Three things the West continues to get wrong in the Peace Process

In a wonderful little miniature book called ‘How to Cure a Fanatic’, one of Israel's most beloved national authors, Amos Oz, tries to explain to westerners what the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is about. He complains that Europeans often think that all conflicts are no more than misunderstandings and all that is required is ‘a little group therapy, a touch of family counselling, and everyone will live happily ever after’. However, he explains, drinking coffee together simply will not do it for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

I have bad news for you: Some conflicts are very real; they are much worse than a mere misunderstanding. And then I have some sensational news for you: There is no essential misunderstanding between Palestinian Arab and Israeli Jew. The Palestinians want the land they call Palestine. They have very strong reasons to want it. The Israelis Jews want exactly the same land for exactly the same reasons, which provides for a perfect understanding between the parties, and for a terrible tragedy.

Rivers of coffee drunk together, writes Oz, cannot extinguish the tragedy of two people who rightly claim the same homeland. Thus, rather than a psychologist, the parties need a real practical solution that can help them figure out how to share the same piece of land. Once such a practical solution is found, claims Oz, outsiders need to support the parties as they make the painful sacrifices required to carry it out. Oz’s arguments highlight one of the many erroneous assumptions often held by Western foreign policy makers and diplomats who deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Three have a particular impact on the success of the peace process. 

The first assumption is something that has been corroborated by diplomats and negotiation specialists all over the world: that underlying most conflicts are conflicting interests, rather than conflicting claims or stakes. Hence, if the true interests of both sides can be elucidated and explained, the conflict should easily be resolved. The assumption stems from the distinction in the negotiation literature between integrative and distributive settlements. While distributive solutions are ‘zero-sum’ in that they split the stake down the middle, integrative solutions are ‘win-win’, in that the negotiation process encourages parties to realise that although their claims may seem identical, their interests may overlap or completely diverge. The reason why this logic does not work for Israelis and Palestinians is because the conflict is deeply tied to territoriality with a very specific twist: both parties claim the same land exclusively, and that land is tied to their national and religious identity. Their interests are in this respect identical and negatively defined based on the exclusion of the ‘other’ from that space. The same rocks and buildings are considered sacred to both sides and are imperative to each side’s national narrative. While the conflict literature shows that the redrawing of borders between warring parties is not difficult in and of itself, it is the inherent value of the territory within those borders that adds to the intractability. Once a disputed territory becomes imbued with ethno-religious attachments, it can no longer be divided through a simple measuring exercise on a map. 

Thus, while parts of the two-state solution will most likely need to be realised in order for Palestinians to accept a future peace deal, there needs to be a rethinking about the ability or usefulness of a future agreement to surgically divide the territory as well as its sovereignty. What is needed, in the words of Amos Oz, is a difficult but unambiguous divorce settlement. The problem, he explains, is that the divorcing couple does not only have to figure out who gets custody of the kids, they also need to decide who gets to use which room in the very tiny apartment in which they both live, since nobody is moving out. Thus, even if a successful division of the territory were possible, neither side will ever be entirely satisfied and outside intervention will continue to be required. Therefore, because any territorial compromise will create terrible resentment within both communities, we are looking at something that to current generations looks more like a ‘lose-lose’ agreement, albeit with a promise of a better future for their grandchildren.

The second assumption is that the conflict is primarily related to identity and that identity is malleable and fluid and amenable to manipulation in order for the parties to collectively reinterpret the past and reenvision their future. Scholars of instrumentalist theory explain that ethnicity is only one of a multitude of identities that humans acquire through socialisation, and that, rather than being an ascribed trait, ethnic identity is a tool used by elites in order to foster cohesiveness and mobilisation, especially when groups are threatened by outsiders. This, they claim, was demonstrated most markedly in the Balkans. While instrumentalist theory works beautifully for debunking perceived differences in race and biology in most Western cultures, one little thing about territorial conflict tends to be forgotten when it comes to more traditional societies engaged in intractable conflict. While ethnicity is certainly not hardwired in our DNA, identity that has become territorial and that has suffered a history of conflict and hardship in defence of a territory is much more difficult to forget or disregard. Studies on conflict outcomes have found that while disputes over identity or territory are both easy to resolve by themselves, when the two issues are combined, conflicts tend to be much more intractable. Once the first martyr of the land is buried in the soil, land acquires sacred value and cannot easily be given up.

Hence, while efforts by outside mediators to get Israelis and Palestinians to drink coffee together in order to realise their similarities are indeed honourable, they are often misguided. The feeling among both Palestinians and Israelis is that they are indeed brothers, and that once an agreement is made, cooperation will be much easier than that between Israel and other Arab states in the region. Just like brothers who share the same parents, Jews and Palestinians share the same land; that relationship will not change even if the leaders put their signatures on a piece of paper. The bitter rivalry between those two brothers will continue unless a practical arrangement can be made by which the territory can be shared.

