The success of civilian crisis management missions also depends on well-established and effective training standards and procedures. Training is essential in preparing personnel for an international mission context and to ensure their professional and efficient performance in the field – one precondition of missions executing their mandated objectives.

Training directly affects improving practices in the field, amplifying the impact of CSDP missions and the delivery of mandates. Relevant training standards ensure that individual mission members are well-prepared, which enables the teams in any mission to operate cohesively and effectively, as mission staff better understand their roles and responsibilities. This can improve the mission's overall performance and enable it to make a more significant impact in crisis situations.

In addition to improving mission performance, training can help to position CSDP as part of the EU's integrated approach to conflict and crisis. By establishing consistent training standards across EU Member States, CSDP missions can work more closely with other actors in the field, such as multilateral and/or humanitarian organisations and local authorities. This integration can improve coordination and ensure a more comprehensive response to crises, leading to better outcomes for affected populations.

Establishing effective training standards and procedures ensuring training in preparation of deployment and thereafter is essential for successful EU civilian crisis management missions. Training safeguards individual mission members' professional and efficient performance, improves field practices, amplifies the mission's impact, and helps place CSDP as part of an integrated approach to conflict and crisis. Therefore, EU Member States should prioritise

developing and implementing consistent and effective training standards for their civilian crisis management personnel. The following experts' inputs outline tangible ways to enhance this approach to training for civilian CSDP.

Implementing training ⁽¹⁾

Input 15: Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna

Recommendation

CSDP-related training standards at national level shall take stock of work undertaken by the EUCTG on the Training Requirement Analyses (TRAs) and be informed by lessons learned from relevant training activities implemented within the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and EU co-funded (e.g., by Foreign Policy Instrument – FPI) training projects.

The identified CSDP training requirements and priorities outlined in the TRAs should be considered as an additional support tool for Member States and EU institutions in their 'duty of care' regarding recruited and deployed personnel and as a step forward towards the definition of 'quality assurance standards' in priority civilian training areas.

The new Compact should include a reference to the TRAs – as strategic processes for the definition of training standards and requirements – and to the role of Member States in implementing them at national level since this would further contribute to:

1. Enhance the link between CSDP-related training activities carried out by Member States and the operational needs of civilian CSDP

(1) Please refer also to Input 8 in this volume for additional aspects related to training.

2. Enable Member States who deploy civilian personnel to CSDP missions and operations to offer training based on agreed high-level training outcomes prior to deployment
3. Foster the process of harmonisation of CSDP-related training curricula so as to enhance compatible approaches towards the development and management of knowledge and skills that improve the work of crisis management missions
4. Support the deployment of “qualitatively relevant” personnel ready to serve in multilateral contexts.

Why it matters

Effective training standards are pivotal for the successful training of personnel in civilian crisis management. Well-trained personnel directly contribute to improved practices in the field and enhance the impact of the CSDP mission of which they are part. Since its establishment in 2018, the EUCTG has started work aimed at fostering the adoption of adequate training standards for equipping civilian personnel with the appropriate knowledge, skills and competencies as part of the broader EU response to crises. Namely, TRAs have been carried out in priority areas with the objectives to identify gaps and deficiencies as they appear from a structured mapping of available training; to propose ways to avoid redundant training; and to suggest measures necessary to meet training requirements for the civilian training area at stake.

The 19 TRAs already developed by Civilian Coordinators for Training (CCTs) nominated by Member States and approved by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom), identify CSDP training requirements in priority areas. A process of alignment to the recommendations contained in the TRAs for training curricula relevant for CSDP is already ongoing at national and EU level. The human and financial resources that Member States have invested through their nominated CCTs should be further capitalised by framing and offering training that reflects the CSDP training requirements derived from existing policies and lessons identified, CSDP specific performance objectives and high-level learning outcomes outlined in the TRAs.

Input 16: EPLO

with contributions by
**NONVIOLENT PEACEFORCE, PEACE DIRECT, SAFERWORLD,
 CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT (CIVIC)**

Recommendation

Training for civilian CSDP missions needs to ensure that personnel are adequately prepared to understand and help shape the environment of their areas of operations, including in relation to the needs of the local populations. Training prior to deployment should include sessions on international humanitarian law, human rights, gender equality, civilian–military cooperation, human security and conflict sensitivity, as well as anti–racism and intercultural communication.

Why it matters

As per the EU’s commitments, training on conflict sensitivity for planners and implementers is needed to ensure that the missions do no harm and instead maximise their positive impact on conflict dynamics⁽²⁾. The EU’s efforts should also contribute to ‘rolling out mandatory training on mainstreaming gender perspectives for all staff at HQ, EU delegations, CSDP missions and operations etc’⁽³⁾. In line with the recommendations provided by the EUCTG⁽⁴⁾, fur-

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- (2)** See: General Secretariat of the Council, ‘Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises – Council Conclusions’, 22 January 2018. The document stresses ‘the need for EU’s engagement in fragile contexts to work in a conflict sensitive manner’ (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5413-2018-INIT/en/pdf>); See also General Secretariat of the Council, ‘European Consensus for Development’, 19 May 2017, which notes that the EU and its Member States ‘will integrate conflict sensitivity in all their work, to maximise the positive impact on peace’ (<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24011/european-consensus-for-development-st09459en17.pdf>).
- (3)** European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – An ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU external action’, 25 November 2020 (<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020JC0017&from=EN>).
- (4)** European External Action Service, ‘Report on the Follow-up Baseline Study on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality into the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy’, 17 May 2022 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9198-2022-INIT/en/pdf>).

ther training should also focus on international humanitarian law and human rights. Training on intercultural communication and anti-racism could also help address and mitigate issues related to deep-rooted structural/systemic racism, from which CSDP structures are not exempt.

As most of the training prior to deployment is carried out by Member States, the EU should develop a set of standards and make sure training sessions organised by Member States are harmonised, not only concerning technical aspects and knowledge, but also in relation to human security, civil-military coordination⁽⁵⁾, conflict sensitivity and gender equality. More efforts are needed to ensure that all staff receive training prior to deployment as described above⁽⁶⁾.

Input 17: CoE

Recommendation

Ensuring proper development in training and education requires a four-tiered process that entails quantity, quality, timeliness, and requirements of training. This is highlighted in the new Compact.

Regarding *quality*, Member States must develop guidance and coordination in their training approach to ensure implementation of their commitment to the EU Policy on Training for CSDP. Concretely, this means mission preparation training should become mandatory and consist of an aligned (i) hostile environment awareness training (HEAT); (ii) pre-deployment training (PDT) (online combined with bilateral meetings with desk officers at the EEAS *et al.*); (iii) a generic comprehensive mission preparation process; and (iv) mission induction (post-deployment, to be carried out by missions).

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- (5)** Especially where civilian and military CSDP missions operate on the same territory, training needs to include civilian-military cooperation, leading to an understanding of missions' respective roles and opportunities for cooperation. This should include the roles of the missions in enhancing protection of civilians, supporting humanitarian operations, and building partner capacity to abide by IHL and IHRL.
- (6)** As stated in the Report on the Follow-up Baseline Study on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality into the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy: 'As of 2017, pre-deployment training is mandatory for all staff. Although the percentage of staff that were given a pre-deployment training session involving human rights and gender equality elements has increased since 2015, more than a third of respondents did not receive such a session.'

Regarding *quantity*, Member States must share and pool their training resources (national and EU-based such as ESDC and FPI-funded projects). However, as sharing and pooling would not be sufficient for all secondees and contracted staff EU-wide, additional training resources could be provided by FPI and administered through an external party.

Regarding *timeliness*, seconding authorities in the Member States and CPCC should agree to add a period of about 10–14 days to be added to personnel contracts prior to deployment to allow sufficient time for mission preparation for all secondees and contracted staff, equipping them with the abovementioned training elements (itemised in the paragraph on *quality*).

Regarding *requirements*, training should become a mandatory requirement for the selection and deployment to civilian CSDP missions and be agreed upon as a matter of liability and duty of care by Member States.

Why it matters

The 2018 Civilian CSDP Compact recognises the interlinkage between training and human resources management in commitments 5 and 10, setting the minimum training requirements for the selection and deployment of all mission members. However, these commitments have yet to be fully implemented and require continued attention in the new Compact.

The current EU Policy on Training for CSDP (2017) was adopted before the Civilian CSDP Compact (2018) and the Strategic Compass (2022) and requires revision and adaptation. Training safeguards the professional and efficient performance of individual mission members and thereby directly impacts the effectiveness of the civilian CSDP mission and the delivery of mandates. It also matters in terms of avoiding liability of seconding agencies, Heads of Mission (HoMs) as well as the Civilian Operations Commander.

Input 18: FBA

Recommendation

In line with the existing EU policy on training for CSDP, its implementing guidelines and strategic guidance for civilian CSDP, EU-level training should be reemphasised as a *strategic tool* to implement policy and underpin EU principles and democratic values. The relevance of pooling and sharing among Member States can be utilised further through the ESDC network as the overall umbrella for CSDP training. Aiming for shared standards, the TRAs should continue to be translated into practice. As part of the duty of care for mission personnel, adequate funding should be identified to ensure mandatory pre-deployment and hostile environment training prior to deployment.

Why it matters

Placing CSDP in a broader context and as part of the integrated approach to conflict and crisis is an important element of CSDP training. CSDP supports the whole conflict cycle and is linked to conflict prevention, stabilisation and other crisis management efforts. Areas such as international humanitarian law (IHL) and refugee law, human rights and gender equality should be an integral part of the training.

The ESDC network should further highlight the benefits of pooling and sharing among Member States. The training architecture with shared responsibility between the Member States, the EU institutions and dedicated bodies (including ESDC and EEAS) are important for the success of CSDP training. More can however be done to enhance ESDC as the relevant body for both strategic and operational training, e.g., by linking up Commission-funded projects (i.e., EUCTI, EUPCST) under such an overarching structure.

