Europe and Angola: the case for deeper engagement
Analysis - 22 September 2011
Why Angola matters
In the last decade, Angola has become one of the major players on the African continent and has exerted increased power at regional and international level. This new role needs to be clearly understood by the EU and its Member States and matched by significantly upgraded engagement policies.
Angola’s geopolitical significance for Europe
Angola is a medium power in the making. Although it does not have a large population (between 18 and 20 million, with a decreasing birth rate), the level of its GDP per capita has been rapidly increasing, its military expenditure has remained high and most observers consider it should remain politically stable.
Internationally, the economic and human ties it has developed with China, its closer relationship with the US, the fact that it belongs to the CPLP (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa – Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries) organisation of which Brazil is a member, its historic bonds with Russia and Cuba as well as more recent cooperation with Israel, have all allowed the country to adopt an autonomous foreign policy. At regional level, the Angolan president Eduardo Dos Santos, who is now one of the oldest African leaders and who has spent the longest time in power, has become increasingly active in regional and African diplomacy (Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Zambia, Guinea Bissau inter alia) and his voice is listened to by other African powers (despite Angola’s recent isolation in the Ivorian crisis).
Importance of the Angolan oil sector for Europe
Angola is the second (after Nigeria) and sometimes, depending on production conditions, the first oil producer in Africa. Recent discoveries and potential reserves could see Angola rise to the rank of Africa’s leading oil producer. It is the first oil supplier to China, provides between 8 to 15% of French imported oil (figures for overall EU supply are difficult to obtain), and a significant percentage of US imported oil. As with other producers in Africa, Angolan oil has become a significant alternative source of oil supply for Europe. This producer and supplier role means that Angola has become an international player to be reckoned with in energy politics and has strong implications for its strategic significance.
First, high oil prices and favourable contractual conditions with oil companies have considerably enriched Angola and its elite, making it one of the wealthiest states in Africa, able to pay off its debts, to be self-sustainable in its macro-economic governance, to support regional and multilateral organisations of which it is a member, and to invest abroad.
Second, oil revenues allow Angola to make its own foreign policy choices and adopt autonomous policy stances and, by doing so, to influence the course of African international relations.
Third, investment opportunities in the country’s oil (but also non-oil) sector make the country an attractive place in which to invest and to be employed, in a context of economic downturn in Europe where industrial and services investment opportunities have become highly competitive and markets are often saturated.
Angola as an opportunity
Today’s Angola reflects changes on the African continent, some parts of which should now be primarily regarded as areas of opportunity for Europeans. With an impressive growth rate (although mostly due to oil exports and not to actual economic diversification), political stability, huge economic potential and real investment opportunities (provided investors adjust to local conditions), the country presents many opportunities for increased engagement from the European private sector.
Successful business experiences of large and smaller European companies and Angolan expectations of further investments show that there is a lot of scope to capitalise on lucrative economic and business opportunities in this country, in a truly win-win manner.
In addition to oil and diamonds, there are other raw materials in Angola that are still to be explored. The infrastructure sector needs to be developed further. Education and vocational training are one of the weakest points of Angolan society, which has suffered from several decade-long conflicts: the country desperately needs skilled workers and technicians in all sectors and at all levels. There is a strong agricultural and agro-industrial potential in Angola. The six European countries already represented in Angola know it well and have been proactive (often in competition with each other) in promoting investments by private operators. But there is a lot more to be done by other European states and by the EU to encourage further investment and engagement.
Angola as a threat
Because of its increasing power, Angola may be seen as a threat to European interests for a number of reasons. First, its foreign policy is still very much influenced by Cold War and civil war politics: those European powers that supported UNITA against the currently leading MPLA are still seen as former foes and are regarded with deep mistrust at the higher level of Angolan leadership; European political and security engagement is therefore still viewed as imperialist and colonialist by the older guard of the elite. As a consequence, the Angolan foreign policy stance remains rather suspicious vis-à-vis European foreign policies and, if not engaged properly, may play a damaging role in relation to European external action, as was recently the case in the context of the Ivorian and Libyan crises. Second, because of its Cold War and civil war experience, the Angolan leadership pursues a very pragmatic and realist foreign policy line favouring primarily bilateral relations with nation states. Relations with multilateral organisations are not a priority, probably because of a lack of knowledge and limited understanding of their potential. In the case of the EU, this was demonstrated at the end of the civil war when the MPLA refused to comply with EU conditionality. In practice, this has led to foreign policy being conducted bilaterally with individual European countries, largely to the detriment of EU external action, coordination among Member States and EU diplomatic culture.
Third, the Angolan leadership’s sensitivity to its own international image and profile has led to uncomfortable situations where certain European states have suffered from superficial and temporary but nevertheless damaging tensions with Angola, therefore impacting negatively on their bilateral ties. This risk could be avoided in the future if European Member States were ready to apply more solidarity and cohesion in their approach, allowing them to present a common European front against potential Angolan ‘divide and rule’ foreign policy tactics.