Israelis naturally feel uncomfortable that among the Palestinian population – both inside the West Bank and among the outside refugees – there are many who believe and wish that a two-state solution is a mere stepping stone for the return to historic Palestine. As long as that is the case, some Israelis explain, Palestinians are not ready for peace. However, before making such a judgement, Israelis need to take a step back and also reexamine themselves. Who among Israelis, even the most non-religious ones, would not consider Biblical Bethlehem, Hebron and Schem as part of the Jewish ancient homeland? Are there not plenty of groups within Israel who advocate the annexation of those ancient sacred territories to the state of Israel? Does the existence of such sentiments among Israel's Jewish population mean that Israel is not ready for peace? Rather, the realisation that dual and historic claims will persist is something that future generations will have to learn to live with and respect. While some type of divided administrative ownership over separate territories will be needed, a dual claims model needs to be developed, based on the realisation by the adversaries that while they can demand ‘temporary-but-eternal’ sovereignty over a specific, bounded territory (the borders of which obviously need to be worked out), the ownership question may never be satisfactorily resolved. What needs to be ‘resolved’ however, are the messianic dreams among certain groups on both sides that the historic homeland needs to be redeemed. 

The third and final assumption is that the role of religion is bad for the purposes of conflict resolution and that it should (and indeed could) be discouraged and marginalised. While most westerners understand that religion plays a large role in Middle East politics, their understanding of that role, including its destructiveness and potential, is often limited. Most would agree that religion is a source of both conflict and peace, but few are willing to engage with religious concepts and doctrines in order to facilitate peacemaking. Instead, religion is often viewed as an archaic obstacle that should be discouraged and avoided. What is important to remember here is that in the Middle East, not only are people on both sides regularly killed because of their religious beliefs, their religion is most likely also inseparable from their identity, which is also closely defined by territory. Thus, even if religion is disregarded, it does not mean that ethno-religious claims to territory will go away any time soon; studies on conflicts over sacred territory where claims are absolute show that territorial claims tend to be recycled and revived after generations, only to feed into new conflict cycles and strengthen ethno-territorial ties even more. 

Religion is the perfect instrument for fostering a commitment to a disputed territory because religion requires faith, which requires tangible evidence. A territory, especially a historically sacred homeland containing the graves of generations of saintly ancestors, provides the tangible evidence required for religious faith to be ‘real’. Even if only a small extremist minority perceives a territory to be absolute, it becomes a problem if that minority is willing to both die and kill in its defence. 

Still however, extremists should not be appeased, and radical national-religious doctrines need to be properly dealt with. Religious leaders are therefore paramount in order to engage religious extremists so as to moderate them and help them reinterpret religious ‘truths’. That such reinterpretation may indeed be possible can be seen in the Israeli Jewish case. While sacred territorial doctrines advocated by the most fervent religious-nationalist groups are inherently rigid, the understanding about the scope and boundaries of that territory among regular Israeli Jews has been altered over time both by contemporary geopolitical realities and by rival spiritual and scriptural interpretations. Today’s religious settlers no longer talk of Transjordan and Southern Lebanon as land that should be conquered by Israel because it is part of the historic Promised Land. Instead, they focus on the much more narrowly defined Biblical notion of the Kingdom of Israel. Although today’s interpretation still presents a problem for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, a close look at this shift shows that religious leaders have been indispensable for authorising this reinterpretation of the ethno-religious narrative.

Outsiders have to be reminded that Israeli and Palestinian leaders will never make the choice of territorial compromise out of a sudden burst of compassion or understanding for the other side. Rather, as self-interested statesmen, they will make a choice for compromise when they deem it absolutely necessary and when they realise that if nothing is done, the situation will surely get worse. The choice of compromise resembles the decision, in Amos Oz’s words, to cut off one’s limb in a necessary surgery. The procedure needs to take place, or the patient will die. The surgery between Palestinians and Israelis will require painful sacrifices for both sides and will be painted by both as a terrible tragedy. In order to live through the tragedy, Palestinians and Israelis need full outside support. To say, as Hillary Clinton has, that ‘we cannot want peace more than the parties themselves’, is therefore short-sighted. History has shown that they were unable to do so despite the fact that they tried several times in earnest. Instead, the international community in general, and the US in particular, need to recognise that we are all parties to this conflict and that we will all have to suffer the consequences if nothing is done. Hence, only by understanding the need to let go of these erroneous assumptions can Europeans and Americans be truly helpful in their efforts to move Israelis and Palestinians further along the path to peace.