The PDT run by various Member States and the EEAS within the ESDC is a good example of how pooled training can support missions and operations. PDT and HEAT are part of the duty of care and should be part of the on-boarding process for all mission personnel. This connects also to the efforts to build a safe and inclusive working environment including awareness of standards of behaviour and

code of conduct. To fully ensure the mandatory aspect of PDT, as outlined in the training policy, ways to link existing funding to the PDT need to be examined further. Also, the link between training and selection procedures should be strengthened. The 'onboarding package for CSDP' should also include other relevant and more specialised pre-training to better match various job descriptions.

The development of TRAs for a broad range of training areas relevant for the success of the CSDP is much welcomed. Translating TRAs and shared standards into practice by following up on the recommendations is an important next step. This has already been initiated in the ESDC curricula development process. A learner-centred, interactive approach to the design and delivery of training courses should also be promoted. A broad range of thematic training areas is essential to improve the skillset needed for personnel working in or with CSDP. The improvement of knowledge management of CSDP-related documents and shared tools for the purpose of training is welcomed. More could be done to develop thematic background material such as applied texts on policy documents and concepts, mini-exercises, tutors' handbooks etc. Here Commission-funded projects and the CoE could provide additional support.

CHAPTER 4

Plan, analyse, assess and evaluate

A good understanding of civilian CSDP missions in theatre is central to the progress of any civilian CSDP mission. However, currently, there is no shared conceptual understanding of evaluating and assessing the effectiveness and impact of CSDP missions among the EEAS or EU Member States. The current assessment of CSDP missions is limited to evaluating how effectively the missions use their resources and which, primarily quantitative, indicators they can fulfil. Although the EEAS conducts regular strategic reviews of CSDP missions and, in individual cases, country assessments, these exercises often lack a homogenous methodological and analytical approach, and their independence can be questioned.

CSDP lacks critical monitoring and evaluation functions, which have increasingly become the norm among many bilateral partners and international organisations. This hampers the assessment of mandate implementation, limits the situational awareness of missions, and impedes the understanding of progress made in the CSDP realm among EU actors and national counterparts. This results in a failure to grasp what CSDP missions deliver for the Member States and, most importantly, the host countries.

By implementing more precise planning, analysis, assessment and evaluation of missions, Member States can crystallise their national procedures in terms of goal setting for their participation in civilian CSDP, which would feed into a broader, positive discussion on the merits and possibilities of civilian CSDP, also providing enhanced strategic understanding and guidance on its direction in the future. Apart from that, there is a need for a systematic approach

to knowledge management within CSDP structures – establishing effective processes for lessons learned and closing knowledge gaps against the backdrop of high staff turnover is essential to demonstrate the ability of civilian CSDP to deliver targeted and timely results.

Implementing clearer and more structured planning, analysis, assessment and evaluation procedures, among other elements, as a systematic approach to knowledge management is crucial to enhance the effectiveness of CSDP missions. By doing so, Member States can better understand the impact of CSDP missions, ultimately guiding the future direction of civilian CSDP. The following experts' inputs outline concrete ways to enhance planning, assessment and evaluation procedures in EU civilian crisis management.

Overall objectives

Input 19: EPLO

with contributions by
**NONVIOLENT PEACEFORCE, PEACE DIRECT, SAFERWORLD,
CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT (CIVIC)**

Recommendation

Civilian CSDP missions will recognise that their overall objectives need to be underpinned by a commitment to human security as a key factor contributing to security and stability. Missions informed by a peacebuilding approach with regular gender, conflict and political economy analysis would be more effective in addressing underlying causes of conflicts and therefore contributing to building lasting, positive peace and stability.

Why it matters

Article 21 (2c) of the TEU commits to ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter’⁽¹⁾. The EU’s 2016 Global Strategy commits to an integrated approach to conflicts, whereby the ‘EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, and foster human security’⁽²⁾. The 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence states that the EU ‘remain[s] strongly committed to promoting and advancing human security and the respect of and the compliance with International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the protection of civilians’⁽³⁾. The EU’s civilian CSDP missions’ overall objectives should therefore align with these commitments on peace and human security.

Defining the overall objectives of civilian CSDP missions in a restrictive manner – for example, focusing on curbing the manifestations of irregular migration or the rise of extremism without addressing the root causes that create the conditions for their rise – is likely to lead to a focus on technical aspects relating to police and border guard capabilities to the detriment of efforts to improve the economic situation and human rights, as well as overall SSR and legitimacy and accountability of security institutions. Research has shown that grievances against security institutions, often caused by abuses and mistreatment against civilians, lack of capacity, and corruption, can fuel recruitment by extremist groups⁽⁴⁾. Applying a human security lens to help define the objectives of missions would enable a focus on measures that could contribute to increasing the institutional competency of national security forces and to building

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- (1)** Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union - TITLE V: GENERAL PROVISIONS ON THE UNION’S EXTERNAL ACTION AND SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY - Chapter 1: General provisions on the Union’s external action - Article 21, 2008 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2008/art_21/oj).
 - (2)** ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy’, op.cit.
 - (3)** European External Action Service, *A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence*, March 2022. (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf).
 - (4)** United Nations Development Programme, ‘Journey to Extremism in Africa’, 2017 (<https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/downloads/UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf>).

trust between institutions and populations, which could help increase social cohesion and resilience and support development. In order to improve the effectiveness of CSDP missions, the EU and its Member States should share more information about the impact of missions on conflict dynamics and discuss more openly their added value as well as cost-effectiveness in comparison to European Commission support to locally-led initiatives.

Analysis capabilities

Input 20: FBA

Recommendation

Preventative conflict analysis should be included in CSDP reporting and mission analysis for better informed EU decision-making and to link mandates to the overarching peace and security agenda. By improving thematic understanding in areas such as human rights, gender, civil affairs, protection of civilians, and SSR, recommendations can be put forward to build and to strengthen a more coherent case for change in conflict dynamics. Furthermore, CSDP mission analysis needs to improve vertically and horizontally to ensure a more integrated and holistic analysis.

Why it matters

The recommendation matters for better informed EU decision-making. The conflicts in which CSDP missions operate are not one-dimensional or linear but are often inherently complex, influenced by several factors and events. For CSDP mission reporting and analysis to remain effective and relevant it is limited to fit the needs of the implementation plan and the narrative in which it is embedded. This limits the reporting and analysis to the scope of EU activities and its stance *vis-à-vis* conflict parties and issues, and can often remain quite technical in nature. By contextualising the reporting in a larger framework and by drawing more upon local and

regional mission capabilities, maybe even at the stage of mission planning, a more vertically and horizontally integrated approach to conflict analysis can be generated. By mandating a broader analysis there is potential to strengthen CSDP mission objectives further and to contribute to the EU's peace and security agendas in a greater variety of ways. CSDP missions tend to remain in conflict settings for long periods of time (10 years+), and by improving institutional memory (knowledge management) in conjunction with strengthened analysis of local and regional conflict dynamics and how they fit into a wider national or even geopolitical scope/narrative, potential conflict triggers can be identified earlier, and confidence-building measures put in place.

A broader reporting and analytical scope that reflects the local and regional perspective can contribute to solution-driven peace-building efforts and encourage relevant dialogue on local and regional levels. Understanding an array of methodologies for conflict mapping, stakeholder analysis, identification of conflict drivers and long-term information management tools to enable an intersectoral analysis framework can aid this approach. Also, better awareness needs to be created among EU management structures, planning officers and Member States of the various profiles and functions of roles such as information managers, knowledge managers, mission analytical capabilities and reporting officers, and how they can be better utilised and contribute to a more robust, accumulative and consistent analysis that can generate impact.

Evaluation and assessment

Input 21: CMC Finland

Recommendation

The Council and the Member States should commit to continuing and expanding the development of systematic and transparent evaluation of the impact of the missions, continuing, enhancing and expanding Commitment 13 of the existing Compact and the Concept

Paper on Strengthening Civilian CSDP (2018). The previously un-addressed areas, such as outcome, impact and sustainability need to be included, to create a comprehensive and standardised system of evaluation. This system would produce a comparable analysis on the effectiveness and impact of the missions, also for external use, while resting on an internally developing Knowledge Management System piloted by the EEAS. This commitment should be executed in collaboration between the relevant bodies of the EEAS and the Member States, applying the existing resources produced by numerous Commission-funded research projects⁽⁵⁾, consulting similar systems in operation⁽⁶⁾ and in liaison with international entities of expertise⁽⁷⁾, to first agree on the concepts to be used, the scope of the evaluation and the division of work, including addressing the question of how to use an external evaluator for added objectivity. After reaching the conceptual and methodological understanding, a comprehensive and standardised evaluation should commence. The execution of this commitment should be closely monitored by the Member States, possibly through a periodic review process, linked to PFCA and Strategic Reviews. This would turn evaluation and impact assessment into a regularly applied tool. It should be assured that the results of the evaluations would directly feed into the decision-making and planning processes of civilian CSDP, making possible a more effective and adaptive model of crisis management with documented added value for the local beneficiaries and the Member States.

Why it matters

Currently there is no shared conceptual understanding on the concepts of evaluation, assessment, effectiveness and impact among the EEAS bodies or the Member States. The quality of existing evaluation on all levels is questionable, as measurable goals and indicators are not set. The current assessment of the missions is limited

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- (5)** Including but not limited to H2020 projects Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention (IECEU) and EU-CIVCAP.
 - (6)** Such as the UN Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS).
 - (7)** Such as the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON).

to evaluating how effective the missions are in using the resources at their disposal and which, mostly quantitative, indicators they are able to fulfil. This is ignoring the actual impact of the missions in their operational environments and beyond. It is currently unclear what the missions are delivering for the Member States, and most importantly for the host countries. This explains the current prevailing disinterest towards civilian CSDP.

In executing this commitment, Member States would also have the opportunity to crystallise their own national procedures in terms of goal setting for their own participation in civilian CSDP, which would feed into a broader, positive discussion on the merits and possibilities of civilian CSDP, also providing guidance on its direction.

