Die jüngste Diskussion um die Finanzierung wichtiger Rüstungsprojekte hat einmal mehr die Engpässe im deutschen Verteidigungshaushalt aufgezeigt. Noch ist der Start des Airbus A400M finanziell nicht gesichert, da kündigt sich bei der Bewaffnung für den Eurofighter (Stichwort: Meteor-Rakete) neues Ungemach an. Auch im Streit um die Anschaffung des neuen Schützenpanzers "Panther" spielen neben Terminfragen finanzielle Aspekte eine gewichtige Rolle
It is now widely accepted that Europe does not spend enough on defence. Most European defence budgets were dramatically cut back after the cold war and have remained at a very low level ever since. This governmental parsimony has had a damaging effect in two respects. First, it has resulted in glaringly obvious gaps in Europe's military capability.
It is known all too well that Europe has a defence budget problem. Both the quantity and the quality of its defence spending are largely insufficient to provide for the capabilities the EU needs to fulfil its declared ambitions
The history of transatlantic armaments cooperation goes back to the beginning of the Cold War. Since then, however, the nature of cooperation has changed considerably, from simple licensing of US systems to Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s to co-production arrangements in the 1970s, followed by government-to-government joint development programs in the 1980s and 1990s. In recent years, industry-led cooperation has become the most prominent feature
Over the last two years, cross-border consolidation of defence industries has been high on the agenda of European defence. However, public debate on this issue is often characterised by profound misunderstandings
Recent terrorist attacks in New York and Washington raise the question whether similar attacks could also take place in Europe. Is the threat of catastrophic terrorism the same for EU members as for the US? Or does it create different zones of security and vulnerability within NATO and the EU?...
In nuclear matters more than in any other political area, perceptions have the force of law. The most concrete nuclear technology would count for little without the extremely sophisticated theories of uncertainty that form the basis of any nuclear deterrence strategy. Yet for the last few years both the technological and intellectual worlds of deterrence, as mankind has known it since 1945, have been in turmoil on all continents.
In Europe, arms and dual-use exports raise complex questions. They fall between two policy spheres that are organised in a distinctly contrasting manner. On the one hand, they are an intrinsic part of commercial policy that lies within the exclusive competence of the European Community (EC). On the other hand, they come under the aegis of security and defence policy, a jealously guarded area of responsibility of the EU member states.
A few months ago, the Institute published a Chaillot Paper by Burkard Schmitt dealing specifically with the new industrial integration strategies of the big European armaments groups (Chaillot Paper 40, ‘From cooperation to integration: defence and aerospace industries in Europe’, July 2000). This Chaillot Paper examines the prospects for transatlantic cooperation in this field, and also the constraints on it.
The first session focused on threat perceptions and threat assessments. The key question was whether a threat exists that justifies NMD deployment. Do the so-called ‘countries of concern’ really intent to threaten the US homeland and, even more importantly, do they have the financial and the technological means to scale up their existing arsenal to true intercontinental range?