Angola as a battlefield of competition
Because of its strategic significance as outlined above, Angola has been courted by numerous non-European international powers including China, the US, Brazil, Russia, South Africa and Israel. This being said, those that have probably become the most closely connected to the Angolan leadership are multinational private or government-led companies. Competition in the oil sector is intense, as well as in all services related to it. While oil majors and large oil-related companies are powerful and wealthy enough to invest in the country, the same cannot be said for small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). The question of how to support and encourage European SMEs in this competitive environment is relevant, but no clear answer has been given to it so far (apart from increased national presence of commercial attachés/advisers from individual states), and it should probably be addressed more collectively by Member States.
There is a sense that early Angolan enthusiasm for Chinese engagement is being put on hold. The quality of some deliverables has been questioned, and the potentially negative consequences of large Chinese communities in Angola are now being raised almost publicly. With over 100, 000 citizens in Angola, the Chinese are now the first foreign community in the country, and not only in the capital, Luanda. It is expected that this presence will lead to new challenges for the integration of the Chinese population within Angolan society. While China has kept a rather low political and security profile in the country, it is also expected that once Beijing so decides, Chinese engagement in these domains will increase significantly.
The US have pursued a coherent strategy vis-à-vis the Gulf of Guinea as an oil supplier and it is expected that their cooperation in the security sphere will develop, for instance on maritime security.
Is the EU’s external action sufficiently focused on Angola?
The EU’s engagement in Angola has so far been rather limited. It is sometimes compared to that of some UN agencies operating in the country with low visibility, weak political weight and a small amount of funds dedicated to cooperation.
The primacy of bilateral relations at national level
A group of six Member States dominate European relations with Angola: Portugal, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK are the most prominent European powers in the country. Below some (there are many more) illustrations of national European engagement in Angola are given. It should also be noted that for historical reasons, Central and European Member States (like Poland for instance) may enjoy good relations with and understanding of Angolan governance style due to their belonging to the former Soviet bloc.
Portugal’s relationship with Angola is unique. Based on a strong interdependence derived from long historical, political, economic and human ties, the relationship between the two countries goes beyond a mere country-to-country cooperation model. To some extent, Portugal is part of Angola’s future as much as Angola is part of Portugal’s destiny. The intensity of exchanges (around 7,000 people travelling back and forth each week) is tremendous. The participation of Angolan companies in the Portuguese economy and vice versa is such that some dimensions of the two countries’ private sectors are intimately intertwined. For Portugal, this is both an asset and a weakness: it is an asset since it still has a say in the Angolan economy but it is also a weakness because any move by Portugal that displeases the Angolan government may jeopardise Portuguese business interests in Angola. Portugal is very keen to make the case for Angola’s strategic significance for the EU and would, on certain matters, benefit from the European umbrella to address certain aspect of the relationship with Angola.
Germany – and in particular its Eastern part - has a long history of involvement in the country and is not a new player. It has recently upgraded its foreign policy stance as a neutral broker and fair partner in the economic and development cooperation, emphasising the equal nature of new bilateral contacts. The visit of Chancellor Merkel in mid-July reflected a new proactive bilateral German policy towards Angola.
France has pursued a two-tier policy: at the political level, the visit of President Sarkozy in 2007 was meant to upgrade bilateral relations at all levels, but was then hampered by the Angolagate affair and subsequently by divergences over the Ivorian and Libyan crises. In parallel, economic ties through private channels have flourished. The French oil and energy company Total is about to become the first European oil investor in the country, leading to heavy French reliance on Angolan oil supplies, while other businesses are very successful.
The Netherlands are deemed to be the primary investor in Angola (probably because some major Portuguese companies are registered in Holland but also because of the large number of Dutch oil refineries) and have enjoyed a very good relationship with the country, despite a limited presence.
Responding to the changes in Angola
To some extent, European Member States have grasped the importance of the recent changes that have taken place in Angola. Their focus is now more on the economic and business-to-business side, on developing mutual trust and on offering cooperation that matches Angolan priorities. Their attitude is pragmatic and follows the Angolan tendency to favour state-to-state bilateral relations. It has however to be recognised that political stability and the opening of democratic space in the country will depend on the way the country manages the post-dos Santos phase when the current president leaves the political scene. So far, the country’s political and economic life are still dominated by a centralised oligarchy that has left very little space for fundamental political, social and economic rights. Freedom of expression is still a matter of concern, especially in the field of the new media. New constitutional provisions on freedom of gathering have already led to unprecedented – although not very visible – civil society protests. The MPLA is increasingly split internally and fierce debates are taking place behind the scenes. This governance challenge will culminate with the holding of parliamentary elections in 2012 and will also have to be addressed by Europeans.
Thinking and acting European
There seems to be a huge gap between the degree of Member States’ new bilateral engagement with Angola and the potential for upgraded relations at European level, the two channels being without doubt, as has been shown in all parts of the world, mutually beneficial. So far, Member States have had the lion’s share of engagement with Angola while the EU (with the Commission and the EEAS) has kept a rather low profile.