Input 22: DCAF

Recommendation

Enhance CSDP mission reviews by developing and applying a standardised evaluation approach which accounts for the specific logic of crisis management, focuses on mission contributions at the country level, and assesses the integration of CSDP missions into the wider EU country portfolio. Evaluations should be carried out at regular intervals, during transition points, and at the termination of a mission, to become a cornerstone of CSDP's overarching institutional learning and enable an encompassing learning strategy for the CSDP mechanism as a whole. Evaluations should be conducted through internal joint evaluation teams, to foster synergies and cooperation between CSDP, Commission/Delegation and JHA components at country and strategic levels. Adequate resourcing at the mission as well as HQ levels to design, conduct, oversee and process evaluations will be essential for the effectiveness of strategic evaluations in informing mission adaptation and institutional learning.

Why it matters

Based on observations from numerous DCAF mandates directly or indirectly engaged with CSDP missions, CSDP currently lags behind in developing critical monitoring and evaluation functions which

have become the norm among many bilateral partners and international organisations. CSDP missions do undergo regular strategic reviews by the EEAS, and in individual cases may have been subject to country assessments. These exercises however remain fragmented, unsystematic, and often limited to operational effects; and few examples exist of evidence-driven adaptation of individual country missions or the CSDP mechanism as a whole. The lack of verified and sharable results data not only hampers the effectiveness of the CSDP missions but limits situational awareness and understanding of progress made in the sector among EU and international partners, as well as national counterparts.

Establishing a robust evaluation mechanism that coherently assesses contributions and impact will provide the CSDP mission leadership with critical data to enhance delivery and identify new opportunities for support. More importantly, if conducted as an internal exercise and contributed to by the various EU stakeholders at country and strategic levels, such evaluations can provide a platform for enhanced strategic understanding and collaboration, as well as assist in bridging the divides between EU portfolios in-country, at the regional and strategic levels. Finally, after decades in the field, CSDP missions offer a wealth of experience in addressing conflict and building security and justice sectors that remains to be fully harnessed through systematic learning.

While focusing in our submission on strategic evaluations and learning, the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) strongly supports the incorporation of the other sub-themes proposed under this section – notably on conflict/context analysis, analysis capability and mission objectives – as critical functions to enable and complement evaluations. In particular, adequate investment into articulation of the envisaged intervention logic, core objectives and targets during the planning phase will be a crucial precursor for evaluations to be able to assess what has been achieved.

With a view to the significance of the CSDP mechanism and its long-standing presence across the globe, we would also suggest adding a separate recommendation on an institutional learning strategy to support long-term development of CSDP approach and delivery structures; or alternatively establish institutional learning as a core component of the ‘plan, analyse, assess, and evaluate’

functions which hitherto appear heavily focused on the individual mission contexts.

Input 23: German Police University

Recommendation

As the international engagement in Afghanistan has shown, it is not enough to help – what is paramount is to do it the right way. Evaluation is one key element in this regard.

Applying the participatory approach to evaluation helps increase the understanding of the benefits and methods of evaluation. The idea of the participatory approach is to include all or selected actors – clients (e.g. the CPCC), implementers (e.g. mission leaders) and beneficiaries (e.g. representatives of local partners) – in the planning and implementation of the evaluation. Their information needs are at the core of the project. A central component of the approach is to continuously increase knowledge about the evaluation – not only on the part of the evaluators, but also of the clients and implementers – e.g., in joint meetings and workshops on key topics such as setting goals, data collection and evaluation results.

Why it matters

The EU is increasingly taking responsibility in the field of international peace and security. With increasing commitments and expenses, the pressure to prove successful is also growing – and with it the pressure to evaluate CSDP missions according to international standards. The focus is on the questions of how effective and sustainable missions and the measures they take are and to what extent they tangibly tie in with the complex activities of other international actors. Another central question is whether and how evaluation results and lessons learned are effectively used for future engagements – in the political process as well as by implementing actors. However, since systematic, impact-oriented evaluations in this field are a relatively new phenomenon, there is a lack of strategies that have proven successful for dealing with the specific challenges in this policy area. One example is the particularly sensitive political context in which international security engagement takes

place and which tends to pose serious obstacles for mission leaders and evaluators. Furthermore, EU CSDP missions often break new ground. For this reason, it is all the more important to monitor their effectiveness and sustainability, to adjust their parameters if necessary and to use the lessons learned to plan and implement future missions and measures.

Participatory evaluations are a suitable means for creating knowledge about the often dynamic and complex local context in countries of intervention, facilitating access to the field and a better understanding of evaluation results among all actors involved. Although the participatory evaluation approach is complex and time-consuming, and requires considerable human resources and a high level of communication and learning ability on all sides, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Experience has shown that the actors involved can make better use of evaluation results because they better understand and accept them. In addition, the approach helps evaluators to ensure access to the field: in regular joint events and meetings, important contacts are maintained, and trust is built. Ideally, this leads to an improved supply of information and to a broader database – and thus to improved and more useful evaluation results and recommendations.

Knowledge management

Input 24: CMC & FIHA

Recommendation

The Council and Member States should commit to developing a systematic and structured approach to knowledge management for civilian CSDP to facilitate information sharing, organisational learning and institutional memory. Policy and practical guidelines for knowledge management should be drafted in consultation with producers and consumers of information in the CSDP architecture, to ensure that the needs and responsibilities of all parties are addressed. To facilitate information sharing, and to build bridges between silos

of knowledge, a network of staff tasked with knowledge management should be created across the whole of the CSDP architecture. In civilian CSDP missions, reporting officers and Mission Analytical Capability (MAC) analysts could potentially function as focal points. Knowledge retention in the face of staff turnover should be a key focus. The CPCC requires strengthened knowledge management capabilities in the form of dedicated staff and information tools, as it plays a key role in bridging and synthesising information between civilian missions, EEAS and Commission stakeholders, as well as Member States. To support this triangular approach, existing fragmentary information should be collected into an information repository, in the form of an annual report or database. Knowledge management should be periodically discussed with Member States, in learning exercises and the annual civilian CSDP conference, to facilitate a joint understanding of the state of civilian CSDP.

Why it matters

The lack of a systemic approach to knowledge management derives from the initial institutional development of CSDP structures, light and scattered to start with, which created space for individuals to play critical roles in defining institutional relations and working methods. Short tours of service exacerbated the lack of a common memory and a shared strategic culture from the beginning, as processes of institutional learning have to be repeated due to staff changes and turnover. Member States also struggle with institutional memory issues due to similar staff rotation in national services. Effective processing of identified lessons and closing gaps in knowledge management are essential to demonstrate the ability of civilian CSDP to remain timely and adaptive.

The current level of knowledge management reduces the utility of lessons learned processes, evaluation of missions and institutional learning in CSDP. For example, strategic reviews and evaluations of CSDP missions should better reflect successes, failures and options on the ground to adapt missions to changing circumstances but are hampered due to a lack of systematic and genuine analysis on the ground, and an institutional structure to follow up and translate the identified lessons into practical outcomes and developments. 'Dressing up' reports is a recognised challenge in CSDP,

which can also be addressed through structured and analytical information and knowledge management processes.

Another question relates to the agents of knowledge management. EU actors are constrained in their access to actionable information, especially in hostile contexts, which poses a challenge to operational planning. While strategic reviews already serve as an opportunity for e.g. civil society actors to advise CSDP, a more inclusive approach to knowledge management would allow insight from a wider European community – and even partners from the host states – to be integrated into the EU’s CSDP. A structured knowledge management process helps CSDP actors to take cognisance of and remember external perspectives on their work.

Input 25: EPLO

with contributions by
NONVIOLENT PEACEFORCE, PEACE DIRECT, SAFERWORLD

Recommendation

The EEAS should develop a knowledge management (KM) architecture to retain expertise, best practices and lessons learned in a more systematic way, and encourage a culture of learning among staff working in and on civilian CSDP missions. Missions should foster a culture of transparency, accountability and performance management and make a genuine commitment to monitoring, evaluation and learning on an ongoing basis. Best practices should be harnessed and integrated into missions. Regular internal learning exercises should draw on gender-balanced evidence and testimony from affected populations and civil society.

Why it matters

Developing a KM strategy and identifying KM tools would enhance the communication between the missions and EEAS headquarters and contribute to creating synergies and collaboration between planning and implementation, avoiding duplication of work and increasing knowledge retention and sharing. It would also support

the network of human rights, gender and civil society advisers and cement their roles as a community of practitioners⁽⁸⁾. A stronger culture of learning within CSDP structures could encourage personnel to be more self-reflective about the impact of their work and be more open to discuss successes and mistakes. These practices could be encouraged through monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mentoring schemes, inclusion of relevant provisions in job descriptions, staff reviews and other internal management tools.

Operational guidelines should be developed for regular assessments of missions. Missions should report on both strengths and shortcomings and involve communities in monitoring results and adapting actions. Frequent structured dialogue meetings with civil society that work on issues relevant to the mission mandate should be put in place. These would contribute to undertaking regular and effective participatory analyses of conflict, peace and power dynamics, as well as community security and justice needs. Such analysis should inform the design of policies, strategies and responses to mitigate harmful risks, respond to people's needs, and build on the resulting more nuanced understanding of social and political issues. Missions are often deployed in conflict-affected and volatile settings which are subject to rapid and unpredictable changes. Committing to regular learning exercises and assessments of the missions and conflict analysis will help ensure that missions remain sensitive to conflict dynamics and increase mission staff's awareness of how and when to adapt actions in order to be responsive to people's priorities and needs.

Input 26: IFSH

Recommendation

The European Union should establish an operational knowledge repository for (police) work within CSDP, more specifically, a unit and/or mechanism to collect, systematise, contextualise and distribute operational knowledge and thematic expertise on (police)

(8) 'Report on the Follow-up Baseline Study on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality into the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy', op.cit.

work carried out under the umbrella of civilian CSDP. This knowledge repository should either be embedded within existing institutional arrangements for knowledge management (e.g., ISP.1), delegated to a suitable service provider (like the European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management), or could be newly established within the CPCC. As part of such a unit, seconded national (police) experts, supported by knowledge management experts and/or academics, would systematically collect, curate, contextualise and reflect on operational knowledge (e.g., through exit-interviews or focus groups) and technical expertise (e.g., thematic training curricula or project proposals). The aim of such a repository is to make accessible the vast amount of operational expertise that already exists but as of now largely resides with individual experts or officers.

Depending on the level of ambition, a dedicated police knowledge repository, run as a pilot project, could serve as nucleus and testing ground in order to then expand its scope and branch out into other fields later on. An expanded repository could include other areas of expertise crucial for civilian CSDP as well as relevant links to the field of JHA.

Why it matters

Police-related tasks have been a key component of most civilian CSDP missions. However, since in many areas police work is still dominated by distinctly national approaches, police work within CSDP missions often is an amalgamation of different national policing practices. Research indicates that when introducing specific policing practices in host states, officers regularly exercise a considerable degree of discretion and either rely on their own domestic models or create hybrid approaches by drawing on practices from several Member States⁽⁹⁾. Over time, due to continuous change and adaptation, policing approaches can become specific to individual missions ('the EULEX way of doing things'). Moreover, incoming mission members may have to first familiarise themselves with

(9) Neubauer, P., 'Making the international work: Police training experts as brokers for international missions', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 29, No 3, 2022, pp. 522-547 (<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2022.2047026?src=recsys>).

the specific approach that is used within a certain mission (e.g., a Scandinavian public order policing concept promoted as ‘best European practice’ by EUAM Ukraine).

Several Member States already conduct interviews with returnees⁽¹⁰⁾. However, insights from these interviews usually only serve to update or adapt existing prior-to-deployment preparation procedures. Specific insights about operational practices are not made accessible to a wider audience of (police) experts.

An operational (police) knowledge repository offers three inter-linked advantages:

- > It serves as a complementary knowledge resource to handover protocols. Before being deployed, incoming mission members can already familiarise themselves with specific (policing) practices that are present within a certain mission.
- > Instead of simply introducing what officers or experts ‘know from back home’, an operational knowledge repository (where training curricula, project proposals, doctrinal documents and other products are accessible) enables officers and experts to rely on a variety of approaches that can then be adapted to fit specific host state contexts.
- > Over time, systematic feedback and institutionalised reflection on operational knowledge retained within the knowledge repository may contribute to organisational learning and the identification of ‘good practice’ models on the operational level.

(10) Caparini, M. and Osland, K., *Knowledge Management and Police Peacekeepers: Experiences and recommendations*, NUPI Report, Oslo, 2017 (<https://www.nupi.no/en/publications/cristin-pub/knowledge-management-and-police-peacekeepers-experiences-and-recommendations>).

CHAPTER 5

New areas of focus

The EU plays a critical role in crisis management by providing much-needed support through civilian CSDP missions for short and long-term stabilisation efforts. In 2000, at the Santa Maria da Feira summit, the European Council identified policing, the rule of law, civil administration, and civil protection as the priority areas for the EU in crisis management (the so-called Feira principles). Since then, the Civilian Headline Goals were expanded in 2008 to add two additional priorities: monitoring missions and support for EU Special Representatives, as well as focusing on (civilian) SSR as well as DDR to provide a comprehensive and coordinated EU response to crises. Notwithstanding this, the geopolitical landscape has changed significantly since 2010. New crises have emerged, including those linked to irregular migration, hybrid threats, terrorism and radicalisation, and violent extremism, becoming ever more complex.

To tackle emerging challenges in civilian crisis management, the EU and its Member States should explore new areas of engagement, including climate-related security risks, and promote gender-responsive leadership. It should also prioritise mediation efforts, youth empowerment and human security protection in all aspects of its crisis management. By integrating these areas into civilian CSDP, the EU and its Member States can contribute to a more peaceful and sustainable future for all by better addressing the multifaceted challenges of today. The following expert inputs introduce concrete ways in which the EU and its Member States can enhance their engagement in these critical areas.

Climate and security


Input 27: DCAF

Recommendation

Do not overload the role of the environmental advisor with tasks requiring different skillsets and positions. A focus on key tasks could be ensured by deploying visiting experts to the missions to assess the situation and jointly with the mission determine the Terms of Reference (ToRs) for incoming environmental advisors. Walking the walk on climate and environmental


Climate security

EU discussions and policies over the years



security requires making the investment and necessary resources available.

A holistic approach to environmental crime is required to deliver people- and planet-centred security. This means recognising the difference between livelihood-driven environmental crimes and organised crime; responses need to include, on the one hand, building institutional capacities to combat environmental crime such



as working on legislation, strengthening law enforcement and the criminal justice chain, supporting oversight and anti-corruption initiatives; in short, a balanced approach. On the other hand it requires addressing the livelihood dimensions around environmental crime from a community perspective, with the mission supporting dialogue between communities and law enforcement, and making connections to actors proposing alternative livelihood interventions.

Leveraging access and coordination as CSDP missions are uniquely placed to convene and monitor efforts of other EU, multilateral, and bilateral actors, as well as work towards funding across the triple nexus. This requires significant resources towards playing such a convening and coordination role, but it will multiply results.

Learning lessons and gathering evidence of what works before deploying large resources on environmental crime as a new focus area for civilian CSDP. There should be a lessons-learning exercise that gathers evidence from these three missions on what has worked well, where the bottlenecks were and what could be learned for future mission planning and implementation.

Leveraging political clout: Civilian CSDP missions are uniquely placed to have access to a partner country's political leadership as well as security institutions. This access should be purposefully leveraged to raise awareness of the importance of people and planet-centric security concepts, especially when there might be sensitivities around environmental crime or issues of prioritisation. This requires a combination of political capacity and awareness of climate and environmental security risks.

Exploring additional areas beyond environmental crime: It is worth considering exploring additional areas beyond environmental crime. Police in most countries have a strong role to play in civil protection that might be in need of prioritisation and support. Civilian CSDP missions could also leverage expertise around institutional reform, change management and strategic advising procedures to work with security sector actors in a broader sense, such as park rangers and civil protection agencies. Finally, when working on community policing, specific skills around early warning as well as mediation of climate-induced conflict would be useful additions.

Why it matters

Relevant policies and commitments, including most recently the so-called mini-concept on climate change, recognise environmental crime as one of the main possible focus areas for civilian CSDP missions and the importance of the latter stepping up their engagement on climate and environmental security. A core area is the mitigation of climate change by protecting the environment and functioning ecosystems.

Currently, there are three missions (EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL COPPS, EUCAP Somalia) whose mandate includes working on environmental crime. Moreover, there is a commitment to deploying an environmental advisor to each mission. The tasks expected from environmental advisors cover a very broad range of issues, ranging from duty of care aspects, reducing mission footprint, and climate security-sensitive conflict analysis to possibly advising host countries' security forces on their footprint.

An ongoing stocktaking study by DCAF across four countries has confirmed that there is significant underexplored potential of security sector actors to be leveraged for the purposes of human and planetary security. Working at this nexus requires integrated approaches that combine actors from different policy communities, such as climate, environment, peace and security, sustainable development and infrastructure, as well as political clout. This complexity of stakeholders and communities of practices makes coordination an utmost priority. Moreover, community-driven approaches and community resilience are of high importance for sustainable and effective solutions.

Input 28: EPLO

with contributions by
CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT (CIVIC)

Recommendation

Civilian CSDP should be part of a broader political strategy aiming at addressing the root causes of conflict, including as they intersect with the effects of climate change. Mandates of CSDP missions should be informed by climate-sensitive conflict analysis, and activities should limit to the extent possible their environmental footprint. CSDP missions should also seek to limit the damage caused to the environment by armed conflict, promote rules and support partners' capacities to conflict-sensitive environmental protection. Personnel of civilian CSDP missions should be adequately trained in mainstreaming climate sensitivity.

Why it matters

The EU has recognised and committed to addressing the risks posed by the climate-conflict nexus⁽¹⁾. Climate change can exacerbate violence and threatens to spark future conflicts, including due to its effects on access to natural resources, the movement of population groups and people's trust in authorities⁽²⁾.

In light of these challenges, it is essential for the personnel of CSDP missions to be sufficiently aware of how the climate-conflict nexus affects the context where they are intervening, particularly with regard to what it means for civilian protection, environmental protection, and the ability of authorities to deliver services to their populations and ensure their safety (including with regard to the

(1) European External Action Service, 'Concept for an Integrated Approach to Climate Change and Security', October 2022 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12537-2021-INIT/en/pdf>).

(2) For example, see Center for Civilians in Conflict, "If I leave, I cannot breathe": Climate change and civilians protection in Iraq', July 2022 (<https://civiliansinconflict.org/if-i-leave-i-cannot-breathe-climate-change-and-civilian-protection-in-iraq/>).

risks of violence that may arise following extreme weather events). It also means that the environmental footprint of CSDP missions should be minimised to the greatest extent possible, in order to ‘do no harm’ and to ensure that missions are not perceived negatively by local populations.

As part of their activities aimed at building the capacities of partner governments and their security forces, CSDP missions should also support their ability to address the climate–conflict nexus in a manner that is sensitive to the needs of local populations, particularly with regard to how their livelihoods may depend on natural resources and their environment. Strengthening the role of environmental advisers in civilian CSDP missions is crucial in order to improve engagement with the local populations and better understand their needs and concerns in connection to climate change, environmental degradation and conflict.

Input 29: FBA

Recommendation

In general terms, the EU has identified climate change and wider environmental degradation as risks to international peace and security. Furthermore, climate-related security risks are evident in most of the places where EU missions are present, and the EU needs to understand and integrate these risks in planning and analysis for these missions. In order to pinpoint the importance of climate security more widely and promote further development, the Civilian CSDP Compact needs to recognise and explicitly mention the impact that the effects of climate change have on peace, security and development.

The introduction of Environmental Advisers (EAs) to civilian CSDP missions is one example of a valuable tool in the CSDP toolbox. The EAs, and the goal of having an EA in all civilian CSDP missions by 2025, should be explicitly mentioned in the Compact. At the same time, given that this role entails multiple tasks requiring different skills and technical expertise, ranging from footprint issues to environmental crime, the Adviser cannot alone cover all these tasks. Therefore, the Compact should also highlight the need for the missions to mainstream climate-related security risks into

its mandate more broadly. Recognising the fact that the role of the EA might differ quite substantially between different contexts depending on the specific needs and the mission mandate, a mainstreaming approach would help in focusing efforts to the areas that can generate most results in any given context.