Things seem to be changing steadily with the new Head of Delegation’s efforts to encourage more team spirit among European heads of mission and taking initiatives for collective action, for instance on visa policies or with a joint visit to Cabinda in late July 2011. The arrival of a new EEAS political adviser in the delegation is also expected to boost the EU’s diplomatic profile in the country, in close coordination with the Member States. Thinking and acting European will probably have to start in- country with concerted efforts by key embassies in Luanda and the will to boost the profile of the EU in Angola.
Challenges facing EU-Angola relations
The perceptions and trust challenge
The memory of the EU’s failure to seize the opportunity to engage in deeper cooperation with Angola in 2002 in the wake of the civil war is still very prominent in the minds of the Angolan leadership, which seems to still bear some kind of resentment towards the EU. This grievance is clearly a hurdle that needs to be addressed at the highest European political level. Some wounds need to be healed and a new basis for trustful relationships needs to be established. The first challenge is therefore very much symbolic and psychological and should be addressed at a human and political level to re-establish trust with the Angolan president.
The knowledge challenge
The second challenge relates to the lack of knowledge about Angola among Member States and EU bodies. Because of the civil war, relations have for long been limited and exchanges with the country have been virtually non-existent: there has always been limited media coverage of Angola, a limited direct diplomatic presence and very little Angolan immigration to Europe, apart from Portugal and, to a much lesser extent, France. This is also true for the Angolans who, because of linguistic ties, have been exclusively oriented towards contacts with Portugal, Brazil and other Portuguese-speaking countries, as well as more recently the United States. European visa policies have remained very strict for Angolan citizens, even when they are part of the wealthy and skilled elite. As a result, there is almost no mutual knowledge and affinity on a broad scale between Angolans and Europeans. This is also reflected in parliaments and political elites on both sides. Without upgraded people-to-people exchanges and enhanced communication and outreach policies, mutual knowledge will remain poor.
The political dialogue challenge
Closely related to the issue of trust and knowledge, the biggest challenge for the EU in Angola is to establish a sustained and equal political dialogue equivalent to the one set up with Nigeria and South Africa, and as ambitious as those existing in the framework of the EU’s strategic partnerships. However, one should bear in mind that without increased trust and knowledge, this dialogue will not be accepted by the Angolan leadership, and therefore will not take off the ground. The prospect of 2012 parliamentary elections is also an opportunity to deepen dialogue on governance and election monitoring.
The MPLA has slowly embarked on a set of reforms in its foreign policy making structures (new minister, new ambassadors, improved training for diplomats etc.) but its civil war mindset vis-à-vis Europe will have to be replaced by new foreign policy strategies, doctrines and outlook. Member States can certainly accompany Angola along this path, as much as the EU, provided appropriate behaviour and attitudes are followed. One of the biggest challenges for Europeans to develop a political dialogue will be to overcome Angolan post-liberation pride, anti-colonial and anti-imperialist feelings, civil war mistrust and what some call ‘petro-arrogance’.
The framework for such political dialogue is already on the negotiating table. A ‘Joint Way Forward’ document has been prepared by the EU and Angola and is under examination at the presidential level in Angola, where it seems to be pending for decision, probably for the reasons mentioned above regarding Angolan foreign policy and memories of the civil war era, but also due to Member States’ choice to prioritise bilateral ties.
Recommendations
Against this background and on the basis of interviews conducted in Luanda in mid-July 2011, the following recommendations could be made to the Member States and the EEAS to upgrade EU relations with Angola:
- The EU should consider the organisation of reciprocal official visits at the appropriate level to finalise the ‘Joint Way Forward’ with Angola.
- The EU delegation in Luanda should be beefed up to implement the ‘Joint Way Forward’ effectively and Member States’ embassies should appoint staff who are used to close EU-wide coordination.
Although the following proposals are or could be included in the ‘Joint Way Forward’ document, some planning could already be started by relevant stakeholders:
- In general terms, Angola should be put on the agenda of the Africa Working Group (COAFR) more regularly to address questions related to internal governance but also multilateral issues on which the EU is competent, like for instance climate change or trade negotiations.
- The EU should get ready to send an electoral observation mission to Angola for the forthcoming elections in 2012 and start engaging with the Angolan government on this issue.
- The EU should consider a favourable and tailor-made visa regime for Angola, on the model of the one signed with the US allowing citizens from both countries to obtain 2 year-long visas.
- The EU should create a large EU-wide exchange and studies programme (including vocational training) to reach a quantitative target (for instance 3,000 a year) of Angolan students or postgraduates to come and study in Europe.
- The EU should develop a more ambitious cultural presence to develop language training in Angola in order to diversify the knowledge of European languages. This could be done together with EUNIC (European Union National Institutes for Culture), the EEAS, the DG EAC and DG DEVCO in the European Commission
- Member States should be more proactive in developing their coordination to encourage, support and protect European investments from medium and small competitor companies in Angola. This could for instance be done through the drafting of a joint options paper considering various initiatives like a European-Angolan chamber of commerce or other more pragmatic and less bureaucratic formats.
- The EU should negotiate with Angola the possibility of conducting a nation-wide assessment that would help the country to identify EU instruments and other international tools and resources to develop a strategy for economic diversification.