Why it matters

As highlighted in the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) the world is facing unprecedented risks from climate change that affect every region of the world. Given the magnitude of the climate emergency, its cascading effects extend beyond the environmental sphere and into the social and political realm. While climate change is rarely – if ever – the primary cause of conflict, it can act as a risk multiplier, exacerbating underlying vulnerabilities and compounding existing grievances.

The EU Strategic Compass recognises that climate change exacerbates socio-economic instability in fragile countries and leads to increased security challenges for populations. This analysis is shared by the UN, and the climate change, peace and security nexus is being mainstreamed across the shared UN-EU priorities, approved by the Council in January 2022.

(Gender-Responsive) Leadership

Input 30: FBA

Recommendation

Build on the work of the EUCTG and the TRA on Leadership and Management, the TRA on Gender Equality, the CPCC's Leadership Framework, and the requirement for Gender-Responsive Leadership (GRL) in the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III and the Council

Conclusions of 14 November 2022 when developing a coherent and strengthened CSDP leadership.

Include the concept of GRL in the new Civilian CSDP Compact and make sure it is compatible with the language from GAP III and the Council Conclusions, both in terms of definition, goals and targets.

Use the defined leadership competencies and requirements for GRL in the development of human resources processes, such as recruitment and performance evaluation in CSDP missions.

Make more time and means available for the development of leadership competencies as key for the EU to lead by example on gender equality in both the workplace and all external activities.

Gender-responsive leadership framework

Five core leadership skills to achieve gender equality



Why it matters

As part of the commitment to create a more capable civilian CSDP, the Council and Member States agreed in 2018 to develop and provide generic capability needs, among other management skills. In 2020 they added the need to promote a safe and inclusive working environment in civilian CSDP missions, including efforts to strengthen leadership. In addition, the EU Action Plan III (2020) says that the EU should be ‘Leading by example, by establishing gender-responsive and gender-balanced leadership at top EU political management levels’.

Although steps have been taken to contribute to an improved working environment (such as the reemphasis of the Standards of Behaviour, review of the Code of Conduct, the Strategy and Action Plan to enhance women’s participation, enhancing gender mainstreaming and exploring the possibilities for a more family-friendly policy in low to medium-risk missions) the role of managers in contributing to a safe and inclusive working environment and gender equality in external activities has not been sufficiently emphasised.

In recognition of the need for strengthened leadership in CSDP and as a result of tasks given by the EUCTG, a TRA on Leadership and Management was developed, providing recommendations and guidance. One of the recommendations of the TRA is the formulation of relevant leadership competencies. Furthermore, the TRA on Gender Equality established that the policy framework for the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in the context of the CSDP has a comprehensive set of guidelines requiring active efforts at every level of CSDP missions, including leadership. The TRA points to a lack of systematic training and learning on gender equality in peace and security and provides targeted learning levels for managers and staff to support the implementation of the WPS agenda.

A Leadership Framework with recommended leadership competencies specific to managers in civilian CSDP missions was recently launched. This Leadership Framework can and should be used as the foundation for other much-needed steps to create a more capable civilian CSDP.

Safe and inclusive working environment

Input 31: FBA

Recommendation

Create a dedicated role/unit within the CPCC responsible for workplace well-being⁽³⁾. As a first step, such a role/unit should draft and implement an action plan as a response to the 2021 mission staff survey on a safe and respectful workplace. In addition, such a unit should be responsible for setting up a team of confidential counselors who can support mission staff who may be victims of harassment, abuse of authority, bullying etc. It is recommended to have a full-time psychologist responsible for such an initiative.

Support mission leaders and managers to improve workplace well-being by providing the right leadership tools as established in the Leadership Framework. The Leadership Framework includes recommended leadership competencies specific to leaders and managers in civilian CSDP.

Why it matters

The Civilian CSDP Compact aims to make civilian missions more capable, effective, flexible and responsive. To attain such goals, it is essential that mission personnel are engaged and can maintain physical, mental and emotional health throughout their deployment.

In line with the results of the 2021 CPCC staff survey on a safe and respectful workplace and an internal evaluation of the CPCC

(3) 'Workplace Wellbeing relates to all aspects of working life, from the quality and safety of the physical environment, to how workers feel about their work, their working environment, the climate at work and work organization. The aim of measures for workplace well-being is to complement occupational safety and health measures to make sure workers are safe, healthy, satisfied and engaged at work.' International Labour Organisation, *Workplace Well-being*, 2009 (http://www.ilo.org/safework/info/WCMS_118396/lang--en/index.htm).

earlier this year, it became evident that structural and management challenges are prevalent. Seconding authorities are witnessing similar challenges (especially related to dysfunctional management practices) at field/mission level which need to be addressed swiftly.

Based on the established Standards of Behaviour⁽⁴⁾, civilian CSDP missions need a different organisational culture that will help improve workplace well-being. Changing an organisational culture cannot be achieved overnight and requires managers to lead by example. Therefore, leaders and managers in civilian CSDP missions need to enhance and strengthen their leadership skills in order to improve overall well-being at work. Working as a leader and manager in a civilian mission, regardless of having a police, military or civilian background, is different and more complex than working in one's home country. Thus, additional skills are required to navigate these complex mission settings. The goal is to create a workplace which brings out the best in people, where employees are motivated, engaged, feel safe, included, and where they can actively contribute to achieve results and implement the mandate.

Peace mediation

Input 32: ZIF

Recommendation

To leverage the full potential of civilian CSDP missions in supporting peace mediation, EU Member States and EU mission planning must fully embrace the essential roles that CSDP missions can play in enhancing EU conflict prevention and crisis management efforts through direct and indirect contributions to peace mediation/mediation support activities, including:

(4) General Secretariat of the Council, 'Upgraded generic standards of behaviour for CSDP missions and operations', 6877/18, 7 March 2018 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6877-2018-INIT/en/pdf>).

- > Capacity building, e.g., in security sector reform and transitional justice, support for electoral processes, good governance and economic development;
- > Confidence building, e.g., through their field presence and well-established communication channels;
- > Dialogue promotion on different tracks as well as support to conflict resolution efforts at the local level.

These activities can either take place in support of ongoing mediation efforts by other EU or multilateral actors (such as EUSRs, Heads of EU Delegations or UN Envoys), serve as entry points for dialogue and successive conflict resolution efforts or prepare the ground for mediation engagements further down the line.

EU Member States should make full use of the CSDP toolbox and other EU presences on the ground to maximise their comparative advantages and added value, following the integrated approach to security and peace.

Cooperation and coordination between EU entities as well as other multilateral actors must be enhanced to optimise and synchronise efforts, while at the same time minimise parallel and, at worst, counterproductive activities or further outsourcing of potentially contentious activities.

EU Member States should utilise CSDP missions as flexible instruments and provide the mission leadership with more autonomy to adapt mission resources (financial and personnel) to fluid operating environments and changing needs on the ground. Including elements of peace mediation/mediation support tasks in their mandates would allow missions to proactively engage and seize fleeting windows of opportunity for mediation engagements.

EU Member States should increase political backing and financial support for capacity building of relevant CSDP mission staff in the area of peace mediation/mediation support as well as for the implementation of activities that enable mission leadership to realise CSDP missions' important contributions to peace mediation.

EU Member States should draw on the primarily political nature of CSDP missions and be willing to accept a greater level of risks when engaging in political processes. The acceptance of failure as part of the process will facilitate contingency planning and more agile and nimble reactions to changing circumstances on the ground.

Why it matters

Promoting international peace and security is one of the EU's main foreign policy objectives. As key components of EU foreign policy, civilian CSDP missions play an important role in EU conflict prevention and crisis management efforts, of which peace mediation is an integral part. The 2020 EU Peace Mediation Concept assigns civilian CSDP missions alongside a range of other EU actors 'a supporting role in peace monitoring and mediation, where relevant and according to their respective mandate.' The engagement of CSDP missions in these areas, however, remains limited. The development of the new Civilian CSDP Compact offers the opportunity to build on the EU Peace Mediation Concept by leveraging the full potential of CSDP missions in supporting peace mediation efforts in their respective host countries or regions.

Input 33: Maynooth University

Recommendation

First recommendation:

Embedding of the 2020 EU Concept on Peace Mediation into CSDP missions through:

- > inclusion of 'mediation support' activities in all mission mandates;
- > insistence that all mission staff are capable in this regard before deployment;
- > upskilling of all mission members in Mediation, Negotiation and Dialogue (MND) facilitation capacities.

Second recommendation:

All CSDP missions should contain a 'societal observer' component, i.e. personnel whose primary focus is on spotting and recording emergent discord within communities, risk, tensions and opportunities for conflict, strengthening two-way communication, the use of a co-creative approach to facilitate interaction between citizens and interventions, jointly identifying needs and jointly developing

procedures beyond technical solutions, to build enhanced resilience and support for opportunities of restorative practice and conditions of healing, thus shaping future EU interactions.

Why it matters

First recommendation:

Post-conflict peacebuilding and security sector projects will only work if the security and justice institutions can create the future conditions for healing in communities. In line with the 2018 Civilian CSDP Compact, civilian CSDP missions can play a supporting role in peace monitoring and mediation, where relevant and according to their mandate. According to the 2020 EU Concept, 'mediation support can involve activities that assist and improve mediation practices, e.g. advising of mediators and mediation teams, provision of mediation services in track II and III processes training and coaching activities, developing guidance on thematic and geographically specific issues, carrying out background research, working on policy issues, offering consultation, backstopping ongoing mediation processes, networking and engaging with parties'. All CSDP civilian missions should be prepared to contribute to mediation support, as an aspect of their mandated work. Presently, only eight appointments of the seventy-seven general and specific functional profiles set out in the Force Generation Handbook for Civilian CSDP Missions (2017) have mediation or negotiation as part of their job description.

Recent research in the Kennedy Institute of Maynooth University (2021) for the EUCTG TRA on Mediation, Negotiation and Dialogue (MND) in CSDP supports findings that this capacity is important as MND skills, broadly interpreted, are critical in their day-to-day activities. In essence, all CSDP staff need basic levels of MND competence to be operationally competent, and able to interact with optimum levels of efficacy when dealing with disputes, conflicts and disagreements across the whole range of circumstances arising in the multinational, multicultural CSDP civilian mission environment. They also need to understand and recognise circumstances when an additional and more specialised MND expertise from the wider EU family is needed to support the mission.

Second recommendation:

In missions, there can be a misalignment between risk management, mission capacity and local citizen expectations. The EU should negotiate a type of civilian CSDP mission that would have a strong dimension of psycho-social interaction, with much more focus in mandates on cultivating depth of relationships and human security on the ground and understanding risk perceptions *vis-à-vis* the potential for and the drivers of future conflict. The establishment or expansion of ‘societal observer’/‘civil engagement’ teams is proposed in each mission to support the current mission configuration and closely associate with the EU Delegation. These teams should interact with civil society to provide local interventions and social support through discernment of tacit needs while shaping the complexion of future and longer-term CSDP deployments.

Youth, peace and security

Input 34: CMC Finland

Recommendation

The Council and the Member States should commit to implementing the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security (2015) in civilian CSDP missions. Specific focus should be placed on incorporating the perspectives and needs of youth in the planning process, strategic reviews and evaluations of CSDP missions as part of an overall integrated human rights-based approach, that covers the whole lifecycle of a mission. Any conflict analyses and other assessments such as human rights risk and impact assessments (HRIA) conducted should include consideration for the status of youth. Coordination and coherence between women, peace and security and young people, peace and security would support a wider approach to inclusive security. Based on mission mandates and a preceding analysis, a mainstreaming approach to youth, peace and security should be considered in mission activities, particularly in advisory support to host states and training of

host state officials. To support integration of youth perspectives, specific actions should be undertaken on consultation and dialogue with youth organisations. A survey by the CPCC of existing practices related to youth, peace and security in civilian CSDP missions and an analysis of training needs for mission staff could be considered as first steps.

Why it matters

The UNSCR 2250 focuses on the role of youth between the ages of 18 and 29. It calls for (i) increased participation and representation of young people in decision-making related to conflict prevention and resolution; (ii) protection of young people and their rights; (iii) creation of an enabling environment for young people to contribute to conflict prevention; (iv) partnerships at different levels including with local actors and civil society to further the aims of the resolution specifically on countering violent extremist narratives; and (v) recognition of young people's needs with regard to disengagement and reintegration.

The recent EU Youth Action Plan in EU External Action for 2022 to 2027 includes the aim to 'incorporate the Youth Peace and Security dimension into conflict prevention and crisis management efforts'⁽⁵⁾, but lacks specificity on the role of CSDP missions and operations. As part of the consultation process for the action plan, youth groups raised issues related to participation, in the form of lack of recognition and even gatekeeping of youth groups' participation in consultations and dialogue processes, as well as protection issues, such as security threats from both armed groups and security services. EU civilian CSDP missions can respond on both counts. In the Follow-up Baseline Study on Integrating Human Rights in the CSDP⁽⁶⁾, 58 % of civilian CSDP missions reported having engaged with issues related to children's rights, while 42 % had

(5) European Commission, 'Youth Action Plan', October 2022 (https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/youth/youth-action-plan_en).

(6) European External Action Service, 'Report on the Follow-Up Baseline Study on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality into the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy', 17 May 2022 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9198-2022-INIT/en/pdf>).

engaged with protection of civilians. No information was included on engagement with youth, although some EU civilian CSDP missions have already acted to improve youth participation, such as the EULEX YOUNG-conference⁽⁷⁾, organised in 2019. Other similar initiatives have possibly taken place in other civilian CSDP missions, but information on these has not been collected.

Human security

Input 35: EPLO

with contributions by
**NONVIOLENT PEACEFORCE, PEACE DIRECT, SAFERWORLD,
CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT (CIVIC)**

Recommendation

Civilian CSDP missions should implement a people-centred approach which seeks to respond to the needs of communities. This should be done in a conflict and gender-sensitive manner, ensuring that existing power balances and/or conflict divides are not reinforced. A human security lens should be applied in mission design, execution and assessment as per EU commitments, *inter alia* in the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence⁽⁸⁾. Civilian CSDP missions have the potential to help promote the role of government institutions in protecting civilians and promoting human rights by emphasising their roles as duty bearers and by amplifying the voices of their populations. Building partners' capacity should be designed and assessed with the ultimate security of the populations in mind.

(7) EULEX Kosovo, 'Young Conference', webpage (<https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,67>).

(8) *A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence*, op.cit., p. 28.

Why it matters

Human security is a people-centred approach to security, focusing attention on the security of the individual, community and society at large, rather than only state security, which focuses on the territorial integrity of the state. The EU has acknowledged the importance of human security as an important commitment in EU external policy⁽⁹⁾. Several studies have shown that an excessive focus on curbing migration⁽¹⁰⁾, hard security responses to terrorism⁽¹¹⁾, or the technical and state-centred aspects of security sector reform (SSR) including in contexts where CSDP missions are operational⁽¹²⁾, is very likely to backfire and have negative consequences on conflict dynamics and human security⁽¹³⁾.

Transforming crises and building partners' capacity needs to be understood as more than simply reinforcing operational capabilities and providing equipment. It needs to be seen as a contribution to the overall goal of creating security institutions that appreciate their key tasks as security providers for the populations. This should guide the civilian CSDP missions' approach to SSR and partners' capacity building. These considerations also need to underpin the

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- (9)** See for example: *A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence*, op.cit.; European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council – Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform, 2016 (<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0031&from=EN>); European External Action Services, 'EEAS/Commission services' issues paper suggesting parameters for a concept on Stabilisation as part of the EU Integrated Approach to external conflicts and crises', 2017 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15622-2017-INIT/en/pdf>). These all reference human security as an important commitment in EU external policy.
- (10)** Tubiana, J., Warin, C. and Saeneen, G.M., 'Multilateral damage: The impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes', Clingendael CRU Report, The Hague, September 2018 (<https://www.clingendael.org/publication/impact-eu-migration-policies-central-saharan-routes>).
- (11)** UNDP, 'Journey to Extremism in Africa', op.cit.
- (12)** Guiryman, O., Montanaro, L. and Rätty, T., 'European security assistance: The search for stability in the Sahel', Saferworld, September 2021 (<https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1368-european-security-assistance-the-search-for-stability-in-the-sahel>).
- (13)** See for example: Dursun-Ozkunca, O., *The Nexus Between Security Sector Governance/ Reform and Sustainable Development Goal-16: An examination of conceptual linkages and policy recommendations*, Geneva Sector for Security Sector Governance, 2021; Deneckere, M., Neat, A. and Hauck, V., 'The future of EU security sector assistance: learning from experience', European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2020; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, conference, 'Gaps in Security Sector Reform and Governance – Possible Contributions of Civil Society and Non-Traditional Security Actors', 2021 (<https://pscc.fes.de/e/gaps-in-security-sector-reform-and-governance-possible-contributions-of-civil-society-and-non-traditional-security-actors>).

civilian CSDP missions' approach to counter-terrorism and migration management. Without an increased emphasis on human security and a focus on individuals' rights, capacity building could lead to increased repression, widen the gap between governments and populations, and exacerbate the very issues the missions attempt to address.

Local environment

Input 36: EPLO

with contributions by
NONVIOLENT PEACEFORCE, PEACE DIRECT, SAFERWORLD

Recommendation

Civilian CSDP missions should ensure that the approach to local ownership integrates both state and society. CSDP missions are often in a unique position to act as a bridge and to assist in building trust between national, regional and local authorities and civil society. Missions should establish a systematic, regular engagement with a diverse set of civil society actors for them to proactively contribute to shaping the mission's decisions and actions. Missions should support community security initiatives, design actions based on consultations with communities and civil society and support them in playing a meaningful role in addressing conflict and insecurity.

Why it matters

Local ownership is not only achieved thanks to the host country's formal request to deploy a civilian CSDP mission but is demonstrated through meaningful engagement with and consideration of local communities. Spending time and resources to attain an in-depth understanding of the conflict and power dynamics at play is essential to assess where the mission could bring added value and

support locally-led changes (instead of imposing a plan which was externally designed). Regular and continuous engagement with civil society should inform mission decision-making and support building local ownership. A locally-led approach in civilian CSDP missions may also require investing in intercultural communication, and in many cases acknowledging the challenging historical background between Europe and the host countries.

Including a commitment to local ownership through engaging, supporting and building the capacities of communities and civil society and community security initiatives in the Compact would align with the EU's Integrated Approach to Crises and Conflicts, in which the Council 'stresses the importance of local ownership, inclusiveness, resilience and sustainability of supported actions, by engaging with national and local authorities, communities and civil society' ⁽¹⁴⁾. These recommendations on local ownership through supporting communities and civil society in playing a role in local security have been supported by research findings on community perspectives on international interventions ⁽¹⁵⁾. The practical recommendations are also based on research into successful approaches to localisation that show 'proof of concept' ⁽¹⁶⁾.

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- (14)** Waugh, L., 'How not to lose the Sahel: Community perspectives on insecurity and international interventions in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso', Saferworld, 2022 (<https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1385-how-not-to-lose-the-sahel-community-perspectives-on-insecurity-and-international-interventions-in-mali-niger-and-burkina-faso>).
- (15)** Stephen, M. and Martini, A., 'Turning the tables: insights from locally-led humanitarian partnerships in conflict-affected situations', Save the Children and Saferworld, 2020 (<https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1253-turning-the-tables-insights-from-locally-led-humanitarian-partnerships-in-conflict-situations>).
- (16)** General Secretariat of the Council, 'Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises', 2018 (<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5413-2018-INIT/en/pdf>).

Input 37: EPLO

with contributions by
**NONVIOLENT PEACEFORCE, PEACE DIRECT, SAFERWORLD,
 CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT (CIVIC)**

Recommendation

Civil society should be meaningfully engaged at all stages of the mission's mandate, from the shaping and design to implementation, monitoring and evaluation, including by setting up regular platforms for exchange. The performance of civilian CSDP mission personnel, as well as of Brussels-based EU officials planning and reviewing CSDP missions, should be assessed *inter alia* based on their efforts to engage with and take into account the perceptions of a wide range of civil society actors. Safe formal and informal channels, including anonymous channels, should be set up for missions to receive feedback and criticism/complaints from civil society in order to develop a better understanding of the effectiveness of its operations.

Why it matters

It remains unclear for many CSDP personnel why and how they should engage with civil society⁽¹⁷⁾. Several civilian missions have engaged with civil society in *ad hoc* ways over the years, from co-designing training curricula, to organising tripartite dialogue platforms between CSDP missions, national security forces and civil society organisations (CSOs). Civil society actors and organisations have a key role to play in building sustainable peace in the countries where missions are being deployed, but interaction with CSDP missions mostly depends on individual committed staff.

Civil society actors working in conflict-affected contexts have unique knowledge and understanding of the dynamics, priorities

(17) As evidenced in the informal survey of civilian CSDP staff in eight missions initiated by EUCAP Sahel Mali in 2019.

and needs of the populations, and on how external interventions are perceived across society. Meaningfully engaging with them can therefore help ensure CSDP missions realistically target activities to address conflict drivers, prioritise human security, and minimise potential harm. It is in the interest of CSDP missions to tap into this civil society expertise to better understand the context in which they operate and adapt their mandates and activities based on excellent conflict analysis. Engaging with civil society actors, including those in hard-to-reach areas, is also about the EU leading by example in *leaving no one behind* and serving as an example to national authorities which may be less open to such engagement.

The 2017 Council Conclusions on EU engagement with civil society in external relations highlight the ‘important role that CSOs play in promoting peaceful, just and inclusive societies including in fragile or conflict situations’, and states that ‘more strategic engagement with CSOs should be mainstreamed in all external instruments and programmes’⁽¹⁸⁾.

Future level of ambition

Input 38: ZIF

Recommendation

The EEAS should task an independent group of experts to implement an impact analysis of CSDP missions (and operations). It could be done as an in-depth analysis either requested by the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) or another subcommittee of the

(18) Similar commitments to civil society engagement are found in policy documents such as: European Commission, ‘Joint Communication on “A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action”’, 2017 (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_17_1555); General Secretariat of the Council, ‘Women, Peace and Security – Council conclusions’, December 2018 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37412/st15086-en18.pdf>); European External Action Service, ‘EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’, 2020 (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_action_plan_on_human_rights_and_democracy_2020-2024.pdf).

European Parliament or using a platform like the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON). Another option would be to use the CoE as facilitator for such a process. The options paper recently prepared by SecDefPol might be an entry point for an independent and systematic assessment of missions.

In general, the EU should consider moving away from smaller and medium-sized missions that primarily train and advise. These mandates could also be fulfilled by the European Commission, as the example of the EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine mission shows. CSDP as an instrument could instead refocus on short- to medium-term external and ambitious crisis management. This would include missions where the EU makes the difference, such as in Georgia – where the UN and OSCE are either blocked or unable to act. The recent establishment of the EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) might hint at a potential future for civilian missions: clearly political and closely linked to an EU-facilitated dialogue process.

Civilian crisis management needs flexible and unlimited funding in case of emergencies. It should not be determined by the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF). In times of scarce funds, it is also important to rethink the EU-UN partnership. Instead of deploying a CSDP mission, resources could be made available on a modular basis for UN peace operations in countries to which one or even two EU missions are currently deployed in parallel. There is still a lot of room for improvement with regard to the objective of enhanced complementarity and division of labour between EU and UN missions.

Why it matters

An independent impact analysis has not yet been implemented, probably due to concerns about negative results. Initial analyses of the EU's military training missions by the Stockholm-based peace research institute SIPRI show that this concern is not unfounded. However, an organisation will only learn and develop further if it also acknowledges and includes negative results and deals with them constructively.

The Commission has been undertaking activities similar to those conducted by CSDP missions, especially with EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine. Commission projects are planned from the outset as medium- to long-term support, in this case as part of the European

Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and have direct access to Commission funds that also ensure planning and budget security for the host countries.

The current situation with a capped and fixed budget under the MFF until 2027 is not workable for civilian crisis management. Both civilian and military CSDP need to be funded in a joint and flexible way through the European Peace Facility, even if this means that Member States have to change Article 41.2 of the Treaty. Otherwise, EU civilian crisis management either needs its own EPF, or the mid-term review of the MFF is moved from the end of 2023 to mid-2023 – leading to a significant increase of the CFSP budget.

Conclusions

Jointly authored by
CoE, EUISS

The global security arena has undergone significant changes since 2018, and the new Civilian CSDP Compact presents an opportunity to steer civilian CSDP in the desired direction: that of developing stronger capabilities to cope with evolving geopolitical dynamics. Against this backdrop, the contributors to this book suggest multiple ways of enhancing the further development of civilian CSDP. These encompass both concretising existing targets and commitments in some areas as well as redefining overall objectives in others. Additionally, the book explores what has worked and what has not worked, and assesses the potential role that civilian CSDP could play in the altered geopolitical landscape.

One of the key messages of this book is that the new Compact needs more clarity and more ambition, as well as more emphasis on implementation, compared to its predecessor. Gender parity, gender-responsive leadership, and the inclusion of youth and local communities' perspectives are areas that lacked the necessary ambition in the first Compact. To work towards an ambitious and unambiguous civilian CSDP, the book has identified three main themes that recurred throughout the expert input.

Coordination, communication and cooperation

Although the first Compact aimed to create cooperation and synergies between various EU security actors, there are still limitations in this regard. The boundaries between roles and responsibilities within civilian CSDP, as well as between civilian CSDP and other actors, are often a bit blurred, particularly as internal and external security becomes more intertwined.

The opportunity to initiate cooperation mechanisms across different levels, including between headquarters, between headquarters and the operational level, and between the EU and other international organisations should be availed of. Establishing regular communication and institutionalised mechanisms for cooperation is necessary to create synergies between civilian CSDP and other security actors, as well as cross-cutting issues that are not yet sufficiently taken up in civilian CSDP but are already well-developed in other EU or international institutions. Examples of such issues include climate and security, youth, peace and security, and peace mediation.

Ultimately, coordination and cooperation require the full implementation of the EU's integrated approach, which involves coordinating and synchronising different tools and actors to achieve the desired effect.

From ad hoc to institutionalised knowledge management and evaluation

The process of knowledge management, planning, and evaluation within CSDP has been inconsistent and lacking in organised and institutionalised procedures. This has resulted in a lack of shared strategic culture, limited institutional learning, and a knowledge

gap between various institutions such as the European Commission and the EEAS. To address these issues, it is essential to establish standardised and institutionalised procedures that span the entire CSDP cycle. This includes implementing continuous evaluation and assessment procedures that align with the articulation of overall objectives and end strategies.

Invest in and rethink human resources

Humans are the biggest and most important assets of civilian CSDP. Management of human resources and a structured capability development process in this regard is crucial when attempting to achieve an effective and efficient civilian CSDP. For most reforms, whether it is improving civil-military cooperation or broadening the scope of civilian CSDP, having an adequate number of well-trained personnel is crucial. Additional training is suggested in areas such as peace mediation, climate security or DDR.

Is the Compact merely repeating itself?

In comparing the ambitions for the new Civilian CSDP Compact to the 2018 Compact, it is important to note that increased clarity have been a goal since the first Compact. The 2018 Compact aimed to achieve a more capable, effective, and joined-up civilian CSDP, which aligns with some of the goals for the new Compact. Many of the issues addressed in the new Compact, such as a focus on the internal-external security nexus, enhancing capabilities and effectiveness, and establishing regular review processes with a defined end strategy, were in some ways already articulated in the first Compact. Therefore, the new Compact builds on the previous one, aiming to address the gaps and limitations that were identified

through its implementation. At the same time, the new Compact addresses new topics such as the climate–security nexus.

The new Compact represents an opportunity to build on the lessons of the past five years and to live up to more ambitious and detailed commitments. For instance, the new Compact provides more specifics on the commitment to enhance collaboration and cooperation between civilian CSDP and JHA. Additionally, quantitative targets, such as women’s participation, are more clearly defined instead of (in the latter case) a vague commitment to ‘actively promote’ better representation of women at all levels.

The new Civilian CSDP Compact is not an inward-looking exercise but is instead likely to focus on evaluating and assessing missions in line with carefully articulated overall objectives during the planning phase.

The path to a new Civilian Compact

The stakes for fulfilling commitments under the new Civilian CSDP Compact are now higher than ever. The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and hybrid threats in the EU’s neighbourhoods require a more proactive and aware CSDP. The traditional divide between economic and military security has become increasingly blurred, and civilian CSDP is the EU’s primary tool for addressing threats that cross traditional borders of defence, including human, energy and food security. As a result, Member States must urgently fulfil their commitments under both the first Compact and the new one.

In conclusion, the contributions in this book suggest that the new Civilian CSDP Compact is not likely to mark a dramatic departure from the trends that have been in place since 2018. It shall however enhance and strengthen the headway we have made in some areas and expand this progress into others.

Essentially, civilian CSDP provides the EU with a competitive edge in a changing geopolitical landscape, and the new Compact is likely to reflect this reality. It offers a critical opportunity to advance and expand the scope and effectiveness of civilian CSDP. This

is especially significant given the present strategic context, where civilian CSDP is no longer merely a strategic ambition but an essential geopolitical imperative.

Annexes

Annex 1: FBA – Types of missions: Case study results

In a recent case study discussion on a fictive scenario based on a post-war Ukraine-like situation, a civilian CSDP mission with an overarching objective to support regional stability and the resilience of Ukraine's governmental institutions was envisioned.⁽¹⁾ It was suggested, in line with the Feira priorities and the existing CSDP mission, to further strengthen security and judicial sectors, as part of a resilient public administration architecture. This could include providing strategic advice and training/capacity building to support Ukraine's authorities, central administration, internal civilian security forces and the prosecution/judiciary services. For example, support could be offered to strengthen the functioning criminal justice chain for addressing organised crime, war crimes, and human rights violations, while building an independent, impartial and efficient judicial system.

Attention was also drawn to areas such as internal-external security including border management, cross-border crime and corruption including for example trafficking in human beings, weapons, goods etc. Moreover, inclusion of topics relating to the area of civilian administration, e.g. land rights, environmental threats as well as DDR, was suggested. These topics are relevant also in a (pre-war) conflict setting. To respond to and address some of these

(1) Based on the summary discussion of the case study on 'Centerland' in the ESDC's 'Strategic Planning processes for civilian CSDP', Brussels, 11–15 July 2022 (<https://esdc.europa.eu/2022/07/18/strategic-planning-processes-for-civilian-missions-course-11-15-july-2022-brussels/>).

challenges it was recommended that the existing concept of civilian administration be revisited.

It was proposed that the fictive mission functions act in an integrated manner with host country authorities, with law enforcement investigators, advisors and technical experts being embedded in national authorities. Further recommendations were to:

Deploy an investigative/forensics component without delay, even during high-intensity fighting. A significant increase in the resources and capabilities for the investigation of war crimes is necessary to secure the collection of evidence in an immediate phase after the acts have taken place. The collection of evidence will be both physical (in the field and/or crime scene) as well as in the digital sphere. Close cooperation with relevant actors such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) is crucial.

Strengthen the link between external and internal security and border management. Based on the experience from the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s with the proliferation of weapons, trafficking, organised crime and its possible links to hybrid warfare, as well as instrumentalisation of refugees and migrants, it is clear that the EU needs to upgrade and further revise its toolbox. Consequently, increased cooperation and liaison arrangements should be added to a CSDP mission by designated liaison officers with EUROPOL, EUROJUST and Frontex; as well as police and justice liaison officers from EU Member States. Additionally, security-related issues linked to, for example, critical infrastructure including nuclear power plants, sea border and harbours, transport and material, food security etc that are having strategic impacts in and outside the region, need to be addressed.

Apply a whole-of-government approach which incorporates advice based on lessons drawn from civilian CSDP missions to be provided in all phases of the conflict and to a broad segment of host country stakeholders. Taking the lead or supporting the DDR process, together with the UN and other actors, can be a task supported by CSDP.

Enable some form of peace agreement, ceasefire monitoring, verifying implementation of subsequent agreements, and/or apply a CSDP component in a broader multilateral framework to substitute for the defunct OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine. Any such

initiative could also be part of an integrated civ-mil mission if such an avenue is to be explored.

Annex 2: FBA – Leadership (including gender- responsive leadership)

In 2020, the CPCC accepted an offer for Leadership Development Programmes for Heads of Departments and Heads of Units within civilian CSDP missions from the FBA, which has now provided support in different forms to over 100 managers to develop their leadership competencies. The programme has been developed in close cooperation with the CPCC and is constantly evolving in line with the development of the CPCC's Leadership Framework.

Supporting managers in their role as leaders should also help in giving mission members guidance (something that is often lacking today). With a clear purpose, it is possible to address the changes needed to establish a safe and inclusive working environment. On a practical level, this means more means and time made available for the development of leadership skills as well as guidance of Senior Management Teams.

The EU GAP III definition of gender-responsive leadership specifies the actions required by leaders and provides comprehensive guidance. In addition, GAP III clearly points out that management will receive mandatory training on gender equality and on implementing GAP III, including on gender-responsive leadership, which is currently being piloted for the EEAS, by the FBA.

The FBA framework on GRL was developed to give leaders and managers concrete guidance on how to lead the work on gender equality in the context of peace and security. The importance of having active leadership on the implementation of gender equality in peace and security is not new, and the FBA and others have been supporting leaders in this area of work for the past 10 years. During these years, leaders and managers have repeatedly asked the same question: what am I supposed to do? This question is central to the

FBA's work on GRL: to provide concrete guidance to leaders and managers – closely linked to their formal leadership role – on how to promote gender equality in peace and security and thereby contribute to the implementation of the WPS agenda.

Annex 3: Edward M. Kennedy Institute for Conflict Intervention – A new way of doing things: List of responsibilities for societal observers

The general characteristic for these societal Observer or civic engagement elements should be focused on creating networks and assessing macro-drivers of conflict such as:

- > insecurity;
- > inequality;
- > private interests and incentives; and
- > perceptions, including risk perceptions

with a focus on:

- > individual-level communications and understanding to increase the EU's normative influence;
- > negotiations with key interlocutors and representatives from diverse communities;
- > facilitation of exchanges and establishment of networks at the community, local, or interest-based representative level;
- > operations through questioning and reflecting rather than mentoring;

- > examination and analysis of deeper cultural aspects, including values and economic aspects and citizen relationships with government;
- > identification of risk, grievances and future blockages;
- > examination of discrepancies between communal and group grievances, narratives and anxieties, and the actual complex reality underlying causal mechanisms of violent conflict through exploratory discussions and facilitated dialogues.

These teams could operate on multiple levels: local, district, provincial, national, sub-regional, regional, and international. At each level, information exchange can be organised between different stakeholders who then agree on a linkage to the next higher level.

Practical engagement can happen through crisis management of 'on the ground' issues, i.e.:

1. preventing occurrences or further occurrences of violence and protecting the lives of mission staff;
2. unblocking freedom of movement, or examining human rights and gender issues and fulfilling human needs relevant to the host environment;
3. addressing issues relating to mission mandate and multilateral working with other IGOs, NGOs and the host government in a post-conflict environment;
4. Enhanced Communication and Trust Building (ECTB) – through facilitating dialogue, and enhancing the positive reputation of the mission with representatives of local government and local communities.

Intercultural competence is needed, as it enables socio-cultural analysis of the operational environment, complemented by intercultural creativity, which enables knowledge generation and actions which lead to a strategic impact. Other valuable skills will be: understanding the complexity of cultural contexts, an empathetic capacity to understand the impact of actions in a complex environment, and how cultural symbols can be used in direct and media communications to create a common group identity with the recipients.

Annex 4: EPLO – Gathering of contributions

The European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) is an independent network of 48 European NGOs, networks of NGOs and think tanks that are committed to peacebuilding and the prevention of violent conflict.

The EPLO has facilitated a series of meetings with various practice-oriented peacebuilding organisations to gather their feedback on a range of topics relevant to them in view of the upcoming Civilian CSDP Compact. These input notes are a combination of written contributions from EPLO member organisations and notes from the meetings facilitated by the EPLO. For this reason, these notes might be slightly different in nature from the contributions of think tanks and other organisations who took part in the project.

Abbreviations and acronyms

AU

African Union

CAR

Central African Republic

CCT

Civilian Coordinator for Training

CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Policy

CivCom

Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

Civ-Mil

Civil-Military

CMC

Crisis Management Concept

CoE

European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management

CONOPS

Concept of operations

CPCC

Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

CSDP

Common Security and Defence Policy

CSO

Civil Society Organisation

CT/CVE

Counter Terrorism/Counter Violent Extremism

DCAF

Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance

DDR

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

DG NEAR

Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations

EA

Environmental Advisor

EC

European Commission

EEAS

European External Action Service

EPC

European Political Community

EPF

European Peace Facility

EPLO

European Peacebuilding Liaison Office

EPON

Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network

ESDC

European Security and Defence College

EU

European Union

EUAM

European Union Advisory Mission

EUAM RCA

European Union Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic

EU-DEL

European Union Delegation

EUGS

European Union Global Strategy

EULEX

European Union Rule of Law Mission

EUCAP

European Union Capacity Building Mission

EU-CIVCAP

European Union Civilian Capabilities for Sustainable Peace project

EUCTG

European Union Civilian Training Group

EUCTI

European Union Civilian Training Initiative

EUMA

European Union Mission in Armenia

EUPCST

European Union Police and Civilian Services Training

EUPOL COPPS

European Union Police Mission, Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support

EUSR

EU Special Representative

FIMI

Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference

FPI

Foreign Policy Instrument

Frontex

European Border and Coast Guard Agency

GAP

Gender Action Plan

GRL

Gender-Responsive Leadership

HEAT

Hostile Environment Awareness Training

HoM

Head of Mission

HRIA

Human Rights and Impacts Assessments

HRM

Human Resource Management

HQ

Headquarters

IA

Integrated Approach

IDP

Internally Displaced Person

IGO

Intergovernmental Organisation

IHL

International Humanitarian Law

IHRL

International Human Rights Law

IPCC

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

ISP

Integrated Approach for Security and Peace

JHA

Justice and Home Affairs

KM

Knowledge Management

KSC/SPO

Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutor's Office

M&E

Monitoring and Evaluation

MAC

Mission Analytical Capability

MFF

Multi-Annual Financial Framework

MIP

Mission Implementation Plan

MND

Mediation, Negotiation and Dialogue

MoI

Ministry of Interior

MoJ

Ministry of Justice

MPCC

Military Planning and Conduct Capability

MS

Member State(s)

NGO

Non-Governmental Organisation

OpCdr

Operation Commander

OSCE

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PDT

Pre-Deployment Training

PFCA

Political Framework of Crisis Approach

PFM

Public Financial Management

RACC

EU Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell for the Sahel

SecDefPol

Security and Defence Policy

SEDE

Subcommittee on Security
and Defence

SSG

Security Sector Governance

SSR

Security Sector Reform

TEU

Treaty on European Union

ToR(s)

Terms of Reference

TRA

Training Requirement Analysis

TÜV

Technischer Überwachungsverein
(Association for Technical
Inspection)

UN

United Nations

UNSCR

United Nations Security Council
Resolution

WPS

Women, Peace and Security

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(1) The content of these contributions is the sole responsibility of the authors and any opinions expressed therein should not be taken to represent an official position of the European Parliament.

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This book presents 38 contributions from EU civilian crisis management experts, which fed into the policymaking process leading to the adoption of the new Civilian CSDP Compact in May 2023.

The new Compact offers a critical opportunity to build upon the lessons drawn from the implementation of the first Compact over the past five years, and to enhance the scope and effectiveness of civilian CSDP. One of the key messages is that it is essential to place more emphasis on implementation of commitments agreed by the Member States, while prioritising new objectives and ambitions. These include gender-responsive leadership, the incorporation of youth and local communities' perspectives, and more systematic attention to the climate-security nexus.

Against the backdrop of the current altered geopolitical landscape, the stakes for fulfilling commitments under the new Civilian CSDP Compact are now higher than ever.